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42. Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations
- Author:
- Nicholas Burns and Yasheng Huang
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations | Tuesday, February 17, 2026 Speakers: Nicholas Burns is the Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He is the founder and faculty chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project and a faculty affiliate at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Burns worked in the United States government for over three decades, serving six presidents and nine secretaries of state. Most recently, he served as the US ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 2021-2025, leading public servants from forty-eight US government agencies at the US mission to China in overseeing one of America's most important bilateral relationships. Moderator: Yasheng Huang is the Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He also serves as the faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. From 2013 to 2017, he served as an associate dean of MIT Sloan’s GlobalPartnership programs and its Action Learning initiatives. His previous appointments include faculty positions at the University of Michigan and at Harvard Business School. Huang is the author of 11 books in both English and Chinese and of many academic papers. His most recent book, “The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to its Decline”, was a 2023 Best Book of the Year by Foreign Affairs magazine.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
43. The WhatsApp World Order: Learning to Live with the New Global Political Economy
- Author:
- David Henig
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- An inter-connectivity and technology revolution transformed the world over the last 30 years – with AI being the latest instalment. Multiple, interlocking, instant networks now cover the world like an ever-expanding changing set of WhatsApp groups, affecting all countries and governments. Today’s trade is responsive, resilient, diverse, and above all global as a result. Modern globalisation has in turn proved resistant to the many claims of its demise. Yet clearly this is not creating a happy world. Politics has not kept pace with the changes. National control, stability, optimism and trust are as a result particularly in short supply. At a macro level, challenger economies – most notably China – are engaged in mutual suspicion with the former hegemons EU and US, not helped by issues around subsidies and access to markets. All the major powers are undermining existing global rules while simultaneously suggesting an impossible retreat into self-sufficient manufacturing as they seek to come to terms with today’s economy. They are not helped by political debate that largely misunderstands the moment. Meanwhile corporate concentration in global markets has entrenched dominant private actors who navigate diverse regulations but can undermine competitiveness and governments. Political turmoil is enhanced by demographic shifts to ageing populations, social media, and citizen dislocation in the face of intense societal change and financial insecurity. Government failure to deal with challenges they are wrongly assumed to have created is too often simply leading to a search for scapegoats. Matters may even get worse given that the major powers have weaponised trade to a degree in recent years. Many urge them to intensify planning for economic warfare. This is turning dependencies from an inevitable by-product of greater product availability to a dangerous weakness. Such approaches threaten peace and prosperity, reflecting frustration that public demand for control in an inter-connected world cannot be met. Better approaches need to be found, that start with accepting today’s technology-enabled world including a strong China and other emerging economies. Governments must recognise that adaptive institutions will be more effective than trying to second-guess complex supply chains or put in place extensive new national rule-sets, particularly given their diverse public policy objectives. They must then protect where they must, prioritise where they can including for national security, and guide the public through their choices based on the best information that they have. For Europe in particular, long-standing respect for and implementation of rules that balance societal interests is more important than protecting all old industries. Internationally, agreements among friendly countries can be helpful but will not be sufficient. What is required is all countries accepting and enhancing core trade principles which were specifically designed to prevent a 1930s style global descent into mutual suspicion. WTO rules should be modernised to reflect today’s inter-dependencies and the dangers of weaponisation, rebalancing commitments on the basis of a broad definition of reciprocity, and avoiding of concentration of supply when countries grow. This though can only happen satisfactorily when the largest powers understand the need to discipline their own behaviours. Challenges such as dealing with dominant companies and scarce raw materials will never be easily resolved. Improvements will require international cooperation similarly based on trust, and should draw upon global networks of expertise that have developed as another result of today’s inter-connected world. Economies do adjust to new circumstances. Governments must therefore stop decrying resilience as an easy but incorrect way to be seen doing something, and focus instead on rebuilding economies and societies that adjust to today’s emerging inter-connected global order.
- Topic:
- Globalization, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, and Connectivity
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
44. Mind the minds: China’s education strategy and its implications for NATO
- Author:
- Veronica Strina
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Education lies at the heart of China’s grand strategy as it advances its global ambitions and reshapes strategic competition in nontraditional security terms, compelling NATO to rethink the ‘China challenge’ beyond the military domain. China is racing at unprecedented speed to become a global education superpower, fuelling its scientific and technological dominance. Yet deep-seated structural weaknesses within its socio-educational system, together with mounting international mistrust, risk slowing its ascent. NATO in its education and training institutions would be well placed to cultivate the critical thinking necessary for securing the intellectual edge.
- Topic:
- NATO, Education, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
45. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024
- Author:
- Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
46. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
- Topic:
- Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
47. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat
- Author:
- Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
48. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia
- Author:
- David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea
49. Assad’s Fall Is an Opportunity for a U.S. Win Over China
- Author:
- Grant Rumley
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Beijing consistently supported the regime’s brutal repressive measures, so cozying up to the rebel-led transition government may be more difficult than it expects. In the months since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region. For years, Chinese diplomats had been careful to toe a centrist line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly. Yet as the conflict has dragged on the past year, and as the region’s criticisms of the U.S. have risen, Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own. Chinese officials have regularly omitted mention of Hamas’s atrocities while blasting Israel and the U.S. for its support. Now, however, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has presented the U.S. with a similar opportunity...
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, Bashar al-Assad, 2023 Gaza War, and Transitional Government
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America
50. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China
- Author:
- Aurelio Insisa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
- Topic:
- Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America