Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

251. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:: Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

252. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:: Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

253. China Maritime Report No. 44: Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng's Downfall Amid Increasing PLAN Readiness

Author:: Christopher Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Although corruption runs deep in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and across China’s armed forces, disciplinary-related removals appear not to have a major impact on naval capabilities or operations. The fight against corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has General Secretary Xi Jinping’s attention and appears to be picking up steam for 2025. The Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a report on 25 December 2024 identifying Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) as one of eight NPC deputies removed for “serious violations of discipline and the law.” Li was an officer on the fast track and identified early in his career by PLA press as one to watch. He had the unprecedented distinction of having command of two separate Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort task force deployments, extensive international maritime experience, and involvement in some of the PLAN’s most significant international navy accomplishments. Li’s career and his operations in the Mediterranean Sea had the personal attention of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi. Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng replaced Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) as the Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Navy roughly a year ago. Admiral Ju suffered Admiral Li’s same fate. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a revealing dataset to analyze the impact of sacking the commander, and of corruption more broadly, on PLAN operational capabilities and how they affect the force. The PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper. Regardless of corruption’s pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.
Topic:: Corruption, Leadership, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Ju Xinchun, Southern Theater Command, and Readiness
Political Geography:: China and Asia

254. China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy's Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects

Author:: Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Hospital Ship
Political Geography:: China and Asia

255. Come and (Re)discover China: Staunchly Patriotic, Sincerely Religious, and Eager to Further Engage with the World

Author:: Bart Dessein
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: While elderly women and men are happily singing and dancing on the shores of Hangzhou’s famous West Lake, grandparents are taking their grandchildren out for a stroll and a boat trip on the lake. Buddhist monasteries in the vicinity of Ningbo, a coastal city south of Shanghai that has recently been elevated to a ‘new first-tier city,’ are teeming with monks who have retreated from every-day life and devote themselves to the word of the Buddha. On a daily basis, tens of thousands of ordinary citizens visit Putuoshan, an insular sanctuary just off the coast of Ningbo, devoted to Avalokitesvara, the Buddhist god(ess) of compassion. In a small place in the neighborhood of Ningbo, the local monastery has newly built the ‘Avalokitesvara’s Dharma-world,’ a temple complex in full marble, ornamented with precious stones and gold leaf, venerating the same Buddhist god(ess). Also in early morning Beijing, hundreds of people are queuing up, waiting for the gates of the Lama temple to open, so that they can enter to pay their respect to the Buddhist deities. Meanwhile, the number of European tourists – despite the extended visa free travel possibilities of up to one month for many European citizens – can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even in cities such as Shanghai where, judging from the attendance in the breakfast room of an international hotel, the foreign guests are of Indian or Near-Eastern descent, and where shops that have closed down business and commercial spaces for rent in newly built high-rise buildings catch the eye. Also in Hangzhou (equally a new first-tier city), top-end restaurants and small street stalls alike are waiting for customers. This picture is repeated in Anyang, a provincial town in Henan Province, where waitresses and waiters brave the freezing cold to lure customers into their restaurants.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nationalism, Religion, and Tourism
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

256. Summits and Sanctions, War and Peace: Is the EU Still in the Game?

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: As I set out for Beijing in early July, to teach my annual summer course on grand strategy and great powers, I knew in advance what all my Chinese interlocutors would make fun of: Mark Rutte’s and Donald Trump’s embarrassing “Daddy moment” at the NATO Summit in The Hague, epitomising European subservience to the United States. While I was still in Beijing, the EU-China Summit produced the expected non-result. That didn’t seem to bother my Chinese contacts, or so they pretended. And shortly after returning to Brussels, Ursula von der Leyen and Trump announced the EU-US trade deal – a bad deal whose main merit is that it avoided an even worse one. Even the EU’s claim to be a strong and unified economic player, as opposed to its often divided diplomatic and military posture, begins to sound hollow. One has to wonder: is the EU still in the game of great power politics?
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Grand Strategy, Trade, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China and Europe

257. Stepping up Engagement in the Sahel: Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have strategically realigned and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long, 13,000 troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense partnership with the US. In a second wave of expulsion, yet different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024. This recent expulsion of Western and multilateral partners has been accompanied by a turn by Sahelian states to old and new, predominantly authoritarian, actors. This shift reflects an effort by the military regimes to project independence, diversify their partners and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Traditional partners like China and Russia have intensified economic and security relationships with their Sahelian partners during the past few years, while newer partners like Turkey and the Gulf states have increased their presence and influence in the region through infrastructure projects, arms exports and natural resource deals. At the same time, the exit by the AES states from the regional organisation ECOWAS has resulted in both new partnerships and new tensions among member states, profoundly reshaping the regional landscape. This article, the second in a two-part series examining the security and political context in the Sahel, explores these evolving partnerships with non-Western actors, focusing in particular on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It examines the broader lines of cooperation and engagement by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states and identifies both similarities and important differences in their approaches. The aim is to provide a clearer overview of the Sahel’s shifting international relationships and to deepen our understanding of the dynamics, tensions and strategic choices among non-Western partners. differences and tensions between the non-Western partners. With a growing number of external actors competing for influence in the Sahel, Europe must base its recalibrated (re)engagement on a solid understanding of these dynamics.
Topic:: Politics, Coup, Engagement, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, Asia, Sahel, and Gulf Nations

258. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:: Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

259. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

260. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

261. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

262. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:: Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

263. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:: Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

264. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

265. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

266. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:: Tanner Greer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

267. Partners or Rivals? Areas of Convergence and Divergence of Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Alexander Korolev and Thomas J. Shattuck
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China announced that their friendship had “no limits” and “no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in 2022.[1] That summit between President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping occurred before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the two leaders have since doubled down on their cooperation and partnerships. However, the limits of their “no limits” partnership have not necessarily been tested, particularly within the context of the Indo-Pacific region. How close are the two countries’ priorities and interests in the Indo-Pacific? Are the two partners or prospective rivals? Do their interests converge or diverge? The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s report series for the US European Command’s Russia Strategic Initiative has utilized the instruments of statecraft to analyze the interests, influence, and relationships of Moscow and Beijing across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The first report provided a general overview of the strengthening of the bilateral relationship and specific and joint interests in the region. The second report focused specifically on China’s diplomatic, military, and economic interests across the Indo-Pacific region and gave Moscow’s perspectives on these interests. The third report homed in on the two countries’ relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the prospect of the three forming a trilateral axis, concluding that such an arrangement is unlikely to occur. The fourth report analyzed Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examined how China perceived it. This report seeks to bring the elements of the series together and provide a forward-looking approach to Moscow and Beijing’s foreign policy trajectory in the Indo-Pacific region. It will first analyze how there is a systemic convergence of joint interests at the global level. Given the context of the Ukraine war and a general Western anti-China push, the two countries and their interests are quite close at the systemic level. However, at the regional level, some divergences emerge in the security and economic realms. Russia’s historic relationships with Vietnam and India, in particular, could put Moscow and Beijing at odds, and the negative historical memories and economic imbalances of their own relationship have the potential to create new cleavages among their populations and hinder alignment formation. The report will then attempt to investigate the future trajectories of the bilateral relationship and where convergences and divergences may emerge. While specific tensions may erupt at the regional level, such as those related to a greater Russian defense presence in Southeast Asia or a Taiwan conflict, the deep structural interests and convergences will likely prevail.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

268. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:: Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

269. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

270. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:: Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

271. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:: Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

272. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:: Nury Turkel
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

273. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:: WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

274. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:: Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

275. Five Ways to Bolster the US Semiconductor Ecosystem Under the Trump Administration

Author:: Jason Hsu
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: As the United States seeks to strengthen its semiconductor industry—a national security imperative amid rising competition with China—the next four years will be crucial. Policymakers and industry professionals need a comprehensive strategy to build on the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore this critical supply chain. This policy memo examines Washington’s past and present approaches to semiconductor policy and provides recommendations for the United States to secure a sustainable and successful ecosystem at a time of intensifying US-China technology competition.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

276. Multi-Pole-arity: How Poland can help Europe think big on China

Author:: Alicja Bachulska
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: China’s strategic approach to its industrial policy—particularly its trade surplus and dominance in clean technologies—is a growing risk to Europe’s competitiveness and economic security. Like many other European states, Poland prefers to focus on the bilateral dimension of its relationship with China. But the scale of China’s economic threat means the EU’s only hope is to address it as a unified bloc. Poland should use its growing leadership role in the EU to help shift the bloc towards a more assertive China policy using the available tools. As it confronts the prospect of a trade war with the US, the EU cannot afford vulnerability to China. But first, Warsaw will need to recalibrate its own policies by grasping the realities of its trade relationship with China and assessing its vulnerabilities: investments, critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Topic:: Agriculture, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

277. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

278. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

279. 50 Years of Relationship: Looking to the Future

Author:: CEBRI
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: In 2024, Brazil and China celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations, marked by friendship, cooperation, and shared aspirations for the future. Over this period, the bilateral relationship has evolved from a predominantly trade-based partnership into a comprehensive strategic partnership, encompassing themes such as innovation, sustainability, and global governance. Among these agendas, sustainable development plays a central role, serving as a reference point for understanding the future paths of cooperation. In this context, CEBRI has gathered the main reflections from the China Analysis Group, an initiative carried out in partnership with BOCOM BBM, as well as from the events organized to mark the 50th anniversary of Sino-Brazilian relations. The publication highlights three priority areas for the future agenda: sustainable development, the digital economy, and strategic areas for deepening the bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Trade, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

280. Transición Geopolítica Global: Conectividad, Competición y Fragmentación. Introducción

Author:: Soledad Segoviano and Antonio Marquina
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Este número especial de la Revista UNISCI se centra en una de las cuestiones relvantes de la trasnformación que está aconteciendo en el sistema internacional, la transformación geopolítica y la rivalidad creciente entre Estados. Se puede decir que el orden internacional creado tras la segunda guerra mundial y reforzado tras el fin de la guerra fría se está disipando en medio de una profunda división y fragmentación geopolítica.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Space, Strategic Competition, BRICS, Connectivity, International Order, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, United States of America, and Global South

281. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:: Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:: Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

282. Cyber Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific: Navigating Digital Potential and Cyber Peril

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri, Lisa Curtis, Janet Egan, Morgan Peirce, Elizabeth Whatcott, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific faces a cyber crossroads. Down one path lies deeper military, intelligence, and economic ties between Washington and its key allies and partners in this strategically vital region. Down another, rising cyber threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Russia, and a growing shadow industry of cybercriminals and hacktivists derail these ambitions by compromising critical infrastructure, weakening data security, and undermining democratic institutions. The outcome will depend on the choices Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners make—or fail to make—in the coming years. The U.S.-China rivalry has long extended to the cyber domain, but in recent years, Beijing has increasingly exploited the gray zone of cyberspace to test, probe, and push other nations as part of a broader campaign to gain influence and shape regional norms and power structures.1 In recent years, the PRC has sharply escalated its cyber aggression in a dangerous new game that combines traditional operations focused on espionage, intellectual property theft, and data exfiltration with newly assertive disinformation, influence operations, and pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Adding to the uncertainty, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could further tilt the balance toward offense in cyberspace in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways. Against this backdrop, Indo-Pacific governments have taken historic steps to strengthen their resilience in a cyber landscape that has grown more varied, volatile, and dangerous than ever. To assess how Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners are navigating this cyber crossroads, the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and Indo-Pacific Security Program led a year-long research project that combined extensive desk research with in-person field research and expert workshops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This report draws on this research to offer in-depth assessments of the cyber landscapes in all four countries to identify key trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience in partnership with the United States. The findings offer cause for both optimism and concern. On the one hand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have all undergone notable shifts in elevating cybersecurity as foundational to national security. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy made cybersecurity a pillar for the first time, and the government has passed reforms to facilitate information sharing with the United States and shift toward active cyber defense.2 South Korea updated its National Cybersecurity Strategy to adopt a Defend Forward cyber posture, mirroring the U.S. shift in 2018.3 Taiwan established a National Institute of Cybersecurity within its Ministry of Digital Affairs, and the Executive Yuan approved a four-year plan to boost digital resilience.4 The Philippines finalized a five-year National Cybersecurity Plan.5 For its part, the United States has elevated cybersecurity in its foreign policy with expanded information sharing, capacity building, and diplomacy anchored in a new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy within the U.S. Department of State. Recent years have seen Washington both strengthen its proactive cyber capacities and embrace a “name and shame” approach to call out malign cyber operations from foreign adversaries like Russia and the PRC. Still, these laudable efforts to bolster cyber policies, personnel, and partnerships have failed to keep pace with rising threats. Washington’s finger-wagging statements and targeted sanctions in the wake of cyber incidents have failed to stem rising threats. To confront growing cyber dangers across the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its partners need a more assertive and coordinated approach that intensifies efforts on two fronts: (1) building capacity within each country to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience, and (2) strengthening cooperation to enable more integrated, proactive cyber defense, collective signaling, and cost inflicting on malign cyber actors. To that end, this report offers recommendations to government leaders in the United States, along with both country-specific and cross-cutting recommendations for government leaders in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Although many of the recommendations directed toward the four countries could fairly apply to the United States, strengthening domestic cybersecurity and resilience is beyond the scope of this report. Summary of Recommendations
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

283. Global Compute and National Security: Strengthening American AI Leadership Through Proactive Partnerships

Author:: Janet Egan
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The current pathway to breakthrough artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities relies on amassing and leveraging vast “compute”—specialized chips housed within massive data centers that generate the computational power to train, enhance, and deploy advanced models. If current AI development trends continue, securing and extending U.S. access to a robust compute ecosystem will play a decisive role in whether the United States leads the world in AI or cedes its leadership to competitors. The nation that leads in deploying compute worldwide will wield critical leverage over the rules and norms governing its use. Most importantly, U.S. leadership can crowd out China’s expanding sphere of technology influence and ensure the AI transition is underpinned by trusted democratic technologies. This goal necessitates a strategy with two key components: maintaining U.S. control of the most capable compute infrastructure in the world to ensure leadership at the AI frontier, while simultaneously providing subfrontier levels of compute to partners around the world. Recent advances in AI efficiency, as demonstrated by Chinese AI models like DeepSeek-R1, have not negated the fundamental importance of compute for AI leadership.1 The nation with the most robust compute ecosystem will retain key advantages: the ability to train the most advanced systems, enhance and deploy those systems at scale, and run the experiments necessary to drive new breakthroughs in model efficiency and training.2 These advantages are likely to generate a self-reinforcing cycle of AI development, making it increasingly difficult for other nations to close the gap. If current technical trends hold, and as chip export controls increasingly hinder China’s capabilities, the AI capability gap between the United States and China should widen. However, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Washington’s efforts to protect America’s AI leadership have relied heavily on controlling the export of advanced AI chips. Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment going to China were imposed as early as 2019, followed by AI chip export controls targeting U.S. adversaries in 2022, which were strengthened in 2023, 2024, and 2025.3 In January 2025, the Biden administration’s Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion went a step further, placing caps on compute exports to most countries in the world.4 While now rescinded, this unprecedented action sent a clear signal to other nations that the United States is willing and able to control AI compute access. However, a heavily protectionist approach faces challenges. Abroad, chip smuggling has provided China with illegal access to advanced chips, eroding the U.S. lead.5 At home, permitting and regulatory constraints threaten to limit America’s ability to meet the energy demand for large-scale AI data centers and chip fabrication. Nondemocratic countries that possess the regulatory flexibility, capital, and readily available energy now seek to rapidly build frontier-scale AI data centers, with the potential to surpass the United States’ own compute ecosystem, absent adequate safeguards. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing investments in its compute capacity could eventually create a viable alternative supply chain beyond U.S. control, while growing concerns over reliance on U.S. technology among traditional partners may fuel demand for non-U.S. compute offerings.
Topic:: Partnerships, Leadership, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

284. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC

Author:: Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

285. Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition

Author:: Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: International politics is undergoing a period of rapid, significant change. China and Russia are working together more closely and alongside Iran and North Korea in opposition to what they view as a U.S.-dominated international order.1 The current U.S. administration has in its early days pursued a form of upheaval, altering key policies, relationships, and arrangements. Policymakers in Washington represent a mix: Some see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, while others argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense. In contrast to broad, vague notions of what constitutes international order, five concrete pillars have benefited the United States over recent decades. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest; the global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase; the financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises; the nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and the human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere. Despite the many doubts about them, these core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans. As a result, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. Policymakers should work with allies and against adversaries in this attempt, focusing on six “global swing states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of these countries is multi-aligned and determined to maintain ties with the United States, Russia, and China. They all seek to reform existing rules and institutions. Together, they possess the geopolitical weight to sway the future of global order. This report offers a multifaceted path for engaging with global swing states, aiming U.S. policy at a vision of world order favorable to American interests and values. Informed by more than a year of research and consultations, it offers a set of cross-cutting and country-specific policy recommendations.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

286. The Axis of Upheaval: Gauging the Growing Military Cooperation Among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a critical catalyst for cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—what the authors call the “axis of upheaval.” Already, defense cooperation between these countries has enabled Russian aggression against Ukraine, increased their military capabilities in ways that make each country a more formidable threat, emboldened their more brazen and destabilizing actions, and magnified gray zone actions against the United States and its allies. Although much of this cooperation occurs bilaterally among specific dyads of the axis, that cooperation is increasingly beneficial to the overall group. Russian advancements on the battlefield in Ukraine and experience in modern warfare, for example, are diffusing to each axis country. Iranian drone technology now flows through Russia to North Korea and China, and Russian defense officials frequently travel from one axis capital to the next, creating connectivity among multiple members of the axis that would not otherwise exist. The cooperation among the axis of upheaval will persist, despite some claims that Russia’s and China’s limited support for Iran amid Israeli and U.S. strikes spell the end of their ties. China, Iran, and North Korea deliberated for months on the sidelines of Russia’s war before moving to more fully support Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China gave little more than its diplomatic support to the Kremlin in the first months after Russia’s invasion, and it was nearly six months until public reports documented the arrival of Iran’s drones in Russia. While these countries are reticent to incur unnecessary costs on behalf of their partners, they will seek out opportunities to support one another, especially in ways that help them withstand Western pressure. The incentives fueling their cooperation have not changed since Israel’s actions against Iran, and, if anything, Russia, China, and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Tehran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States and create policy dilemmas for Washington.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

287. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Kenya

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The third case study focuses on Kenya. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing U.S. and Kenyan policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Kenya’s digital ecosystem. It assesses the effectiveness of China’s DSR campaign vis-à-vis U.S. and allied efforts to align Kenya’s digital ecosystem with theirs in a way that advances U.S. security, economic interests, and values.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Digital Silk Road (DSR), and Digital Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, and China

288. Quad: The Next Phase

Author:: Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

289. China in Iraq

Author:: Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

290. The First 90 Days of Trump 2.0

Author:: Rachel Tausenfreund, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Claudia Schmucker, Aylin Matlé, and Stefan Meister
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This report examines the first 90 days of the Trump 2.0 administration and offers strategic recommendations for the new German government and its partners in Europe and beyond. DGAP experts analyze the administration’s priorities and methods across key policy areas and explore how best to respond. The opening chapter outlines the ideological foundations of Trump’s new coalition and their foreign policy implications, concluding with key insights and policy takeaways.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Migration, Science and Technology, Trade, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

291. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:: Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:: GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

292. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:: Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

293. Russia and China in Central Asia’s Technology Stack

Author:: Dylan Welch
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Central Asia’s role as a geopolitical battleground among Russia, China, Europe, and the United States has grown in recent years as Western countries seek trade and digital connectivity routes that bypass Russian infrastructure. While Western discourse on a “Middle Corridor” through Central Asia has focused on railways, ports and pipelines, China’s Digital Silk Road is quietly reshaping the region’s digital landscape and deepening strategic dependencies on Beijing. At the same time, Central Asian governments are drawing primarily on PRC technologies and Russian regulatory models to strengthen their own digital authoritarian regimes, risking joint domination by the increasingly aligned governments in Beijing and Moscow. China’s increasing control over the region’s “technology stack” could have an outsized impact on the future of digital connectivity, cybersecurity, and geopolitical competition across Eurasia. Russia’s regulatory influence on the region’s governments could shape digital governance norms across Eurasia. For Central Asian actors and Western policymakers invested in preserving the region’s strategic autonomy, it is crucial to understand these vulnerabilities and offer viable alternatives in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Ensuring a resilient and diversified digital landscape in Central Asia is therefore not only a regional concern but a vital issue for global security. This report seeks to shed light on the influence of Russia and China on the ICT sectors of three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It uses the “technology stack” method adapted from two previous reports by GMF’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) on the future internet and the digital information stack released in 2020 and 2022. The framework is used to examine one country’s presence in and penetration of another country’s technology and regulatory ecosystem. The analysis of the resulting dependencies provides an indicative, rather than exhaustive overview of Russia and China’s technological footprint in Central Asia, offering key examples and highlighting areas where policymakers can focus their attention with the goal to de-risk digital technologies and governance in Central Asia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

294. U.S. and Chinese Dual Citizen Engineer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Missile Launch and Detection Technology

Author:: Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: During and shortly after his employment at a large U.S. defense contractor, a Chinese-US dual citizen downloaded thousands of export-controlled and proprietary files from the company’s secure server onto multiple hard drives, some of which remain at large. The files included manufacturing specifications and test results for two sophisticated types of sensors used for space-based detection and tracking of threats, suitable for tracking ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The files included assembly designs and engineering specifications for a specialized vacuum-sealed, cooling enclosure to further protect the radiation-hardened sensors in space. While it is not explicitly stated that he acted at the direction of the Chinese government, it appears likely that Gong intended to utilize the information he stole to benefit the Chinese military.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Missile Defense, Exports, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

295. Leveraging the Gaps in Russia and China’s Complex Relations with Iran

Author:: Richard Nephew
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Far from signaling a strong trilateral alliance, their history of often transactional cooperation reveals strategic gaps that Washington can leverage to help curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For all the hoopla that preceded it, the trilateral China-Iran-Russia meeting on Tehran’s nuclear program did not appear to generate anything of great significance. The joint statement issued after the March 15 Beijing gathering largely echoed previous such documents, from condemning “unlawful unilateral sanctions” against Iran to reiterating a mutual desire for a diplomatic solution. That said, the mere act of holding the meeting may have been the objective, to signal to the world that the three countries stand together. This show of unity could have immediate practical effects given the partial expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2025—including the “snapback” provision that permits the UN to reimpose full sanctions on Iran if a JCPOA participant triggers the mechanism. At the same time, the three governments still have diverging historical and strategic interests on a range of issues—differences that will not dissipate just because they hold a joint meeting and share friction with the United States. If Washington hopes to exploit these fault lines, however, it must properly understand them.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

296. Setting Up the Next Phase of U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation

Author:: Noam Raydan
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: With the U.S. point man on energy development touring the Gulf and Chinese and Russian nuclear initiatives on the rise, the Trump administration should consider how best to replicate the responsible Emirati model elsewhere in the region. To kick off his first official tour of the Middle East, U.S. energy secretary Chris Wright arrived in the United Arab Emirates this week, where he has been meeting with key stakeholders and is expected to make a timely visit to the Barakah civil nuclear power plant in al-Dhafra. The plant visit comes amid growing global enthusiasm about nuclear energy, both to meet decarbonization targets and to address tech company plans for more data centers and artificial intelligence initiatives that require substantial amounts of nonstop power. Yet Wright also has an opportunity to underscore the importance of solid nuclear policy in a region where such technology is usually associated with proliferation risks.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

297. China Flexes Its Soft Power in the KRI

Author:: Winthrop Rodgers and Sardar Aziz
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, signs of Chinese soft power are increasingly visible to residents of an area with longstanding ties to the United States. As the world’s largest nation without a state of their own, Kurdish politicians in Iraq have long prioritized robust and visible relationships with foreign powers as a means to ensure the leaders and interests of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region (KRI) remain relevant amid changing geopolitical tides. For foreign governments, this welcoming atmosphere provides an opportunity to nurture the green shoots of soft power, often in the most ordinary ways. Given the longstanding role of U.S. foreign aid in the KRI, Chinese soft power efforts and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG)’s response may provide a bell weather for how other longstanding U.S. allies respond to the shift in American attitudes towards aid and its attendant soft power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, United States of America, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

298. Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Integrating Whole-of-Government and Nation Approaches in the Philippines

Author:: Ivy Ganadillo
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The Philippines faces mounting challenges in its maritime domain. This includes geopolitical tensions, criminal activities, environmental degradation, and socio-economic vulnerabilities in coastal communities. Institutional fragmentation and outdated policies further complicate these issues by hindering effective governance. To address these pressing concerns, revising and modernizing the National Maritime Security Policy and Strategy (NMSPP) is more than an administrative necessity. It is a strategic imperative. This policy overhaul can serve as the foundation for safeguarding maritime sovereignty, fostering innovation in ocean-based industries, and ensuring the sustainability of the Philippines’ critical marine ecosystems. As an archipelagic nation with over 7,600 islands, the Philippines’ strategic location amplifies its vulnerability to maritime challenges. Competing territorial claims in the West Philippine/South China Sea strain limited resources, while illegal fishing, marine pollution, piracy, smuggling, and human trafficking are just some of the many threats that pose risks to both national security and livelihoods. The NMSPP, previously known as the National Marine Policy (NMP), was designed as a framework for integrating maritime issues into the national agenda. However, it has struggled to keep pace with evolving realities. In 2024, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. issued Executive Order No. 57 (EO 57), which renamed and reorganized the National Coast Watch System into the National Maritime Council (NMC), reflecting the administration’s intent to unify governance. However, realizing this vision demands a comprehensive update to the NMSPP.
Topic:: Governance, Geopolitics, Maritime, Vulnerability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Philippines, and Indo-Pacific

299. The Winds of Change: How China's Focus on Rare Earth Minerals Reshapes the World

Author:: Ian Murphy and Kevin Johnston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article examines how rare earth minerals and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic dominance in the global economy affect U.S. national security. The PRC’s near monopoly on rare earth processing and its use of export controls as leverage pose significant risks to global supply chains and U.S. national security interests. This analysis explores contemporary PRC strategies in the rare earth sector and their implications for U.S. national security by explaining how the PRC’s view of international cooperation differs from the United States’ view. In essence, the PRC is using the transition to renewable energy to pursue its broader security goals and enhance its position in the global power hierarchy. Furthermore, the article offers policy recommendations aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring the secure and sustainable supply of resources critical to U.S. interests.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

300. Recent U.S. Government Policy Literature on Critical and Strategic Minerals

Author:: Bert Chapman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Critical and strategic minerals have become increasingly important in U.S. government civilian and military policymaking in recent years. This is demonstrated by the heavy use of such minerals in many critical civilian and military infrastructures. This work will discuss how this subject has been addressed in laws, presidential documents, and works by government agencies along with congressional oversight committees and support agencies. It will stress how the United States is heavily dependent on strategic minerals from adversarial foreign countries such as China and will examine U.S. efforts to increase its ability to produce such materials in the United States by reforming permitting processes. It will conclude with recommendations for the United States to enhance its ability to produce these materials domestically and acquire them from reliable foreign sources. The conclusion will also suggest ways that the president and federal agency stakeholders can enhance public awareness of this problem and their efforts to rectify it.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Information, Critical Minerals, and Permitting
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS