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1302. Don’t Interfere, Integrate: China Proposes (Yet Another) Middle East Peace Initiative
- Author:
- Tuvia Gering
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel should work with China so that its initiative doesn’t interfere with the Abraham Accords, and should seek to capitalize on common denominators between Beijing and Washington.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America
1303. EU-China Engagement in Humanitarian Aid: Different Approaches, Shared Interests?
- Author:
- Ina Friesen and Leon Janauschek
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
- Abstract:
- Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN. Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision. China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus. • Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance. • Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Food Security, and Engagement
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
1304. Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges
- Author:
- Edmund Downie
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- In September 2020, China announced its intentions to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The neutrality goal in particular was a breakthrough for global climate ambitions: a net-zero target from the world’s largest emitter, responsible for around one-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The two new goals—referred to in Chinese policy discourse as the “30-60” goals—are not China’s first public targets on GHG reduction. They are, however, the centerpieces of a new Chinese climate policy in which GHG cuts are a standalone goal rather than an ancillary benefit of more immediate priorities like energy efficiency and industrial upgrading. Prior approaches had required little engagement from firms in carbon management. Indeed, none of the largest Chinese firms in the coal power, cement, and steel sectors had publicized quantitative targets for reducing or controlling carbon emissions before the government announced the 30-60 goals. They faced little pressure to do so; authorities pressed firms in climate-adjacent areas like reducing air pollution rather than carbon management. The 30-60 announcement appears to mark a break from this era, forcing firms to adjust accordingly. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, assesses how China’s high-emitting industries have responded to the 30-60 targets and the accompanying elevation of climate within national policy priorities. It focuses on corporate and sectoral emissions reduction targets through June 2021 among 30 major firms in three of China’s largest sources of direct emissions: coal power generation, cement, and steel.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Coal, Industry, and Decarbonization
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
1305. Green Giants? China’s National Oil Companies Prepare for the Energy Transition
- Author:
- Erica Downs
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- On September 22, 2020, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, made a surprise announcement about China’s climate ambitions during remarks to the United Nations General Assembly. He stated that China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), aims to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Xi also said that China’s GHG emissions would peak before 2030, a slight revision to China’s pledge under the Paris Climate Agreement to peak emissions around 2030. China’s new climate targets spurred the country’s three major national oil companies (NOCs)—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—to strengthen their climate ambitions. PetroChina (the flagship subsidiary of CNPC), which had already set a goal of achieving near-zero emissions by 2050, intends to peak its carbon emissions by 2025. Sinopec Corp. (the flagship subsidiary of Sinopec Group) also aims to peak its carbon emissions by 2025 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. CNOOC Ltd. (the flagship subsidiary of CNOOC) plans to reduce its GHG emissions by 16 percent between 2020 and 2025 and aims to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, provides a baseline for understanding how China’s NOCs are responding to climate change. It examines the activities the three companies identified as part of their emerging energy transition strategies before Xi unveiled the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets, and why they didn’t do more. The report then assesses the implications of China’s new climate ambitions for its NOCs and lays out their preparations to date for supporting Xi’s 2030 and 2060 pledges.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, and Green Technology
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
1306. China’s Experience in Building a Venture Capital Sector: Four Lessons for Policy Makers
- Author:
- Anton Malkin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
- Abstract:
- China’s journey from being a technological backwater to a technological superpower was fuelled, in part, by the success of its venture capital (VC) sector in supporting start-ups. Its VC market is now the second largest in the world after that of the United States. As of 2019, China produced more “unicorns” (privately held, rapidly growing, early-stage technology companies valued at US$1 billion or more) than the United States. Policy makers can learn the following lessons from China’s growing VC sector: China’s use of labour market incentives promotes reverse migration of highly educated expatriates; weak intellectual property protection is not necessarily a deterrent to VC funding, especially in developing countries; government finance, when used appropriately, can help direct VC toward promising technology firms; and an emerging market does not need to wait until it becomes financially developed in order to create funding channels to support start-ups and entrepreneurship.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Hegemony, Finance, and Venture Capital
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
1307. Biotechnology and Security Threats: National Responses and Prospects for International Cooperation
- Author:
- Hanzhi Yu and Yang Xue
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
- Abstract:
- Cutting-edge biotechnology, mainly consisting of gene editing, gene drives and gene synthesis, is developing and changing rapidly. It acts as a double-edged sword, bringing benefits to human development in many fields, such as medical treatment and agriculture, while also posing serious threats to biological security, human existence and development. For example, the case of He Jiankui, a young scholar from the Southern University of Science and Technology of China who created gene-edited babies, triggered a global controversy and debate on biosafety in the winter of 2018. This paper argues that the problems China faces do not only exist in China — they are in fact common problems faced by all countries in the world. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the world is paying close attention to global health governance and biosafety issues. There is a window of opportunity for global collaboration to deal with biosecurity threats.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Biotechnology
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
1308. China’s Techno-Industrial Development: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry
- Author:
- Alex He
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
- Abstract:
- This paper reviews the strategies and plans, policy-making institutions, process and problems in China’s techno-industrial development. Although it has made noticeable progress in some areas in the past two decades, China still lags behind in most core technology and advanced manufacturing fields, such as high-end chips. There have been several real breakthroughs in the semiconductor sector by private companies such as HiSilicon and rapid advancement in frontier technologies — artificial intelligence, fifth-generation wireless communication network technology, big data, blockchain and the Internet of Things — by private companies such as Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu; however, state-sponsored technological innovation and breakthroughs have been crippled by the existing problems in China’s science and technology research system and a campaign-style catch-up strategy that rewards bureaucrats on short-term goals, as well as by weak links between academic research and industry and a swing between the market-oriented approach for technology acquisitions and indigenous innovation for technology breakthroughs. A case study of China’s semiconductor industry demonstrates both the problems and progress in China’s techno-industrial development, as well as the implications for the country's prospects of evolving into a technological powerhouse.
- Topic:
- Development, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Industry, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
1309. How China Loses: The Pushback Against Chinese Global Ambitions
- Author:
- Luke Patey and Elizabeth Wishnick
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- From its Belt and Road Initiative linking Asia and Europe, to its "Made in China 2025" strategy to dominate high-tech industries, to its significant economic reach into Africa and Latin America, China is rapidly expanding its influence around the globe. Many fear that China's economic clout, tech innovations, and military power will allow it to remake the world in its own authoritarian image. But despite all these strengths, a future with China in charge is far from certain. Rich and poor, big and small, countries around the world are recognizing that engaging China produces new strategic vulnerabilities to their independence and competitiveness. Researching the book took Dr. Patey to East Africa, Latin America, Europe, and East Asia over the past five years and he will discuss how countries in these parts of the world are responding to China’s rise and assertiveness. This event was cosponsored by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, the APEC Study Center and the Columbia Harvard China and the World Program at Columbia University.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Economics, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
1310. The Evolving Cross-Strait Policy of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan
- Author:
- Jason Po-Nien Chen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- This talk was composed of three main sections. First, Dr. Chen introduced the DPP's evolving cross-Strait policy by breaking it down into three respective phrases:1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Then he explained why the party changed from championing independence versus unification in 1990s; intraparty power struggle between de facto and de jure independence in 2000s; and reach the current position of "opposition to de facto unification under one China" rather than "pursuit of Taiwan de jure independence" in 2010s. Second, he shared his research finding and understanding regarding the DPP's view towards the status quo of cross-Strait relations. Third, he discussed the change and continuity of the DPP's position towards sovereignty and cross-Strait relations. Jason Chen has served in different positions in the Democratic Progressive Party for years mainly covering the party's external relations including cross-Strait relations and national security. His last position with the DPP was advisor (Section of National Security) in New Frontier Foundation, the DPP's think tank.
- Topic:
- Sovereignty, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia