Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 3 Years and within 5 Years / Topic: Politics

1. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:: Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:: Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:: Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China and Asia

3. Episode 04: Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:: Sahar Aziz and Khaled A. Beydoun
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Host Sahar Aziz and Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Professor Khaled Beydoun discuss the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries. The conversation is informed by Professor Beydoun’s new book The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims.
Topic:: Politics, Law, Discrimination, Islamophobia, War on Terror, and Muslims
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

4. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:: Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

5. The Sky Is Not the Limit. Geopolitics and Economics of the New Space Race

Author:: Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Space is a contested domain for its very nature and today it is evidently becoming an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. An increasing number of actors, infrastructures and technologies deployed in space also raises concerns for safety and security, especially in cyberspace. Many countries are striving to achieve space capabilities and autonomous access to space, and this is having a tremendous geopolitical impact, especially since space is emerging as an increasingly critical military and strategic domain. The development of the new space economy, which is increasingly involving the private sector and many industrial actors and services, will also be a game changer for the international economy. The space race likewise implies disruptive technologies that could contribute massively to the energy and digital transitions, accelerating solutions that could benefit humanity. A new international governance system for space is therefore needed urgently, considering that the current rules are no longer able to respond to a sector evolving at such a rapid pace. Which actors are leading the race? Which economic sectors could benefit the most and what could the new space economy mean for the world? How is space emerging as a military domain against a backdrop of increasing international tensions? What would a new system of global governance for space look like?
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, India, Italy, Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

6. The Open Gap in the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific

Author:: Kenneth Gofigan Kuper
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: "For many of us in Guam, a free and open Indo-Pacific cannot be fully accomplished without resolving the paradox of the United States maintaining a modern-day colony even though the local government has supported moving forward with a decolonization process."
Topic:: Politics, Decolonization, Strategy, and Colonization
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam

7. South Korean Perspectives on China-Russia Collaboration in the Arctic

Author:: Young Kil Park
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Young Kil Park, Research Fellow at Korea Maritime Institute, explains that "While the immediate impact of China-Russia collaboration in the Arctic on South Korea is limited, it remains wary of the long-term implications for its economic and security interests."
Topic:: Security, Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Collaboration
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Arctic

8. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent

Author:: Hargisl Shirley Martey
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America

9. Understanding Elite Politics Through Relentless Research: Warren Sun’s Hua Guofeng Nianpu, Chronology of Hua Guofeng (1971–1981)

Author:: Frederick C. Teiwes
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Working Paper is a pre-publication review of an immense documentary collection prepared over the past 25 years by Warren Sun, Adjunct Associate Professor at Monash University and Affiliate Member of the Sydney CSC. It is based on the intellectual premise that elite politics in the CCP cannot be understood without deep penetration into the details of political decision-making and conflict. In its absence, simplistic narratives emerge and become widely accepted, especially when the Party itself is creating the basis for the narrative. This is most prevalent for the immediate post-Mao period as a Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping struggle between different ideological lines and in the profound misunderstanding of Hua as a limited, merely transitional political leader. Hua nianpu uses a wide range of sources to uncover details that contest such views. These include: the contemporary PRC public record; official documentary collections; internal Party documents including unpublished speeches and compendia of circulars at major Party meetings; memoirs, oral accounts, and recollections published in the PRC by or about leaders; studies by Party history scholars in PRC journals; more-adventurous books published in Hong Kong by Party historians and former officials; interviews with scholars and retired officials; and unique interviews with officials who worked as secretaries or as aides to very senior figures and their family members, especially members of Hua’s family. However, these sources have limitations that must be considered critically and discussed in terms of what they can and cannot provide. Taken together the detailed information compiled in Hua nianpu undermines central features of the accepted narrative, most notably by showing that the 1978 work conference and the subsequent Third Plenum were joint Hua-Deng ventures to advance modernization, and when unanticipated developments weakened Hua, Deng did not act against him. Instead, he worked to lower tensions and to return the focus to their original joint plan. Hua nianpu is a major basis for our joint book project, Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. But this nianpu is entirely Professor Sun’s creation and exacting work. The target for submission of both these projects to their respective publishers is early 2025.
Topic:: Politics, History, Elites, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Hua Guofeng
Political Geography:: China and Asia

10. Climate Action, Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Policy: The Western Race to Secure Critical Raw Materials

Author:: Salvatore Finizio
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country’s industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU’s climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between “decoupling” and “derisking”, with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.
Topic:: Security, Politics, European Union, Institutions, Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

11. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

12. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

13. Abrogating the Visiting Forces Agreement: Its Effects on Philippines’ Security and Stability in Southeast Asia

Author:: Renato Acosta
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: During much of 2022, the defense and security alliance between the United States of America and the Philippines, anchored on and reinforced by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, teetered on the brink of collapse. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte brought relations to the brink through attempts to scuttle the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move would only embolden Chinese challenges to Manila’s territorial integrity and its aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. While the Duterte administration recited parochial reasons to terminate the VFA, pundits from the security and diplomatic sectors viewed Duterte’s attempts as a pretext to steer the Philippines towards China under his own brand and definition of an independent foreign policy. During his term, Duterte reiterated that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials were his friends. He also publicly declared that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), a northeastern section of the Spratly Islands, was already in physical control and possession of Beijing due to the unchallenged presence of its military and maritime militia vessels there. Given these statements, Duterte has constantly received criticism over his defeatist stance towards China.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Politics, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:: China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

14. Rejuvenating Communism: Youth Organizations and Elite Renewal in Post-Mao China

Author:: Jérôme Doyon and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Working for the administration remains one of the most coveted career paths for young Chinese. Rejuvenating Communism: Youth Organizations and Elite Renewal in Post-Mao China seeks to understand what motivates young and educated Chinese to commit to a long-term career in the party-state and how this question is central to the Chinese regime’s ability to maintain its cohesion and survive. Jérôme Doyon draws upon extensive fieldwork and statistical analysis in order to illuminate the undogmatic commitment recruitment techniques and other methods the state has taken to develop a diffuse allegiance to the party-state in the post-Mao era. He then analyzes recruitment and political professionalization in the Communist Party’s youth organizations and shows how experiences in the Chinese Communist Youth League transform recruits and feed their political commitment as they are gradually inducted into the world of officials. As the first in-depth study of the Communist Youth League’s role in recruitment, this book challenges the assumption that merit is the main criteria for advancement within the party-state, an argument with deep implications for understanding Chinese politics today.
Topic:: Communism, Politics, History, Youth, and Elites
Political Geography:: China and Asia

15. US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions

Author:: John K. Culver and Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and from Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years. This grim prospect is driven by the United States and China arraying themselves for a strategic rivalry since 2017 through the continuing trade war, economic decoupling, and increasing rhetorical and military positioning for confrontation over Taiwan. In light of the Chinese military’s threatening gestures, belligerent rhetoric, and other recent actions that read like they could be preparation for war, there is a danger that the successive warnings by senior US military commanders that Chinese CCP General Secretary and President Xi Jinping has already decided to use military force in the near term could become the proverbial tail wagging the dog — and could impose a logic that makes a US-China war more likely, rather than enhancing deterrence.1 Therefore, the key question for the United States and its allies is how an increasingly truculent and belligerent Chinese leadership can be incentivized to walk back from the brink. This paper examines what lessons China, the United States, and European allies have drawn from the Ukraine conflict and how such lessons have shaped these actors’ strategic assumptions. It concludes with a discussion of policy recommendations for the transatlantic community confronting the possibility of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:: Dale Aluf
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

17. Humanitarian aid: Defining new areas of US-LAC collaboration

Author:: Pepe Zhang and Isabel Bernhard
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The US humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) system—well practiced and extensively developed—could further serve US and partners’ needs in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and beyond through targeted improvements. Based on our experience as HADR practitioners with operational and academic expertise, we share insights from many years of working with partners in the Americas. The task is urgent: fragile governments and organizations further impacted by COVID-19 and climate change have exposed HADR deficiencies that need to be rapidly strengthened. Redoubling the US’s HADR commitment to allies and partners can also have strategic benefits during a period of renewed competition with the People’s Republic of China. We believe that the United States can strengthen its HADR work globally, and particularly with LAC countries, through partnership and relationship building as well as education and exercises. By deepening its strengths and address- ing room for improvement, the United States can remain the partner of choice for LAC countries and conserve its positional advantage over China and other strategic competitors. How can LAC and partner nations (such as the United States), nongovernmental organizations, and regional and other global organizations strengthen their abilities to respond to natural disasters? What can the United States do to improve its disaster preparedness and response in LAC? And what can Washington learn from Beijing’s approach to disaster assistance in LAC? In crafting this report to address these questions, we drew from a roundtable discussion, verbal and written consultations with subject matter experts, and written material. A full description of the methodology is provided in the appendix. The findings of the report include eight recommendations grouped under two mutually complementary areas: (1) partnership and relationship building, and (2) education and exercises. Not only are these recommendations timely and relevant for HADR practitioners, but taking these steps would strengthen Western hemispheric security by investing in the region’s infrastructure and human capital. As the United States and its LAC partners consider future room for cooperation and collaboration, HADR work will form an indispensable centerpiece of their strategies.
Topic:: NATO, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Humanitarian Aid, International Organization, Politics, Partnerships, Resilience, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

18. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:: Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

19. China and the new globalization

Author:: Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

20. Warnings and Welcomes: China’s Reopening and the Politics of International Travel

Author:: John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Over the past two months, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has rapidly rolled back its strict zero-COVID epidemic prevention policy, COVID-19 has spread rapidly throughout the country. The combination of the PRC reopening its borders to outbound travel on January 8 and the ongoing pandemic has put countries that are major travel destinations for Chinese nationals in a bind. Governments have responded differently to the situation, with some imposing testing and quarantine requirements and others declining to do so. In China, official and social media have generally lauded countries that have desisted from testing requirements and opened their doors to Chinese tourists. Thailand, in particular, has been widely celebrated. Not only did Thailand decline to impose testing requirements on inbound travelers from the PRC, but several senior Thai government ministers went to the airport to welcome the first planeload of Chinese tourists following the lifting of travel restrictions on January 8 (Guangming Daily, January 17). Scenes of smiling Thai officials and airport workers greeting the first group of arriving tourists circulated widely in Chinese media.
Topic:: Politics, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Travel
Political Geography:: China and Asia

21. Continuismo, contra reacción y triangulación: el desembarco de China en América Latina y la coexistencia de líneas de acción exterior de España hacia la región

Author:: Javier Martín Merchán
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Las relaciones entre España y América Latina siempre han conformado un pilar en la estrategia de integración internacional del país ibérico. No obstante, ante la singular coyuntura que supone el auge exponencial de China en la región latinoamericana, ¿qué riesgos afronta hoy España en América Latina? ¿Ha influido dicha coyuntura en las líneas maestras de acción exterior de España hacia la región? Este artículo arroja algo de luz en torno a tales preguntas, y su conclusión es doble. Por un lado, sugiere que el desembarco chino supone un serio desafío para España. Por otro, se sostiene que la política exterior española ha hecho coexistir tres tipos de actitudes como respuesta: una más continuista, otra que capitaliza esta nueva coyuntura y busca aprovechar sus oportunidades, y una última más reactiva a las amenazas que suscitaría la pujanza china en América Latina.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, and Spain

22. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System

Author:: Mariah Thornton
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

23. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:: Michael Singh
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

24. Investigating China’s economic coercion: The reach and role of Chinese corporate entities

Author:: William Piekos
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: China’s economic statecraft has expanded in line with Beijing’s vision for an international environment that is more conducive to its interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are willing to use every means at their disposal to achieve this goal, bringing the full force of the party-state to bear in support of Xi’s objectives abroad and against perceived enemies of the Chinese government. Economic statecraft—the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals—has been a consistent feature of Xi’s dealings with CCP competitors and adversaries. Intensifying US-China strategic competition and Beijing’s increasingly overt attempts to assert its preferences only further emphasize the importance of confronting China’s use of economic coercion and influence and understanding the reach of Chinese companies. The deliberate use of economic ties to achieve geopolitical objectives is underpinned by corporate entities that facilitate trade, investment, and financial flows.1 Beijing’s preference for plausible deniability and nontransparency in theory makes corporate entities an attractive mechanism through which to signal its displeasure and to achieve strategic goals. Understanding the reach and role of such entities is, therefore, key to identifying where Beijing might be best positioned to advance its economic statecraft. To that end, this report explores avenues through which researchers can investigate these issues, considers industries that could be vulnerable to future coercion and influence, and offers policy recommendations to counter China’s economic statecraft.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Global Markets, Economy, Trade, Norms, and Coercion
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

25. The Economic Impact of China PNTR Repeal

Author:: David Schockenhoff and Michael Kleiman
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: As scepticism towards China is rising among policymakers, businesses grow more concerned about the potential economic fallout from an escalation in US-China tariff policy. Oxford Economics was commissioned by the US-China Business Council (USCBC) to help inform the policymaking process by examining two scenarios that could materialize if China’s Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) status was revoked – including the increase of US tariffs on Chinese goods to column 2 rates as well as a Chinese retaliation imposing pre-WTO rates on US goods. Our analysis incorporates state-of-the art trade and economic models, including the Oxford Economics GEM, and finds that the US could lose up to $1.9trn in output over the five-year period following a China PNTR repeal. This is our third study for USCBC after examining the impact of the US-China relationship and associated scenarios in two previous reports (2017 and 2021).
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Regulation, Tariffs, Trade, Supply Chains, Policymaking, Decoupling, and Goods and Services
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. China’s South China Sea Overreach Faces Growing Obstacles

Author:: Denny Roy
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Even without the mandate of a formal international organization, coalitions of willing governments can coalesce around the task of dissuading China from enforcing invalid South China Sea claims.
Topic:: Politics, Territorial Disputes, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and South China Sea

27. Taiwan's Security Future: How Domestic Politics Impact Taipei’s Defense

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: With a presidential election fast approaching, Taipei’s defense policy could go in multiple directions. As China has grown more militarily capable and assertive under President Xi Jinping, Beijing’s promise to forcibly unify with Taiwan has increasingly worried both Taiwan and the United States. Beijing’s large-scale military exercise near Taiwan this fall underscores the role Taiwan’s own military capabilities play in deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait. To that end, US policymakers have increased defense cooperation with Taiwan and urged Taipei to do more for its defense in recent years. However, whether Taipei will stick to the defense policies implemented under current president Tsai Ing-wen is uncertain. This coming January, Taiwan’s voters will select a new president. Currently leading the polls is Vice President Lai Ching-te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is committed to Taiwan’s sovereignty and views Taiwan as effectively already independent. Beijing has angrily decried this position and boycotted talks with Taipei as long as the DPP remains in power. Meanwhile, the path ahead for the Kuomintang (KMT), the primary opposition party, is riven with internal fissures. The party has traditionally sought closer economic and cultural ties with Beijing to defuse tensions—something it seems uniquely qualified for, since the PRC will not talk to the current DPP government. Yet emphasizing dialogue with an increasingly aggressive PRC, especially after Xi’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s limited self-government in 2020, has soured many voters on the KMT’s message. In response, reformers in the party have suggested a new direction more closely aligned with the DPP on national security to win back moderate voters, while traditionalists have doubled down on the old promise of peace through dialogue. This latter path would be worrying for the Biden administration, which has increased arms sales to Taipei and presided over a period of worsening US-China mistrust. US concerns are a helpful reminder that, whether discussing Taiwan’s future or the risk of a catastrophic cross-Strait war, Taiwan’s own politics cannot be ignored. The rigor of Taipei’s defense—and, with it, the health of cross-Strait deterrence—will depend largely on the course Taiwan’s politics take.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Elections, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, East Asia, and United States of America

28. CCP Ideology, 1976-1980: From the “Two Whatevers,” to the “Criterion of Truth,” to the “Four Cardinal Principles,” and beyond

Author:: Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Nowhere is this period more misunderstood than in the area of ideology and its notional centrality to an imagined Hua-Deng power struggle. In the accepted narrative, a critical feature of this struggle is the February 1977 “two whatevers” editorial notionally requiring support for all of Mao’s decisions, that allegedly sought to prevent Deng’s return to work and to enforce a rigid ideological framework preventing significant change from Mao’s practices. In fact, Deng’s return to high office had been decided at the start of January, and more importantly, from the earliest days of Hua’s leadership, the task was to move away from Mao’s Cultural Revolution but to maintain regime stability and unity by expressing fealty to a leader still deeply worshipped in major sections of the population and respected by Party leaders, notably those of the revolutionary generation. Claims that “whateverists” engaged in an intense struggle with reformers seeking a pragmatic approach under the slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” beginning in May 1978 are not totally amiss, but they exaggerate the situation and do not adequately account for the fact that the conflict was largely among lower-level figures on the theoretical front who did not deeply engage the top leadership. There were nuanced differences between Hua and Deng on the “criterion of truth” question but nothing fundamental, and neither wanted ideological issues to disrupt the economic agenda of the fall 1978 pre-Third Plenum work conference. At the conference, however, arguments initiated by progressive theorists resulted in official acceptance of the criterion position, although there was high-level concern, most prominently expressed by Deng, for proceeding with caution, particularly as it related to Mao’s prestige. More broadly, in Party ranks many felt the plenum’s policies had gone too far and were leading to disruption in society. At the end of March 1979, Deng reacted with his “four cardinal principles” speech that demanded adherence to the political practice of Mao’s pre-Cultural Revolution period. This not only alarmed progressives but it also created leadership concern that the practical focus of the Third Plenum policies was being undermined. Deng then sought to bolster those policies, but at the time of the 30th anniversary of the PRC, he still gave priority to the “four principles” and defence of Mao. Indeed, he explicitly affirmed a lavish claim concerning Mao’s essential role in the Party’s successes, the same claim that had appeared in the “two whatevers” editorial more than two and a half years earlier.
Topic:: Politics, History, Ideology, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

29. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:: Chris Miller
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

30. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:: Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

31. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

32. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

33. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:: Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

34. A Green Wave?

Author:: Jessica Drun
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

35. The Urbanization of People- The Politics of Development in the Chinese City

Author:: Eli Friedman and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Urbanization of People (May 2022, Columbia University Press) reveals how cities in China have granted public goods to the privileged while condemning poor and working-class migrants to insecurity, constant mobility, and degraded educational opportunities. Using the school as a lens on urban life, Eli Friedman investigates how the state manages flows of people into the city. He demonstrates that urban governments are providing quality public education to those who need it least: school admissions for nonlocals heavily favor families with high levels of economic and cultural capital. Those deemed not useful are left to enroll their children in precarious resource-starved private schools that sometimes are subjected to forced demolition. Over time, these populations are shunted away to smaller locales with inferior public services. Based on extensive ethnographic research and hundreds of in-depth interviews, this interdisciplinary book details the policy framework that produces unequal outcomes as well as providing a fine-grained account of the life experiences of people drawn into the cities as workers but excluded as full citizens.
Topic:: Development, Politics, Urbanization, and Cities
Political Geography:: China and Asia

36. Assessing the Chinese Communist Party 20th Party Congress

Author:: Thomas J. Christensen, Shang-Jin Wei, Junyang Jiang, Xiaobo Lü, Sun Zhe, and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Assessing the political and foreign policy implications of whatever happens at the 20th Party Congress, presumably including Xi Jinping’s election to a third term as party General Secretary.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

37. How Malaysian Politics Shaped Chinese Real Estate Deals and Economic Development

Author:: Guanie Lim
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Iskandar Malaysia is the oldest and by far the most prominent economic corridor in Malaysia. Located in the southernmost state of Johor, the corridor came to host several real estate developments (such as Princess Cove and Forest City) involving multinational corporations (MNCs) from China almost immediately after the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013. On one level, the infrastructure-spending spree associated with the BRI helped boost Malaysia’s economy as Chinese real estate MNCs invested in Iskandar Malaysia to grow their overseas portfolios. However, their involvement in the corridor disrupted the existing dynamics between Malaysia’s central and local governments. Although these Chinese projects offered an opening for Johor’s state government to counter Putrajaya’s dominance in the economic corridor, some swiftly became a magnet for divisive electoral campaigning and voter anger. Combined with several socioeconomic issues, the discontent generated by these Chinese real estate projects contributed to the unexpected defeat of the long-ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysia’s May 2018 general election. Chinese real estate MNCs have sought to adapt to these shifting dynamics, yet it is uncertain to what degree their adaptive strategies will bear fruit amid a looming real estate crisis back in China and other related issues. Ultimately, Chinese real estate investment has been both a tool and an enabler of efforts undertaken by various Malaysian stakeholders, rather than the all-powerful China-imposed juggernaut that some commentators on Malaysia’s development over the last two decades have tended to see. Despite the allure of lucrative real estate deals, it is equally important to recognize the potential pitfalls when local politics go awry. Events in Iskandar Malaysia demonstrate that it is politically unsustainable to push real estate projects that are too expensive for most local residents to afford.
Topic:: Politics, Entrepreneurship, Risk, Economic Development, and Real Estate
Political Geography:: China, Malaysia, and Asia

38. The Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy

Author:: Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J. Rothschild
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: How should US diplomacy adapt for the twenty-first century? The practice of diplomacy has changed drastically over the past several decades, with the return of great power rivalry, the emergence of the new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), and the rise of other important developments. Yet, while scholars and strategists have devoted enormous attention to how these new developments affect other domains, such as the future of warfare, they have devoted scant attention to the changing nature of diplomacy. If we believe, however, that diplomacy is a—if not the—most important tool of American statecraft, then twenty-first-century diplomacy deserves the same level of sustained attention. This paper will seek to characterize the changing nature of diplomacy with the objective of helping US and allied diplomats more effectively practice strategy and statecraft. This issue brief considers two key questions. How is the context of twenty-first-century diplomacy different from that of the past? How can US diplomacy begin to adapt for the twenty-first century? In answering the first question, this issue brief will focus on the most salient change in the international balance of power—the rise of China—in addition to the current technological revolution. After outlining how these changes have affected the context in which the United States conducts diplomacy, this issue brief will suggest several proposals to adapt US diplomacy to the twenty-first century. These suggestions will address both how changes in the global context—especially technology—have affected the conduct of US diplomacy and how US diplomacy can best respond to China’s rise and the 4IR.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Science and Technology, and Innovation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

39. China’s Role in Korean Security Issues

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China’s great power over North Korea eroded when COVID-19 control measures ended most trade with the Kim regime. Moreover, China’s conflicts with various countries mean Beijing cannot afford to alienate any friend, and Kim Jong Un knows that. Beijing is still influential in Seoul, but it lost much of its clout when the conservative-leaning candidate prevailed in the March 2022 presidential election. China will also suffer a loss in standing because it is paying less attention to Korean affairs and is closing itself off to the world.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Elections, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

40. Policy Experimentation in China: The Political Economy of Policy Learning

Author:: Shaoda Wang and David Y. Yang
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Determining what policies to implement and how to implement them is an essential government task. Policy learning is challenging, as policy effectiveness often hinges on the nature of the policy, its implementation, the degree that it is tailored to local conditions, and the efforts and incentives of local politicians to make the policy work.
Topic:: Political Economy, Politics, Policy Implementation, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

41. China: An Economic and Political Outlook for 2022

Author:: Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In recent years, Xi Jinping has taken China to the “left” politically and economically, but to the “right” with his deeply nationalist narratives at home and a more assertive foreign and security policy abroad. More recently, this has contributed to a slowdown in the Chinese economy and an increase in the level of political and policy reaction against Xi’s anti-market measures. Now, with last month’s Central Economic Work Conference, the Communist Party appears to have now acknowledged a number of Xi’s measures have indeed gone too far, especially as Xi himself seeks to maximize economic stability ahead of his bid for reappointment to another term in office at the 20th Party Congress this November. But whether these corrective measures will be enough to restore economic growth in the short term given the Chinese private sector is now “once bitten, twice shy” is another question altogether. In China: An Economic and Political Outlook for 2022 – Domestic Political Reaction to China’s Economic Slowdown ASPI President and CEO Kevin Rudd tackles these questions and provides an analysis of how China’s economic challenges are likely to shape its politics and policies in the year ahead.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

42. Will the Xi Jinping Leadership Take Up Reformist Policies After the 20th Party Congress?

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: That President Xi Jinping and his faction will dominate the 20th Party Congress is apparent from the Politburo announcement that the week-long, five-yearly conclave will take place on October 16. The Politburo meeting, which was held on August 30, said that the guiding principle of the party and country would remain “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” (Gov.cn, October 16). The Politburo reasserted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would follow principles laid down by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and above all, Xi Jinping. However, the dictums on reform and the open door – as well as the “lie low” foreign policy – promulgated by “Chief Architect of Reform” Deng in the 1980s and 1990s were conspicuously absent from the Party Congress announcement. Instead, the communique emphasized the so-called “three continuances” (三个继续, san ge jixu). This is a reference to Xi’s efforts to uphold Mao Zedong-style “common prosperity” (共同富裕, gongtongfuyu); to sustain “party construction” (党的建设 (dang de jianshe) in order to ensure the loyalty of cadres; and to work toward the formation of a “community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体,renlei mingyun gongtongti) (Xinhua, August 30; Ming Pao, August 30).
Topic:: Politics, Reform, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

43. China and Sri Lanka’s Debt Crisis: Belt and Road Initiative Blowback

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Sri Lanka is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis. For several months, the country has been reeling under a severe foreign exchange crisis. In early May, Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said that its usable forex reserves were just $50 million (Daily News, May 5). As a result, Sri Lanka has been forced to suspend repayment of $51 billion worth of debt owed to China, Japan and other foreign creditors (The Hindu, April 12; The Island, April 13). The country has also been unable to pay for imports of essential commodities, and has experienced serious shortages of food, fuel and medicine (The Island, January 15). The economic crisis has in turn triggered a political crisis. Public anger has boiled over onto the streets. Angry protesters have been calling for the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (Colombo Telegraph, April 7). The Rajapaksa family has dominated Sri Lankan politics for decades and several members of the family are in positions of power as ministers, legislators or heads of corporations and departments. Sri Lankans want the entire clan out. Some of them, including Mahinda, resigned under public pressure in recent months (Island, April 17). Although Gotabaya remains president and under the country’s executive presidential system, continues to wield enormous power, it is evident that the influence of the Rajapaksas has declined. The unfolding crises in Sri Lanka have implications beyond the island. China is among Sri Lanka’s largest bilateral lenders and has played a big role in the island’s infrastructure development. Sri Lanka is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite China’s pledges that BRI would boost Sri Lanka’s economic and social development by transforming it into “the hub of the Indian Ocean”, Chinese loans are widely believed to have pushed the country into a ‘debt trap’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sri Lanka, June 16, 2017). How have the crises impacted China’s image in Sri Lanka and will the decline of the Rajapaksas, widely regarded as ‘pro-China,’ impact Sino-Sri Lankan relations? Finally, will the Sri Lankan crises affect the fate of BRI?
Topic:: Debt, Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, and Sri Lanka

44. Future Global Policeman? The Growing Extraterritorial Reach of PRC Law Enforcement

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The recently signed security agreement between the Solomon Islands and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the support of Chinese police to the Solomon Islands government to suppress social unrest in November 2021, highlight the increasing international deployment of PRC law enforcement (China Daily, April 2). This deployment follows several decades of expanding PRC international law enforcement activity, which is intended for extraterritorial enforcement action, seeking the return of fugitives, and as part of China’s engagement with other countries. The 2021 violence in the capital, Honiara, led to destruction in the local Chinatown and the subsequent deployment of Chinese police officers, who have previously provided equipment and training to the Solomon Islands. The China Police Liaison Team is led by Zhang Guangbo, an officer of the rank of Commissioner third class, who stated that the deployment is intended to protect the safety of Chinese communities in the Solomon Islands as well as to contribute to the overall stability in the islands (Embassy of the PRC in the Solomon Islands, March 4). There has been considerable unease in wider region over the expanded deployment of Chinese police officers to the Solomon Islands. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States have all criticized the security pact, and have raised concerns that the deployment of Chinese police officers could lead to a future military presence. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated on March 25 that “Australia is aware of the proposed draft Security Cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands…We would be particularly concerned by any actions that undermine the stability and security of our region, including the establishment of a permanent presence such as a military base” (Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2022). In response to these concerns, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia has said that if Chinese police officers were called on for assistance they would be under the command of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and stated that “We will try and do our best in terms of dealing with them to make sure that what is happening in other countries where, like Hong Kong, doesn’t happen in our country” (Solomon Times, 6 May 2022).
Topic:: Security, Politics, Law Enforcement, and Economy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

45. The Beijing Olympics in Retrospect: An Anti-Human Rights Politics Machine

Author:: Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the U.S. and other Western nations announced diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently exhorted the international community to keep politics out of the games (People’s Daily, December 8, 2021). Spokespersons of the Beijing Organizing Committee also objected to the “politicization” of the Olympic Games, and claimed that the closed loop Olympic bubble was solely a COVID-19 containment measure necessitated by growing concerns over the spread of the Omicron variant in China (Global Times, January 5). Although, the creation of a closed loop bubble was ostensibly undertaken for epidemic prevention purposes, it also had the impact of isolating athletes and journalists, and forestalling unwanted international focus on poor human rights conditions in China.
Topic:: Human Rights, Politics, Sports, and Olympics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

46. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: News Framing in Political, Strategic, and Economic Perspectives in Print Media of Pakistan

Author:: Hammad Naseer, Muhammad Raza Majid, and Malik Adnan
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The treatment, image, and issues related to CPEC become significant when this venture is considered a game-changer for the Pakistani economy. This study analyzes the CPEC coverage in Pakistan's highly circulated English newspaper, Daily Dawn, and The News. The quantitative content analysis technique is employed for this study from April 2015 to December 2019. This study aims to explore how news contents of selected newspapers portray the image of CPEC and the treatment of selected newspapers toward this project. The theoretical foundation of this study work under the Grunig models of Public Relations. The findings of this study reveal that both newspapers portray a positive image of CPEC. The primary focus of the news content of selected newspapers is information regarding the economic and political aspects of this project, while inadequate significance is given to strategic, social, and legal aspects. Moreover, from Grunig’s models' perspective, major public relations practices worked under the public information and press agent model.
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Media, and CPEC
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and South Asia

47. PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng

Author:: Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Normalization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

48. Japan's "Economic Security" Measures

Author:: Didi Kirsten Tatlow and Afra Herr
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Japan and Germany face an acute dilemma. China, a key trading partner for both nations, uses political warfare and economic statecraft to advance its interests. Like Germany, Japan has a strong SME economy and auto industry, and has dependencies on China. Yet Japan faces more risk due to its geographical proximity to China and territorial disputes. As global tensions grow, Japan is responding robustly by building economic security. Germany, together with the EU and other like-minded partners, should do the same.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Politics, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, and Germany

49. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China: Linkages, real and imagined

Author:: David S. G. Goodman
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: An exploration of the significance of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party based on the linkages apparent in and through its proceedings. The article argues that the Congress represents less of a break with the past than the affirmation of policies and practices long since established in the CCP's operational handbook. The CCP is presented as both a learning organisation and the guiding presence that guarantees China's continued development.
Topic:: Development, Politics, Political Parties, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS