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21. From Mao to Now: China's 20th-Century Global Development Finance

Author:
Austin M. Strange and (Zoe) Liu Zongyuan
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
March 25, 2026 — The nature, aims, and impacts of Chinese overseas aid and lending have attracted major policy and scholarly attention since 2000. However, the first 50 years of China's international development cooperation are often omitted from discussion. The University of Hong Kong's Austin Strange introduces a dataset on China's 20th-century development finance, including approximately 4,000 projects in over 130 countries, and shows how these data can be analyzed to enrich theoretical and empirical research on Chinese development finance in international relations.
Topic:
International Relations, International Cooperation, Mao Zedong, and Development Finance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

22. The Future of China-Russia Relations

Author:
Thomas Eder and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
March 26, 2026 — What does China('s leadership) stand to gain or lose by remaining close to Russia? Thomas Eder's presentation explores energy and broader economic ties, Russia's potential role in conflicts involving China in the Indo-Pacific, and the joint promotion of (global) governance ideas. It also address the realities of China’s and Russia’s presence and cooperation in the Arctic, as well as consequences of their deeper bilateral ties for China-Europe ties and China's regional security interests in East Asia.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Energy, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

23. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Learning Mandarin, Riding the Metro: China’s Street-Level Presence in Bogotá

Author:
Tony Kirby
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
China’s presence in Colombia is no longer an abstract geopolitical discussion but rather a reality negotiated day by day through construction work, commercial exchange, language learning, and personal relationships.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Construction
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Colombia, and South America

25. From fragmentation to integration: China’s “Vertical-Horizontal Model” for the protection of overseas interests

Author:
Zhiqiang Zou, Degang Sun, and Jinan Wang
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China’s overseas interests have been faced with a growing array of multidimensional threats. China has carried out legislative and institutional reforms, forming a “vertical-horizontal model” for interagency cooperation and government-society fusion. The central government of China has passed a series of legislative acts to legalise China’s protection of overseas interests, a top-down vertical governance. Parallel ministries, departments, and offices have formed task-based institutions through consultation to promote China’s overseas interest protection, thereby establishing a cross-sectoral horizontal governance mechanism. The implementation of the “vertical-horizontal model,” however, confronts an array of hurdles, with heavy bureaucracy potentially giving rise to problems such as inefficiency and collective irresponsibility.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Reform, Legislation, Institutions, and Vertical-Horizontal Model
Political Geography:
China and Asia

26. Countering Russian escalation in space

Author:
John Klein and Clementine G. Starling-Daniels
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This report’s findings are meant to guide policymakers in making important decisions about safety, security, and sustainability in the space domain, as well as to better inform the public on these issues. The report explains why current US space policy, Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs, and commercial integration strategies by themselves are inadequate to address the growing threats from Russia in space. The report makes the case for the development of policies, practical strategies, and more effective acquisition programs to better address a range of potential futures, considering possible space-related actions by Russia’s political leadership. Beyond recommending changes to US declaratory policy, this report details why the United States needs a more resilient space architecture. It examines how Russia’s nuclear threat—specifically, its designs to place a nuclear weapon in orbit, in clear violation of its obligations under international law—could alter the rationale for pursuing proliferated low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations. This report also explores the kind of space architecture the United States would need during a conflict against a major power, and how the United States can further integrate the private sector and allies in pursuit of its national security objectives. Each of these issues carries significant near-term policy and acquisition implications. This report explains why some US policymakers might be reluctant to take the necessary coercive action to compel acquiescence by Russian political and military leaders. This reluctance is driven by a Western sense of morality and “rightness,” an inherent right of self-defense mentality, and current conceptions of international humanitarian law. US anticipatory actions seeking to deter Russian malicious actions might prove unreliable because any anticipatory action will be a political decision based upon a Western mindset and worldview. This observation underscores that deterrence by denial of benefit—including resilience and active defense—should play a substantial role in military strategies, one even more substantial than cost-imposition efforts. Additionally, assurance and reassurance efforts directed toward Chinese and Indian leadership could help dissuade potential Russian aggressive behavior and deescalate crises. This report’s analysis illuminates important defense and force planning considerations. Its three scenarios span a catastrophic nuclear detonation (NUDET) in LEO to debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to less aggressive action against commercial satellites. A qualitative assessment using a detailed framework highlights the relative importance of the methods used to dissuade potential aggression while also prevailing in conflict. In priority order, the relative importance of affecting Russian leadership’s decision calculus is: deterrence by denial of benefit; assurance and reassurance; and deterrence by cost imposition. Finally, this report provides fifteen actionable policy and defense acquisition recommendations for advancing a comprehensive and practical framework to counter potential Russian aggression and escalation in space. Should dissuasion efforts fail and conflict in space occur, it is necessary that the United States, its allies, and commercial partners fight through Russia’s irresponsible and aggressive actions in space, while working to deescalate any crisis and seek a lasting peace.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Space Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America

27. A US strategy for energy competition with China in emerging markets

Author:
Steven Burns
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Emerging economies are set to drive the largest share of energy demand growth over the next two decades, making them a central arena for competition over influence in the future of global energy systems. China has positioned itself as the dominant partner for energy and infrastructure development across the Global South, in part by pairing state-backed finance with turnkey project delivery, which allows Chinese firms to shape technical standards and financing norms while securing long-term positions in future procurement and service markets. The United States can compete more effectively by organizing its financing, project development, and technical capabilities into a coherent offer that is closer to the speed and simplicity of competing models, while preserving the transparency and predictability on which partners rely.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Strategic Competition, Energy, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

29. Chinese Loans to Sub-Saharan African countries: BalancingDevelopment and Dependency

Author:
Ahmed Salim Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) foremost tradingpartner and the region’s main bilateral creditor, profoundly reshaping its financial and geopoliticallandscape. Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders extended over USD 170 billion in loans toAfrican countries , with major recipients (such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia)each receiving between USD 5 and 40 billion. Today, China accounts for around 20% of SSA’sbilateral external debt , underscoring its strategic importance in the continent’s developmenttrajectory. This Policy Brief argues that while Chinese loans are instrumental in addressing Africa’smassive infrastructure deficit, they concurrently heighten debt vulnerabilities and geopoliticaldependence. The attractiveness of Chinese financing is best understood in relation to Africa’spersistent structural needs. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2024) , SSA facesan annual infrastructure financing gap of USD 100-150 billion, far exceeding the capacity ofdomestic revenues and traditional donors. Chinese loans therefore stand out due to their speed of approval focus on large-scale physical infrastructure, and limited policy conditionality’s comparedto Western lenders. For many African governments, this makes Chinese credit an appealing andpragmatic alternative for accelerating development.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Infrastructure, Trade, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

30. China’s Solar Industry Is in Upheaval—The Effects Will Be Global

Author:
Michael Davidson and Sandy Qian
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China’s solar industry has entered a period of intense upheaval. Price wars and margin compression have forced industry leaders—including Jinko Solar, Trina Solar, and JA Solar—to report significant losses. These firms, along with LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei—the industry’s top five—slashed their workforce by over 30 percent in 2024. The market is facing industry consolidation and exits not seen in over a decade, as over 40 smaller firms have filed for bankruptcy, been acquired, or exited the market. Chinese regulators are accelerating this process, which will have ripple effects across global solar markets. Several critical questions arise: Does this phase erode China’s leadership in solar, or entrench it further? Is it a window for others to close the gap, or a prelude to deeper market displacement? And when the current wave of capacity consolidation settles, what will the next global competitive order look like? The answer is already emerging. Rather than opening space for rivals to catch up, the current shocks are forging a more resilient Chinese solar core. By embedding deeper into global value chains and securing a technological lead, China is effectively reshaping the industry’s future trajectory to its own long-term advantage.
Topic:
Sustainability, Industry, Solar Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia