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202. The Geopolitical Impact of USAID’s Retreat on Humanitarian Aid: Towards a Complementary Approach between China and the EU?
- Author:
- Edouard Xia and Alexandre Piron
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Trump’s decision to cut funding and stop most of USAID’s projects will have lasting consequences. First and foremost, it adds great pressure on an already big funding gap. Forgotten and underfunded crises will suffer from it. But Trump’s action will also bear an effect on the nature of humanitarian aid itself. USAID’s retreat accelerates a geopolitical shift. China, “Champion of the Global South”, will inevitably fill the void and promote its own model of foreign aid. Development, economic and humanitarian rationales are therefore expected to be increasingly mixed at the expense of a principled approach. What could in turn the EU, and Belgium within it, do? Could they play the role of a “missing link” and promote a complementary approach to China? This brief offers insights on some questions ahead of the upcoming European Humanitarian Forum.
- Topic:
- Humanitarian Aid, European Union, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
203. Military policy toward China: The case against overreaction
- Author:
- John Mueller
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- It is often argued that the policies of containment and military deterrence worked against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and many have urged applying these same policies to China today. However, it is not clear that containment was all that successful during the Cold War nor is it clear that it should now be applied to China. Should it pursue the “hegemonic” ambitions often attributed to it, China, like the USSR, may prove its own worst enemy by overstretching its resources and provoking its neighbors. In any case, China does not seem to harbor hegemonic ambitions. Its existing gestures at global influence, like the Belt and Road Initiative, are in disarray and unlikely to work. Rather than rushing to more forcefully contain or balance China, the United States should let China make its own mistakes. Doing nothing or next to nothing against a perceived threat isn’t always wise or politically popular but in this case it’s the most rational choice. The U.S. can wait for China to mellow while warily profiting from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible and expanding mutually beneficial exchange. The U.S. can also help Taiwan prepare to defend itself while maintaining that the island is independent so long as it doesn’t say so.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Deterrence, and Containment
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
204. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific
- Author:
- Mike Sweeney
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
205. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support
- Author:
- Lyle Goldstein
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America
206. Target Taiwan: One China and cross-strait stability
- Author:
- Lyle Goldstein
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Washington should not move away from the One China policy, as doing so would increase the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” remains appropriate to the volatile cross-strait situation, but some policymakers overestimate the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Recent administrations have taken steps to undermine the One China policy as part of an American strategy to counter China across the board, but this has had the deleterious effect of causing the U.S. and China to come to the brink of war over Taiwan. A realist approach to the Taiwan issue accepts and even seeks to strengthen both strategic ambiguity and the One China policy. In doing so, it increases the odds of negotiated solutions to disagreements while ensuring U.S. military forces are in a less vulnerable and volatile defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Invasion, and Strategic Ambiguity
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
207. Setting the Stage: An Overview of Chinese and Russian Interests and Influence in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Robert E. Hamilton
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- In late September, a US HC-103J Super Hercules spotted four foreign vessels operating about 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island, Alaska. Upon closer inspection, the patrol turned out to be Russian Border Guard and Chinese Coast Guard ships. While this marked the northernmost location at which the US military has spotted Chinese ships operating, the presence of the joint Chinese-Russian patrol fit an increasingly common pattern. This sighting was the third time in three months that the US has spotted either Chinese or Russian ships close to Alaska. In both 2022 and 2023, the US Navy sent assets to shadow joint Chinese-Russian naval patrols operating in the Aleutian Islands region.[1] The Chinese and Russian navies have also been operating together near US partners and allies closer to their own shores, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2021, a Chinese-Russian patrol circumnavigated Japan’s main island. China’s official description of the event claimed the flotilla was focused on “maintaining international and regional strategic stability,” while Russia’s Defense Ministry said its goal was to “maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” In an understatement that certainly masked some alarm, Japan merely characterized the patrol as “unusual.”[2] Since then, the pace of Chinese-Russian naval patrols and exercises in the region has increased, with several in 2024 alone. One of these, Ocean 2024, involved some 90,000 troops and more than 500 ships and aircraft, according to the Kremlin, and was the largest of such exercises in 30 years. Ocean 2024 came on the heels of another joint naval patrol in the northern Pacific and another set of drills in the waters off Japan.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific
208. Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific: China’s Use of the Instruments of Power
- Author:
- Robert E. Hamilton
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- The first report in this series examined Chinese and Russian influence and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This report, the second of five in the series, analyzes China’s use of the instruments of power to build its influence and advance its interests in a region it sees as vital to its future. We use a modified version of the DIME framework (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) here, with the modification being that we do not analyze the information instruments separately. Even in an information environment as controlled as China’s, the state has multiple ways to shape the information space—some official and some unofficial, some acknowledged and others unacknowledged. Given these facts, a separate examination of the information instrument is beyond the scope of this report. Although it does not explicitly analyze the information instrument, the report weaves Beijing’s use of information throughout the narrative. The report analyzes Beijing’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments in the Indo-Pacific region, and then examines how Russia perceives China’s activity in the region. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, the report examines Chinese activity in the following subregions: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Japan/East China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)/South China Sea, and India.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Power Politics, Economy, Strategic Interests, Influence, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
209. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability
- Author:
- Aaron Stein
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
- Topic:
- National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- North America, United States of America, China, and Russia
210. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific
- Author:
- Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
211. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment
- Author:
- Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
212. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies
- Author:
- John Lee and Lavina Lee
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
213. Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump
- Author:
- Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli, and Pawel Zerka
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- ECFR polling reveals the gloom that has fallen over European perceptions of the transatlantic relationship since early November. Respondents are more likely to call the US merely a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally”. But views of Donald Trump’s return vary markedly according to country and political outlook. That, and intra-European differences on both Russia-Ukraine and China, create ample opportunities for Trump to split Europeans. Building a broad coalition of “Euro-optimists” along with more cautious groups can help European leaders resist any such attempts—and even forge a new dawn in transatlantic relations.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
214. Eyes wide shut: How to read China’s playbook in the Western Balkans
- Author:
- Vladimir Shopov
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The EU lacks a clear “China conditionality” in its enlargement policy with Western Balkan countries—that is, defining and implementing conditions for candidates to engage with China—and the topic of China remains largely absent from accession talks. The EU’s own hesitant China policy is in part to blame. The union’s official stance of balancing cooperation and rivalry no longer reflects EU actions in practice, which lean towards confrontation. As membership talks stall, China’s influence in the Western Balkans grows, raising fears that new member states could act as promoters of Chinese interests and veto actions against Beijing in the EU. The EU must clarify its China policy and embed it as a clear conditionality in the accession process. It also needs to establish a firm timeline for Western Balkan membership and strike a better balance between requirements and incentives to encourage progress.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Enlargement
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Western Balkans
215. China's Investment Pivot and Africa’s Industrial Prospects: Any Hope for African “Flying Geese”?
- Author:
- Charles Kenny
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Global Development (CGD)
- Abstract:
- This paper examines the changing shape of Chinese investment in Africa, as it evolves from large scale infrastructure toward small scale manufacturing. It looks at the opportunity for the region in the context of a deepening manufacturing labor shortage in China; discusses barriers to that opportunity in both China and the Africa region; and the potential response of Western countries. It may be possible for at least some economies in Africa to benefit from a combination of Chinese investment in manufactured export and processed commodity industries and preferential access to economies including the US and China if geopolitics allow, but there are many reasons this could fail and the geopolitics are increasingly hostile. A backup plan for regional growth would be wise.
- Topic:
- Debt, Investment, Trade, Industry, and Development Policy
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
216. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics
- Author:
- Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
217. Cambio Climático y Transición Energética: Una Transformación Geopolítica en Marcha
- Author:
- Xira Ruiz
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- El artículo analiza la dimensión geopolítica del cambio climático y de la transición energética, en un contexto internacional marcado por la rivalidad entre grandes potencias y la fragmentación del orden global. Se exploran los efectos que estas transformaciones generan en la reconfiguración de las interdependencias materiales, el acceso a recursos críticos y la redefinición de la seguridad energética. El texto se centra especialmente en el papel de Estados Unidos, China y la Unión Europea, así como en las implicaciones para el Sur Global. También analiza el desplazamiento del liderazgo climático desde los marcos multilaterales tradicionales hacia nuevas formas de diplomacia orientadas a la competencia por el liderazgo tecnológico y el control de cadenas de valor. El artículo concluye que la transición energética implica una reorganización estratégica de las relaciones internacionales, que genera nuevas formas de dependencia, redefine las prioridades de seguridad y plantea desafíos para la equidad global y la gobernanza compartida.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Energy Transition, Energy Security, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- China, United States of America, and Global South
218. Countering the Digital Silk Road
- Author:
- Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
219. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Saudi Arabia
- Author:
- Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The fourth case study focuses on Saudi Arabia. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team traveled to the country to interview U.S. and Saudi policymakers, personnel in technology firms, members of civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Saudi Arabia’s digital ecosystem.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia
220. Understanding China’s New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa
- Author:
- Jason Warner
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, Foreign Influence, and Security Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
221. Ten Years of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia: The Critical Assessment and Future Directions
- Author:
- Elżbieta Proń
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Polish Political Science Yearbook
- Institution:
- Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
- Abstract:
- This paper looks at how China’s use of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in its policy towards Central Asia (CA) has changed since 2013 and what this change signalizes regarding China’s use of the BRI at international forums. To answer these research questions, the paper focuses on Central Asia – once dubbed “the first strand of the BRI” (R. Pantucci); the region where China has “tested” many institutions of its international engagement; and where the BRI was introduced in 2013. To answer the research questions, this study draws from analyzing literature and sources in Russian, Chinese, English, and Polish. This study is primarily empirically oriented. This study finds that at its 10, the BRI will focus on connectivity, clean energy, and new technologies. It also finds that despite the high profile of the Green BRI and many relevant agreements, only a fraction of projects are branded “Green BRI.” It thus argues that the BRI has served as a legitimizing “umbrella” label for various Chinese policy initiatives, which are realized via other cooperation formats.
- Topic:
- Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Renewable Energy, and Silk Road
- Political Geography:
- China and Central Asia
222. The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety
- Author:
- Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathias Thoenig
- Publication Date:
- 12-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
- Abstract:
- We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
- Topic:
- International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Risk, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
223. The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations
- Author:
- Krystyna Sikora and Bret Schafer
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- It is easy to dismiss foreign information operations as playing out at the national level, designed to influence federal policymakers and Beltway insiders. But these threats transcend the “Beltway Bubble”. Increasingly, foreign nation-state actors are running operations that exploit trust in local sources and impact state and local communities. US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to better target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States to destabilize the country at home and weaken it on the world stage. These nation states are increasingly exploiting domestic actors to launder and manipulate content that originates in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran and ultimately reaches American audiences who have no way of knowing they are on the receiving end of foreign information operations. They are also experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI), which, according to the US intelligence community, has allowed nation-state actors to “improve and accelerate” their operations, potentially enabling them to reach more Americans with more targeted content. Adversaries understand that state and local governments and communities are foundational to the strength of American democracy, so it is no surprise that they have targeted individuals and issues at the local level. In some cases, adversarial nations seek favorable outcomes around local policy issues; in others, they use local debates as Trojan horses to advance their broader geopolitical agendas. In others still, they attempt to influence views on the integrity of US elections and institutions or disenfranchise American citizens in specific communities to destabilize and erode trust in American democracy. But in all cases, American democratic discourse and the country’s information space—messy as they can sometimes be—are being used as primary vectors to advance foreign interests. If Americans lack that understanding, their communities—and the country—are left vulnerable. This report outlines an example of a foreign information operation targeting each of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Each case study indicates the foreign threat actor (if known) and explains the tools, tactics, and motivations for targeting Americans at the state and local level.
- Topic:
- Security, Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence, and Information Manipulation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America
224. Media Vassalage: How Venezuela’s TeleSUR Acts as Russia’s and China’s Information- Laundering Front
- Author:
- Peter Benzoni
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- After a contested July presidential election in which Nicolás Maduro claimed victory with 51% of the vote—amid allegations of irregularities, limited oversight, and too few international observers—Venezuela was thrown into turmoil. The Carter Center, one of the few sanctioned observers, concluded the “election did not meet international standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic.” To sustain its tenuous grip on power, Maduro’s administration must seek legitimacy from powerful allies such as Russia and China, even while attempting to mend ties with the Trump administration—an effort the latter had warmed to, then cooled on. Digital Forensic Research Lab fellow Iria Puyosa argues that authoritarian regimes across Latin America engage in cross-regional authoritarian collaboration in the form of “strategies to manipulate media and information spaces in order to undermine weak democracies … and help like-minded illiberal leaders seize and consolidate power”. For Venezuela, this manifests in its subordinate relationships with Russia and China, hinging on mutual legitimation—endorsing each other’s elections, governance practices, and policies—and strategic amplification, in which China and Russia promote their preferred narratives and national interests in Venezuela. Yet TeleSUR, Venezuela’s premier state media outlet, does not parrot Russian and Chinese lines under duress. Rather, its editorial line frequently aligns with those of these major powers due to overlapping ideological and political goals, including a shared desire for a multipolar world that counters Western influence and sanctions. This synergy allows Venezuela to secure vital international support and reinforce its domestic legitimacy, thus preserving the Maduro administration’s foothold in power. Venezuela, in turn, recreates this same patron-client relationship with its own regional allies—a dynamic we term “media vassalage.”
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Foreign Interference, and Nicolas Maduro
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, South America, and Venezuela
225. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan
- Author:
- Bonnie S. Glaser
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- In an increasingly fractured world where authoritarianism is gaining ground, Taiwan stands as one of the strongest and most resilient democracies. Taiwan placed first in Asia and 12th globally in the 2025 democracy index compiled by the London-based Economic Intelligence Unit. This year, Freedom House ranked Taiwan as the sixth-freest country in the world with a score of 94 out of 100. These are remarkable achievements for a relatively young democracy that experienced decades of authoritarian rule, lifted martial law in 1987, and conducted its first direct presidential election in 1996. Taiwan is also an economic powerhouse. With just 23.5 million people, Taiwan has a GDP of nearly $760 billion, which puts it close to the top 20 economies of the world. Its crucial role in global technology supply chains is unquestionable, especially in semiconductor manufacturing, where Taiwanese companies produce close to 70% of the world’s chips and over 90% of the most advanced ones. Taiwan is also driving innovation and delivering state-of-the-art solutions in artificial intelligence, information technology, and renewable energy. Taiwan is a global leader in public health, including medical technology, public hygiene, and transplants. It has one of the best national health care systems in the world and among the most competitive biomedical industries. Taiwan is also among the world’s leading nations in scientific research to improve prevention and detection of diseases. Another area where Taiwan excels is in the provision of disaster preparedness and relief, both domestically and internationally. Taiwan’s government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) frequently provide aid to countries affected by disasters, donating supplies, offering financial assistance, and dispatching search and rescue teams. After Japan’s massive Tohoku earthquake in 2011, Taiwan donated over $250 million in combined aid. Following the 2023 earthquake in Türkiye, Taiwan provided financial aid along with a search-and-rescue team. Taiwan’s importance to the international community is undeniable. As a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Taiwan has demonstrated that it is a valuable and reliable partner. Yet Taiwan is largely excluded from participating in the United Nations System, including the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Kimberley Process aimed at ensuring that diamonds are not used to fund violent conflicts or undermine legitimate governments. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) actively thwarts Taiwan’s participation in international organizations by exerting pressure within those organizations and on individual member countries. The Taiwan-US-Europe Policy Program (TUPP) encourages young professionals from the United States and Europe to include Taiwan in their research and activities and help Taiwan to expand its global networks. Established in 2017, annual TUPP delegations were originally composed only of Americans, but expanded to include Europeans in 2022 in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the world. Delegation members are selected through a rigorous application process. The annual program begins in Washington, DC, where the cohort (5 Americans and 5 Europeans) meets with officials and experts, and continues with a week-long visit to Taiwan to gain firsthand exposure to Taiwan’s politics, culture, and history. Through their participation in TUPP and especially their experience in Taiwan, participants are instilled with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history, its commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order, and its potential to contribute more actively to international organizations. They also gain a deeper understanding of the importance of strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Over time, TUPP aims to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. It is my earnest hope that all the TUPP participants will be inspired to work both on and with Taiwan. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of these goals. The contributions here, written by the members of the 2025 TUPP cohort, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate greater transatlantic and global attention to Taiwan and its future.
- Topic:
- Democracy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
226. Risky Configuration: China’s Footprint in Germany’s Technology Stack
- Author:
- Sharinee Jagtiani
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Germany—just like the EU as a whole—has recognized the strategic importance of reducing unilateral dependencies in digital technologies. In the face of geopolitical threats and economic uncertainty, the new German government has vowed to strengthen the country’s technological growth and resilience. Germany confronts a changing global order, in which it faces a growing threat from Russia while traditional security guarantees under the transatlantic alliance have weakened. While the threat from Russia dominates Berlin’s immediate strategic concerns, the growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing demands that this challenge cannot be viewed in isolation. As Germany recalibrates its national security posture from a peacetime orientation to one prepared for potential war, it is crucial to address the deepening strategic ties between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as part of a broader, interconnected threat. The PRC’s growing dominance in the German technology landscape threatens both Germany’s national security and its long-term economic resilience. Germany’s new government should now make increased efforts to effectively implement its China strategy, especially in the technology sector. Reducing exposure to systemic risks and de-risking the technological ecosystem is an urgent economic need and should be a security priority. This analysis examines the digital footprint of PRC entities in Germany’s technology ecosystem. It applies a “tech stack” framework to assess this footprint and its associated risks across five technology layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. The report illustrates the PRC’s involvement within each layer, situates this engagement within the PRC’s broader strategic objectives and identifies key vulnerabilities that could undermine Germany’s security and competitiveness if left unaddressed.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Germany
227. Europe Between the United States and China
- Author:
- Gesine Weber
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
228. The New Political Economy of Supply: resources, rare earths and finance
- Author:
- Philip Andrews-Speed
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- China is the dominant player in the global low-carbon energy transition in two respects: it has deployed the largest fleet of low-carbon electricity generation capacity in the world, and it dominates several international supply chains for clean energy minerals, metals and equipment. China has installed a massive amount of infrastructure for both solar and wind energy since 2010. The total capacity reached 1,300 GW by the end of 2024, which is more than 45% of the global total. Investment in hydro power and nuclear power also continues. These non-fossil fuels accounted for about 40% of the nation’s power generation in 2024. At the same time, the country has built up the world’s largest electric vehicle industry and is likely to take the lead in the manufacture and use of green hydrogen. This success has been built upon several foundations. Most important are the various policies of central and local government that supported investment and innovation along the clean energy supply chains over two decades or more. In the early days, this relied on technology transfer from abroad. More recently, the development of technology and manufacturing clusters have assisted scaling up and innovation, all supported by abundant and skilled human capital (Hove, 2024). All this adds credibility to Xi Jinping’s pledge to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and ‘strive for’ carbon neutrality by 2060. However, energy and fossil fuel consumption are still rising, as are carbon emissions. Coal is the main culprit as the country has large reserves, and the government sees coal as providing the foundation for energy security. Coal accounted for about 55% of power generation in 2024 and remains an important fuel in some industries. The continued increase in the use of coal will result in the peak of carbon emissions being significantly higher than might have been projected ten years ago. The good news is that the declining rate of GDP growth combined with the increasing electrification of the economy may result in emissions peaking in the next two-to-three years.
- Topic:
- Political Economy, Natural Resources, Finance, Carbon Emissions, Rare earth elements (REEs), and Energy Transition
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
229. Unsolicited Thoughts on How the New Administration Can Improve American Diplomacy
- Author:
- Raymond F. Smith
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- A country’s political leadership establishes its foreign policy goals, and its diplomatic service works to achieve them. Ideally, a country’s fundamental foreign policy goals should be so clear and compelling that they transcend specific administrations and provide enduring guidelines for carrying out the work of diplomacy. Previous post-Cold War administrations have made half-hearted, but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to do this. The new administration may want to consider these three strategic objectives: 1) create a more stable international system; 2) avoid an alliance between China and Russia; 3) decrease the likelihood of a nuclear war. These objectives are clear, compelling, and enduring. The benefits of any system adhere disproportionately to those at the top of the system. Since we are at the top of the current international system, no one has a greater interest in its stability than we do. An alliance between the other nuclear superpower and the other economic superpower would represent a clear and present danger to our preeminence. And in all likelihood, we’d all be dead after a major nuclear war. A diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives should include: 1) prioritizing US interests; 2) talking less and listening more; and 3) leading by example.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, Strategic Interests, and International System
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North America, and United States of America
230. India: Strategic Partner or Global Challenger?
- Author:
- Keith McCormick
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- American Diplomacy
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- This article provides the highlights of the discussions at this year’s DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired) conference on how the US should deal with a rising India. The participants—academics, retired diplomats, and current government officials—participated on the basis of no attribution. The three panels discussed whether India can be a new strategic partner for the US in containing China; how the US. should respond to the Modi government’s increasing use of Hindu chauvinism to undermine democracy and tolerance; and what is ahead for India’s economy, including whether it will become the leader of the Global South in challenging the current, Western-dominated international trading order.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, Trade, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, and India
231. Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals
- Author:
- Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
- Abstract:
- The United States and its allies and partners face a two-pronged crisis. Increases in global temperatures call for the rapid expansion of critical mineral infrastructure—to include mines and refinement—if we hope to deploy the technology needed to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Meanwhile, the United States’ primary geopolitical adversary has obtained a near-monopoly position in the supply of most of these minerals. Heavy use of certain minerals in our defense-industrial base further underscores the need to reduce reliance on People’s Republic of China (PRC) supplies. Both our climate and our national security demand concerted efforts to wean us away from fossil fuels and the PRC’s market power. In the spring of 2024, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) convened a New Global Commons working group over two meetings titled “Mission Critical: Securing America’s Critical Minerals.” Working group participants represented academia, think tanks, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, bringing a broad range of experience and global perspectives to the discussions. Participants discussed definitions of critical minerals and the need for a successful green energy transition to support digital technology and fulfill 21st-century defense needs. Participants weighed the complexity of overlapping issues and how the United States and its partners might best effectively coordinate and balance these issues.
- Topic:
- National Security, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Mining, Energy, Green Transition, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
232. Building on Momentum in U.S.-Turkey Relations
- Author:
- Soner Cagaptay
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The two leaders can use their personal rapport to solve bilateral and regional problems, but they will also face tough challenges in matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dealings with China. In the second in a series of TRANSITION 2025 memos, Soner Cagaptay explores areas for U.S. partnership with Turkey in the Middle East and beyond. After a decade of malaise, relations between the two countries have lately recovered thanks to Turkish support for Sweden’s accession to NATO, granted in return for permission to buy U.S. F-16 fighter jets. The personal magnetism between President Trump and his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could smooth the way for further cooperation in military and economic areas, and also potentially help the new U.S. administration in Ukraine and Syria. But complex challenges remain, relating not only to the Syrian conflict—where Ankara and Washington backed different actors—but also to dealings with China and affinities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. MIDDLE EAST POLICY TRANSITION 2025 by Washington Institute experts address challenges and opportunities for the Trump-Vance administration during a period of extraordinary change in the Middle East. A primary challenge will be countering Iran’s march toward the bomb. Also critical will be determining a sustainable U.S. force posture in the region and updating America’s counterterrorism mission. Opportunities, meanwhile, are suddenly ample after blows to the “axis of resistance” and include the imperative to forge a better relationship with Turkey, which is set to be an influential player in post-Assad Syria.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
233. Saudi Public Opinion in a Changing Middle East: Great Powers, the Gaza War, Pathways for the Kingdom
- Author:
- Catherine Cleveland
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- China and Russia get higher marks than the United States, and Israel normalization is on hold—but respondents view Hamas negatively, want Arab involvement in the peace process, and increasingly support moderate interpretations of Islam. Recent polling in Saudi Arabia offers reasons for concern as well as optimism regarding U.S. interests. On the downside, Saudi respondents are more likely to prioritize good relations with China or Russia as opposed to America, despite a history of U.S.-Saudi strategic ties. Likewise, enthusiasm for Israel-Saudi normalization has fallen from already-low levels amid the Gaza war, although support is slightly higher for business links. More encouragingly, respondents express negative views about Hamas, growing support for an Arab role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and increasing sympathy for moderate interpretations of Islam, mirroring the trajectory of Riyadh’s official rhetoric. In this Policy Note, polling expert Catherine Cleveland offers thought-provoking analysis of surveys taken shortly before Israel’s twelve-day war with Iran. U.S. policymakers can chart a productive course, she explains, by first taking an honest look at Saudi public skepticism of bilateral ties and then promoting initiatives more likely to earn support.
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Normalization, Hamas, Regional Politics, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Palestine, Gaza, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
234. Here’s How State Department Cuts Would Impede U.S. Policy in the Middle East
- Author:
- Ben Fishman and Elizabeth Surman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The Trump administration’s budget cuts, intended to make America “safer, stronger, and more prosperous,” could wind up harming U.S. interests in the region while strengthening Russian and Chinese media warfare. At a time when the Middle East needs additional help managing the fallout from the war with Iran, the extreme State Department budget cuts initiated by the Trump administration are especially ill-timed. By cutting funds to partners who combat Iran’s most dangerous regional proxies, the administration risks enabling a faster rehabilitation of Tehran’s “axis of resistance.” Other cuts would limit Washington’s ability to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to Yemen, constrain efforts to reach the Iranian people, and cede ground to China and Russia in the information wars—one of the many negative repercussions of eliminating a vital network like Voice of America (VOA). The Senate has until July 18 to object to these cuts because the administration submitted its budget by means of a rescission bill, a rarely used procedure that gives Congress a limited period to respond to the administration’s proposal before it takes effect.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, State Department, and Humanitarian Assistance
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, and United States of America
235. Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar
- Author:
- Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan
- Publication Date:
- 12-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based firms are expanding rare-earth mining in Myanmar’s Shan and Kachin States by partnering with militias that lease mines, provide security, and tax exports. Satellite imagery shows a rapid increase in rare earth elements (REE) sites since 2015, turning militia-held enclaves into major suppliers of dysprosium, terbium, and other critical minerals for the PRC. As U.S.–PRC competition intensifies, Myanmar’s fragmented sovereignty enables armed groups with ties to Beijing to shape REE supply chains, complicating potential U.S. and Indian efforts to source Burmese minerals.
- Topic:
- Sovereignty, Natural Resources, Strategic Competition, Militias, Supply Chains, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
- Political Geography:
- China, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and United States of America
236. How Trump’s Foreign Policy May Hurt US Interests in Southeast Asia
- Author:
- Aristyo Rizka Darmawan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- Donald Trump’s neglect of Southeast Asia, coupled with controversial foreign policy decisions like his Gaza proposal and the abolishment of USAID, is eroding US credibility and trust in the region. As ASEAN states seek alternative partnerships with middle powers and China capitalises on Washington’s missteps, America risks losing its strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, USAID, ASEAN, Strategic Interests, and Middle Powers
- Political Geography:
- China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
237. How Does China’s Rising Defence Budget Affect India?
- Author:
- Neeraj Singh Manhas
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- China’s 2025 defence budget increased by 7.2%, totalling $245 billion, continuing military modernisation under Xi Jinping. Over the past decade, spending has doubled, focusing on advanced tech. This escalates challenges for India in border security and regional balance.
- Topic:
- Modernization, Xi Jinping, Defense Spending, and Military
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, India, and Asia
238. China’s Long Game in Iran’s Short War
- Author:
- Pierre Pahlavi
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- Following the twelve-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, China has quietly accelerated its strategic partnership with a weakened Islamic Republic through renewed infrastructure commitments, expanded technological cooperation, and deepened diplomatic alignment. This calculated entrenchment represents Beijing’s broader ambition to reshape the post-American architecture of influence across Eurasia, potentially shifting the future of Middle Eastern geopolitics away from Western capitals toward Beijing.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Asia
239. Serbia Between Brussels, Beijing, and Moscow: A Foreign Policy of Diversification
- Author:
- Nina Markovic Khaze
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- As global rivalries intensify, Serbia stands at a complex geopolitical juncture. The country is simultaneously pursuing accession negotiations with the European Union (EU), deepening strategic ties with China, and maintaining longstanding relations with Russia.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Diversification, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Serbia
240. After Palestine, Should Australia Recognise Somaliland
- Author:
- Abdi Daud
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- Australia should give serious consideration to recognise Somaliland, particularly following its recognition of Palestine in September 2025. In doing so, it would reinforce its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, align with US interests, counter Chinese expansion, and address practical challenges facing Australian Somaliland communities.
- Topic:
- Strategic Interests, Regional Politics, and Recognition
- Political Geography:
- China, Palestine, Australia, Somaliland, and Indo-Pacific
241. Beyond the Pit: Can Australia Compete in Critical Mineral Processing?
- Author:
- Sangita Gayatri Kannan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- The energy transition depends on critical minerals, but supply chains are vulnerable due to processing concentration in China. Australia can play a key role if it moves beyond raw material exports.
- Topic:
- Natural Resources, Exports, Mining, Supply Chains, Energy Transition, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- China, Australia, and Oceania
242. The Critical Minerals Trap: Why Australia Must Proceed with Caution
- Author:
- Christopher Khatouki
- Publication Date:
- 12-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
- Abstract:
- Australia’s critical minerals push is being sold as a strategic win, but it risks doubling down on a “dumb” commodity economy while locking Canberra deeper into U.S.-led geoeconomic rivalry. With China’s dominance already entrenched and processing environmentally costly and uncompetitive, the real danger is mistaking subsidised extraction for strategy – and sacrificing long-term industrial sovereignty for short-term alliance politics.
- Topic:
- Economy, Mining, Geoeconomics, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- China, Australia, and Oceania
243. Foreign Policy of China: Pursuing the Resources in Afghanistan
- Author:
- Naqibullah Mashwani
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- South Asian Studies
- Institution:
- Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
- Abstract:
- China, a major power playing the peripheral diplomacy to bring developing countries to a table of dialogues, negotiations and international conferences to express their interests and form new relations.Thus, it has always been friendly and supportive to Afghanistan; providing humanitarian aid, investing in infrastructure, and extracting natural resources. However, China spent more on the minerals of Afghanistan during the new acting government than in the previous government. China was not deeply involved economically with the former government though they had signed some significant agreements.This was also one of the reasons China did not resist and took part in the 20 years long war in Afghanistan, instead, China supported, hosted and mediated Taliban. After the fall of Kabul and the return of the Taliban, China turned its policy and filled the vacuum, gave them de facto recognition and backed them in terms of security and economic development. This paper deeply explores the foreign policy of China towards Afghanistan and how they invested in extracting natural resources, infrastructure and tightened major economic agreements with the Taliban and contributed to the internal security and stability.China, a pioneer in oil extraction in Afghanistan has signed significant agreements and contracts with the interim government of Afghanistan for mineral extraction and refinery development.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Natural Resources, and Taliban
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, China, and Asia
244. Constructive Role of State-Owned Broadcaster in Elevating Economic Development and Peacebuilding: The Case Study of China Radio International and CGTN-Radio (2024-2025)
- Author:
- Muhammad Ahmad Sheikh and Muhammad Yousaf
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- South Asian Studies
- Institution:
- Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
- Abstract:
- Constructive or solutions-focused news is often promoted as a way to lessen the conflicts based news and encourage audience to participate in national development, rather than reporting negative, conflict-driven news. (Djerf-Pierre, M., & Ekström, M. (2025) The study analyzes CRI/ CGTN -Radio news, podcast and talk shows highlighting positive economic frames while suggesting a need for stronger constructive journalism practices in prevailing world economic and peace situation. The thematic analysis of the main themes development, peace, and stability in the programmes of CR/CGTN -Radio (state-owned broadcaster) of China show mostly positive coverage. The programming content reveals that the news coverage of china radio international and CGTN-Radio emphasizes the economic development and peace initiatives of Pakistan and China. This study employs qualitative content analysis. Furthermore, the research highlights the necessity for constructive journalism globally, with a particular focus on China. The results indicate that state media prioritizes solutions to issues, social and economic stability, sustainability, and prosperous development.
- Topic:
- Journalism, Economic Development, Peacebuilding, and Radio
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia
245. Artificial Intelligence and the New World Order: A Comparative Study of US-China Technological Rivalry
- Author:
- Adnan Nawaz, Syed Raghab Ali, Naudir Bakht, and Zosha Noor
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- South Asian Studies
- Institution:
- Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
- Abstract:
- The power rivalry between the United States and China in the twenty-first century has been significantly influenced by advancements in artificial intelligence. This technology not only transforms economic markets but also enhances military capabilities and shapes political governance. This research explores the historical progression of AI development across these countries by showing how their unique political frameworks, alongside economic tables and strategic visions, created separate paths toward AI domination. During the Cold War years, the United States paced ahead through governmental investments combined with university innovation and its flexible private sector activity yet China obtained its growth through state-mandated direction and national planning alongside substantial financial allocations in line with initiatives like the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. China's Belt and Road initiative employs AI surveillance tools to construct new infrastructure as the United States depends on autonomous private enterprise operations without state control and freedom to conduct independent research. The competition between China and the United States targets multiple areas including semiconductor manufacturing technology together with quantum computing research and ethical standards creation which exposes weaknesses for each side. This study qualitatively evaluates the competition between US and China and analytically elucidates the key challenges which are posing threats to the global power hierarchy.AI operates as an accelerating force that shapes future power dynamics while determining digital sovereignty principles and deepening global ideological conflicts.
- Topic:
- Governance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Digital Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
246. Intersectionality and Atrocity Crimes: Reflecting on the Experiences of Youth in Atrocity Situations
- Author:
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- Mass atrocity crimes are often perpetrated against populations based on shared identity characteristics, such as ethnicity, religion, race or language. In many contexts, individuals who belong to more than one marginalized group face heightened and compounded risks. These risks are shaped by the unique social and political dynamics of a given context, where assumptions about power and identity intersect. There is growing recognition that failing to address complex and overlapping identities can obscure or deny the human rights inherent to all. Effective atrocity prevention must reflect the diversity of populations around the world and recognize how intersecting identities contribute to vulnerability and risk. Applying an intersectional lens is essential to identifying early warning signs, understanding the drivers of identity-based violence and ensuring no one is overlooked. This new policy brief focuses on the specific risks faced by youth in atrocity situations, particularly when multiple forms of identity compound their vulnerability. This brief underscores the urgent need to meaningfully center youth perspectives, in all their diversity, within national, regional and multilateral atrocity prevention strategies and decision-making processes. The brief draws on case studies from the Gaza Strip, El Salvador, Sudan and the Uyghur community in and beyond China. These examples are informed by testimony and insights shared by youth activists during an event hosted by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the European Union on 18 April 2024. Participants included young advocates for marginalized ethnic groups, people with disabilities and LGBTQIA+ youth, who shared their lived experiences and strategies for more inclusive, effective prevention
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Youth, Atrocities, Uyghurs, Identity, and Activism
- Political Geography:
- China, Sudan, Gaza, and El Salvador
247. Strategic Vulnerabilities in Space: U.S.-China Militarization and the Risks to Global Strategic Stability
- Author:
- Ameema Khalid
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- This study investigates the militarization of space by the United States and China using the theoretical frameworks of technological determinism and the security dilemma. Data analysis of policy documents, military doctrines, and strategic literature reveals how technological advancements, mutual distrust, and dual-use technologies have transformed space into a contested domain. Findings indicate that the lack of international regulations and transparency exacerbates the risks of miscalculation and conflict. The study suggests actionable measures, including binding treaties, enhanced transparency, and conflict resolution mechanisms to promote peaceful space exploration. This research contributes to the broader discourse on space security by offering insights into managing militarization challenges in a rapidly advancing technological era.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Space, Strategic Stability, and Militarization
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
248. How Does China View the Western Balkans, Kosovo, and the Normalization Dialogue?
- Author:
- Ramadan Ilazi, Delmin Saljunovic, and Matt Delvoye
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
- Abstract:
- A mix of ideological and pragmatic approaches shapes China’s engagement in the Western Balkans. While the region of the Western Balkans is not central to Beijing’s foreign policy, it offers a critical discursive and geopolitical space through which China challenges the West and tests elements of its broader international relations strategy. In other words, China aspires to rival the West in the Balkans, primarily through economic competition in an effort to preach its political values over international order (or its view of the world) as a model that is, according to the Chinese, better than the model of regional and European integration that the Western Balkans pursues jointly with the West. In this context, Kosovo stands out as an important case. For China, Kosovo is not simply a state that is contested by Serbia but means through which it articulates its opposition to the West and liberal democracy while consolidating its alliance with Serbia. This paper argues that China’s stance on Kosovo is not driven by legal principle but by political utility. Kosovo is treated as a “Western project” to be delegitimized rather than a dispute to be resolved. The paper is structured into five sections. It begins with sections one and two by outlining a conceptual discussion of Chinese foreign policy, aiming to provide a foundation for understanding the underlying principles that drive Chinese foreign policy philosophy. Section three discusses China’s presence in the Western Balkans and discusses the path dependency approach of Chinese foreign policy. Section four presents a discourse analysis of Chinese foreign policy to examine the specific language China employs when discussing Kosovo, Serbia, and the normalization process, based on an analysis of 82 texts totaling over 30,000 words, that include official statements, speeches and interviews from officials largely from 2008 to 2024. Section five adopts a more critical, attitudinal perspective, situating China’s approach within its broader interests in the Western Balkans. Drawing from official Chinese statements, UN Security Council speeches, MFA briefings, and diplomatic visits, the paper traces China’s positioning toward Kosovo, a subject which, to date, has been largely unexplored in Kosovo. At its core, the paper also identifies a consistent pattern of rhetorical distance paired with alignment with Serbia. The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, China’s discourse on Kosovo is grounded in a legalistic framework in appearance or rhetoric and opportunistic in practice. However, even in its legalistic appearance China always ignores ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence in 2010. Second, China’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans is not neutral, but explicitly aligned with Serbia, both rhetorically and technically, and this makes Serbia a key platform for Chinese influence in our region, as other studies have shown.1 Third, despite its support for the EU-led normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in principle, China undermines the process by refusing to endorse its objectives, distancing itself from the notion of “normalization,” and promoting a status quo that favors ambiguity over resolution. For China, Kosovo is not an issue that needs to be resolved, but a Western design liberal-democratic project that needs to fail. In other words, China’s position on Kosovo has largely remained the same since 1998, and viewing Kosovo’s “solution” in a way that best fits interests of Sebia, which, as this paper seeks to show, is largely because of Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Normalization, International Order, and Dialogue
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Kosovo, and Western Balkans
249. How Does the Serbian Security Doctrine View Kosovo, the West, Russia, and China?
- Author:
- Ramadan Ilazi
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
- Abstract:
- This paper analyzes Serbia’s security doctrine as outlined in its National Security Strategy (2021), focusing on how it perceives Kosovo, the West (EU, NATO, and the US), Russia, and China. Serbia’s security posture is shaped by a balancing act— engaging both the West (EU, U.S., NATO) security structures while at the same time maintaining strong strategic relations with Russia and China. Despite its proclaimed military neutrality, Serbia’s security doctrine reflects an aggressive posture toward Kosovo, a skeptical stance on the West, and a deepening strategic alignment with Moscow and Beijing. The strategy frames Kosovo’s independence as a direct challenge to Serbia’s territorial integrity and national security. Serbia’s security apparatus is engaged in diplomatic efforts, intelligence operations, and hybrid warfare to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty and prevent its international recognition. While Serbia rejects NATO membership, it cooperates with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Serbia maintains strong defense and energy ties with Russia, benefiting from diplomatic backing on Kosovo while avoiding Western sanctions on Moscow. China is emerging as a key economic and security partner, providing investments in infrastructure, digital surveillance, and military technology. Serbia has significantly expanded its military capabilities, acquiring weapons from Russia and China while participating in joint drills with both NATO and CSTO. The adoption of the Total Defense concept—mobilizing the entire population and resources for national security—raises concerns about escalation and arms races in the Western Balkans. Serbia’s strategy frames Western influence as a security challenge, particularly regarding media, civil society, and foreign-backed democratization efforts. The West is seen as a hybrid threat, accused of interfering in Serbia’s internal affairs, while Russia and China are portrayed as strategic allies. Serbia’s approach contributes to a geopolitical divide in the Western Balkans, where Kosovo is aligned fully with the West, while Serbia hedges between the EU and authoritarian states, as well as grappling internally with authoritarian practices. Serbia’s influence campaigns portray Kosovo as a source of instability, using disinformation, cyber-attacks, and lobbying efforts to stall Kosovo’s state-consolidation process as well as EU and NATO aspirations. Kosovo’s reactive foreign policy and languishing partnership with the U.S., and the EU create an enabling environment for Serbia’s efforts against Kosovo’s statehood.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Kosovo
250. Signals in the Swarm: The Data Behind China’s Maritime Gray Zone Campaign Near Taiwan
- Author:
- Jose M. Macias and Benjamin Jensen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Under the guise of fishing, Beijing is using dual-use and unmarked vessels to surveil, harass, and assert presence around Taiwan. Analysis of AIS tracks, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) drill zones, and Global Fishing Watch data narrowed a subset of 12,000 vessels traveling near Taiwan on days likely to coincide with maritime drills down to 315 vessels that were both flying the Chinese flag and identified as fishing vessels. The classification framework developed at the Futures Lab flagged 128 likely gray zone actors. Institutionalizing this framework inside a Coalition Joint-Maritime Anomaly Cell (CJ-MAC) would automate anomaly detection and scale coverage across the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific. CJ-MAC should be leveraged to fuse intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), publish suspect-vessel alerts, and cue real-time monitoring and patrols. Many suspect vessels manipulate identity and visibility—going dark, switching names, or masking movements—behavior consistent with covert tasking. Publishing and punishing a rolling blacklist of repeat offenders through sanctions on owners, insurers, and operators would raise costs and shrink deniability. To support this effort, U.S. and allied intelligence agencies should map corporate ownership networks tied to suspicious vessels—identifying shell companies and economic exposure in allied jurisdictions. Gray zone tactics exploit ambiguity, with mixed fleets and massive automatic identification system (AIS) volumes making it hard to separate commerce from covert operations. A Taiwan Transparency Dashboard and an annual Gray Zone Maritime Threat Estimate would give policymakers and partners a clear, shared operating picture.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Maritime, and Gray Zone
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia