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202. The US Should Enhance Economic Engagement with Taiwan
- Author:
- Min-Hua Chiang
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Min-Hua Chiang, East-West Center Adjunct Fellow and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub, explains "Further strengthening Taiwan’s economy will make it more capable of bearing the financial burden of defending the island against a Chinese invasion…," and this imperative is compounded as Taiwan is “a critical player in America’s competition with China in the global semiconductor industry.”
- Topic:
- International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, Leadership, Regional Economy, and Economic Engagement
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
203. US Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and Roles for Partners
- Author:
- Rebecca Pincus
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center, explains that "The development of Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbons is dependent on foreign investment and advanced technologies; as the West has withdrawn from Russia, China is an important, if imperfect, substitute..."
- Topic:
- International Relations, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Hydrocarbons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
204. Sino-Russia Arctic Relations: The View from Singapore
- Author:
- Hema Nadarajah
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Hema Nadarajah, Program Manager for Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, explains that states seeking to deepen their engagement in the Arctic, such as Singapore, may find themselves trying to balance tensions, especially in the wake of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region and US-China strategic competition.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic
205. Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective
- Author:
- Anurag Bisen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Capt. (IND) Anurag Bisen (Retd.), Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, explains that "India needs to step up its engagement to secure its increasing national interest in the Arctic" and "must also use its equities with all the Arctic states to facilitate collaboration, ensuring access to infrastructure, research areas, and data."
- Topic:
- International Relations, Climate Change, Governance, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, and Strategic Engagement
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, India, North America, and Arctic
206. South Korean Perspectives on China-Russia Collaboration in the Arctic
- Author:
- Young Kil Park
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Young Kil Park, Research Fellow at Korea Maritime Institute, explains that "While the immediate impact of China-Russia collaboration in the Arctic on South Korea is limited, it remains wary of the long-term implications for its economic and security interests."
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Collaboration
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Arctic
207. United States, UNESCO, and International Relations through Cultural Heritage
- Author:
- Neel Kamal Chapagain
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Dr. Neel Kamal Chapagain, Professor at Ahmedabad University's Centre for Heritage Management, explains that "[c]ultural heritage is becoming a more prominent vehicle for building international ties" and "support for or opposition to global cultural heritage campaigns, like UNESCO, have been used [in US presidential campaigns] to make political statements."
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Culture, Heritage, UNESCO, and Emerging Powers
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
208. Rise of Economic Nationalism in Emerging Economies and the Influence of Elections
- Author:
- Michio Ueda
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Mr. Michio Ueda, President of Geopolitics & Strategy and Visiting Lecturer University of Tokyo, examines "the intersection between economic nationalism and recent elections in Indonesia and India" and finds that "industrial policy is not a significant point of political contention" and elections "serve as an opportunity to gain legitimacy for policies supporting economic nationalism."
- Topic:
- Economics, Industrial Policy, Nationalism, and Elections
- Political Geography:
- China, Indonesia, India, Asia, and United States of America
209. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?
- Author:
- William D. Hartung
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America
210. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation
- Author:
- James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
211. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
212. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine and James Park
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
213. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent
- Author:
- Hargisl Shirley Martey
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America
214. Competing Values Will Shape US-China AI Race
- Author:
- Valerie Shen and Jim Kessler
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- President Biden’s AI executive order reflects a set of values recognizable to all Americans: Privacy, equal treatment and civil rights; free speech and expression; the rule of law; opportunity and free market capitalism; pluralism; and advancement of global leadership as the beacon of a free world. President Xi Jinping’s government has also issued AI regulations with values recognizable to China: Collectivism and obedience to authority; social harmony and homogeneity; market authoritarianism and rule of state; and digital world hegemony to restore China’s rightful place as the Middle Kingdom. The United States and China may share similar broad goals for “winning” AI along the lines of leading innovation and advancement, spurring broad-based economic growth and prosperity, achieving domestic social stability, and becoming the clear global influencer for the rest of the world—but they define those goals and seek to achieve those ends through very different values. Those values embedded in our respective AI policies and underlying technology carry high-stakes, long-term national and economic security implications as US and Chinese companies compete directly to become dominant in emerging global markets. They also share similar fears that reflect each country’s values. China worries that AI could cause social unrest if information to a sheltered population is too real and unfiltered. America fears that AI could cause social unrest if information Americans receive is too fake. And that massive disinformation and algorithms that rile the population could threaten our democratic system. Why do these value differences matter when it comes to the AI race? Below, we outline six contrasting values that we believe will be the most determinative in how the US-China AI competition plays out. We argue that understanding our different values-based approaches illuminates our respective advantages and disadvantages in this competition. It assesses who is currently set up to “win” across key metrics and determines how to lean into our democratic advantages or mitigate some practical disadvantages compared with the PRC, this will ultimately win the AI marathon.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
215. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?
- Author:
- Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- The Harriman Institute
- Abstract:
- Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
216. Revitalizing U.S. Trade Remedy Tools for an Era of Industrial Policy in an Interconnected World
- Author:
- Ryan Mulholland
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- To implement an effective industrial policy, the United States needs to update its trade enforcement toolkit to meet the challenges of the modern world and utilize its existing trade authorities differently.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, Economy, and Economic Development
- Political Geography:
- China and United States of America
217. What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy
- Author:
- Julian Baqaee, Julian Hinz, Benjamin Moll, Moritz Schularick, Feodora A. Teti, Joschka Wanner, and Sihwan Yang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- How would the German economy cope with a hard economic decoupling from China? The authors study a scenario where the global economy fragments into three distinct blocs: the G7 economies and their allies, China and her allies, as well as neutral countries. German trade with China would have to be entirely rerouted to countries within the "Western" block and neutral countries. The authors quantify the costs of such a worst-case hard decoupling using the (Baqaee and Farhi 2021) multi-sector model of the world economy. The key finding is that a total cut-off of trade relations with China would have severe but not devastating effects on the German economy. The welfare loss for Germany (relative to a no-cut-off baseline) would be around 5 percent of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) over the first few months and around 4 percent over the first year, plus additional short run costs due to business-cycle amplification effects. In the medium and long run, the costs would fall to a permanent loss in the 1–2 percent range. Less extreme decoupling or gradual de-risking scenarios (“small yard, high fence") would incur smaller costs. The single most influential assumption relates to the “trade elasticity,", i.e., the ease and speed with which trade can be reorganized away from China to neutral countries and within the “Western” block. The authors´ findings, in particular the critical dependence of economic costs on the time horizon over which adjustments take place, provide some rationale for embarking on a gradual de-risking trajectory to avoid a costly and politically contentious hard decoupling dictated by geopolitical events.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Geoeconomics, Decoupling, and De-Risking
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Germany
218. Mild Deglobalization: Foreign Investment Screening and Cross-Border Investment
- Author:
- Vera Z. Eichenauer and Feicheng Wang
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- Openness to foreign investments is associated with risks. To mitigate these risks, many high-income countries have strengthened the control of foreign investments over the last decade in an increasing number of sectors considered critical. Investment screening distorts the market for cross-border investments in controlled sectors, which might lead to unintended economic effects. This is the first cross-country panel study to examine the economic effects of investment screening mechanisms. We combine deal-level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for the period 2007–2022 with information on sectoral investment screening. Using a staggered triple difference design, we estimate a reduction of 11.7 to 16.0 percent in the number of M&A in a newly screened sector. The effects are driven by minority acquisitions and deals involving a foreign government or state-owned enterprises or US firms as investors. There is no reduction in the number of deals within the EU/EFTA, most of which are not subject to screening. The findings call policymakers’ attention to weighing the benefits of national security and the economic costs of introducing investment screening.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment, Geoeconomics, Global Capital Allocation, and Deglobalization
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
219. What role for Chinese FDI in Africa? New survey evidence from Ethiopia and Ghana
- Author:
- Charles Ackah, Alemayehu Geda, Holger Görg, and Federico Merchan
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- Foreign investments bring in not only new employment but also novel technology, managerial skill and know-how, that may also dissipate into the local economy. It is not clear whether this effect differs by the nationality of source countries, in particular between Chinese and non-Chinese firms. Based on a firm level survey on Ethiopia and Ghana, we found that all types of firms are engaged in limited R&D and innovation activity and their transfer to host countris in both countries. There is little difference between Chinese and non-Chinese foreign firms in such technology and managerial skill transfer once controlling for firm size and industry characteristics in the majority of metrices (R&D activities, horizontal & vertical spillover, directly adopting techniques). However, we found for Ghana that Chinese firms have more suppliers but are less likely to transfer technology to them. Chinese firms are more likely to transfer managerial skills than non-Chinese firms in Ghana though not in Ethiopia. Also, there is little evidence that foreign firms transfer technology via horizontal or backward spillovers in either countries. Finally, Chinese firms are much more likely to receive host country policy support than other foreign firms in Ghana but not in Ethiopia.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Economy, and Technological Transfer
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Ethiopia, and Ghana
220. Foul Play? On the Scale and Scope of Industrial Subsidies in China
- Author:
- Frank Bickenbach, Dirk Dohse, Rolf Langhammer, and Wan-Hsin Liu
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- China makes extensive use of subsidies in order to take a leading role on the global markets in the green technology sectors of electric vehicles, wind turbines and railway rolling stock. According to DiPippo et al. (2022) and recent OECD studies, the industrial subsidies in China are at least three to four times or even up to nine times higher than in the major EU and OECD countries. According to a very conservative estimate, industrial subsidies in China amounted to around EUR 221 billion or 1.73% of Chinese GDP in 2019. According to recent data of 2022, direct government subsidies for some of the dominant Chinese manufacturers of green technology products had also increased significantly - the electric car manufacturer BYD alone received EUR 2.1 billion. The authors point out that Chinese companies are benefiting from further support measures, including subsidized inputs, preferential access to critical raw materials, forced technology transfers, the strategic use of public procurement and the preferential treatment of domestic firms in administrative procedures. The authors recommend the EU to use its anti-subsidy proceeding against BEV imports from China to enter into negotiations with the Chinese government and persuade it to abolish public support measures that are particularly harmful to the EU.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Business, Renewable Energy, Industry, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
221. The Motives for Chinese and Western Countries’ Sovereign Lending to Africa
- Author:
- Eckhardt Bode
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- This paper is one of the first to show systematically that the motives for sovereign lending to African countries differed considerably between China and Western countries during the last two decades. While Chinese lending mainly served its own economic or geopolitical objectives, which is well-known from the existing literature, Western countries’ lending also pursued objectives that appear to be at odds with their self-interests but whose precise nature is not yet well-understood. Using a new, da-taset on loans from China, Western countries and multilateral organizations to African countries, I empirically examine a broad variety of potential motives, aim at separating the motives pursued by the national governments from those pursued by their lending agencies, and employ an estimation strategy with increasingly complex fixed effects that yields additional interesting insights into the specificities of the motives.
- Topic:
- Economics, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Geopolitics, and Sovereign Lending
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Global West
222. African Sovereign Defaults and the Common Framework: Divergent Chinese Interests Grant Western Countries a “Consumer Surplus”
- Author:
- Eckhardt Bode
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- • China has become a major player in sovereign lending towards Africa during the past two decades but has recently been faced with increasing defaults. A new African debt crisis is looming. • Differences in the motives of sovereign lending between China and Western creditor countries contribute to preventing effective global sovereign debt management under the “Common Framework for Debt Treatment” in this looming African debt crisis. Chi-nese lending during the past two decades was motivated primarily by its own economic interests while most of the Western countries’ lending appears to be at odds with their self-interests but is not yet well-understood. • Debt settlements under the Common Framework that involve China are less generous than past settlements with the Paris Club alone. This is an obstacle to a rapid and sus-tainable economic recovery of financially distressed African countries. • Western countries derive a kind of “consumer surplus” from the agreements under the Common Framework because they are prepared to make greater concessions than Chi-na. They could transfer this hypothetical surplus as additional (conditional) Official De-velopment Assistance to the defaulted African countries to alleviate social hardship.
- Topic:
- Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Lending, Economic Crisis, Sovereign Debt, Consumer Behavior, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- Africa and China
223. EU-China Trade Relations: Where Do We Stand, Where Should We Go?
- Author:
- Alexander Sandkamp
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- • In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s share in European trade has fallen continuously. Nevertheless, the country remains the EU’s largest source of imports (20.5 percent in 2023) and its third largest export destination (8.7 percent). • This apparent dominance of China is put into perspective when incorporating intra-EU trade. For example, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – sent 6.1 percent of its ex-ports to China, but 55 percent to EU members states. For imports, the Chinese and Euro-pean shares are 11.5 percent and 52.7 percent, respectively. • Decoupling the EU from China (i.e. almost eliminating bilateral trade) would permanent-ly reduce European real income by 0.8 percent in the long-run. In terms of gross domes-tic product in 2023, the EU would forego 136 billion EUR of value added every year. Short-term effects are likely to be stronger. • China dominates global production of important products such as laptops and mobile phones as well as raw materials including Germanium and Gallium that are critical for the green energy transition. A trade disruption might thus both delay the energy transi-tion and increase its costs. • To reduce specific dependencies, the EU should intensify its efforts to diversify procure-ment by increasing the attractiveness of alternative suppliers. Finding the courage to move forward in the negotiation of free trade agreements with potential strategic part-ners such as Australia and the Mercosur countries would strengthen the EU’s geopolitical position and increase prosperity among partners.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Germany
224. When the Exception Overtakes the Rule: COVID-19, Security Exemption Clauses, and International Investment Agreements
- Author:
- Kayla Maria Rolland
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Goettingen Journal of International Law
- Institution:
- The Goettingen Journal of International Law
- Abstract:
- In the trade and investment law regimes built in the post-war period, “security exemption clauses” were included within trade and investment agreements as a safety valve, permitting States to deviate from their commitments in the event that their security interests were implicated. Initially, these clauses were understood to be narrowly limited to instances of war and interstate conflict. With the rise of the national security state in the decades since, however, the concept of security interests has ballooned to encompass an ever-growing set of issues, with some fearing that the rules may become irrelevant. This has been particularly facilitated through “third generation” security exemption clauses and their inclusion of self-judging language. The COVID-19 pandemic in particular adds a new dimension to this phenomenon. As a case study analysis of the text of the Chile-Hong Kong, China SAR bilateral investment treaty (BIT) will demonstrate, it may be feasible for States to invoke security exemption clauses to justify measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in some contexts, particularly with third generation, self-judging security exemption clauses. The expanding notions of security exemption clauses have significant implications for the investor-State dispute system as a whole.
- Topic:
- Security, International Law, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, COVID-19, and International Investment Agreements
- Political Geography:
- China and Global Focus
225. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe
- Author:
- Jyri Lavikainen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
226. China’s approach to AI standardisation: State-guided but enterprise-led
- Author:
- Junhua Zhu
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- AI standardisation is a major battleground in the international AI race, in which states compete against each other for standard-setting power. China sees AI standardisation as a sector in which it could become a norm-maker rather than a norm-taker. The global landscape of AI standardisation is undergoing a phase of reconstruction. The US and China are discussing new bilateral standardisation frameworks, while the significance of pre-existing multilateral standardisation frameworks is declining. The Chinese approach to AI standardisation is found to be heavily reliant on the corporate sector, following an enterprise-led and state-guided pattern. The state cooperates closely with the private sector in a community of practice, acting as a catalyst in the early stage, a supporter in the mid-stage, and a supervisor in the later stage of the AI standardisation process. Enhancing a contextualised understanding of the fast-changing landscape of AI standardisation in China is critical for European policymakers to safeguard Europe’s competitiveness, preserve European values, and engage in dialogue on global AI governance.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Standardization
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
227. The Liquidity Crisis at the United Nations: How We Got Here and Possible Ways Out
- Author:
- Eugene Chen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
- Abstract:
- The United Nations (UN) is suffering from an acute liquidity crisis because its member states have not been paying the assessed contributions required to finance the budgets they have approved. A major part of the problem is the fact that the United States does not pay in full or on time. However, late payments in recent years by China and the closure of several large peacekeeping operations are exacerbating the liquidity challenges. The Secretary-General has proposed several measures to improve the financial position of the organization, but these are stopgap measures at best. The ongoing financial difficulties can only be resolved by member states paying in full and on time but getting there requires understanding the policy decisions and member state dynamics that led us to the current situation and developing recommendations designed around the constraints of the intergovernmental process.
- Topic:
- United Nations, Budget, Finance, and Liquidity
- Political Geography:
- China and Global Focus
228. China: New Hegemonic Power after the War in Ukraine?
- Author:
- Zeno Leoni and Veronica Strina
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
- Institution:
- International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
- Abstract:
- The War in Ukraine has had international order implications, deepening previously existing fault lines between West and East (Leoni & Tzinieris, 2024). As China’s grand strategy does also have an impact on the international order, the conflict in Eastern Europe provides an opportunity to pause and reflect on what this means from a perspective of China’s engagement with the world. While the literature on Chinese grand strategy has been prolific in recent years, lessons from Ukraine have yet to be captured in a systematic manner. Hence, this article examines China’s behaviour in relation to the war in Ukraine to evaluate whether this case study offers valuable insights into China’s grand strategy and foreign policy. The contribution concludes that the war in Ukraine has confirmed that China is not yet willing or capable of taking a role of leadership over international controversies, and thus is not directly challenging US hegemony. However, it is actively seeking to build a sphere of interests that involves non-Western countries and the developing world, as highlighted by our discourse analysis of the communications on the “Ukraine issue” from the Foreign Ministry through its spokespersons. To assess whether there is evidence that the war in Ukraine has provided China with an opportunity to pursue a hegemonic project and whether it has been successful at it so far, the article adopts a critical IR approach and delves into the study of communications by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople on the “Ukraine issue” as key to building a hegemonic discourse. Articles published from the 24th of February 2022 until the 24th of February 2024 have been extracted from the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and imported into software for qualitative and mixed methods data analysis to examine keywords’ frequency and correlations.
- Topic:
- Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Olympics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- China, Ukraine, and Asia
229. China Maritime Report No. 42: Invasion Plans: Operation Causeway and Taiwan's Defense in World War II
- Author:
- Ian Easton
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- During World War II, the United States and the Empire of Japan each developed plans and marshaled forces for a climactic battle over Taiwan. Both sides regarded the island as an area of strategic consequence. Code-named Operation CAUSEWAY, the American invasion of Taiwan would have been the largest amphibious campaign in the Pacific Theater and the largest sea-air-land engagement in world history. Strategists in Japan believed the attack was coming and designed a blueprint for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands called SHO-GO(捷 2 号作戦, or “Operation Victory No. 2”), which envisioned a bloody campaign of annihilation. Japanese camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in Taiwan were effective at hiding many capabilities from American intelligence. In recent years, Taiwanese military officers have drawn lessons from Taiwan’s wartime history to improve their defense plans. They highlight the need to stockpile, update beach defenses, mobilize whole-of-society support, expand underground bunker complexes, and prepare for a long fight and layered defense campaign. One important lesson of this history for the U.S. Navy and Joint Force is that deterrence worked before. It can work again. Under certain circumstances, the United States and Taiwan may be capable of preventing a PRC invasion of the island. But a tremendous amount of hard work will be needed to realize that goal. By revisiting the history of Taiwan-focused war plans, we may better assess current challenges and develop insights that could inform future strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.
- Topic:
- History, Military Affairs, Maritime, World War II, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Invasion, and Operation Causeway
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
230. China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: PLA Navy Blue Force Development for Realistic Combat Training
- Author:
- J. Michael Dahm
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training. This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four sections. Part one provides background on PLAN efforts to professionalize its maritime blue force. Part two describes the PLAN’s blue force training units. Part three examines companies producing equipment and virtual environments for China’s blue force units, while part four discusses current blue force capabilities. The report concludes with a summary of findings and implications for the United States, its allies, and partners.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
231. China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control - The Ship Political Commissar in Chinese Merchant Shipping
- Author:
- Conor M. Kennedy
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.
- Topic:
- History, Political Parties, Shipping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
232. China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, and Cultural Practices Aboard PLAN Submarines
- Author:
- Conor M. Kennedy
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life and duty in the “Dragon Palace,” both an internal joke and the overarching embodiment of PLAN submarine culture, reveals a professional community focused on secrecy, safety, and expertise that is working to enhance its human performance.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
233. China Maritime Report No. 38: PLAN Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft - Sensors, Weapons, and Operational Concepts
- Author:
- Eli Tirk and Daniel Salisbury
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- The PLA Navy recognizes the importance of a robust anti-submarine warfare (ASW) system to counter adversaries seeking undersea asymmetric advantages, and its aviation component is a key part of that system. This report discusses the PLAN's efforts to improve its airborne ASW platforms and equipment and describes how PLAN-affiliated sources discuss the employment of those assets. The PLAN's significant buildup and growing employment of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft in recent years are key indicators of the importance it attaches to the airborne ASW mission set, as is its push to acquire improved sensors on both fixed and rotary wing ASW platforms. PLAN-affiliated authors show that its academic and operational components are coordinating to explore best practices and maximize the effectiveness of these assets across a wide array of ASW scenarios.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Warfare, and Aircraft
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
234. China Maritime Report No. 37: Re-Engaging With the World: China's Military Diplomacy in 2023
- Author:
- Jie Gao and Kenneth W. Allen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- China’s military diplomacy plays a crucial role in advancing the nation's foreign policy objectives and safeguarding its strategic interests. This report highlights a diverse array of activities within military diplomacy, including senior-level meetings, joint military exercises, naval port calls, UN peacekeeping operations, and academic exchanges. Our findings reveal a significant—but incomplete—recovery in China's military diplomacy activities in 2023, following a period of reduced contacts with foreign militaries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Southeast Asia and Russia remain primary partners for China, with emerging strategic importance also seen in Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East. Overall, China's military diplomacy underscores its efforts to diversify partnerships and assert its global influence, emphasizing regional stability and international cooperation in pursuit of its diplomatic goals.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, United Nations, Peacekeeping, COVID-19, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Diplomacy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Southeast Asia
235. China Maritime Report No. 36: China's T-AGOS: The Dongjian Class Ocean Surveillance Ship
- Author:
- Devin Thorne
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has commissioned a new class of ocean surveillance vessel into its order of battle: the Type 927. Similar in design and function to the U.S. Navy’s Victorious and Impeccable class T-AGOS ships, the Type 927 was introduced to help remedy the PLAN’s longstanding weakness in anti-submarine warfare. The PLAN has likely built six Type 927 ships to date, most based for easy access to the South China Sea. In peacetime, these ships use their towed array sonar to collect acoustic data on foreign submarines and track their movements within and beyond the first island chain. In wartime, Type 927 vessels could contribute to PLAN anti-submarine warfare operations in support of a range of different maritime campaigns. However, their lack of self-defense capabilities would make them extremely vulnerable to attack.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Navy, Maritime, Surveillance, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
236. China Maritime Report No. 35: Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales: The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China's Military Activities, 2023
- Author:
- J. Michael Dahm
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities in 2023. As of 2023 and probably through at least 2030, the PLA’s reserve fleet of civilian ships is probably unable to provide the amphibious landing capabilities or the over-the-shore logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, 2023 activity has demonstrated significant progress toward that end. In addition to the extensive use of civilian ferries, this report identifies the first use of large deck cargo ships to support PLA exercises. While not as capable as large, ocean-going ferries, China’s civil fleet boasts dozens of large deck cargo ships and may provide the PLA with the lift capacity necessary to eventually support a large crossstrait operation. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities including “surge lift events,” coordination and synchronization of multi-theater events, floating causeway developments, and the dedicated use of civilian ships for intra-theater military logistics.
- Topic:
- Maritime, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
237. China Maritime Report No. 34: PLAN Submarine Training in the "New Era"
- Author:
- Christopher Sharman and Terry Hess
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
- Abstract:
- Since 2018, there have been significant changes to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force training, and these changes have been driven by important revisions to strategic guidance and subsequent directives that focused PLA efforts to enhance its capabilities to operate in the maritime domain. While this guidance is applicable to all services, improving PLAN submarine force capabilities appears to have been of particular interest to senior Chinese leadership. This guidance expanded the PLA’s maritime domain requirements, which demanded that China’s submarine force improve its capabilities to operate independently or along with other PLAN assets at greater distances from coast and in the far seas. This has resulted in submarine training that is more realistic, rigorous, and standardized across the fleet. Though stressful on submarine equipment and crews, these changes to training may ultimately yield a more combat-capable submarine fleet operating throughout the western Pacific.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
238. Taiwan’s International Legal Standing: Navigating the Fragile Status Quo
- Author:
- Mahir Al Banna
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- This study aimed to discuss the legal limbo of Taiwan, whose political situation lies in a grey area of international law. Its legal status is ambiguous: while meeting the characteristics of a State, it is not recognized by other States so long as China claims it as a Chinese territory. The methodology developed in this study adopted the descriptive analytical approach to the different principles of international law, in addition to quantitative methods, which involved gathering data on cases, courts, and resolutions of international organizations, followed by thorough analysis. This research provided an in-depth investigation to critically assess Taiwan’s fragile status quo, threatened by a potential Chinese military intervention. The study found that the idea that Taiwan is deprived of legal status points out the shortcomings of international law. This study concluded that to overcome this tricky situation, Taiwan should take bold moves, such as making constitutional reforms to facilitate its independence.
- Topic:
- International Law, Status Quo, Recognition, and Use of Force
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
239. The Strategic Adjustments of China, India, and the US in the Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Context
- Author:
- Binh Nguyen, Hiep Tran, Co Nguyen, and Vuong Nguyen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- Since the beginning of the XXI century, the Indo-Pacific region has become the “focus” of strategic competition between the world’s great powers. This area included many “choke points” on sea routes that are strategically important for the development of international trade, playing an important role in transporting oil, gas, and goods around the world from the Middle East to Australia and East Asia. The article analyzed the geostrategic position of the Indo-Pacific region and the strategic adjustments in foreign affairs of some major powers in this region, specifically the US, China, and India. To achieve this goal, the authors used research methods in international relations to analyze the main issues of the study. In addition to reviewing previous scholarly research and reviews, the authors used a comparative approach to assess the interactions between theory and data. The authors believed that these data are important for accurately assessing the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region, and this area was an important trigger for the US, China, and India to make adjustments to its foreign policy. If the US proposed a strategy called “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), India’s strategy was called the Indo-Pacific Initiative. China’s Indo-Pacific strategy was clearly expressed through the “String of Pearls” strategy and the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). As a result, in the geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific region, the competition between major powers (the US, China, India...) is also becoming fiercer and more complex. It has a significant impact on other countries in the region.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, Trade, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
240. The Taiwan election result: A strategic opportunity for a calmer Taiwan Strait
- Author:
- Mikael Mattlin and Jyrki Kallio
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Taiwan held combined presidential and legislative elections last weekend. The international media generally expected that a win by Lai Ching-te (DPP), who in the past has favoured independence, would lead to tensions and even conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, there are several reasons why the opposite could be the case.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Elections, and Lai Ching-te
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
241. No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War
- Author:
- Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The West supports Ukraine as a non-belligerent. China purports to be neutral, but the West increasingly sees it as a non-belligerent on the side of Russia. In a way, the West’s and China’s approaches are not dissimilar: doing enough for “their” side to stop it from losing the war, but otherwise sitting it out in the hope that the other side will somehow give up. That can hardly be called a strategy. Both the West and China will have to review their strategies if they want to preserve their interests. Will this inevitably increase tensions between them?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific
242. China, the West, and the Rest: Who is Enjoying the Shadow of Whom?
- Author:
- Jasper Roctus and Bart Dessein
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- On Tuesday, July 25, 2023, Beijing announced that seasoned diplomat Wang Yi would return to his function as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he had held for ten years (2013–2022). With this, he replaced his predecessor Qin Gang, a so-called ‘wolf warrior’ diplomat who was in office for only a few months. When former premier Li Keqiang (2013–2023) died of a heart attack on October 27, 2023, crowds of ordinary citizens laid chrysanthemum bouquets across the country, mourning for the more open and optimistic times that had characterized the era under Li’s patron, State President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Jintao (r. 2002–2012). Minister of Defense Li Shangfu was, after an equally short stint in office, replaced by former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral Dong Jun on December 29, 2023. In the case of Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the United States (US) over arms sales to Russia, his resignation was combined with a purge and crackdown on corruption within the rocket force of the PLA. Given the focus on the PLAN in Xi Jinping’s military reforms of the mid-2010s, this could be interpreted as an advantage point for the faction of China’s leader. This signal stands in contrast to the promotion of Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, to vice minister of Civil Affairs on January 16, 2024. Keeping the much-speculated removal of Hu’s father during the 20th National Congress of the CCP of October 22, 2022 into mind, one might ask: Who enjoys whose sunlight to step out of the shadows?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
243. Figures on the Billiard Table: EU-China Dynamics in the Wake of the 2024 European Elections
- Author:
- Bart Dessein and Jasper Roctus
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- While still a powerhouse in its own right, Europe’s relative influence on the world stage has been diminishing over the last few decades. Data, for example, highlight a significant shift in global trade patterns away from the old continent. According to a recent Brookings’ calculation, South-South trade had by 2009, i.e., around the time of the global financial crisis, increased from 10.9 per cent to 25.0 per cent worldwide. South-South trade thus surpassed North-North trade for the first time in world history. Today, 35.0 per cent of global trade is accounted for by South-South merchandise trade, and just 25.0 per cent of global trade is North-North trade. One important factor in this is a surging China-Africa trade. With China’s bilateral trade with Africa rising from 2.7 billion dollar in 1990 to 209 billion dollar in 2022, China has now become Africa’s single largest trading partner.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
244. Infrastructures, energy and digitalisation: pillars for the sustainable development of transport in the Western Mediterranean
- Author:
- Mark Furness, Jordi Selfa, Sassi Hammami, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Michel Noussan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- IEMed/EuroMeSCo
- Abstract:
- With the Russian aggression on Ukraine and the war in Gaza being prolonged over time the Mediterranean region at large is in total turmoil. The Policy Study entitled “Infrastructures, energy and digitalisation, pillars for the sustainable development of transport in the Western Mediterranean” aims at contributing with shared reflections and formulation of policy proposals to the challenges and strategies that the region faces in the field of promoting sustainable development in the transport sector. To this end, the Policy Study delves into this topic from these three cross-cutting dimensions in the Western Mediterranean: infrastructures, energy and environment, and digitalisation. The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean (CETMO) have taken on this stimulating task by continuing for a third year the preparation of a Policy Study that involves various authors who are experts in the field, while also unveiling some recommendations of public policy addressed to the Presidency of the Group of Transport Ministers for the Western Mediterranean (GTMO 5+5). Indeed, this publication released as a Policy Study comes within the framework of the Med Think 5+5 network of Western Mediterranean think tanks, a multidisciplinary platform of exchange associated with the 5+5 Dialogue, which brings together policymakers, practitioners and academics from the Western Mediterranean area. Considering transport and logistics as one of the most relevant sectors to foster socio-economic development and regional integration in the Western Mediterranean, the Med Think 5+5 network has been committed to promoting debate and knowledge-sharing on the issue, building upon support and expertise of the CETMO as Technical Secretariat of the Group of Transport Ministers for the Western Mediterranean (GTMO 5+5). As a matter of fact, the Med Think 5+5 convened seminars (2018, 2021) dedicated to the analysis of trends in the Western Mediterranean transport and logistics sectors, organised back-to-back with the GTMO 5+5. In this context, this Policy Study, which is part of the work programme of GTMO 5+5 under the Maltese presidency, aims at giving response to the challenges posed by climate change in the region and how the transport sector can counter it and adapt to it through digitalisation, the transformation and connection of transport with infrastructures and energy.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, European Union, Transportation, Energy, and Sustainable Development
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, North Africa, and Mediterranean
245. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
- Author:
- Mike Sweeney
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
246. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare
- Author:
- Steven Blockmans
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
- Topic:
- International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America
247. Rapprochement Despite Strategic Divergence: The Significance of the 2024 Japan-China-South Korea Summit
- Author:
- Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- After four and a half years of interruption, Japan, China, and South Korea finally held their trilateral summit. Initiated in 2008 and planned to be held annually, the summit has promoted three-way economic, trade, and cross-sectoral cooperation. Over the years, historical grievances, territorial disputes, and strategic divergencies between the three neighbours often derailed mutual engagement, thus disrupting the trilateral framework. In 2024, the timing was ripe for the leaders to meet again. The 9th summit has succeeded in restoring communication among Japan, China, and the ROK and in softening somewhat the rough edges of the trilateral framework. This approach reflects the shared understanding in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul that common challenges and goals, including ageing societies and enhanced connectivity of supply chains, require joint responses. As the other regional players in the wider Indo-Pacific, especially the smaller Southeast Asian nations, navigate an increasingly unpredictable strategic environment driven by major power rivalries, the restoration of dialogue among the three Northeast Asian heavyweights sends a positive signal to the whole region. The summit did not lead to major breakthroughs on sensitive matters. Future cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea will likely remain limited to the economic and non-traditional security domains, not crossing over to the more sensitive geopolitical, territorial, and national security issues. At the same time, taking into consideration the continuing divisions over security issues, the strategic significance of restored high-level dialogue among three highly interdependent economies and key geopolitical players in the Indo-Pacific region should not be underestimated.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific
248. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?
- Author:
- Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific
249. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships
- Author:
- Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America
250. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition
- Author:
- Maximilian Hess
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia
251. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia
- Author:
- Robert E. Hamilton
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Central Asia
252. The Realignment of the Middle East
- Author:
- Lior Sternfeld
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, and United States of America
253. Paralysis versus Obedience: China’s Local Policymakers’ Strategic Adaptation To Political centralization
- Author:
- Jessica C. Teets
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Under the concept of “top-level design,” President Xi Jinping has repurposed institutions to eliminate problems caused by local discretion such as corruption and policy implementation gaps. Increasing centralization of policy and strict penalties for lack of compliance is resulting in local officials no longer experimenting with policy to solve local governance problems and instead focusing more on documenting procedures. These strategic adaptations lead to erratic policy swings between paralysis and overcompliance at the local level, and an increasingly rigid and unresponsive policy process. Although these institutional changes are resulting in less corruption and more standardized governance (rule by law), they also reduce the local feedback and policy autonomy that constructed a more durable system than normally seen in authoritarian regimes (so-called “resilient authoritarianism”).
- Topic:
- Corruption, Xi Jinping, Centralization, and Strategic Adaptation
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
254. Russia and China in Central Asia
- Author:
- Bruce Pannier
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia
255. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview
- Author:
- Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- Abstract:
- With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
- Topic:
- European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
256. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union
- Author:
- Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- Abstract:
- This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
- Topic:
- European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
257. Understanding and Countering China’s Global South Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- John Lee
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- While the United States and advanced economies and democracies in Europe and Asia are hardening their views of and position against China, the latter is gaining much ground with respect to the developing economies of the Global South. Indeed, China increasingly demands that developing nations base their discourse and policies on approaches that Beijing supports, and many Global South nations are increasingly complying. In other words, a growing number of these nations have started to alter and adopt discourse and policies that better align with Chinese demands and preferences. In the Indo-Pacific, a region that will largely determine the future shape of the global strategic landscape, evidence shows that developing nations are absorbing Chinese norms and preferences and gradually adjusting their thinking and behaviors accordingly. China’s progress vis-à-vis the Global South—especially in the Indo-Pacific—relies on what material inducements and opportunities Beijing can offer. These are most successful when they prioritize rapid development and regime security over liberal economic rules and individual rights. Meanwhile, regardless of where the fault lies, many developing nations do not believe they have benefited as much materially or institutionally from the US-led order as they would like or expect. Members of the Global South often believe the Chinese narrative about the alleged failure of US-led globalization in the post-colonial and post–Cold War periods. For this reason, many in developing economies believe that the interests and values of these nations (or at least those of the regimes in power) better align with what China is promising than with what Washington is delivering. The US and allies such as Japan and Australia have to accept and respond to this reality. This report analyzes and assesses why and how China is making worrying progress when it comes to shaping and influencing the policies and actions of developing economies in the Indo-Pacific. It explains why this is a significant problem for the US and its allies. It then offers some recommendations to counter the Chinese Global South strategy in the region. In offering six recommendations, this report argues that the US can complicate China’s bid for leadership within the Global South, increase the cost and risk for Beijing, challenge and change narratives and discourse favoring China in the Global South, and compete more effectively in the normative and institutional context.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Global South, and Indo-Pacific
258. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait
- Author:
- John Lee and Lavina Lee
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
259. Strengthening Implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act
- Author:
- Olivia Enos
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Since 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has carried out a comprehensive campaign against the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group predominately based in Xinjiang, China. Beijing is holding an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political reeducation camps, subjecting more than 3 million to some form of forced labor, and seeking to reduce the Uyghur population through forced abortions and sterilizations. Because of this and other evidence, the United States issued an atrocity determination declaring that Uyghurs face ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. The atrocity determination was incredibly important as it spurred follow-on action from the US and other governments. The passage of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) was one of the more powerful actions following the US determination. The UFLPA created a “rebuttable presumption” stating that the government would bar all goods produced “wholly or in part” with Uyghur forced labor from entering US markets. The UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021 and enforcement provisions went into effect in June 2022. Now, more than two years after its passage, trendlines are emerging, and policymakers can now evaluate the law’s effectiveness and ascertain new means for mitigating Uyghur forced labor. The CCP has not stopped targeting Uyghurs, and in fact has subjected even more of them to forced labor. Today, the CCP operates what some analysts believe is the largest state-sponsored forced labor program in the world. Given the CCP’s ongoing exploitation, the onus is on the US and the international community to curtail this egregious practice. At a minimum, democratic leaders need to ensure that citizens of the free world are not inadvertently supporting the continuation of these abuses. For the UFLPA to be maximally effective, Washington should complement it with comprehensive sanctions implementation and a secondary sanctions regime that targets entities aiding and abetting in the CCP’s enslavement of Uyghurs. Moreover, other countries need to close their markets to goods produced with Uyghur forced labor. To that end, the US and other countries can coordinate better to implement strong measures similar to the UFLPA. Perpetrators of Uyghur forced labor need to pay financially for their crimes through fines and forfeiture. Finally, the US should offer financial remedies to help survivors of the CCP’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. While the UFLPA was a notable development in the fight against Uyghur forced labor, more has to be done to ensure the end of Uyghur forced labor. The international community needs to join together to hold the CCP accountable and protect Uyghur rights.
- Topic:
- Legislation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Uyghurs, Freedom of Religion, Forced Labor, and Implementation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
260. The Global Impact of China’s Water and Related Environmental Problems
- Author:
- Thomas J. Duesterberg
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The quantity, location, and quality of water resources in China have long been a distinguishing and even defining characteristic of its history. Records at least as far back as the Ch’in era in the third century BC note the presence of massive waterworks such as irrigation and transportation canals. Terraced rice fields in hilly areas in central and southern China remain iconic images of Chinese civilization. During a contentious and important debate in the mid-twentieth century, geographers and political scientists asked whether the erection of a “hydraulic society” was the explanation for what political scientist Karl Wittfogel identified as “oriental despotism.”1 The German-trained academic argued that the existential requirement to contain endemic flooding and move water from the massive rivers of central and southern China to agricultural areas necessitated an authoritarian system for deploying labor on the scale required for hydraulic engineering projects spanning the continent. Chairman Mao Zedong drily noted at the beginning of his reign that “there is a lot of water in the south and not much water in the north . . . borrowing some water would be good.”2 Mao was soon to unleash the massive workforce of China to renew and expand efforts over the centuries to get water to farmland, control flooding, and reengineer the landscape of modern China. Even without exaggerating the centrality of water issues for historical China, in the modern era water resources are clearly still vital to the country’s economic and ecological health. And hydraulic engineering projects have become increasingly important, both to China’s Asian neighbors and to the global environment. An important new survey of the “ecological history” of modern China concludes that “in growing from impoverished giant to wealthy superpower in seventy years, China has sacrificed whatever resilience its ecosystem once possessed. It has polluted and poisoned its air, water, and soil . . . it has turned forests into plantations and seen deserts expand . . . and has seen lakes come to resemble green paint.”3 Unfortunately, China’s ecological problems have increasingly had negative impacts outside its borders. China’s unprecedented geoengineering to move water from the south to the north is now imperiling both the water resources available downstream from Tibet and the Hindu-Kush mountains, and the economy and ways of living of literally billions of people. China needs ever more land to grow higher quality food and produce higher yields, which frees up land for housing its population. These efforts have led to deforestation not only in China but also in South America and South Asia. And the consistent choice of Beijing’s leadership to drive economic growth at the expense of environmental health has led to dangerous levels of water pollution and poor soil health in China. Environmental degradation has become a growing political issue in China, and its export of this problem has incited considerable international concern. This study explores these issues with a focus on water resources, and it outlines the regional and global impacts of Chinese policy. The study concludes with a discussion of China’s ability and ambition to address these problems as well as how affected countries can help move Chinese leadership toward a more constructive and cooperative effort to develop a solution.
- Topic:
- Economics, Environment, and Water
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
261. The Western Innovators of the Mobile Revolution: The Data on Global Royalty Flows to U.S. and Europe and Why It Matters
- Author:
- Adam Mossoff
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The mobile revolution has radically altered our world in ways that were imagined only as science fiction a mere thirty years ago. Western innovators launched this revolution in creating its foundational telecommunications technologies; thus, it is unsurprising that private companies in the United States and Europe receive payments for the use of their telecommunications technologies, which is compensation for the billions in investments and decades of research and development of these inventions. The majority of the commercial implementers—the companies that make and sell consumer products that use these telecommunications technologies like smartphones or connected cars—are in Asia. China in particular has an increasingly growing share of these implementers across all sectors of the global innovation economy. This explains in part China’s domestic industrial policies that seek to lower the royalties paid by its national companies like Huawei or Oppo. Evidence-based policymaking should guide U.S. and European laws and regulations. Data confirm the critical role of reliable and effective patent rights, the rule of law, and courts using due process to resolve disputes have been essential for Western innovators creating the modern world—and will drive the technologies of tomorrow in the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI).
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Telecommunications
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
262. Trust and trade-offs: How to manage Europe’s green technology dependence on China
- Author:
- Alexander Lipke, Janka Oertel, and Daniel O'Sullivan
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- “De-risking” is the guiding motif of the EU’s new approach to China, particularly in green technologies where Chinese companies are striving for full dominance. For Europe, these same industries are supposed to generate future prosperity, enable the green transition, and enhance security through greater energy independence. As economic growth, climate goals, and national security cannot all be maximally achieved together in these sectors, European policymakers need to weigh these up and decide which to prioritise, when, and how. Instead of individually using incentives and trade tools ad hoc, at random, and in insufficient doses, member states should revolutionise their approach with: a real push in political leadership, enhanced coordination at the EU level, and clear prioritisation backed up by credible arguments. Policymakers need to define politically where the risks are greatest and what constitutes a tolerable dependency, actively seek partners in the world to preserve competition, and communicate clearly about the necessary trade-offs. A key question for Europeans to ask immediately is whether they trust Chinese companies to form the backbone of Europe’s green transition. The answer will determine the options available to them.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Green Technology, Trust, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
263. Material world: How Europe can compete with China in the race for Africa’s critical minerals
- Author:
- Sarah Logan
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- In the last two decades, China has come to dominate global supply chains for critical raw materials and the green energy and other technologies they enable. This increases competition and economic risks for Europe. In an effort to build CRM supply chains insulated from China, the EU has signed strategic partnerships with several politically friendly countries around the world, including in Africa. However, the EU will only realise its de-risking ambitions if the European private sector invests in CRM supply chains in partner countries in Africa and elsewhere. Yet the incentives for European companies to enter mining and processing operations in these markets are too weak. The example of Namibia shows that the EU’s strategic partnership with the country has borne little fruit – and may even be benefitting Chinese firms at European expense. To address this, the EU must enhance support to European companies to invest in securing access to critical raw materials. This should include new financial incentives and measures to protect against China manipulating prices on international markets.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, Strategic Partnerships, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Europe, Asia, and Namibia
264. Nuclear Danger and the NPT
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America
265. China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- As the dust settles on the election, one thing is certain: there is going to be increased interest in expanding America’s nuclear arsenal. Whatever the merits of what that move might be, it’s hardly a complete strategy to cope with a long term strategic contest, Russia, China, and their proxies. That will require far more than any adjustment of our nuclear arsenal. What’s required? At the request of several national security officials and outside experts, NPEC is sharing its answer with today’s release of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War available as an Amazon book. It consists of four chapters. The first sketches out what a long-term contest with China, Russia, and its proxies will demand. Although building up military might and using threats of massive destruction against our enemies were critical to winning the Cold War, in the coming cool contest, they will no longer serve as our top ace in the hole. Instead, the key levers will be keeping our key military, political, and commercial functions immune to attacks and communicating, protecting, sharing, and analyzing essential information on an unprecedented scale. Wars may be waged against nations but the aim increasingly will be to disable them without physically obliterating them. What, though, should we do about the growing nuclear threat? That’s the focus of the book’s next chapter, “Xi and Putin Are Building More Nukes: How to Compete.” It, in turn, is followed by “What Missile-driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” which was first released three years ago. The Pentagon recently confirmed this chapter’s predictions about China’s development of intercontinental conventional missiles by 2030. The chapter’s other forecasts and military and diplomatic proposals are still timely. This brings us to the book’s last chapter, “Can Self-Government Survive the Next Convulsion?” It examines the domestic political, economic, and social implications of pursuing this volume’s recommendations. What’s needed most is a geographic distribution of America’s critical military and financial infrastructure and demographic capital. Fortunately, this has already begun, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aligns with America’s bent to spread and increase political power and wealth domestically. The book’s final section is an appendix consisting of an introduction Thomas Cochran and I co-authored for “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” — a three-year NPEC study of China’s nuclear weapons production potential. The Pentagon has cited this research in each of its annual Chinese military power assessments for the last three years running. The Pentagon has used the study to help explain why China is likely to acquire as many nuclear weapons in a decade as the United States currently has deployed. It was this projection, perhaps more than any other, that caused national security analysts to focus on what is likely to be a long-term strategic contest with China and its new ally, Russia. Paul Bracken, author of The Second Nuclear Age, reviewed the book: “China and Russia’s military buildups have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. Yet the US is not remotely prepared to cope either intellectually or with appropriate hardware. Henry Sokolski takes a major step forward here by analyzing these challenges and what we need to do about them.”
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and AUKUS
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
266. Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? (Occasional Paper 2404)
- Author:
- Hui Zhang
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- It’s unclear when Iran might get the bomb. In July, Secretary of State Blinken revealed that Iran was only one to two weeks away from producing enough weapons grade uranium for several bombs. The New York Times quoted experts who estimated it would take Iran up to another year to make a missile-deliverable weapon. A conservative estimate would be no more than five months but could be much less. In the attached historical analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program, Hui Zhang pegs the number at three to five weeks, and possibly less. It makes for interesting reading, not only on what China was able to accomplish so quickly sixty years ago, but on what Iran may do.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- China and Iran
267. War Game Reveals Chinese Attacks on Communications Could Paralyze Taiwan’s Efforts to Resist
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Top security analysts have long noted that if China disables Taiwan’s underseas cable and disrupts its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems, Beijing could secure a smokeless victory over the island. Over the last five to 10 years, however, private commercial space-based communications and internet services have grown dramatically in importance. The critical role of Starlink in supporting Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point. This prompts several policy questions: What national security roles should governments require commercial space service providers to play during a security crisis or war? Should governments set minimum standards for cyber and physical hardening for commercial satcom providers to meet in order to be eligible to compete for government contracts? What is the proper response to repeated “accidental” or deniable assaults on commercial and military space systems? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center conducted a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. It utilized the talents of current and retired officials, congressional staff, and outside experts to play the game. In the game, China cut communications cables, disrupted microwave and cellular services, attacked Taiwan’s electrical supply system locally and jammed its satellite communications. The United States and its space-faring allies acted slowly. Private space service providers were no quicker. Finally, the President of the United States authorized covert cyberattacks against China’s Beidou satellite ground stations. China responded by launching similar cyberattacks on U.S. GPS systems and the U.S., redoubling its attacks against the Beidou system. With U.S. naval forces closing in to disrupt a Chinese naval quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing called for a mutual ceasefire in exchange for bilateral talks to lock Taiwan’s future as a province of China. The U.S., allies and Taiwan rejected this offer, opening the door for further military escalation. In the hot wash, the players discussed three key findings: Washington, its space-faring allies and industry players must clarify how they might backfill Taiwanese communication systems well before China might try to disable them. The US and its allies must address Taiwan’s lack of legal recognition, which leaves it uniquely vulnerable to offensive Chinese space and terrestrial military actions against Taiwan’s communications systems. Washington and its space-faring allies must develop additional military space options with plausible deniability to deter and counter similar Chinese capabilities. The recommendations paired with each of these findings. Taiwan needs to be more vocal about its communications systems’ vulnerabilities and consider developing mechanisms to disable China’s satellites temporarily, in a deniable manner. The United States should lower the classifications associated with its non-kinetic anti-satellite systems and create an operational working group on space security that includes Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Nonproliferation, and War Games
- Political Geography:
- China and Taiwan
268. Green Soft Power? Checking in on China as a Responsible Stakeholder
- Author:
- Agnieszka Nitza-Makowska, Kerry Anne Longhurst, and Katarzyna Skiert-Andrzejuk
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Polish Political Science Yearbook
- Institution:
- Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
- Abstract:
- By assuming a proactive role in international environmental regimes and extending the ‘green’ dimensions of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been seeking to promote itself as a leader and responsible stakeholder in global environmental governance. This article examines this development concerning the notion of China’s ‘soft power’ and, more specifically, the notion of ‘green soft power’ – which aims to bridge the traditional concept of soft power with a state’s behavior on environmental and climate issues. China presents an interesting case since it has accrued a considerable amount of green soft power through its multilateral environmental diplomacy practiced at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs), the high-profile annual United Nations Climate Change Conferences, but its patchy deployment of environmental standards in the bilateral engagements under the BRI highlights the contradictions in referring to China as a green soft power. With these ideas in mind, this article holds that in the search to understand the evolving nature of China’s responsible stakeholder role, attention should be given to exploring the notion of green soft power.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
269. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World
- Author:
- Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
- Topic:
- NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
270. Nuclear China in the Twenty-First Century: Status and Implications for the World and Europe
- Author:
- David Santoro
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- In August 2021, shortly after new evidence surfaced that China might be expanding its nuclear arsenal much more extensively and rapidly than previously assumed, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, described Beijing’s military investments as a “strategic breakout.” He underscored that the “explosive growth and modernization of [China’s] nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking,” adding that “that word, breathtaking, may not be enough.” Since then, several senior officials in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have echoed that message and the final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published in October 2023 concluded that at its current pace, China “will reach rough quantitative parity with the United States in deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s.” The result has been the emergence of work, including by this author, to understand this unprecedented development. This work is in its infancy, however, and more is needed to grasp the scale and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization (especially given that much of it is shrouded in secrecy) as well as its implications for strategic stability, deterrence, and arms control and risk reduction. Existing work has focused primarily on the implications for the United States and, to some extent, the United States and Russia. Yet it is also important to grapple with the implications for Europe, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reflect on actions that Europeans, individually or with others, should take in response.
- Topic:
- NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Modernization
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
271. Beyond Target: Indirect Impacts of Antidumping
- Author:
- Sébastien Jean and Kevin Lefebvre
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
- Abstract:
- This paper investigates the bilateral impacts of antidumping measures, beyond directly targeted products and exporting firms. It focuses on the country whose exports are most exposed to such measures, China. Productlevel analysis shows that export volumes are negatively affected for products similar to a product targeted by an antidumping case, i.e. belonging to the same tariff heading. Using firm-level data, we show that this impact is driven by within-firm contagion: targeted firms not only cut their exports of targeted products, they also reduce significantly their exports of non-targeted products. The decrease is half as large for the latter than for the former, but the total impact on bilateral trade is far larger, because the value of export flows affected by these indirect impacts is ten times larger than the value of directly targeted export flows. In addition, interestingly, this effect is more pronounced for small and private firms.
- Topic:
- Business, Exports, Trade, Spillovers, and Antidumping
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
272. ‘Self-Revolution’ Suggests Stronger CCDI Mandate
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Xi Jinping addressed the perennial dilemma of corruption within the CCP, pronouncing “victory” in a decade of anti-corruption efforts but simultaneously warning that the situation remains “grim and complex.” In the short term, anti-corruption crackdowns are expected to continue, with Xi targeting sectors with concentrated power, capital-intensive industries, and resource-rich areas. The military, particularly the Strategic Support Force, might face increased scrutiny. The third plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the twentieth party congress took place on January 8, emphasizing “courage in [performing] self-revolution” as a distinctive character and advantage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
- Topic:
- Corruption, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
273. State Goals, Private Tools: Digital Sovereignty and Surveillance Along the Belt and Road
- Author:
- Che Chang, Lian Huang, and Athena Tong
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Beijing promotes digital sovereignty in its engagements with other countries but with the caveat that it can maintain access to partner countries’ digital systems. Leaked documents from cyber contracting firm iS00N indicate a focus on One Belt One Road partner countries, targeting critical systems, including telecoms, government ministries, and financial institutions. A new paradigm of using nominally private firms allows Beijing to put distance between its inclusive rhetoric of “win-win cooperation” while companies hack partner countries’ infrastructure at the direction of its security services.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Surveillance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Digital Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
274. The Shapeshifting Evolution of Chinese Technology Acquisition
- Author:
- Matthew Brazil
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Smuggling, a critical tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acquire technology to enhance its defense industrial base, is reemerging in the wake of the US Government’s technology controls. Diversion—falsifying the end-user—is another common tactic that the Party has successfully used to acquire critical technology, including dual-use items that it would have been otherwise unable to obtain. Talent attraction is an underrated part of technology acquisition that the CCP has promoted in academia as well as in the corporate sector to help advance its technology ambitions. Foreign businesses have been willing to engage in technology transfer in return for potential access to the PRC market. This tradeoff frequently has not paid off for these firms.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Trade, Smuggling, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
275. The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System
- Author:
- Edward Schwarck
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Centralizing reforms to the Ministry of State Security probably constitute the most important development in China’s civilian intelligence system since its establishment in 1983. These reforms instituted “vertical leadership,” under which the MSS is empowered to control local bureaus’ personnel affairs, budgets, and oversight. Structural changes that began in 2016–2017 mean that local state security bureaus are no longer subject to the authority of local party committees, and so are freer to impose a security-first agenda on other government agencies, leading to a more oppressive political environment. The ministry is now better able to direct joint operations between bureaus, exploit pockets of regional expertise, and ensure that local activities serve the strategic intelligence and security requirements of the central government. The reforms are part of Xi Jinping’s broader efforts to ensure that the “party center has supreme authority over state security.” The state security system’s further empowerment suggests it is likely to remain a powerful and durable interest group in PRC politics beyond the Xi era.
- Topic:
- Security, Intelligence, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Centralization
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
276. The Art of War: PRC Weaponizes Culture to Galvanize the People
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The Party sees culture as a tool to achieve its strategic ambitions both inside and outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Speeches, articles, and conferences portray it as central to achieving national rejuvenation. Party discourse on culture is shot through with militaristic terminology. Not just echoing Mao-era rhetoric, this reflects Beijing’s desire to “engineer souls” in pursuit of a strong nation. Artists, culture workers, and academics are perceived as pawns in a project to present the PRC globally as peaceful and prosperous, but the Party is aware of the deficiencies of its soft power.
- Topic:
- Arts, Culture, Soft Power, Academia, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
277. Xi Jinping’s Quantitative Easing Unlikely to Save Economy
- Author:
- Willy Wo-Lap Lam
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In an apparent U-turn, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has initiated stimulus policies that have boosted the stock market and are attempting to jump-start key sectors and meet the annual GDP growth target of 5 percent. In the last week of September, the central bank announced a package worth at least 2 trillion Renminbi (RMB; $280 billion), cut the banks’ reserve requirement ratio by 50 basis points, and hinted at further measures. The domestic and international response has been underwhelming, in part because the package leaves the economy even more overleveraged than before. President Xi Jinping’s attempts to enhance the PRC’s global stature, including through a recent ICBM test and by deepening support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and for other countries willing to denounce the United States and the West, will not help the domestic economic woes as they discourage foreign investment.
- Topic:
- Monetary Policy, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Quantitative Easing
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
278. Understanding the PRC’s Selective Use of Military Hotlines
- Author:
- Augusto Leal Rinaldi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk, which can be seen in crises ranging from the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the present day. There is a recognition that hotlines offer tactical benefits, but they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations. The PRC is largely skeptical of military hotlines, believing that they lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. Defense scholars fear that the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate crises could embolden adversaries to take more risks, and doubt that hotlines can help mitigate long-term mistrust in bilateral relations. Beijing also perceived some benefits of military hotlines. These include enhancing safety and crisis management, enabling the political signaling of intentions, and improving the PRC’s reputation as a responsible power, as well as allowing it to control narratives and influence other states’ actions.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, and Deescalation
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
279. Beijing’s Soft Power Push with African Nations
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South. Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains. Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains. Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South. Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains. Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains. Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, Soft Power, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
280. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race
- Author:
- Sunny Cheung
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
281. Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media. The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
282. Economic and Technological Zones: Economic Strategy in the Tibet Autonomous Region
- Author:
- Devendra Kumar
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- New Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) are focused on pockets of the Han population, which will exacerbate tensions within the region. The Tibetan economy is already largely under Han control (except for in the agriculture and livestock sectors), and Han people constitute the majority group in many of Tiber’s urban centers. The TAR government has set up the zones to import practices from elsewhere in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and shift the region’s economy away from traditional sectors and toward export-oriented industries, construction, and even high-tech manufacturing. The TAR’s external trade is currently limited to Nepal, due to ongoing border tensions with India. Meanwhile, infrastructural challenges hampering the development of the Sichuan-Tibet railway or national highways connecting the TAR with other provinces suggest that further integration with the rest of the PRC remains some way off. In a related policy, the PRC has developed border towns strategically located near land border ports that it has built along its borders with India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Infrastructure buildup on the border could also serve a dual-use purpose in the case of a conflict, as has been the case in India in recent years.
- Topic:
- Economics, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Trade, and Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Tibet
283. PRC Advances New International Order In Astana
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an important part of a wider strategy to construct a new international order. Beijing projects soft power through promoting norms, discursive constructs, and policy preferences in the SCO which member states officially endorse. These include language about comprehensively reforming the UN and supporting all PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” with Taiwan. Military exercises that take place via the SCO provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unique opportunities to gain practical experience outside its borders and normalizes basing of Chinese forces in other countries through international treaties.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, Soft Power, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
284. PRC Transfer of Military and Dual-Use Technology: the Case of the International Conference on Defence Technology
- Author:
- Matthew Bruzzese
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The International Conference on Defence Technology (ICDT), held biannually since 2018, exemplifies an approach by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to leverage defense technology from Western researchers. The conference features participation from PRC defense entities and Western scientists, facilitating direct transfer of advanced defense technology insights to the People’s Liberation Army. The Military-Civil Fusion development strategy has increased the absorption of foreign S&T knowledge for military purposes. Research with any PRC institution operates under the premise that anything with potential military applications will be utilized for defense purposes. Despite increased awareness of PRC’s tech transfer efforts, Western researchers continue to attend PRC-hosted conferences with military affiliations, exposing them to risks of being probed for sensitive information and potential espionage activities.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Defense Industry, and Dual Use Infrastructure
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
285. New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-centric Nation-Building
- Author:
- James Leibold
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Another cultural revolution is in full swing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is not the purported class revolution Mao advocated in the past, but rather a wave of Han cultural and racial nationalism. Xi’s new approach to ethnic minority policy repudiates the Party’s past promise to allow minority nationalities to exercise political and cultural autonomy, becoming “masters of their own house.” Following more than ten years of incremental change, a new textbook from scholar-officials articulates the discourse, ideology, and policies associated with a new Han-centric narrative of China’s past and future. In this conception, the sovereignties and homelands of the Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongol, and other indigenous minorities are erased and replaced with a seamless teleology of the Han colonial and racial becoming.
- Topic:
- Education, Culture, Political Parties, and Xi Jinping
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
286. Foreign Fixations at the Heart of Chinese-style Modernization
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- A new report from two high-end PRC think-tanks details the country’s path to modernization in anticipation of July’s Third Plenum but suggests that any shifts in policy direction will be muted. The report emphasizes the triumph of Chinese-style modernization over the Western model and provides substantial criticisms of the failures of the West. It also argues that the PRC’s model contains lessons for other developing countries. The report leverages Western individuals and institutions to buttress its arguments for the superiority of Chinese-style modernization, which suggests that the West is still perceived as (or can be instrumentalized as) a source of legitimacy by the PRC. The report asserts the core message that only Party-led Chinese-style modernization can bring about national rejuvenation, and that this will occur through an economic program that is focused on “seizing the commanding heights in a new round of global scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation.”
- Topic:
- Development, Modernization, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
287. Planned Obsolescence: The Strategic Support Force In Memoriam (2015-2024)
- Author:
- Joe McReynolds
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force likely was designed principally as a transitional structure meant to provide a home for disparate space, cyber, and informatization forces until their force structure could be developed enough to stand as independent branches. The successor branches of the SSF, the new Space Force, Cyber Force, and Information Support Force, likely maintain the units, capabilities, and mission areas previously held under the SSF. These branches can be best understood as rough PLA equivalents to US functional combatant commands, non-geographically defined joint-force structures intended to support services and military theaters by providing critical capabilities and operations in strategic domains of warfare. The creation of the branches also has the benefit of bringing critical resources and capabilities under the direct oversight of the Central Military Commission. This design feature is likely motivated by a desire to have greater control and more closely shape broader PLA modernization. It is in part also a response to controversies and international incidents associated with the SSF’s current leadership.
- Topic:
- Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
288. Xi Signals Firm Strategy but Flexible Tactics at China’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference
- Author:
- Neil Thomas
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- The readout from the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC) at the end of December indicated an emerging strategy of countering US leadership by mobilizing the support of Global South countries while dividing the West on contentious global issues. Recent changes in official discourse and new language that now forms part Xi’s messaging to visiting politicians makes clear Beijing’s enhanced conviction of the need to actively shape and influence world events. The CFAWC meeting signaled a turn away from the more abrasive forms of “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Xi’s desired shift in rhetoric does not mean that PRC diplomats will be less assertive in communicating their preferences overseas.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, and Xi Jinping
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
289. Foreign Intelligence Hackers and Their Place in the PRC Intelligence Community
- Author:
- Matthew Brazil
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Leaked files from iS00N reveal deep insights into the PRC’s intelligence operations, highlighting an intensified global security offensive as well as issues within the intelligence community. iS00N’s growth is tied to Xi Jinping’s aggressive policies and demonstrates the importance of private contractors in fulfilling the PRC’s increased intelligence and security needs. The leaks expose employee dissatisfaction and underscore iS00N’s critical role in intelligence gathering and job provision, reflecting the contractor’s complex relationship with the PRC government. The exposure raises questions about the role and regulation of hacking contractors in the PRC, potentially leading to investigations and reforms that could affect the PRC’s intelligence strategy and international relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Intelligence, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
290. National Defense Mobilization: Toward A Clear Division of Labor between the PLA and Civilian Bureaucracies
- Author:
- Yu-Ping Chang
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- As the result of the ongoing military reform, the military’s guiding and leadership role over civilian bureaucracies seems to be strengthened. Meanwhile, the responsibilities of the State Council and local governments on NDM have been substantiated, and the administrative work which the PLA used to undertake has been transferred to local governments. A clearer division of labor between the military and civilian bureaucracies allows the PLA to focus on the development of combat capabilities without being distracted by administrative work, while more attention and resources devoted to national defense projects by civilian bureaucracies are likely to improve NDM work. National defense mobilization is an area where the PLA and civilian bureaucracies need to cooperate closely during peacetime to allow an effective generation and mobilization of national resources during wartime. The national defense mobilization system (NDM system), composed of civilian bureaucracies and the PLA bureaucracies, used to be characterized by a bureaucratic structure in which the military sat above local governments and both guided and administered a significant portion of administrative work related to national defense development.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Reform, Bureaucracy, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
291. Implications of Article 23 Legislation on the Future of Hong Kong
- Author:
- Eric Y. H. Lai
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Hong Kong’s Article 23 legislation will integrate the PRC’s national security framework into Hong Kong’s legal system, impacting the city’s rule of law and foreign business interests. Broad and vague definitions of national security will create challenges for Hong Kong’s common law system. It will likely contribute to the erosion of legal certainty and judicial independence. Proposed offenses such as “theft of state secrets” and “espionage” are ambiguously defined, creating uncertainty. This may cause issues for foreign businesses collecting information for due diligence and will further chill freedom of expression in the city. The legislation aims to isolate Hong Kong further from the liberal democratic world, granting extensive powers to the government for political control and undermining public oversight and due process rights.
- Topic:
- National Security, Rule of Law, Legislation, and Due Process
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Hong Kong
292. Civil Society Defense Initiatives
- Author:
- Marco Ho Cheng-hui
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Civic groups are enhancing “social resilience” by forming self-training organizations focused on preparing for potential conflict impacts beyond just military engagement. These groups address a broad range of issues including civil defense, emergency rescue, disaster preparedness, cyberattack responses, and infrastructure maintenance. Civil society advocates for the use of civilian technologies in defense, such as drones and AI, reflecting a proactive stance on Taiwan’s security. Kuma Academy exemplifies practical action in civil defense education, offering courses and activities to thousands, alongside other groups focusing on specific preparedness aspects. Taiwan’s civil society is urging government and political parties to implement defense reforms, over concerns about the country’s level of defense in the face of threats from the PRC.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Reform
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
293. PLA Personnel Shakeups And Their Implications
- Author:
- Ying Yu Lin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Dong Jun’s appointment as Defense Minister and changes in the PLA Rocket Force leadership mark a strategic shift towards bolstering military diplomacy, particularly with Russia, and enhancing combat and technological readiness, reflecting Dong’s significant role in shaping future military strategy. The leadership overhaul within the PLA highlights a concerted effort to root out corruption, critical for maintaining the military’s operational integrity and effectiveness. This move is partly inspired by the need to avoid the operational pitfalls seen in the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine. The hiring of PLA officers from services outside the Rocket Force, as well as those with personal connections to Xi Jinping, indicates a desire to start afresh, while also suggesting the extent of corruption within PLARF. Analysts believe the ousting of officials like Li Shangfu will not necessarily directly weaken the PLA’s combat capabilities, given the defense minister’s primarily diplomatic role. However, it also suggests that Li, with his technical background, was perhaps not well-suited to his role. Nonetheless, it prompts speculation about future military diplomacy and technological focus.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Corruption, Military Affairs, Leadership, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
294. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program
- Author:
- Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
295. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic
- Author:
- Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea
296. Is the G7 still relevant?
- Author:
- Raffaele Trombetta
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Europe, and Asia
297. China in Africa: The Nuanced Reality of Belt and Road
- Author:
- Hank Cohen
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- China’s growing presence in Africa has been the subject of significant criticism. The popular understanding in the US of China’s role on the continent has been that the People’s Republic, via the Belt and Road Initiative, has offered African countries a raw deal: shoddy infrastructure projects in exchange for loans they know their partners cannot repay. The approach is commonly described as debt-trap diplomacy, garnering unfavorable comparisons to organized crime behavior. But the reality of China’s presence in Africa is more nuanced.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
298. The Problem with Power: Taiwan in the Era of Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Joey Ching Aracena
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Fletcher Security Review
- Institution:
- The Fletcher School, Tufts University
- Abstract:
- The United States and the PRC hold opposing positions on the “Taiwan Question.” The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act affirms U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by providing weapons and services to promote Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” The Act also considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Conversely, the PRC emphasizes that Taiwan “reunification” is a strategic priority that “cannot be dragged on generation after generation.” At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC President Xi Jinping stated, “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification… but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” Despite the PRC’s coercive behavior and sharpened rhetoric, Taiwan refuses to accept “reunification” under the PRC’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” model. Nevertheless, the United States and the PRC both discourage Taiwan’s independence. Both states understand that if Taiwan were to formally declare independence, it would compel both parties to respond, potentially escalating towards military conflict. By attempting to influence Taiwan’s behavior, both great powers implicitly recognize Taiwan’s role in making or breaking their respective strategies. In this way, Taiwan maintains a powerful point of leverage in the “Triangular Relationship,” as it could take actions that trigger future conflict between the United States and the PRC.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
299. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia
- Author:
- Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
- Topic:
- Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Asia
300. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China
- Author:
- David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine