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121. Partners or Rivals? Areas of Convergence and Divergence of Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Alexander Korolev and Thomas J. Shattuck
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China announced that their friendship had “no limits” and “no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in 2022.[1] That summit between President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping occurred before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the two leaders have since doubled down on their cooperation and partnerships. However, the limits of their “no limits” partnership have not necessarily been tested, particularly within the context of the Indo-Pacific region. How close are the two countries’ priorities and interests in the Indo-Pacific? Are the two partners or prospective rivals? Do their interests converge or diverge? The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s report series for the US European Command’s Russia Strategic Initiative has utilized the instruments of statecraft to analyze the interests, influence, and relationships of Moscow and Beijing across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The first report provided a general overview of the strengthening of the bilateral relationship and specific and joint interests in the region. The second report focused specifically on China’s diplomatic, military, and economic interests across the Indo-Pacific region and gave Moscow’s perspectives on these interests. The third report homed in on the two countries’ relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the prospect of the three forming a trilateral axis, concluding that such an arrangement is unlikely to occur. The fourth report analyzed Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examined how China perceived it. This report seeks to bring the elements of the series together and provide a forward-looking approach to Moscow and Beijing’s foreign policy trajectory in the Indo-Pacific region. It will first analyze how there is a systemic convergence of joint interests at the global level. Given the context of the Ukraine war and a general Western anti-China push, the two countries and their interests are quite close at the systemic level. However, at the regional level, some divergences emerge in the security and economic realms. Russia’s historic relationships with Vietnam and India, in particular, could put Moscow and Beijing at odds, and the negative historical memories and economic imbalances of their own relationship have the potential to create new cleavages among their populations and hinder alignment formation. The report will then attempt to investigate the future trajectories of the bilateral relationship and where convergences and divergences may emerge. While specific tensions may erupt at the regional level, such as those related to a greater Russian defense presence in Southeast Asia or a Taiwan conflict, the deep structural interests and convergences will likely prevail.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

122. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:
Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

123. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

124. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

125. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:
Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

126. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

127. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:
WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

128. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

129. Five Ways to Bolster the US Semiconductor Ecosystem Under the Trump Administration

Author:
Jason Hsu
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to strengthen its semiconductor industry—a national security imperative amid rising competition with China—the next four years will be crucial. Policymakers and industry professionals need a comprehensive strategy to build on the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore this critical supply chain. This policy memo examines Washington’s past and present approaches to semiconductor policy and provides recommendations for the United States to secure a sustainable and successful ecosystem at a time of intensifying US-China technology competition.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

130. Multi-Pole-arity: How Poland can help Europe think big on China

Author:
Alicja Bachulska
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s strategic approach to its industrial policy—particularly its trade surplus and dominance in clean technologies—is a growing risk to Europe’s competitiveness and economic security. Like many other European states, Poland prefers to focus on the bilateral dimension of its relationship with China. But the scale of China’s economic threat means the EU’s only hope is to address it as a unified bloc. Poland should use its growing leadership role in the EU to help shift the bloc towards a more assertive China policy using the available tools. As it confronts the prospect of a trade war with the US, the EU cannot afford vulnerability to China. But first, Warsaw will need to recalibrate its own policies by grasping the realities of its trade relationship with China and assessing its vulnerabilities: investments, critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Topic:
Agriculture, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland