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1. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:
Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. Why democracies stick together: The theory and empirics behind alliance formation

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Domestic regime type affects both inter-state conflict and alliance formation. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies do not go to war with one another, while democratic alliance theory suggests that they rarely, if ever, join nondemocratic alliances (or alliances led by nondemocratic powers). Empirical evidence strongly supports both theories. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes further reinforces the hypothesis that economically prosperous democracies tend to align with one another, whereas authoritarian states gravitate toward similarly nondemocratic and less prosperous partners. If these theories hold, they carry significant implications for Western and especially US foreign policy. First, global democratization would reduce the number of potential conflicts, at least among an increasing number of democracies. Second, it would expand the pool of democratic alliance partners, while at the same limiting the alliance options available to nondemocratic powers. This strategic logic underscores the importance of upholding democratic norms abroad and promoting democratization in nondemocratic states. However, advocating for democratization of nondemocratic great powers will be perceived as both a geopolitical and domestic political challenge aimed at weakening their international position and threatening their governments’ domestic grip on power. Efforts to democratize nondemocratic great-power like Russia and China therefore provoke intense countermeasures. If such a strategy is deemed to be too high risk or too difficult to pursue successfully, a less provocative, “peripheral” strategy may focus on fostering democracy and economic development in authoritarian regimes’ weaker, less prosperous partners, thereby depriving them of potential allies.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

3. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:
Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:
Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Episode 04: Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:
Sahar Aziz and Khaled A. Beydoun
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Host Sahar Aziz and Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Professor Khaled Beydoun discuss the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries. The conversation is informed by Professor Beydoun’s new book The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims.
Topic:
Politics, Law, Discrimination, Islamophobia, War on Terror, and Muslims
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

5. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:
Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

6. The Sky Is Not the Limit. Geopolitics and Economics of the New Space Race

Author:
Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Space is a contested domain for its very nature and today it is evidently becoming an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. An increasing number of actors, infrastructures and technologies deployed in space also raises concerns for safety and security, especially in cyberspace. Many countries are striving to achieve space capabilities and autonomous access to space, and this is having a tremendous geopolitical impact, especially since space is emerging as an increasingly critical military and strategic domain. The development of the new space economy, which is increasingly involving the private sector and many industrial actors and services, will also be a game changer for the international economy. The space race likewise implies disruptive technologies that could contribute massively to the energy and digital transitions, accelerating solutions that could benefit humanity. A new international governance system for space is therefore needed urgently, considering that the current rules are no longer able to respond to a sector evolving at such a rapid pace. Which actors are leading the race? Which economic sectors could benefit the most and what could the new space economy mean for the world? How is space emerging as a military domain against a backdrop of increasing international tensions? What would a new system of global governance for space look like?
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, India, Italy, Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

7. The Open Gap in the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific

Author:
Kenneth Gofigan Kuper
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
"For many of us in Guam, a free and open Indo-Pacific cannot be fully accomplished without resolving the paradox of the United States maintaining a modern-day colony even though the local government has supported moving forward with a decolonization process."
Topic:
Politics, Decolonization, Strategy, and Colonization
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam

8. South Korean Perspectives on China-Russia Collaboration in the Arctic

Author:
Young Kil Park
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Young Kil Park, Research Fellow at Korea Maritime Institute, explains that "While the immediate impact of China-Russia collaboration in the Arctic on South Korea is limited, it remains wary of the long-term implications for its economic and security interests."
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Arctic

9. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent

Author:
Hargisl Shirley Martey
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America

10. Understanding Elite Politics Through Relentless Research: Warren Sun’s Hua Guofeng Nianpu, Chronology of Hua Guofeng (1971–1981)

Author:
Frederick C. Teiwes
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Working Paper is a pre-publication review of an immense documentary collection prepared over the past 25 years by Warren Sun, Adjunct Associate Professor at Monash University and Affiliate Member of the Sydney CSC. It is based on the intellectual premise that elite politics in the CCP cannot be understood without deep penetration into the details of political decision-making and conflict. In its absence, simplistic narratives emerge and become widely accepted, especially when the Party itself is creating the basis for the narrative. This is most prevalent for the immediate post-Mao period as a Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping struggle between different ideological lines and in the profound misunderstanding of Hua as a limited, merely transitional political leader. Hua nianpu uses a wide range of sources to uncover details that contest such views. These include: the contemporary PRC public record; official documentary collections; internal Party documents including unpublished speeches and compendia of circulars at major Party meetings; memoirs, oral accounts, and recollections published in the PRC by or about leaders; studies by Party history scholars in PRC journals; more-adventurous books published in Hong Kong by Party historians and former officials; interviews with scholars and retired officials; and unique interviews with officials who worked as secretaries or as aides to very senior figures and their family members, especially members of Hua’s family. However, these sources have limitations that must be considered critically and discussed in terms of what they can and cannot provide. Taken together the detailed information compiled in Hua nianpu undermines central features of the accepted narrative, most notably by showing that the 1978 work conference and the subsequent Third Plenum were joint Hua-Deng ventures to advance modernization, and when unanticipated developments weakened Hua, Deng did not act against him. Instead, he worked to lower tensions and to return the focus to their original joint plan. Hua nianpu is a major basis for our joint book project, Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. But this nianpu is entirely Professor Sun’s creation and exacting work. The target for submission of both these projects to their respective publishers is early 2025.
Topic:
Politics, History, Elites, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Hua Guofeng
Political Geography:
China and Asia

11. Warnings and Welcomes: China’s Reopening and the Politics of International Travel

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Over the past two months, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has rapidly rolled back its strict zero-COVID epidemic prevention policy, COVID-19 has spread rapidly throughout the country. The combination of the PRC reopening its borders to outbound travel on January 8 and the ongoing pandemic has put countries that are major travel destinations for Chinese nationals in a bind. Governments have responded differently to the situation, with some imposing testing and quarantine requirements and others declining to do so. In China, official and social media have generally lauded countries that have desisted from testing requirements and opened their doors to Chinese tourists. Thailand, in particular, has been widely celebrated. Not only did Thailand decline to impose testing requirements on inbound travelers from the PRC, but several senior Thai government ministers went to the airport to welcome the first planeload of Chinese tourists following the lifting of travel restrictions on January 8 (Guangming Daily, January 17). Scenes of smiling Thai officials and airport workers greeting the first group of arriving tourists circulated widely in Chinese media.
Topic:
Politics, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Travel
Political Geography:
China and Asia

12. Rejuvenating Communism: Youth Organizations and Elite Renewal in Post-Mao China

Author:
Jérôme Doyon and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Working for the administration remains one of the most coveted career paths for young Chinese. Rejuvenating Communism: Youth Organizations and Elite Renewal in Post-Mao China seeks to understand what motivates young and educated Chinese to commit to a long-term career in the party-state and how this question is central to the Chinese regime’s ability to maintain its cohesion and survive. Jérôme Doyon draws upon extensive fieldwork and statistical analysis in order to illuminate the undogmatic commitment recruitment techniques and other methods the state has taken to develop a diffuse allegiance to the party-state in the post-Mao era. He then analyzes recruitment and political professionalization in the Communist Party’s youth organizations and shows how experiences in the Chinese Communist Youth League transform recruits and feed their political commitment as they are gradually inducted into the world of officials. As the first in-depth study of the Communist Youth League’s role in recruitment, this book challenges the assumption that merit is the main criteria for advancement within the party-state, an argument with deep implications for understanding Chinese politics today.
Topic:
Communism, Politics, History, Youth, and Elites
Political Geography:
China and Asia

13. US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions

Author:
John K. Culver and Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and from Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years. This grim prospect is driven by the United States and China arraying themselves for a strategic rivalry since 2017 through the continuing trade war, economic decoupling, and increasing rhetorical and military positioning for confrontation over Taiwan. In light of the Chinese military’s threatening gestures, belligerent rhetoric, and other recent actions that read like they could be preparation for war, there is a danger that the successive warnings by senior US military commanders that Chinese CCP General Secretary and President Xi Jinping has already decided to use military force in the near term could become the proverbial tail wagging the dog — and could impose a logic that makes a US-China war more likely, rather than enhancing deterrence.1 Therefore, the key question for the United States and its allies is how an increasingly truculent and belligerent Chinese leadership can be incentivized to walk back from the brink. This paper examines what lessons China, the United States, and European allies have drawn from the Ukraine conflict and how such lessons have shaped these actors’ strategic assumptions. It concludes with a discussion of policy recommendations for the transatlantic community confronting the possibility of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Dale Aluf
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

15. Humanitarian aid: Defining new areas of US-LAC collaboration

Author:
Pepe Zhang and Isabel Bernhard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The US humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) system—well practiced and extensively developed—could further serve US and partners’ needs in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and beyond through targeted improvements. Based on our experience as HADR practitioners with operational and academic expertise, we share insights from many years of working with partners in the Americas. The task is urgent: fragile governments and organizations further impacted by COVID-19 and climate change have exposed HADR deficiencies that need to be rapidly strengthened. Redoubling the US’s HADR commitment to allies and partners can also have strategic benefits during a period of renewed competition with the People’s Republic of China. We believe that the United States can strengthen its HADR work globally, and particularly with LAC countries, through partnership and relationship building as well as education and exercises. By deepening its strengths and address- ing room for improvement, the United States can remain the partner of choice for LAC countries and conserve its positional advantage over China and other strategic competitors. How can LAC and partner nations (such as the United States), nongovernmental organizations, and regional and other global organizations strengthen their abilities to respond to natural disasters? What can the United States do to improve its disaster preparedness and response in LAC? And what can Washington learn from Beijing’s approach to disaster assistance in LAC? In crafting this report to address these questions, we drew from a roundtable discussion, verbal and written consultations with subject matter experts, and written material. A full description of the methodology is provided in the appendix. The findings of the report include eight recommendations grouped under two mutually complementary areas: (1) partnership and relationship building, and (2) education and exercises. Not only are these recommendations timely and relevant for HADR practitioners, but taking these steps would strengthen Western hemispheric security by investing in the region’s infrastructure and human capital. As the United States and its LAC partners consider future room for cooperation and collaboration, HADR work will form an indispensable centerpiece of their strategies.
Topic:
NATO, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Humanitarian Aid, International Organization, Politics, Partnerships, Resilience, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

16. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:
Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

17. China and the new globalization

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

18. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:
June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

19. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

20. Abrogating the Visiting Forces Agreement: Its Effects on Philippines’ Security and Stability in Southeast Asia

Author:
Renato Acosta
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
During much of 2022, the defense and security alliance between the United States of America and the Philippines, anchored on and reinforced by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, teetered on the brink of collapse. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte brought relations to the brink through attempts to scuttle the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move would only embolden Chinese challenges to Manila’s territorial integrity and its aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. While the Duterte administration recited parochial reasons to terminate the VFA, pundits from the security and diplomatic sectors viewed Duterte’s attempts as a pretext to steer the Philippines towards China under his own brand and definition of an independent foreign policy. During his term, Duterte reiterated that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials were his friends. He also publicly declared that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), a northeastern section of the Spratly Islands, was already in physical control and possession of Beijing due to the unchallenged presence of its military and maritime militia vessels there. Given these statements, Duterte has constantly received criticism over his defeatist stance towards China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Politics, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

21. Continuismo, contra reacción y triangulación: el desembarco de China en América Latina y la coexistencia de líneas de acción exterior de España hacia la región

Author:
Javier Martín Merchán
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Las relaciones entre España y América Latina siempre han conformado un pilar en la estrategia de integración internacional del país ibérico. No obstante, ante la singular coyuntura que supone el auge exponencial de China en la región latinoamericana, ¿qué riesgos afronta hoy España en América Latina? ¿Ha influido dicha coyuntura en las líneas maestras de acción exterior de España hacia la región? Este artículo arroja algo de luz en torno a tales preguntas, y su conclusión es doble. Por un lado, sugiere que el desembarco chino supone un serio desafío para España. Por otro, se sostiene que la política exterior española ha hecho coexistir tres tipos de actitudes como respuesta: una más continuista, otra que capitaliza esta nueva coyuntura y busca aprovechar sus oportunidades, y una última más reactiva a las amenazas que suscitaría la pujanza china en América Latina.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, and Spain

22. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System

Author:
Mariah Thornton
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

23. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

24. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials

Author:
Salvatore Finizio
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
Topic:
Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

25. Investigating China’s economic coercion: The reach and role of Chinese corporate entities

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s economic statecraft has expanded in line with Beijing’s vision for an international environment that is more conducive to its interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are willing to use every means at their disposal to achieve this goal, bringing the full force of the party-state to bear in support of Xi’s objectives abroad and against perceived enemies of the Chinese government. Economic statecraft—the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals—has been a consistent feature of Xi’s dealings with CCP competitors and adversaries. Intensifying US-China strategic competition and Beijing’s increasingly overt attempts to assert its preferences only further emphasize the importance of confronting China’s use of economic coercion and influence and understanding the reach of Chinese companies. The deliberate use of economic ties to achieve geopolitical objectives is underpinned by corporate entities that facilitate trade, investment, and financial flows.1 Beijing’s preference for plausible deniability and nontransparency in theory makes corporate entities an attractive mechanism through which to signal its displeasure and to achieve strategic goals. Understanding the reach and role of such entities is, therefore, key to identifying where Beijing might be best positioned to advance its economic statecraft. To that end, this report explores avenues through which researchers can investigate these issues, considers industries that could be vulnerable to future coercion and influence, and offers policy recommendations to counter China’s economic statecraft.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Global Markets, Economy, Trade, Norms, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

26. The Economic Impact of China PNTR Repeal

Author:
David Schockenhoff and Michael Kleiman
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
As scepticism towards China is rising among policymakers, businesses grow more concerned about the potential economic fallout from an escalation in US-China tariff policy. Oxford Economics was commissioned by the US-China Business Council (USCBC) to help inform the policymaking process by examining two scenarios that could materialize if China’s Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) status was revoked – including the increase of US tariffs on Chinese goods to column 2 rates as well as a Chinese retaliation imposing pre-WTO rates on US goods. Our analysis incorporates state-of-the art trade and economic models, including the Oxford Economics GEM, and finds that the US could lose up to $1.9trn in output over the five-year period following a China PNTR repeal. This is our third study for USCBC after examining the impact of the US-China relationship and associated scenarios in two previous reports (2017 and 2021).
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Regulation, Tariffs, Trade, Supply Chains, Policymaking, Decoupling, and Goods and Services
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. China’s South China Sea Overreach Faces Growing Obstacles

Author:
Denny Roy
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Even without the mandate of a formal international organization, coalitions of willing governments can coalesce around the task of dissuading China from enforcing invalid South China Sea claims.
Topic:
Politics, Territorial Disputes, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia-Pacific, and South China Sea

28. Taiwan's Security Future: How Domestic Politics Impact Taipei’s Defense

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
With a presidential election fast approaching, Taipei’s defense policy could go in multiple directions. As China has grown more militarily capable and assertive under President Xi Jinping, Beijing’s promise to forcibly unify with Taiwan has increasingly worried both Taiwan and the United States. Beijing’s large-scale military exercise near Taiwan this fall underscores the role Taiwan’s own military capabilities play in deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To that end, US policymakers have increased defense cooperation with Taiwan and urged Taipei to do more for its defense in recent years. However, whether Taipei will stick to the defense policies implemented under current president Tsai Ing-wen is uncertain. This coming January, Taiwan’s voters will select a new president. Currently leading the polls is Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is committed to Taiwan’s sovereignty and views Taiwan as effectively already independent. Beijing has angrily decried this position and boycotted talks with Taipei as long as the DPP remains in power. Meanwhile, the path ahead for the Kuomintang (KMT), the primary opposition party, is riven with internal fissures. The party has traditionally sought closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing to defuse tensions—something it seems uniquely qualified for, since the PRC will not talk to the current DPP government. Yet emphasizing dialogue with an increasingly aggressive PRC, especially after Xi’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s limited self-government in 2020, has soured many voters on the KMT’s message. In response, reformers in the party have suggested a new direction more closely aligned with the DPP on national security to win back moderate voters, while traditionalists have doubled down on the old promise of peace through dialogue. This latter path would be worrying for the Biden administration, which has increased arms sales to Taipei and presided over a period of worsening US-China mistrust. US concerns are a helpful reminder that, whether discussing Taiwan’s future or the risk of a catastrophic cross-Strait war, Taiwan’s own politics cannot be ignored. The rigor of Taipei’s defense—and, with it, the health of cross-Strait deterrence—will depend largely on the course Taiwan’s politics take.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Elections, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and United States of America

29. CCP Ideology, 1976-1980: From the “Two Whatevers,” to the “Criterion of Truth,” to the “Four Cardinal Principles,” and beyond

Author:
Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Nowhere is this period more misunderstood than in the area of ideology and its notional centrality to an imagined Hua-Deng power struggle. In the accepted narrative, a critical feature of this struggle is the February 1977 “two whatevers” editorial notionally requiring support for all of Mao’s decisions, that allegedly sought to prevent Deng’s return to work and to enforce a rigid ideological framework preventing significant change from Mao’s practices. In fact, Deng’s return to high office had been decided at the start of January, and more importantly, from the earliest days of Hua’s leadership, the task was to move away from Mao’s Cultural Revolution but to maintain regime stability and unity by expressing fealty to a leader still deeply worshipped in major sections of the population and respected by Party leaders, notably those of the revolutionary generation. Claims that “whateverists” engaged in an intense struggle with reformers seeking a pragmatic approach under the slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” beginning in May 1978 are not totally amiss, but they exaggerate the situation and do not adequately account for the fact that the conflict was largely among lower-level figures on the theoretical front who did not deeply engage the top leadership. There were nuanced differences between Hua and Deng on the “criterion of truth” question but nothing fundamental, and neither wanted ideological issues to disrupt the economic agenda of the fall 1978 pre-Third Plenum work conference. At the conference, however, arguments initiated by progressive theorists resulted in official acceptance of the criterion position, although there was high-level concern, most prominently expressed by Deng, for proceeding with caution, particularly as it related to Mao’s prestige. More broadly, in Party ranks many felt the plenum’s policies had gone too far and were leading to disruption in society. At the end of March 1979, Deng reacted with his “four cardinal principles” speech that demanded adherence to the political practice of Mao’s pre-Cultural Revolution period. This not only alarmed progressives but it also created leadership concern that the practical focus of the Third Plenum policies was being undermined. Deng then sought to bolster those policies, but at the time of the 30th anniversary of the PRC, he still gave priority to the “four principles” and defence of Mao. Indeed, he explicitly affirmed a lavish claim concerning Mao’s essential role in the Party’s successes, the same claim that had appeared in the “two whatevers” editorial more than two and a half years earlier.
Topic:
Politics, History, Ideology, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

30. PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng

Author:
Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Normalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

31. Japan's "Economic Security" Measures

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow and Afra Herr
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Japan and Germany face an acute dilemma. China, a key trading partner for both nations, uses political warfare and economic statecraft to advance its interests. Like Germany, Japan has a strong SME economy and auto industry, and has dependencies on China. Yet Japan faces more risk due to its geographical proximity to China and territorial disputes. As global tensions grow, Japan is responding robustly by building economic security. Germany, together with the EU and other like-minded partners, should do the same.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and Germany

32. China’s Role in Korean Security Issues

Author:
Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
China’s great power over North Korea eroded when COVID-19 control measures ended most trade with the Kim regime. Moreover, China’s conflicts with various countries mean Beijing cannot afford to alienate any friend, and Kim Jong Un knows that. Beijing is still influential in Seoul, but it lost much of its clout when the conservative-leaning candidate prevailed in the March 2022 presidential election. China will also suffer a loss in standing because it is paying less attention to Korean affairs and is closing itself off to the world.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Elections, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

33. Policy Experimentation in China: The Political Economy of Policy Learning

Author:
Shaoda Wang and David Y. Yang
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Determining what policies to implement and how to implement them is an essential government task. Policy learning is challenging, as policy effectiveness often hinges on the nature of the policy, its implementation, the degree that it is tailored to local conditions, and the efforts and incentives of local politicians to make the policy work.
Topic:
Political Economy, Politics, Policy Implementation, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

34. China: An Economic and Political Outlook for 2022

Author:
Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In recent years, Xi Jinping has taken China to the “left” politically and economically, but to the “right” with his deeply nationalist narratives at home and a more assertive foreign and security policy abroad. More recently, this has contributed to a slowdown in the Chinese economy and an increase in the level of political and policy reaction against Xi’s anti-market measures. Now, with last month’s Central Economic Work Conference, the Communist Party appears to have now acknowledged a number of Xi’s measures have indeed gone too far, especially as Xi himself seeks to maximize economic stability ahead of his bid for reappointment to another term in office at the 20th Party Congress this November. But whether these corrective measures will be enough to restore economic growth in the short term given the Chinese private sector is now “once bitten, twice shy” is another question altogether. In China: An Economic and Political Outlook for 2022 – Domestic Political Reaction to China’s Economic Slowdown ASPI President and CEO Kevin Rudd tackles these questions and provides an analysis of how China’s economic challenges are likely to shape its politics and policies in the year ahead.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

35. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

36. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:
Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

37. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

39. Will the Xi Jinping Leadership Take Up Reformist Policies After the 20th Party Congress?

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
That President Xi Jinping and his faction will dominate the 20th Party Congress is apparent from the Politburo announcement that the week-long, five-yearly conclave will take place on October 16. The Politburo meeting, which was held on August 30, said that the guiding principle of the party and country would remain “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (Gov.cn, October 16). The Politburo reasserted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would follow principles laid down by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and above all, Xi Jinping. However, the dictums on reform and the open door – as well as the “lie low” foreign policy – promulgated by “Chief Architect of Reform” Deng in the 1980s and 1990s were conspicuously absent from the Party Congress announcement. Instead, the communique emphasized the so-called “three continuances” (三个继续, san ge jixu). This is a reference to Xi’s efforts to uphold Mao Zedong-style “common prosperity” (共同富裕, gongtongfuyu); to sustain “party construction” (党的建设 (dang de jianshe) in order to ensure the loyalty of cadres; and to work toward the formation of a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体,renlei mingyun gongtongti) (Xinhua, August 30; Ming Pao, August 30).
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

40. China and Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis: Belt and Road Initiative Blowback

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Sri Lanka is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis. For several months, the country has been reeling under a severe foreign exchange crisis. In early May, Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said that its usable forex reserves were just $50 million (Daily News, May 5). As a result, Sri Lanka has been forced to suspend repayment of $51 billion worth of debt owed to China, Japan and other foreign creditors (The Hindu, April 12; The Island, April 13). The country has also been unable to pay for imports of essential commodities, and has experienced serious shortages of food, fuel and medicine (The Island, January 15). The economic crisis has in turn triggered a political crisis. Public anger has boiled over onto the streets. Angry protesters have been calling for the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (Colombo Telegraph, April 7). The Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for decades and several members of the family are in positions of power as ministers, legislators or heads of corporations and departments. Sri Lankans want the entire clan out. Some of them, including Mahinda, resigned under public pressure in recent months (Island, April 17). Although Gotabaya remains president and under the country’s executive presidential system, continues to wield enormous power, it is evident that the influence of the Rajapaksas has declined. The unfolding crises in Sri Lanka have implications beyond the island. China is among Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral lenders and has played a big role in the island’s infrastructure development. Sri Lanka is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite China’s pledges that BRI would boost Sri Lanka’s economic and social development by transforming it into “the hub of the Indian Ocean”, Chinese loans are widely believed to have pushed the country into a ‘debt trap’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sri Lanka, June 16, 2017). How have the crises impacted China’s image in Sri Lanka and will the decline of the Rajapaksas, widely regarded as ‘pro-China,’ impact Sino-Sri Lankan relations? Finally, will the Sri Lankan crises affect the fate of BRI?
Topic:
Debt, Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, Asia, and Sri Lanka

41. Future Global Policeman? The Growing Extraterritorial Reach of PRC Law Enforcement

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The recently signed security agreement between the Solomon Islands and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the support of Chinese police to the Solomon Islands government to suppress social unrest in November 2021, highlight the increasing international deployment of PRC law enforcement (China Daily, April 2). This deployment follows several decades of expanding PRC international law enforcement activity, which is intended for extraterritorial enforcement action, seeking the return of fugitives, and as part of China’s engagement with other countries. The 2021 violence in the capital, Honiara, led to destruction in the local Chinatown and the subsequent deployment of Chinese police officers, who have previously provided equipment and training to the Solomon Islands. The China Police Liaison Team is led by Zhang Guangbo, an officer of the rank of Commissioner third class, who stated that the deployment is intended to protect the safety of Chinese communities in the Solomon Islands as well as to contribute to the overall stability in the islands (Embassy of the PRC in the Solomon Islands, March 4). There has been considerable unease in wider region over the expanded deployment of Chinese police officers to the Solomon Islands. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States have all criticized the security pact, and have raised concerns that the deployment of Chinese police officers could lead to a future military presence. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated on March 25 that “Australia is aware of the proposed draft Security Cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands…We would be particularly concerned by any actions that undermine the stability and security of our region, including the establishment of a permanent presence such as a military base” (Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2022). In response to these concerns, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia has said that if Chinese police officers were called on for assistance they would be under the command of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and stated that “We will try and do our best in terms of dealing with them to make sure that what is happening in other countries where, like Hong Kong, doesn’t happen in our country” (Solomon Times, 6 May 2022).
Topic:
Security, Politics, Law Enforcement, and Economy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

42. The Beijing Olympics in Retrospect: An Anti-Human Rights Politics Machine

Author:
Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
As the U.S. and other Western nations announced diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently exhorted the international community to keep politics out of the games (People’s Daily, December 8, 2021). Spokespersons of the Beijing Organizing Committee also objected to the “politicization” of the Olympic Games, and claimed that the closed loop Olympic bubble was solely a COVID-19 containment measure necessitated by growing concerns over the spread of the Omicron variant in China (Global Times, January 5). Although, the creation of a closed loop bubble was ostensibly undertaken for epidemic prevention purposes, it also had the impact of isolating athletes and journalists, and forestalling unwanted international focus on poor human rights conditions in China.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Sports, and Olympics
Political Geography:
China and Asia

43. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: News Framing in Political, Strategic, and Economic Perspectives in Print Media of Pakistan

Author:
Hammad Naseer, Muhammad Raza Majid, and Malik Adnan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The treatment, image, and issues related to CPEC become significant when this venture is considered a game-changer for the Pakistani economy. This study analyzes the CPEC coverage in Pakistan's highly circulated English newspaper, Daily Dawn, and The News. The quantitative content analysis technique is employed for this study from April 2015 to December 2019. This study aims to explore how news contents of selected newspapers portray the image of CPEC and the treatment of selected newspapers toward this project. The theoretical foundation of this study work under the Grunig models of Public Relations. The findings of this study reveal that both newspapers portray a positive image of CPEC. The primary focus of the news content of selected newspapers is information regarding the economic and political aspects of this project, while inadequate significance is given to strategic, social, and legal aspects. Moreover, from Grunig’s models' perspective, major public relations practices worked under the public information and press agent model.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Media, and CPEC
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and South Asia

44. A Green Wave?

Author:
Jessica Drun
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

45. The Urbanization of People- The Politics of Development in the Chinese City

Author:
Eli Friedman and Yao Lu
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
The Urbanization of People (May 2022, Columbia University Press) reveals how cities in China have granted public goods to the privileged while condemning poor and working-class migrants to insecurity, constant mobility, and degraded educational opportunities. Using the school as a lens on urban life, Eli Friedman investigates how the state manages flows of people into the city. He demonstrates that urban governments are providing quality public education to those who need it least: school admissions for nonlocals heavily favor families with high levels of economic and cultural capital. Those deemed not useful are left to enroll their children in precarious resource-starved private schools that sometimes are subjected to forced demolition. Over time, these populations are shunted away to smaller locales with inferior public services. Based on extensive ethnographic research and hundreds of in-depth interviews, this interdisciplinary book details the policy framework that produces unequal outcomes as well as providing a fine-grained account of the life experiences of people drawn into the cities as workers but excluded as full citizens.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Urbanization, and Cities
Political Geography:
China and Asia

46. Assessing the Chinese Communist Party 20th Party Congress

Author:
Thomas J. Christensen, Shang-Jin Wei, Junyang Jiang, Xiaobo Lü, Sun Zhe, and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Assessing the political and foreign policy implications of whatever happens at the 20th Party Congress, presumably including Xi Jinping’s election to a third term as party General Secretary.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

47. How Malaysian Politics Shaped Chinese Real Estate Deals and Economic Development

Author:
Guanie Lim
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Iskandar Malaysia is the oldest and by far the most prominent economic corridor in Malaysia. Located in the southernmost state of Johor, the corridor came to host several real estate developments (such as Princess Cove and Forest City) involving multinational corporations (MNCs) from China almost immediately after the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013. On one level, the infrastructure-spending spree associated with the BRI helped boost Malaysia’s economy as Chinese real estate MNCs invested in Iskandar Malaysia to grow their overseas portfolios. However, their involvement in the corridor disrupted the existing dynamics between Malaysia’s central and local governments. Although these Chinese projects offered an opening for Johor’s state government to counter Putrajaya’s dominance in the economic corridor, some swiftly became a magnet for divisive electoral campaigning and voter anger. Combined with several socioeconomic issues, the discontent generated by these Chinese real estate projects contributed to the unexpected defeat of the long-ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysia’s May 2018 general election. Chinese real estate MNCs have sought to adapt to these shifting dynamics, yet it is uncertain to what degree their adaptive strategies will bear fruit amid a looming real estate crisis back in China and other related issues. Ultimately, Chinese real estate investment has been both a tool and an enabler of efforts undertaken by various Malaysian stakeholders, rather than the all-powerful China-imposed juggernaut that some commentators on Malaysia’s development over the last two decades have tended to see. Despite the allure of lucrative real estate deals, it is equally important to recognize the potential pitfalls when local politics go awry. Events in Iskandar Malaysia demonstrate that it is politically unsustainable to push real estate projects that are too expensive for most local residents to afford.
Topic:
Politics, Entrepreneurship, Risk, Economic Development, and Real Estate
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, and Asia

48. The Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J. Rothschild
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How should US diplomacy adapt for the twenty-first century? The practice of diplomacy has changed drastically over the past several decades, with the return of great power rivalry, the emergence of the new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), and the rise of other important developments. Yet, while scholars and strategists have devoted enormous attention to how these new developments affect other domains, such as the future of warfare, they have devoted scant attention to the changing nature of diplomacy. If we believe, however, that diplomacy is a—if not the—most important tool of American statecraft, then twenty-first-century diplomacy deserves the same level of sustained attention. This paper will seek to characterize the changing nature of diplomacy with the objective of helping US and allied diplomats more effectively practice strategy and statecraft. This issue brief considers two key questions. How is the context of twenty-first-century diplomacy different from that of the past? How can US diplomacy begin to adapt for the twenty-first century? In answering the first question, this issue brief will focus on the most salient change in the international balance of power—the rise of China—in addition to the current technological revolution. After outlining how these changes have affected the context in which the United States conducts diplomacy, this issue brief will suggest several proposals to adapt US diplomacy to the twenty-first century. These suggestions will address both how changes in the global context—especially technology—have affected the conduct of US diplomacy and how US diplomacy can best respond to China’s rise and the 4IR.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

49. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:
Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China: Linkages, real and imagined

Author:
David S. G. Goodman
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
An exploration of the significance of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party based on the linkages apparent in and through its proceedings. The article argues that the Congress represents less of a break with the past than the affirmation of policies and practices long since established in the CCP's operational handbook. The CCP is presented as both a learning organisation and the guiding presence that guarantees China's continued development.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Political Parties, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

51. China After Covid-19: Economic Revival and Challenges to the World

Author:
Alessia Amighini, Yukon Huang, Tyson Barker, Eduardo Missoni, Giulia Sciorati, Haihong Gao, Elisa Sales, Maximilian Kärnfelt, and Paola Magri
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic that has rocked China since December 2019 has posed a gruelling test for the resilience of the country’s national economy. Now, as China emerges from its Covid-induced "recession", it feels like the worst is behind it. How did China manage to come out almost unscathed from the worst crisis in over a century? This Report examines how China designed and implemented its post-Covid recovery strategy, focussing on both the internal and external challenges the country had to face over the short- and medium-run. The book offers a comprehensive argument suggesting that, despite China having lost economic and political capital during the crisis, Beijing seems to have been strengthened by the “pandemic test”, thus becoming an even more challenging “partner, competitor and rival” for Western countries.
Topic:
Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

52. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

53. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey

Author:
Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

54. Field-by-Field Changes in China since Covid-19 and Implications for Korea

Author:
Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
China has been able to escape from the Covid-19 outbreak relatively quickly compared to other countries. Nevertheless, it still remains greatly influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic across its politics, economy, society, culture, and other areas, which has led to various changes throughout China. Therefore, this study comprehensively examined the impact of the Covid-19 outbreak on various aspects of Chinese politics, economy, society, and culture. And in response to these changes in Chinese society, the study explores new strategies toward China in the post-Covid-19 era.
Topic:
Politics, Culture, Economy, COVID-19, and Society
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Korea

55. Twenty Years of One Country Two Systems in China: Evaluation and Future Prospects

Author:
Jai Chul Heo
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study evaluated China's model of “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制) 20 years into operation and the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China ‒ focusing on Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan ‒ and examined future prospects. The study is meaningful in that it conducts a more objective evaluation than the previous studies by empirically analyzing data accumulated over the past 20 years of implementation of the One Country Two Systems principle from various perspectives. In addition, it is also a timely study in that it analyzes how the One Country Two Systems arrangement is likely to develop in the future, and what impact this would have, making considerations for changes in China's national strategy during the Xi Jinping period and the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China. The results of the analysis indicate that over the past 20 years China has been experimenting with the possibility of coexisting different systems in one country, and that the One Country Two Systems arrangement, as a new form of unification which has never been attempted in the history of mankind, has actually shown the possibility of success. However, in recent years, various political contradictions have been exposed in the process of implementing the arrangement, mostly in the Hong Kong society, and the resulting conflict has gradually intensified. While maintaining the current capitalist system for 50 years, Macau is expected to gradually progress in its “Sinicization,” with continuing active economic and social exchanges and cooperation with mainland China. As a result, Macau is expected to be fully incorporated into China's socialist system in 2049, 50 years after the return, but it is likely to remain a city of special character considering Macau's region and its economic structure. On the other hand, the One Country Two Systems arrangement with Hong Kong is expected to undergo a difficult process in the future. In the midst of various conflicts surrounding Hong Kong, the guarantee for Hong Kong’s autonomy is expected to end in 2047 amid efforts on the part of the mainland government to sinicize Hong Kong. And China wants to apply the philosophy of “One Country, Two Systems” to its reunification with Taiwan as well, but in reality this remains very low in possibility.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, Hong Kong, and Macau

56. ‘A careful foot can step anywhere’: The UAE and China in the Horn of Africa: Implications for EU engagement

Author:
Jos Meester and Guido Lanfranchi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the UAE and China have vastly expanded their economic, political and military footprint in the Horn of Africa, and their actions now have the potential to shape developments in the region. Room for cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Beijing exists on issues such as maritime security, regional stability, and economic development. Moreover, the two countries’ interaction could lead to improvements in the Horn’s underdeveloped infrastructure by triggering a race to investment. Yet, development and stability in the region might suffer if the strategic interests of external players take precedence over local ones, or if local elites (mis)use external support for narrow domestic political calculations. The EU and its member states have high stakes in the Horn’s stability. To optimise their engagement, European policymakers should be aware of the implications of the Emirati and Chinese presence, and they should strive to improve cooperation among the wide range of external players active in the Horn.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Affairs, Economic Development, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Horn of Africa

57. Assessing China and Russia’s Influence on the German Parliamentary Elections

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow and András Rácz
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
China and Russia want to maintain Germany’s political status quo: Centrist, at times mercantilist policies, have often worked in their favor. Now, with the Green Party ascendant and public opinion shifting, neither Russia nor China can be sure that classic "centrism” will emerge after September. Russia and China will increase their influence and interference efforts in the run-up to the election and beyond, using informational, political, and cyber tactics, and economic and political networks.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Public Opinion, and Elections
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

58. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda

Author:
James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America

59. Technological Competition: Can the EU Compete with China?

Author:
Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The debate on technological development and the unfolding fourth technological revolution tends to neglect the role of the EU, relegating it to follower status. The leadership positions are occupied by the US and China, who compete with one another for technological supremacy. Yet, despite lagging behind in some areas, the EU is better placed than is often assumed and still stands a chance of guaranteeing the delivery of a technological revolution that is not only environmentally but also socially sustainable. This is critical in proposing a model of technological development alternative to that of China, in particular, and especially in such sectors as artificial intelligence, supercomputing and digital skills. Study produced as part of the project “La geopolitica del digitale”, March 2021.
Topic:
Politics, Science and Technology, European Union, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

60. The World After the Pandemic: European Unity and the Challenge of Reviving Multilateralism

Author:
Sonia Bianconi
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Covid-19 has dramatically re-focussed the world’s attention on the adverse implications of globalisation. Coming on the heels of the 2008 financial crisis, the global pandemic has further weakened the image and credibility of the United States, causing the West to lose appeal compared to a more authoritarian but equally efficient East.
Topic:
Globalization, Politics, European Union, Multilateralism, Institutions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

61. Climate Variability and Steppe Empires: New Findings and Future Directions

Author:
Nicola Di Cosmo
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Nicola Di Cosmo, Henry Luce Foundation Professor of East Asian History, Institute for Advanced Study; Associate Member at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University Moderated by: Gray Tuttle, Leila Hadley Luce Professor of Modern Tibetan Studies, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Columbia University Three decades of climatological research in Mongolia and neighboring regions have transformed our knowledge about the environmental history of Inner Asian empires. The processes that gave rise to these political formations, many of which have played a distinct and crucial role in Chinese history, are still very poorly understood. High-resolution climatic reconstructions, when placed in historical contexts, provide clues about the nomads' responses to climatic variability, and thus illuminate critical nexuses between economic production, social structures, and political change. By illustrating a range of representative historical cases studies, this lecture will explore both the nature of the data and the methods that historians and climatologists have adopted to gauge the impact of climate upon pre-modern nomadic peoples.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Politics, History, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Mongolia, and Asia

62. Leveraging Submarine Cables for Political Gain: U.S. Responses to Chinese Strategy

Author:
Lane Burdette
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure that carry nearly all internet traffic. However, unclear international governance does not always guarantee their protection, leaving global information networks vulnerable to sabotage and espionage. China’s access to submarine cables for strategic manipulation is greatly expanded through the Digital Silk Road and territorial claims in the South China Sea, posing a clear threat that requires a U.S. response. Current U.S. policy is uncoordinated and can be sorted into the isolationist, cooperative, competitive, and militaristic responses, which each present unique frameworks for future action. The isolationist response would disconnect the United States from insecure cable networks, limiting China’s influence over U.S. assets but reducing international connectivity. The cooperative response emphasizes international norms-setting processes to achieve multilateral agreements protecting cables from state influences. The competitive response advocates U.S. competition with China in the submarine cable market through alternate assistance programs, which would increase the redundancy of a secure network. Finally, the militaristic response explores the role of America’s military in defending submarine cables from foreign exploitation. This article recommends that future policy emphasize a combination of the competitive and militaristic responses in order to most immediately and effectively address China’s threat to information security along submarine cables while minimizing U.S. risk.
Topic:
International Relations, Politics, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

63. U.S. Economic Challenges for the Biden Administration

Author:
Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The U.S. economy is emerging from the recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. To maintain growth and at the same time achieve climate and technology goals, the Biden administration is pushing large socio-economic programmes. To pass them in Congress, the administration will be forced to reach compromises with factions within the Democratic Party. Biden also will need some Republican support. In foreign policy, these programmes aim to strengthen the U.S. position in its rivalry with China, something that also opens greater possibilities for closer cooperation with the EU.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, COVID-19, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

64. Russians See Greater Reward than Risk in Closer Relations with China

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
As Russia and China grow closer through economic ties, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship. With China and Russia on the outs with the United States, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have broadened bilateral economic and military cooperation over the last few years. Recent cooperation has included energy and infrastructure projects, and even a little bit of panda diplomacy. While some observers warn about the potential risk that Russia may grow too dependent on Beijing, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Asia

65. 2021 Chicago Council Survey: A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Emily Sullivan
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
While the Biden administration seems to understand where Americans stand on China and domestic renewal to support global competitiveness, the data disproves their assumptions that Americans are skeptical about trade and weary of US global engagement and leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

66. The crisis of American power: How Europeans see Biden’s America

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Most Europeans rejoiced at Joe Biden’s victory in the November US presidential election, but they do not think he can help America make a comeback as the pre-eminent global leader. Europeans’ attitudes towards the United States have undergone a massive change. Majorities in key member states now think the US political system is broken, and that Europe cannot just rely on the US to defend it. They evaluate the EU and/or their own countries’ systems much more positively than that of the US – and look to Berlin rather than Washington as the most important partner. There are geopolitical consequences to American weakness. A majority believe that China will be more powerful than the US within a decade and would want their country to stay neutral in a conflict between the two superpowers. Two-thirds of respondents thought the EU should develop its defence capacities. There is a great chance for a revival of Atlanticism, but Washington cannot take European alignment against China for granted. Public opinion will have a bigger effect on the relationship than it once did, and needs to be taken into account.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

67. A New World Order, According to Beijing

Author:
Nadège Rolland
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After seven decades of liberal order and three decades of American unipolarity, it may be difficult to imagine that the current rules-based international system, supported by liberal norms and values and organised around a set of multilateral institutions, could eventually give way to something radically different. But in Beijing, political and intellectual elites have engaged in intense discussions about building a new world order. This latest brief of China Awareness Series casts light on this discussion and outlines the emerging contours of vision and strategy pursued by China in building a new world order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, Unipolarity, Emerging Powers, and International System
Political Geography:
China and Asia

68. The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This memo is adapted from Nury Turkel’s testimony before the US House of Representative’s Committee on Foreign Affairs’ hearing on May 6, 2021, “The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang.” He testified on behalf of the Uyghur Human Rights Project.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Religion, Repression, Uyghurs, and Freedom
Political Geography:
China and Asia

69. The Chinese Political System

Author:
Marcos Caramuru, Philip Yang, Daniel Bell, Kamila Aben Athar, Leondardo Burlamaqui, and Xiaoyu Pu
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The XXVI China Analysis Group Meeting proposed dialogue on the fundamental characteristics of China's political system and the main issues surrounding its particularities and governance capacity. In this report, which summarizes the main discussion points of the event, the reader will find the participants' reflections regarding the difference between the ideal and the reality of China's meritocratic political structure, its challenges in terms of managing the world's largest population, and China's internal contradictions. In addition, the text brings reflections on the international pressure China faces regarding human rights, democratic values, and sources of legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party today and in a future governance perspective. The China Analysis Group is a CEBRI initiative, sponsored by Banco BOCOM BBM since 2017.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Governance, Democracy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

70. Taking the Helm: A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge

Author:
Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces a challenge like no other in its history: a strategic competition with a highly capable and increasingly resourceful opponent whose worldview and economic and political models are at odds with the interests and values of the world’s democratic states. A rising China poses a fundamental challenge to the economic vitality and national security of the United States and its allies and the currency of liberal democratic values around the world. Technology—a key enabler for economic, political, and military power—is front and center in this competition. Technological leadership—how a country invents, innovates, and deploys technologies to compete economically and to secure its interests—will shape the coming years to a remarkable degree. The United States has maintained such leadership for decades. Today, that leadership is at risk. The United States is failing to rise to the occasion—its policies inadequate and disconnected and its response reactive and disjointed. The country needs a new approach to regain the initiative. The stakes are high and the window for action is closing. The U.S. government must craft a national technology strategy for an era of sustained competition with a highly capable contender: a comprehensive framework to plan, execute, and update its technology policies. The strategy is a whole-of-nation approach—including human capital, infrastructure, investments, tax and regulatory policies, and institutional and bureaucratic processes—to preserve its current advantages and to create new ones. To be effective, creating and executing the strategy must involve stakeholders from federal and state governments, private industry, academia, and civil society. The overarching goal is to maintain the United States’ standing as the world’s premier technology power so that it can empower its citizens, compete economically, and secure its national interests without having to compromise its values or sovereignty. The purpose of this report is to provide the intellectual framing for what a national technology strategy is and why the United States needs one. It does not offer a list of prioritized technology areas. Rather, it provides guidelines for how to think about such prioritization and what qualities should inform the resulting policy decisions.
Topic:
Politics, Science and Technology, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

71. How Can America Challenge China's Political Ambitions in an Age of Deglobalisation?

Author:
Dimitri Zabelin
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
COVID-19 has accelerated the trend of deglobalisation and further entrenched China into the growing political and economic fort of Asia. This has made the US less effective at implementing policies aimed at curbing Beijing’s political ambitions and strength in the region. Washington must therefore make itself indispensable in Asia and employ strategies for bringing China into a global network that can collectively reign in the Asian giant’s growing influence.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. China Coup: The Great Leap to Freedom

Author:
Roger Garside and Andrew Nathan
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This short book predicts—contrary to the prevailing consensus—that China’s leader Xi Jinping will very soon be removed from office in a coup d’état mounted by rivals in the top leadership. The leaders of the coup will then end China’s one-party dictatorship and launch a transition to democracy and the rule of law. Long-time diplomat, development banker, and author Roger Garside draws on his deep knowledge of Chinese politics and economics first to develop a detailed scenario of how these events may unfold, and then—in the main body of the book—to explain why. His gripping, persuasive account of how Chinese leaders plot and plan away from the public eye is unique in published literature. Garside argued that under Xi’s overconfident leadership, China is on a collision course with an America that is newly awakened out of complacency. As Xi’s rivals look abroad, they are alarmed that he is blind to the reactions that China’s actions have provoked from the world’s strongest power and its allies. In domestic affairs, Xi’s rivals recognize that economic and social change without political reform have created problems that require not just new leaders but a new system of government. Security abroad and stability at home demand a revolution to which Xi is implacably opposed. To save China—and themselves—from catastrophe, they must remove him and end the dictatorship he is determined to defend. But their will and capacity to do so depend crucially on how liberal democracies act. Garside’s scenario shows America leading its allies in creating the conditions in which Xi’s rivals move against him.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Leadership, and Coup
Political Geography:
China and Asia

73. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:
Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

74. Shared History, Divided Consciousness: The Origins of the Sino-ROK Cultural Clash amid the Pandemic

Author:
Dong Xiangrong
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since 1992, bilateral relations between China and South Korea have sustained a state of positive development, although there have naturally been some moments of friction and contradictions. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, a number of disputes arose between netizens in China and South Korea over such things as the origin of pickled vegetables (paocai in Chinese, kimchi in Korean) and the Van Fleet award acceptance speech of South Korea’s BTS singing group. Different interpretations of a few thousand years of bilateral interactions—cultural, political, military, historical, and other topics mutually entangling the two—have led to some sharply vitriolic disputes between netizens in the two neighboring countries. Today’s tensions over national identity issues are rooted in how history is understood in the two countries and the enduring salience of cultural symbols of identity tied to history. Nobody could have anticipated that pickled vegetables would, ultimately, become a focus of the 2020 dispute between netizens of China and South Korea. Since over a decade ago when the Gangneung Danoje (端午祭) was granted UNESCO recognition and other developments occurred, all the way up to today’s pickles, it seems that almost all ongoing Sino-South Korean identity disputes are connected to the entangled histories of the two sides. Seen from the history of cultural exchanges from long ago, is traditional medicine, after all, your Chinese medicine or my Korean medicine? Is traditional dress our Han Chinese clothing or your Korean clothing? Is the May 5 festival our Duanwujie (端午節，Dragon Boat Festival) or your Danoje? Are vegetables marinated by pickling, our “paocai” or your “kimchi”? A thousand-year cultural legacy should be a factor to strengthen shared identity and tighten cultural connections in Sino-South Korea relations. However, against the current geopolitical and geo-economical background, shared cultural connections unexpectedly became the focus of contention between the two neighbors. Geopolitically, China and South Korea have been involved in different political camps since World War II. During the decades of Cold War, these two countries unfortunately fell into hot war although they were not each other’s main enemy. Each country describes the war and justifies its actions through its own lens. Was the war, after all, our “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” or your “Korean War”? Different memories of the war led to widespread, fervent protest from Chinese fans against South Korea’s popular singing group BTS’s acceptance speech in receiving the Van Fleet Award by the Korea Society. Sensitivity toward remarks about the war some 70 years ago has unexpectedly heightened recently. Geo-economically, China and South Korea have been interdependent over the past three decades. China has been the biggest trade partner of South Korea for many years. The Chinese market is bigger than the U.S. and Japanese ones combined for Korean products. The market matters. The Samsung Group and Hyundai Group have had to react to the voices of customers and stop showing an advertisement performed by BTS. Also, when Seoul and Washington decided to deploy THAAD in South Korea, Seoul had to face the negative economic consequences of its deteriorating bilateral relationship with China. Both geopolitical differences and historical memories are now capable of arousing economic retaliation. This chapter analyzes from the angle of how history and the present are linked the current identity conflicts between China and South Korea. It recognizes that using today’s concepts to evaluate history leads clearly to tearing asunder Sino-South Korean mutual historical recognition. At the same time, the influence of values, geopolitics, differences in level of development, and other factors, along with cultural clashes between China and South Korea intersecting with political and security topics mutually arouse and even worsen relations between the two peoples. Security confrontations and ideological divergence have severely worsened public relations between the Chinese and South Koreans. These disputes, such as the Korean War and THAAD, have become important backdrops for the emergence and exacerbation of cultural rifts.
Topic:
Politics, Culture, History, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

75. Hong Kong’s future on edge: Countering China’s national security law

Author:
Ash Jain, Joel Kesselbrenner, and Peter Mattis
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the past seventy-five years, the United States and its allies have constructed and defended a rules-based international system that has provided unprecedented levels of peace, prosperity, and freedom. In recent years, the system has come under increasing strain, as a new era of great power competition has emerged. Despite hopes that China would become a “responsible stakeholder” in a rules-based system, Beijing has grown increasingly assertive, especially under President Xi Jinping. Beijing’s more confrontational path poses a significant challenge to a rules-based system. The challenge presented by China is particularly acute in the context of Hong Kong, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has brashly violated an international treaty and curtailed democratic institutions and human rights. As the world enters an era of strategic competition with China, Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong should be a priority for policymakers in the United States and allied countries. This report addresses the importance of Hong Kong within the context of China’s broader challenge to the rules-based system and offers recommendations for how the United States and its allies can prevent a further erosion of democracy in Hong Kong and, over time, seek to restore it. It suggests that the United States and its allies still have available a range of pragmatic policy tools that can can be used to exert pressure and impose meaningful costs on Beijing. These should be implemented as part of a broader, comprehensive strategy to prevent China from undermining the rules-based system in the security, economic, and governance domains. On June 30, 2020, the CCP imposed a sweeping new National Security Law on Hong Kong, effectively giving Beijing direct control over the autonomous territory. Since then, China has acted to erode Hong Kong’s liberal traditions, in violation of Beijing’s treaty commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The National Security Law has for all practical purposes outlawed democratic activism, organizing, and speech. Over the past year, Beijing has cracked down on Hong Kong’s democratic institutions and thrown the pro-democracy movement into disarray. Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong is aimed at achieving several objectives. First, China’s leaders seek to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP in the face of a pro-democracy movement that it fears could spread to the mainland. Second, they seek to advance the unification of China by harmonizing the cultural, social, and economic aspects of life across the country, including Hong Kong. Third, the CCP aims to achieve a comprehensive modernization of China, while retaining the Party’s leadership, including by reaping economic benefits from the Greater Bay Area Integration Plan. Finally, China’s crackdown is aimed at stemming the advance of a liberal, democratic world order by pushing back on democratic norms that it views as antithetical to the Party and a danger to its efforts to modernize China on its own terms.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Human Rights, Politics, Sanctions, and Business
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

76. A strategic framework for countering China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China is engaged in a systematic campaign of repression against predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in northwest China. Through a combination of detention camps, mass surveillance, birth suppression, and other means, China is responsible for gross human-rights violations. In recent years, the international community has devoted an increasing amount of attention to China’s actions in Xinjiang. Earlier this year, the United States declared that Beijing’s behavior constituted genocide. More recently, the United States and several key partners announced multilateral sanctions on Chinese officials facilitating repression in the region. To build on these developments, the United States and its allies and partners should adopt a more strategic approach to addressing China’s human-rights abuses. This Issue Brief proposes a framework for such a strategy, articulating a multilateral approach for dealing with China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang. This Issue Brief argues that addressing China’s abuses in Xinjiang is of strategic importance. Ultimately, the goal of this strategy is to achieve an end state in which China has ceased its repressive activities; however, even if achieving this objective proves elusive, imposing costs on Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang can still serve broader strategic ends vis-a-vis China. China has chosen an assertive path to attaining global power and influence, and decades of economic growth and incorporation in the global economic system have not been enough to transform Beijing into a responsible stakeholder in a rules-based international system. The United States and its allies and partners will need to impose costs on Chinese behavior that violates international norms. Imposing costs on China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang is a critical element of a broader strategy to dissuade Chinese Communist Party (CCP) behavior that undermines international norms and to push Beijing toward becoming a cooperative member of a rules-based international system.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Organization, Politics, Sanctions, Economy, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

77. Taiwan's 2020 Elections

Author:
Natasha Kassam and Richard McGregor
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
China has lost the battle for public opinion in Taiwan. Saturday’s elections are likely to reflect strong anti-Beijing sentiment China is already looking past the elections to weaken the island’s democracy through overt and covert means Whatever the result, Beijing will increase pressure on Taipei to open talks on unification
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

78. The Chinese Penetration of Israeli Media

Author:
Roie Yellinek
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
In 2009, China Radio International (CRI) began broadcasting in Hebrew. This venture has proven a success for the Chinese and a failure for the Israeli media, which uncritically swallow the messages sent out by CRI’s Hebrew team.
Topic:
Politics, Mass Media, Media, and YouTube
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

79. The Novel Coronavirus Outbreak and Its Political/Economic Impact on China

Author:
Li Hao
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
As of March 9, 2020, instances of pneumonia attributable to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) have appeared in more than 100 countries; more than 80,000 persons have been infected in China, of whom over 3,000 have died. These infections have spread to Japan, South Korea, Italy, Iran and elsewhere, devastating global exchange and economic activity. This paper offers a brief examination of the political and economic impact of this outbreak on China.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

80. The Novel Coronavirus Outbreak and Its Political/Economic Impact on China (Continued)

Author:
Li Hao
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The author released a short paper in early March 2020 on China's reaction to the spread of novel coronavirus infections, but circumstances have since progressed to a new stage. A pandemic of historic proportions has broken out, and the spread of infections has been relentless even in the Western countries that initially looked upon China coolly. The numbers of infections and deaths in the US in particular have significantly surpassed those in China, making the US the most infected country in the world. At the same time, China continues to contain the spread of infections, and appears to be moving toward resuming economic activities. Nevertheless, there are numerous issues that still need to be addressed. This paper will briefly examine the novel coronavirus situation in China since March.
Topic:
Politics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

81. Do Republicans and Democrats Want a Cold War with China?

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Do Republicans and Democrats Want a Cold War with China? OCTOBER 13, 2020 By: Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Craig Kafura, Assistant Director, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy American Views of China Plummet; Public Split on Containment or Cooperation For the first time in nearly two decades, a majority of Americans describe the development of China as a world power as a critical threat to the United States, according to the 2020 Chicago Council Survey. At the same time, American feelings towards China have fallen to their lowest point in Council polling history, dating back to 1978. Reflecting these changing attitudes, Americans are now split on whether the US should cooperate and engage with China or actively seek to limit its influence. This is a significant change. Over the past four years, US-China relations have lurched from one crisis to another. Despite the sharp downturn in relations, and the growing consensus in Washington on pursing a more confrontational approach to China, Chicago Council Survey data through January 2020 showed that this consensus and the growing US-China rivalry had yet to make a deep impact on American views of China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Politics, Public Opinion, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

82. The “China Dream” and the African Reality: The Role of Ideology in PRC-Africa Relations

Author:
James Barnett
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promotes its worldview and political and economic model overseas, particularly in the developing world, albeit in a very different manner than it did in the era of Mao Zedong. Under Mao, who fashioned himself the champion of Third World revolutionary movements, China exported a comprehensive, proactive, and universal ideology. Today the party’s theorists are struggling to develop a message of similar caliber. What they have produced so far has not translated into a particularly coherent or compelling “Xi Jinpingism” that appeals across cultures and societies. But this has not stopped the PRC from pursuing an ideologically grounded foreign policy. President Xi speaks frequently of a “Community of Common Destiny,” a still-vague vision for a Sinocentric world order in which the CCP’s model is lauded as a contribution to human civilization, liberal democracy is widely discredited, and the developing world looks to China above all others for inspiration.
Topic:
International Relations, Politics, Elites, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

83. A strategic concept for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats

Author:
Lauren Speranza
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Tackling hybrid threats, particularly from state actors such as Russia and China, remains one of the greatest challenges for the transatlantic community. Hybrid threats have gained more traction among policymakers and publics across Europe and the United States, especially in a world with COVID-19. Over the last five years, Euro-Atlantic nations and institutions, such as NATO and the European Union (EU), have taken important steps to respond to hybrid issues. But, as hybrid threats become more prominent in the future, policymakers must move toward a more coherent, effective, and proactive strategy for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats. To develop such a transatlantic counter-hybrid strategy for Russia and China, this paper argues that two major things need to happen. First, transatlantic policymakers have to build a common strategic concept to guide collective thinking on hybrid threats. Second, transatlantic policymakers need to take a range of practical actions in service of that strategic concept. In a strategic concept for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats, Lauren Speranza offers five strategic priorities that could form the basis of this strategic concept and presents a series of constructive steps that NATO, the EU, and nations can take, in cooperation with the private sector and civil society, to enhance their counter-hybrid capabilities against Russia and China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Resilience, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

84. Taking stock: Where are geopolitics headed in the COVID-19 era?

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is a strategic shock, and its almost immediate, damaging effects on the global economy constitute a secondary disruption to global order. Additional secondary strategic shocks (e.g., in the developing world) are looming. Together, these developments pose arguably the greatest threat to the global order since World War II. In the aftermath of that conflict, the United States and its allies established a rules-based international system that has guaranteed freedom, peace, and prosperity for decades. If the United States and its allies do not act effectively, the pandemic could upend this order. This issue brief considers the current state of the pandemic and how it has strained the global rules-based order over the past few months. First, it considers the origins of the novel coronavirus and how it spread around the world. Next, it examines how COVID-19 has exacerbated or created pressure points in the global order, highlights uncertainties ahead, and provides recommendations to the United States and its partners for shaping the post-COVID-19 world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, Economy, Business, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Asia, Eurasia, India, Taiwan, Asia, North America, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

85. Democracy under siege: Advancing cooperation and common values in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Kharis Templeman
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the past three decades, democracy has put down roots in many seemingly unlikely places across Asia, from Mongolia to Indonesia. At a time when democracy is in global retreat, the majority of these Asian regimes have demonstrated surprising resiliency, though many continue to suffer from glaring flaws: weak state capacity and accountability institutions, the absence of impartial rule of law, and uneven protection of political rights and civil liberties. This issue brief, “Democracy under Siege: Advancing Cooperation and Common Values in the Indo-Pacific,” by Dr. Kharis Templeman, examines challenges and opportunities for advancing cooperation and common values in the Indo-Pacific as the region faces an increasing challenge from China.
Topic:
Civil Society, Corruption, Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Reform, Elections, Democracy, Rule of Law, Norms, and Transition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, Australia, Korea, and Indo-Pacific

86. U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
U.S.-China strategic rivalry is intensifying – and nowhere more so than in the Indo-Pacific. This is likely to result in new US requests to close allies like Denmark to increase their security and defense policy contributions to the region. French and British efforts to establish an independent European presence in the Indo-Pacific present Denmark with a way to accommodate US requests without being drawn directly into the US confrontation with China. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ The importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Danish security and defense policy is likely to grow in the coming years. The focus and resources should therefore be directed towards strengthening Danish knowledge of and competences in the region. ■ Several European states, led by France and the UK, are increasing their national and joint European security and defense profiles in the Indo-Pacific by launching new initiatives. Denmark should remain closely informed about these initiatives and be ready to engage with them. ■ Regarding potential requests to the Danish Navy for contributions to the Indo-Pacific, Denmark should prioritize the French-led European naval diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Denmark, North America, and United States of America

87. China’s Activities in the South Caucasus: Issue 1, 29.06.2020 – 26.07.2020

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The digest covers China’s political, diplomatic, economic and other activities in the South Caucasus region and relations between China and the South Caucasus countries. It relies on a wide variety of sources, including the Chinese media. It is worth noting that the Chinese media is controlled by the Communist Party of China (according to the World Press Freedom Index China is nearly at the bottom of the list and ranks 177th out of 180 countries).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Media, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Eurasia, Caucasus, Asia, and South Caucasus

88. Taiwan's 2020 Election and Its Implications for the New Southbound Policy

Author:
H. H. Michael Hsiao and Alan H. Yang
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The elections in January 2020 marked a new era for Taiwan, clearly demonstrating citizens’ resistance to China. The results showed that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was re-elected with a landslide victory of 8.17 million votes (57.1%) which is higher than the previous record high of 7.65 million votes obtained by the Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying Jeou in 2008. Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang, Chairman and Executive Director, respectively, of the Taiwan‐Asia Exchange Foundation in Taiwan, explain that “The Taiwanese people firmly defended Taiwan’s sovereignty and cherished democracy through free and open elections.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sovereignty, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

89. China’s Activities in the South Caucasus: Issue 2, 27.07.2020 – 23.08.2020

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The digest covers China’s political, diplomatic, economic and other activities in the South Caucasus region and relations between China and the South Caucasus countries. It relies on a wide variety of sources, including the Chinese media. It is worth noting that the Chinese media is controlled by the Communist Party of China (according to the World Press Freedom Index China is nearly at the bottom of the list and ranks 177th out of 180 countries)
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Media, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Eurasia, Caucasus, Georgia, and South Caucasus

90. China’s Activities in the South Caucasus: Issue 3, 24.08.2020 – 20.09.2020

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The digest covers China’s political, diplomatic, economic and other activities in the South Caucasus region and relations between China and the South Caucasus countries. It relies on a wide variety of sources, including the Chinese media. It is worth noting that the Chinese media is controlled by the Communist Party of China (according to the World Press Freedom Index China is nearly at the bottom of the list and ranks 177th out of 180 countries).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Media
Political Geography:
China, Caucasus, Georgia, and South Caucasus

91. China’s Activities in the South Caucasus: Issue 4, 21.09.2020 – 18.10.2020

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The digest covers China’s political, diplomatic, economic and other activities in the South Caucasus region and relations between China and the South Caucasus countries. It relies on a wide variety of sources, including the Chinese media. It is worth noting that the Chinese media is controlled by the Communist Party of China (according to the World Press Freedom Index China is nearly at the bottom of the list and ranks 177th out of 180 countries)
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Media
Political Geography:
China, Caucasus, Georgia, and South Caucasus

92. The Chinese School, Global Production of Knowledge, and Contentious Politics in the Disciplinary IR

Author:
Yongjin Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Chinese studies of International Relations constitute today an integral part of the claim of IR as a global discipline. This paper starts by providing a critical evaluation of the contribution made by the so-called ‘Chinese School of IR’ to the global production of knowledge. Against this background, it teases out a curious case of ‘schools of IR’ as commonly labelled in the global IR theoretical conversation and looks at how such labels have been used by the ‘core’ to create a parallel but explicitly inferior universe of knowledge production to localize theoretical noises from the ‘peripheries’. Situating the Chinese School of IR in such global context, it considers how ‘school’ label has been proactively appropriated by Chinese scholars to engage in a purposely contentious politics in the disciplinary IR, which questions the claim of the American ‘core’ as the creator, depositor, and distributor of universal knowledge, and seeks to unveil the geo-historical linkage between the political and the epistemic. School labelling therefore matters, it is argued, because it has become a site of contestation of geopolitics of knowledge and reflects the perils and promises in our collective pursuit of constructing a truly global IR.
Topic:
International Relations, Politics, Academia, and Knowledge Production
Political Geography:
China and Asia

93. China Maritime Report No. 10: PLAN Force Structure Projection Concept, A Methodology for Looking Down Range

Author:
Christopher P. Carlson
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Force structure projections of an adversary’s potential order of battle are an essential input into the strategic planning process. Currently, the majority of predictions regarding China’s future naval buildup are based on a simple extrapolation of the impressive historical ship construction rate and shipyard capacity, without acknowledging that the political and economic situation in China has changed dramatically.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China and Asia

94. Central Europe in the new Millennium: The new Great Game?

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
After the fall of communism, Central Europe (CE) was a region with relatively high US interest and support. Washington supported the NATO membership of CE countries, provided financial as well as technical assistance to the region and several American high-positioned political representatives visited the region. However, during the last few years, it is evident that CE is a space where the Russian and Chinese presence and influence have been risen. The present article analyses several questions aiming to scrutinize the Russian and Chinese presence and activities in CE, particularly, when and how Russia and China penetrated into CE, what are the consequences of the rising Russian and Chinese influence and who are the supporters and opponents of Moscow and Beijing in CE. The article concludes that, the main competing actors in CE are Washington and Russia, while China profits from the US-Russia clash. While the US and Russian interests are dominat in security and political issues, China aims to penetrate CE economics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Politics, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Europe, and United States of America

95. “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong, A Model of Influence, Resistance and Adjustment

Author:
Lukasz Zamecki
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
The aim of this article, based on the author’s field research in Hong Kong and critical analysis of publications, is to conceptualize the process of “mainlandization” of the Hong Kong SAR. “Mainlandization” is understood here as the process of transfer and institutionalization of political visions, policy paradigms, procedures, and norms which originate from the PRC. The model is inspired by various theoretical perspectives (e.g. diffusion of regimes, dependence, political convergence, and processes of “Europeanization”). The article differentiates the “top-down” transfer of values and/or policy standards and the “bottom-up” adjustment. All institutions engaged in intermediation (such as the “one country, two systems” principle) are mentioned, as well as the processes connected to the reaction to PRC activity in Hong Kong and their variations (e.g. accommodation, resistance, resignation). Moreover, the concept of “sinoscepticism” is introduced.
Topic:
Politics, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Institutions, Autonomy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

96. Language and Politics in India and China: A Cross-Cultural Comparative Study

Author:
Daniel Komarzyca and Janina Fras
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
This paper provides insights into the relationship between language and politically relevant aspects of culture in India and China which are as follows: attitude toward revolution and tradition, the domination of politics over religion or vice versa, and a concern for the liberty of the individual. The paper introduces a novel approach to the comparative study of civilizations by advancing the political-linguistic explanation. In so doing, it combines Hajime Nakamura’s hypothesis of the strict connection between language and culture (understood as a way of thinking) with Samuel P. Huntington’s emphasis on the impact of cultural differences on the political dimension of society – so that our explanatory model can be expressed as follows: language→culture→politics. As far as language is concerned, the focus is on the basic structure of Sanskrit and Chinese; besides, special attention is given to Indian and Chinese philosophies of language. Culturally, the most relevant schools of Hindu philosophy may be called “ultraconservative” since they tend to ground unchanging meaning firmly in metaphysics and rely on the supreme authority of ancient religious texts. In contrast, the Chinese typically considered language a social mechanism for shaping our behavior (so the relation of language and society is the most crucial); they also expressed clearly divergent views on naming. In short, at least four distinctive perspectives are essential: (1) conservative Confucianism, (2) anti-traditional and highly authoritarian Legalism, (3) egalitarian and linguistically skeptical Laozian Daoism, (4) nonconformist and proto-libertarian Zhuangzian Daoism.
Topic:
Politics, Culture, Philosophy, Language, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

97. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

98. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries

Author:
Matt Schrader
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

99. Battleground Southeast Asia: China's Rise and America's Options

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Southeast Asia, while still a reservoir of goodwill for the US, has in recent years come increasingly under China's umbrella. In this Strategic Update, Charles Dunst analyzes China's expansion there, discusses Southeast Asians' American predeliction, and offers steps the US can take to "win back" the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

100. The “Democratic Life Meetings” of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 26 and 27, China’s central leadership held a “democratic life meeting” (民主生活会, minzhu shenghuo hui) for the full membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo (Xinhua, December 27, 2019). This has become an annual end-of-year tradition for the Politburo, with similarly-designated meetings held in late December of each year from 2015 to the present (see accompanying chart). Official press treatment of the meetings since 2015 has consistently emphasized the authoritative position of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, invariably stating that he “presided over the meeting and delivered an important speech” (主持会议并发表重要讲话, zhuchi huiyi bing fabiao zhongyao jianghua) to the other assembled members.
Topic:
Politics, Leadership, State Building, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia