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131. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

132. Five Ways to Bolster the US Semiconductor Ecosystem Under the Trump Administration

Author:
Jason Hsu
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to strengthen its semiconductor industry—a national security imperative amid rising competition with China—the next four years will be crucial. Policymakers and industry professionals need a comprehensive strategy to build on the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore this critical supply chain. This policy memo examines Washington’s past and present approaches to semiconductor policy and provides recommendations for the United States to secure a sustainable and successful ecosystem at a time of intensifying US-China technology competition.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

133. Multi-Pole-arity: How Poland can help Europe think big on China

Author:
Alicja Bachulska
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s strategic approach to its industrial policy—particularly its trade surplus and dominance in clean technologies—is a growing risk to Europe’s competitiveness and economic security. Like many other European states, Poland prefers to focus on the bilateral dimension of its relationship with China. But the scale of China’s economic threat means the EU’s only hope is to address it as a unified bloc. Poland should use its growing leadership role in the EU to help shift the bloc towards a more assertive China policy using the available tools. As it confronts the prospect of a trade war with the US, the EU cannot afford vulnerability to China. But first, Warsaw will need to recalibrate its own policies by grasping the realities of its trade relationship with China and assessing its vulnerabilities: investments, critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Topic:
Agriculture, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

134. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

135. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

136. 50 Years of Relationship: Looking to the Future

Author:
CEBRI
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
In 2024, Brazil and China celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations, marked by friendship, cooperation, and shared aspirations for the future. Over this period, the bilateral relationship has evolved from a predominantly trade-based partnership into a comprehensive strategic partnership, encompassing themes such as innovation, sustainability, and global governance. Among these agendas, sustainable development plays a central role, serving as a reference point for understanding the future paths of cooperation. In this context, CEBRI has gathered the main reflections from the China Analysis Group, an initiative carried out in partnership with BOCOM BBM, as well as from the events organized to mark the 50th anniversary of Sino-Brazilian relations. The publication highlights three priority areas for the future agenda: sustainable development, the digital economy, and strategic areas for deepening the bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Trade, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

137. Transición Geopolítica Global: Conectividad, Competición y Fragmentación. Introducción

Author:
Soledad Segoviano and Antonio Marquina
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Este número especial de la Revista UNISCI se centra en una de las cuestiones relvantes de la trasnformación que está aconteciendo en el sistema internacional, la transformación geopolítica y la rivalidad creciente entre Estados. Se puede decir que el orden internacional creado tras la segunda guerra mundial y reforzado tras el fin de la guerra fría se está disipando en medio de una profunda división y fragmentación geopolítica.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Space, Strategic Competition, BRICS, Connectivity, International Order, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Global South

138. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:
Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:
Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

139. Cyber Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific: Navigating Digital Potential and Cyber Peril

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri, Lisa Curtis, Janet Egan, Morgan Peirce, Elizabeth Whatcott, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific faces a cyber crossroads. Down one path lies deeper military, intelligence, and economic ties between Washington and its key allies and partners in this strategically vital region. Down another, rising cyber threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Russia, and a growing shadow industry of cybercriminals and hacktivists derail these ambitions by compromising critical infrastructure, weakening data security, and undermining democratic institutions. The outcome will depend on the choices Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners make—or fail to make—in the coming years. The U.S.-China rivalry has long extended to the cyber domain, but in recent years, Beijing has increasingly exploited the gray zone of cyberspace to test, probe, and push other nations as part of a broader campaign to gain influence and shape regional norms and power structures.1 In recent years, the PRC has sharply escalated its cyber aggression in a dangerous new game that combines traditional operations focused on espionage, intellectual property theft, and data exfiltration with newly assertive disinformation, influence operations, and pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Adding to the uncertainty, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could further tilt the balance toward offense in cyberspace in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways. Against this backdrop, Indo-Pacific governments have taken historic steps to strengthen their resilience in a cyber landscape that has grown more varied, volatile, and dangerous than ever. To assess how Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners are navigating this cyber crossroads, the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and Indo-Pacific Security Program led a year-long research project that combined extensive desk research with in-person field research and expert workshops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This report draws on this research to offer in-depth assessments of the cyber landscapes in all four countries to identify key trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience in partnership with the United States. The findings offer cause for both optimism and concern. On the one hand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have all undergone notable shifts in elevating cybersecurity as foundational to national security. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy made cybersecurity a pillar for the first time, and the government has passed reforms to facilitate information sharing with the United States and shift toward active cyber defense.2 South Korea updated its National Cybersecurity Strategy to adopt a Defend Forward cyber posture, mirroring the U.S. shift in 2018.3 Taiwan established a National Institute of Cybersecurity within its Ministry of Digital Affairs, and the Executive Yuan approved a four-year plan to boost digital resilience.4 The Philippines finalized a five-year National Cybersecurity Plan.5 For its part, the United States has elevated cybersecurity in its foreign policy with expanded information sharing, capacity building, and diplomacy anchored in a new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy within the U.S. Department of State. Recent years have seen Washington both strengthen its proactive cyber capacities and embrace a “name and shame” approach to call out malign cyber operations from foreign adversaries like Russia and the PRC. Still, these laudable efforts to bolster cyber policies, personnel, and partnerships have failed to keep pace with rising threats. Washington’s finger-wagging statements and targeted sanctions in the wake of cyber incidents have failed to stem rising threats. To confront growing cyber dangers across the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its partners need a more assertive and coordinated approach that intensifies efforts on two fronts: (1) building capacity within each country to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience, and (2) strengthening cooperation to enable more integrated, proactive cyber defense, collective signaling, and cost inflicting on malign cyber actors. To that end, this report offers recommendations to government leaders in the United States, along with both country-specific and cross-cutting recommendations for government leaders in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Although many of the recommendations directed toward the four countries could fairly apply to the United States, strengthening domestic cybersecurity and resilience is beyond the scope of this report. Summary of Recommendations
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

140. Global Compute and National Security: Strengthening American AI Leadership Through Proactive Partnerships

Author:
Janet Egan
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The current pathway to breakthrough artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities relies on amassing and leveraging vast “compute”—specialized chips housed within massive data centers that generate the computational power to train, enhance, and deploy advanced models. If current AI development trends continue, securing and extending U.S. access to a robust compute ecosystem will play a decisive role in whether the United States leads the world in AI or cedes its leadership to competitors. The nation that leads in deploying compute worldwide will wield critical leverage over the rules and norms governing its use. Most importantly, U.S. leadership can crowd out China’s expanding sphere of technology influence and ensure the AI transition is underpinned by trusted democratic technologies. This goal necessitates a strategy with two key components: maintaining U.S. control of the most capable compute infrastructure in the world to ensure leadership at the AI frontier, while simultaneously providing subfrontier levels of compute to partners around the world. Recent advances in AI efficiency, as demonstrated by Chinese AI models like DeepSeek-R1, have not negated the fundamental importance of compute for AI leadership.1 The nation with the most robust compute ecosystem will retain key advantages: the ability to train the most advanced systems, enhance and deploy those systems at scale, and run the experiments necessary to drive new breakthroughs in model efficiency and training.2 These advantages are likely to generate a self-reinforcing cycle of AI development, making it increasingly difficult for other nations to close the gap. If current technical trends hold, and as chip export controls increasingly hinder China’s capabilities, the AI capability gap between the United States and China should widen. However, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Washington’s efforts to protect America’s AI leadership have relied heavily on controlling the export of advanced AI chips. Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment going to China were imposed as early as 2019, followed by AI chip export controls targeting U.S. adversaries in 2022, which were strengthened in 2023, 2024, and 2025.3 In January 2025, the Biden administration’s Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion went a step further, placing caps on compute exports to most countries in the world.4 While now rescinded, this unprecedented action sent a clear signal to other nations that the United States is willing and able to control AI compute access. However, a heavily protectionist approach faces challenges. Abroad, chip smuggling has provided China with illegal access to advanced chips, eroding the U.S. lead.5 At home, permitting and regulatory constraints threaten to limit America’s ability to meet the energy demand for large-scale AI data centers and chip fabrication. Nondemocratic countries that possess the regulatory flexibility, capital, and readily available energy now seek to rapidly build frontier-scale AI data centers, with the potential to surpass the United States’ own compute ecosystem, absent adequate safeguards. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing investments in its compute capacity could eventually create a viable alternative supply chain beyond U.S. control, while growing concerns over reliance on U.S. technology among traditional partners may fuel demand for non-U.S. compute offerings.
Topic:
Partnerships, Leadership, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America