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202. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft
- Author:
- Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America
203. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations
- Author:
- Matt Sheehan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China, East Asia, and Asia
204. The risk of artificial intelligence: China edition
- Author:
- Filip Jirouš
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
- Abstract:
- We should be worried about China’s AI capacities, not only because it enhances the powers of the Party-state, but also because it is exporting its population control technology and policy abroad.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Social Control, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
205. Starr Forum: China: The Rise and Fall of the EAST
- Author:
- Yasheng Huang and Will Knight
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Speaker: Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, and faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. Discussant: Will Knight, senior writer, Wired magazine, covers artificial intelligence and other emerging technology. He was previously a senior editor at MIT Technology Review, where he wrote about fundamental advances in AI and China’s AI boom.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Autocracy
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
206. US Hegemony in Latin America: Think Tanks and the Formation of Consensus about the Chinese Presence
- Author:
- Luciana Wietchikoski and Livia Peres Milani
- Publication Date:
- 05-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
- Institution:
- Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
- Abstract:
- In recent years, U.S. government agencies have defined the Chinese presence in Latin America as a challenge, which has organized foreign policy towards the region. Departing from a neo-Gramscian approach, this paper investigates the bibliographical production of U.S. think tanks and seeks to understand the construction of consensus about the Chinese presence in Latin America. The methodology is based on content analysis and we identified two main narratives: in the first, the Chinese presence is presented as a threat to U.S. regional hegemony; in the second, the Chinese adaptation to liberal precepts is sought. There are therefore nuances in how the Chinese power is perceived, although the discourses remain restricted to the promotion of capitalism and neoliberalism under U.S. leadership.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Hegemony, and Think Tanks
- Political Geography:
- China, Latin America, North America, and United States of America
207. Palestine: Public Opinion Report 2023, Part 2
- Author:
- Khalil Shikaki
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arab Barometer
- Abstract:
- Palestinians see the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine and their most preferred countries are Turkey, Qatar, and China. In a comparison between China's and U.S. foreign policies, the Palestinian public views China's policies more positively than those of the U.S. on all issues at hand. Wide-ranging opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remains as strong as it was two years ago, but most express optimism about the world's solidarity with the Palestinians, and the vast majority expresses opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side. The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize SaudiIsraeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement. This report is the second in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB. It addresses one important issues covered by AB8: Palestinian perception of various international and regional actors and other international relations issues. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier, and one poll conducted after AB8.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Normalization, and October 7
- Political Geography:
- China, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Qatar
208. Lessons from China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic
- Author:
- Tianlei Huang
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- Expansionary fiscal policy helped China's economy grow in 2020, a year in which most economies contracted because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid a broader pivot to policy and regulatory tightening, fiscal support was withdrawn in 2021. In 2022, government budget turned expansionary to ensure economic stability ahead of the Communist Party Congress, but the execution fell short and fiscal policy ended up being weaker than planned. A recurrent problem during the pandemic, however, was that local governments did not fully spend their budgets. Aside from the sharp drop in local governments' land sale revenue in 2022, which dragged down their spending, it was also caused by local governments' failure to fully utilize their special bond quotas approved by the central government for capital investment. China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic highlights four issues with implications for fiscal policy making. First, the government needs to avoid projecting unrealistically high land sale revenue in its budgets. Second, it needs to reconsider its problematic use of local-government special bond as a major fiscal stimulus instrument. Third, it needs to make sure its deficit, growth, and inflation targets are consistent. Last, Beijing needs to be more tolerant of higher fiscal deficits, at a minimum ensuring that overall fiscal spending grows at least as rapidly as nominal output.
- Topic:
- Budget, Economic Growth, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Fiscal Deficit
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
209. China’s Perspective on Economic Security
- Author:
- Audrye Wong
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This paper examines how Beijing views economic security as well as other countries’ actions in this realm. Economic security is not a new or foreign concept to Chinese thinkers and policymakers, but the emphases, concerns, and priorities have evolved, due in part to changes in the international environment as well as in China’s own economic and geopolitical situation. This paper examines how Chinese leaders and scholars have approached the definition and scope of economic security, as well as recent and proposed policy responses. It draws on a range of Chinese-language official documents and scholarly writings, as well as broader secondary source analyses. The paper explores that while Chinese discussions of economic security tend to be framed as ensuring economic development and stability, development is implicitly and explicitly linked to national security. Many writings emphasize that economics is the foundation for national strength (including military capabilities). As such, it is more than just economic survival and growth for the economy’s sake; it also has implications for China’s geopolitical position in the international order. In that respect, economic stability and national security may be hard to separate. Indeed, we see a resurgence in today’s rhetoric about the notions of development and security as inextricably linked, along with the need to coordinate the two—and in service of maintaining CCP rule and regime stability. Finally, the paper shows Beijing is taking concrete steps toward increased legalization and institutionalization of economic security measures. This represents a shift, at least in the domain of retaliatory countermeasures, from its usually more “informal” approach to economic coercion, which has afforded more flexibility and minimized political costs for the regime. At the same time, actual implementation has been relatively limited thus far.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Trade Wars, and Economic Security
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
210. South Korea: Caught in the Crosshairs of U.S.−China Competition Over Semiconductors
- Author:
- Paul Triolo
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This paper explores how countries with advanced semiconductor industries are caught in the middle of the growing U.S.-China competition in technology that is focused on advanced computing. Among them, South Korea and its national champions, Samsung and SK Hynix, have arguably incurred some of the most significant pressure. This paper explores how those firms have billions of dollars of sunk investment in China-based facilities producing cutting-edge memory, and the future of these facilities remains in doubt after a series of U.S. export control measures unleashed by the U.S. Commerce Department starting in October 2022. South Korean companies are also players in other parts of the global semiconductor supply chain, including semiconductor manufacturing tools, and China remains an important market for both components and electronic devices. This paper argues that each country caught between the United States and China in technology competition faces difficult trade-offs in determining how best to support its leading companies while navigating changing and often what is viewed as arbitrary decisions coming from Washington that have already significantly disrupted global supply chains. Finally, at the same time as U.S. export controls are having a major impact on the ability of South Korean companies to retain business operations and market access in China, major front-end manufacturers, particularly Samsung, are also looking to expand their operations in the United States and benefit from U.S. CHIPS Act funding. This paper argues that all of the above dynamics put South Korea in one of the more complex positions as the industry faces continued restructuring, buffeted by both export controls and industrial policies.
- Topic:
- Supply Chains, Economic Security, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
211. Economic Security and U.S.-China Competition: The View from North Korea
- Author:
- Rachel Minyoung Lee
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This paper argues that while North Korea does not discuss “economic security” in domestic contexts or have an established definition of the term, it thoroughly understands that the economy and national security are inseparable. North Korea is essentially unaffected by the typical economic issues that many major economies are grappling with in relation to economic security, but like other countries, it has closely tracked economic security developments and deepening U.S.-China strategic competition for potential political fallout and what opportunities and challenges that may generate. The paper shows that U.S.-China strategic competition has offered unique opportunities to North Korea, including China’s cover against fresh and existing sanctions against North Korea, and economic assistance. Moreover, deteriorating U.S.-China ties provide Pyongyang extra space to consider and put into motion alternative foreign and economic policy paths, namely, shifting away from its three-decade policy of nonalignment with China and normalization of relations with the United States. Also, China appears to be a factor in North Korea’s shift to a more conservative economic policy. Despite the opportunities presented by the U.S.-China divide, however, North Korea is wary of the risks of dependence on China and has tried to build economic resilience at home, for example by launching a national campaign on domestic production and recycling. North Korea’s somewhat cooler handling of China and its proportionately warm treatment of Russia since the Armistice Day celebrations in July is a clear example of North Korea’s China dilemma. This is where North Korea’s recent strengthening of ties with Russia comes into the picture. The paper contends that it is hard to conclude at this point whether North Korea’s moves are aimed at short-term, tactical gains or are part of a longer-term, strategic calculus, but we can be certain of this: it has just as much to gain or lose as any other country affected by economic security and U.S.-China strategic competition, though not in the same ways as other countries.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Economic Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America
212. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia
- Author:
- Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Asia
213. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment
- Author:
- Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America
214. Geoeconomic fragmentation and net-zero targets
- Author:
- Shirin Hakim and Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The second half of the twentieth century experienced significant economic integration. International trade, cross-border migration, capital flows, and technological diffusion increased per capita incomes across countries and reduced global poverty. However, events such as the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic—all against the backdrop of escalating great power rivalry and tensions between the United States and China—have demonstrated the rise of geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF). Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a growing numberof world leaders have addressed the impacts of GEF on global energy and agricultural markets. For one, higher and increasingly volatile food and energy prices have made it increasingly difficult for developing nations to prioritize environmental concerns and implement sustainable development initiatives.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, International Trade and Finance, Economy, Economic Growth, Inclusion, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Net Zero
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
215. How Huawei Weathered the Storm: Resilience, Market Conditions or Failed Sanctions?
- Author:
- Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robin Baker
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- Huawei is exhibiting stoic resilience in the face of US sanctions, economic downturns, and the slow pace of 5G investments. There is a narrative that the company has been propped up by the Chinese government, but the key to Huawei’s resilience is multifaceted. Through pre-emptive stockpiling and ingenuity, the company has continued to fulfil its base station orders and defend its market shares abroad. Concurrently, Huawei has made an autonomous business decision to reinvest its earnings and intensify R&D to secure its supply chains against political risks and diversify into new business areas. Successful forays into semiconductors, cloud services and energy grids have also been facilitated by a capital structure that lends itself to long-term planning. Huawei’s survival is not necessarily a lesson in the futility of sanctions to stifle technological progress. However, it does show that muddled political objectives and inconsistent implementation will yield potentially contrary outcomes. At the same time, factors that contribute to Huawei’s resilience also highlight the infighting and vulnerabilities of listed firms like Mavenir, Ericsson and Nokia.
- Topic:
- Markets, Sanctions, Digital Economy, Resilience, and Huawei
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
216. What if…? 12 Dragon King scenarios for 2028
- Author:
- Florence Gaub
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- At first glance, this publication appears to be a collection of Early Warning essays – they are, to some extent, but they should not be exclusively read as such. Conventional Early Warning systems have a much shorter time horizon – normally hours, perhaps months at most – than these scenarios, and they are solely mitigation mechanisms, that is to say they provide no insight into how the event they are warning of can be avoided. They are thus not an intellectual thought exercise, but solely an alarm bell. Our Dragon Kings in this volume provide insight into how they can be avoided, but they also challenge our assumptions in more ways than one. They are therefore awareness-raisers no matter how credible or plausible you will find them. Just reading them will have a readiness-increasing effect. (In fact, the more absurd you find them, the more pronounced this is because your mind will learn more when the emotion they generate is greater.) These scenarios can become even more useful, however, if you use them for simulation exercises in a team. You can use them as a blueprint for a wider scenario exercise, whether one wishes to adopt a blue or red team approach to them, and ask questions such as: how could this have been prevented, what would have to be done? What are alternative pathways of this scenario that are even worse, and how can we prevent those? The most important aspect is that every exercise of this kind must lead to some concrete policy steps. Merely thinking about improbable futures is never enough – doing something about them is what makes them a useful policy-tool. In that case, they lead to active, rather than passive, engagement with the content, foster collaboration, encourage innovation, practice decision-making, provide a space for failure and experimentation with alternative courses of action. It is precisely because of this that scenarios are a common feature in military education, but they work just as well in any other strategic context – provided, time and space is made for it. If yes, they contribute to increasing preparedness and readiness, and accelerate the response time to surprise. What’s more, generally engaging in fringe thinking about the future will strengthen these capabilities no matter what kind of surprise eventually occurs. Much like how vaccines teach the immune system, disruptive thinking strengthens our neural networks, making us more resilient for extreme situations.
- Topic:
- NATO, Natural Disasters, Elections, Crisis Management, Coup, UN Security Council, Biological Weapons, Resilience, Arctic Council, and Readiness
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iraq, Europe, India, Taiwan, Latin America, Nigeria, and Tunisia
217. The history of China’s future Lessons from the CIA
- Author:
- Dylan Levi King
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Predictions about China’s future made in the years since the Communist Party took power in 1949 have routinely cycled between two extremes of improbability: imminent collapse and indomitable ascent. These cycles came more slowly in the age before cable news and social media. The idea of the capture of the People’s Republic of China by Republic of China forces, or of the country tearing itself apart with political violence, held for years, before being wiped out by a popular impression of China’s meteoric rise and future economic domination.1 These cycles have now become supercharged for the attention economy. As one wave of forecasts of unstoppable lift-off and financial supremacy breaks, it is chased immediately by predictions of terminal economic dysfunction and social disintegration. For the expert, in danger of having their voice drowned out by amateur forecasters, it is difficult to inject the necessary rigour and nuance. For the layperson, it is hard to make any sense of the incessant deluge of contradictory and often extreme predictions. To wade into the forecast cycle is to risk being swept off one’s feet. To step away, and to simply avoid making any predictions is tempting, but it would be a grave error, given China’s economic gravity, immense population, status as a superpower and potential rival of NATO and allied countries. To get the future of the country wrong is to get the future of the planet wrong.
- Topic:
- History, Forecast, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Readiness
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
218. NATO and a Taiwan contingency
- Author:
- James Lee
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- This paper Discusses the conditions under which a Taiwan contingency could trigger Article 5. Explains how individual NATO countries already play a role in Taiwan’s security. Outlines scenarios under which individual NATO countries could become directly involved in a Taiwan contingency.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
219. Decoding China’s Technology and Industrial Policy: Seven Terms You Need to Know
- Author:
- Barry Naughton, Siwen Xiao, and Yaosheng Xu
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- China’s technology and industrial policy programs have grown in scope and intensity since 2020, but the vocabulary used to describe them is vague and often misleading. This policy brief decodes seven essential terms and shows that they have concrete and complementary meanings. When understood in concert, they reveal the establishment of a large-scale, government-directed program of mission-oriented research, development, and application. Together these terms outline a substantial expansion of the Chinese government’s direct role in organizing economic activity, and hint at some of the limits of that expansion.
- Topic:
- Economics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Research and Development, and Terminology
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
220. The Quantum Race: U.S.-Chinese Competition for Leadership in Quantum Technologies
- Author:
- Juljan Krause
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Quantum computing is poised to unleash innovation across various sectors, from materials science to pharmaceutical and medical research, finance, logistics, and even climate change management. Quantum computing also has the potential to provide the backbone for future artificial intelligence and autonomous systems that cannot be realized with digital hardware alone, while quantum communication can strengthen security in cyberspace. For these reasons, quantum technologies feature prominently in the emerging technologies race between the United States and China. In this policy brief, IGCC postdoctoral fellow Juljan Krause analyzes China’s advances in quantum communication, which aim to signal China’s technological leadership while protecting Chinese communications from foreign surveillance. He argues that Chinese leadership in quantum communication will have strategic repercussions, particularly as it is likely to give China’s efforts to shape global industry standards additional momentum. Even if quantum communication has no immediate military implications, policymakers should consider how the technology could embolden China further.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific