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51. Laboratories of Autocracy: Centralized Versus Decentralized Policymaking in China

Author:
Kaicheng Luo, Shaoda Wang, and David Y. Yang
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Afundamental question in governance concerns the merits of centralized versus decentralized policymaking. While top-down, centralized policymaking may streamline adoption, enhance efficiency, and improve coordination between regions, it often sacrifices the local suitability of bottom-up, decentralized policy initiatives. This tension is especially relevant when governing large nations with many regional differences. However, measuring centralization in policymaking is difficult because it requires tracing the origin and spread of all policies across layers of government hierarchy; as a result, most studies of centralization and decentralization focus on only one policy. Assessing centralization’s impact on policy outcomes is even more demanding because it involves linking policies to both local conditions and intended outcomes.
Topic:
Governance, Economic Development, Decentralization, Centralization, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

52. Kate Adie: 'A Life in Reporting'

Author:
Kate Adie and Robert Saunders
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
In the Mile End Institute's fifth distinguished Hennessy Lecture, Kate Adie joined ‪Queen Mary University of London's very own ‪Robert Saunders‬ to reflect on her long career as a reporter and explored the challenges facing a reporter in a changing world today. Kate Adie was Chief News Correspondent for BBC News from 1989 to 2003, becoming one of the most famous and respected figures in British journalism. She reported live from the Iranian Embassy Siege in 1980, the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986 and the Lockerbie bombing of 1988. She was at Tiananmen Square in 1989, was shot by a Libyan army commander and reported on the Gulf War and the war in the former Yugoslavia. She has been a freelance journalist since 2003 and presents "From Our Own Correspondent" on BBC Radio 4 and was awarded the CBE in 2018 for services to journalism. She has written five books including "The Kindness of Strangers”, an account of her work as a reporter, "Nobody's Child: The Lives of Abandoned Children" which formed the basis of the BBC series, Found, and "Fighting on the Home Front: The Legacy of Women in World War One".
Topic:
Media, Journalism, Career, and Book Talk
Political Geography:
Britain, China, Iran, Libya, and Yugoslavia

53. Taiwan’s Democratic Backsliding and Resilience: Institutional Backsliding and Sources of Renewal

Author:
Hans H. Tung and Lev Nachman
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Hans H. Tung, Professor at National Taiwan University, and Lev Nachman, Associate Professor at National Taiwan University, examine the signs of democratic backsliding and institutional stress in Taiwan following the 2024 election, highlighting the gridlock between the Legislative Yuan and the Constitutional Court. They point out that this internal polarization, combined with external pressures such as the PRC’s military threats and disinformation campaigns, is undermining Taiwan’s democratic foundations. Ultimately, they underscore that civil society's resilience and international linkages remain the core strengths sustaining Taiwan's democracy, suggesting that protecting the rules of fair competition will determine its future course.
Topic:
Civil Society, Elections, Institutions, Disinformation, Polarization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

54. Assetizing, Trading, Franchising: China's Strategy for Building a National Data Economy

Author:
Ran Guo
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
How can the state harness data as a driver of economic development? This paper examines China’s efforts to expand its data economy since 2022 through a combination of policy and market mechanisms. Two developments signaled this shift. First, the issuance of the Twenty Data Measures in December 2022 articulated a national framework for development-oriented data governance. Second, the establishment of the National Data Administration (NDA) in October 2023 designated a central authority responsible for coordinating data-related economic policymaking. Together, these moves reflect China’s distinctive policy vision — an institutional division of labor in China’s data governance regime, in which developmental functions are increasingly centralized under the NDA, while data security and privacy oversight remain with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and other agencies responsible for enforcing preexisting regulatory frameworks. The paper analyzes three policy experiments aimed at advancing China’s data economy: data assetization, which enables data to be valued and traded as a financial assets; state-owned data exchanges, which provide platforms for the controlled marketization of data; and public data franchising, which grants select entities exclusive rights to commercialize government-held public data. These experiments seek to integrate fragmented local data markets into a unified national market, addressing China’s persistent data fragmentation across jurisdictions and sectors, also called the “data island” problem. While early progress is evident, significant challenges remain, including uneven data quality, weak demand for data products, limited interoperability among domestic data markets, emerging monopolistic tendencies in data franchising, and unresolved privacy and security risks. Globally, China’s state-led data economy is often presented as an alternative to European Union and U.S. approaches to data governance, which tend to frame data governance primarily as a constraint on liberal markets rather than tools to support market construction and development. By examining China’s evolving data governance regime, this paper contributes to comparative debates on data governance and offers insights into why China’s approach may hold particular appeal in non-Western contexts, especially as emerging digital powers actively advance growth-centered political economies around data and AI.
Topic:
Governance, Economic Development, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

55. What to Watch at China's Two Sessions in 2026

Author:
Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s annual “Two Sessions” convene from March 4 to approximately March 11. Thousands of delegates from across the nation will gather in Beijing for one of the most important events on the Chinese political calendar. This year is especially significant because the government will not only announce its annual economic targets but will also publish the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), outlining policy objectives for 2026–2030. Key watchpoints include: How fast does Beijing want the economy to grow this year? How quickly can it shift from old to new growth drivers? Which strategic emerging industries will receive policy support? Is China prioritizing high-tech competition with the United States at the expense of rebalancing toward consumption and services? What signals will Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, send about his personal priorities? Could there be personnel shakeups?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

56. Scam Offensives in Southeast Asia: Comparing Beijing's and Washington's Strategies and Assessing Opportunities for Coordination

Author:
Bryanna Entwhistle
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Disrupting Asia’s cyber scam industry, which is valued at between $88.3 billion and $114.1 billion annually, presents a rare point of mutual interest for the United States and China. Both Chinese and American citizens are both primary targets of complex online fraud schemes run predominantly out of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. To identify where opportunities for cooperation on addressing the issue exist for the United States and China, this paper examines the nature of Beijing's crackdowns on cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia, when Beijing chooses to act, and how. It identifies three core factors driving Chinese action: domestic pressure, reputational damage, and national security concerns. Where these factors converge, as in Myanmar, Beijing has acted swiftly and forcefully. Where reputational pressure collides with countervailing strategic interests, as in Cambodia, Beijing's pressure has been delayed but has grown over time. And where none of the three factors materially apply, as in Laos, Beijing has yet to move against major actors. When Beijing does act, it leverages bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks to conduct joint operations and intelligence gathering with its Southeast Asian partners. Framed under China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), these mechanisms have broadened the country’s security relationships across the region—although partner states have not always welcomed Beijing's inroads. As Beijing conducted raids against scam centers in Myanmar, the industry began redirecting its targeting toward the West: American losses to China-linked criminal groups grew to $10 billion per year by 2024. Washington has responded with a cross-departmental campaign of sanctions, indictments, asset seizures, and takedowns of scam-enabling online infrastructure. Still, the U.S. response is hampered by limited operational capacity on the ground in Southeast Asia and the "whack-a-mole" nature of the industry. Concerns about China’s GSI expansion, intelligence sharing sensitivities, host-state political economies, and Beijing’s treatment of trafficked workers are substantial obstacles that stand in the way of U.S.-China cooperation on this issue. Still, bounded cooperation has the potential to serve the interests of both Beijing and Washington. There appears to be recognition of this on the ministerial level: FBI Director Kash Patel has traveled to Beijing twice in the past year to discuss expanding coordination on tackling cyber scams with China, alongside several other forms of transnational crime. In April, the United States, China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates organized a joint raid on scam centers in Dubai; however, misaligned incentives and strategic distrust have thus far stood in the way of further law enforcement coordination between Beijing and Washington. In support of future law enforcement coordination between China and the United States that takes into account existing obstacles rather than ignoring them, this paper draws on an understanding of Beijing’s cyber scam offensive in Southeast Asia to propose the following recommendations for how Washington could pursue tactical and bounded coordination on the issue: Push for leader-to-leader engagement, drawing on lessons from the fentanyl negotiations; Utilize third countries to mediate and coordinate joint raids and intelligence sharing; Approach Beijing with intelligence-backed asks; Leverage existing channels to facilitate financial intelligence sharing; and Continue using sanctions and indictments to incentivize Beijing to recall key actors.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Law Enforcement, Fraud, Intelligence Sharing, and Scam Centers
Political Geography:
China, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, Myanmar, and United States of America

57. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry

Author:
Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity

Author:
Sungmin Cho
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

60. Global Public Opinion on China: China’s Standing in Southeast Asia’s Swing States

Author:
Kevin Zongzhe Li
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Public opinion toward China across Southeast Asia's swing states has remained net positive over the past two decades, but has steadily declined. The regional average declines from roughly +33 in the 2000s, to +26 in the 2010s, and +20 in the 2020s. The trajectory reflects greater sensitivity to security risks, as China's economic weight and geopolitical presence expanded. The analysis identifies three distinct patterns across the region. In maritime frontline states such as the Philippines and Vietnam, sovereignty confrontations in the South China Sea have been followed by sharp and, sometimes, durable shifts in public sentiment. In maritime tension states such as Indonesia and Malaysia, frictions are present but more tightly managed; public opinion fluctuates but does not experience sustained rupture. In non-frontline states such as Thailand and Singapore, attitudes are comparatively stable, shaped primarily by economic interdependence, domestic political context, and social factors. Attitudes toward China across Southeast Asia's swing states reflect the interaction of economic exposure and sovereignty pressure. Where China is encountered primarily through economic engagement, baseline sentiment tends to remain positive; where territorial disputes become politically salient, attitudes shift more sharply. Public opinion does not move uniformly across Southeast Asia, nor does it point toward simple alignment with or against China. General public perceptions may diverge from the more security-focused views reflected in elite surveys of regional policy, business, and academic communities. While elite responses often emphasize strategic rivalry and risk, public opinion appears to evolve more gradually and remains strongly influenced by economic and social exchange.
Topic:
Economics, Territorial Disputes, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Elites, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand