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221. The Sky Is Not the Limit. Geopolitics and Economics of the New Space Race

Author:
Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Space is a contested domain for its very nature and today it is evidently becoming an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. An increasing number of actors, infrastructures and technologies deployed in space also raises concerns for safety and security, especially in cyberspace. Many countries are striving to achieve space capabilities and autonomous access to space, and this is having a tremendous geopolitical impact, especially since space is emerging as an increasingly critical military and strategic domain. The development of the new space economy, which is increasingly involving the private sector and many industrial actors and services, will also be a game changer for the international economy. The space race likewise implies disruptive technologies that could contribute massively to the energy and digital transitions, accelerating solutions that could benefit humanity. A new international governance system for space is therefore needed urgently, considering that the current rules are no longer able to respond to a sector evolving at such a rapid pace. Which actors are leading the race? Which economic sectors could benefit the most and what could the new space economy mean for the world? How is space emerging as a military domain against a backdrop of increasing international tensions? What would a new system of global governance for space look like?
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, India, Italy, Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

222. Unpacking China’s industrial policy and its implications for Europe

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China is often credited with a successful application of industrial policy. One important particularity of China’s industrial policy is that it aims at levelling the playing field between the state economy and the private economy in access to finance, yet within a framework of strategic goals. This aim is not relevant for market economies, such as those of the European Union, but only for those where state enterprises are clearly privileged. Notwithstanding the difficulties in making valid comparisons, our analysis of how China conducts industrial policy in a variety of sectors points to success in some sectors but not all. More importantly, productivity growth in China has already been declining for two decades. Given the very large resources that China has put into industrial policy, with subsidies being only one part, it is surprising that success is not more evident. This relates partly to factors including cronyism and regional protectionism. While the former might be less relevant for the EU given the different institutional background, the latter certainly is relevant since the EU faces the potential consequences of member country-level industrial policy for its single market. A lesson from China seems to come from the sectoral focus, with a long-term and economic-security mindset. The EU is far from this, but it is in the process of linking economic security to industrial policy. Finally, responding to China’s industrial policy involves diverse investigations and challenges in measuring subsidies accurately. Understanding China’s very diverse and complex approach to helping companies achieve the government’s industrial policy goals is crucial for anticipating the consequences of China’s actions. These could be positive, such as cheaper imports of green technology, or negative, such as Chinese overcapacity spilling over to the EU single market.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Markets, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

223. How to de-risk: European economic security in a world of interdependence

Author:
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Pandemic-related supply disruptions, the energy crisis provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and economic coercion by China have put economic security high on the European Union policy agenda. The question is how exactly the EU should ‘de-risk’ its external economic relationships without foregoing the benefits of trade. The standard answer is that it should identify product-level trade dependencies, mainly on the import side, and reduce them, mainly through diversification of suppliers, while otherwise maintaining maximum trade integration. This Policy Brief argues that this answer falls short. First, product-level dependencies cannot be identified reliably even with sophisticated analysis and data. As a result, both ‘missed dependencies’ and ‘false positives’ are inevitable. Second, external shocks and coercion could be propagated through exports, productive assets held abroad and financial channels as much as through imports. The analysis has five main implications Import de-risking should focus on a few product categories for which the costs of supply interruptions would be unquestionably large. This reduces false positives. De-risking and/or buffers to deal with exports and financial coercion require more attention. De-risking must be complemented by raising resilience against all shocks, whatever theirorigin. This requires a deeper and broader European single market. De-risking and resilience must be complemented by deterrence. A sufficiently high probability of chronic trade conflict – or one very large conflict – may justify reducing overall integration with a large trading partner, on both the export andimport sides. EU economic security policies have been right to emphasise the reduction of import dependence on chips and critical raw materials, and the creation of a powerful legal instrument to deter coercion (the Anti-Coercion Instrument). In most other respects, there is room for improvement.
Topic:
European Union, Risk, Trade, Imports, Economic Security, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China and Europe

224. Global supply chains: lessons from a decade of disruption

Author:
Luca Léry Moffat and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
This paper explores both the character and impact of three recent shocks to global supply chains: the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the US-China trade war. These were large shocks which have had significant impacts on domestic and international supply chains, but these impacts have differed in their longevity, economic impact and policy responses. We show that supply chains were remarkably resilient against shocks of such magnitude. However, this resilience was also achieved thanks to the equally remarkable size and scope of policy responses and global supply chain reorganisation. We recommend that pre-emptive policies may be justified to shield households and industry from future shocks. Given the entangled nature of these shocks and that their effects continue to reverberate, we emphasise the need for extensive future research to understand the nature of these shocks and the effectiveness of policy responses.
Topic:
Global Markets, Trade Wars, Trade, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

225. Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage

Author:
Meg Keen and Alan Tidwell
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Pacific Islands Countries are leveraging geopolitical rivalries to maximise their development options. But unmanaged competition for influence among key development partners can compromise good governance and privilege geopolitical posturing over local priorities. Australia, the United States, and other traditional donors can capitalise on areas of strength, such as social inclusion and regional and multilateral initiatives. Joint efforts along these lines and the pooling of resources would scale up impact and set higher accountability standards. Despite the risk that higher standards will open gaps for non-traditional donors with less burdensome criteria, there is much long-term value in traditional development partners collaborating in a “race to the top” in meeting the region’s needs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Regional Cooperation, Foreign Aid, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:
China, Australia, Australia/Pacific, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

226. China Threats and the Exploitation of China Threats: The 2024 Taiwan General Election

Author:
Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%. Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication. The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

227. Climate Change in China’s Governance: Agenda, Agents, and International Collaboration

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China is the world's leading emitter and a key player in the international community's fight against climate change, but its climate action remains underpinned by a black box of policies, actors, and international influences. As China accelerates action to achieve domestic and international climate goals, it is more important than ever to detangle these webs and peer into the black box, to develop an understanding of what motivates China's decision-makers and how climate policy choices are made. In this insightful new report, Climate Change in China’s Governance: Agenda, Agents, and International Collaboration, Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics Guoguang Wu conducts an in-depth investigation of China’s climate-related policies, politics, governance, and international relations. He finds that the Xi Jinping administration has paid special attention to climate action by advancing the green technology revolution and reducing energy dependence. However, at the same time, there are signs that China may be relaxing rather than strengthening its climate commitment. By conducting a deep dive into the evolving political actors and departments working on China’s climate agenda, Guoguang finds that ultra-concentrated political power and fragmented governance under Xi and the Chinese Communist Party pose obstacles to China’s climate action over the next five years.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Governance, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
China and Asia

228. Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia's Industrial Giants

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Asia’s transformation in recent decades into a global manufacturing hub has fueled economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty. However, this success has also massively increased the region’s emissions footprint, making it essential for Asia’s industries to rapidly transition to green technologies and processes. “Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia’s Industrial Giants” assesses the future potential and trajectory for electrolyzers needed to meet green hydrogen (H2) demand in Asia’s four largest economies: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The report, which was commissioned by the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero and carried out by Global Efficiency Intelligence, highlights the role of manufacturers as agents of change in the Asia’s net zero transition. The study focuses on the role of green H2 in three priority industries — steel, ammonia, and methanol — under various decarbonization scenarios. In these sectors, green H2 has the capacity to significantly reduce emissions by replacing carbon-intensive processes with renewable energy-powered electrolysis. Should the four countries adhere to their declared net zero targets, the collective market potential of electrolyzers for these industries is expected to skyrocket to $180 billion by 2050, with a compound annual growth rate as high as 12% between 2030 and 2040. This is nearly five times as large as the market potential under a business-as-usual scenario. The report offers a suite of recommendations for policymakers, industry players, investors, and think thanks aimed at accelerating the development and adoption of green H2 and electrolyzer manufacturing. These targeted strategies aim to collectively support a robust ecosystem for green H2 production and use in these countries toward a net zero industry.
Topic:
Industry, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

229. The Limits of Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Japan-ROK-China Relations After the Fukushima Wastewater Release

Author:
Daria Kurushina
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
More than a decade after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, causing the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the aftermath of the “triple disaster” continues to shape perceptions of Japan among its neighbors. The Japanese government’s decision to release into the sea more than a million tons of treated radioactive wastewater stored at the wrecked Fukushima plant beginning on August 24, 2023, decisively shifted the narrative of Japan’s experience: whereas the country was once viewed as the victim of one of the world’s worst nuclear disasters, it came to be seen by many in Northeast Asia as an atomic chemical antagonist. Following the announcement of the wastewater release, Japan faced an immediate backlash from neighboring countries and the international community over environmental and health concerns. The decision divided public opinion in both Japan and the broader Asia-Pacific region and threatened Japan’s attempts to position itself as the leader of a free, fair, and open Indo-Pacific. The Japanese government’s decision particularly roiled the public in Northeast Asia, where anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from the collective memory of Japan’s military ambition, colonialism, and atrocities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries persists. Meanwhile, authorities in some countries, especially China, intentionally stirred historical grievances and distrust in an attempt to undermine the trilateral relationship among Japan, Korea, and the United States. However, are concerns about the wastewater release warranted? In a Comprehensive Safety Review[1] the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the United Nations nuclear watchdog – determined that the release had no radiological impact on public health and the marine environment. Emphasizing the Fukushima plant’s compliance with “international safety standards,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi focused on the ongoing process of wastewater release and the Japanese’s government accountability for the water’s treatment, while also expressing concerns about the accumulation of tritium (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that cannot be removed) in the water and the importance of further research on the effects of the wastewater on marine life. Driven by health concerns, geopolitical dynamics, and the absence of regional consultation, the Japanese decision provoked a furious public backlash among Asia-Pacific nations, particularly in South Korea and China. Relations among Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and China have deteriorated in recent years amid rising security concerns over North Korea’s volatility, tensions between China and the United States, and wartime forced-labor reparations that caused long-term damage to Japan-ROK relations long before the rapprochement of 2023.[2] Participants in the Japan-ROK-China trilateral summit now have wastewater as another contentious topic to discuss during the renewed dialogue, which is scheduled to be convened in 2024. As the nuclear wastewater decision seems to have surfaced many thorny issues among the three countries, this paper seeks to explain the regional reaction to Japan’s decision, why this reaction matters, and how the trilateral relationship might evolve alongside the wastewater issue.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Crisis Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Fukushima

230. China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Southeast Asia stands at a critical juncture in its energy transition, grappling with the need to foster clean energy development while confronting infrastructure and investment challenges. A series of engagements in 2023 organized by the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) brought together key stakeholders to strategize on enhancing China's role in the region's shift towards renewable energy, focusing on targeted investments and policy synergy with regional initiatives. This policy report, China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030, introduces the "Clean Prosperity Plan," a blueprint advocating socio-economic and climate resilience through joint China-Southeast Asia efforts. The plan highlights project-specific recommendations, green industrialization, and renewable energy projects expedited by policy support, poised to catalyze investment and job creation, thereby sparking a positive feedback loop that could amplify regional clean energy ambitions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

231. The geopolitics of water: how the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

Author:
Neely Haby
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations. To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.
Topic:
Water, Geopolitics, Rivers, Competition, Regional Security, and Brahmaputra River
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

232. Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention. This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica. Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing's actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia's strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty. China's domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT's military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo. With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing's growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT. With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China's presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants' cooperation. It's time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Antarctica

233. Chinese foreign policy in 2024: crisis management and global governance

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This Trend Report examines key aspects of Chinese foreign policy in 2024, emphasizing three critical questions: the Taiwan situation, China’s stance in the Ukraine conflict, and its global governance reform proposals. The analysis suggests that the likelihood of a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan remains low due to electoral outcomes and various deterrent factors. China is expected to intensify non-physical threats. Economic considerations, including reliance on exports and partnerships with Europe, deter China from escalating support for Russia. The "Global South" is likely to support China’s global governance reforms, driven by resentment against perceived US double standards. European decision-makers are advised to align strategies with China’s nuanced approach, emphasizing reassurances on Taiwan, clear red lines on Russia, and increased engagement with the "Global South" while upholding UN principles.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China and Asia

234. The European Union can go green and lower dependencies on China

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Some Western pundits see the ongoing policy push from the European Union to de-risk supply chain dependencies on China as a threat to gains from decades of economic globalisation. Others regard Chinese industrial strengths in green technologies as unbreakable and see attempts to diversify the EU’s reliance as setting back global efforts to fight climate change. Yet, diversifying sources of critical minerals away from China and other large suppliers is a necessity in today’s volatile geopolitical climate. As well as actively pursuing new partnerships overseas to lower large dependencies on single sources, EU member states should fully harness new regulatory tools, such as the Critical Raw Materials Act, to diversify sources of critical minerals and exploit the Net-Zero Industry Act to support the production of green technologies and leverage European resources, capabilities and know-how. Contrary to conventional thinking, Europe is not starting from scratch when it comes to developing strategic supply chains in green, digital and defence technologies. Over time, there is ample potential for de-risking critical minerals to have a positive impact on the EU’s supply chain resilience and its contribution to lowering global emissions.
Topic:
European Union, Green Technology, Supply Chains, Energy Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China and Europe

235. Forecasting Chinese expansion into Central Asia

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
In early April 2024, China signed a two-year enhanced security cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan, which was reached during a meeting between Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Interior Minister Pulat Bobojonov in Tashkent. Some believe this pact was prompted by escalating international and regional competition for Central Asia, mainly because it came amid moves by international and regional powers in the five countries. Moreover, as China expands activities in this region to capitalize on cooperation potentials and opportunities, its influence in the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is steadily rising, mainly encouraged by Moscow's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. The development is raising questions about the future of China's presence in Central Asia in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

236. Xi Demands Fealty Despite Domestic And Foreign Woes

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Politburo held a “democratic life meeting (民主生活会)” on December 21–22, 2023, in which President Xi Jinping gave an internal, unpublished speech. According to accounts provided to the author by three officials at the rank of department head or above, Xi admitted that he had repeatedly postponed the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (which according to Party norms should have taken place in October) because he “could not offer any viable solution for the nation’s problems.” Xi, who is general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, went on to blame the other 23 Politburo members and other senior cadres, not only for failing to give him good advice but also for demonstrating signs of disobedience. Reports of Xi’s frank admission of the dire straits of the Party’s leadership were widely circulated on social media. The official Xinhua read-out of the Politburo meeting also cited Xi as demanding “unison of thought” among top-tier officials. This entails adhering closely to the instructions of the “core leadership”—in other words, to Xi himself (Xinhua, December 25, 2023). The supreme leader raised the “two safeguards (两个维护),” a slogan that refers to “safeguarding the authority of comrade Xi Jinping as core of the party” and “safeguarding Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.” President Xi also admonished his close advisors to “take a firm grip on the internal laws of developments [of issues]; accurately distinguish between events and trends, crises and opportunities, and benefits and harms … and effectively combat risks and take action on the basis of stability” (People’s Daily, December 23, 2023). This instruction tallies with caveats given by Xi throughout the past year, in which he has warned that China faces unprecedented challenges and that the party-state apparatus must ready itself to tackle “black swans and gray rhinos.”
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Leadership, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

237. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:
Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

238. Xi’s New Year’s Speech Dismisses Difficulties

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On New Year’s Eve, a prerecorded address from Chinese President Xi Jinping was broadcast across the Party’s global network of official media outlets (Youtube, December 31, 2023). The speech is an annual tradition, delivered from behind a wooden desk in rhetoric that is at once paternalistic and triumphalist, in which Xi surveys the high points of the outgoing year and looks to the year ahead. The form of this year’s set-piece was no different, but the content departed from previous years in ways that are indicative of Xi’s shifting priorities, and the Party’s growing concerns about the state of the nation. The most significant section of the speech addressed the economic difficulties that China has weathered in the last year: “On the road ahead, trials and hardships [lit. ‘wind and rain’] will be the norm. Some enterprises are facing pressures, some of the masses are encountering difficulties finding jobs and meeting basic needs, and some places have hit by floods, typhoons, earthquakes, or other natural disasters (有风有雨是常态 。一些企业面临经营压力，一些群众就业、生活遇到困难，一些地方发生洪涝、台风、地震等自然灾害).”
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:
China and Asia

239. China’s Anti-Corruption Efforts Gain Momentum in Finance and Healthcare

Author:
Alexis Brown
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On September 27, Chinese President Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo, where he announced the end of the current round of finance inspections but suggested that more were to follow (Xinhua, September 27). The authorities may have chosen to focus on financial corruption to coincide with the restructuring of financial regulators in March, in which a central finance commission was created to give the Party center more direct control over the finance sector. This move indicates that the Party has taken a greater interest in the sector. So far in 2023, China’s anti-corruption organs, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC, 中华人民共和国国家监察委员会), have intensified investigations across both the healthcare and finance sectors. Authorities have investigated at least 180 hospital chiefs and 80 senior employees in financial institutions between January and early September. [1] By comparison, the CCDI and NSC only targeted 12 hospital leaders from 2019-2022 (CCDI). Through the anti-corruption campaigns, the party leadership is likely to bolster support among certain demographics, eliminate political opponents, and address some real instances of graft. However, due to the absence of robust institutions and transparency, systemic corruption will persist after the current drives wind down. The Party and state organs carry out anti-corruption in healthcare regularly, but in 2023 they have elevated the importance of this work. This is the first time the CCDI and NSC were involved in the National Health Commission’s annual conference on anti-corruption, where a national centralized campaign to crack down on graft was launched. The campaign will continue until mid-2024 (National Health Commission, July 21). [2] One motivation may be to address public frustrations with healthcare from the COVID-19 pandemic. There was an uproar over incidents like hospitals turning away ER patients for not having negative Covid tests and testing centers generating huge profits but producing fraudulent test results (Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council, December 9 2022 Credit China, December 23 2022). Another reason may be to combat illegal healthcare charges in order to boost household consumption, one of the government’s top economic targets for 2023 (Xinhua, March 14).
Topic:
Corruption, Finance, Public Policy, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
China and Asia

240. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:
Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:
International Relations and Research
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, and Global Focus