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401. Los problemas surgidos tras el grave conflicto Israelí-Palestino en Gaza a raíz de los ataques de Hamás del 7 de octubre de 2023

Author:
Romualdo Bermejo and Natalia Ordoñez
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Los ataques del 7 de octubre de 2023 por parte de Hamás contra Israel, y las atrocidades cometidas por los milicianos y terroristas de esta organización, pasarán a la historia como un ejemplo de barbarie, por mucho que no todos los Estados los hayan condenado, e incluso tácitamente aprobado. Si para Israel esto ha sido un segundo "Holocausto", para otros Estados y actores se ha ejercido un derecho de "resistencia". Estos ataques han suscitado una dura reacción de Israel y de sus fuerzas armadas sobre la Franja de Gaza, que es criticada por no respetar el Derecho internacional humanitario, dejando de lado el derecho de legítima defensa. En este contexto, ha vuelto la idea de la creación de un Estado palestino, ahora con más ímpetu,
Topic:
Human Rights, Hamas, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Two-State Solution
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

402. The End of a Partnership and Cooperation. How Sino-Russian partnership ruined perception of China in Central Europe

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Since the first decade of the 21st century, pro-China attitudes have gradually become the political mainstream in Central Europe. Today, however, the relationship between Central European countries and Beijing is different. While Beijing remains an important partner for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have turned away from cooperation with China, and Slovakia's enthusiasm for China has cooled somewhat. This article examines why the Czech Republic and Poland, but not Slovakia and Hungary, have stopped building and maintaining their relations with China. It uses contrafactual analysis to find an answer. The article concludes that what caused the change and ruined the relations between Czechia and Poland on the one hand and China on the other hand was China's building of relations with Russia. In contrast, Hungary and Fico's Slovakia, which have repeatedly refused to recognise the Russian invasion of Ukraine and have maintained relations with Moscow, continue to have good relations with China
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Central Europe, and Slovakia

403. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

404. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2 PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3 Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4 PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives. Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

405. Beyond China's Black Box: Five Trends Shaping Beijing’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-Making Under Xi Jinping

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s foreign and security policymaking apparatus is often described as a metaphorical black box about which analysts know little. That is true to an extent, but at the same time, it is possible to develop a better understanding of the people, institutions, processes, and pressures that go into making China’s policies toward the world during Xi’s “new era,” that is, his time as the country’s top leader. This report pursues that objective by identifying five major trends mostly internal to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-state system that shape its foreign and security policymaking. In addition, the paper describes the effects that each trend generates, from bureaucratic incentives to behavioral patterns. The first trend is personalization of the system around Xi. It reduces the influence of various interest groups and therefore the need to bargain with and among them, raises the prospect of groupthink among the loyalists Xi has surrounded himself with, and potentially increases the importance of achieving certain goals for China on Xi’s watch. In addition, Xi’s centrality creates a major management bottleneck that could hamper the system during even brief absences. The second trend is empowering the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the state. That trend has made more officials into policy-implementers rather than policymakers, even on issues below the level of strategy. It has also increased central demands for ideological activities, such as Xi Jinping Thought study sessions. At the same time, while the leadership wants to improve coordination and might be making some progress, it stops short of actions that could allow government organs to coordinate horizontally if doing so might plausibly jeopardize the center’s control. The third trend is domestic policy headwinds and the search for alternative forms of political legitimacy for the CCP. This creates two contradictory pressures: China’s reaching out and trying to improve ties with the world, and its turn to an assertive and at times even aggressive form of nationalism to counteract stalling economic growth. It also dents the power and influence China gained through its rapid rise and its role as a massive market driving global economic growth. The fourth trend is further elevation of regime security over other concerns. This trend negatively affects Beijing’s ties with foreign countries by worsening the experience of foreigners visiting and living in China, exporting repressive political ideas and techniques to the world, and complicating how China’s foreign and security bureaucracy interacts with its counterparts. The fifth and final trend is diplomatic and military assertiveness and seeking an active global leadership role, which feeds a self-reinforcing cycle of growing tensions, requires PRC diplomats to shoehorn any activities into Xi’s marquee frameworks, and leads Beijing to build out structures of an alternative international order. Examining these trends helps illuminate the macro pressures shaping China’s foreign and security policy decision-making. Still, aspects of how the party-state makes decisions about its foreign and security policies—“known unknowns” —remain particularly opaque. These include information flows to senior leaders, the dynamic among Xi and his top advisors, and the structure and frequency of important meetings. More knowledge in those areas might shed light on larger questions related to whether there are informal constraints on Xi’s power and how Xi is thinking about eventual transfer of power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China and Asia

406. Disorderly Conduct: How U.S.-China Competition Upended the International Economic Order & What the U.S. Can Do to Fix It

Author:
Emily Kilcrease and Adam Tong
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
To gauge the health of the U.S.-China economic relationship, one can turn to the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who remarked in March 2024 that U.S. “tactics to suppress China . . . [were] reaching a bewildering level of unfathomable absurdity.”1 Rhetorical flourishes may be the one bright spot in the relationship. As tensions rise over economic restrictions and policies on both sides, economic relations have become a worrisome source of instability in the overall geopolitical relationship. The economic relationship has become increasingly dominated by security concerns, and integration is seen as not an opportunity but a risk to U.S. interests and values. The United States must develop a strong, pragmatic strategy for advancing its economic and security interests within the U.S.-China economic relationship, accounting for the fact that the security competition is now playing out across the economic landscape. To inform the development of an effective U.S. strategy for the economic relationship with China in the context of rising securitization, the United States must learn from its past attempts to advance its economic and security interests in the relationship. The first section of this report, “Where have we been?” examines past U.S. approaches, along with the challenges of pursuing similar policies in today’s geopolitical context. The second section, “Where are we going?” distills lessons from these past approaches and defines a new strategy for the United States, offering recommendations to implement it. Broadly speaking, prior U.S. strategies can be divided into two camps. First, the United States sought to bring the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the rules-based order and incentivize it to be a responsible stakeholder.* When that failed, U.S. strategy pivoted to one of imposing costs on the PRC and taking actions to constrain behaviors that threatened U.S. economic security interests. Within those broad strategies, U.S. policymakers have pursued four main approaches, in differing combinations and intensity, all of which involve associated challenges. They are: Play by the rules: The intention of bringing the PRC into the rules-based international system was to create external pressure that would align PRC actions with U.S. economic and security interests. Key efforts under this approach included the U.S. support for the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the later U.S. attempts to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty. Challenges for the approach include the fact that rules have a weak ability to constrain state behavior in a geopolitically contested environment where national security risks arise from economic integration. We need to talk: In light of increasing complexity in the bilateral relationship, U.S.-PRC dialogues were intended to identify and advance mutual interests while providing a regular forum to attempt to resolve disputes. This is seen in the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in the Bush administration and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in the Obama administration. In other contexts, such as ongoing talks under the Biden administration, dialogues have served primarily to communicate the rationale for U.S. policy actions in an attempt to put a floor under the bilateral relationship.2 Challenges to this approach include that commitments made in a dialogue process may not be enforceable, the meeting can become the deliverable, and the dialogue process cannot alter underlying geopolitical shifts. Defense is the best offense: Defensive approaches relied on domestic U.S. authorities to counter specific harms created by PRC practices and policies. The United States has a wide range of economic tools (e.g., tariffs and trade remedies) as well as national security–based tools (export controls and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS] process for conducting national security reviews of foreign investments), all of which have been used with greater frequency over the past decade. Challenges when using these tools include the disruptive and potentially escalatory nature of defensive approaches, and the lack of clear frameworks to assess the effectiveness of defensive policies. Additionally, relying on unilateral approaches can create friction within potential economic alliances. In the United States, defensive approaches have often suffered from a blending of economic, national security, and values concerns, eroding the legitimacy of the national security argument. Have more friends: These strategies centered on efforts to shape the PRC’s external environment through the negotiation of ambitious trade and investment agreements with major trading partners, with the goal of increasing economic integration with close partners, creating indirect pressure on the PRC to level up to higher standards, and developing common approaches to address concerns with nonmarket economies. Such an approach is challenging because traditional ways of shaping the external environment have not directly addressed securitization of the U.S.-China economic relationship. U.S. domestic political realities impose a considerable constraint on the use of trade policy as a strategic tool.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

407. The China-Russia Entente in East Asia: Contending with Authoritarian Partnership in a Critical Region

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Evan Wright, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Closer cooperation between China and Russia is a major force driving global geopolitics. But how relations between the two authoritarian powers are shaping specific regional and functional areas remains understudied. This report helps to fill that gap for the critical region of East Asia. The China-Russia relationship has improved despite—and, in some ways, because of—Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing helps to fuel Russia’s war machine and defends the principles Moscow uses to justify the invasion. Both powers are also deepening and expanding their relationship beyond Ukraine. The pair cooperate across a range of fields, from military affairs to economics and global norms. Undoubtedly, current and potential fissures remain in the bilateral relationship. However, the leadership in both countries carefully manages these tensions to ensure they do not derail the overall relationship. Beijing-Moscow coordination extends to East Asian hot spots, including the areas around Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Around Japan, China and Russia work together to advance their respective territorial claims and pressure a rival Northeast Asian power and close U.S. ally. China and Russia use multiple military tools in pursuit of those goals, including joint aerial and naval patrols, joint exercises, and incursions into Japan’s air defense identification zone. Together, these activities put significant operational strain on the Self-Defense Forces, Japan’s military, as they respond. On the Korean Peninsula, China and Russia have turned away from multilateral cooperation to manage the North Korea threat and toward blaming democracies and reaching out to Pyongyang instead. Russia has moved closer to North Korea to help offset Moscow’s diplomatic isolation and barter for weapons. But that cooperation has not yet undermined China’s preferences or interests. Beijing maintains its own working relationship with Pyongyang while coordinating with Moscow to blunt international pressure on North Korea. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. To the south, Russia increasingly backs Beijing’s actions to pressure Taiwan as Taipei reaches out to democracies worldwide. Moscow’s support for Beijing has been particularly pronounced during major cross-Strait events in recent years. In the South China Sea, Russia tries to balance historical relationships with Southeast Asian states even as its power wanes and subservience to China deepens. For example, Russia’s cooperation on energy projects with Vietnam shows that Beijing’s and Moscow’s regional interests sometimes diverge. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. Moscow’s presence and power in East Asia have already suffered because of its disastrous war in Ukraine. Over time, Russia likely will become even more subservient to China. The China-Russia entente might therefore prove most useful for Beijing in its home region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

408. The Chinese Migrant Workers in Indonesia: A Contested Security Issue

Author:
Ali Maksum
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The influx of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia has become a contentious debate and is perceived publicly as a threat. Chinese migrant workers are accused of seizing local occupational employment amidst high local unemployment. The government has repeatedly told people that Chinese workers are not a threat. In fact, several issues involving Chinese workers have arisen, for example, related to residence permits, involvement in smuggling, involvement in crime, even suspicion that Chinese workers were members of security forces. This article examines two competing representations of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia. First, a public representation which is negative and strongly attempts to securitize Chinese migrant workers. Second, the government representation that views Chinese migrant workers in a more positive light and that acts as a form of counter-securitization. The paper argues that the failure of securitization of Chinese migrant workers by the public is due to staunch counter-securitization carried out on a massive scale by the government through political apparatus, mainstream media and social media influencers.
Topic:
Security, Smuggling, Labor Market, Migrant Workers, and Securitization
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia

409. The Great Reset and the Near-Term Implications for the Chinese Economy

Author:
R. Reghunanadhan and J. T. Karackattu
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The Great Reset has had a severe impact on the Chinese economy, with implications domestically, and on the global supply chain. One consequence has been the decline in the overall market demand in China, with a significant negative impact on infrastructure development and the labour industry. A unique aspect is a survey is to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on innovation and integration of digital technologies in China. The authors explicate the impact of the Great Reset on the Chinese economy, the implications on the supply chains that China is a crucial part of, and the global implications thereof.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Economy, Innovation, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Great Reset
Political Geography:
China and Asia

410. China Tests the Water in Palestinian Diplomacy

Author:
Ramzy Baroud
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
While the ramifications of the recent unity agreement signed in Beijing by multiple Palestinian factions remain to be seen, it is evident that China has stepped up as a leader in the region
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and Palestine

411. The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency

Author:
Warwick McKibbin, Megan Hogan, and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The paper explores policies promoted by former president and now candidate Donald Trump that would potentially affect the global economy. We focus on immigration policy, trade, and erosion of the Federal Reserve Board’s political independence. Each policy has differing macroeconomic and sectoral impacts on the United States and other countries. We find, however, that all the policies examined cause a decline in US production and employment, especially in trade-exposed sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, as well as higher US inflation. The trade policies do little to improve the US trade balance; however, the erosion of Fed independence does so by causing capital outflows, a significant depreciation of the dollar, and higher unemployment toward the end of 2028, which worsen American living standards. Scenarios combining individual policies show that the changes cause a large inflationary impulse and a significant loss of employment (particularly in manufacturing and agriculture) in the US economy. The negative impact of a contraction in global trade is significant for countries that trade with the United States the most. The adverse effect is offset for some economies by the positive effects of an inflow of foreign capital that would otherwise have gone into the US economy. An online dashboard contains a full set of macroeconomic and sectoral results for all countries.
Topic:
Migration, Central Bank, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, and Deportation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

412. Economic implications of revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status

Author:
Megan Hogan, Warwick McKibben, and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The United States’ granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, formerly known as most favored nation status, to China in 2000 resulted in a large expansion of bilateral trade. Concerns over Chinese trade practices and the impact of Chinese exports on US import-competing sectors have contributed to US political discontent and calls for the revocation of PNTR, including by former president Donald Trump in his reelection campaign and in the 2024 Republican Party Platform. The authors find that revoking China’s PNTR status would cause higher inflation and a short-term decline in US gross domestic product relative to baseline from which the economy never fully recovers. The loss of output and employment would be felt unevenly across the economy, with agriculture, durable manufacturing, and mining taking the biggest hits. Stock market prices would fall, with agricultural, durable manufacturing, and mining firms absorbing the biggest declines. All of these impacts would be magnified if China retaliates. Ironically, the revocation would damage the US industrial sector and contribute to a wider US trade deficit.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

413. The Rise of US Economic Sanctions on China: Analysis of a New PIIE Dataset

Author:
Martin Chorzempa, Mary Lovely, and Christine Wan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Concerns over China’s national security and human rights activities have led the United States to rely increasingly on financial sanctions and export controls to curb Beijing’s behavior. But the tools are so complex it is difficult to assess their effectiveness. A new PIIE dataset sheds light on this economic statecraft. The first Trump administration added three times as many Chinese entities to export control and other sanctions lists than the previous four administrations; the Biden administration added even more to these lists. Most sanctions and controls target high-tech sectors, especially electronics, military and defense entities, aviation, space, and aerospace; targets are chosen under a veil of secrecy, raising questions over accountability and transparency. The benefits of isolating Chinese firms come with potential costs, hobbling innovation for US and allied business, encouraging circumvention of sanctions, and accelerating Chinese innovation.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, National Security, Sanctions, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

414. US-South Korea Cyber Cooperation: Towards the Higher-Hanging Fruits

Author:
Jenny Jun and So Jeong Kim
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the past decade, the US and South Korea faced a relatively narrow set of challenges in cyberspace, notably North Korea’s cyber crime facilitating sanctions evasion. In the next decade, however, the two countries will face a more diversified set of challenges with growing North Korean ties with Russia, its involvement in the war in Ukraine, and intensifying US-China competition. The US and South Korea must develop a joint playbook for responding to scenarios of disruptive cyber operations targeting South Korean public and private sectors and prepare for an even more difficult environment for curbing North Korea’s cyber crime as Russia provides a way out. Over the past two years, the US and South Korea have significantly deepened and broadened cooperation on cyber issues and have expanded cooperation further to trilateral and multilateral settings. The two countries established several regular high-level and working-level dialogues, have issued joint sanctions and threat advisories, and deepened mil-to-mil cooperation. However, 2024 has been a watershed in terms of shifting geopolitical dynamics on and around the Korean peninsula. Cyber threats will become more diversified, and the bilateral relationship will be tested at the seams without a clear joint strategic concept and operational plan.
Topic:
Sanctions, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

415. Effective US government strategies to address China’s information influence

Author:
Kenton Thibaut
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s global influence operations have received increasing attention in the national security community. Numerous congressional hearings, media reports, and academic and industry findings have underscored China’s increased use and resourcing of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics in its covert operations both in the United States and abroad. In response, US government offices the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), among others, have made strides in raising awareness of the issue and charting pathways to increase the resilience of the US information ecosystem to foreign influence. To date, however, the efforts to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been fragmented. That fragmentation is indicative of a lack of cohesion around the concept of influence operations itself. Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms. This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence. As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order. The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded. To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit. This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale. The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity. In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world. That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos. This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such. The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces. The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.
Topic:
Media, Disinformation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

416. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power

Author:
David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

417. Competing for the Global South: Asia and the Quest for Leadership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Filippo Fasulo and Nicola Missaglia
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
As the world transitions into a multipolar era, an increasing number of nations are challenging Western dominance and reshaping the global order. Central to this shift is the rise of the Global South, led by Asia’s powerhouses - India and China. These two nations, each offering distinct governance, development, and security models, are in a growing competition for influence. Countries across the Global South are advocating for a more equitable international system, demanding debt restructuring, climate action, and solutions to emerging security challenges. What strategies will India and China propose to address these demands? And how will their rivalry shape the future of the Global South as a unified force on the world stage?
Topic:
Leadership, Global South, Multipolarity, International System, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

418. The Rise of Fragmentation. A New Economic Security Era?

Author:
Alessandro Gili and Filippo Fasulo
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Multiple crises have shaken the foundations of the global economy, and the resulting instability has yet to recover. Instead, it has led to increasing fragmentation along political and ideological lines. The current geoeconomic order is increasingly defined by the use of advanced trade defense and economic security tools, such as tariffs, trade barriers, sanctions, and export restrictions, which have become more sophisticated. Major economies are adapting to this new reality by shaping their own definitions of economic security, particularly to safeguard critical and high-tech sectors. The EU, the US, and China are each calibrating their economic security strategies, seeking a balance between openness and protection that maximizes their respective advantages. However, in this shifting international landscape, new actors are emerging with the potential to influence the global balance of power. What type of "new globalization" is emerging? Could economic security tools become the new normal in the global economy? What are the key economic security strategies adopted by the world's leading economies?
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Ideology, Tariffs, Trade, Economic Security, Instability, Fragmentation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

419. China’s influence at the United Nations: words and deeds

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Théo Storella, and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We investigate China’s influence at the United Nations by focusing on the promotion of its narratives (words) and its voting behaviour (deeds). For the former, we assess the extent to which China’s global initiatives have become embedded in UN discourse compared to Western initiatives. For the latter, we assess the degree to which countries, regions and voting coalitions align their UN General Assembly votes with China compared to the US. When it comes to words, China’s global initiatives are sometimes louder than the West’s. More specifically, the Belt and Road Initiative has had a much greater impact on UN discourse than any Western initiative. Other Chinese global initiatives do not clearly stand out from those of the West, with the Global Compact for Migration mentioned more frequently at the UN than any Chinese initiative other than the BRI. We also find that Chinese initiatives are more self-referential. Thematically, both Chinese and Western initiatives are very focused on security as well as aid and human rights. Moving to voting patterns, countries’ income levels are a key determinant of alignment in voting. Poorer countries are much more aligned with China than with the US. North America and the European Union, in that order, are generally more aligned with the US than with China and these trends are much more stable than one could expect given China’s growing economic influence.
Topic:
United Nations, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

420. Updating the EU strategy on China: co-existence while derisking through partnerships

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Abigaël Vasselier
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union-China relationship has deteriorated markedly since the EU introduced a three-part strategy in 2019 based on partnership, competition and systemic rivalry. Th e relationship has been undermined by China’s support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its increasingly anti-Western foreign policy that aims to alter the international rules-based system. Meanwhile, the economic relationship is changing because of China’s structural deceleration and increasing self-reliance, coupled with the EU’s growing critical dependence on China, especially for digitalisation and decarbonisation. Europe must accept that relations with China will not return to their pre-pandemic state. While there is no need to change the overall strategy, the EU should seek co-existence with China while preserving EU values and interests. Cooperation is still needed to address global problems, including climate change, in which China plays an important role in finding solutions, but on which the EU cannot accept Chinese cooperation at any price. In terms of co-existence, the EU must continue to pursue de-risking – or reducing its exposure to China – especially for its energy and digital transitions. De-risking has started but more needs to be done to understand how it can be continued while not creating conflict. The EU should pursue a three-part approach: increase coherence and coordination with all European stakeholders, refi ne the EU economic-security strategy while accepting trade-offs, and seek partnerships as the best offensive tool. The 2024-2029 European Commission should foster discussion of China and coordination of strategic issues within a larger constituency. EU countries, with Commission coordination, need to be more involved in building a comprehensive approach, including by conducting national risk assessments and by shaping and implementing de-risking measures. On economic security, full implementation of current defensive instruments is needed, along with new protections, such as better coordination of export controls and a new outbound-investment screening mechanism. The trade-offs stemming from pursuing more security will need to be made explicit in order to mitigate them. On partnerships, the EU must look beyond the United States, working within the G7 and with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and South Korea, which have valuable experience of de-risking. Mutually beneficial and strategic cooperation agreements need to be brokered with relevant emerging and developing economies.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Economy, Risk, Trade, and Coexistence
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

421. Xi Transforms the Party: Senior Cadre Selection in a New Era

Author:
Mark Stokes, Eric Lee, Cathy Fang, and Marek Haar
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Due to the challenges associated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise, anticipating who will lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a major concern. General Secretary Xi Jinping has reshuffled the deck around norms for succession. With old patterns woven out of the CCP’s banner, studying the new framework for promoting new senior leaders and the sub-factional politics lying underneath will aid in identifying who will lead the CCP and govern the PRC in the future. To that end, this report offers a summary of the leader promotion process within the CCP, a guide to identifying rising CCP leadership in the future, and a map of the current six sub-factions competing for Xi’s favor.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

422. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence

Author:
Rahman Yaacob
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Cambodia

423. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and East China

424. Who Briefs Xi Jinping? How Politburo Study Sessions Help to Decode Chinese Politics

Author:
Neil Thomas and Feifei Hung
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s politicians are lifelong learners. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls itself a “learning party” (xuexi dang) because its members participate in regular study sessions. These are designed to enhance organizational discipline and to instill practical knowledge. Even the Party’s top leaders, the 24 members of the Politburo, dedicate a half-day almost every month to the “collective study” (jiti xuexi) of a topic chosen by General Secretary Xi Jinping. This practice is unusual compared to most Western governments. It is rare that a U.S. president would convene their cabinet for lectures on employment policy, political theory, or World Trade Organization reform — all recent topics of Politburo study sessions. So why do Party leaders spend so much of their limited time doing collective study? What do they study? Who briefs from? How can we use this information to better understand Beijing? This paper first explains the nature and importance of Politburo study sessions. It then uses a unique dataset to analyze changes in topics and briefers over time before presenting case studies of how sessions focused on technology and foreign affairs relate to policymaking. The conclusion summarizes our findings about the value and limits of using these sessions to decode Chinese politics.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

425. The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan. What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan? This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”1 The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Regional Integration, Economic Development, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

426. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:
Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:
Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

427. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

428. On U.S.-China Relations & Security

Author:
Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

429. On the Road of Excess: How Startups Are Driving China’s Electric Vehicle Boom

Author:
G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A complex mix of ingredients came together to create China's electric vehicle boom, but government subsidies alone cannot explain the emergence of the industry's sophisticated ecosystem and vast manufacturing capacity. An alternate explanation is that Chinese carmakers could scale up and rapidly expand production of electric vehicles because they have access to the deep pools of flexible financing provided by capital markets, sovereign wealth funds, and private equity and venture capital investors, both in China and from overseas. China’s electric vehicle startups have raised billions from investors eager to finance potential unicorns in innovative, environmentally friendly industries. Taking inspiration from Tesla, Google, and other Silicon Valley pioneers, the founders of these startups have relied on rising valuations to attract new investment to sustain their operations despite years of losses. However, many of China's electric vehicle startups now find it hard to raise funds as their valuations have plummeted, and the market forces that drove the industry's breakneck growth may now be slowing it down.
Topic:
Investment, Manufacturing, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
China and Asia

430. Chinese Nationalism, PRC Resolve, and Crisis Escalation: Views from Indo-Pacific Experts

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
How do Indo-Pacific experts assess the role of Chinese public opinion during a crisis? Does Chinese nationalist pressure boost Beijing’s resolve in the eyes of analysts, former officials, and policy advisers around the region? What effect does Chinese nationalist outrage have on these strategic elites’ views of different policy approaches? Do China specialists differ from generalists in their interpretations of Chinese public opinion’s significance? This report offers insight into these questions using data from a survey conducted with 799 international affairs experts in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in late 2023 and early 2024. Comparing respondents’ views of a crisis before and after Beijing goes public — issuing a public threat statement, leading a wave of online outrage, and permitting street demonstrations — indicates a large majority of experts regard Chinese public opinion as a significant factor in hypothetical crisis situations involving their country. However, its effects on observers’ policy preferences generally run counter to Beijing’s interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nationalism, International Affairs, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

431. Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration Speech: Reactions from China, Civil Unrest in Taiwan

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After winning Taiwan’s presidential election with 40% of the vote in January,1 Lai Ching-te faced his first major test on May 20, 2024: his inaugural address. The speech incited a strong military reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, the largest civil protests since the Sunflower Student Movement2 have gripped the island in reaction to a bill passed by opposition parties — a bill that some fear could expand the legislature’s power and undermine the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency. For a number of reasons, Lai’s address, the protests, and his cross-Strait policies are crucial to understanding the continuing evolution of cross-Strait relations as well as the PRC-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. First and foremost, cross-Strait relations are at an all-time low; second, the U.S. presidential election in November could shift U.S. policy toward Taiwan; and third, Lai will govern with a divided Legislative Yuan, presenting challenges to his domestic agenda. This paper will first deal with President Lai’s address and how it framed cross-strait issues, Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC, and other important topics. It will then cover China’s response and likely posture in the upcoming months. The paper then analyzes the current civil protests in Taiwan and how a divided legislature will impact politics over the next four years. The penultimate section looks at the expected differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency for Beijing, Taipei, and the world. A conclusion sums up the paper’s key points.
Topic:
Protests, Presidential Elections, Regional Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

432. Politics First: The Key to Understanding China’s Third Plenum

Author:
Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Anticipation is growing for one of the most important events in Chinese politics this year. On June 27, General Secretary Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the 24-man Politburo that announced the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its Third Plenum in Beijing on July 15–18. A plenum is a plenary meeting of the committee’s 205 members and 171 non-voting alternate members. The meeting is important because the Central Committee will issue an authoritative “decision” (jueding) that will guide policymaking for years to come. The document will center on “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” amid concerns both at home and abroad about the Party’s ability to steward China’s economic, geopolitical, and social development. However, expectations should be modest. Historically, third plenums are often overrated as catalysts for transformational change and instead introduce plans that expand on existing policy themes. Xi’s first third plenum in 2013 appeared unusually ambitious, raising hopes for economic and political liberalization, but its true significance was in enabling Xi’s centralization of power. The policy signals for this month’s plenum suggest a strong emphasis on Xi’s goals of achieving technological self-reliance, addressing financial risks, streamlining central-local relations, and improving social welfare. There are also hints that Beijing may try to ease conditions for private firms and foreign investors in high-tech sectors, as well as efforts to enhance internal Party governance. Additionally, several previously sacked officials are expected to lose their seats on the Central Committee. This article analyzes the historical context, policy signals, personnel movements, and key documents related to the upcoming Third Plenum.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

433. Persuasive technologies in China: Implications for the future of national security

Author:
Daria Impiombato, Nathan Attrill, Albert Zhang, Fergus Ryan, and Bethany Allen
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The rapid adoption of persuasive technologies—any digital system that shapes users’ attitudes and behaviours by exploiting physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities—will challenge national security in ways that are difficult to predict. Emerging persuasive technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), ambient technologies and neurotechnology interact with the human mind and body in far more intimate and subconscious ways, and at far greater speed and efficiency, than previous technologies. This presents malign actors with the ability to sway opinions and actions without the conscious autonomy of users. Regulation is struggling to keep pace. Over the past decade, the swift development and adoption of these technologies have outpaced responses by liberal democracies, highlighting the urgent need for more proactive approaches that prioritise privacy and user autonomy. That means protecting and enhancing the ability of users to make conscious and informed decisions about how they’re interacting with technology and for what purpose. China’s commercial sector is already a global leader in developing and using persuasive technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls China’s private sector and mandates that Chinese companies—especially technology companies—work towards China’s national-security interests. This presents a risk that the CCP could use persuasive technologies commercially developed in China to pursue illiberal and authoritarian ends, both domestically and abroad, through such means as online influence campaigns, targeted psychological operations, transnational repression, cyber operations and enhanced military capabilities. ASPI has identified several prominent Chinese companies that already have their persuasive technologies at work for China’s propaganda, military and public-security agencies. They include: Midu—a language intelligence technology company that provides generative AI tools used by Chinese Government and CCP bureaus to enhance the party-state’s control of public opinion. Those capabilities could also be used for foreign interference (see page 4). Suishi—a pioneer in neurotechnology that’s developing an online emotion detection and evaluation system to interpret and respond to human emotions in real time. The company is an important partner of Tianjin University’s Haihe Lab (see page 16), which has been highly acclaimed for its research with national-security applications (see page 17). Goertek—an electronics manufacturer that has achieved global prominence for smart wearables and virtual-reality (VR) devices. This company collaborates on military–civil integration projects with the CCP’s military and security organs and has developed a range of products with dual-use applications, such as drone-piloting t
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Persuasion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

434. When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia

Author:
Anne Marie Brady
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
China’s covert foreign interference activities in the Pacific are a very important, and yet under-researched, topic. This report uses New Caledonia as the case study to examine China’s hidden front, 隐蔽战线, throughout the wider Pacific. Successive months of violence and unrest in New Caledonia in 2024, have heightened regional and international awareness of the uncertain future of the territory, and the role of China in that future. The unrest erupted after France pushed through legislation extending voting rights in the territory. The CCP has engaged in a range of foreign interference activities in New Caledonia over many decades, targeting political and economic elites, and attempting to utilise the ethnic Chinese diaspora and PRC companies as tools of CCP interests. Local elites have at times actively courted China’s assistance, willingly working with CCP front organisations. Assessing the extent of China’s foreign interference in New Caledonia is a legitimate and necessary inquiry. The debate about China’s interests, intentions and activities in the territory has lacked concrete, publicly available evidence until now. This study aims to help fill that lacuna. The report draws on open-source data collection and analysis in Chinese, French and English. It was also informed by interviews and discussions that took place during my visits to New Caledonia and France in 2018, 2019, 2022 and 2023, as well as conversations in New Zealand. My research shows that the French Government and New Caledonian authorities are working to manage risks in the China – New Caledonia relationship. Moreover, civil society, the New Caledonian media, many politicians, and Kanak traditional leadership have also had a role in restraining the extent of the CCP’s foreign interference activities in New Caledonia. Few Pacific Island peoples would welcome a relationship of dependency with China or having the Pacific become part of a China-centred order. The report concludes by recommending that New Caledonia be included in all regional security discussions as an equal partner. New Caledonia needs to rebalance its economy and it needs help with the rebuild from the riots. Supportive partner states should work with France and New Caledonia to facilitate this.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, United Nations, Foreign Interference, Regional Security, Risk Assessment, and Political Unrest
Political Geography:
China, Europe, France, Australia, New Caledonia, and Indo-Pacific

435. A Taiwan crisis is a China crisis

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European Union needs a China contingency. Government and corporate decision-makers may be preparing for a possible Chinese military attack on Taiwan, but they must also focus on how a Taiwan crisis will impact China and, consequently, the EU’s economic security. Largely on account of Taiwan’s prominent position in the global semiconductor industry, a Chinese attack on the island will inflict trillions of dollars in costs on the global economy. But a Taiwan crisis also threatens to disrupt China-centered production and supply chains for green technologies, such as electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, as well as create unprecedented geopolitical risk for European companies in China.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

436. Pragmatic Considerations: Analyzing Why is China Concerned About North Korea-Russia Growing Military Cooperation?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On November 11, 2024, North Korea’s Central News Agency reported that Pyongyang had ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia. This agreement, signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in June, stipulates that both parties will provide support to each other in the event of an armed attack. In October 2024, reports suggested that North Korea dispatched several thousand troops to Russia to assist in its war effort in Ukraine. Although both Moscow and Pyongyang have neither confirmed nor denied this action outright, China’s silence and ambiguous stance on the matter have been equally enigmatic. The increasing military alignment between North Korea and Russia has raised significant concerns in China, a key strategic ally of both nations. These concerns stem from the potential repercussions on Beijing’s regional and global influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

437. Voters Consider, Trump Comes, China Coercion Cools

Author:
Graeme Dobell
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Australia’s politicians prepare for the national election that must be held by May. In judging the first term of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government, the key concern for Australia voters is the cost of living, while international issues are bracketed by the United States and China—the return of President Donald Trump and the cooling of China’s trade coercion of Australia. The Albanese government tells Australians they face “fraught and fragile global conditions” in a “a time of great global uncertainty,” in “the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” Canberra’s approach to the Trump administration will emphasize traditional alliance ties while reinforcing new elements: AUKUS nuclear submarines, the Quad, the increase of US forces on Australian soil, and steps toward free trade in defense equipment and technology to achieve more integration between US and Australian industries.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Strategic Interests, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

438. Moscow and Beijing at the Dawn of A Grave New World of Trump 2.0

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The election of Donald Trump as the 47th US president changed the chemistry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing so much and yet so little. It was so much because the war-ending rhetoric of the president-elect was in sharp contrast to his predecessor’s steadfast support of Ukraine. It was so little because the war in Ukraine not only continued but even escalated after Trump’s decisive electoral win in early November as the Biden administration rushed arms to Ukraine with much relaxed restrictions (on ATACMS, etc.). Meanwhile, Beijing-Moscow relations continued to broaden and deepen throughout 2024 despite Trump’s repeated vows to split the Russia-China entente. Xi and Putin met three times in six months (May, July, and October). Their joint enterprises (SCO, BRICS, etc.) also expanded steadily while experiencing growing pains. Meanwhile, the two large powers considerably stepped up their mil-mil interactions with more exercises, exchanges, and joint patrols. It remains to be seen how Trump would operationalize his campaign rhetorics not just to capture a pivotal position within the Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle, but more importantly, to avert the Kissingerian dark prophecy of a grave new world of WMD and AI racing toward World War III.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

439. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

440. China and the Two Koreas’ Triangular Games

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
A rebound in China-ROK diplomacy raised optimism after a slow start to 2024, paving the way for the summit between Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 15. They met on the sidelines of APEC Peru before attending the G20 summit in Brazil. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul met in Beijing on May 13, facilitating the China-ROK-Japan trilateral summit and Yoon’s meeting with Premier Li Qiang in Seoul. As China-DPRK exchanges dwindled compared to the first third of this year, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s summits with Putin in May and June raised questions about the direction of China’s Korea policy. Donald Trump’s reelection in November intensified debate on the regional security and economic implications of US-China competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

441. Increasing Perils Ahead

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Lai Ching-te insisted at his May inauguration that Taiwan is sovereign and not subordinate to China. Beijing reacted by increasing cross-Strait tensions. China’s latest rounds of military exercises make clear that it is preparing to use force or at least gray-zone intimidation to effect reunification. Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang continued unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, seeking reconciliation but risking aiding China’s efforts to fragment Taiwan. Taiwan’s TSMC continues to expand in Taiwan and overseas in ways that keep it at the center of the global high-tech economy. Taiwan has increased its purchases of military equipment from the US and opened negotiations on a bilateral tax agreement. Beijing views US support for Taiwan as collaboration in Lai’s separatism. US President-elect Donald Trump has said that Taiwan stole the production of semiconductors from the US and should pay for US military support. However, this animus may be balanced by the outspoken Taiwan supporters he has chosen for his national security team. Can Taiwan overcome its internal divisions and Trump’s Taiwan skepticism? Can China, Taiwan, and the US step back from a confrontational spiral? None of this will be easy, but failure may put Taiwan’s future at risk.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

442. Beijing Seeks Advantage in US Competition, Leadership Change

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
China marked the end of 2024 and four years of often intense competition for regional influence with the Biden administration and its allies and partners by continuing strong opposition to outside interference and working to advance China’s leading position among most Southeast Asian governments. The Biden government made significant gains at China’s expense, notably in the Philippines, a contrast with the decline in US regional influence and China’s ascendance that occurred during the first Trump administration. Looking forward, Beijing will seek to advance Chinese influence as a reliable partner and stabilizing presence amid widespread regional and global uncertainties caused by growing economic protectionism, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and perceived negative implications of a second Trump administration.
Topic:
Leadership, Strategic Competition, Influence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

443. Political Changes May Roil Security Dynamics

Author:
Catharin Dalpino
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the second half of 2024, Southeast Asia faced growing headwinds that challenged its longstanding principles of neutrality in external conflict and, above all, “ASEAN Centrality” in regional affairs. Maritime competition between the Philippines and China around the Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals intensified, causing Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., to warn Beijing that there would be serious repercussions if Chinese naval vessels crossed a “red line” in the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Overtures from Moscow to several Southeast Asian nations for increased security cooperation presented two worrisome complications: a more pro-active Russian military role and the implications of the strengthening China-Russia alliance on the region’s security. A threat internal to the region, the civil war in Myanmar, developed new complications when China stepped up its diplomatic and security presence in the country to protect its economic interests. In Indonesia, however, an internal threat may be abating as the Jemmah Islamiyah publicly agreed to dissolve. During these challenges, political shifts could color Southeast Asian responses to security threats. Political transition in Vietnam and Indonesia ushered in new leaders whose geo-political alignments are not yet clear. Thailand underwent a peaceful shift of prime ministers, but the process demonstrated that the country could remain internally focused for the near-term. The political transition in Japan raised questions of whether Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru would continue Tokyo’s growing security relations with its Southeast Asia partners. Throughout the summer and into the fall, US presidential politics loomed over the region. The election in November of Donald Trump raised concerns in Southeast Asia over Washington’s future relations with its security partners; the impact on Southeast Asia of a stiffer US posture toward China; and blanket tariffs, which could erode bilateral relations and impede cooperation in security and other key policy areas.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Maritime, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Philippines, and Southeast Asia

444. Trump’s Return Scrambles Outlook

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
US-China relations through 2024 remained marked by a paradox. On the one hand, ties displayed a distinct stabilization. The two sides translated their leaders’ modest “San Francisco Vision” into reality. Cabinet officials and the numerous working groups met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened though differences emerged, sensitive issues were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. US electoral politics, or threat of Chinese interference in the elections, did not materially impinge on ties. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in US-China relations deepened. With its time in office winding down, the Biden administration went into regulatory overdrive to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two countries’ advanced technology ecosystems. China methodically responded in kind using its now-robust economic lawfare toolkit. The chasm in strategic perceptions remained just as wide. Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office portends a period of disruptive unpredictability in ties, although “Tariff Man” Trump can reliably be expected to enact additional impositions on Chinese imports. Two years to the day that they met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia to place a floor under their troubled relationship and initiate a process of emplacing guardrails, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met for their third in-person meeting as presidents in Lima, Peru, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. In Lima, the two presidents took stock of the gradual rehabilitation of ties over the past two years, despite its early interruption by the balloon incident, and pledged to consolidate the fragile stability and make the relationship more predictable. They also patted themselves for harvesting some of the low-hanging fruit since their summit in Woodside, California, 12 months ago. US-China relations have made important incremental progress over the past 18 months, starting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June 2023 (Blinken returned to Beijing again this April). In Spring 2023, aside from meetings of their senior-most officials, there was practically no active communication channel between the two sides. Fast forward to today and there are more than 20 dialogue frameworks that span the range from diplomacy, security, economy, trade, fiscal affairs, finance and military to counternarcotics, law enforcement, agriculture, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

445. Peace mediation in the age of geopolitical contestation: Navigating the new reality

Author:
Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Violent conflict increasingly operates as an intertwined set of local, national and transnational conflicts. Peace processes need to acknowledge the tensions between geopolitics, power machinations and mediation. Traditional mediation models aimed at achieving settlements between belligerents are rare. Instead, diplomatic efforts often seek mainly to manage flashpoints, signal red lines and avoid mishaps and miscalculations. Emerging actors from the Gulf, Turkey, China and ASEAN are reshaping diplomacy in a multipolar world and directly impacting the peace mediation scene, once the playing field of the UN and primarily Western actors. While third parties have long played an integral role in official peace mediation, a range of non-governmental organisations has emerged in recent years to act as go-betweens, provide analysis and build the capacities of negotiating parties. AI is playing an increasing role in peace mediation. It can help process and analyse vast amounts of data, including historical conflict data, socio-political dynamics and cultural nuances, giving mediators a greater understanding of complex conflict settings and helping them formulate more effective strategies.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Multilateralism, Science and Technology, United Nations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Turkey, China, Asia, Gulf Nations, and Middle East

446. China’s global initiatives: Common security in the service of national interest

Author:
Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Between 2021 and 2023, China introduced three global initiatives, namely the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. China has also put forward a proposal for the reform and development of global governance. Together, they constitute a major goodwill campaign and are presented as examples of China’s contribution towards “a global community of shared future”, China’s slogan envisioning an ideal world. At least at the rhetorical level, the initiatives are aimed at cooperation rather than rivalry. China deserves credit for attempting to introduce constructive and positive thinking into international relations. However, the initiatives are closely related to China’s core interests, such as maintaining state sovereignty and safeguarding Communist Party rule. Expectations about the initiatives can only be low, given the lack of concrete roadmaps and the anti-Chinese sentiments among many of the Western nations.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China and Asia

447. La fragmentación geopolítica de la Unión Europea en la multipolaridad

Author:
Alejandro Sánchez Barrera
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The geopolitical landscape of Europe is undergoing a profound transformation as the continent navigates the complexities of a multipolar world, intensified by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This paper argues that the European Union lacks a cohesive geopolitical strategy, as internal divisions among member states prevent the formation of a unified foreign, energy, and security policy. The analysis explores how the distinct geographical, historical, and political realities of individual EU countries hinder a common approach to external challenges. Additionally, the study examines the implications of Europe's strategic autonomy in the face of emerging global powers like Russia, China and India, as well as the continued dependence on the United States. The prospective method is employed to assess potential geopolitical trajectories and the future of Europe in an increasingly fragmented international order.
Topic:
European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, Armed Conflict, Multipolarity, Realism, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe, Russia, Ukraine, China, and India

448. Examining the Value of a “Soft Power” Net Assessment: Comparing Chinese and U.S. Power Projection in Africa

Author:
Michael J. McNerney, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, and Daniel Egel
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has entered an era in which it is no longer willing to be second fiddle to the United States. After many years of quietly growing China’s economy, following Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to “hide your strength and bide your time,”1 the CCP and President Xi Jinping are overseeing a plan for a more assertive China that uses its political and economic power to influence international relations. Underpinning China’s more assertive approach is a new concept that Xi has called zonghe guoli or “comprehensive national power.” This is a concept that seeks to describe “China’s combined military, economic, and technological power and foreign policy influence,”2 particularly as it compares to that of the United States and its allies.3 Xi’s conclusion, it seems, is that China’s zonghe guoli has grown such that China no longer needs to stand in America’s shadow. The United States is well-aware of the challenge posed by China. The 2022 National Security Strategy emphasized that China “is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”4 Given such high stakes, it should be no surprise that the U.S. government’s strategy argues for including “all elements of national power” in “out-competing China.”5 Competing effectively against China requires a nuanced understanding – a net assessment – of the relative strengths of China and the United States.6 There are now robust U.S.-China net assessments focused on military capabilities,7 key emergent technologies,8 defense industrial base,9 and overall national competitiveness.10 But how effective are the non-military components of U.S. efforts to project power abroad in comparison to those of China? Comparable analyses of America’s “soft power” vis-à-vis China are far more limited.11
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Economy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

449. The Twentieth Century, the Global South, and China’s Historical Position

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
Chinese scholar Wang Hui looks back at the twentieth century, which was born out of the multiple revolutions in the peripheral areas of the world, including China.
Topic:
History, Global South, and Revolution
Political Geography:
China and Asia

450. Allies balancing: A safer strategy for the U.S. in Asia

Author:
Daniel Depetris and Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
As China’s wealth and military power have increased, the United States has responded with a combination of military deployments in East Asia, regular military exercises in regional waterways, and stronger alliances. These steps have been accompanied by restrictions on the Chinese economy, including sanctions, export controls, and bans on U.S. investments in sectors deemed sensitive from the standpoint of U.S. security. These policies reflect the idea that only though primacy—military preponderance—can the United States protect its key interests in East Asia. These interests are traditionally seen as: (1) avoiding war with China unless it is essential for defending vital U.S. national security interests, (2) preserving access to the region’s markets, and (3) ensuring that China cannot dominate the region. Yet the balance of power in Asia is stabler than conventional wisdom suggests. Given Asia’s geography, China’s internal constraints, and resistance from Asia’s middle powers, Beijing cannot easily dominate East Asia. The best way forward is to maintain a favorable regional balance of power that does not rest on U.S. hegemony. This approach would shift defense burdens onto capable allies, especially South Korea and Japan, and better safeguard U.S. interests by ensuring regional stability while lowering the risk of war.
Topic:
Strategic Competition, Military, National Security, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

451. China in South Asia

Author:
S. L. Narasimhan
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
China and India both give great importance to their neighbours – the former through its Friendly Neighbourhood policy, the latter through Neighbourhood First. Although China has been increasing its influence in the region, narratives that say that India is losing out to China lack in-depth analysis. To deduce the future trajectory of China in South Asia, it is important to study both China’s and India’s relations with each of these countries, as also with each other.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and India

452. China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe

Author:
Maria
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that encompasses infrastructure projects, trade and financial agreements, and cultural and defence cooperation with over 140 countries worldwide. Bringing the digital component into the BRI seamlessly advanced Beijing’s ambition of taking a leadership position in the technology sector. The DSR not only speaks across regions but also goes beyond the technology infrastructure, which raises two critical concerns by giving China leverage to advance the digital authoritarian governance model and jeopardizing data privacy. To mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on China, the EU must find alternatives by collaborating with trusted partners and diversifying supply chains. First, the EU can expand its technological landscape and engage nations in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific. Second, it must develop and enforce regulatory mechanisms to prevent Chinese state agencies from misusing sensitive data.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Information Technology, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

453. How Weakness in the Social Safety Net Undermines the Political Compact in China

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg and Alexander Aibel
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This policy memo details China’s approach to social welfare and its impact on the nation’s socioeconomic stability. Xi Jinping and other Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have an aversion to being “welfarist,” which historically aligns with China’s tendency to view its citizens as a source for labor and tax revenue rather than as human resources to be cultivated and assisted when in need. This has resulted in a social safety net that considerably lags international standards, especially those of developed and even middle-income countries. High debt levels burden Chinese local governments, and shrinking revenues, declining birthrates, falling marriage rates, and aging populations further fuel the deterioration of government finances. These problems contribute to the growing financial vulnerability of Chinese households and create significant concerns for future generations. Families often shoulder the costs of caring for their elderly, educating their children, and paying for healthcare. China’s public healthcare spending is limited, with around 7 percent of gross domestic product devoted to the national system. Families, on average, spend at least 27 percent out-of-pocket of their total health costs to make up for shortfalls in their health insurance, compared to just 11 percent in the United States. Local governments are responsible for more than 90 percent of China’s social services costs but only receive about 50 percent of tax revenues. For decades, they have relied on land sales and related real estate revenues to meet their budgets, but both sources have declined precipitously as the housing boom has reversed course. According to the Rhodium Group, more than half of Chinese cities face difficulties paying down their debt, or even meeting interest payments, severely limiting their resources for social services. China’s total debt levels are estimated to be around 140 percent of GDP, limiting budget flexibility for supporting social services. China’s household savings rates are high by global standards, as Chinese increasingly use personal resources to cover shortfalls in the national safety net. As a result, consumer spending and confidence are down. China has seen lower wage growth in recent years, especially in the private sector, reversing the trend of elevated growth in the first part of the 2010s. Through his dual circulation model of growth, Xi Jinping hopes to shift the country away from an export- and investment-driven economy to a consumption-driven model. But the growing burdens on youth and families undermine this shift. There are major shortfalls in access to, and quality of, education and healthcare systems, especially in rural areas. The hukou system of residency compounds these problems, stopping many rural migrants from obtaining urban residency and thus preventing them from accessing higher quality urban social services. Due to severe wealth inequality, low tax revenues, and the decision to prioritize resources for national security and investment in manufacturing and technology, Beijing has limited resources to improve social welfare programs. Low public confidence in the economy and consumer market—fueled by the COVID lockdowns—has reinforced falling birth and marriage rates. Youth unemployment and public dissent have also increased, with the so-called lying flat movement and white hair demonstrations exemplifying public rejection of China’s attitudes toward overworking, professional achievement, and CCP handling of elder care and other social services. Xi and the CCP have chosen to maintain a limited social services system. Their reluctance to improve the system has contributed to a cycle of slowing economic growth, massive debt levels, stressed personal finances, and declining public confidence. China’s ambitions to become a consumption-driven economy will face significant challenges, possibly further straining the implied social contract that has for decades resulted in social and political stability.
Topic:
Debt, Inequality, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Safety Net, and Social Welfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

454. A Strategy to Free Political Prisoners in China

Author:
Olivia Enos
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has placed hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Chinese citizens behind bars as political prisoners. The scale of this brutal practice reveals something about the CCP: there are few things it fears more than its people. Taking political prisoners is one of the CCP’s core tactics for maintaining power. The United States Department of State estimates that the CCP currently detains thousands of political prisoners, in addition to an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political prison camps. The CCP’s practice of extrajudicial imprisonment is uniquely unjust. The party targets anyone it believes does not align with CCP ideals. That means political activists, human rights lawyers, and in particular, religious and ethnic populations that CCP leadership views as a threat to its core interests. Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, and Christians are among the most targeted. Although there have been notable successes in securing political prisoners’ release from China recently, there remains a need to strengthen the US political prisoner advocacy apparatus. Political prisoner advocacy may seem tangential to US foreign policy objectives. But it is one of the most practical steps the US government can take to offer relief to persecuted populations when Washington cannot easily fix the system that extrajudicially targets these populations, as is certainly the case in China. As it stands, the US executive branch does not have a centralized system focused on freeing political prisoners. Such a system could help the government craft policies that advance US interests while safeguarding and securing the freedom and human rights of the imprisoned. Of course, US efforts to free political prisoners are not limited to China. The US rightfully seeks to aid any person extrajudicially imprisoned globally. While the focus of this paper is on China, many of the recommendations in this paper are intended to advance US policy toward freeing political prisoners more generally. The next Trump administration should prioritize political prisoner advocacy in its overarching policy toward China. To that end: Congress should create an office for political prisoner advocacy within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the Department of State and appoint a special envoy for political prisoner advocacy of ambassador rank who would be responsible for prioritizing political prisoner release. Congress and the executive branch should institute a standard process for coordinating political prisoner advocacy and release. The executive branch should evaluate tools to punish key nodes of the Chinese government responsible for persecuting political prisoners. The executive branch should refine its options for permanently resettling political prisoners who want to come to the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Political Prisoners, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

455. Modernizing Sino-U.S. Confidence-building Measures: Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives

Author:
Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. This research utilizes the Cold War analogy as a starting point for analyzing how nuclear war between the U.S. and China can be averted.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Rivalry, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

456. China Maritime Report No. 43: Shadow Force, A Look Inside the PLA Navy Reserve

Author:
Tiffany Tat
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The PLA Navy Reserve is an important and understudied element of PRC maritime power that could augment the active-duty force and improve its ability to undertake global operations and wage a protracted war. The PLAN Reserve appears to be transitioning from a substandard backup force to an increasingly well-trained complement to the active-duty force. In the past, the PLAN Reserve suffered from low morale and lackluster participation. Training scandals occurred in which navy reservists did not muster up when recalled for training. It is unclear to what extent these problems persist today. The overhaul of the PLAN’s reserve components, specifically the integration of the PLAN Reserve into a centralized command structure and the introduction of new legislative and policy reforms, constitutes a serious effort to enhance operational effectiveness, increase mobilization speeds, and improve readiness. The PLAN Reserve is remarkably opaque. While little has been publicly revealed about this shadowy force, future research may offer opportunities to develop early-warning indicators and help reveal plans, intentions, and capabilities.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Maritime, Militias, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Reserves
Political Geography:
China and Asia

457. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

458. China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022

Author:
J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

459. China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

Author:
Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Maritime, Port, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

460. China Maritime Report No. 27: PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational Performance

Author:
Roderick Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

461. China Maritime Report No. 28: Bitterness Ends, Sweetness Begins: Organizational Changes to the PLAN Submarine Force Since 2015

Author:
J. Michael Dahm and Alison Zhao
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
“Above-the-neck” reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that began in 2015 directed the development of a new joint operational command system that resulted in commensurate changes to PLA Navy submarine force command and control. Additional changes to tactical submarine command and control were driven by the evolution and expansion of PLA Navy surface and airborne capabilities and the introduction of new longer-range submarine weapons. Follow-on “below-theneck” reforms inspired significant organizational change across most of China’s military services. However, the PLA Navy submarine force, for its part, did not reorganize its command structure but instead focused on significant improvements to the composition and quality of its force. Between 2017 and 2023, the PLA Navy submarine force engaged in a notable transformation, shuffling personnel and crews among twenty-six submarines—eleven newly commissioned and fifteen since retired—relocating in-service submarines to ensure an equitable distribution of newer, more capable submarines across the fleet. Observations of infrastructure improvements at PLA Navy submarine bases portend even more changes to submarine force structure in the coming years.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Reform, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

462. China Maritime Report No. 29: PLAN Mine Countermeasures: Platforms, Training, and Civil-Military Integration

Author:
Brian Waidelich and George Pollitt
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made incremental progress in its mine countermeasures (MCM) program in recent years. The PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 MCM ships and craft includes classes of minehunters and minesweepers mostly commissioned in the past decade as well as unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and remotely operated vehicles with demonstrated explosive neutralization capability. Despite the addition of these advanced MCM platforms and equipment, experts affiliated with the PLAN and China’s mine warfare development laboratory have serious reservations about the PLAN’s current ability to respond to the full range of likely threats posed by naval mines in future contingencies. The PLAN’s MCM forces are currently organized for operations near China’s coastline, but writings by Chinese military and civilian experts contend that to safeguard Beijing’s expanding overseas interests, the PLAN must develop MCM capabilities for operations far beyond the First Island Chain. PLAN and civilian mine warfare experts have proposed various solutions for offsetting perceived shortcomings in the PLAN’s MCM program, including the development of autonomous USVs and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), deployment of modularized MCM mission packages on ships such as destroyers and frigates, and mobilization of civilian assets such as ships and helicopters in support of MCM operations. Although there appears to have been little to no adoption of these proposed solutions to date, the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its biggest challenges, and one can expect the PLAN to continue making measured progress in its MCM program in the years ahead.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Integration, Landmines, Civil-Military Relations, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

463. China Maritime Report No. 30: A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines

Author:
Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

464. China Maritime Report No. 31: China's Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards: Bohai Shipyard, Huludao; Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan; and Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Industry, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

465. The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

Author:
Scott Bentley
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, Commerce, and Expansion
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

466. Space: America's New Strategic Front Line

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Last week, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released its final report. Although Congress tasked it to assess the role of space systems in America’s strategic posture, the commission dedicated less than a half-page of its 160-page review to this matter. Of its 20 pages of specific recommendations, the commission made none on space. This seems odd. As China and Russia build up their nuclear arsenals well beyond what America has deployed, the cost and impracticality of quantitatively countering these threats only grows. The commission report rightly recommends the United States make its strategic nuclear forces less vulnerable to a potential first strike. But what of the argument that to do this America and its allies must be able to stun or disable its adversaries’ military eyes, ears, voices, and nervous systems both on Earth and in space? Those who argue this maintain that if America commands space, it can be assured of victory in war and, better yet, be able to deter conflicts. Does it follow that if America and its allies lose assured command of space, acquiring more and better nuclear weapons may be for naught? What does securing command of space demand? What would it enable our military to do? What space capabilities are our key space adversary — China — and our key Asian allies—Japan and South Korea — planning to employ? What will implementing America’s current space strategy entail and cost? What might alternatives to this strategy entail? Which, if any, space capacities and military actions does the Outer Space Treaty (to which Russia, China, the United States, and most states in Asia and Europe are parties) allow or prohibit? Can these limits be enforced? What can space war simulations do to help get the answers? NPEC commissioned some of the nation’s top military and legal space experts to examine these issues. It then held a series of space simulations to test their answers out. The result, which my staff and I are releasing today, is a 354-page volume, Space: America’s New Strategic Front Line (introduction below). It features insights from space policy experts and practitioners and more than suggests that strategic deterrence will depend on securing space superiority.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

467. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:
Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands

468. CHINA-INDIA COUNTERBALANCING MEASURES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CORRIDORS AND PORTS: THE FOCUS ON CHABAHAR AND GWADAR PORTS

Author:
Kashif Hasan Khan and Ali Omidi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Beijing and New Delhi, as new world emerging powers, despite border skirmishes, have not considered themselves arch-rivals. Still, the necessities of real politics have forced India to take counter-measures towards China’s grand connectivity strategy in the framework of BRI and the Maritime Silk Road. This article assumes that China’s grand connectivity strategy has not targeted India in particular, but unavoidably it has affected India’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. In a qualitative and case study methodology, this research explains China’s grand connectivity strategy and how it affects Indian strategic interests. It also elaborates on India’s counter-measures vis-à-vis China policy. It concluded that the Chinese connectivity strategy has affected Indian strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. Therefore, Chabahar, Gwadar ports, and Malacca Strait are centers of gravity in these great connectivity rivalries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Silk Road, Port, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and India

469. THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY ON THAILAND’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Author:
Sanyarat Meesuwan
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This study uses the theory of collective memory in international politics to examine the connection between collective memory and foreign policy to investigate why the Belt and Road Initiative has witnessed slow progress in Thailand. Qualitative data were gathered from various sources, including books, newspapers, journals, policy documents, and textbooks. The study concludes that cooperation between states is essential for achieving shared objectives but is contingent upon establishing mutual trust. Collective memories that one country maintains concerning another country can influence mutual understanding and trust, becoming ingrained even if the situation responsible for the memories changes or no longer exists. In the case of Thailand and China, the Thai government’s push for the high-speed rail project faced criticism and concerns due to the public’s deep-seated fears and distrust of China, the result of historical events and past experiences. This paper’s findings highlight the state’s role in creating collective memory and otherness, recognizing that external variables such as major power activities play a significant role.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Collective Memory
Political Geography:
China, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

470. Time to say goodbye? The impact of environmental regulation on foreign divestment

Author:
Haiou Mao, Holger Görg, and Guopei Fang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We look at divestments by foreign firms – a topic that has received comparatively little attention in the literature – and investigate how changes in the regulatory environment in the host country may impact on such divestment decisions. We use the implementation of China’s Two Control Zone (TCZ) policy as a “quasi-natural experiment”, using detailed firm level combined with city level data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that the implementation of TCZ policy has led to higher probabilities of divestments by foreign firms in targeted TCZ cities and industries. The mechanism behind this seems to be a TCZ-induced increase in discharge fees and efforts to reduce SO2 emissions. Allowing for heterogeneity of effects, we find that the effect is particularly strong for firms from source countries with less stringent environmental regulation, and those using less advanced technology. We furthermore show that firms using intermediates from polluting industries also experience a higher probability of divestment.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Foreign Direct Investment, Regulation, Business, and Divestment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

471. China as an International Lender of Last Resort

Author:
Sebastian Horn, Bradley C. Parks, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into China’s growing role in the global financial system. A key finding is that the global swap line network put in place by the People’s Bank of China is increasingly used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in liquidity support extended to crisis countries, including repeated rollovers of swaps coming due. The swaps bolster gross reserves and are mostly drawn by distressed countries with low liquidity ratios. In addition, we show that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have given out an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. Taken together, China’s overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20 percent of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. These findings have implications for the international financial and monetary architecture, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.
Topic:
Debt, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

472. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:
Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

473. Enhancing small state preparedness: Risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and technological dependencies

Author:
Mikael Mattlin, Shaun Breslin, Elina Sinkkonen, Liisa Kauppila, and Annika Björkdahl
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War liberalist view, according to which interdependences supported a virtuous cycle of mutual gains, has given way to a realist-tinged view that regards economic interdependence as a cause of insecurity and an element in conflicts. In this new environment of increasing great power competition and technological decoupling, all states are not created equal. Major states such as the United States and China can be system shapers, whereas small states tend to be system takers. Unlike smaller states, they have a greater ability to use their investment leverage, supply chain dominance and control of core technologies. For smaller states with open economies, such as Finland and Sweden, these capabilities of major powers create vulnerabilities in the form of security risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and critical technological dependencies. The report explores how small states can mitigate such risks. A series of innovative Delphi backcasting exercises in Finland and Sweden brought together 113 sectoral experts and generalists to ponder ways to prevent dystopian scenarios from unfolding. The target years of the scenarios extended from 2027 to 2035, encouraging ideas on both short- and longer-term solutions. Instead of aiming for a consensus of expert views, the process sought to produce a variety of effective means and measures that a small state could choose to adopt. The exercise consisted of nine scenarios, presented as comic art. The narratives on the risks of foreign ownership focused on 1) acquisitions of gaming companies gathering personal data, 2) transfers of real estate ownership in Lapland and 3) venture capital investments in emerging technology start-ups. The scenarios on supply disruptions dealt with 4) discriminatory practices limiting access to antibiotics, 5) political retaliation limiting access to water treatment components and 6) sanctions on wind power materials, components and minerals. As for high technology dependencies, the cases included 7) the maintenance of military technology, 8) the cybersecurity of health technology and 9) the supply of chemicals for research and development activities. According to the report, small states have the least leeway in navigating the risk environments created by technological dependencies, whereas the toolkits to tackle the potential dangers of foreign ownership and supply disruptions are more extensive. Although different issues and insecurities require different bespoke solutions, all the risk categories call for active mitigation efforts. Most of the suggested Finnish and Swedish expert solutions can be clustered into three alternative approaches: protectionist/interventionist, liberal and technologically oriented. Protectionist/interventionist solutions would expand the state’s powers in controlling, guiding and limiting economic activities. Key suggestions included: covering acquisitions and greenfield investments in national foreign direct investment screening screening real estate acquisitions with a wide range of countries of origin imposing country-specific limitations to real estate acquisitions screening venture capital investments in emerging technologies initiating a national security act to limit foreign control rapidly imposing country- and company-specific limitations to bids in critical industries increasing tariffs supporting domestic or EU-level production through subsidies and industrial policy friendshoring the production of critical goods expanding the scope of supply stockpiling in pharmaceuticals and water treatment components The more liberal approach towards national preparedness would focus on solving the challenges primarily through carrots instead of sticks – to avoid limiting entrepreneurial freedoms and interfering with the dynamics of the capitalist market economy. The proposed solutions included: initiating value debates to guide individuals’ choices when accepting investments formulating a national innovation strategy to boost domestic companies’ operating conditions in emerging technology fields teaching “technology literacy” to guide the use of foreign-owned products engaging all stakeholders in making decisions on foreign ownership diversifying the sources of critical goods such as antibiotics enhancing awareness of risks and making “plan Bs” in supply chain management deepening the EU’s single market to offer genuine scalability opportunities for start-ups The third, more technologically oriented approach would rely on new innovations or technical solutions to enhance small state preparedness. Key ideas included: innovating new medicines to replace antibiotics prioritising non-conventional technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) enhancing domestic capacity to produce key components with 3D printing researching alternative materials to replace critical chemicals developing the recycling, recovery and transportation of critical chemicals adopting geofencing and coding solutions to enhance cybersecurity designating emerging technologies as focus areas in higher education increasing the adaptability of technical solutions through standardisation These three approaches prioritise different key solutions for enhancing small state preparedness. However, they represent generic policy preferences rather than ready-made policy recommendations. Ideally, states can formulate their own pick-and-mix toolkit by combining elements from the different approaches. The complementary nature of some of the expert views was also suggested by the fact that many – even most – respondents argued for diversification as a solution to various challenges. For example, and regardless of the chosen strategy, tendering rules could be improved by placing quality over price, taking geopolitical risks into account and allowing multiple winners in contrast to the currently dominant winner-takes-it-all logic, which leads to overly concentrated supply chains. Moreover, at least minor legislative tightenings were widely proposed to be made on foreign ownership – especially with regard to that of nationals of authoritarian states. These changes were, however, typically proposed to be complemented with such balancing acts as long-term leases and incentives to develop and acquire domestic products and companies. Ultimately, by highlighting alternative approaches to small state preparedness, this report seeks to encourage democratic discussion on a broader political choice: what type of state and economy do we want in the future? It is not only their identity that guides what states do; adopted policies and means also shape state identities over time.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Supply, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Finland, Asia, Sweden, and United States of America

474. The Great Supply Chain Shift from China to South Asia?

Author:
Ganeshan Wignaraja
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Global supply chains connect world industry and international trade in manufactures. East Asia’s dominance with China as the preferred assembly hub in global supply chains has brought unprecedented regional prosperity, but South Asia remains a latecomer. However, pandemic-related and post-pandemic continuing disruptions to supply chains and slowing growth are being keenly felt, dampening China’s attractiveness. In an uncertain global economy, increasingly footloose foreign investors are looking for alternative production locations. Is it South Asia’s turn to prosper through supply chains in this uncertain world? This is the topical public policy question facing India and the others in South Asia. This paper discusses the concept of global supply chains, the industrial rise of East Asia, drivers of supply chain relocation from China, South Asia’s prospects, India as a complementary hub and policy lessons from East Asia’s industrial success. For the purposes of this paper, South Asia is broadly defined as the India and its contiguous countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Monetary Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Industrialization, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

475. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:
Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

476. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:
Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

477. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:
Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

478. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation

Author:
N. Lill
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
Topic:
Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

479. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

480. On the Horns of a Dilemma: Will Corruption Bring Down the Chinese Communist Party?

Author:
George A. B. Peirce
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
When the People’s Republic of China’s president and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he publicly acknowledged that the Party faced an existential crisis from pervasive corruption at all levels of Chinese government and business activity. Such corruption has put the Party’s leaders on the horns of a dilemma: If they fail to adopt political reforms that could root out corruption independent of Party control, like a free press, competitive elections, and the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary, then the crisis of corruption will continue to fester; but if the Party were to embrace such reforms, then that would inevitably lead to democratization and the Party’s loss of autocratic control of China. As one Chinese scholar aptly sums up this dilemma: “There’s a commonly used phrase: Not reforming means to wait for death. Reforming means to court death.” China’s crisis of corruption should be of immediate interest to American political and business leaders. China is the world’s largest developing nation with the world’s second largest economy, exceeded only by that of the United States. It may justifiably be said that the United States and China are now the two most significant nations on earth, so American interests will be profoundly affected by China’s future economic and political development. A better understanding of the challenges the Communist Party faces in the coming years may prove invaluable for effective U.S. policy formulation. Such insights may also contribute to enduring and mutually beneficial economic and political relationships with China. Accordingly, this report initially examines the historical development of China’s regime of institutionalized corruption and the toll it has already taken on the Chinese people, economy and governmental process. Then it turns to an evaluation of divergent perspectives on the future for China’s now thoroughly corrupted Communist Party and the extraordinary civilization and people it continues to rule. Finally, the article will conclude by addressing the question of whether the Party can overcome corruption and survive in the 21st century.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Business, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

481. China Is Finally Making Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

Author:
Niva Yau
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, China has tried to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The railway would advance China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia. Until recently, China has been unable to overcome opposition to the project in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, local concerns about the railway may be giving way since Russia’s war in Ukraine has made new trade routes bypassing Russia more profitable, and a new Uzbek government is looking to expand regional and international engagement.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

482. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

483. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

484. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:
Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

485. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

486. Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China

Author:
Michael Roberts
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For decades, companies outside the United States have dominated the international commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries. At various times since World War II, Japan, Korea, and certain European countries have been able to leverage their export-driven manufacturing economies and government support to become world leaders in commercial shipbuilding and major players in international shipping. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken that strategy to a new level and now produces more than half the large commercial ships delivered annually, controls scores of seaports in dozens of foreign countries, and owns almost one-fifth of the global commercial fleet. American commercial shipbuilders and US flag shipping companies have long faced fierce headwinds in international markets and have seen support from the US government dwindle. The US reset its maritime policies in the 1990s when America was the sole superpower and the security benefits of a robust commercial maritime industry were in doubt. By the end of 2022, Americans owned only 3 percent of the 55,000 ships in the global commercial fleet, including just 178 large US flag cargo ships, 85 of which are committed to international trade (see tables 1 and 2 below for a breakdown of US and global commercial fleets). The emergence of the PRC as a challenger to America’s global leadership has forced sweeping changes in US policy and spending priorities to boost America’s economic and military security. This report recommends that the US reform its policies governing America’s commercial maritime industries because shipping and shipbuilding are core components of national power. These industries remain especially crucial in the twenty-first century, as international trade is more important to a healthy American economy today than ever before. Yet Americans have almost no control over the maritime logistics systems that feed the US economy. The pandemic-induced supply chain crisis showed how much damage can be done when those systems break down.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, National Security, Maritime, Industry, Domestic Policy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

487. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

488. The “Odious” Legacy of Chinese Development Assistance in Africa: The Case of Angola

Author:
Rafael Marques de Morais and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Within days of taking office, China’s new foreign minister, Qin Gang, was on a plane to his country’s main African client: Angola. Landing in Luanda on January 12, Qin Gang was ostensibly bringing a gift—a $250 million loan to help Angola expand high-speed broadband. Some gifts, however, are not what they seem, and some of the recent financial gifts from Chinese sources have been toxic. Soon after Qin visited Angola, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to three African countries but skipped Angola, possibly because of its checkered history with Chinese development assistance. The case of Angola raises questions about the extent and nature of Chinese loans and infrastructure aid to a growing number of African nations, as well as the consequences of such loans on those countries’ relations with the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, Trade, Development Assistance, and Loans
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Angola, and United States of America

489. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

490. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:
Ellen Bork
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

491. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

492. Xi Jinping’s Vision for the Middle East

Author:
Yair Albeck
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly aspires to establish a new global economic order centered around Beijing, not Washington. However, a new global economic order cannot be built in a day. The immensity of this challenge has forced Xi to set his sights on a set of interim goals. These include cementing the Communist Party’s control of the Chinese economy and shielding supply chains, capital flows, and strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships from hostile American policies. These goals equate to the creation of a Sinocentric global economic subsystem. This would be partially integrated into the current Western-led system but would be sufficiently decoupled from the West to protect the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s political economy. In Beijing’s grand design, the Middle East plays an indispensable role. But Western analysts have often misjudged China’s interests in the region as purely commercial. While Xi values the region for its economic potential, he sees it as one of the most important arenas of competition with the United States. Yet when United States National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently discussed American leadership of the global economy, he focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific and mentioned Africa and Latin America. He did not mention the Middle East once.1 Washington’s persistent blind spot in the Middle East has obscured its view of Beijing’s global ambitions. If the US does not rectify this mistake, it risks losing more influence in the region and aiding China’s effort to supplant the US atop the global economic order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Middle East

493. Campaigning to Dissuade: Applying Emerging Technologies to Engage and Succeed in the Information Age Security Competition

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the United States with its most comprehensive economic and security rival since Great Britain during the nineteenth century. Starting in 2018, US defense strategies have highlighted the threat that the PRC poses to US allies, and successive presidential administrations and Congresses responded by increasing defense budgets to expand US military capability and capacity. Despite these efforts, numerous assessments now show that modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has eroded—and in some missions overcome—US military superiority. Absent large and politically fraught increases in defense spending, continued expansion and improvement of today’s US force are unlikely to regain broad overmatch against the PLA in the Western Pacific. Instead, the United States will need new strategies and operational concepts to deter PRC aggression. Recognizing this imperative, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) attempted to move in a different direction from its predecessors through two new lines of effort called “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” However, in unclassified documents and speeches by defense officials, both the essence of integrated deterrence and the mechanism of campaigning remain unclear. 1 Emerging technologies offer the US military a way to put these new concepts into action, sustaining its ability to prevent conflict and gaining an upper hand in the strategic competition with China despite the PLA’s “home team” advantages. The United States remains the world leader in operational and technological innovation, as evidenced by decades of advancements in networking and computing—marked recently by the rapid commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI). Building on the 2022 NDS, this report proposes a strategy for campaigning that would exploit information technologies to dissuade China from pursuing acts of aggression against allies such as Taiwan. The primary objective of the proposed campaigning model is to shape PRC government decision-making, especially that of the PRC military, in ways that are conducive to long-term regional stability and prosperity. A whole-of-government effort like that implied by the 2022 NDS would be the most effective form of campaigning because it could exploit the PRC government’s numerous vulnerabilities, from its appalling record on human rights to its loss of economic momentum and its growing demographic challenges. However, this report focuses on actions the US military can take by itself or with allied militaries to dissuade future PRC aggression. In the proposed approach, campaigning is an ongoing sequence of probing, signaling, adapting, and acting by the US military and intelligence community, coupled with and informed by instrumentation of the information environment. In addition to demonstrating US resolve, campaigning should enable the US to estimate competitor habits, preferences, and fears. These estimates would guide future campaigning activities and inform US force planners regarding a competitor’s uncertainty and areas of concern. Armed with increasing insight about adversary beliefs, campaigning actions would aim to shape an opponent’s preferences and priorities away from violent paths to their goals and toward scenarios that are more aligned with US interests. In offering an approach to dissuasion, this report diverges from the strategy of deterring war primarily through threats of denial or punishment. This construct has dominated US defense strategy since the Soviet Union collapsed because conventional dominance enabled the US military to credibly stop or reverse an act of aggression and nuclear weapons provided the capability to impose existential punishment. Today, the PRC’s status as a peer competitor makes denial and punishment less credible. The US government will instead need to prevent conflict before it becomes imminent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

494. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

495. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

496. The battle for the Indian Ocean: How the EU and India can strengthen maritime security

Author:
Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU. Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests. Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers. As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Maritime, Trade, Modernization, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Indian Ocean

497. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

498. The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions

Author:
Tobias Gehrke and Julian Ringhof
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Technology is increasingly a battleground in the strategic competition between the US and China. Western technology contributes to China’s military modernisation as well as the development of Russian weapon systems. The US is restricting trade in key technologies with China and pushing EU member states to follow its lead. To better defend its interests, the EU needs to develop clearer policies on China and security, including pursuing the ‘de-risking’ of its relations with Beijing. The EU must develop a new strategic technology doctrine and upgrade its export control policy. This more coherent stance will enable the EU both to act where necessary but also to defend itself and its member states from future pressure from China – and the US.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

499. EU-China relations - Will the current crisis change the relationship between the two great powers?

Author:
Eliška Prostřední
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
As part of the Café Evropa debate cycle, one of the discussions took place on the relationship and approach between the European Union and China. Among those invited were Magdaléna Slezáková, Ondřej Wagner, David Gardáš and Zdeněk Beránek. You can read a summary of the outputs of individual guests in the report written by our intern Eliška Prostřední.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Crisis Management, and Debates
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

500. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America