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4651. ROK Military Transformation and ROK-US Security and Maritime Cooperation: MD, PSI and Dokdo Island

Author:
Taewoo Kim
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
In the last decade the ROK-U.S. alliance has soured as the two ideologically slanted predecessor administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun brandished 'idealist policy experiments' over issues critical to the alliance. Under the banner of 'autonomy,' the Roh administration initiated the 2007 decision to separate operational control (OPCON) and dismantle the Combined Forces Command (CFC) by 2012. The Defense Reform 2020 was a decisive masterpiece to placate the conservative realists critical to the Roh's leftist experiments. The task of redressing the vestige of distortions belongs to the newly elected Lee Myung Bak, who already began restoration of the bilateral relations since the two summits in 2008, which promised to forge a 'strategic alliance.' If the 2007 agreement over OPCON and CFC is irreversible, the Lee administration has no other choice but to formulate a new security cooperation while utilizing the Defense Reform as the highway leading to military transformation and upgraded ROK-U.S. cooperation in that regard. The rationale is that the U.S. will remain a critical partner even after the transfer of OPCON in all defense areas such as collaboration upon a Korean contingency, purchase of new weapon systems, and interoperability. There are other critical issues that need mutual adjustment and understanding. For South Korea, more active participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is worth a try. The U.S. needs to understand South Korea's hesitation to fully participate in the U.S.-initiated TMD. Technically, the proximity to North Korea's high speed ballistic missiles may nullify the South's missile defense efforts. Politically, such participation will irritate China and Russia. Particularly, U.S. recognition of Japan's claim over Dokdo (Takesima) island, if any, will pour cold water on ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral maritime cooperation, and dishearten 'ordinary South Koreans' who pin high expectations on the 'strategic alliance.'
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, and Island

4652. Crisis and Consensus; America and ASEAN in a New Global Context

Author:
Donald K. Emmerson
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
No crisis is uniformly global. The suffering and the opportunity that a “global” crisis entails are always unevenly distributed across countries, and unevenly across the population inside any one country. That said, one can nevertheless argue that we—not the old royal “we” but, more presumptuously, the new global “we”—are in January 2009 experiencing the latest of four dramatic changes that major parts of the world have undergone over the last twenty years. In 1989, of course, the Berlin Wall was breached, ending the Cold War, followed by the implosion of Lenin's Soviet dystopia two years later. Nor did the 1989 massacre of proreform demonstrators in Tiananmen Square revive a command economy in China. Instead it kept the polity shut so that Deng's economy could continue to open.
Topic:
International Relations, Globalization, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, Israel, Asia, and Berlin

4653. A Roadmap for U.S.-China Collaboration on Carbon Capture and Sequestration

Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Global greenhouse gas emissions are fast approaching unsustainable and alarming levels . There is broad consensus that these emissions, caused primarily from the burning of fossil fuels, have led to global warming. it is increasingly evident that maintaining the current trajectory of greenhouse gas emissions poses wide-ranging and potentially catastrophic risks to natural systems and human welfare . it is also clear that an unprecedented level of global cooperation will be necessary to successfully confront the immense challenge of reversing the effects of climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, Environment, Bilateral Relations, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
United States and China

4654. China and the Global Environment: Learning from the Past, Anticipating the Future

Author:
Katherine Morton
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
One of the greatest dilemmas of the early 21st century is how to satisfy the demands of densely populated states in the context of a global environmental crisis. As the world's biggest polluter and prominent emerging world power, China is at the centre of the global debate. Worsening pollution trends, increasing resource scarcity, and widespread ecological degradation have serious implications for China's ongoing modernisation drive. The spillover effects across borders also pose a challenge to its relations with the outside world. Although China's per capita CO2 emissions are low relative to the United States and Australia, they already exceed the world average. In 2007, China overtook the United States to become the world's largest aggregate emitter.
Topic:
Environment, Government, International Trade and Finance, and Reform
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

4655. U.S.-China Cooperation on Nuclear Power

Author:
John R. Lyman
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In 2007, the Atlantic Council of the United States (the Council) partnered with the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center (EETC) at Tsinghua and Tulane Universities to hold a series of dialogues to foster cooperation between the United States and China on developing secure and sustainable energy supplies. Over the past several years, the Council and EETC have invited key organizations, experts from industry and government, and representatives from relevant United States (U.S.) and Chinese government agencies to become directly involved in several meetings designed to identify concrete recommendations for increasing official governmental and industry cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

4656. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and China

4657. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia

Author:
David C. Kang
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Columbia University Press
Abstract:
Throughout the past three decades East Asia has seen more peace and stability than at any time since the Opium Wars of 1839-1841. During this period China has rapidly emerged as a major regional power, averaging over nine percent economic growth per year since the introduction of its market reforms in 1978. Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in China, and Chinese exports have begun to flood the world. China is modernizing its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and plays an increasingly visible role in international politics. In response to this growth, other states in East Asia have moved to strengthen their military, economic, and diplomatic relations with China. But why have these countries accommodated rather than balanced China's rise? David C. Kang believes certain preferences and beliefs are responsible for maintaining stability in East Asia. Kang's research shows how East Asian states have grown closer to China, with little evidence that the region is rupturing. Rising powers present opportunities as well as threats, and the economic benefits and military threat China poses for its regional neighbors are both potentially huge; however, East Asian states see substantially more advantage than danger in China's rise, making the region more stable, not less. Furthermore, although East Asian states do not unequivocally welcome China in all areas, they are willing to defer judgment regarding what China wants and what its role in East Asia will become. They believe that a strong China stabilizes East Asia, while a weak China tempts other states to try to control the region. Many scholars downplay the role of ideas and suggest that a rising China will be a destabilizing force in the region, but Kang's provocative argument reveals the flaws in contemporary views of China and the international relations of East Asia and offers a new understanding of the importance of sound U.S. policy in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China and East Asia
Publication Identifier:
9780231141888
Publication Identifier Type:
ISBN

4658. Muddling along with Missiles

Author:
Dongho Jo
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4659. Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus

Author:
Sukhee Han
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Having detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Having consistently attempted to dissuade the North from such tests, China has been infuriated by the North’s defiance of Chinese advice and interests. Immediately after the 2009 test, China released a statement almost identical to the one it announced in the wake of the 2006 test. Beijing’s unprecedented wrath and “resolute opposition” to Pyongyang’s unmannerly behavior had been clearly expressed in the 2006 statement. In the 2009 statement, the Chinese government “strongly demands” that Pyongyang abide by its non-nuclearization commitments, “stop actions that may lead to a further deterioration of the situation,” and “return to the track of the Six-Party Talks.” Furthermore, China’s subsequent vote in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which was designed to impose tougher sanctions on the Pyongyang regime than its previous resolution passed in 2006, seemed to indicate that China may implement a strategic shift away from North Korea and may also increase its strategic cooperation with the international community in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Witnessing China’s stern behavior toward the North, some China watchers in Washington and Seoul have argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test, along with a series of other provocations in the first half of 2009, which included a rocket launch and a complete withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, have prompted China to reconsider its long-standing policy of amity toward North Korea. In contrast to its traditional policy, China since the 2009 nuclear test has not hesitated to make it clear in its official statements that North Korea has become a liability than a strategic asset, and that it was not satisfied with North Korea’s arbitrary behavior threatening the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Remarkably open discussions about North Korea have also been permitted in the Chinese academia and media. In the debates, some Chinese analysts have criticized their government for its failure to get tough with North Korea; others have also advocated for Beijing to take a firmer stance toward North Korea. These debates seem to be a departure from the traditional brotherly attitudes many Chinese have shared concerning North Korea, and also serve as convincing reasons for many experts to argue that China may change its policy toward North Korea. At the same time, however, China has made clear that it intends to continue its traditional policy of friendship toward North Korea. U.S. foreign policy circles have frequently commented that the Chinese leadership has become increasingly angry at the Kim Jong-il regime, especially in the wake of the second nuclear test, and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, however, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of PRC-DPRK(People’s Republic of China-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) diplomatic relations, reassured North Korea of its economic patronage by providing a number of economic measures for expanding China’s economic exchanges with the North. Furthermore, the recent visit of Liang Guanglie, China’s defense minister, to North Korea has also consolidated the Sino–North Korean military alliance. His avowal of “China’s willingness to have closer military contacts with the DPRK” must have provided more confidence for the North Korean leaders in dealing with post–nuclear test reactions. Given this situation, that China’s national interest concerning North Korea has been the maintenance of peace and stability is reconfirmed. On the one hand, in order to keep Pyongyang from further undermining peninsular security, Beijing has resolutely opposed North Korea’s provocations. China’s statements have emphasized its diplomatic pursuit of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and have also underscored that China, as a great power, acknowledges that it shares responsibility for preserving regional order and stability. On the other hand, China still places more importance on the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of supporting the North Korean regime itself. China has exerted much more effort on behalf of the North’s survival than on behalf of its denuclearization. While China has in principle supported the UN economic sanctions on the North, it has never been sympathetic to the implementation of realistically effective sanctions. In facing Kim Jong-il’s presumed health concerns and subsequent contingencies in the North, however, China has realized that the status quo on the Peninsula cannot always guarantee regional peace and stability. Given that the demise of Kim Jong-il himself is relatively imminent and certainly inevitable, China has to adopt a new approach to North Korea. China’s chief concern is to strengthen its economic and military grip over the North with the intention of keeping the regime afloat and its leadership under China’s control even after Kim Jong-il has passed from the scene.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

4660. Are Chinese Exports Sensitive to Changes in the Exchange Rate?

Author:
Shaghil Ahmed
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
This paper builds a model of two types of Chinese exports, those processed and assembled laregely from imported inputs ("processed" exports) and "non- processed" exports. Based on this model, the sensitivity of Chinese exports to exchange rate changes is empirically examined. Unlike previous work, the estimation period includes the net real appreciation of the renminbi that has occurredoverthepastthreeyears. Theresultsshowthatgreaterexchangerate appreciation dampens export growth, both for non-processed and processed ex- ports, with the estimated cumulative price elasticity being substantially greater thanunity. WhenthesourceoftheincreaseintheChineserealexchangerateis appreciations against the currencies of other emerging Asian trading partners, the e§ect on processing exports is positive but insignÖcant, while the e§ect on non-processing exports is signiÖcantly negative. By contrast, when the source of the increase in the Chinese real exchange rate is appreciation against Chinaís advanced-economy trading partners, the e§ects on both types of exports are negative. These results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. Counterfactualsimulationsbasedontheestimatedmodelstronglysug- gest that if the trade-weighted real renminbi had appreciated at an annual rate of 10 percent per quarter since mid-2005, Chinese real exports would have been roughly 30 percent lower today. Thus greater exchange rate áexibility could contribute to lowering Chinaís huge trade surplus through restraining growth of exports.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Exchange Rate Policy, and Exports
Political Geography:
China and Asia