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101. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics

Author:
Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
Topic:
International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

102. Cambio Climático y Transición Energética: Una Transformación Geopolítica en Marcha

Author:
Xira Ruiz
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo analiza la dimensión geopolítica del cambio climático y de la transición energética, en un contexto internacional marcado por la rivalidad entre grandes potencias y la fragmentación del orden global. Se exploran los efectos que estas transformaciones generan en la reconfiguración de las interdependencias materiales, el acceso a recursos críticos y la redefinición de la seguridad energética. El texto se centra especialmente en el papel de Estados Unidos, China y la Unión Europea, así como en las implicaciones para el Sur Global. También analiza el desplazamiento del liderazgo climático desde los marcos multilaterales tradicionales hacia nuevas formas de diplomacia orientadas a la competencia por el liderazgo tecnológico y el control de cadenas de valor. El artículo concluye que la transición energética implica una reorganización estratégica de las relaciones internacionales, que genera nuevas formas de dependencia, redefine las prioridades de seguridad y plantea desafíos para la equidad global y la gobernanza compartida.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Energy Transition, Energy Security, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Global South

103. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

104. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Saudi Arabia

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The fourth case study focuses on Saudi Arabia. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team traveled to the country to interview U.S. and Saudi policymakers, personnel in technology firms, members of civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Saudi Arabia’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

105. Understanding China’s New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa

Author:
Jason Warner
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, Foreign Influence, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

106. Ten Years of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: The Critical Assessment and Future Directions

Author:
Elżbieta Proń
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
This paper looks at how China’s use of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in its policy towards Central Asia (CA) has changed since 2013 and what this change signalizes regarding China’s use of the BRI at international forums. To answer these research questions, the paper focuses on Central Asia – once dubbed “the first strand of the BRI” (R. Pantucci); the region where China has “tested” many institutions of its international engagement; and where the BRI was introduced in 2013. To answer the research questions, this study draws from analyzing literature and sources in Russian, Chinese, English, and Polish. This study is primarily empirically oriented. This study finds that at its 10, the BRI will focus on connectivity, clean energy, and new technologies. It also finds that despite the high profile of the Green BRI and many relevant agreements, only a fraction of projects are branded “Green BRI.” It thus argues that the BRI has served as a legitimizing “umbrella” label for various Chinese policy initiatives, which are realized via other cooperation formats.
Topic:
Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Renewable Energy, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
China and Central Asia

107. The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety

Author:
Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathias Thoenig
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Risk, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

108. The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations

Author:
Krystyna Sikora and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
It is easy to dismiss foreign information operations as playing out at the national level, designed to influence federal policymakers and Beltway insiders. But these threats transcend the “Beltway Bubble”. Increasingly, foreign nation-state actors are running operations that exploit trust in local sources and impact state and local communities. US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to better target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States to destabilize the country at home and weaken it on the world stage. These nation states are increasingly exploiting domestic actors to launder and manipulate content that originates in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran and ultimately reaches American audiences who have no way of knowing they are on the receiving end of foreign information operations. They are also experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI), which, according to the US intelligence community, has allowed nation-state actors to “improve and accelerate” their operations, potentially enabling them to reach more Americans with more targeted content. Adversaries understand that state and local governments and communities are foundational to the strength of American democracy, so it is no surprise that they have targeted individuals and issues at the local level. In some cases, adversarial nations seek favorable outcomes around local policy issues; in others, they use local debates as Trojan horses to advance their broader geopolitical agendas. In others still, they attempt to influence views on the integrity of US elections and institutions or disenfranchise American citizens in specific communities to destabilize and erode trust in American democracy. But in all cases, American democratic discourse and the country’s information space—messy as they can sometimes be—are being used as primary vectors to advance foreign interests. If Americans lack that understanding, their communities—and the country—are left vulnerable. This report outlines an example of a foreign information operation targeting each of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Each case study indicates the foreign threat actor (if known) and explains the tools, tactics, and motivations for targeting Americans at the state and local level.
Topic:
Security, Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence, and Information Manipulation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

109. Media Vassalage: How Venezuela’s TeleSUR Acts as Russia’s and China’s Information- Laundering Front

Author:
Peter Benzoni
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
After a contested July presidential election in which Nicolás Maduro claimed victory with 51% of the vote—amid allegations of irregularities, limited oversight, and too few international observers—Venezuela was thrown into turmoil. The Carter Center, one of the few sanctioned observers, concluded the “election did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic.” To sustain its tenuous grip on power, Maduro’s administration must seek legitimacy from powerful allies such as Russia and China, even while attempting to mend ties with the Trump administration—an effort the latter had warmed to, then cooled on. Digital Forensic Research Lab fellow Iria Puyosa argues that authoritarian regimes across Latin America engage in cross-regional authoritarian collaboration in the form of “strategies to manipulate media and information spaces in order to undermine weak democracies … and help like-minded illiberal leaders seize and consolidate power”. For Venezuela, this manifests in its subordinate relationships with Russia and China, hinging on mutual legitimation—endorsing each other’s elections, governance practices, and policies—and strategic amplification, in which China and Russia promote their preferred narratives and national interests in Venezuela. Yet TeleSUR, Venezuela’s premier state media outlet, does not parrot Russian and Chinese lines under duress. Rather, its editorial line frequently aligns with those of these major powers due to overlapping ideological and political goals, including a shared desire for a multipolar world that counters Western influence and sanctions. This synergy allows Venezuela to secure vital international support and reinforce its domestic legitimacy, thus preserving the Maduro administration’s foothold in power. Venezuela, in turn, recreates this same patron-client relationship with its own regional allies—a dynamic we term “media vassalage.”
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Foreign Interference, and Nicolas Maduro
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South America, and Venezuela

110. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In an increasingly fractured world where authoritarianism is gaining ground, Taiwan stands as one of the strongest and most resilient democracies. Taiwan placed first in Asia and 12th globally in the 2025 democracy index compiled by the London-based Economic Intelligence Unit. This year, Freedom House ranked Taiwan as the sixth-freest country in the world with a score of 94 out of 100. These are remarkable achievements for a relatively young democracy that experienced decades of authoritarian rule, lifted martial law in 1987, and conducted its first direct presidential election in 1996. Taiwan is also an economic powerhouse. With just 23.5 million people, Taiwan has a GDP of nearly $760 billion, which puts it close to the top 20 economies of the world. Its crucial role in global technology supply chains is unquestionable, especially in semiconductor manufacturing, where Taiwanese companies produce close to 70% of the world’s chips and over 90% of the most advanced ones. Taiwan is also driving innovation and delivering state-of-the-art solutions in artificial intelligence, information technology, and renewable energy. Taiwan is a global leader in public health, including medical technology, public hygiene, and transplants. It has one of the best national health care systems in the world and among the most competitive biomedical industries. Taiwan is also among the world’s leading nations in scientific research to improve prevention and detection of diseases. Another area where Taiwan excels is in the provision of disaster preparedness and relief, both domestically and internationally. Taiwan’s government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) frequently provide aid to countries affected by disasters, donating supplies, offering financial assistance, and dispatching search and rescue teams. After Japan’s massive Tohoku earthquake in 2011, Taiwan donated over $250 million in combined aid. Following the 2023 earthquake in Türkiye, Taiwan provided financial aid along with a search-and-rescue team. Taiwan’s importance to the international community is undeniable. As a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Taiwan has demonstrated that it is a valuable and reliable partner. Yet Taiwan is largely excluded from participating in the United Nations System, including the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Kimberley Process aimed at ensuring that diamonds are not used to fund violent conflicts or undermine legitimate governments. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) actively thwarts Taiwan’s participation in international organizations by exerting pressure within those organizations and on individual member countries. The Taiwan-US-Europe Policy Program (TUPP) encourages young professionals from the United States and Europe to include Taiwan in their research and activities and help Taiwan to expand its global networks. Established in 2017, annual TUPP delegations were originally composed only of Americans, but expanded to include Europeans in 2022 in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the world. Delegation members are selected through a rigorous application process. The annual program begins in Washington, DC, where the cohort (5 Americans and 5 Europeans) meets with officials and experts, and continues with a week-long visit to Taiwan to gain firsthand exposure to Taiwan’s politics, culture, and history. Through their participation in TUPP and especially their experience in Taiwan, participants are instilled with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history, its commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order, and its potential to contribute more actively to international organizations. They also gain a deeper understanding of the importance of strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Over time, TUPP aims to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. It is my earnest hope that all the TUPP participants will be inspired to work both on and with Taiwan. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of these goals. The contributions here, written by the members of the 2025 TUPP cohort, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate greater transatlantic and global attention to Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Democracy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

111. Risky Configuration: China’s Footprint in Germany’s Technology Stack

Author:
Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Germany—just like the EU as a whole—has recognized the strategic importance of reducing unilateral dependencies in digital technologies. In the face of geopolitical threats and economic uncertainty, the new German government has vowed to strengthen the country’s technological growth and resilience. Germany confronts a changing global order, in which it faces a growing threat from Russia while traditional security guarantees under the transatlantic alliance have weakened. While the threat from Russia dominates Berlin’s immediate strategic concerns, the growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing demands that this challenge cannot be viewed in isolation. As Germany recalibrates its national security posture from a peacetime orientation to one prepared for potential war, it is crucial to address the deepening strategic ties between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as part of a broader, interconnected threat. The PRC’s growing dominance in the German technology landscape threatens both Germany’s national security and its long-term economic resilience. Germany’s new government should now make increased efforts to effectively implement its China strategy, especially in the technology sector. Reducing exposure to systemic risks and de-risking the technological ecosystem is an urgent economic need and should be a security priority. This analysis examines the digital footprint of PRC entities in Germany’s technology ecosystem. It applies a “tech stack” framework to assess this footprint and its associated risks across five technology layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. The report illustrates the PRC’s involvement within each layer, situates this engagement within the PRC’s broader strategic objectives and identifies key vulnerabilities that could undermine Germany’s security and competitiveness if left unaddressed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

112. Europe Between the United States and China

Author:
Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

113. The New Political Economy of Supply: resources, rare earths and finance

Author:
Philip Andrews-Speed
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
China is the dominant player in the global low-carbon energy transition in two respects: it has deployed the largest fleet of low-carbon electricity generation capacity in the world, and it dominates several international supply chains for clean energy minerals, metals and equipment. China has installed a massive amount of infrastructure for both solar and wind energy since 2010. The total capacity reached 1,300 GW by the end of 2024, which is more than 45% of the global total. Investment in hydro power and nuclear power also continues. These non-fossil fuels accounted for about 40% of the nation’s power generation in 2024. At the same time, the country has built up the world’s largest electric vehicle industry and is likely to take the lead in the manufacture and use of green hydrogen. This success has been built upon several foundations. Most important are the various policies of central and local government that supported investment and innovation along the clean energy supply chains over two decades or more. In the early days, this relied on technology transfer from abroad. More recently, the development of technology and manufacturing clusters have assisted scaling up and innovation, all supported by abundant and skilled human capital (Hove, 2024). All this adds credibility to Xi Jinping’s pledge to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and ‘strive for’ carbon neutrality by 2060. However, energy and fossil fuel consumption are still rising, as are carbon emissions. Coal is the main culprit as the country has large reserves, and the government sees coal as providing the foundation for energy security. Coal accounted for about 55% of power generation in 2024 and remains an important fuel in some industries. The continued increase in the use of coal will result in the peak of carbon emissions being significantly higher than might have been projected ten years ago. The good news is that the declining rate of GDP growth combined with the increasing electrification of the economy may result in emissions peaking in the next two-to-three years.
Topic:
Political Economy, Natural Resources, Finance, Carbon Emissions, Rare earth elements (REEs), and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

114. Unsolicited Thoughts on How the New Administration Can Improve American Diplomacy

Author:
Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
A country’s political leadership establishes its foreign policy goals, and its diplomatic service works to achieve them. Ideally, a country’s fundamental foreign policy goals should be so clear and compelling that they transcend specific administrations and provide enduring guidelines for carrying out the work of diplomacy. Previous post-Cold War administrations have made half-hearted, but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to do this. The new administration may want to consider these three strategic objectives: 1) create a more stable international system; 2) avoid an alliance between China and Russia; 3) decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war. These objectives are clear, compelling, and enduring. The benefits of any system adhere disproportionately to those at the top of the system. Since we are at the top of the current international system, no one has a greater interest in its stability than we do. An alliance between the other nuclear superpower and the other economic superpower would represent a clear and present danger to our preeminence. And in all likelihood, we’d all be dead after a major nuclear war. A diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives should include: 1) prioritizing US interests; 2) talking less and listening more; and 3) leading by example.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Strategic Interests, and International System
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

115. India: Strategic Partner or Global Challenger?

Author:
Keith McCormick
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
This article provides the highlights of the discussions at this year’s DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired) conference on how the US should deal with a rising India. The participants—academics, retired diplomats, and current government officials—participated on the basis of no attribution. The three panels discussed whether India can be a new strategic partner for the US in containing China; how the US. should respond to the Modi government’s increasing use of Hindu chauvinism to undermine democracy and tolerance; and what is ahead for India’s economy, including whether it will become the leader of the Global South in challenging the current, Western-dominated international trading order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, Trade, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and India

116. Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals

Author:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
The United States and its allies and partners face a two-pronged crisis. Increases in global temperatures call for the rapid expansion of critical mineral infrastructure—to include mines and refinement—if we hope to deploy the technology needed to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Meanwhile, the United States’ primary geopolitical adversary has obtained a near-monopoly position in the supply of most of these minerals. Heavy use of certain minerals in our defense-industrial base further underscores the need to reduce reliance on People’s Republic of China (PRC) supplies. Both our climate and our national security demand concerted efforts to wean us away from fossil fuels and the PRC’s market power. In the spring of 2024, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a New Global Commons working group over two meetings titled “Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals.” Working group participants represented academia, think tanks, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, bringing a broad range of experience and global perspectives to the discussions. Participants discussed definitions of critical minerals and the need for a successful green energy transition to support digital technology and fulfill 21st-century defense needs. Participants weighed the complexity of overlapping issues and how the United States and its partners might best effectively coordinate and balance these issues.
Topic:
National Security, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Mining, Energy, Green Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

117. Building on Momentum in U.S.-Turkey Relations

Author:
Soner Cagaptay
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The two leaders can use their personal rapport to solve bilateral and regional problems, but they will also face tough challenges in matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dealings with China. In the second in a series of TRANSITION 2025 memos, Soner Cagaptay explores areas for U.S. partnership with Turkey in the Middle East and beyond. After a decade of malaise, relations between the two countries have lately recovered thanks to Turkish support for Sweden’s accession to NATO, granted in return for permission to buy U.S. F-16 fighter jets. The personal magnetism between President Trump and his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could smooth the way for further cooperation in military and economic areas, and also potentially help the new U.S. administration in Ukraine and Syria. But complex challenges remain, relating not only to the Syrian conflict—where Ankara and Washington backed different actors—but also to dealings with China and affinities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. MIDDLE EAST POLICY TRANSITION 2025 by Washington Institute experts address challenges and opportunities for the Trump-Vance administration during a period of extraordinary change in the Middle East. A primary challenge will be countering Iran’s march toward the bomb. Also critical will be determining a sustainable U.S. force posture in the region and updating America’s counterterrorism mission. Opportunities, meanwhile, are suddenly ample after blows to the “axis of resistance” and include the imperative to forge a better relationship with Turkey, which is set to be an influential player in post-Assad Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

118. Saudi Public Opinion in a Changing Middle East: Great Powers, the Gaza War, Pathways for the Kingdom

Author:
Catherine Cleveland
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
China and Russia get higher marks than the United States, and Israel normalization is on hold—but respondents view Hamas negatively, want Arab involvement in the peace process, and increasingly support moderate interpretations of Islam. Recent polling in Saudi Arabia offers reasons for concern as well as optimism regarding U.S. interests. On the downside, Saudi respondents are more likely to prioritize good relations with China or Russia as opposed to America, despite a history of U.S.-Saudi strategic ties. Likewise, enthusiasm for Israel-Saudi normalization has fallen from already-low levels amid the Gaza war, although support is slightly higher for business links. More encouragingly, respondents express negative views about Hamas, growing support for an Arab role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and increasing sympathy for moderate interpretations of Islam, mirroring the trajectory of Riyadh’s official rhetoric. In this Policy Note, polling expert Catherine Cleveland offers thought-provoking analysis of surveys taken shortly before Israel’s twelve-day war with Iran. U.S. policymakers can chart a productive course, she explains, by first taking an honest look at Saudi public skepticism of bilateral ties and then promoting initiatives more likely to earn support.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Normalization, Hamas, Regional Politics, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Palestine, Gaza, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

119. Here’s How State Department Cuts Would Impede U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Author:
Ben Fishman and Elizabeth Surman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s budget cuts, intended to make America “safer, stronger, and more prosperous,” could wind up harming U.S. interests in the region while strengthening Russian and Chinese media warfare. At a time when the Middle East needs additional help managing the fallout from the war with Iran, the extreme State Department budget cuts initiated by the Trump administration are especially ill-timed. By cutting funds to partners who combat Iran’s most dangerous regional proxies, the administration risks enabling a faster rehabilitation of Tehran’s “axis of resistance.” Other cuts would limit Washington’s ability to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to Yemen, constrain efforts to reach the Iranian people, and cede ground to China and Russia in the information wars—one of the many negative repercussions of eliminating a vital network like Voice of America (VOA). The Senate has until July 18 to object to these cuts because the administration submitted its budget by means of a rescission bill, a rarely used procedure that gives Congress a limited period to respond to the administration’s proposal before it takes effect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, State Department, and Humanitarian Assistance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, and United States of America

120. Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar

Author:
Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based firms are expanding rare-earth mining in Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States by partnering with militias that lease mines, provide security, and tax exports. Satellite imagery shows a rapid increase in rare earth elements (REE) sites since 2015, turning militia-held enclaves into major suppliers of dysprosium, terbium, and other critical minerals for the PRC. As U.S.–PRC competition intensifies, Myanmar’s fragmented sovereignty enables armed groups with ties to Beijing to shape REE supply chains, complicating potential U.S. and Indian efforts to source Burmese minerals.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Natural Resources, Strategic Competition, Militias, Supply Chains, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and United States of America