Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

451. The European China Strategy to Enhance Economic Security

Author:: Hyun Jean Lee
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The recent strategy change of the European countries toward China has identifiable triggering factors such as the continuation of high growth in the Chinese economy, rising status of China in the international community, and China’s FDI expansion. The West has criticized the Chinese Communist Party’s dealing with human rights issues and media control, which was further aggravated by China’s pro-Russian stance upon the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Eventually, the European countries responded with confrontational strategies against China. This study analyzes these recent de-risking methods of the EU and four European countries – i.e., Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Poland – regarding economic relations with China. Finally, the Brief concludes with an assessment of the impact of the recent changes in Europe’s China strategy on Korea and policy recommendations.
Topic:: Human Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, International Community, Economic Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

452. An Overview of International Discourse surrounding China and Its Implications

Author:: Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study began with the idea that the international community’s discourse on China may not be produced, distributed, and utilized separately in each country, but instead formed within a huge global network. Building upon this idea, this study tried to examine the essential substance of discourse on China, who produces it, and how it is being distributed and utilized in the international community. At the same time, we examined the political dynamics under which the international community’s discourse on China is produced. This study first selected the issues of the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the COVID-19 pandemic and conducted a case analysis of the international community’s discourse on China, focusing on these issues. This analysis produced many interesting facts. In particular, we found that political images of the BRI tended to have a stronger influence than direct experience with the initiative in shaping the international community’s discourse on the BRI. Through the analysis of these three cases, it became possible to identify countries, regions, and organizations that play an important role in shaping the international community’s discourse on China. Among countries or regions, the United States and the United Kingdom appear to be the most prominent actors in shaping the international community’s discourse on China. In addition, Japan and Taiwan, both of whom are China’s neighbors and have a tense relationship with China in the context of establishing order in the Asian region, also emerged as important actors. Accordingly, this study analyzed in more depth the mechanisms of how the discourse on China is being formed within the relevant countries and regions, targeting the U.S., EU (UK), Taiwan, and Japan. At the same time, we also analyze the formation of discourse on China within Korea, along with ASEAN, which is becoming increasingly important geopolitically, as can be seen from the U.S.’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy and China’s BRI.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), International Community, COVID-19, and Discourse
Political Geography:: China and Asia

453. Investigating the Effect of the U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls on China

Author:: Hyok Jung Kim, Jonghyuk Oh, and Hyuk Hu Kwon
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: his report examines the significant impact of U.S. semiconductor export controls imposed under the Biden administration in October 2022. These controls, which target a broad range of semiconductor manufacturing facilities and AI chips, are part of a strategy aimed at curbing China’s advancement in critical technologies. A notable 32.5% decline in China’s imports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment has been observed, particularly in regions with advanced production capabilities and foreign company operations, such as those involving Samsung Electronics and SK hynix. While Korea experienced substantial drops in exports to China, the Netherlands saw an increase, reflecting its dominance in specific technologies like lithography. The AI chip sector has also been affected, with China turning to downgraded chips due to restricted access to high-performance models from companies like Nvidia. South Korea must adapt by strengthening its upstream semiconductor industry, considering reshoring production, and collaborating with international partners to mitigate risks. As U.S. export controls continue to evolve, the global semiconductor industry may face increased fragmentation, making strategic responses from affected nations essential to maintain competitiveness. Additionally, ongoing monitoring and adaptation to the dynamic regulatory environment shaped by these export controls are crucial.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Exports, Artificial Intelligence, Imports, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

454. Hidden Champions of the Chinese Economy: Implications for Korea

Author:: Seungshin Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This paper reviews China's policy of nurturing small and medium sized enterprises. The Chinese government is expanding its establishment of national manufacturing innovation centers necessary to promote national strategies. It plays a very important role in the financial support process for these hidden champions. This is because the government certification process to identify hidden champions is linked to direct and indirect financial support using government and private capital. This paper attempted to analyze the management situation and export competitiveness of listed hidden champions. As a result of analyzing the trade statistics of materials, parts, and equipment from 2012 to 2022, when China's policy of cultivating foster hidden champions was fully implemented, the global trade balance of the China's materials, parts, and equipment industry increased significantly from a deficit of $55.6 billion in 2012 to a surplus of $264.1 billion in 2022. The improvement of China's competitiveness in the fields of materials, parts, and equipment can also be seen as a change in the trade specialization index (TSI) of these industries. Looking at China's global trade specialization index for materials, parts, and equipment, it was import-specialized at -0.033 in 2012, but rose to 0.100 in 2022, improving export competitiveness. Korea should recognize the changes in the trade and industrial structure between Korea and China and form a new paradigm of economic cooperation to overcome the limitations of economic exchanges between the two countries. China, which used to be seen as a manufacturing base for other countries, must now be seen as an advanced country in new industries with which the current structure of economic cooperation structure must be modified accordingly.
Topic:: Economy, Business, Innovation, Trade, and Capital
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

455. Export Controls Game: Rethinking Global Integration

Author:: Sangjun Yea
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The article discusses how geopolitical interests are influencing trade policies and global supply chains, leading to a reevaluation of international relationships. The U.S. and China are specifically highlighted, with the U.S. implementing export controls on semiconductors to prevent China's military advancement, while China responds with its own export restrictions on essential raw materials. Using a game-theoretic model, the study illustrates how countries use export control measures to balance security interests and economic benefits, ultimately impacting the global semiconductor supply chain and production decisions of multinational corporations.
Topic:: Exports, Trade Policy, Economic Integration, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

456. Brazil-ASEAN Relations and the Energy Transition

Author:: Beatriz Pfeifer
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: On the occasion of the XXXII meeting of the Analysis Group on China, Ambassador Piragibe dos Santos Terragô, Nuki Agya Utama, Executive Director of the ASEAN Center for Energy (ACE) and Juliana Rangel do Nascimento, Energy Research Analyst at Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (EPE) share their views on Brazil-ASEAN relations and the opportunities for economic cooperation and tackling global challenges, cooperation in the energy sector and what benefits Brazil can derive from this partnership.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Partnerships, Economic Cooperation, ASEAN, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

457. Serbia’s Newly-Signed Extradition Agreement with China: U-turn on Human Rights? – Ana Krstinovska

Author:: Ana Krstinovska
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: In May 2024, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia, President Aleksandar Vučić signed 28 agreements with China, including a controversial extradition treaty. This treaty raises concerns about potential human rights violations, particularly for Chinese dissidents, as it follows the European Court of Human Rights’ precedent in Liu vs. Poland, which cited risks of ill-treatment in the Chinese prison system. The agreement highlights Serbia’s strategic alignment with China, emphasizing mutual legal cooperation and Chinese investments, despite past human rights scandals involving Chinese companies in Serbia. This development challenges Serbia’s commitments to the European Convention on Human Rights and complicates its EU accession prospects. In May 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Serbia, France, and Hungary to advance Chinese interests in Europe. Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, signed 28 agreements with China, including a contentious extradition treaty. This extradition agreement potentially undermines human rights protections in Serbia, echoing concerns raised by the European Court of Human Rights in the Liu vs. Poland case regarding risks of ill-treatment in Chinese prisons. The treaty may facilitate the extradition of Chinese dissidents and political refugees, aligning with Beijing’s efforts to control overseas Chinese populations through legal and police cooperation. Serbia has strengthened its partnership with China, evidenced by joint police patrols and surveillance initiatives, and has become a significant hub for the Chinese diaspora in the Balkans. Past human rights issues in Serbia, involving Chinese companies’ labor practices, highlight a pattern of overlooking abuses to maintain strong bilateral relations. China’s support for Serbia on key international issues, such as the status of Kosovo, underpins this strategic alliance. Serbia’s deepening ties with China pose a challenge to its EU accession aspirations, requiring a balance between its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and its commitment to China’s vision of state-centric human rights.
Topic:: Human Rights, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Extradition
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, and Serbia

458. Negotiating Africa’s Digital Partnerships amid Geopolitical Competition

Author:: Folashadé Soulé
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: Rising geopolitical tensions among China, the United States and other major powers are making digital partnership negotiations between African stakeholders and these global actors more complex. China is becoming an increasingly popular choice among African states because the country typically offers more affordable technology options to achieve digital development goals than its Western counterparts. Negotiating Africa’s Digital Partnerships — a policy research project supported by the Centre for International Governance Innovation and hosted at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford — looks at how these partnerships are formed as African governmental actors seek new and rising partners to help build their digital capacity. The project involves interviews with African ministers, policy makers, the private sector, and civil society actors from both francophone and anglophone Africa with a focus on digital connectivity, infrastructure, digital sovereignty, norm-setting and governance issues.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Competition, Digital Partnerships, and Digital Governance
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and United States of America

459. American Ambassadors Review: Spring 2024 (Full Issue)

Author:: Peter Pham, Michael Battle, Morse Tan, Michael DeSombre, and Richard Holwill
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: The Ambassadors Review
Abstract:: Understanding China’s Middle East Marathon (Ambassador Peter Pham); BRICS and the Contest for Shaping Global Public Opinion (Ambassador Michael Battle); A Journey for Justice (Ambassador Morse Tan); Balkans Mission Report; Managing Relationships and Perceptions of Leverage (Ambassador Michael DeSombre); Climate and the Migration Crisis (Ambassador Richard Holwill)
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Migration, Public Opinion, and BRICS
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and Balkans

460. Elections Aftermath, Session III: China, Taiwan, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance After the Elections

Author:: Andrew J. Nathan, Thomas Christensen, Satoru Mori, Ayumi Teraoka, and George Miller
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: In the third panel of the full-day conference co-sponsored by Columbia University and Keio University, authorities on East Asian and global politics delve into the challenges and opportunities arising from leadership transitions in both Tokyo and Washington and how the two allies can address security challenges surrounding the Taiwan Strait. (Please note: This is a partial video edited in accordance with speaker preferences.) Speakers: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University Thomas Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University Satoru Mori, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University Ayumi Teraoka, Postdoctoral Research Scholar and Lecturer, Columbia University George Miller, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs and Adjunct Professor, Columbia’s Journalism School (moderator)
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, and United States of America

461. Is Guanxi Changing? Referral Hiring and Social Networks in China

Author:: Elena Obukhova and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Speaker: Elena Obukhova, Associate Professor of Strategy and Organization, McGill University Moderator: Yao Lu, Professor of Sociology, Columbia University What is the role of Guanxi in China today? To answer this question, Professor Elena Obukhova examines the relationship between social networks and referral hiring. In the first study, she compares China and the US. In the second study, she explores differences between China’s provinces. This event is part of the 2023-2024 lecture series on “Labor Market Transformations in China" and is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by Columbia's China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:: Labor Market, Social Networks, and Hiring
Political Geography:: China and Asia

462. Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-China Nuclear Relations and International Security

Author:: Tong Zhao
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The message from Chinese officials has become increasingly clear: the United States and China should first stabilize their political relationship before taking on nuclear issues.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Bilateral Relations, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

463. How DiDi Chuxing Adapts to Latin America’s Era of Digital Platforms

Author:: Omar Manky and Natalia Mogollón
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The Chinese ride-hailing app has acclimated remarkably well to local conditions, challenging simplistic narratives about the entry of Chinese companies into the region.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, and Digital Platforms
Political Geography:: China and Latin America

464. Transatlantic Policies on China: Is There a Role for Türkiye?

Author:: Sinan Ülgen and Temur Umarov
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Türkiye is an important transatlantic actor in Sino-Western competition. It can add value to Western efforts aimed at synchronizing policies toward a rising China. And yet, at present, Ankara’s policies on China are not harmonized with those of its partners in the West.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

465. Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Jack Keating
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Each one of these states threatens U.S. interests. Yet they are far from a coherent bloc and largely pose threats independent of one another.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea

466. Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020–2024

Author:: Saheb Singh Chadha
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: India and China have been engaged in a standoff at their border in eastern Ladakh since April–May 2020. Over 100,000 troops remain deployed on both sides, and rebuilding political trust will take time.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

467. Non-meritocrats or choice-reluctant meritocrats? A redistribution experiment in China and France

Author:: Margot Belguise, Yuchen Huang, and Zhexun Mo
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:: Recent experimental evidence contends that meritocratic ideals are mainly a Western phenomenon. Intriguingly, the Chinese public does not appear to differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, despite China’s historical emphasis on meritocratic institutions. We propose that this phenomenon could be due to the Chinese public’s greater reluctance to make an active choice in realstake redistribution decisions. We run an incentivized redistribution experiment with elite university students in China and France, by varying the initial split of payoffs between two real-life workers to redistribute from. We show that, compared to French respondents, Chinese respondents consistently and significantly choose more non-redistribution across both highly unequal and relatively equal status quo scenarios. Additionally, we also find that Chinese respondents do differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, and do not redistribute less than the French, excluding the individuals who engage in non-redistribution choices. Chinese respondents are also as reactive as the French towards scenarios with noisy signals of merit, such as inequalities of opportunities. Ultimately, we contend that the reluctance to make an active choice is indicative of diminished political agency to act upon redistribution decisions with real-life stakes, rather than apathy, inattention, having benefited from the status quo in Chinese society or libertarian preferences among the Chinese. Notably, our findings show that Chinese individuals’ reluctance to make a choice is particularly pronounced among those from families of working-class and farming backgrounds, while it is absent among individuals whose families have closer ties to the private sector.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Class, Institutions, Redistribution, and Meritocracy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and France

468. La competición internacional y el papel de la Unión Europea en el Sur Global

Author:: Marta González Isidoro and Antonio Marquina
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Europea recordaban en la reunión de principios de octubre de 2023 en Kiev, que Rusia es una amenaza existencial y que la victoria de la guerra depende de la cooperación con Europa. Mientras que los antiguos integrantes del bloque soviético perciben la amenaza rusa como inmediata y existencial, los países mediterráneos, sienten que su foco inmediato de atención está en la Frontera Sur y en el llamado Sur Global. La necesidad de cambiar el enfoque de la Unión Europea hacia los países en desarrollo es fundamental para la supervivencia, como actor geopolítico, de una Europa que no logra superar la visión eurocéntrica y occidental del mundo, y que sigue considerando el reordenamiento global en curso como complicado, pero no imposible de manejar.
Topic:: European Union, Global South, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS, and International Competition
Political Geography:: China and Europe

469. Los problemas surgidos tras el grave conflicto Israelí-Palestino en Gaza a raíz de los ataques de Hamás del 7 de octubre de 2023

Author:: Romualdo Bermejo and Natalia Ordoñez
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Los ataques del 7 de octubre de 2023 por parte de Hamás contra Israel, y las atrocidades cometidas por los milicianos y terroristas de esta organización, pasarán a la historia como un ejemplo de barbarie, por mucho que no todos los Estados los hayan condenado, e incluso tácitamente aprobado. Si para Israel esto ha sido un segundo "Holocausto", para otros Estados y actores se ha ejercido un derecho de "resistencia". Estos ataques han suscitado una dura reacción de Israel y de sus fuerzas armadas sobre la Franja de Gaza, que es criticada por no respetar el Derecho internacional humanitario, dejando de lado el derecho de legítima defensa. En este contexto, ha vuelto la idea de la creación de un Estado palestino, ahora con más ímpetu,
Topic:: Human Rights, Hamas, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and Two-State Solution
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

470. The End of a Partnership and Cooperation. How Sino-Russian partnership ruined perception of China in Central Europe

Author:: Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Since the first decade of the 21st century, pro-China attitudes have gradually become the political mainstream in Central Europe. Today, however, the relationship between Central European countries and Beijing is different. While Beijing remains an important partner for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have turned away from cooperation with China, and Slovakia's enthusiasm for China has cooled somewhat. This article examines why the Czech Republic and Poland, but not Slovakia and Hungary, have stopped building and maintaining their relations with China. It uses contrafactual analysis to find an answer. The article concludes that what caused the change and ruined the relations between Czechia and Poland on the one hand and China on the other hand was China's building of relations with Russia. In contrast, Hungary and Fico's Slovakia, which have repeatedly refused to recognise the Russian invasion of Ukraine and have maintained relations with Moscow, continue to have good relations with China
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Central Europe, and Slovakia

471. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

472. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region

Author:: Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2 PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3 Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4 PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives. Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

473. Beyond China's Black Box: Five Trends Shaping Beijing’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-Making Under Xi Jinping

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China’s foreign and security policymaking apparatus is often described as a metaphorical black box about which analysts know little. That is true to an extent, but at the same time, it is possible to develop a better understanding of the people, institutions, processes, and pressures that go into making China’s policies toward the world during Xi’s “new era,” that is, his time as the country’s top leader. This report pursues that objective by identifying five major trends mostly internal to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-state system that shape its foreign and security policymaking. In addition, the paper describes the effects that each trend generates, from bureaucratic incentives to behavioral patterns. The first trend is personalization of the system around Xi. It reduces the influence of various interest groups and therefore the need to bargain with and among them, raises the prospect of groupthink among the loyalists Xi has surrounded himself with, and potentially increases the importance of achieving certain goals for China on Xi’s watch. In addition, Xi’s centrality creates a major management bottleneck that could hamper the system during even brief absences. The second trend is empowering the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the state. That trend has made more officials into policy-implementers rather than policymakers, even on issues below the level of strategy. It has also increased central demands for ideological activities, such as Xi Jinping Thought study sessions. At the same time, while the leadership wants to improve coordination and might be making some progress, it stops short of actions that could allow government organs to coordinate horizontally if doing so might plausibly jeopardize the center’s control. The third trend is domestic policy headwinds and the search for alternative forms of political legitimacy for the CCP. This creates two contradictory pressures: China’s reaching out and trying to improve ties with the world, and its turn to an assertive and at times even aggressive form of nationalism to counteract stalling economic growth. It also dents the power and influence China gained through its rapid rise and its role as a massive market driving global economic growth. The fourth trend is further elevation of regime security over other concerns. This trend negatively affects Beijing’s ties with foreign countries by worsening the experience of foreigners visiting and living in China, exporting repressive political ideas and techniques to the world, and complicating how China’s foreign and security bureaucracy interacts with its counterparts. The fifth and final trend is diplomatic and military assertiveness and seeking an active global leadership role, which feeds a self-reinforcing cycle of growing tensions, requires PRC diplomats to shoehorn any activities into Xi’s marquee frameworks, and leads Beijing to build out structures of an alternative international order. Examining these trends helps illuminate the macro pressures shaping China’s foreign and security policy decision-making. Still, aspects of how the party-state makes decisions about its foreign and security policies—“known unknowns” —remain particularly opaque. These include information flows to senior leaders, the dynamic among Xi and his top advisors, and the structure and frequency of important meetings. More knowledge in those areas might shed light on larger questions related to whether there are informal constraints on Xi’s power and how Xi is thinking about eventual transfer of power.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China and Asia

474. Disorderly Conduct: How U.S.-China Competition Upended the International Economic Order & What the U.S. Can Do to Fix It

Author:: Emily Kilcrease and Adam Tong
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: To gauge the health of the U.S.-China economic relationship, one can turn to the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who remarked in March 2024 that U.S. “tactics to suppress China . . . [were] reaching a bewildering level of unfathomable absurdity.”1 Rhetorical flourishes may be the one bright spot in the relationship. As tensions rise over economic restrictions and policies on both sides, economic relations have become a worrisome source of instability in the overall geopolitical relationship. The economic relationship has become increasingly dominated by security concerns, and integration is seen as not an opportunity but a risk to U.S. interests and values. The United States must develop a strong, pragmatic strategy for advancing its economic and security interests within the U.S.-China economic relationship, accounting for the fact that the security competition is now playing out across the economic landscape. To inform the development of an effective U.S. strategy for the economic relationship with China in the context of rising securitization, the United States must learn from its past attempts to advance its economic and security interests in the relationship. The first section of this report, “Where have we been?” examines past U.S. approaches, along with the challenges of pursuing similar policies in today’s geopolitical context. The second section, “Where are we going?” distills lessons from these past approaches and defines a new strategy for the United States, offering recommendations to implement it. Broadly speaking, prior U.S. strategies can be divided into two camps. First, the United States sought to bring the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the rules-based order and incentivize it to be a responsible stakeholder.* When that failed, U.S. strategy pivoted to one of imposing costs on the PRC and taking actions to constrain behaviors that threatened U.S. economic security interests. Within those broad strategies, U.S. policymakers have pursued four main approaches, in differing combinations and intensity, all of which involve associated challenges. They are: Play by the rules: The intention of bringing the PRC into the rules-based international system was to create external pressure that would align PRC actions with U.S. economic and security interests. Key efforts under this approach included the U.S. support for the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the later U.S. attempts to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty. Challenges for the approach include the fact that rules have a weak ability to constrain state behavior in a geopolitically contested environment where national security risks arise from economic integration. We need to talk: In light of increasing complexity in the bilateral relationship, U.S.-PRC dialogues were intended to identify and advance mutual interests while providing a regular forum to attempt to resolve disputes. This is seen in the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in the Bush administration and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in the Obama administration. In other contexts, such as ongoing talks under the Biden administration, dialogues have served primarily to communicate the rationale for U.S. policy actions in an attempt to put a floor under the bilateral relationship.2 Challenges to this approach include that commitments made in a dialogue process may not be enforceable, the meeting can become the deliverable, and the dialogue process cannot alter underlying geopolitical shifts. Defense is the best offense: Defensive approaches relied on domestic U.S. authorities to counter specific harms created by PRC practices and policies. The United States has a wide range of economic tools (e.g., tariffs and trade remedies) as well as national security–based tools (export controls and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS] process for conducting national security reviews of foreign investments), all of which have been used with greater frequency over the past decade. Challenges when using these tools include the disruptive and potentially escalatory nature of defensive approaches, and the lack of clear frameworks to assess the effectiveness of defensive policies. Additionally, relying on unilateral approaches can create friction within potential economic alliances. In the United States, defensive approaches have often suffered from a blending of economic, national security, and values concerns, eroding the legitimacy of the national security argument. Have more friends: These strategies centered on efforts to shape the PRC’s external environment through the negotiation of ambitious trade and investment agreements with major trading partners, with the goal of increasing economic integration with close partners, creating indirect pressure on the PRC to level up to higher standards, and developing common approaches to address concerns with nonmarket economies. Such an approach is challenging because traditional ways of shaping the external environment have not directly addressed securitization of the U.S.-China economic relationship. U.S. domestic political realities impose a considerable constraint on the use of trade policy as a strategic tool.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

475. The China-Russia Entente in East Asia: Contending with Authoritarian Partnership in a Critical Region

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Evan Wright, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Closer cooperation between China and Russia is a major force driving global geopolitics. But how relations between the two authoritarian powers are shaping specific regional and functional areas remains understudied. This report helps to fill that gap for the critical region of East Asia. The China-Russia relationship has improved despite—and, in some ways, because of—Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing helps to fuel Russia’s war machine and defends the principles Moscow uses to justify the invasion. Both powers are also deepening and expanding their relationship beyond Ukraine. The pair cooperate across a range of fields, from military affairs to economics and global norms. Undoubtedly, current and potential fissures remain in the bilateral relationship. However, the leadership in both countries carefully manages these tensions to ensure they do not derail the overall relationship. Beijing-Moscow coordination extends to East Asian hot spots, including the areas around Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Around Japan, China and Russia work together to advance their respective territorial claims and pressure a rival Northeast Asian power and close U.S. ally. China and Russia use multiple military tools in pursuit of those goals, including joint aerial and naval patrols, joint exercises, and incursions into Japan’s air defense identification zone. Together, these activities put significant operational strain on the Self-Defense Forces, Japan’s military, as they respond. On the Korean Peninsula, China and Russia have turned away from multilateral cooperation to manage the North Korea threat and toward blaming democracies and reaching out to Pyongyang instead. Russia has moved closer to North Korea to help offset Moscow’s diplomatic isolation and barter for weapons. But that cooperation has not yet undermined China’s preferences or interests. Beijing maintains its own working relationship with Pyongyang while coordinating with Moscow to blunt international pressure on North Korea. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. To the south, Russia increasingly backs Beijing’s actions to pressure Taiwan as Taipei reaches out to democracies worldwide. Moscow’s support for Beijing has been particularly pronounced during major cross-Strait events in recent years. In the South China Sea, Russia tries to balance historical relationships with Southeast Asian states even as its power wanes and subservience to China deepens. For example, Russia’s cooperation on energy projects with Vietnam shows that Beijing’s and Moscow’s regional interests sometimes diverge. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. Moscow’s presence and power in East Asia have already suffered because of its disastrous war in Ukraine. Over time, Russia likely will become even more subservient to China. The China-Russia entente might therefore prove most useful for Beijing in its home region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

476. The Chinese Migrant Workers in Indonesia: A Contested Security Issue

Author:: Ali Maksum
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The influx of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia has become a contentious debate and is perceived publicly as a threat. Chinese migrant workers are accused of seizing local occupational employment amidst high local unemployment. The government has repeatedly told people that Chinese workers are not a threat. In fact, several issues involving Chinese workers have arisen, for example, related to residence permits, involvement in smuggling, involvement in crime, even suspicion that Chinese workers were members of security forces. This article examines two competing representations of Chinese migrant workers in Indonesia. First, a public representation which is negative and strongly attempts to securitize Chinese migrant workers. Second, the government representation that views Chinese migrant workers in a more positive light and that acts as a form of counter-securitization. The paper argues that the failure of securitization of Chinese migrant workers by the public is due to staunch counter-securitization carried out on a massive scale by the government through political apparatus, mainstream media and social media influencers.
Topic:: Security, Smuggling, Labor Market, Migrant Workers, and Securitization
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia

477. The Great Reset and the Near-Term Implications for the Chinese Economy

Author:: R. Reghunanadhan and J. T. Karackattu
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The Great Reset has had a severe impact on the Chinese economy, with implications domestically, and on the global supply chain. One consequence has been the decline in the overall market demand in China, with a significant negative impact on infrastructure development and the labour industry. A unique aspect is a survey is to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on innovation and integration of digital technologies in China. The authors explicate the impact of the Great Reset on the Chinese economy, the implications on the supply chains that China is a crucial part of, and the global implications thereof.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Economy, Innovation, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Great Reset
Political Geography:: China and Asia

478. China Tests the Water in Palestinian Diplomacy

Author:: Ramzy Baroud
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: While the ramifications of the recent unity agreement signed in Beijing by multiple Palestinian factions remain to be seen, it is evident that China has stepped up as a leader in the region
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and Palestine

479. The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency

Author:: Warwick McKibbin, Megan Hogan, and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The paper explores policies promoted by former president and now candidate Donald Trump that would potentially affect the global economy. We focus on immigration policy, trade, and erosion of the Federal Reserve Board’s political independence. Each policy has differing macroeconomic and sectoral impacts on the United States and other countries. We find, however, that all the policies examined cause a decline in US production and employment, especially in trade-exposed sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, as well as higher US inflation. The trade policies do little to improve the US trade balance; however, the erosion of Fed independence does so by causing capital outflows, a significant depreciation of the dollar, and higher unemployment toward the end of 2028, which worsen American living standards. Scenarios combining individual policies show that the changes cause a large inflationary impulse and a significant loss of employment (particularly in manufacturing and agriculture) in the US economy. The negative impact of a contraction in global trade is significant for countries that trade with the United States the most. The adverse effect is offset for some economies by the positive effects of an inflow of foreign capital that would otherwise have gone into the US economy. An online dashboard contains a full set of macroeconomic and sectoral results for all countries.
Topic:: Migration, Central Bank, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, and Deportation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

480. Economic implications of revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status

Author:: Megan Hogan, Warwick McKibben, and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The United States’ granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, formerly known as most favored nation status, to China in 2000 resulted in a large expansion of bilateral trade. Concerns over Chinese trade practices and the impact of Chinese exports on US import-competing sectors have contributed to US political discontent and calls for the revocation of PNTR, including by former president Donald Trump in his reelection campaign and in the 2024 Republican Party Platform. The authors find that revoking China’s PNTR status would cause higher inflation and a short-term decline in US gross domestic product relative to baseline from which the economy never fully recovers. The loss of output and employment would be felt unevenly across the economy, with agriculture, durable manufacturing, and mining taking the biggest hits. Stock market prices would fall, with agricultural, durable manufacturing, and mining firms absorbing the biggest declines. All of these impacts would be magnified if China retaliates. Ironically, the revocation would damage the US industrial sector and contribute to a wider US trade deficit.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:: China and Asia

481. The Rise of US Economic Sanctions on China: Analysis of a New PIIE Dataset

Author:: Martin Chorzempa, Mary Lovely, and Christine Wan
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Concerns over China’s national security and human rights activities have led the United States to rely increasingly on financial sanctions and export controls to curb Beijing’s behavior. But the tools are so complex it is difficult to assess their effectiveness. A new PIIE dataset sheds light on this economic statecraft. The first Trump administration added three times as many Chinese entities to export control and other sanctions lists than the previous four administrations; the Biden administration added even more to these lists. Most sanctions and controls target high-tech sectors, especially electronics, military and defense entities, aviation, space, and aerospace; targets are chosen under a veil of secrecy, raising questions over accountability and transparency. The benefits of isolating Chinese firms come with potential costs, hobbling innovation for US and allied business, encouraging circumvention of sanctions, and accelerating Chinese innovation.
Topic:: Economics, Human Rights, National Security, Sanctions, and Exports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

482. US-South Korea Cyber Cooperation: Towards the Higher-Hanging Fruits

Author:: Jenny Jun and So Jeong Kim
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the past decade, the US and South Korea faced a relatively narrow set of challenges in cyberspace, notably North Korea’s cyber crime facilitating sanctions evasion. In the next decade, however, the two countries will face a more diversified set of challenges with growing North Korean ties with Russia, its involvement in the war in Ukraine, and intensifying US-China competition. The US and South Korea must develop a joint playbook for responding to scenarios of disruptive cyber operations targeting South Korean public and private sectors and prepare for an even more difficult environment for curbing North Korea’s cyber crime as Russia provides a way out. Over the past two years, the US and South Korea have significantly deepened and broadened cooperation on cyber issues and have expanded cooperation further to trilateral and multilateral settings. The two countries established several regular high-level and working-level dialogues, have issued joint sanctions and threat advisories, and deepened mil-to-mil cooperation. However, 2024 has been a watershed in terms of shifting geopolitical dynamics on and around the Korean peninsula. Cyber threats will become more diversified, and the bilateral relationship will be tested at the seams without a clear joint strategic concept and operational plan.
Topic:: Sanctions, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

483. Effective US government strategies to address China’s information influence

Author:: Kenton Thibaut
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: China’s global influence operations have received increasing attention in the national security community. Numerous congressional hearings, media reports, and academic and industry findings have underscored China’s increased use and resourcing of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics in its covert operations both in the United States and abroad. In response, US government offices the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), among others, have made strides in raising awareness of the issue and charting pathways to increase the resilience of the US information ecosystem to foreign influence. To date, however, the efforts to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been fragmented. That fragmentation is indicative of a lack of cohesion around the concept of influence operations itself. Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms. This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence. As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order. The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded. To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit. This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale. The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity. In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world. That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos. This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such. The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces. The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.
Topic:: Media, Disinformation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

484. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power

Author:: David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

485. Competing for the Global South: Asia and the Quest for Leadership in a Multipolar World

Author:: Filippo Fasulo and Nicola Missaglia
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: As the world transitions into a multipolar era, an increasing number of nations are challenging Western dominance and reshaping the global order. Central to this shift is the rise of the Global South, led by Asia’s powerhouses - India and China. These two nations, each offering distinct governance, development, and security models, are in a growing competition for influence. Countries across the Global South are advocating for a more equitable international system, demanding debt restructuring, climate action, and solutions to emerging security challenges. What strategies will India and China propose to address these demands? And how will their rivalry shape the future of the Global South as a unified force on the world stage?
Topic:: Leadership, Global South, Multipolarity, International System, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

486. The Rise of Fragmentation. A New Economic Security Era?

Author:: Alessandro Gili and Filippo Fasulo
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Multiple crises have shaken the foundations of the global economy, and the resulting instability has yet to recover. Instead, it has led to increasing fragmentation along political and ideological lines. The current geoeconomic order is increasingly defined by the use of advanced trade defense and economic security tools, such as tariffs, trade barriers, sanctions, and export restrictions, which have become more sophisticated. Major economies are adapting to this new reality by shaping their own definitions of economic security, particularly to safeguard critical and high-tech sectors. The EU, the US, and China are each calibrating their economic security strategies, seeking a balance between openness and protection that maximizes their respective advantages. However, in this shifting international landscape, new actors are emerging with the potential to influence the global balance of power. What type of "new globalization" is emerging? Could economic security tools become the new normal in the global economy? What are the key economic security strategies adopted by the world's leading economies?
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Ideology, Tariffs, Trade, Economic Security, Instability, Fragmentation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

487. China’s influence at the United Nations: words and deeds

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Théo Storella, and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: We investigate China’s influence at the United Nations by focusing on the promotion of its narratives (words) and its voting behaviour (deeds). For the former, we assess the extent to which China’s global initiatives have become embedded in UN discourse compared to Western initiatives. For the latter, we assess the degree to which countries, regions and voting coalitions align their UN General Assembly votes with China compared to the US. When it comes to words, China’s global initiatives are sometimes louder than the West’s. More specifically, the Belt and Road Initiative has had a much greater impact on UN discourse than any Western initiative. Other Chinese global initiatives do not clearly stand out from those of the West, with the Global Compact for Migration mentioned more frequently at the UN than any Chinese initiative other than the BRI. We also find that Chinese initiatives are more self-referential. Thematically, both Chinese and Western initiatives are very focused on security as well as aid and human rights. Moving to voting patterns, countries’ income levels are a key determinant of alignment in voting. Poorer countries are much more aligned with China than with the US. North America and the European Union, in that order, are generally more aligned with the US than with China and these trends are much more stable than one could expect given China’s growing economic influence.
Topic:: United Nations, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

488. Updating the EU strategy on China: co-existence while derisking through partnerships

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Abigaël Vasselier
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union-China relationship has deteriorated markedly since the EU introduced a three-part strategy in 2019 based on partnership, competition and systemic rivalry. Th e relationship has been undermined by China’s support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its increasingly anti-Western foreign policy that aims to alter the international rules-based system. Meanwhile, the economic relationship is changing because of China’s structural deceleration and increasing self-reliance, coupled with the EU’s growing critical dependence on China, especially for digitalisation and decarbonisation. Europe must accept that relations with China will not return to their pre-pandemic state. While there is no need to change the overall strategy, the EU should seek co-existence with China while preserving EU values and interests. Cooperation is still needed to address global problems, including climate change, in which China plays an important role in finding solutions, but on which the EU cannot accept Chinese cooperation at any price. In terms of co-existence, the EU must continue to pursue de-risking – or reducing its exposure to China – especially for its energy and digital transitions. De-risking has started but more needs to be done to understand how it can be continued while not creating conflict. The EU should pursue a three-part approach: increase coherence and coordination with all European stakeholders, refi ne the EU economic-security strategy while accepting trade-offs, and seek partnerships as the best offensive tool. The 2024-2029 European Commission should foster discussion of China and coordination of strategic issues within a larger constituency. EU countries, with Commission coordination, need to be more involved in building a comprehensive approach, including by conducting national risk assessments and by shaping and implementing de-risking measures. On economic security, full implementation of current defensive instruments is needed, along with new protections, such as better coordination of export controls and a new outbound-investment screening mechanism. The trade-offs stemming from pursuing more security will need to be made explicit in order to mitigate them. On partnerships, the EU must look beyond the United States, working within the G7 and with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and South Korea, which have valuable experience of de-risking. Mutually beneficial and strategic cooperation agreements need to be brokered with relevant emerging and developing economies.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Economy, Risk, Trade, and Coexistence
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

489. Xi Transforms the Party: Senior Cadre Selection in a New Era

Author:: Mark Stokes, Eric Lee, Cathy Fang, and Marek Haar
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Due to the challenges associated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise, anticipating who will lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a major concern. General Secretary Xi Jinping has reshuffled the deck around norms for succession. With old patterns woven out of the CCP’s banner, studying the new framework for promoting new senior leaders and the sub-factional politics lying underneath will aid in identifying who will lead the CCP and govern the PRC in the future. To that end, this report offers a summary of the leader promotion process within the CCP, a guide to identifying rising CCP leadership in the future, and a map of the current six sub-factions competing for Xi’s favor.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

490. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence

Author:: Rahman Yaacob
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Cambodia

491. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi

Author:: Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, and East China

492. Who Briefs Xi Jinping? How Politburo Study Sessions Help to Decode Chinese Politics

Author:: Neil Thomas and Feifei Hung
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China’s politicians are lifelong learners. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls itself a “learning party” (xuexi dang) because its members participate in regular study sessions. These are designed to enhance organizational discipline and to instill practical knowledge. Even the Party’s top leaders, the 24 members of the Politburo, dedicate a half-day almost every month to the “collective study” (jiti xuexi) of a topic chosen by General Secretary Xi Jinping. This practice is unusual compared to most Western governments. It is rare that a U.S. president would convene their cabinet for lectures on employment policy, political theory, or World Trade Organization reform — all recent topics of Politburo study sessions. So why do Party leaders spend so much of their limited time doing collective study? What do they study? Who briefs from? How can we use this information to better understand Beijing? This paper first explains the nature and importance of Politburo study sessions. It then uses a unique dataset to analyze changes in topics and briefers over time before presenting case studies of how sessions focused on technology and foreign affairs relate to policymaking. The conclusion summarizes our findings about the value and limits of using these sessions to decode Chinese politics.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

493. The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan

Author:: Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan. What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan? This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”1 The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Regional Integration, Economic Development, and Identity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

494. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:: Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:: Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

495. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:: Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

496. On U.S.-China Relations & Security

Author:: Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

497. On the Road of Excess: How Startups Are Driving China’s Electric Vehicle Boom

Author:: G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: A complex mix of ingredients came together to create China's electric vehicle boom, but government subsidies alone cannot explain the emergence of the industry's sophisticated ecosystem and vast manufacturing capacity. An alternate explanation is that Chinese carmakers could scale up and rapidly expand production of electric vehicles because they have access to the deep pools of flexible financing provided by capital markets, sovereign wealth funds, and private equity and venture capital investors, both in China and from overseas. China’s electric vehicle startups have raised billions from investors eager to finance potential unicorns in innovative, environmentally friendly industries. Taking inspiration from Tesla, Google, and other Silicon Valley pioneers, the founders of these startups have relied on rising valuations to attract new investment to sustain their operations despite years of losses. However, many of China's electric vehicle startups now find it hard to raise funds as their valuations have plummeted, and the market forces that drove the industry's breakneck growth may now be slowing it down.
Topic:: Investment, Manufacturing, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:: China and Asia

498. Chinese Nationalism, PRC Resolve, and Crisis Escalation: Views from Indo-Pacific Experts

Author:: Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: How do Indo-Pacific experts assess the role of Chinese public opinion during a crisis? Does Chinese nationalist pressure boost Beijing’s resolve in the eyes of analysts, former officials, and policy advisers around the region? What effect does Chinese nationalist outrage have on these strategic elites’ views of different policy approaches? Do China specialists differ from generalists in their interpretations of Chinese public opinion’s significance? This report offers insight into these questions using data from a survey conducted with 799 international affairs experts in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in late 2023 and early 2024. Comparing respondents’ views of a crisis before and after Beijing goes public — issuing a public threat statement, leading a wave of online outrage, and permitting street demonstrations — indicates a large majority of experts regard Chinese public opinion as a significant factor in hypothetical crisis situations involving their country. However, its effects on observers’ policy preferences generally run counter to Beijing’s interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nationalism, International Affairs, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: China and Indo-Pacific

499. Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration Speech: Reactions from China, Civil Unrest in Taiwan

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: After winning Taiwan’s presidential election with 40% of the vote in January,1 Lai Ching-te faced his first major test on May 20, 2024: his inaugural address. The speech incited a strong military reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, the largest civil protests since the Sunflower Student Movement2 have gripped the island in reaction to a bill passed by opposition parties — a bill that some fear could expand the legislature’s power and undermine the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency. For a number of reasons, Lai’s address, the protests, and his cross-Strait policies are crucial to understanding the continuing evolution of cross-Strait relations as well as the PRC-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. First and foremost, cross-Strait relations are at an all-time low; second, the U.S. presidential election in November could shift U.S. policy toward Taiwan; and third, Lai will govern with a divided Legislative Yuan, presenting challenges to his domestic agenda. This paper will first deal with President Lai’s address and how it framed cross-strait issues, Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC, and other important topics. It will then cover China’s response and likely posture in the upcoming months. The paper then analyzes the current civil protests in Taiwan and how a divided legislature will impact politics over the next four years. The penultimate section looks at the expected differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency for Beijing, Taipei, and the world. A conclusion sums up the paper’s key points.
Topic:: Protests, Presidential Elections, Regional Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

500. Politics First: The Key to Understanding China’s Third Plenum

Author:: Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Anticipation is growing for one of the most important events in Chinese politics this year. On June 27, General Secretary Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the 24-man Politburo that announced the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its Third Plenum in Beijing on July 15–18. A plenum is a plenary meeting of the committee’s 205 members and 171 non-voting alternate members. The meeting is important because the Central Committee will issue an authoritative “decision” (jueding) that will guide policymaking for years to come. The document will center on “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” amid concerns both at home and abroad about the Party’s ability to steward China’s economic, geopolitical, and social development. However, expectations should be modest. Historically, third plenums are often overrated as catalysts for transformational change and instead introduce plans that expand on existing policy themes. Xi’s first third plenum in 2013 appeared unusually ambitious, raising hopes for economic and political liberalization, but its true significance was in enabling Xi’s centralization of power. The policy signals for this month’s plenum suggest a strong emphasis on Xi’s goals of achieving technological self-reliance, addressing financial risks, streamlining central-local relations, and improving social welfare. There are also hints that Beijing may try to ease conditions for private firms and foreign investors in high-tech sectors, as well as efforts to enhance internal Party governance. Additionally, several previously sacked officials are expected to lose their seats on the Central Committee. This article analyzes the historical context, policy signals, personnel movements, and key documents related to the upcoming Third Plenum.
Topic:: Government, Politics, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS