Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

51. The impact on developing economies of WTO dissolution

Author:: Lloyd Barton
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: This report revisits the analysis presented in our April 2024 paper on the potential impact of WTO dissolution, drilling down to quantify national-level impacts for a sample of ten developing economies. Our previous report (The economic impact of abandoning the WTO) focused on presenting aggregated results for developing countries by region and income level. This report drills down to quantify impacts for a sample of ten individual countries: Brazil, Cameroon, China, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam. These countries provide a rich, varied sample that captures the complexity of trade policy in the developing world. Their diversity in geography, economic size, policy orientation, and development stage allows for a nuanced analysis of how WTO dissolution could potentially influence pathways to higher incomes, poverty reduction and economic resilience. Our analysis reinforces the importance of ensuring the WTO can adapt to new trade realities and continue to function as an effective global trade body.
Topic:: Economics, Poverty, Trade, Economic Development, and WTO
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Turkey, India, South Africa, Brazil, Vietnam, Egypt, Guatemala, and Cameroon

52. The New Geopolitical Scramble for Corridors

Author:: Velina Tchakarova
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The geopolitical landscape in winter 2024- 2025 is marked by significant transformation, uncertainty, and fierce competition for influence. The geopolitical hotspots of this new contest are most visible in the regions that bridge Europe and Asia—what the editors of Baku Dialogues call the “Silk Road region.” Central to this dynamic is the growing intersection of interests between major regional players against the backdrop of a Cold War 2.0, putting the West against what I was the first to call the “DragonBear” alliance of China and Russia. These corridors are not just infrastructural undertakings; they are the arteries of global power, trade, and connectivity, reflecting deeper geopolitical ambitions and contestations. This extensive analysis elaborates on today’s most significant connectivity projects, exploring their strategic implications and the new power dynamics they are fostering. In the traditional sense, empires have always relied on transport and trade corridors to project power and expand influence. From the ancient Silk Roads to the West’s colonial sea routes, the ability to control the flow of goods and resources has often equated to geopolitical dominance. Today, this principle remains unchanged, though the scale and stakes have reached unprecedented levels.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and International Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

53. Back to the Future: The Rise of Militarization in China in the 2020s

Author:: Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: In this policy brief, IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung analyzes Chinese militarization efforts as the country seeks tighter integration of the civilian and defense economies and a strong sense of national security, and whether such efforts lead to China being more prone to going to war in the near future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Militarization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

54. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

55. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

56. India-China rapprochement: what are the long-term prospects?

Author:: Nayanima Basu and Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: China-India relations, which have long been fraught, were further complicated by the 2020 military standoff on the Himalayan border. The political disruption had a significant impact on Chinese companies’ presence in India. And yet, India’s dependence on Chinese imports has increased since. The Indian economy is decelerating at a challenging time for Prime Minister Modi, who governs in a coalition. China could offer a partial solution to India’s economic woes by providing manufacturing FDI and creating jobs. The Modi-Xi ‘rapprochement’ after their encounter at the October 2024 BRICS summit signals that relations could improve. India may be willing to accept targeted investment from China, but relations are unlikely to fully normalise, particularly since the 2025 India-Pakistan military stand-off. There are three main reasons for this. First, the Indian army remains cautious about the situation at the border and security risks relating to China. Second, the United States under President Trump will exert pressure on Modi not to depend further on China. This is even more relevant in the context of Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on India. Third, Indian public opinion on China and the Belt and Road Initiative remains negative. India is predicted to experience greater growth than China in the coming decades, meaning China could lose its upper hand in economic relations between the two countries. This, however, will depend on how dependent India might have become on China for imports or for jobs through FDI and other channels. The militarised border, India’s asymmetric economic dependence on China and China’s leadership in the Global South will still shape the relationship even if the Indian economy grows to a similar size to China’s. India-China ‘rapprochement’ is possible but will remain fragile and unlikely to be maintained in the long run.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Governance, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

57. Will China’s economy follow the same path as Japan’s?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Since the bursting of China’s real-estate bubble in mid-2021, there has been a growing concern that the Chinese economy could end up like that of Japan in the early 1990s. Some structural patterns are strikingly similar: low private consumption over a long period, especially when compared to the rest of the world, and an excessively high savings ratio, though China’s imbalances now are even larger that Japan’s were then. Initial policy responses to the bursting of their respective bubbles have also been similar. Both China now and Japan then were initially hesitant to ease monetary and fiscal policies, and opted to expand manufacturing, with an eye on external demand, supported by more research and development expenditure. In both cases, the outcomes were stubborn trade surpluses and a mercantilist attitude to their growth problems, leading to the United States taking protectionist measures. China also seems to be following Japan’s offshoring of production to mitigate the impact of protectionism. The main difference, though, is that China now is a poorer country than Japan was then, with still more convergence opportunities ahead. China is also a much bigger military and geopolitical contender than Japan ever was. China’s geopolitical weight is behind the US technological containment of China, but also gives China more room for manoeuvre globally, especially in the Global South. It remains unclear – though globally significant – whether China will be able to deviate from the path followed by Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Growth, Innovation, and Real Estate
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

58. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:: Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. Trapped in debt: China’s role in Laos’ economic crisis

Author:: Keith Barney, Roland Rajah, and Mariza Cooray
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Laos is trapped in a severe debt crisis with no resolution in sight, threatening a decade of economic and social malaise. Recent global shocks were key triggers. Yet a crisis was almost inevitable, driven by poor planning and over-investment in the domestic energy sector, financed mostly by Chinese loans and exacerbated by broader fiscal and governance problems. Exiting the crisis will require China to provide substantial debt relief. However, the politics appear unfavourable, as neither side wants to admit failure and accept the consequences. Whether by design or neglect, China has created a debt trap in Laos. The crisis illustrates some of the most troubling pathologies of Chinese lending under the Belt and Road Initiative, and its unwillingness to provide sufficient debt relief, despite the clear-cut need.
Topic:: Debt, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Crisis, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Laos

60. Hedging bets: Southeast Asia’s approach to China’s aid

Author:: Alexandre Dayant and Grace Stanhope
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Southeast Asian states with acute development needs and constrained access to development financing — Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar — are the most reliant on China. By contrast, lower-middle income countries with more diversified foreign relations — the Philippines and Vietnam — have become far more restrained in accepting Chinese largesse over the last decade. Upper-middle income countries with only moderate development needs — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand — appear to be playing the field of development partners the most opportunistically and politically. Amid weakening demand for Chinese development financing in Southeast Asia, Beijing is recalibrating its offering, transitioning to fewer, smaller, and more targeted projects. In 2022, China implemented $3 billion in development financing in the region, a sharp drop from more than $9 billion in 2015. However, Southeast Asia’s success in reshaping their development ties with China could be undone if Western cuts to development budgets lead to a drastic reduction in financing to the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, and Economic Development
Political Geography:: China, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, and Myanmar

61. The future of Indonesia’s green industrial policy

Author:: Robert Walker and Hilman Palaon
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Indonesia now supplies more than half of the world’s nickel. Under its green industrial policy, it has also become a leading destination for foreign investment in critical minerals, electric vehicles (EVs), and the battery supply chain. While this strategy has offered some concentrated economic gains, rapid industry expansion has also been costly. Nickel processing has had damaging environmental, labour, and governance impacts, and has increased reliance on Chinese investment, technology, and demand, which presents vulnerabilities. Indonesia can strengthen its industrial policy by improving environmental and labour standards in the nickel industry, fostering a more competitive and export-oriented EV industry, and diversifying trade and investment partners.
Topic:: Foreign Direct Investment, Industry, Green Economy, Nickel, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia

62. Global Futures Bulletin: The BRICS and the Decarbonization and Biodiversity Protection Challenges

Author:: Igarapé Institute
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Igarapé Institute
Abstract:: The world faces an unprecedented convergence of environmental crises – climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss – that collectively threaten the planet’s ecological balance and humanity’s future. Reversing the Triple Planetary Crisis necessitates urgent and coordinated action across all sectors and countries, accelerating the transition to low-carbon economies while protecting biodiversity are key challenges for the coming years. Countries that have joined the BRICS in its inception (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are increasingly an important geopolitical force in current global politics, and their individual and collective action is key to the success of concerted global action. The group’s recent expansion – BRICS+ includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Indonesia joining in 2025 and Saudi Arabia finally formalizing its membership – offers an opportunity to boost the role of their New Development Bank (NDB) in bridging climate, biodiversity, and development finance, and aim for greater policy coherence for concerted global action across these agendas. Combined, BRICS countries are not only biodiversity and energy-rich but also contribute to a large share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This Strategic Paper examines the role of the expanded BRICS+ and explores whether and how this “mini-multilateral” grouping, with its considerable human and technological capacity, can address two major global challenges: accelerating decarbonization and protecting biological diversity. The discussion is framed around the opportunities and challenges faced by the member countries to increase their ambitions and become leading voices in these agendas – not only for BRICS countries (some of which are among the most biodiverse in the world) but also for the wider international community. Without a strong commitment by BRICS countries (individually and as a group) the world will fail to accelerate action on decarbonization and biodiversity protection.
Topic:: Climate Change, Pollution, BRICS, Decarbonization, Biodiversity, and Minilateralism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and Global Focus

63. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:: Asia Sociey
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:: Exports, Manufacturing, Industry, ASEAN, Supply Chains, Regional Economy, and De-Risking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

64. China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Asia Sociey
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”1 This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

65. Xi’s Personal Priorities: What Matters Most to China’s Leader?

Author:: Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Time is a politician’s most precious resource. Every decision to attend a meeting, launch an initiative, or deliver a speech involves trade-offs. Unlike budgets or personnel, time cannot be expanded or replenished. How a leader allocates their time reveals their priorities. Xi Jinping is acutely aware of this reality. “To realize the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must race against time,” he declared in January 2020. State media claimed that on an “ordinary day,” Xi sleeps just six hours and works through every meal. Li Zhanshu, Xi’s former chief of staff, summarized his work tempo in one word: “fast.” This urgency helps explain why Xi wants to become the “chairman of everything,” replacing collective leadership with personalized rule, sidelining colleagues, and centralizing decision-making within Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bodies under his direct control. Yet even a leader as powerful and driven as Xi cannot do everything. So how does Xi spend his time? It is impossible to know for sure, but a useful proxy could be official statements about actions that he has taken “personally” (qinzi). In particular, CCP media have mentioned several policies that Xi has “personally planned, personally arranged, and personally promoted” (qinzi mouhua, qinzi bushu, qinzi tuidong). The Center for China Analysis has compiled a database of these policies. Analysis suggests that Xi pays special attention to regional development projects, internal CCP governance, and environmental protection. Notably absent are indications of personal involvement in key political economy issues such as consumption, demographics, healthcare, public finance, and welfare reform. For policymakers and businesses seeking leverage or opportunity in China, understanding Xi’s priorities is a critical starting point.
Topic:: Leadership, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

66. The People’s Republic of Wellness: Why Beijing Worries About Well-Being

Author:: G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Wellness is booming in China as more people engage in activities that promote healthier living, emotional balance, and spiritual growth. Interest in living well has grown steadily as living standards rise and China undergoes radical social and economic change. More people are facing financial distress amid a slowing economy, and younger generations struggle with intense academic pressure and limited employment opportunities. Wellness trends gained steam during the COVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated the shift from materialism toward a search for spirituality and meaning. Maintaining a harmonious and stable social environment is central to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. Beijing recognizes the value of many popular wellness trends and actively encourages those that align with its interest in fostering citizens’ well-being and improving public morale. As people struggle to manage the stress of daily living and define wellness and the good life on their own terms, building a harmonious society has become a major challenge for China’s leaders. In an attempt to manage this friction, they increasingly focus propaganda efforts on highlighting the country’s economic and technological achievements and their assertiveness in the trade conflict with the United States.
Topic:: Economy, Public Health, Society, and Well-Being
Political Geography:: China and Asia

67. A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Author:: Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally). What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific? Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland. In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support. Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,3 as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.4 This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015. On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.5 In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support? This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:: China, Europe, India, and Asia

68. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

69. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:: Brendan Kelly and Shay Wester
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Exports, ASEAN, Supply Chains, and De-Risking
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

70. What to Watch at China’s Two Sessions in 2025

Author:: Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: The annual Two Sessions is the closest thing to a carnival in Chinese politics. Thousands of leaders, bureaucrats, experts, reporters, and celebrities from across the country flock to Beijing for a week of political pageantry. While the premier’s annual “state of the union” address is more restrained than its American counterpart — U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress just a day earlier — it remains a key indicator of China’s economic direction. The Two Sessions refers to the concurrent annual meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which opens on March 4, and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which begins on March 5. These meetings are expected to conclude on or around March 11. Both institutions answer to the Chinese Communist Party, led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The CPPCC National Committee, with 2,169 members, serves as the overarching organization of the United Front system, which mobilizes various social groups to support and advise the Party. Meanwhile, the NPC, with 2,977 delegates, functions as a single-chamber parliament that is, at least notionally, the supreme organ of state power. Anticipation surrounding this year’s event has been heightened by a rare “symposium on private enterprises” that Xi hosted on February 17, attended by some of the country’s top entrepreneurs. This uncommon symposium, last held in 2018, raised hopes for China’s struggling economy — particularly following the January return of President Trump, a self-proclaimed “tariff king” who has already imposed an additional 10% levy on Chinese imports. Now, attention shifts to how much Beijing is willing to boost stimulus, support businesses, and respond to Trump’s trade policies. The Two Sessions is expected to reveal a more pro-growth agenda compared to last year, with approximate targets of 5% for GDP growth, 4% of GDP for the fiscal deficit ratio, and 2% for consumer inflation. Further stimulus will come from roughly 3 trillion yuan in ultralong special treasury bonds and 4.5–5 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds. Measures to boost consumer spending and encourage private-sector innovation will also be introduced. While Beijing aims to stabilize growth, it is unlikely to unleash the proverbial “bazooka” stimulus, as it needs to conserve fiscal resources for a potential trade war. Similarly, sweeping structural reforms remain improbable as the government remains committed to Xi’s vision of high-tech industrial self-reliance.
Topic:: Reform, Economic Growth, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

71. China’s Middle Class Searches for Faith and Meaning

Author:: John Osburg
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Members of China’s urban middle class — long assumed to be the most secular segment of Chinese society — are turning to religion and spirituality in greater numbers. Rejecting officially sanctioned religious institutions and state-promoted ideology, many urbanites are seeking alternatives considered less tainted by party-state interference. Independent Christian churches, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, and New Age workshops are attracting increasing numbers of affluent, well-educated urban Chinese looking for authentic spiritual experiences and a sense of community, some of whom mix aspects of different religions to create their own personal spiritual practices. Growing interest in religious communities at the margins of state control reflects the failure of official ideology to provide spiritual comfort and the party-state’s lack of moral authority. Attempts by Beijing to co-opt religious institutions through “Sinicization” have undermined their spiritual authority. “Boss Christians” fund their own churches to gain social status and legitimize their wealth, while a growing number of intellectuals see Christian values as a model for reforming China’s government and society. Members of China’s elite who convert to Tibetan Buddhism say they value its purity and intellectually rigorous philosophy, which they contrast to the corrupted, diluted teachings of Han Chinese Buddhism.
Topic:: Religion, Christianity, Secularism, Buddhism, Middle Class, and Society
Political Geography:: China and Asia

72. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:: Lyle Morris
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:: Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

74. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Chinese Foreign Policy in 2025: Absorbing Blows & Profiting from Others’ Mistakes

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2025, decision-makers in Austria and the EU should prioritize three highly topical questions that are at the forefront for China researchers: Will China respond severely to US tariffs? Will China contribute to peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine War? Will China fill the vacuum as the US retreats from global governance leadership? Among other trends in China research, there will be further work on how China’s technological and industrial progress—including on electric vehicles, AI, and quantum computing—will impact relations with the US and EU (ReConnect China 2025). Moreover, there will be more research on how integrated the Chinese economy is with the EU and others, and how resilient Europe is in this context (China Horizons 2025). Lastly, among rising regional focal areas, scholars will publish more on China’s rise as a research, economic, and geopolitical actor in the polar regions (Funaiole et al 2024; Paul 2024).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Tariffs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Austria

76. Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments

Author:: Anders Christoffer Edstrøm, Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China’s overtures have been met with suspicion in the Arctic states, where some analysts and commentators read nefarious intent into Chinese actions and statements. China’s construction of critical infrastructure and investments in the strategically located and resource-rich Arctic have raised concerns about national security. This is particularly the case in the seven out of eight Arctic states (excluding Russia), all of whom are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What is more, questions abound about the dual-use applicability of Chinese research activities in the region.1 The Arctic is a highly strategic location, and activities here are often framed in geopolitical terms. In an era of intensifying great power competition between the United States and China, this suspicion has generated several core narratives2 about China’s Arctic interests and its engagement with and in the region. Xi Jinping launched China’s Belt and Road Initiative3 (BRI) in 2013. The initiative envisages interconnectivity across the Eurasian continent, primarily from China to Europe. Since then, the project has expanded to other areas of the globe, including the Arctic region. The Arctic region was officially made a part of the Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Cooperation Vision statement (“一帶一路”建設海上合作設想).4 Later, China established the Polar Silk Road (冰上丝绸之路) in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper5 connecting Asia and Europe through the Arctic Ocean. In the 2018 White Paper, the State Council of the PRC refers to its country as a “Near-Arctic State,” a statement that has remained highly controversial. While the White Paper emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to peaceful cooperation in the region, as well as a desire to contribute to Arctic research, protection, and development in accordance with international law, it also articulates Beijing’s aim of increasing its participation and influence in Arctic governance. It further iterates Beijing’s responsibility for maintaining security and stability in the region as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013; since then it has contributed to scientific knowledge through research stations and expeditions, invested in Arctic business and competence, engaged in infrastructure projects, traded with Arctic states, and participated in multilateral international agreements such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement.6 Chinese Arctic ambitions and activities are contentious. Commentators in the seven Arctic states often frame Chinese investments in an adversarial way, describing Chinese activity in alarmist language in terms of scale, scope, and risk. Analysts have the tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments. For example, some analysts estimate that Chinese investments in the Arctic top $90 billion7 and call this level of investment “unconstrained.”8 According to one mainstream narrative, China will use this “inflow of investments”9 to increase its influence among Arctic nations by means of debt-trap diplomacy.10 Our research finds that these numbers are highly exaggerated and often mobilized to support a narrative in which China is successfully “buying up” the Arctic region, but that these inflated numbers include unsuccessful investment projects and proposed projects that have not been implemented. To facilitate informed debate and decision-making, this policy paper attempts to outline, although not to summarize, the actual level and state of Chinese ownership in the Circumpolar Arctic. To help illustrate our findings, we present a map displaying geographical locations of investment interests (See Figure 1), containing two further information layers. The first information layer displays the type of known Chinese interests in the Arctic, and the second information layer indicates whether this interest materialized, is paused/in question, or has been cancelled. For further description of our mapping methodology, see Appendix A. We use the term “investment” generously in this brief, including traditional foreign direct investment (FDI) according to established definitions, but also other modes of Chinese economic engagements. We have relied on open-source material in various languages to support our analysis, including Russian, Chinese, English, Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish. For a detailed description of our methodology, see Appendix A. This inclusiveness means that the amount of investments appears larger than with a more restrictive definition of FDI.
Topic:: National Security, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Critical Infrastructure
Political Geography:: China and Arctic

77. China's Green Belt and Road

Author:: Yang Jiang
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In the past 15 years, green industries have developed rapidly in China, and China has assumed a leading position in several global supply chains of renewable energy. Because the domestic solar, wind and biomass markets have become quite saturated, Chinese companies have intensified their search for overseas markets, and the Chinese government is strengthening its support for that pursuit under the Green Belt and Road Initiative. For the governments and businesses in the green industries in the West, the Green Belt and Road Initiative could result in more competition over market shares and geopolitical influence, but it also encompasses opportunities for cooperation. For developing countries, more competition and diversification between foreign partners can be an advantage, allowing them to negotiate with the development partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Business, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

78. China and Russia challenge the Arctic order

Author:: Patrik Andersson
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction. Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures. At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Arctic

79. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

80. How China Collateralizes

Author:: Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, Sebastian Horn, Paulina Kintzinger, Bradley C. Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). We present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio to EMDEs is effectively collateralized - amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. We document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20% of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. Our findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower’s reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Topic:: Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Americas

81. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:: Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

82. China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China's Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings

Author:: Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Xi Jinping has played a direct and active role in China’s naval buildup. He is China’s first great navalist statesman, the world’s greatest navalist leader today, and among the world’s greatest navalist statesmen in modern history. Notwithstanding major advances in ships, submarines, aircraft, and other hardware, Chinese military leaders believe that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to lag behind in human factors. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PLAN has dismissed (or is rumored to have dismissed) eleven flag officers. Beyond combating outright dysfunction, these removals are intended to prevent potential disloyalty and factionalism, centralize power, and further modernization and warfighting goals. These high-profile dismissals have had no apparent impact on PLAN operational capabilities, which continue to improve at a remarkable rate. From the Taiwan Strait to the “distant oceans” (远洋), the service is present daily and visible internationally, particularly its surface fleet, indicating reliability, trust, and growing responsibilities and capabilities. Since 2008, the PLAN’s surface fleet has almost doubled. Despite being projected to exceed 400 ships by the end of 2025, China’s Navy continues to successfully crew, operate, and train with them. China’s Navy draws on a massive, sufficiently-capable talent pool and education system. Provincial-level compulsory conscription quotas avoid individual compellence thanks to high levels of volunteerism. Given the demands of increasingly frequent and intense training and missions—often with the austere privations of submarines or remote installations—mental health support is increasingly prioritized. Nevertheless, it remains a weakness for China’s Navy, which views U.S. care as the gold standard yet has treated counseling as a “political” issue. China’s Naval Command College in Nanjing—the Naval War College’s closest equivalent—educates its students differently from its counterpart in Newport by focusing on naval operations and warfighting for top-priority scenarios. The PLAN enjoys unique human capital advantages: educational partnerships as early as elementary school; personal data compiled centrally, available and utilizable without privacy restriction; eldercare benefits; and warfighting-focused naval education. PLAN sources perceive weaknesses in lack of talent for new-domain operations and advanced S&T given rising demand in these burgeoning areas; recruitment and training pipeline supply-demand imbalance and talent-skills mismatches; officers’ overly narrow early-career experience and subsequent aging out of cutting-edge relevance; and youths’ declining commitment to the Communist system. Despite being an improvement on its Soviet progenitor, China’s Political Commissar system could represent a critical weakness, causing real-time decision-making bottlenecks or distraction, particularly in crisis or conflict.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, Human Capital, Xi Jinping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Nanjing

83. China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Julia Famularo
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: People’s Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement operations function as forms of cognitive and legal warfare. They represent a clear effort to undermine international maritime law as well as Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC asserts that the Taiwan Strait comprises multiple “zones,” to include “internal waters, territorial sea, [the] contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone.” While China does not explicitly claim that the waters of the Taiwan Strait wholly constitute PRC sovereign territory, it clearly implies that it has the self-defined right to exercise distinct forms of control over different zones of the Strait. While stressing that China “respects the lawful rights of other countries in relevant waters,” the PRC exploits the absence of the term “international waters” in UNCLOS to assert non-existent sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait. China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and beyond. The overzealous execution of “law enforcement” operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands represents an effort to signal that the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration is incapable of conducing effective patrols. It also reinforces the narrative that the PRC possesses legal jurisdiction over waters within the First Island Chain, thereby undermining the lawful rights of Taiwan and neighboring states. The PRC very likely believes that employing China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) assets to implement a sea-based quarantine would remain below the threshold of conflict, effectively mitigating the risk of escalation and preventing third-party intervention. As joint MSA and CCG operations grow in scope, scale, and complexity, China is gradually exercising the skills necessary to seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands and potentially seek to force Taiwan leaders to the negotiating table. Under China’s revised maritime law enforcement legal framework, leaders in Beijing could authorize the establishment of exclusion zones to prevent foreign vessels from entering into and operating in PRC-claimed waters, as well as board and inspect ships within the exclusion zone. China could also potentially attempt to divert ships to regional PRC ports for customs inspection and clearance. Beijing furthermore could authorize the use of “all necessary means”—to include the use of force—to implement its quarantine and counter perceived threats to its national security and sovereignty. A PRC decision to implement a quarantine, rather than a full military blockade, would force the United States and its key allies and partners to decide how to react effectively while themselves also mitigating the risk of substantial military escalation. Response options could comprise targeted sanctions or military escorts for commercial vessels carrying critical supplies.
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Navy, Maritime, Jurisdiction, Coast Guard, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and Taiwan Strait

84. China Maritime Report #49: The PLAN Corruption Paradox: Insights from the 1st Destroyer Flotilla

Author:: Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Like all organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suffers from endemic corruption, defined as the personal abuse of power for selfish ends. Corruption occurs when PLAN leaders use their power to: 1) influence personnel decisions in exchange for money and/or favor; and 2) extract kickbacks for influencing decisions in the contracting/procurement process for equipment and materiel, construction projects, and other service requirements. Despite widespread corruption in the PLAN, the service has continued to grow and modernize at an astonishing rate. One explanation for this paradox is that the PLAN has strived to keep corruption from infecting the personnel selection process in operational units, which matter most for combat power generation. For at least two decades, the PLAN’s anti-corruption “watchdog”—the Discipline Inspection Commission—has prioritized scrutiny over those units and personnel most directly responsible for the “preparation for military struggle.” This top-down approach has combined with efforts by the units themselves—likely driven by the self-interest of the unit Party Committee, which must answer for poor unit performance—to enact policies to ensure that the best candidates are chosen for leadership positions. The case of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla illustrates policies adopted by operational units to ensure the integrity of the personnel selection process. These include formulating clear regulations stipulating minimum qualifications for leadership positions, adopting strict standards for officer evaluation, and carrying out a transparent selection process. The Flotillas’ personnel selection process entails knowledge and skills competitions judged by senior unit members and incorporates feedback and inputs from other members of the unit. Due to the approaches adopted by units such as the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, individuals in positions of power have less leeway to engage in corrupt behavior, thereby increasing the probability that the most capable officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) will be selected for leadership positions.
Topic:: Corruption, Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

85. China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia

Author:: Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (海上侦察) units. Located in China’s coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called “information boats” (信息船). China’s maritime militia has developed a cadre of intelligence specialists who serve the function of collecting intelligence and reporting it to the PLA. These militia members, called “information personnel” (信息员), generally deploy with militia vessels tasked with reconnaissance missions, but may also embark on boats from other types of militia units. While at sea, maritime militia intelligence personnel maintain close contact with the PLA units that oversee militia operations, called People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). PAFDs direct militia reconnaissance operations and receive incoming intelligence reports, which they then share with operational PLA forces. As part-time soldiers, often with comparatively low education levels, maritime militia intelligence personnel cannot meet the same performance standards as intelligence specialists in the PLA. However, the existence of a large cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists ensures a basic level of competence across the force and guarantees that capable personnel are available for important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Given China’s aspirations to become a global naval power, it makes sense that the PLA leverage the latent ISR capacity of China’s distant-water fishing fleet and Chinese owned/operated merchant vessels. PLA experts have argued for embarking intelligence personnel on Chinese vessels operating abroad, and it is likely that this is already happening.
Topic:: Intelligence, Navy, Maritime, Espionage, Militias, Reconnaissance, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

86. China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario

Author:: Ian Easton
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.” In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard. Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception. Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective. Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war. American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action. War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures. Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

87. Sea Dragons: Special Operations and Chinese Military Strategy

Author:: John Chen and Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: As China continues to rise as a global sea power, its maritime strategy continues to evolve. Among these critical evolutions is one of the People’s Liberation Army’s naval special operations forces’ most elite units: the Sea Dragons. A small yet highly specialized unit, the Sea Dragons entered the global spotlight and international consciousness with the 2018 film Operation Red Sea, raising several questions for Chinese naval experts. What does Chinese military strategy and doctrine require of special forces, and specifically naval SOF, to be able to accomplish the mission, particularly along the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea? What are their capabilities and limitations? What real-world experience do they have and how might they be employed in the future? This volume attempts to answer those questions and many more regarding one of China’s more enigmatic units and its role in future peacetime and low-intensity conflicts.
Topic:: Maritime, Special Operations, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Sea Dragons
Political Geography:: China and Asia

88. The Joy of Reading

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: Reading and popular literacy programmes have played an important role in revolutionary processes, from the Mexican, Chinese, and Russian revolutions in the early twentieth century to today.
Topic:: Revolution, Literacy, and Reading
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, Latin America, and Mexico

89. The Geopolitical Impact of USAID’s Retreat on Humanitarian Aid: Towards a Complementary Approach between China and the EU?

Author:: Edouard Xia and Alexandre Piron
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Trump’s decision to cut funding and stop most of USAID’s projects will have lasting consequences. First and foremost, it adds great pressure on an already big funding gap. Forgotten and underfunded crises will suffer from it. But Trump’s action will also bear an effect on the nature of humanitarian aid itself. USAID’s retreat accelerates a geopolitical shift. China, “Champion of the Global South”, will inevitably fill the void and promote its own model of foreign aid. Development, economic and humanitarian rationales are therefore expected to be increasingly mixed at the expense of a principled approach. What could in turn the EU, and Belgium within it, do? Could they play the role of a “missing link” and promote a complementary approach to China? This brief offers insights on some questions ahead of the upcoming European Humanitarian Forum.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

90. Military policy toward China: The case against overreaction

Author:: John Mueller
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: It is often argued that the policies of containment and military deterrence worked against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and many have urged applying these same policies to China today. However, it is not clear that containment was all that successful during the Cold War nor is it clear that it should now be applied to China. Should it pursue the “hegemonic” ambitions often attributed to it, China, like the USSR, may prove its own worst enemy by overstretching its resources and provoking its neighbors. In any case, China does not seem to harbor hegemonic ambitions. Its existing gestures at global influence, like the Belt and Road Initiative, are in disarray and unlikely to work. Rather than rushing to more forcefully contain or balance China, the United States should let China make its own mistakes. Doing nothing or next to nothing against a perceived threat isn’t always wise or politically popular but in this case it’s the most rational choice. The U.S. can wait for China to mellow while warily profiting from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible and expanding mutually beneficial exchange. The U.S. can also help Taiwan prepare to defend itself while maintaining that the island is independent so long as it doesn’t say so.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Deterrence, and Containment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

91. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

92. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

93. Target Taiwan: One China and cross-strait stability

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Washington should not move away from the One China policy, as doing so would increase the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” remains appropriate to the volatile cross-strait situation, but some policymakers overestimate the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Recent administrations have taken steps to undermine the One China policy as part of an American strategy to counter China across the board, but this has had the deleterious effect of causing the U.S. and China to come to the brink of war over Taiwan. A realist approach to the Taiwan issue accepts and even seeks to strengthen both strategic ambiguity and the One China policy. In doing so, it increases the odds of negotiated solutions to disagreements while ensuring U.S. military forces are in a less vulnerable and volatile defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Invasion, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

94. Setting the Stage: An Overview of Chinese and Russian Interests and Influence in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In late September, a US HC-103J Super Hercules spotted four foreign vessels operating about 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island, Alaska. Upon closer inspection, the patrol turned out to be Russian Border Guard and Chinese Coast Guard ships. While this marked the northernmost location at which the US military has spotted Chinese ships operating, the presence of the joint Chinese-Russian patrol fit an increasingly common pattern. This sighting was the third time in three months that the US has spotted either Chinese or Russian ships close to Alaska. In both 2022 and 2023, the US Navy sent assets to shadow joint Chinese-Russian naval patrols operating in the Aleutian Islands region.[1] The Chinese and Russian navies have also been operating together near US partners and allies closer to their own shores, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2021, a Chinese-Russian patrol circumnavigated Japan’s main island. China’s official description of the event claimed the flotilla was focused on “maintaining international and regional strategic stability,” while Russia’s Defense Ministry said its goal was to “maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” In an understatement that certainly masked some alarm, Japan merely characterized the patrol as “unusual.”[2] Since then, the pace of Chinese-Russian naval patrols and exercises in the region has increased, with several in 2024 alone. One of these, Ocean 2024, involved some 90,000 troops and more than 500 ships and aircraft, according to the Kremlin, and was the largest of such exercises in 30 years. Ocean 2024 came on the heels of another joint naval patrol in the northern Pacific and another set of drills in the waters off Japan.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

95. Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific: China’s Use of the Instruments of Power

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The first report in this series examined Chinese and Russian influence and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This report, the second of five in the series, analyzes China’s use of the instruments of power to build its influence and advance its interests in a region it sees as vital to its future. We use a modified version of the DIME framework (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) here, with the modification being that we do not analyze the information instruments separately. Even in an information environment as controlled as China’s, the state has multiple ways to shape the information space—some official and some unofficial, some acknowledged and others unacknowledged. Given these facts, a separate examination of the information instrument is beyond the scope of this report. Although it does not explicitly analyze the information instrument, the report weaves Beijing’s use of information throughout the narrative. The report analyzes Beijing’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments in the Indo-Pacific region, and then examines how Russia perceives China’s activity in the region. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, the report examines Chinese activity in the following subregions: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Japan/East China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)/South China Sea, and India.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Power Politics, Economy, Strategic Interests, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

96. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:: National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

97. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific

Author:: Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

98. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

99. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

100. Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump

Author:: Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: ECFR polling reveals the gloom that has fallen over European perceptions of the transatlantic relationship since early November. Respondents are more likely to call the US merely a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally”. But views of Donald Trump’s return vary markedly according to country and political outlook. That, and intra-European differences on both Russia-Ukraine and China, create ample opportunities for Trump to split Europeans. Building a broad coalition of “Euro-optimists” along with more cautious groups can help European leaders resist any such attempts—and even forge a new dawn in transatlantic relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS