Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

501. Impact of China's Emissions Trading System on Industries and its Policy Implications

Author:: Jihyun Jung
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: China, the world's largest carbon emitter and skeptical of developing countries’ emissions reduction commitments, announced internationally in 2020 its vision to peak carbon emissions in 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. China's emission reduction strategy has a significant impact on China's economy and society as a whole, and Korea, which has a close economic ties with China, will also be affected. China's carbon neutral policy announced in 2021 includes the continuous promotion of policies such as direct regulation, public investment, and subsidies, as well as the nationwide implementation of the ETS and the expansion of applicable industries. This study analyzed the impact of China's ETS on Chinese industries using the input-output model, and derived implications for Korea-China economic relations based on the results.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Economics, Trade, Industry, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

502. Increasing supply chain risks and Implications for Korea

Author:: Won Seok Choi and Hyoungmin Han
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study starts by highlighting how geopolitical factors, such as the US-China conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war, are reshaping global supply chains. The US-China conflict, marked by tariff wars and policy shifts, particularly affects key sectors like semiconductors and batteries. These conflicts reveal vulnerabilities in supply chains concentrated in specific countries and have been exacerbated by external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic. From these results, it suggests strategies for Korea in response to these global supply chain changes. These include stabilizing supply chain cooperation with the U.S. and China, strengthening connections with emerging countries, and forming multilateral or bilateral supply chain alliances.
Topic:: Conflict, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, and United States of America

503. 2023 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment

Author:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment serves as a guide for academics and practitioners in the defense community on the current challenges and opportunities in the strategic environment. This year’s publication outlines key strategic issues across the four broad themes of Regional Challenges and Opportunities, Domestic Challenges, Institutional Challenges, and Domains Impacting US Strategic Advantage. These themes represent a wide range of topics affecting national security and provide a global assessment of the strategic environment to help focus the defense community on research and publication. Strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China and the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remain dominant challenges to US national security interests across the globe. However, the evolving security environment also presents new and unconventional threats, such as cyberattacks, terrorism, transnational crime, and the implications of rapid technological advancements in fields such as artificial intelligence. At the same time, the US faces domestic and institutional challenges in the form of recruiting and retention shortfalls in the all-volunteer force, the prospect of contested logistics in large-scale combat operations, and the health of the US Defense Industrial Base. Furthermore, rapidly evolving security landscapes in the Arctic region and the space domain pose unique potential challenges to the Army’s strategic advantage.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Corruption, Migration, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Partnerships, Weapons, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, Logistics, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

504. China’s Future Military Capabilities

Author:: Roger Cliff
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America identifies China as the “pacing challenge” for the US military. This monograph examines the process by which China’s military capabilities are developed, the capabilities China’s military is seeking to acquire in the future, and the resulting implications for the US military. To date, all the extant studies have merely described the capabilities the People’s Liberation Army is currently acquiring. This monograph goes further by drawing on the Chinese military’s publications to identify and discuss the capabilities the People’s Liberation Army seeks to acquire in the future. The monograph finds China’s military is engaged in a comprehensive program to field a dominant array of military capabilities for ground, sea, air, space, and cyberspace warfare. Countering these capabilities will require the United States and its allies to engage in an equally comprehensive effort. The monograph’s findings will enable US military planners and policy practitioners to understand the long-term goals of China’s development of military capabilities and to anticipate and counter China’s realization of new capabilities so the United States can maintain its military advantage over the long term.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Strategic Planning, Future, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

505. Americans and the Dragon: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting from the Boxer Uprising

Author:: Mitchell G. Klingenberg
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Drawing from archival materials at the US Army Heritage and Education Center and the United States Military Academy at West Point, numerous published primary sources, and a range of secondary sources, this monograph offers an overview of the China Relief Expedition from June 1900 to the moment of liberation in August. Its considerations range from the geopolitical to the strategic and down to the tactical levels of war. US forces partnered alongside the combined naval and land forces of multiple nations, thus constituting the first contingency, expeditionary, and multinational coalition in American military history. In the face of numerous obstacles conditioned by enemy forces, the environment, and internal to the informal coalition itself, American forces succeeded in liberating their besieged legation. While the character of war has evolved since 1900, students of war should see through disparities that appear to separate the China Relief Expedition from the historical present.
Topic:: War, History, Armed Forces, Army, Coalition, Boxer Rebellion, and Force Protection
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

506. State-Centric Data Governance in China

Author:: Alex He
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: China’s state-centric data governance regime has evolved into a framework characterized by the pursuit of a dual goal to bolster both economic growth and national security at the expense of personal information protection, which is significantly compromised due to the government’s mostly unfettered access to personal data. This paper examines three components of data governance in China and then considers data governance institutions in the country. It describes how digital platform governance and regulation on cross-border data flows have illustrated the country’s dual goal. The paper concludes with a discussion of the global implications of China’s data governance system.
Topic:: National Security, Economic Growth, State, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

507. Navigating Africa’s Digital Partnerships in a Context of Global Rivalry

Author:: Folashadé Soulé
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: As African governments focus on developing their digital infrastructures, choosing global partners depends on which one is best able to meet their national digital priorities. But increasing tension between geopolitical rivals and digital powers, such as China and the United States, has made the decision-making process even more complex. As part of the Negotiating Africa’s Digital Partnerships policy research project, African ministers, policy makers and other stakeholders were interviewed to determine how these partnerships are negotiated. The interviews revealed that China has played a major role in Africa’s digital economic development. As a key strategic partner, China offers more affordable options than its Western counterparts through financing backed by Chinese grants and loans that have enabled the development of network infrastructure and internet access across the continent. The policy brief concludes with recommendations on how African governments can get the most from these partnerships.
Topic:: Development, Geopolitics, Rivalry, and Digital Partnerships
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and United States of America

508. Clarifying China’s Rise Puzzle: Comparison of the Modernisation and Primacy of Institutions Theories

Author:: Ekrem Ok
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Academics show great interest in the progress of countries and the disparities between developing and developed countries. This is grounded on a belief that the change in the number of developed/developing countries may play a significant role in determining the future of the international system. Therefore, China’s rise has a vital place in the study of international systems. Given its sui generis economic and political structure, China is a hard-to-predict country for most academics working on international systems. In this context, this study will look at China’s rise through the lenses of Modernisation and Primacy of Institutions theories and discuss which describes China’s rise more accurately. This will involve a comparative analysis of both theories with historical and political data in order to evaluate their respective arguments.
Topic:: Institutions, Modernization, and International System
Political Geography:: China and Asia

509. Safeguarding Democracy against Disinformation: Insights from Taiwanese Civil Society

Author:: Nelson Wen
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: On August 2, 2022, pedestrians near convenience stores and a few public spaces around Taiwan began noticing that the content on digital billboards had been replaced with strident messages in Chinese, such as “Greater China will ultimately be unified!” That same month, the websites of a Taiwan university and other organizations were defaced with messages, including “There is only one China in the world!” Meanwhile, the military of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was conducting days of drills and missile launches on a scale previously unseen, though certain photos and videos claiming to show Chinese military exercises near Taiwan were later proven by Taiwan-based fact-checking organizations to be doctored or fabricated. This combination of disinformation, military saber rattling and hacking activity was the latest example of what Taiwan authorities, scholars and civil society have termed “cognitive warfare.” The experiences of Taiwan in trying to protect the integrity of its information environment against such influence attempts merit close attention from all societies and the United States in particular. This is because Taiwan provides a model for a multifaceted, grassroots response to combat disinformation, and also because a large proportion of disinformation in Taiwan relates to discrediting the United States as a reliable security partner.[ii] Based on interviews with a select group of Taiwan non-governmental organizations (NGOs), this article will illustrate how parts of Taiwan’s civil society are dealing with the challenges posed by foreign and homegrown disinformation.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

510. China and Russia's Far East

Author:: Richard Holwill
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: In February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin crowed about his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, saying that China and Russia have forged a “friendship without limits.” So far, the Chinese President has backed Putin’s attacks on Ukraine. This agreement serves China’s foreign policy goals, at least for now. China hopes to build an international order in which it supplants the United States as a leader of the international community. Because Putin’s Russia supports that goal, China supports Russia. But make no mistake, this friendship does have limits. At some point, China will have reasons to break with Russia and could do so in a dramatic fashion. The break will be driven by another of China’s foreign policy goals: the desire to regain all of the territory and dominance that it enjoyed prior to its “hundred years of humiliation,” which is how Chinese scholars and officials describe the period from 1839 and 1949, during which the Western powers, along with Japan and Russia, seized Chinese territory. Through that period, China agreed to a series of unequal treaties that allowed those powers to “pick China’s bones.” In 1839, China lost Hong Kong to the British. The Portuguese took Macau in 1887. Following the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the Empire of Japan took Dalian and Taiwan. The Germans seized Jiqozhou Bay and Tsingtao in 1898. China ceded Zhanjiang to France in 1898.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

511. Chengdu Youth

Author:: Zhang Feng and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Zhang Feng is an influential blogger and bookstore owner from Chengdu, who closely observes trends among urban youth. In his city, there is far more independent thought and activism among young people than is generally recognized in the outside world. The "White Paper Movement" that occurred last November to protest strict Covid-19 lockdown measures was a rare public manifestation of deeper and longer trends. Young people are resisting the politicization, ideological rigidity, and organizational rigidity of Chinese life, and pursue their own lifestyles with an emphasis on aesthetics. The fact that they worked out ways to support friends who were arrested for the White Paper Movement is a sign of how urban culture is evolving. Zhang Feng will describe the mood among middle class citizens and youth in Chengdu during and after the Covid lockdown in that city
Topic:: Culture, Youth, Ideology, COVID-19, Activism, and Politicization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Chengdu

512. COSCO in Piraeus: Investment Embeddedness and the Question of Chinese 'influence'

Author:: Konstantinos Tsimonis and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Professor Tsimonis will present his research around the landmark investment of China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in the port of Piraeus and discuss its political, social, economic and environmental repercussions. The speaker will approach COSCO's investment as an embedded phenomenon and unpack the agency of local, regional and global actors in order to assess the question of 'Chinese influence'. This talk will introduce to the Weatherhead audience the context of Chinese activities and policies in Greece. The speaker will also discuss the challenge and the necessity for developing independent China expertise in countries with no China studies tradition, as a way to mitigate the political risks arising from the PRC's global economic outreach.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economy, Investment, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: China, Greece, and Asia

513. PLA Views on US-China Relations

Author:: Yawei Liu and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: There is a wider range of views on U.S.-China relations, including how to handle the Taiwan issue, than is generally known. Dr. Liu will discuss the range of views on these issues among senior military officers.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Perception
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

514. Public Interest and State Legitimation: Early Modern England, Japan, and China–Book Talk, Wenkai He

Author:: Wenkai He and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Wenkai He is an associate professor of Social Science in the Division of Social Science at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He conducts deep and contextualized historical analysis of state formation in England, Japan, and China from the 16th to 19th century. He will give a talk on his second book, Public Interest and State Legitimation: Early Modern England, Japan, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), which investigates the connections between state capacity, state legitimation and the expansion of political participation. He demonstrates how in each case a public interest-based discourse of state legitimation provided a common platform upon which state and society collaborated to provide public goods such as famine relief and large-scale infrastructural facilities. Each discourse of state legitimation entailed ‘passive rights’ that allowed subordinates to justify their demands on the state to redress welfare grievances. Conflicts between domestic welfare and other dimensions of public interest, however, could instigate cross-regional and cross-sectoral mass petitions for fundamental political reforms that were likewise justified by the state’s proclaimed duty to safeguard the public interest; these mass petitions might ultimately transform the state. Such a political ‘great divergence’ occurred in England (1760s-1780s) and Japan (1870s-1880s), but not in China.
Topic:: History, State Formation, Book Talk, and Public Interest
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, and England

515. As Equals: The Oei Women of Java – A Book Talk by Daryl Yeap

Author:: Daryl Yeap, Lien-Hang Nguyen, and Jim Cheng
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: In this talk, Daryl Yeap presents her new book “As Equals: The Oei Women of Java”. The book tells the fascinating story of Oei Hui-lan (aka Madame Wellington Koo), Ida Oei and Lucy Ho Oei, daughters and wife of Asia's richest man at the turn of the 20th century -- Oei Tiong-ham. Born at the height of Sinophobic fears and at a time when the great majority of Chinese women continued to live under the Confucian veil, the three women defied social conventions and punctured through cultural stereotypes – showing to the world that they were the epitome of the modern woman - - sophisticated, educated, sexually aware, and above all, fiercely independent. The talk will focus on the early years and the circumstances that shaped their lives – from the elaborate social networks of the Chinese community in the Dutch East Indies to the colonial policies in South East Asia.
Topic:: Women, History, Colonialism, Book Talk, and Sinophobia
Political Geography:: China, Southeast Asia, and Rojava

516. The Fruits of Opportunism: The Making of the World’s Largest For-profit Education Industry in China

Author:: Le Lin and Qin Gao
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Supplemental education, such as test-preparation coaching and after-school tutoring, has become increasingly influential in shaping educational outcome and social inequality in China, U.S. and around the world. This study examines the last forty years’ making of the world’s largest for-profit education industry—China’s supplemental education industry (the Industry)—on the margin of China’s socialist education system. How and why has the Industry privatized, marketized and become globally financialized, despite the Chinese state’s restrictive policies? Drawing on in-depth interviews, internal archives, and participant observations on 28 leading supplemental education organization, the study finds that the ambiguity of the Industry empowered socially marginalized entrepreneurs to enter this previously state-dominated market and found opportunistic organizations. With their opportunistic practices being made effective and invisible under ambiguity, opportunistic organizations as a prototype of private enterprises expanded the boundaries of market operations, facilitated the retreat of the state and fostered the Industry’s privatization and marketization. This study illustrates that while opportunism leaves destruction in its wake, it can also drive the formation and evolution of a market. The study also has implications for institutional change and social stratification during China’s market transition. This event is part of the 2023-2024 lecture series on “Labor Market Transformations in China" and is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by Columbia's China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:: Education, Markets, Privatization, and Industry
Political Geography:: China and Asia

517. Book Talk: The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy

Author:: Suisheng Zhao
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Professor Zhao will draw on his new book, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy to trace the dramatic shifts in China’s foreign policy since its founding in 1949 and the key roles played by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping. Each of these transformational leaders reshaped foreign policy to better fit their aims for China. His presentation will focus on Xi Jinping’s power concentration and its implications for Chinese foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, Xi Jinping, Mao Zedong, and Book Talk
Political Geography:: China and Asia

518. How to Curb Investments in Chinese Technology: Initiatives and Debates in the United States

Author:: Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In a continuation of U.S. efforts to slow China's development and acquisition of strategic technologies, Washington has imposed new restrictions on American investment in Chinese technology sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and semiconductors. On August 9, 2023, President Biden issued an unprecedented executive order, announcing notification requirements and prohibitions for U.S. tech investments in China. Three sectors are targeted: semiconductors, quantum information technology, and artificial intelligence. Washington’s main concern is that these investments are accompanied by technology transfers and “intangible benefits” contributing to the development of Chinese military capabilities. This concern, first voiced in the 1980s, has received a heightened political response since 2018. Considering the emerging consensus in Congress and the multiplication of bills, further measures are likely to be adopted in the coming months. The European Union and certain Member States are beginning to reflect on the consequences of U.S. measures, and on the relevance of adopting their own tools to control investment in China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Investment, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computers, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

519. China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes: Discontinuities Between Land and Sea

Author:: Benjamin Jebb
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: When does China use force to settle territorial disputes? This paper leverages data from the Correlates of War project and Stanford’s Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict repository to demonstrate that China takes different approaches to settling terrestrial and sea-based disputes. While China has tacitly accepted the territorial status quo and generally used force only after a rival challenged extant terrestrial boundaries, it has initiated revisions to the territorial status quo in the maritime domain. This paper contends that China takes different approaches to its terrestrial disagreements and maritime disputes due to the Chinese Communist Party’s internal risk calculus. While land-based disputes can stoke unmanageable levels of escalation, factors specific to the maritime domain are more likely to keep militarized incidents contained.
Topic:: Security, Territorial Disputes, Maritime, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China and Asia

520. Stabilizing the Border: A Possible Way Ahead in the Post-Galwan Situation

Author:: Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: An abnormal situation continues to prevail along the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) three years after the Galwan valley incident despite bilateral talks to resolve the matter. Although progress is being made, the force levels on both sides and the close proximity in which they are deployed increase the chances of a deadly mishap or an unintended encounter. Even after a mutually satisfactory resolution is achieved, it may still take several months to build back a broad political understanding at the state-to-state level and reverse the erosion in trust. This paper examines why the existing agreements and measures to preserve peace and tranquility along the LAC were not entirely successful in mitigating the military face-offs between the two sides since 2013, including in the Galwan valley in 2020. It also explores whether the three-stage formula1 that is being talked of is a way of resolving the issue—disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction2 of forces—especially the de-induction of forces, could practically work given the absence of trust as well as the geographical and climatic conditions in which the two sides operate. The paper concludes that unless political trust exists, the de-induction of forces may not be achievable. India should be ready for a prolonged state of military preparedness by establishing a credible deterrence along the LAC and adequate reserves in the rear to respond to fresh aggression, while simultaneously engaging China to negotiate a modus vivendi in the border areas. Specific options both on negotiating a new balance with China and building deterrence are suggested. The first section of the paper looks at ways in which both sides created the building blocks of border management in the 1990s. The objective is to determine which elements succeeded in achieving peace and tranquility and why this framework has shown stress in more recent times. This section highlights that the border management framework, as originally envisaged, encompassed immediate measures to both stave off unintended conflict and longer-term ways and means to maintain peace and tranquility along the entire border region through mutual force reduction. It explores the possible reasons as to why the longer-term objective of mutual force reduction was not pursued. The paper concludes that peace and tranquility could not be sustainably maintained because the focus was on short-term management of situations to the detriment of long-term measures that would reduce the risks. The second section of the paper looks at how both sides might deal with border stabilization in the post-2020 scenario and, more specifically, whether mutual reduction of forces is still a feasible option. It seeks to draw lessons from the Sino-Russian experience in this regard, which shows that mutual force reduction happens when state-to-state engagement deepens and both sides feel comfortable with the level of trust and their own capacity for deterrence. The paper concludes that political trust is a prerequisite for meaningful mutual de-induction of forces. Presently, such conditions do not exist in the India-China context. This section of the paper also looks at how the growing infrastructure gap between India and China in the border areas since 2000 also makes it difficult for the two countries to replicate the Sino-Russian model. The final section of the paper looks at the options that might be available to India to build back a framework for peace and tranquility along the border areas. It also outlines the actions that India might consider adopting unilaterally as well as in the negotiations with China with the objective of creating the conditions for restoration of peace and tranquility in the border region. It suggests a three-pronged approach of negotiating with China to stabilize the border region, building deterrence on the LAC, and holding adequate reserves in the rear.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Political stability, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, and India

521. China’s AI Regulations and How They Get Made

Author:: Matt Sheehan
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China is in the midst of rolling out some of the world’s earliest and most detailed regulations governing artificial intelligence (AI). These include measures governing recommendation algorithms—the most omnipresent form of AI deployed on the internet—as well as new rules for synthetically generated images and chatbots in the mold of ChatGPT. China’s emerging AI governance framework will reshape how the technology is built and deployed within China and internationally, impacting both Chinese technology exports and global AI research networks. But in the West, China’s regulations are often dismissed as irrelevant or seen purely through the lens of a geopolitical competition to write the rules for AI. Instead, these regulations deserve careful study on how they will affect China’s AI trajectory and what they can teach policymakers around the world about regulating the technology. Even if countries fundamentally disagree on the specific content of a regulation, they can still learn from each other when it comes to the underlying structures and technical feasibility of different regulatory approaches. In this series of three papers, I will attempt to reverse engineer Chinese AI governance. I break down the regulations into their component parts—the terminology, key concepts, and specific requirements—and then trace those components to their roots, revealing how Chinese academics, bureaucrats, and journalists shaped the regulations. In doing so, we have built a conceptual model of how China makes AI governance policy, one that can be used to project the future trajectory of Chinese AI governance (see figure 1). China’s three most concrete and impactful regulations on algorithms and AI are its 2021 regulation on recommendation algorithms, the 2022 rules for deep synthesis (synthetically generated content), and the 2023 draft rules on generative AI. Information control is a central goal of all three measures, but they also contain many other notable provisions. The rules for recommendation algorithms bar excessive price discrimination and protect the rights of workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The deep synthesis regulation requires conspicuous labels be placed on synthetically generated content. And the draft generative AI regulation requires both the training data and model outputs to be “true and accurate,” a potentially insurmountable hurdle for AI chatbots to clear. All three regulations require developers to make a filing to China’s algorithm registry, a newly built government repository that gathers information on how algorithms are trained, as well as requiring them to pass a security self-assessment. Structurally, the regulations hold lessons for policymakers abroad. By rolling out a series of more targeted AI regulations, Chinese regulators are steadily building up their bureaucratic know-how and regulatory capacity. Reusable regulatory tools like the algorithm registry can act as regulatory scaffolding that can ease the construction of each successive regulation, a particularly useful step as China prepares to draft a national AI law in the years ahead. Examining the roots of these regulations also grants insight into the key intellectual and bureaucratic players shaping Chinese AI governance. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is the clear bureaucratic leader in governance to date, but that position may grow more tenuous as the focus of regulation moves beyond the CAC’s core competency of online content controls. The Ministry of Science and Technology is another key player, one that may see its profile rise due to recent government restructuring and increased focus on regulating underlying AI research. Feeding into this bureaucratic rulemaking are several think tanks and scholars, notably the China Academy for Information Communications Technology and Tsinghua University’s Institute for AI International Governance. In the years ahead, China will continue rolling out targeted AI regulations and laying the groundwork for a capstone national AI law. Any country, company, or institution that hopes to compete against, cooperate with, or simply understand China’s AI ecosystem must examine these moves closely. The subsequent papers in this series will dig into the details of these regulations and how they came about, deepening understanding of Chinese AI governance to date and giving a preview of what is likely coming around the bend.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China and Asia

522. How Saudi Arabia Bent China to Its Technoscientific Ambitions

Author:: Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Steven Jiawei Hai, and Kameal Alahmad
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Technoscientific cooperation between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Arab states has blossomed in recent years.1 The phrase itself has become an official “watchword” (tifa) in the context of Sino-Arab relations, suffusing nearly every official policy paper or statement on the Arab world from Beijing, including its Arab Policy Paper (2016), the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum Action Plan (2020), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Report on Sino-Arab Cooperation in the New Era (2022).2 Yet this newly hailed “breakthrough” (tupo) has attracted both scrutiny and concern from Western officials and academics worried about their states’ influence in the Middle East and, perhaps more pertinently, the outcome of their perceived ongoing global competition with China. The anti-Huawei campaign waged across the Gulf states by American officials during the end of Donald Trump’s presidency and the beginning of Joe Biden’s was animated by questions shaped by these anxieties: Will access to, and adoption of, Chinese technologies lead to the diffusion of new distinctively “Chinese” norms and standards (such as Chinese conceptions of cyber sovereignty) or barriers to unfettered Western market access over the long run? Will these same technologies compromise national digital ecosystems and infrastructures, thereby allowing the PRC to access sensitive information surrounding Western technologies and military deployments in the region while imposing its own distinctively Chinese vision on the region? And to what extent will these processes of technoscientific borrowing embolden authoritarianism and potentially take these states out of a Western security orbit?3 Such questions are neither new nor limited to the Middle East. The PRC’s complicated entanglements in Africa over the past few decades have produced similar-sounding concerns from the West surrounding a range of issues including Chinese “debt trap diplomacy” and resource exploitation, to which scholars such as Deborah Brautigam, Ching Kwan Lee, and Lina Benabdallah have provided nuanced counternarratives.4 Inspired by these works’ emphasis on local factors that China adapts to rather than the “Chinese ways” that Beijing and its proxies ostensibly impose, and also seeking to address some of the (primarily) Western apprehensions on Sino-Arab technoscientific cooperation, this paper focuses on a single regional actor—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a major comprehensive strategic partner (quanmian zhanlüe huoban) of the PRC.5 The paper is anchored by the contention that technoscientific development in Saudi Arabia reflects, above all, the objectives and strategies of the Saudi state in its pursuit of technoscientific self-strengthening. In approaching this topic from a local perspective, this analysis seeks to upend conventional narratives that view these transformations mainly through the prism of China’s rise, or that of the U.S.-China rivalry. There are dreamers and planners beyond those in the Beltway and Zhongnanhai, such as those in al-Yamamah Palace, and their ambitions must be taken into account in understanding the nature, scope, intensity, velocity, and specifics of their collaborations with China. The paper is divided into three sections. The first discusses the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s approach to technoscientific development. It serves to shed light on the underlying logic guiding the kingdom’s global search for technoscientific partnerships. The second focuses on Chinese-Saudi technoscientific cooperation and localization projects, providing a general overview of the history of such cooperation followed by a discussion of some of its structural trends and impediments in terms of human resources, the circulation of capital, and the role of the state versus the private sector. The third and final section dwells on some of the key takeaways and contextualizing lessons based on the previous sections’ findings.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

523. The Belt and Road Initiative and the Mega Infrastructure Investments in Africa

Author:: Amabilly Bonacina and Mamoudou Gazibo
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article seeks to analyze the Sino-African relations and in particular the Belt and Road Initiative investments through the study of deviant cases. Using the cases of interrupted cooperation agreements in Sierra Leone and Tanzania under the initiative, this article argues that the interruption is caused mainly by the nature of the projects which make them vulnerable to changes in domestic politics. To explain this, we propose the concept of presidential megaprojects.
Topic:: Development, Treaties and Agreements, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Tanzania, and Sierra Leone

524. Unavoidable Clashes: Exploring the Implications of a China-Russia Alliance on Global Geopolitics

Author:: Sanjar Yakhshilikov
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The current relations between China and Russia are the result of the rapprochement policies of both countries. Shared fears about US hegemony, mutual economic benefits, and strong links between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin escalated Sino-Russia relations into a new stage. Russia needs regional security in Southeast Asia, and even though the strategic interests of China and Russia do not match over the region, they are both eager to contain the US. Recent Russia – Ukraine border issues are well-matched with China – Taiwan issues that also make the states feel mutuality between them. The results of the two issues may be the same. Moscow is making sure as time goes by that rapprochement with the West is impossible, Russia is going to suffer from economic sanctions, and the West has already begun decoupling. Despite all of the partnerships and mutuality, China and Russia are still not allies. The inactive confrontations between the two outnumber all of the abovementioned positives.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia and China

525. When the Earth is Not Enough: The Role of Outer Space in China's Grand Strategy

Author:: Paulo Afonso Brardo Duarte, Neslihan Topcu, and Daniel Santos
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article assesses China’s Space achievements drawing on realism. Outer Space provides a logic of continuity of a similar assertive stance that already characterises China’s revisionist posture in the South China Sea. We argue that such a realist stance fits well into China’s gradual move towards a flexible perception of borders, despite being a Westphalian State. We aim at answering the following research question: What role does Space exploration play in China’s Grand Strategy and what does it represent for China’s competitive outcomes in terms of economic prowess, military power and even as a source of political prestige and narrative?
Topic:: Grand Strategy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Space

526. Latin America and China's Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges and Proposals from a Latin American Perspective

Author:: Victor Ramiro Fernandez, Juliana González Jáuregui, and Gabriel Esteban Merino
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Despite the divergent perspectives that address the presence of China in the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative, scarce approaches identify how Latin America could face that challenge to reverse its historical dependency and promote economic development. We address this question by recovering and updating structuralist, dependentist, and autonomist contributions developed in Latin America combined with an arrighiean version of the world system. We compare the Latin American and Chinese trajectories regarding regional integration, productive and technological constitutions, spatial asymmetries, and state capacities. Finally, we propose how to forge a relationship with China that enhances Latin American autonomy.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Regional Integration, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Development, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: China and Latin America

527. The Governments of Mauricio Macri and Jair Bolsonaro: Ideology, Pragmatism and Foreign Policy

Author:: André Luiz Coelho, Mariano Ignacio Treacy, and Beatriz Bandeira de Mello
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article compares the foreign policy of the governments of Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, based on the positions of the presidents and their representatives on three issues: 1) relations with the United States, 2) with China and 3) regional integration. We suggest that the Macri government has had to adapt its positions and discursive practices throughout its administration to national and international pressures. We understand that Jair Bolsonaro has adopted a similar stance in his foreign agenda and that his discourses, although strongly ideological, are opposed to more pragmatic actions, especially in the Brazilian economic and trade agendas, as in Argentina. The methodology used in this study is content analysis of speeches and reports from the Brazilian and Argentine foreign ministries, and the theoretical contributions of foreign policy analysis.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Government, Ideology, Regional Integration, Jair Bolsonaro, and Mauricio Macri
Political Geography:: China, Brazil, South America, and United States of America

528. Different Global Contexts of the Confucius

Author:: Ademir Macedo Nascimento and Kerou Xu
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The debate on the Confucius Institute provides a comprehensive view of observation that enriches the understanding of China on the international stage, as well as the stance and participation of other countries in the face of China's integration into the world. In order to analyze the current state of this subject, systematic review methods and procedures were adopted. 25 articles that contemplate the Confucius Institute's praxis in the main continents and countries: Africa, Asia and the USA, as well as comparisons with European language and culture institutions, were included in the reference of this study. As a result, it was possible to identify and summarize some trends; such as research scopes, recurring themes, theories and methodologies used, regional characteristics, successes and controversies.
Topic:: Research, Think Tanks, and Integration
Political Geography:: China and Asia

529. Starr Forum: A permanent partnership? How Xi and Putin are shaping a turbulent world

Author:: Natasha Kuhrt
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: SPEAKERS: Natasha Kurt is a senior lecturer of international peace and security in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Her research interests include Russian and Eurasian security/foreign policy especially in Asia. Elizabeth Wishnick is a professor of political science and law at Montclair State University. Her research interests include international relations in Asia and Chinese foreign policy. CHAIR: Carol Saivetz is a senior fellow in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and China

530. How US chip controls on China benefit and cost Korean firms

Author:: Martin Chorzempa
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Export controls have become one of the most contentious battlegrounds in US-China technology competition. US semiconductor export controls aimed at China, however, have also embroiled allies such as South Korea. These controls largely do not affect Korean firms' chip sales to China, but Korean firms are vulnerable because they have large chip production facilities in China, which make around 40 percent of the memory chips for these firms. Those facilities in China rely on access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) or servicing from not only the United States but also other countries that have imposed controls on exporting advanced SME to China. Although the United States is unlikely to shut off access to the technology needed to keep the plants running for the foreseeable future, it has signaled that it will not allow new technology needed to upgrade those facilities, so they will become uncompetitive over the next few years and will need to be shuttered or sold off. For future production, Korean firms will need to build new facilities at great (albeit subsidized) expense, amortizing the sunk costs of operations in China over the coming years. At the same time, the controls have created significant benefits for Korean firms by shutting off Chinese competition for their memory businesses. Yet benefiting from the tensions between superpowers comes with serious risks. Firms and governments must deal with much greater uncertainty and evaluate the risk of their dependence on both the United States and China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Business, Exports, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, and United States of America

531. Despite disruptions, US-China trade is likely to grow

Author:: Megan Hogan and Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The United States and China hit record trade levels in 2022, despite a prickly relationship, suggesting that calls for severe or even total economic decoupling between the world’s two economic superpowers may be ill-advised, say Hogan and Hufbauer. The dollar value of US-China trade grew significantly between 2019 and 2022, notwithstanding declines in trade flows of certain products such as semiconductors and aircraft due to the trade war. The persistence and even growth of the two countries’ total trade despite political and economic disputes reflects the mutual benefit that private firms see in this commercial relationship. The authors conclude that partial decoupling between the United States and China has not, so far, redrawn the world trade map. Nor does it seem likely to do so on an aggregate trade basis between now and 2025.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

532. Why China's housing policies have failed

Author:: Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: This working paper reviews the current housing crisis in China and explores the roles of supply-demand imbalances and local governments in the real estate sector. To prevent the housing downturn from further dragging down economic growth, Beijing suspended the financing restrictions on developers imposed in August 2020. These restrictions, known as the "three red lines" that limited new borrowing by developers, led Chinese property developers to default on a record number of debt obligations and triggered the most serious housing slump China has seen since 1998. The property sector saw its value added decline by more than 5 percent in 2022, even as the overall economy grew at 3 percent. But the current dynamics in the housing market reflect a repeated pattern: Loosening financing restrictions on developers and using housing as a macroeconomic stabilization tool risk reinforcing the boom-bust housing cycle. China's real estate sector is a systemic problem. Without serious reforms to address concerns such as supply-demand imbalances and local governments' deep connections with real estate, housing slumps like the one in 2022 may recur.
Topic:: Government, Real Estate, Supply and Demand, and Housing Crisis
Political Geography:: China and Asia

533. How trade cooperation by the United States, the European Union, and China can fight climate change

Author:: Chad P. Bown and Kimberly Clausing
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Recent efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have revealed different policy priorities; the United States and China have emphasized subsidy-based approaches, and the European Union has emphasized carbon pricing. These divergent policy choices—some lowering energy costs, others raising them—raise concerns about industry competitiveness and have implications for upstream and downstream firms in supply chains. This paper identifies the trade tensions resulting from varying climate policy approaches and describes policy efforts to address them. It then describes the role of a rules-based trading system in tackling the challenges that these distinct policy approaches create, examining World Trade Organization (WTO) rules on subsidies, border measures, and export restrictions. The authors suggest that the United States, the European Union, and China prioritize reforms to those rules as a path forward for cooperation on trade and climate. Such an approach would be an important starting point toward creating a functioning multilateral system.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Trade, Cooperation, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

534. Construction productivity and global inequality

Author:: Saumik Paul and Kunal Sen
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: Two well established stylized facts of economic development are a strong correlation between investment and income, and large differences in investment rates across countries. Construction is the largest component of investment. This paper examines the implications of heterogeneity in construction productivity on cross-country income disparity. We estimate the 10:1 spread in construction productivity among 145 countries in 2005 as a factor of 61.7-fold. Based on a general equilibrium model with input–output linkages, we find that the 10:1 spread in income per capita declines by 45 per cent when the construction productivity gap is eliminated. Sectoral characterization of the aggregate effect of a change in construction productivity shows heterogeneous sectoral contributions to income convergence. Electrical equipment, metals, and transport equipment play stronger roles in transforming the effect of a change in construction productivity to the aggregate level in China compared with other countries.
Topic:: Inequality, Investment, Productivity, Construction, and Income
Political Geography:: China and Global Focus

535. Reimagining Africa’s role in revitalizing the global economy

Author:: Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The world economy now finds itself at a critical juncture, facing a series of extraordinary setbacks that have pushed down growth. Reigniting growth requires a unique combination of targeted policies, robust international cooperation, and a renewed look at the global economy, with a particular focus on Africa. Due to its burgeoning and youthful population, abundant natural resources, and a strategic geographical location that can facilitate global trade, Africa can play a major role in—and should be front and center of—any renewed efforts for revitalizing the global economy. A decade-long robust, inclusive, and green growth in Africa will not only move hundreds of millions living in the continent out of poverty but will also accelerate a global rebound and recovery. However, for this to materialize, Africa needs substantial investments in its failing and inadequate physical and social infrastructure. With access to basic infrastructure, alongside efficient institutions as well as its young population, massive natural endowments, and strategic location Africa can seize its economic potential and act as an engine of growth for the global economy for decades to come. Therefore, it is crucial to support Africa to unleash its immense economic potential, through massive and focused investments in the continent’s human capital and its physical and social infrastructure.
Topic:: Development, International Organization, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, and United States of America

536. Investigating China’s economic coercion: The reach and role of Chinese corporate entities

Author:: William Piekos
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: China’s economic statecraft has expanded in line with Beijing’s vision for an international environment that is more conducive to its interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are willing to use every means at their disposal to achieve this goal, bringing the full force of the party-state to bear in support of Xi’s objectives abroad and against perceived enemies of the Chinese government. Economic statecraft—the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals—has been a consistent feature of Xi’s dealings with CCP competitors and adversaries. Intensifying US-China strategic competition and Beijing’s increasingly overt attempts to assert its preferences only further emphasize the importance of confronting China’s use of economic coercion and influence and understanding the reach of Chinese companies. The deliberate use of economic ties to achieve geopolitical objectives is underpinned by corporate entities that facilitate trade, investment, and financial flows.1 Beijing’s preference for plausible deniability and nontransparency in theory makes corporate entities an attractive mechanism through which to signal its displeasure and to achieve strategic goals. Understanding the reach and role of such entities is, therefore, key to identifying where Beijing might be best positioned to advance its economic statecraft. To that end, this report explores avenues through which researchers can investigate these issues, considers industries that could be vulnerable to future coercion and influence, and offers policy recommendations to counter China’s economic statecraft.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Global Markets, Economy, Trade, Norms, and Coercion
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

537. The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis

Author:: Gregory Weaver
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The potential for a conflict over Taiwan is increasing due to China’s nuclear and conventional military buildup and the threat of two simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, which would severely stress the ability of US and allied conventional forces to win in both theaters. Nuclear weapons will cast a long shadow over a Taiwan conflict and could play multiple roles in the deterrence and warfighting strategies and operations of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A conflict over Taiwan has a number of attributes that will shape those roles. Those attributes make the potential for limited nuclear escalation real and uncontrolled nuclear escalation possible. In order to prevent war and escalation in war, US policymakers and military planners must take the role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict seriously. The United States should communicate four focused deterrent messages to China and reassure its allies and partners that it can deter Chinese nuclear use. The United States should reevaluate its theater nuclear capability requirements for a Taiwan conflict and carefully analyze options to defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan with limited nuclear strikes if necessary. Finally, the United States must credibly address the potential for collaborative or opportunistic aggression by China and Russia in an environment in which both are peer nuclear adversaries. This requires determining what the US strategy should be to address the two-peer threat, optimizing US and allied conventional forces to address it, and reshaping US nuclear capabilities if necessary. The United States needs to know now whether it is going to require a nuclear force that is larger, or different, or both, because changing the current modernization program requires immediate action to address the threats in time.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

538. The Economic Impact of China PNTR Repeal

Author:: David Schockenhoff and Michael Kleiman
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: As scepticism towards China is rising among policymakers, businesses grow more concerned about the potential economic fallout from an escalation in US-China tariff policy. Oxford Economics was commissioned by the US-China Business Council (USCBC) to help inform the policymaking process by examining two scenarios that could materialize if China’s Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) status was revoked – including the increase of US tariffs on Chinese goods to column 2 rates as well as a Chinese retaliation imposing pre-WTO rates on US goods. Our analysis incorporates state-of-the art trade and economic models, including the Oxford Economics GEM, and finds that the US could lose up to $1.9trn in output over the five-year period following a China PNTR repeal. This is our third study for USCBC after examining the impact of the US-China relationship and associated scenarios in two previous reports (2017 and 2021).
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Regulation, Tariffs, Trade, Supply Chains, Policymaking, Decoupling, and Goods and Services
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

539. The Comeback of Industrial Policy. The Next Geopolitical Great Game

Author:: Alessandro Gili, Davide Tentori, and Paola Magri
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Industrial policies are the key element underlying today’s geopolitical scramble and a pillar of national security. Reacting to Western weaknesses and bottlenecks in the global supply chains, highlighted by multiple shocks such as the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the recent Israel-Hamas war, the US in first place and the EU later have started to introduce new industrial legislation aimed at making up for lost ground with respect to other industrial powerhouses, such as China. Besides being policy tools to accelerate the green and digital transitions, however, the US Inflation Reduction Act and the Net Zero Industry Act, as well as the US and the EU Chips Acts, entail subsidies, local content requirements and export controls targeted at strengthening the domestic industrial base for critical technologies, fostering strategic autonomy and de-risking from excessive foreign dependencies. This race poses risks for the weaponisation of industrial policies and fragmentation of international trade and also potentially jeopardises technological development. How can we strike a balance between economic security and efficiency? Which sectors are the most critical and which ones are the leading global powers pursuing? What will the consequences be for global value chains and international trade? Is it possible to reach an agreement on rules for a new level playing field to prevent economic competition turning into economic warfare?
Topic:: Development, Industrial Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

540. Third time lucky? China’s push to internationalise the renminbi

Author:: Alessia Amighini and Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Western concerns that the renminbi could rival the dollar as an international currency contrast with underwhelming numbers in terms of global settlements in renminbi and with the experience of China’s two main previous failed attempts to achieve renminbi internationalisation. However, China is moving towards a more realistic plan for renminbi internationalisation, focusing on China’s strengths in trade and financing. China is now the main trading partner for a very large number of countries and has become a major creditor for a good part of the Global South. This, together with the increasingly frequent restrictions on the use of the dollar, is strengthening the renminbi. The cross-border use of the renminbi for trade settlements and financing (Chinese banks’ overseas loans denominated in renminbi and official renminbi swap lines offered by the People’s Bank of China) has been on the rise since 2022, coinciding with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the related Western sanctions. The increase is notable considering that the renminbi has been depreciating since January 2023 and China’s economic performance has been underwhelming. However, the use of the renminbi as investment currency has declined since 2022, in terms of both the share of foreign-exchange reserves denominated in renminbi and the share of Chinese onshore assets held by foreign investors. The current push is so far proving successful compared to previous attempts, but it remains hard to tell if China will succeed in this renewed attempt to internationalise its currency through use of its heavy weight among trading nations. Obvious constraints remain that could hold back full internationalisation of the renminbi, especially the absence of full capital account convertibility. Nevertheless, China’s somewhat heterodox approach to internationalising its currency could succeed given the ongoing placing of restrictions on use of the dollar. How the dollar, the euro or the international monetary system may be further affected by the rise of the renminbi is a major policy question that must be explored further.
Topic:: Finance, Currency, Trade, and Internationalization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

541. De-risking and decarbonising: a green tech partnership to reduce reliance on China

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Heather Grabbe, and Axel Källenius
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Trade in renewable energy goods is a global public good; all countries gain when others cut emissions, and all suffer from climate change if decarbonisation is delayed. Yet this trade depends on China, which controls most of the world’s production of solar panels and electric vehicle batteries, and some of the global trade in wind turbines. These supply chains are vulnerable to disruption, natural disasters and weaponisation by China, which has already exercised its dominant position in some critical raw materials to put pressure on other countries. Part of the European Union and United States response to reduce reliance on China is reshoring production, but this is economically inefficient given their limited access to critical raw materials and high production costs. Moreover, Chinese firms are far ahead of the rest of the world in green tech manufacturing and innovation, and in extraction and processing. To reduce reliance on China, incentive-aligned governments and businesses should form a green tech partnership. This would produce green tech with the aim of decarbonising faster, while ensuring greater diversification of resources and improving security of supply. Each partnership economy would use its comparative advantage within a new green-tech supply chain. The aim is to supplement, not substitute, the Chinese supply chain, since both will be needed to meet rising global demand for green tech, including in China. Although such international coordination is difficult, the partnership would offers benefits to many different countries. Emerging economies that are rich in critical raw materials and/or have moderate wages would gain economic development opportunities. The US and the EU should share technology and provide financing, as they will gain from reduced dependence on China and from sourcing than is still cheaper than reshoring. China would have more room to use its clean tech to meet its own decarbonisation targets. The partnership could be organised through a combination of trade and investment agreements, together with tech transfer and financial agreements, under some form of inter-governmental oversight. The dependence of all countries on China for green tech is so great that non-market incentives might also be needed, such as subsidies or, preferably, a system of carbon pricing within the partnership.
Topic:: Partnerships, Green Technology, Risk, Renewable Energy, Supply, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

542. To what extent can urbanisation mitigate the negative impact of population ageing in China?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: China is experiencing population ageing caused by a rapidly declining fertility rate and increased life expectancy. This demographic transition poses economic challenges, yet the intensity of these challenges depends on a number of factors, with the move of people from rural to urban areas being of central importance. To gain a clearer understanding of how urbanisation interacts with population ageing, we investigate changes in the Chinese labour force in both rural and urban areas. Our findings suggest a modest shrinking of the overall labour force up until 2035. However, until 2035, the labour force is projected to contract only in rural areas, while the urban labour force will continue to grow. As urban employment is more productive than rural employment, the combined effect of demographic change and urbanisation on growth will remain moderately positive (0.4 percent per year). Beyond 2035, fertility rate decline will begin to affect the working-age population in both rural and urban areas, especially since the urbanisation process is expected to level off by then. In such circumstances, China’s shrinking population will shave off 1.4 percent from GDP growth annually. These results, however, do not take into account the impact of population aging on labour productivity. China’s fast move towards robotisation and artificial intelligence might help mitigate any negative impacts by increasing productivity, but there is no sign yet that this is the case.
Topic:: Demographics, Urbanization, Economic Growth, and Aging
Political Geography:: China and Asia

543. Before Zero Day: Taiwan’s Evolving Defense Strategy and the Struggle for Peace

Author:: Eric Lee, Ian Easton, Grace Price, Colby Ferland, Cathy Fang, Mark Stokes, and Alice Cho
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The invasion of Ukraine has upended long-held assumptions of the liberal international order, and as tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese leaders are watching Ukraine with their futures in mind. The objective of this report is to provide insights into how Taiwanese policymakers, military officers, diplomats, strategists, and everyday citizens are responding to the evolving threat picture in the Taiwan Strait and offer ideas for the policy debate in Washington. This report examines leadership speeches, strategy reports, military writings, and media articles, as well as recounts findings from interviews with Taiwanese and U.S. government officials, military officers, and civil society.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Peace, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

544. A Perfect Storm: Managing Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Randall G. Schriver
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The United States’ approach to security in the Taiwan Strait has long been defined by its “One China Policy” while maintaining “strategic ambiguity.” However, without coordinated, whole-of-government policies, the People’s Republic of China will continue to act aggressively in the Taiwan Strait and cross-Strait tensions will continue to rise. The United States must creates policies that support U.S. security interests in the Indo-Pacific and develop and execute a strategy for deterring an attack on Taiwan and defeating aggression should deterrence fail. The objective of this report is to offer recommendations for shaping near- and long-term U.S. policy regarding Taiwan in five different areas: political, science and technology, economic, military, socio-cultural, and non-traditional security.
Topic:: Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Crisis Management, Strategic Interests, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China and Taiwan

545. Taiwan’s Urgent Need for Asymmetric Defense

Author:: Eric Gomez
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Amid deteriorating US-China relations, senior US officials have begun suggesting that a Chinese attack against Taiwan could happen soon. The conventional wisdom in Washington is that this urgent threat requires an urgent response, but too much attention has focused on the US-China military balance and too little on Taiwan’s military efforts. Taiwan’s future would likely be determined in the opening days, if not hours, of a conflict. Taiwan must prevail in two critical military operations: surviving China’s conventional bombardment and preventing the first wave of amphibious ground forces from establishing a beachhead. Taiwan would be fighting these two operations alone, but Taiwan’s military does not have the right mix of equipment, manpower, and strategy to mount an effective defense, despite the fact that the results of these operations could prove decisive for the rest of the conflict. US policymakers must press Taipei to focus on improving Taiwan’s ability to execute this narrow set of military missions and to reorient its overall strategy to one of asymmetric defense to counter Chinese advantages. If Taiwan does not or cannot do so, it is unlikely that any amount of potential US assistance or intervention could salvage the island’s position in the event of a conflict. Because these shortfalls are so important, Washington should create a sense of urgency in Taipei through security assistance measures such as conditional arms sales and limited joint training. The United States should also take care not to back Beijing into a corner where it concludes that using force is its only viable option to achieve unification with Taiwan. American assurances to China are a tough sell given Washington’s bipartisan hawkishness on China, but keeping time on Taiwan’s side is essential for the success of Taipei’s self-defense transformation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

546. Enhancing Australia’s Taiwan ties

Author:: Benjamin Herscovitch and Mark Harrison
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Australia should articulate and pursue a disciplined Taiwan strategy that uses the flexibility of its one-China policy to increase engagement with Taipei in service of Australian economic and security interests. Canberra should support Taipei’s bid for entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and start negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. It should also establish regular ministerial exchanges with Taiwan. The Taiwan strategy advocated in this paper is likely to be a net negative for Australia’s relations with China. But it strikes a reasonable balance between Australia’s interests and the stabilisation of the Australia–China relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Regional Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

547. The Anti-Circumvention Instrument: Another Roadblock on the Investment Development Path?

Author:: Weihuan Zhou and Victor Crochet
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:: Companies from emerging economies, and China in particular, have started internationalizing their production operations. In doing so, they are following the same path as that taken by American, European and East Asian corporations before them, by setting up factories in third countries to serve their export markets from closer locations and produce more efficiently. Thus, it is no longer only developed countries’ multinationals which are moving their operations to developing countries, but emerging market companies that are increasingly engaging in production abroad. This phenomenon is having beneficial effects in countries where these companies invest and might help them start their own industrialization process. Yet, it has attracted the ire of developed countries, in particular the European Union. They are now targeting these downstream production plants abroad by using the so-called anti-circumvention instrument, resulting in trade defence duties imposed on the parent companies being extended to their foreign subsidiaries. This application of the anti-circumvention instrument departs from its historic rationale and might hinder the development of countries in need of foreign investment. Therefore, affected governments should consider taking international legal action to bring developed countries to the negotiating table to put a halt to this abuse of the anti-circumvention instrument.
Topic:: Development, Industrial Policy, Investment, Trade, Internationalization, Production, Emerging Economies, and Anti-Circumvention Instrument
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America

548. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:: Minah Kang
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

549. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ② China and the ROK-China Relations

Author:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Amid the deepening U.S.-China strategic competition, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to discern the Korean people’s perception of China and ROK-China relations. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the “EAI Public Opinion Briefing.” Despite predominantly negative impressions of China and President Xi Jinping, over 80 percent of respondents believe that Korea-China relations is crucial for Korea. The survey results unveiled public opinion that separately recognizes the favorability and significance of China.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

550. The New Domestic Politics of U.S.-China Relations

Author:: Evan S. Medeiros
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: The U.S.-China relationship has come to largely define geopolitics in the 21st century, and the bilateral relationship is today often conceived primarily in terms of geopolitical tensions and great power jockeying on the global stage. However, there is more to U.S.-China strategic competition than the geopolitical level. In particular, the influence of domestic political dynamics in both countries is a widely underappreciated factor driving both U.S. and Chinese foreign policy decision-making, including vis-à-vis each other. What are these shifting domestic forces in both countries that are most influencing the relationship, in what ways, and to what effect? In this groundbreaking new report, The New Domestic Politics of U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy Evan S. Medeiros conducts an in-depth investigation and analysis of these questions. He finds substantial new dynamics at play in both countries that have had an increasingly negative impact on U.S.-China ties. In the United States, Congressional activism, electoral politics, public opinion, and shifting roles for interest groups are all influencing U.S. debates, policymaking, and actions — governmental and nongovernmental alike. In China, centralization of decision-making processes, constraints on formerly key actors, shifting national-level priorities, and other structural political and personnel changes are today directly and indirectly influencing Chinese perceptions, policies, and behaviors toward the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

551. Covid-19: implications for the Indo-Pacific

Author:: David Engel and Alex Bristow
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: As we approach four years since the first cases of Covid-19 in the Chinese city of Wuhan, the world seems relatively familiar again, albeit an increasingly scary place because of war in Europe, accelerating climate change, and the unhealthy nexus between new technologies and authoritarian coercion by Beijing and others. Within this ‘polycrisis’, Covid-19 now feels like a secondary concern. But the world remains unprepared for the next pandemic, which the Director-General of the World Health Organization, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, has warned could come soon and be even more deadly. This report provides a comprehensive stocktake of the lessons our region should draw from Covid-19 at precisely the time we risk forgetting the pandemic’s significance, not just for health but also for the resilience of our societies, economies and international rules-based trade and security. This collection of papers by Japanese and Australian academics, journalists and think tankers explores varying aspects of the regional impact of the pandemic, including on trade, foreign affairs and security. The collection includes detailed case studies on Japan, the Philippines and Indonesia, as well as thematic analysis at the regional and multilateral levels. We hope the compilation is useful for policy makers and decision makers throughout the region, in particular the examination of the systemic links between different forms of crisis preparedness, the sovereign resilience of smaller powers against great power influence, and the effect of Covid-19 in accelerating pre-pandemic regional trends, including mounting challenges to liberal democracy. This report was produced with funding support from the Japanese Government.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Crisis Management, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

552. Export controls effectively constrain China's advance in microchip production

Author:: Lisa Fuller
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: American and allied export controls have been successful in slowing the advance of China’s equipment for semiconductor chip production. Chinese players have been increasingly cut off from a global industry where customer-client interaction is essential. The US and its allies should continue with the controls and subsidies they have in place but expanding them further, as some advocate, would be excessively punitive.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Exports, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

553. Why does Germany maintain its rapprochement with China?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: During a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Frankfurt in early October 2023, German Finance Minister Christian Lindner emphasized the importance of developing economic ties between Berlin and Beijing and enhancing joint cooperation on some critical issues, particularly poverty alleviation and climate change.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Economics, Poverty, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

554. Making Collective Deterrence and Defense Work in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: David Santoro and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The Indo-Pacific security architecture is undergoing fundamental transformation to address rising challenges, most notably those posed by an increasingly confident, assertive, and capable China. Pacific Forum has started a multi-year unofficial dialogue with experts and officials from the United States and key allies and partners to share views of this evolving regional security environment and identify common interests and concerns as well as areas of divergence. The inaugural Pacific Forum Defense and Deterrence Dialogue, which included participants from the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, took place in Tokyo on February 2-3, 2023. It was run at the Track 2 level, although diplomatic officials and military officers from each country also attended as observers. Pacific Forum’s goal is to identify ways to shape this evolution to ensure that it meets U.S. national security needs, particularly integrated deterrence of, and defense against, regional adversaries—with China as the foremost concern. Responses to these changes have taken several forms. Bilateral alliances are being modernized. Other security relationships are being strengthened, such as those between Japan and Australia and Japan and the United Kingdom. There is also talk of new coordination among Five Eyes and other partners. In other cases, new initiatives have been launched, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States “enhanced trilateral security partnership” (AUKUS) or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Recent developments, such as the election of conservative Yoon Yuk-soul as president in South Korea, are hopeful signs of the revitalization of currently moribund defense and security arrangements, notably U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. There is also reportedly talk of renewed interest in the Trilateral Security Dialogue that includes the United States, Australia, and Japan. All these initiatives are designed to better compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defend against adversaries determined to rewrite the regional order in ways that align with their interests. While the notion of an Asian equivalent to NATO is out of sync with regional needs (and there is broad recognition of that fact among key allies), current momentum could herald the emergence of an Indo-Pacific defense community reminiscent of the one created by trans-Atlantic nations after the Second World War. That community was forged to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, the nascent group in the Indo-Pacific is focused on China, although it is not the only threat. Understanding how regional governments see and rank those diverse threats is a critical step in ensuring that the new arrangements are most effective. One thing is certain: the current situation—in which there is no coordination mechanism among the existing and emerging arrangements—is not tenable in view of the mounting China challenge. To succeed, this process must be nurtured. The United States must better understand the forces at play and the views driving national action, and it must work to ensure that those changes are effective to counter China and other challenges. Work is needed to understand how all these pieces fit together in a coherent regional deterrence and defense architecture, particularly to deal with strategic conflict. This is not easy. The above- mentioned initiatives and relationships are new and evolving. It is difficult to appreciate each on its own, much less the overlap between them, and their convergences and divergences. Plus, in some cases, governments are also focused on other ways to deter. DTRA’s chief concern is the warfighter, who must be prepared to address a range of threats that extends from “strategic” military problems (including those related to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and other domains) to gray zone issues, but some regional initiatives also address other issues, notably climate change, vaccine diplomacy, and emerging technologies. It is critical that the United States understand how allies and partners see this menu of items and their goals and priorities, even as the focus of our proposed effort is strengthening regional deterrence and defense. Plainly, a cumulative, comparative assessment is critical because effective deterrence and defense demand a comprehensive analysis and there needs to be shared understanding of how these mechanisms can be coordinated to ensure that needs are met and that participating governments maximize and make the most efficient contributions. From a U.S. perspective, building a collective deterrence and defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific is urgent and the only realistic way to compete effectively against China. As a landmark report from the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney has found, “a strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”1 Failure to build an effective Indo-Pacific deterrence and defense architecture would shift the regional balance of forces to the detriment of the United States as it addresses the China challenge.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

555. Stark Choices Confront Taiwan Voters

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Taiwan’s presidential election campaign has begun. Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s vice president and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Hou Yu-ih from the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) Party, Ko Wen-je of Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and independent Terry Gou offer Taiwan voters four different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with China. As senior US and Chinese officials resumed long-stalled face-to-face meetings, China warned once again that it has no room for compromise or concession on Taiwan. Yet, when Lai completed almost invisible transits through the US en route to Paraguay and back, China’s military response seemed almost pro-forma. When US, Japanese, and South Korean leaders reiterated at the trilateral Camp David summit their staunch opposition to China’s intimidation, China chose to interpret their words as one more promise to support Taiwan. The US accelerated weapons deliveries to Taiwan and expanded training for Taiwan’s military, and Taiwan announced that its defense budget will increase by 7.5% in 2024. Taiwan’s TSMC moved forward on constructing its Arizona factory despite some hiccups, and the US and Taiwan signed a long-awaited trade deal—the first part of their 21st Century Trade Initiative. As Taiwan’s presidential and legislative election campaigns enter the home stretch, the DPP’s Lai continues to lead the race. How will Beijing respond? Will Taiwan voters choose caution and vote for the KMT, or will they again interpret Chinese intimidation as one more reason to give four more years to the DPP with its insistence on de-facto independence?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Domestic Politics, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

556. New Leaders Challenged by US-China Rivalry

Author:: Catharin Dalpino
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Over the summer three Southeast Asian nations—Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia—conducted political contests or prepared for them, with Washington and Beijing watching closely for shifts in alignments or opportunities to make inroads with new leaders. Despite this, and possibly because of it, China made bold moves in the South China Sea and caused outcry in the region with the release of a map supporting its claims to the “Nine-Dash Line.” Beijing also showed signs of worry about Russian inroads into Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. The high-profile visit to Washington of Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. enabled both countries to reconfirm the US-Philippines alliance publicly, although it gave little indication of where the broader relationship may be headed. ASEAN continued to make little headway in helping to resolve the conflict in Myanmar; and the 2023 chair, Jakarta attempted to redirect the group toward economic goals and a common approach to looming food insecurity in the region. However, Jakarta may be set to swim in deeper waters: Indonesia was among 20 countries invited to join the BRICS group of “middle powers,” and the only one from Southeast Asia. Jakarta deferred membership for two years in order to “consult” with regional leaders, leaving the new president to make a decision on entering the BRICS, but Indonesia is not likely to turn down the opportunity to play a greater role on the world stage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, BRICS, Rivalry, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

557. Regional Overview: Building Partnerships Amidst Major Power Competition

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Major power competition was the primary topic du jure at virtually all of this trimester’s major multilateral gatherings, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continuing to serve as a litmus test—a test many participants struggled to avoid taking. It was clear which side of the fence the G7 leaders stood on; Putin’s invasion was soundly condemned and Sino-centric warning bells were again gently sounded. At the BRICS Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sans the US), those alarms were clearly muted, as they were at the ASEAN Regional Forum, at which foreign ministers from all three were present. Headlines from the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue focused on the meeting that did not occur, as China’s defense minister pointedly refused to meet with his US counterpart. At the ASEAN-ISIS’ Asia-Pacific Roundtable, participants lamented the impact of major power tensions on ASEAN unity, even though ASEAN’s main challenges are internal ones that predate the downturn in China-US relations. Meanwhile, Beijing and Washington both expended considerable effort at these and other events throughout the reporting period fortifying and expanding their partnerships, even as many neighbors struggled not to choose sides or to keep a foot in both camps.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Partnerships, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

558. Arabia Saudita ante una disyuntiva, ¿Occidente u Oriente?

Author:: Federico Franceschini
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: La reciente visita en diciembre de 2022 del presidente Xi Jinping a Riad ha sido motivo de intensos y preocupados análisis por parte de politólogos y analistas, que leyeron en la bienvenida otorgada al mandatario chino la culminación del alejamiento de Arabia Saudita de su alianza con Washington. Inmediatas fueron las comparaciones con el viaje en julio del presidente norteamericano Joe Biden. Los periodistas internacionales buscaron, analizando sonrisas y formas de saludos, encontrar diferencias de trato como elemento discriminante para un eventual favoritismo de una potencia sobre la otra.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

559. Guyana: Oil, Internal Disputes, the USA and Venezuela

Author:: Raphael Padula, Matheus de Freitas Cecílio, Igor Candido de Oliveira, and Caio Jorge Prado
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: Guyana has a strategic geographic position in the Amazon and the Greater Caribbean area, as revealed in the strategic thinking and military presence of the United States (USA). Its territory also possesses abundant natural resources, especially after the recent and significant oil discoveries, having the American company ExxonMobil as protagonist. Meanwhile, the country is characterised by a domestic political and ethnic cleavage. In addition, Venezuela and Guyana are in a historical dispute for the Essequibo area, which is potentially endowed and surrounded by areas with strategic resources. The main argument of the paper is that the oil discoveries in Guyana are leading to geopolitical and geoeconomic impacts regarding the intensification of domestic and foreign disputes, involving American and Venezuelan interests and recent state actions. More broadly, it points out that the north of South America has become one of the stages of the global power strife, in view of the Sino-Russian and American presences, in a context of Brazil’s absence. To survey and evaluate the actors’ actions resulting from the oil findings in Guyana, the paper is based on geopolitical and geoeconomic concepts, energy data, specialised academic and journalistic bibliography.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, Venezuela, Guyana, and United States of America

560. Eight Contradictions of the Imperialist ‘Rules-Based Order’

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: We are now entering a qualitatively new phase of world history. Significant global changes have emerged in the years since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. This can be seen in a new phase of imperialism and changes in the particularities of eight contradictions.
Topic:: Economics, Human Rights, Imperialism, Financial Crisis, Capitalism, Global South, Socialism, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

561. Visible Limits of the Sino-Russian Unlimited Partnership: Are Spheres of Influence Changing in Central Asia?

Author:: Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine is not only causing enormous militarypolitical and economic damage to the Kremlin, but it is also gradually eroding Moscow’s traditional spheres of influence. While the Kremlin has directed all its resources to wage the war in Ukraine, Russia’s “ally” China is not wasting time, and is seeking to increase its economic and political involvement with the countries of Central Asia. China’s recent moves reveal a crack in Beijing and Moscow’s “unlimited” friendship, as the leaders of China and Russia called the partnership between the two countries back in February 2022. A visible manifestation of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian region was the China-Central Asia Summit held in May, where the host of the event, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, presented the “Grand Development Plan” for Central Asia. Russia was not invited to attend the summit; therefore, the future cooperation plans between the regional countries were discussed without a Russian representative. The great development plan proposed by China covers the main aspects of cooperation - infrastructural development, strengthening of economic ties, and security challenges in the region. By proposing the mentioned plan, Xi Jinping expressed his willingness to give a new impetus to China’s cooperation with Central Asian countries, but without the official involvement of Moscow. Holding such a high-level summit in China indicates that Beijing is trying to conduct regional policy on its own, without its “ally” Russia, and, in certain areas, without even taking into account Russia’s interests. Due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s influence on Central Asia and its role in the region is declining, and China has an ideal moment to fill the vacuum in the absence of Moscow. In addition, Beijing needs to develop its energy and transport land corridors to transport Chinese goods to Europe, for which China is ready to invest billions in Central Asia, and at the same time, to take the regional security initiative on itself. One of the main priorities of China’s foreign policy is to bring the resource-rich countries of Central Asia under its sphere of influence, which obviously means tightening Russia’s interests. It can be assumed that China is aiming to become the dominant political/ economic/military power in the region. Russia’s current military-economic difficulties caused by the war with Ukraine allow Beijing to offer regional countries more prosperity and security guarantees than Moscow can. So the following question arises - is the historically established influence of Russia in Central Asia weakening, while China is gradually strengthening its positioning in the region?
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

562. How Chinese Propaganda Works

Author:: Grigol Julukhidze
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: China is becoming an ever more powerful player in the international political arena. Once a regional power, it now represents the main rival to US global dominance. Over the last few years, Beijing has actively started to apply “propagandistic methods” in order to increase its importance and demonize actual or potential foes. From this point of view, the visibility of the Chinese propaganda model is not as high in Georgia as, for example, the Russian. The main task of the below-presented expert opinion is to illustrate and analyze one of the most powerful machines of disinformation in the world and answer the question, “How does Chinese propaganda work?”
Topic:: Propaganda, Disinformation, and International Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Georgia

563. The People-to-People Exchange Between China and Georgia in the Frames of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Jing Shi
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Since the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in September 2013, the interaction between China and the post-Soviet Eurasian countries has become more dynamic than ever before. Considering the individuality among and differences between these countries (Sun, 2023), and the specific forms of cooperation, China has adopted unified but differentiated objectives and plans for collaboration with them. A key feature is that countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative receive preferential policies and conveniences within the cooperation framework. Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation is also being actively seen. The primary case study chosen to illustrate the progress and current status of people-to-people exchange in this paper is the relationship between China and Georgia. Georgia’s case serves as a representative example when examining cooperation and interaction within the BRI. The exploration of China’s BRI lays the groundwork for understanding the broader context of international collaboration. Within this expansive framework, the specific case study of China-Georgia relations provides a nuanced lens through which to examine the intricacies of people-to-people exchange and cooperation. Evaluating China-Georgia relations through traditional perspectives may risk overlooking the full reality. Firstly, Georgia actively participates in the BRI, demonstrating significant interest in collaboration with China for mutual benefits and profits (Gürcan, 2020). Secondly, due to its geographical distance from China compared to Central Asian states, the forms of interaction and connectivity between Georgia and China require efforts from both sides. This dynamic not only presents specific challenges for various forms of cooperation within the BRI framework, but also underscores the significance and value of this research. Thirdly, analyzing the China-Georgia interaction uniquely from the perspective of the BRI is necessary. When discussing China-Georgia relations, people-to-people exchange and cooperation in science, education, culture, and health represent the realization of mutual interests and understanding between the two countries (Shi, 2018).
Topic:: Development, Education, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, Caucasus, Asia, and Georgia

564. China’s strategic relevance to the port of Rotterdam

Author:: Xiaoxue Martin and Frans-Paul van der Putten
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This report analyses whether recent, current and expected China-related developments may threaten the strategic position of the port of Rotterdam in terms of freight flows and how this might play out. This report is based on research conducted on behalf of the Port of Rotterdam Authority. The report comprises four sections covering the following topics, respectively: Changes in Chinese government policy and Chinese corporate strategies towards European seaports, and specifically the Rotterdam port area. Changing attitudes of the EU and the Netherlands towards Chinese influence in European seaports due to geopolitical factors. Chinese interests and ownership in the port of Rotterdam, including the (future) development of Chinese FDI and freight flow. Sanction scenarios and changing freight flows.
Topic:: Development, Geopolitics, Logistics, and Ports
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Netherlands, and Rotterdam

565. The BRICS Expansion: Challenges for Consensus, Promises of Influence

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The BRICS bloc has expanded to include six new member states, but this expansion may deepen and complicate differences within it and weaken its ability to make influential decisions collectively
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Economy, Alliance, BRICS, and Consensus
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, and Brazil

566. The Sources of China’s Innovativeness: Why China’s “Unstoppable” Innovation Powerhouse Might Falter

Author:: Tim Rühlig
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Western governments appear to fear that China is an innovation powerhouse on an almost unstoppable path to dominating future technologies. This is quite a turnaround. Only a few years ago, Western policies were crafted on the assumption that China was a copycat incapable of innovation. A focus on Intellectual Property theft as the Chinese “sin” that drove China’s technological development led many in the West to miss what I have identified as the “Five Virtues” that have made China the innovation powerhouse it is today. China’s future success is not inevitable, however, but dependent on a delicate policy ecosystem.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

567. China’s South China Sea Overreach Faces Growing Obstacles

Author:: Denny Roy
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Even without the mandate of a formal international organization, coalitions of willing governments can coalesce around the task of dissuading China from enforcing invalid South China Sea claims.
Topic:: Politics, Territorial Disputes, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and South China Sea

568. The Conventional Wisdom About the Chinese Military Challenge: Incomplete and Unpersuasive

Author:: Steven Kosiak
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Now possessing the world’s largest economy and backed up by an increasingly capable military, in recent years China has grown into an ever more significant and complex concern for the United States, its friends and allies, and others in the Indo–Pacific region. It has become not only stronger and more capable but, in a variety of areas, including the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, more assertive. In this light, it is only prudent that the United States remain engaged in the region and, along with its allies, maintain robust military capabilities. At the same time, however, it is difficult to understand some of the main features of what has emerged as the conventional wisdom concerning the magnitude, scope and shape of the challenge China represents, particularly in its military dimensions. Among other things, shortcomings in the conventional wisdom include the unsettling degree to which mainstream assessments of the Chinese military challenge have: • devoted enormous attention to various Taiwan contingencies and, by comparison, remarkably little attention to the Chinese military’s capacity — or lack thereof — to directly conquer or coerce any of the major powers in the region; • equated defending Taiwan, and other relatively small nearby economies, with preventing Chinese regional hegemony, without providing significant analytical support for the presumption; • argued that Taiwan is defensible, in part because of the vulnerability of seaborne invasion forces to precision-guided munitions, as well as the difficulties inherent strategies aimed at punishing adversaries into submission (e.g., through bombardment or blockade) — while seeming to ignore the logical inferences of those conclusions for the defensibility of the major powers in the region, which are larger, economically stronger and generally located much farther from China; • analogized the challenge posed by China today to the threats posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War Two and the Soviet Union during the Cold War in ways that — because of differences in, among other things, geography, technology, nationalism, and China’s role in the global economy (including its great dependence on international trade) — may do more to obscure than illuminate the challenge. These analytical shortcomings need to be addressed through additional, more rigorous and better focused research and analysis. While clearly needed, however, it seems unlikely that this additional analysis will come close to fully redeeming the conventional wisdom about the Chinese military challenge as articulated today, including the necessity of some key components of the U.S. military’s existing force structure, modernization and other plans. Taken together, the gaps, weaknesses, blind spots, and analytical leaps upon which the conventional wisdom rests appear too pervasive and deep for such to be the case. Given this reality, rather than the current U.S. strategy, embracing something akin to the Active Denial strategy proposed by a Quincy Institute panel in 2022 would seem to represent a more prudent approach. 1 This strategy embraces some cuts to force structure — especially among ground forces — yielding significant budgetary savings. But it retrains robust air, naval and other forces that would leave the U.S. military with a powerful capacity to deter and, if need be, counter Chinese aggression in the Indo–Pacific and, specifically, to support key U.S. allies and friends in the region. And better addressing the areas noted above could go far towards facilitating the refinement of this more restrained strategy, and ensuring that it is both as effective as possible and can be supported at an affordable and sustainable price.
Topic:: Nationalism, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, and United States of America

569. Connecting the Pieces: China’s Bricolage Surveillance System

Author:: Kevin D. Haggerty
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Over the last decade, China’s ruling Communist Party has been molding a style of governance built on advanced surveillance capabilities. In some respects, this development is not novel. Modern states have long used surveillance to identify geopolitical risks, fight crime, deliver services, and conduct wars, among other objectives.2 As such, surveillance is normatively neutral; it encompasses practices that run the gamut from appealing to appalling. However, recent developments in China fall on the shocking end of this continuum, signaling an unsettling qualitative and quantitative transformation in state-conducted surveillance. Those interested in the dynamics of governance, the contemporary international order, and the emergence of techno-totalitarianism should pay close attention. China’s surveillance measures restrict millions of peoples’ liberties and are crucial in facilitating the unfolding genocide of the Uyghur people. Furthermore, Chinese officials are globally exporting both these surveillance technologies and the repressive governmental ambitions that shape their use.3 State surveillance involves using familiar tools, such as CCTV cameras and spies, and a tremendous assortment of other devices and systems designed to make populations, processes, and places legible.4 China distinguishes itself not only by the sheer volume of its monitoring devices, but also by optimizing and integrating its computing capabilities into a system unparalleled in scope and efficiency. Since assuming the Presidency in 2012, Xi Jinping has increasingly embraced surveillance, positioning information technology as a centerpiece of China’s pursuit of national stability and enhanced geopolitical standing. Such monitoring serves diverse purposes, but a central concern of the Communist Party is to maintain “social stability.” This catch-all euphemism empowers the authorities to identify and “correct” an eclectic and extraordinarily inclusive assortment of activities through not only more surveillance, but also surveil- lance-augmented forms of shaming, intimidation, re-education, violence, and disappearance. This essay focuses on factors that have contributed to the expansion of totalitarian surveillance in China and offers a framework for interpreting these developments beyond the usual fixation on novel technological tools. While the term “totalitarian” is often used loosely as a simple condemnation, it is apt here given the scope and form of social control currently being pursued by PRC authorities. Monitoring in China has become integral to censorship, propaganda, and unvarnished repression—all tactics that advance and protect the Communist Party’s idiosyncratic vision of social stability. As a result, the Chinese state’s desire for domestic order now entails inspecting everyday life at a granular level that was previously inconceivable.
Topic:: Governance, Surveillance, Totalitarianism, Censorship, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China and Asia

570. Assessing Disproportionate Territorial Development: Insights from 10 Countries

Author:: Davit Hakhverdyan and Gagik Badadyan
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Territorial development disparities are an undeniable reality for all the countries of the world, which implies that no country can practically avoid them. However, how different countries respond to these disparities is another matter. The effectiveness of policies in overcoming territorial development disparities depends significantly on how deeply these disparities are recognized and studied. In this context, assessing disparities in territorial development is necessary, and the article proposes a methodology for its implementation. The methodology examines territorial development indexes and their relative standard deviation. In the article, the developed methodology was also applied to 10 countries, as a result of which the levels of territorial development disparities in Canada, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Serbia, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and China were evaluated. Based on the assessments, general conclusions are also presented for each country in the article.
Topic:: Methodology, Territorial Development, Disparity, and Modeling
Political Geography:: China, Moldova, Canada, Finland, Kazakhstan, Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Georgia

571. Technological Sophistication Made in China? – New Insights from Germany’s Evaluation of COVID-19 Antigen Rapid Tests

Author:: Silas Dreier and Wan-Hsin Liu
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: By analyzing a unique dataset from Germany’s evaluation of COVID-19 antigen rapid tests, we show that Chinese firms can excel under today’s global competition and produce tests at quality levels higher than China’s income level would suggest. We find these achievements are positively associated with China’s rising innovation capability and robust industrial base. Further strengthening China’s innovation and industrial base to support Chinese firms’ future accomplishments is what the Chinese government clearly aims for. This would intensify the challenges facing Western economies that strive for technological sovereignty and eagerly seek to de-risk their economic relations with China.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Innovation, Trade, COVID-19, Production, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Germany

572. Spring 2023 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS LILIT HARUTYUNYAN SUNNI AND SHIA COMMUNITIES’ TRANSFORMATIONS IN LEBANON: CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF POWER ……………………………………………………………………………………..6 KUANG-HO YEH, GUIHUA NI CHINA-PAKISTAN SPACE COOPERATION: PATH, MOTIVATION AND THE FUTURE …………………………………..…......................................................26 ARAM GASPARYAN SOME ASPECTS OF THE ALGERIAN-RUSSIAN MILITARY COOPERATION: THE FEATURES AND PROSPECTS................................................................... .51 WU YEYAN A STUDY ON JAPANESE MINGEI’S BIRTH IN TAISHO ERA AND ALIENATION IN SHOWA ERA ……………………………………………...….64 REPORT CURRENT TRENDS IN TERRORISM: PROGRAM ON TERRORISM AND SECURITY STUDIES HELD AT THE GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES IN GERMANY………………………………………………………..…………….….76 WORKSHOP THE PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY OF 2023……………………………………………………………………..…………..80
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Terrorism, History, Bilateral Relations, Sectarianism, Domestic Politics, Space, Sunni, and Shiism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Japan, China, South Asia, Middle East, Asia, Germany, and Lebanon

573. Fall 2023 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS LILIT HARUTYUNYAN THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS ON LEBANON: GEOPOLITICAL ASPECT (THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT) ............................................................. 5 ZHAO DONGQIAN THE EVOLUTION, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND PROSPECTS OF THE CHINESE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ................................ 15 NAZELI NAVASARDYAN, TATEVIK MANUKYAN RESUMPTION OF THE KURDISH CARD IN IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS: COMPLEX INTERPLAY, PRE-REFERENDUM REALITIES ........................... 31 ARTYOM TONOYAN, LIANA PETROSYAN THE MUSAVAT AZERBAIJAN POLICY TOWARDS KURDS: PARALLELS WITH POST-SOVIET AZERBAIJAN’S ETHNIC POLICY ............................... 46 KUANG-HO YEH THE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM, APPLICATION, AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF TURKEY’S DRONE STRATEGY ............ 63 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THE SYRIAN CRISIS AND THE KURDISH FACTOR: INTRA-KURDISH, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS ............................................... 83
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Minorities, Geopolitics, Drones, International Relations Theory, Syrian War, and Kurds
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Asia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, and Syria

574. EU-China relations in an uncertain world: Walking a geopolitical tightrope

Author:: Sinikukka Saari, Niklas Helwig, Juha Jokela, and Mikael Mattlin
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: After the 2008 financial crisis, the EU’s approach towards China shifted from overconfidence in European normative power to an embrace of unconditional economic engagement with China. The EU policy of de-risking is critically important, but it needs to be carefully considered, managed, and communicated to China. US-China tensions and American debates on China impact the EU’s approach. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between European and US positions on China irrespective of which party holds power in the US. China’s position on Russia’s war of aggression is a make-or-break issue for the EU. By actively enabling Russia’s invasion, China is harming its own long-term interests in Europe and globally. It is in Europe’s interests to avoid framing current international dynamics in terms of “the West and the rest”. Although this discourse may be popular domestically, there is a danger of it becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

575. Taiwan's Security Future: How Domestic Politics Impact Taipei’s Defense

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: With a presidential election fast approaching, Taipei’s defense policy could go in multiple directions. As China has grown more militarily capable and assertive under President Xi Jinping, Beijing’s promise to forcibly unify with Taiwan has increasingly worried both Taiwan and the United States. Beijing’s large-scale military exercise near Taiwan this fall underscores the role Taiwan’s own military capabilities play in deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To that end, US policymakers have increased defense cooperation with Taiwan and urged Taipei to do more for its defense in recent years. However, whether Taipei will stick to the defense policies implemented under current president Tsai Ing-wen is uncertain. This coming January, Taiwan’s voters will select a new president. Currently leading the polls is Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is committed to Taiwan’s sovereignty and views Taiwan as effectively already independent. Beijing has angrily decried this position and boycotted talks with Taipei as long as the DPP remains in power. Meanwhile, the path ahead for the Kuomintang (KMT), the primary opposition party, is riven with internal fissures. The party has traditionally sought closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing to defuse tensions—something it seems uniquely qualified for, since the PRC will not talk to the current DPP government. Yet emphasizing dialogue with an increasingly aggressive PRC, especially after Xi’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s limited self-government in 2020, has soured many voters on the KMT’s message. In response, reformers in the party have suggested a new direction more closely aligned with the DPP on national security to win back moderate voters, while traditionalists have doubled down on the old promise of peace through dialogue. This latter path would be worrying for the Biden administration, which has increased arms sales to Taipei and presided over a period of worsening US-China mistrust. US concerns are a helpful reminder that, whether discussing Taiwan’s future or the risk of a catastrophic cross-Strait war, Taiwan’s own politics cannot be ignored. The rigor of Taipei’s defense—and, with it, the health of cross-Strait deterrence—will depend largely on the course Taiwan’s politics take.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Elections, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, East Asia, and United States of America

576. China Maritime Report No. 33: China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications

Author:: David C. Logan
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Maritime, Deterrence, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

577. China Maritime Report No. 32: The PCH191 Modular Long-Range Rocket Launcher: Reshaping the PLA Army's Role in a Cross-Strait Campaign

Author:: Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: With its fielding of the PCH191 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) and its variety of long-range precision munitions, the PLA Army (PLAA) has become arguably the most important contributor of campaign and tactical firepower during a joint island landing campaign against Taiwan. No longer simply the primary source of amphibious and air assault forces, the PLAA is now capable of using its multiple battalions of PCH191 MRLs to support maritime dominance, the joint firepower strike, and ground forces landing on Taiwan’s shores and in depth. The Chinese ordnance industry has developed multiple low-cost rockets, an anti-ship cruise missile, and a tactical missile to be used with the PCH191, as well as its export variant, the AR3, including munitions that can quickly and precisely strike targets in the Taiwan Strait, across the island, and beyond. Recent demonstrations of the PCH191 during PLA training events and Eastern Theater Command response actions to politically charged visits, in addition to the fielding of new reconnaissance assets capable of providing targeting and battle damage assessments to the MRL, make it clear the Army intends to use the system to achieve effects in a future Taiwan crisis that formerly would have been the responsibility of other PLA services.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Weapons, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

578. Creative Freedom and Censorship: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Framework for Ott Contents in the UK, India, and China

Author:: Siddharth Kanojia
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The emergence of over-the-top (OTT) services has lately revolutionized the way people consume media content. These services have emerged as a significant disruptor in the media industry in recent years. With the advent of OTT platforms, various concerns have arisen over the censorship and regulation of content on these platforms. Accordingly, this paper has examined the current trends in censorship and regulation of OTT content through the perusal of various legal and regulatory frameworks in the United Kingdom, India, and China. It has probed into cases of censorship and examined various aspects of civil and political liberties. The analysis has revealed a persuasive connection between the degree of freedom of expression and creative freedom dispensed in each region. Lastly, the paper has provided recommendations for policymakers and other stakeholders on balancing the need for freedom of expression and access to information with responsible content management and regulation.
Topic:: Regulation, Freedom of Expression, and Censorship
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, and India

579. Here are Four Things the West gets Wrong about Africa

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: External powers are intensifying their efforts to woo African states and their leaders in a context of Great Power Competition. Russian, Chinese and Western leaders are upping their game with new visits, initiatives, investments and strategies aimed at increasing their influence on the continent. Yet, while Western states spend comparatively large financial and human resources in Africa, these investments do not always seem to translate into the intended effects. This brief looks at four things that the West gets wrong about Africa and argues that to create long-term and credible partnerships with African partners there is a need to go beyond the Great Power Competition lens, lower the ambitions, and dial down on the normative language. This, while realising that presence does not equal influence, but absence almost certainly excludes it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, and Europe

580. The EU and Taiwan: Normalizing the Status Quo

Author:: Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: When I read Egmont colleague Sven Biscop’s My Summer in Beijing, I was just about to depart to a little-recognized political entity off the Chinese coast that – constitutionally, at least – still claims Beijing as part of its territory: The Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan). Unlike my colleague, I was not questioned on the academic desirability of my stay – Taiwan has over the last few decades consistently ranked in the higher echelons of academic freedom. I was, however, counselled on multiple occasions to reconsider by concerned family and friends who had seen sensational media reports claiming that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could attack at any moment. Staying in a serene yet vibrant Taipei, visiting multiple places of interest and meeting with local scholars, I have noticed that confusion reigns not only in Europe toward Taiwan, but also in Taiwan toward Europe. Especially the cross-Strait position of the EU, which does not recognize Taiwan due to ‘its “one China” policy’ but has over the last two decades increased the scope of engagement with Taiwan, is little understood. As exchanges between Brussels and Taipei intensify, there is an increasing urgency to consolidate the EU’s position on Taiwan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

581. EU-Pacific Talks: Taiwan and security dimension – lessons learned, Indo-Pacific containment

Author:: Adam Horry
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: During the first debate of the third edition of the EU-Pacific Talks, organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants engaged in a lively debate covering various aspects of Taiwan's status. They discussed the economic, military and value drivers behind Taiwan's importance, addressing concerns about China's approach and lessons from other global conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. Read what our guests debated in this report by Adam Horry.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Deterrence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

582. Chinese Soft Power

Author:: Robert Edmund Łoś
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: China’s modern power is based on traditional sources: territory size, demographics, economy, and army. An important factor of power is soft power, which is based on culture, foreign policy (including economics), and values. Chinese soft power resources have an old tradition and the possibility of using them is large, and most importantly, in the current international environment, they can use them to gain and maintain an advantage over competitors. The article presents the elements of China’s soft power that determine its advantage over other countries and the weaknesses that may limit its influence. It largely determines the research methods used: statistics and system analysis. The latter method makes it possible to determine the scale of China’s influence and the chances of using them in the 21st century.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Culture, Soft Power, and Values
Political Geography:: China and Asia

583. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023

Author:: Decker Eveleth
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China is currently in the process of radically expanding its arsenal of conventional and nuclear land-based missile launchers. Over the past decade China has doubled the number of combat missile brigades in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), and has unveiled a myriad of new capabilities, including missiles capable of firing both conventional and nuclear warheads, and missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles designed to evade missile defenses. The technologies and deployment patterns of these weapons are important indicators of the direction of China’s force posture: they not only indicate China’s military capabilities, but also its fears and its conceptions about how future wars in the region will be conducted. Deployment of particular systems with certain capabilities to certain regions can inform us of what, how, and when China might strike certain targets, which in turn can help us understand what China prioritizes as a threat. The current expansion of China’s missile forces suggests a possible departure from China’s previously restrained second-strike nuclear posture to a posture capable of deterring at multiple levels of conflict and an increased shift towards nuclear warfighting. As the Sino-American relationship becomes increasingly volatile over the status of Taiwan, gaining accurate data on China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces becomes more important than ever. Since China first established a ballistic missile force, that force has historically been quite small, kept at low levels of readiness, and constrained by a policy forswearing the first use of nuclear weapons. A little over a decade ago, China only possessed around 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), of which only the 18 DF-5 ICBMs in silos and 12 DF-31A mobile launchers could reliably reach the contiguous United States. 1 After Xi Jinping elevated China’s missile forces into a full branch of the People’s Liberation Army in 2015, the number of missile launchers deployed by the PRC has increased rapidly. The PLARF, responsible for the operation of all non-tactical ground-based surface-to-surface missile systems in China’s inventory, operates both conventional and nuclear missiles for a variety of strategic missions. This could include utilizing short, medium, and intermediate-range missiles to neutralize Taiwanese defensive installations, striking US warships at long-range while those warships are at sea or in port, or a retaliatory nuclear strike mission. The PLARF is now on track to deploy more than 1,000 ballistic missile launchers by 2028, including at least 507 nuclear capable launchers, 342 to 432 conventional launchers, and 252 dual-capable launchers. At least 320 solid-fueled fixed ICBM silos and 30 liquid-fueled fixed ICBM silos are currently under construction in addition to China’s growing arsenal of mobile ICBM launchers. And this tally does not even touch launchers operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The dramatic multiplication in missile forces, both in terms of those missiles capable of reaching the United States, and those missiles that offer China new capabilities in a regional war, have serious implications for the strategic balance in East Asia as well as the future direction of China’s nuclear posture. The direction of the posture is difficult to assess due to the lack of sources coming out of China. As the Chinese government has not officially commented on the buildup or acknowledged its scope, any concrete data, like statements and records from the PLARF itself or Chinese strategists, is hard to come by. Because of this, analysis of what the PLARF is actually deploying and in what quantity is one of our only windows into developments into how the PRC thinks about its nuclear weapons arsenal and how to use it. Open-source intelligence techniques allow researchers to collect this data. By utilizing publicly available information and commercial satellite imagery, researchers can examine foreign military organizations in a level of detail that was previously only available to state intelligence agencies.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

584. Can Australia and China have a stable relationship?

Author:: Yun Jiang
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: With the first visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by an Australian Prime Minister since 2016, the Albanese Government has successfully stabilised the bilateral relationship in just over a year. This stabilisation comes after a severe deterioration in ties under the Morrison Government. Albanese’s visit to the PRC resolved many of the frictions from the Morrison years. But can this stability continue? What underlying factors could derail it in the medium to long term? In this report, drawing upon research in the PRC in late August 2023, AIIA-China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang explores the perspectives of PRC academics and analysts regarding the future of Australia-PRC relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

585. Finding Firmer Ground: The Role of High Technology in U.S.-China Relations

Author:: Sara Hsu, Ja Ian Chong, Rorry Daniels, Hargisl Shirley Martey, and John Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Carter Center
Abstract:: The latest installment in the Finding Firmer Ground report series examines how technological advancements have increased distrust and uncertainty in U.S.-China relations. From big data to semiconductors, the multiauthor report looks into the geopolitical implications of technological development and what strategies, if any, policymakers in the United States and China can take to mitigate tensions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

586. Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: The danger of armed confrontation over Taiwan is growing, raising the spectre of a direct conflict between China and the U.S. that would have severe global repercussions. Managing this risk will require the parties to rebuild trust by shoring up decades-old understandings.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Risk, and Coercion
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Taiwan Strait

587. Thin Ice in the Himalayas: Handling the India-China Border Dispute

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Frictions along the India-China frontier have heated up following a burst of fighting in 2020, the first in decades. The danger of more will lurk as long as the countries disagree over where the line lies. Both should take steps to manage the mounting risks.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Territorial Disputes, Borders, and Risk
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Himalayas

588. CCP Ideology, 1976-1980: From the “Two Whatevers,” to the “Criterion of Truth,” to the “Four Cardinal Principles,” and beyond

Author:: Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Nowhere is this period more misunderstood than in the area of ideology and its notional centrality to an imagined Hua-Deng power struggle. In the accepted narrative, a critical feature of this struggle is the February 1977 “two whatevers” editorial notionally requiring support for all of Mao’s decisions, that allegedly sought to prevent Deng’s return to work and to enforce a rigid ideological framework preventing significant change from Mao’s practices. In fact, Deng’s return to high office had been decided at the start of January, and more importantly, from the earliest days of Hua’s leadership, the task was to move away from Mao’s Cultural Revolution but to maintain regime stability and unity by expressing fealty to a leader still deeply worshipped in major sections of the population and respected by Party leaders, notably those of the revolutionary generation. Claims that “whateverists” engaged in an intense struggle with reformers seeking a pragmatic approach under the slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” beginning in May 1978 are not totally amiss, but they exaggerate the situation and do not adequately account for the fact that the conflict was largely among lower-level figures on the theoretical front who did not deeply engage the top leadership. There were nuanced differences between Hua and Deng on the “criterion of truth” question but nothing fundamental, and neither wanted ideological issues to disrupt the economic agenda of the fall 1978 pre-Third Plenum work conference. At the conference, however, arguments initiated by progressive theorists resulted in official acceptance of the criterion position, although there was high-level concern, most prominently expressed by Deng, for proceeding with caution, particularly as it related to Mao’s prestige. More broadly, in Party ranks many felt the plenum’s policies had gone too far and were leading to disruption in society. At the end of March 1979, Deng reacted with his “four cardinal principles” speech that demanded adherence to the political practice of Mao’s pre-Cultural Revolution period. This not only alarmed progressives but it also created leadership concern that the practical focus of the Third Plenum policies was being undermined. Deng then sought to bolster those policies, but at the time of the 30th anniversary of the PRC, he still gave priority to the “four principles” and defence of Mao. Indeed, he explicitly affirmed a lavish claim concerning Mao’s essential role in the Party’s successes, the same claim that had appeared in the “two whatevers” editorial more than two and a half years earlier.
Topic:: Politics, History, Ideology, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

589. Working Class Formation in China Since 1920

Author:: Marc Blecher
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: Chinese workers have been the subjects of a great deal of analysis by scholars, documentation by journalists and activists, and portrayal by writers, filmmakers and artists. Light has been shone on the rich tapestry of economic, social, cultural and political forces driving them into low-paid, dangerous, degrading, alienating, mind-numbing, transient employment, on the obstacles to improvement, on workers’ understandings of their world and their lives in it, on their passivity and resistance, and on the effects of their responses. A World to Lose seeks the foundation for all this in three questions: what kind of class is the Chinese working class? What are the historical forces and processes that have formed it and how does the pattern of class formation help explain the working class’s reactions historically, presently and even prospectively? It approaches these questions through the lenses of hegemony theory and political development/path (in)dependence.
Topic:: Development, History, Labor Issues, and Workers
Political Geography:: China and Asia

590. When the State Becomes the Only Buyer: Monopsony in China’s Public Procurement of Medical Technology

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Anna Guildea
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: China’s centralised state procurement policies are moving the Chinese market of medical technologies in a monopsonistic direction. A monopsony means that a single buyer exerts strong power to move the market to its favour by gradually cutting prices and setting terms for producers that are extortionary. It is equivalent to a monopoly – with the only difference being that in a monopsony, it is the single buyer that acts in a market-predatory manner. Ultimately, a monopsonistic market empowers the buyer to capture most of the financial rewards from a contract. Competition gets undermined because a vibrant market also requires competition between buyers and, over time, fewer firms will be able to supply the procured goods at terms that are set by the single buyer. This shift towards monopsony does not happen overnight, it is a process that builds on a number of steps that tilts the balance of power in favour of the buyer. First, there is a concentration of buyers, sometimes down to a single buyer – such as the state. This concentration of buyers acts to extract value from sellers by creating pressure to reduce and converge prices. Buyers in monopsonistic conditions may also add other objectives to their agenda, using their monopsonistic position to abuse the market. For example, political objectives may be in place, which can include discrimination against foreign companies or corruption. Finally, there is a consolidation of the market, with fewer suppliers overall, and a focus on price rather than innovation. Several characteristics of a market could be indicative of a monopsony. One of these indicators is the price. In the case of the Chinese market for medical technology, price reductions have been sustained across medical devices, with price cuts exceeding 90 percent in some medical products. When the buyer’s primary focus is to reduce prices, the risk is that low-quality products will drive out high-quality products. Another indicator is price convergence: the idea that one price should apply to the whole market. Price convergence can be observed as the distance between the average and maximum price reduction offered by companies. The small differences seen in the Chinese procurement of medical technologies for these two indicators indicates that prices are converging downwards. Forcing a convergence of prices breaks with natural market behaviour and overall leads to a market with fewer participants. In a monopsony, the buyer tends to capture the dominant part of the market value of the product, which squeezes the margins of sellers. Over time, this leads to fewer competitors as only a few companies can survive under such conditions. These dynamics have real consequences: the number of winning companies in the procurement of medical technology per one million people in China is substantially lower than in the EU. In addition to a reduced reliance on multiple suppliers, the Chinese centralised state procurement reinforces China’s industrial policy to support Chinese firms growing their domestic market shares to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. These are the consequences of a market that is increasingly taking a monopsonistic form. Public procurement does not have to follow the Chinese recipe of centralised state procurement. There is a substantial body of evidence, research, and studies that recommend specific procurement policies that tackle the monopsonistic tendencies embedded in public procurement markets. These recommendations emphasize the importance of competition without lowering the number of firms in the market, underlining the need for a long-term view on how the market delivers continuous innovation. The danger for China is that monopsony will collapse the future market by making it less attractive for companies to innovate and compete. Chinese centralised state procurement and the move towards monopsony will not go unnoticed. These policies clearly breach basic principles and norms of international exchange, and how governments should behave to avoid a distortion of competition. First, Chinese centralised state procurement favours the Chinese medical technology industry to the detriment of non-Chinese companies. Second, given the low prices achieved in Chinese centralised state procurements, there is a risk that firm’s margins are severely cut, putting a lid on global spending on R&D. The EU and the US should coordinate their policies to counter the monopsonistic tendencies of the Chinese market of medical technologies. Their markets for medical technologies are significantly larger than the Chinese market and Chinese companies rely on the US and the European market to maintain their growth. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) offers a setting to take these discussions forward and agree on policies to counter Chinese market distortions.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Health Care Policy, Public Procurement, and Monopsony
Political Geography:: China and Asia

591. Starr Forum: The Future of US - China Relations

Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Moderator: Taylor Fravel is Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program (SSP). He studies international relations, with a focus on international security, China, and East Asia. Panelists: Eric Heginbotham is a principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS) and SSP. He is a specialist in Asian security issues. Before joining MIT, he was a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he led research projects on China, Japan, and regional security issues. Ketian Vivian Zhang is an assistant professor of international Security in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She studies rising powers, coercion, economic statecraft, and maritime disputes in international relations and social movements in comparative politics, with a regional focus on China and East Asia. Ali Wyne is a senior analyst with Eurasia Group's Global Macro practice, where he focuses on US-China relations and great-power competition. He is the author of a forthcoming book, America's Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing US Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

592. Prospects for the Launch of the Digital Yuan

Author:: Oskar Szydłowski
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Among the digital currency projects developed by major economies, the Chinese digital yuan (e-CNY) is the most advanced. After pilot projects in selected Chinese regions, the biggest test was to be at the Winter Olympics in Beijing. The spread of the digital yuan will enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its digital authoritarianism through increased surveillance of citizens’ finances. It may also increase the Chinese currency’s share of international transactions in the region. The success of the e-CNY should accelerate the ECB’s work on a privacy-preserving digital euro.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Digital Currency, and Yuan
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

593. Determinants of China's Policy Towards the War in Ukraine

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s position on the war in Ukraine depends mainly on the stabilisation of China’s internal situation before the 20th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress planned for autumn this year. By holding NATO responsible for the conflict, the CCP reinforces its rhetoric about the legitimacy of the rivalry with the U.S. China’s signals on supporting peace negotiations and not helping Russia to circumvent sanctions are intended to protect China from possible Western secondary sanctions. The prospect of further Sino-Russian cooperation should induce the EU to reduce its economic interdependence with China.
Topic:: War, Sanctions, European Union, Rivalry, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

594. The International Dimension of the U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption

Author:: Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The first Strategy on Countering Corruption, adopted on 6 December 2021, assumes that by making better use of existing international regulations and organisations, as well as by establishing new mechanisms, the U.S. will tighten global anti-corruption cooperation. The American goal is to limit the freedom to conduct financial operations by authoritarian states, mainly China and Russia, and at the same time to strengthen democratic countries and promote democracy. For Poland, this is an opportunity to tighten bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United States.
Topic:: Corruption, International Cooperation, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

595. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold

Author:: Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

596. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

597. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

598. The rise of China and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:: Markus Kaim and Angela Stanzel
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China’s rise is shaking up international power relations and is calling into question Western ideas of regional and global order. NATO, too, is confronted with the necessity of dealing with the challenges posed by China. This has been reflected in various NATO statements since 2019. According to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “China does not share our values” and “uses modern technology, so- cial media [and] facial recognition, to monitor, to do surveillance of their own population in a way we have never seen before”. “All of this makes it important for NATO to strengthen our policy when it comes to China”, he added.1 NATO Allies only paid attention to the significance of the People’s Republic on their security policy com- paratively late. For a long time, the dominant view was that the Alliance and Beijing were pursuing a num- ber of common interests, e.g. in the areas of crisis management, counter-piracy and in the countering of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.2 Only China’s rise on the international scene and the resulting rivalry with the US in recent years have led to Beijing’s foreign policy to appear on the Alliance’s agenda.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and North America

599. Global Value Chains, Risk Perception, and Economic Statecraft

Author:: Phoebe Moon
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Many countries, including the United States and China, have come to see economic statecraft as superior to armed conflict. Faced with a trading partner’s economic sanctions, some countries try to avoid risk by complying with or ignoring the coercer’s demands, but others retaliate and escalate conflict. In recent years, sanctions have been applied, not only to “rogue” states, but against trading partners. The United States and China, but also Japan, Australia, and Canada, were either the target or purveyor of economic coercion by or against trading partners in the last five years. However, not all resulted in trade wars. When, then, do economic sanctions lead to trade wars? This policy brief examines the ongoing Japan-South Korea trade dispute with a focus on how policymakers’ risk perceptions regarding global value chains (GVCs) can influence when trade wars take shape.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, National Security, Economy, Innovation, Global Value Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

600. Maximizing the Benefits of Trade for Africa

Author:: Prince Paa-Kwesi Heto
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: African countries are increasingly integrating into global supply chains (GSC). Yet the linkages between African and foreign firms and the impact of GSC activities on the development prospects of African states is not well understood. This policy brief analyzes GSC trade between the U.S. and China, on the one hand, and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) member states on the other. It shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that SACU states export raw materials with few value-added products, SACU states are actually positioned further up in the supply chain hierarchy. They import intermediate inputs from China and export a substantial volume of intermediate goods to the U.S. rather than to China. Moreover, GSC trade is diversifying the countries’ exports and increasing their industrial capacity, positioning African countries to attract companies moving out of China, whether because of high production costs, supply chain disruptions, U.S. tariffs, or geopolitical tension between the U.S. and China. But SACU states will need to adopt smart policies to upgrade existing supply chains and position themselves to build or attract new GSCs to their region.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, National Security, Innovation, Trade, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS