Search

Begin New Search Political Geography China Publication Year within 3 Years

71. Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments

Author:
Anders Christoffer Edstrøm, Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
China’s overtures have been met with suspicion in the Arctic states, where some analysts and commentators read nefarious intent into Chinese actions and statements. China’s construction of critical infrastructure and investments in the strategically located and resource-rich Arctic have raised concerns about national security. This is particularly the case in the seven out of eight Arctic states (excluding Russia), all of whom are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What is more, questions abound about the dual-use applicability of Chinese research activities in the region.1 The Arctic is a highly strategic location, and activities here are often framed in geopolitical terms. In an era of intensifying great power competition between the United States and China, this suspicion has generated several core narratives2 about China’s Arctic interests and its engagement with and in the region. Xi Jinping launched China’s Belt and Road Initiative3 (BRI) in 2013. The initiative envisages interconnectivity across the Eurasian continent, primarily from China to Europe. Since then, the project has expanded to other areas of the globe, including the Arctic region. The Arctic region was officially made a part of the Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Cooperation Vision statement (“一帶一路”建設海上合作設想).4 Later, China established the Polar Silk Road (冰上丝绸之路) in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper5 connecting Asia and Europe through the Arctic Ocean. In the 2018 White Paper, the State Council of the PRC refers to its country as a “Near-Arctic State,” a statement that has remained highly controversial. While the White Paper emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to peaceful cooperation in the region, as well as a desire to contribute to Arctic research, protection, and development in accordance with international law, it also articulates Beijing’s aim of increasing its participation and influence in Arctic governance. It further iterates Beijing’s responsibility for maintaining security and stability in the region as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013; since then it has contributed to scientific knowledge through research stations and expeditions, invested in Arctic business and competence, engaged in infrastructure projects, traded with Arctic states, and participated in multilateral international agreements such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement.6 Chinese Arctic ambitions and activities are contentious. Commentators in the seven Arctic states often frame Chinese investments in an adversarial way, describing Chinese activity in alarmist language in terms of scale, scope, and risk. Analysts have the tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments. For example, some analysts estimate that Chinese investments in the Arctic top $90 billion7 and call this level of investment “unconstrained.”8 According to one mainstream narrative, China will use this “inflow of investments”9 to increase its influence among Arctic nations by means of debt-trap diplomacy.10 Our research finds that these numbers are highly exaggerated and often mobilized to support a narrative in which China is successfully “buying up” the Arctic region, but that these inflated numbers include unsuccessful investment projects and proposed projects that have not been implemented. To facilitate informed debate and decision-making, this policy paper attempts to outline, although not to summarize, the actual level and state of Chinese ownership in the Circumpolar Arctic. To help illustrate our findings, we present a map displaying geographical locations of investment interests (See Figure 1), containing two further information layers. The first information layer displays the type of known Chinese interests in the Arctic, and the second information layer indicates whether this interest materialized, is paused/in question, or has been cancelled. For further description of our mapping methodology, see Appendix A. We use the term “investment” generously in this brief, including traditional foreign direct investment (FDI) according to established definitions, but also other modes of Chinese economic engagements. We have relied on open-source material in various languages to support our analysis, including Russian, Chinese, English, Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish. For a detailed description of our methodology, see Appendix A. This inclusiveness means that the amount of investments appears larger than with a more restrictive definition of FDI.
Topic:
National Security, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Critical Infrastructure
Political Geography:
China and Arctic

72. China's Green Belt and Road

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the past 15 years, green industries have developed rapidly in China, and China has assumed a leading position in several global supply chains of renewable energy. Because the domestic solar, wind and biomass markets have become quite saturated, Chinese companies have intensified their search for overseas markets, and the Chinese government is strengthening its support for that pursuit under the Green Belt and Road Initiative. For the governments and businesses in the green industries in the West, the Green Belt and Road Initiative could result in more competition over market shares and geopolitical influence, but it also encompasses opportunities for cooperation. For developing countries, more competition and diversification between foreign partners can be an advantage, allowing them to negotiate with the development partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Business, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

73. China and Russia challenge the Arctic order

Author:
Patrik Andersson
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation is real but limited – and should not distract from the broader strategic challenges each country poses individually. While the partnership merits attention, some aspects are more symbolic than substantive, with Russia ultimately controlling the pace and direction. Media narratives often highlight the growing alignment between China and Russia in the Arctic and the potential threat this poses to other states. Yet the partnership remains constrained by diverging priorities, Russia’s wariness of Chinese influence, and China’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions or engage in risky ventures. At the same time Russia’s increasing dependence on China since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has given Beijing opportunities to pursue deeper access to the Russian Arctic on its own terms and in areas that align with its long-term objectives. Rather than engaging broadly, China is selective in how and where it invests or participates – a dynamic that could intensify underlying frictions between the two even as global geopolitical shifts continue to draw them closer in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Arctic

74. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

75. How China Collateralizes

Author:
Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, Sebastian Horn, Paulina Kintzinger, Bradley C. Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). We present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio to EMDEs is effectively collateralized - amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. We document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20% of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. Our findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower’s reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Americas

76. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

77. China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China's Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings

Author:
Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Xi Jinping has played a direct and active role in China’s naval buildup. He is China’s first great navalist statesman, the world’s greatest navalist leader today, and among the world’s greatest navalist statesmen in modern history. Notwithstanding major advances in ships, submarines, aircraft, and other hardware, Chinese military leaders believe that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to lag behind in human factors. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PLAN has dismissed (or is rumored to have dismissed) eleven flag officers. Beyond combating outright dysfunction, these removals are intended to prevent potential disloyalty and factionalism, centralize power, and further modernization and warfighting goals. These high-profile dismissals have had no apparent impact on PLAN operational capabilities, which continue to improve at a remarkable rate. From the Taiwan Strait to the “distant oceans” (远洋), the service is present daily and visible internationally, particularly its surface fleet, indicating reliability, trust, and growing responsibilities and capabilities. Since 2008, the PLAN’s surface fleet has almost doubled. Despite being projected to exceed 400 ships by the end of 2025, China’s Navy continues to successfully crew, operate, and train with them. China’s Navy draws on a massive, sufficiently-capable talent pool and education system. Provincial-level compulsory conscription quotas avoid individual compellence thanks to high levels of volunteerism. Given the demands of increasingly frequent and intense training and missions—often with the austere privations of submarines or remote installations—mental health support is increasingly prioritized. Nevertheless, it remains a weakness for China’s Navy, which views U.S. care as the gold standard yet has treated counseling as a “political” issue. China’s Naval Command College in Nanjing—the Naval War College’s closest equivalent—educates its students differently from its counterpart in Newport by focusing on naval operations and warfighting for top-priority scenarios. The PLAN enjoys unique human capital advantages: educational partnerships as early as elementary school; personal data compiled centrally, available and utilizable without privacy restriction; eldercare benefits; and warfighting-focused naval education. PLAN sources perceive weaknesses in lack of talent for new-domain operations and advanced S&T given rising demand in these burgeoning areas; recruitment and training pipeline supply-demand imbalance and talent-skills mismatches; officers’ overly narrow early-career experience and subsequent aging out of cutting-edge relevance; and youths’ declining commitment to the Communist system. Despite being an improvement on its Soviet progenitor, China’s Political Commissar system could represent a critical weakness, causing real-time decision-making bottlenecks or distraction, particularly in crisis or conflict.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Human Capital, Xi Jinping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Nanjing

78. China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
Julia Famularo
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
People’s Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement operations function as forms of cognitive and legal warfare. They represent a clear effort to undermine international maritime law as well as Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC asserts that the Taiwan Strait comprises multiple “zones,” to include “internal waters, territorial sea, [the] contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone.” While China does not explicitly claim that the waters of the Taiwan Strait wholly constitute PRC sovereign territory, it clearly implies that it has the self-defined right to exercise distinct forms of control over different zones of the Strait. While stressing that China “respects the lawful rights of other countries in relevant waters,” the PRC exploits the absence of the term “international waters” in UNCLOS to assert non-existent sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait. China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and beyond. The overzealous execution of “law enforcement” operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands represents an effort to signal that the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration is incapable of conducing effective patrols. It also reinforces the narrative that the PRC possesses legal jurisdiction over waters within the First Island Chain, thereby undermining the lawful rights of Taiwan and neighboring states. The PRC very likely believes that employing China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) assets to implement a sea-based quarantine would remain below the threshold of conflict, effectively mitigating the risk of escalation and preventing third-party intervention. As joint MSA and CCG operations grow in scope, scale, and complexity, China is gradually exercising the skills necessary to seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands and potentially seek to force Taiwan leaders to the negotiating table. Under China’s revised maritime law enforcement legal framework, leaders in Beijing could authorize the establishment of exclusion zones to prevent foreign vessels from entering into and operating in PRC-claimed waters, as well as board and inspect ships within the exclusion zone. China could also potentially attempt to divert ships to regional PRC ports for customs inspection and clearance. Beijing furthermore could authorize the use of “all necessary means”—to include the use of force—to implement its quarantine and counter perceived threats to its national security and sovereignty. A PRC decision to implement a quarantine, rather than a full military blockade, would force the United States and its key allies and partners to decide how to react effectively while themselves also mitigating the risk of substantial military escalation. Response options could comprise targeted sanctions or military escorts for commercial vessels carrying critical supplies.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Navy, Maritime, Jurisdiction, Coast Guard, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Taiwan Strait

79. China Maritime Report #49: The PLAN Corruption Paradox: Insights from the 1st Destroyer Flotilla

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Like all organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suffers from endemic corruption, defined as the personal abuse of power for selfish ends. Corruption occurs when PLAN leaders use their power to: 1) influence personnel decisions in exchange for money and/or favor; and 2) extract kickbacks for influencing decisions in the contracting/procurement process for equipment and materiel, construction projects, and other service requirements. Despite widespread corruption in the PLAN, the service has continued to grow and modernize at an astonishing rate. One explanation for this paradox is that the PLAN has strived to keep corruption from infecting the personnel selection process in operational units, which matter most for combat power generation. For at least two decades, the PLAN’s anti-corruption “watchdog”—the Discipline Inspection Commission—has prioritized scrutiny over those units and personnel most directly responsible for the “preparation for military struggle.” This top-down approach has combined with efforts by the units themselves—likely driven by the self-interest of the unit Party Committee, which must answer for poor unit performance—to enact policies to ensure that the best candidates are chosen for leadership positions. The case of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla illustrates policies adopted by operational units to ensure the integrity of the personnel selection process. These include formulating clear regulations stipulating minimum qualifications for leadership positions, adopting strict standards for officer evaluation, and carrying out a transparent selection process. The Flotillas’ personnel selection process entails knowledge and skills competitions judged by senior unit members and incorporates feedback and inputs from other members of the unit. Due to the approaches adopted by units such as the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, individuals in positions of power have less leeway to engage in corrupt behavior, thereby increasing the probability that the most capable officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) will be selected for leadership positions.
Topic:
Corruption, Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

80. China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (海上侦察) units. Located in China’s coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called “information boats” (信息船). China’s maritime militia has developed a cadre of intelligence specialists who serve the function of collecting intelligence and reporting it to the PLA. These militia members, called “information personnel” (信息员), generally deploy with militia vessels tasked with reconnaissance missions, but may also embark on boats from other types of militia units. While at sea, maritime militia intelligence personnel maintain close contact with the PLA units that oversee militia operations, called People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). PAFDs direct militia reconnaissance operations and receive incoming intelligence reports, which they then share with operational PLA forces. As part-time soldiers, often with comparatively low education levels, maritime militia intelligence personnel cannot meet the same performance standards as intelligence specialists in the PLA. However, the existence of a large cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists ensures a basic level of competence across the force and guarantees that capable personnel are available for important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Given China’s aspirations to become a global naval power, it makes sense that the PLA leverage the latent ISR capacity of China’s distant-water fishing fleet and Chinese owned/operated merchant vessels. PLA experts have argued for embarking intelligence personnel on Chinese vessels operating abroad, and it is likely that this is already happening.
Topic:
Intelligence, Navy, Maritime, Espionage, Militias, Reconnaissance, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia