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Begin New Search Political Geography China Publication Year within 25 Years

61. Significant, but Not Systemic: The Challenge of China’s Efforts to Rival Western Financial Predominance

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Lukas Spielberger
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Despite worldwide concerns about the US dollar, the Chinese renminbi is not yet ready to be a serious contender for leading international currency status. This Policy Brief examines three of the most important Chinese approaches to increasing the renminbi’s role as an international settlement currency: promote bilateral swap agreements between the People's Bank of China and other central banks; create international payment systems that do not involve the dollar, most notably the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System; and develop a central bank digital currency for alternative payment infrastructures. The authors find that Beijing’s efforts fall short of posing a systemic challenge to the dollar or to infrastructures like SWIFT. Nevertheless, these approaches have enabled China to use its currency for bilateral foreign policy. US and European policymakers should consider countering or attenuating these efforts, even though they have had limited success in increasing renminbi usage.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Central Bank, Currency, Digital Currency, and SWIFT
Political Geography:
China and Asia

62. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:
Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

63. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:
Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

64. Why democracies stick together: The theory and empirics behind alliance formation

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Domestic regime type affects both inter-state conflict and alliance formation. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies do not go to war with one another, while democratic alliance theory suggests that they rarely, if ever, join nondemocratic alliances (or alliances led by nondemocratic powers). Empirical evidence strongly supports both theories. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes further reinforces the hypothesis that economically prosperous democracies tend to align with one another, whereas authoritarian states gravitate toward similarly nondemocratic and less prosperous partners. If these theories hold, they carry significant implications for Western and especially US foreign policy. First, global democratization would reduce the number of potential conflicts, at least among an increasing number of democracies. Second, it would expand the pool of democratic alliance partners, while at the same limiting the alliance options available to nondemocratic powers. This strategic logic underscores the importance of upholding democratic norms abroad and promoting democratization in nondemocratic states. However, advocating for democratization of nondemocratic great powers will be perceived as both a geopolitical and domestic political challenge aimed at weakening their international position and threatening their governments’ domestic grip on power. Efforts to democratize nondemocratic great-power like Russia and China therefore provoke intense countermeasures. If such a strategy is deemed to be too high risk or too difficult to pursue successfully, a less provocative, “peripheral” strategy may focus on fostering democracy and economic development in authoritarian regimes’ weaker, less prosperous partners, thereby depriving them of potential allies.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

65. Trade with Colombia is big business for US exporters—amid growing Chinese influence in Latin America

Author:
Geoff Ramsey and Enrique Millán-Mejía
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Colombia and the United States have achieved a close, mutually beneficial partnership over several decades on migration, security, counternarcotics, and commerce—with the US trade surplus with Colombia totaling $1.3 billion in 2024. The Colombian market is particularly important for US agricultural producers. Thanks to the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), Colombia is the top destination for US agricultural exports in South America and the third main destination in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is still Colombia’s largest trading partner in South America—with $36.7 billion in two-way trade in 2024—but January data showed Chinese products leading over US imports for the month. The TPA promotes both reciprocal trade and US influence; interpretative improvements to previously agreed-upon matters are possible,
Topic:
Economy, Business, Tariffs, Exports, Trade, and International Markets
Political Geography:
China, Colombia, South America, Latin America, and United States of America

66. How China sees the future and what it means for NATO

Author:
Alice Politi
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China’s military expansion and its geopolitical ambitions, especially in the Indo-Pacifi c macro-area, potentially present growing challenges for NATO. Offi cial documents show that the reunifi cation with Taiwan plays a critical role in China’s 2049 “Great Rejuvenation” goals. However, China’s military capabilities are still too limited to allow for an intervention in Taiwan in the short term. Despite China’s rapid progress in outer space and military sectors, internal challenges such as slowing economic growth and demographic issues raise doubts about its ability to achieve long-term ambitions.
Topic:
NATO, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

67. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:
Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

68. The impact on developing economies of WTO dissolution

Author:
Lloyd Barton
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
This report revisits the analysis presented in our April 2024 paper on the potential impact of WTO dissolution, drilling down to quantify national-level impacts for a sample of ten developing economies. Our previous report (The economic impact of abandoning the WTO) focused on presenting aggregated results for developing countries by region and income level. This report drills down to quantify impacts for a sample of ten individual countries: Brazil, Cameroon, China, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam. These countries provide a rich, varied sample that captures the complexity of trade policy in the developing world. Their diversity in geography, economic size, policy orientation, and development stage allows for a nuanced analysis of how WTO dissolution could potentially influence pathways to higher incomes, poverty reduction and economic resilience. Our analysis reinforces the importance of ensuring the WTO can adapt to new trade realities and continue to function as an effective global trade body.
Topic:
Economics, Poverty, Trade, Economic Development, and WTO
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Turkey, India, South Africa, Brazil, Vietnam, Egypt, Guatemala, and Cameroon

69. The New Geopolitical Scramble for Corridors

Author:
Velina Tchakarova
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The geopolitical landscape in winter 2024- 2025 is marked by significant transformation, uncertainty, and fierce competition for influence. The geopolitical hotspots of this new contest are most visible in the regions that bridge Europe and Asia—what the editors of Baku Dialogues call the “Silk Road region.” Central to this dynamic is the growing intersection of interests between major regional players against the backdrop of a Cold War 2.0, putting the West against what I was the first to call the “DragonBear” alliance of China and Russia. These corridors are not just infrastructural undertakings; they are the arteries of global power, trade, and connectivity, reflecting deeper geopolitical ambitions and contestations. This extensive analysis elaborates on today’s most significant connectivity projects, exploring their strategic implications and the new power dynamics they are fostering. In the traditional sense, empires have always relied on transport and trade corridors to project power and expand influence. From the ancient Silk Roads to the West’s colonial sea routes, the ability to control the flow of goods and resources has often equated to geopolitical dominance. Today, this principle remains unchanged, though the scale and stakes have reached unprecedented levels.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

70. Back to the Future: The Rise of Militarization in China in the 2020s

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In this policy brief, IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung analyzes Chinese militarization efforts as the country seeks tighter integration of the civilian and defense economies and a strong sense of national security, and whether such efforts lead to China being more prone to going to war in the near future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

71. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

72. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

73. India-China rapprochement: what are the long-term prospects?

Author:
Nayanima Basu and Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China-India relations, which have long been fraught, were further complicated by the 2020 military standoff on the Himalayan border. The political disruption had a significant impact on Chinese companies’ presence in India. And yet, India’s dependence on Chinese imports has increased since. The Indian economy is decelerating at a challenging time for Prime Minister Modi, who governs in a coalition. China could offer a partial solution to India’s economic woes by providing manufacturing FDI and creating jobs. The Modi-Xi ‘rapprochement’ after their encounter at the October 2024 BRICS summit signals that relations could improve. India may be willing to accept targeted investment from China, but relations are unlikely to fully normalise, particularly since the 2025 India-Pakistan military stand-off. There are three main reasons for this. First, the Indian army remains cautious about the situation at the border and security risks relating to China. Second, the United States under President Trump will exert pressure on Modi not to depend further on China. This is even more relevant in the context of Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on India. Third, Indian public opinion on China and the Belt and Road Initiative remains negative. India is predicted to experience greater growth than China in the coming decades, meaning China could lose its upper hand in economic relations between the two countries. This, however, will depend on how dependent India might have become on China for imports or for jobs through FDI and other channels. The militarised border, India’s asymmetric economic dependence on China and China’s leadership in the Global South will still shape the relationship even if the Indian economy grows to a similar size to China’s. India-China ‘rapprochement’ is possible but will remain fragile and unlikely to be maintained in the long run.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Governance, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

74. Will China’s economy follow the same path as Japan’s?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since the bursting of China’s real-estate bubble in mid-2021, there has been a growing concern that the Chinese economy could end up like that of Japan in the early 1990s. Some structural patterns are strikingly similar: low private consumption over a long period, especially when compared to the rest of the world, and an excessively high savings ratio, though China’s imbalances now are even larger that Japan’s were then. Initial policy responses to the bursting of their respective bubbles have also been similar. Both China now and Japan then were initially hesitant to ease monetary and fiscal policies, and opted to expand manufacturing, with an eye on external demand, supported by more research and development expenditure. In both cases, the outcomes were stubborn trade surpluses and a mercantilist attitude to their growth problems, leading to the United States taking protectionist measures. China also seems to be following Japan’s offshoring of production to mitigate the impact of protectionism. The main difference, though, is that China now is a poorer country than Japan was then, with still more convergence opportunities ahead. China is also a much bigger military and geopolitical contender than Japan ever was. China’s geopolitical weight is behind the US technological containment of China, but also gives China more room for manoeuvre globally, especially in the Global South. It remains unclear – though globally significant – whether China will be able to deviate from the path followed by Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Growth, Innovation, and Real Estate
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

75. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:
Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

76. Trapped in debt: China’s role in Laos’ economic crisis

Author:
Keith Barney, Roland Rajah, and Mariza Cooray
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Laos is trapped in a severe debt crisis with no resolution in sight, threatening a decade of economic and social malaise. Recent global shocks were key triggers. Yet a crisis was almost inevitable, driven by poor planning and over-investment in the domestic energy sector, financed mostly by Chinese loans and exacerbated by broader fiscal and governance problems. Exiting the crisis will require China to provide substantial debt relief. However, the politics appear unfavourable, as neither side wants to admit failure and accept the consequences. Whether by design or neglect, China has created a debt trap in Laos. The crisis illustrates some of the most troubling pathologies of Chinese lending under the Belt and Road Initiative, and its unwillingness to provide sufficient debt relief, despite the clear-cut need.
Topic:
Debt, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Crisis, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Laos

77. Hedging bets: Southeast Asia’s approach to China’s aid

Author:
Alexandre Dayant and Grace Stanhope
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Southeast Asian states with acute development needs and constrained access to development financing — Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar — are the most reliant on China. By contrast, lower-middle income countries with more diversified foreign relations — the Philippines and Vietnam — have become far more restrained in accepting Chinese largesse over the last decade. Upper-middle income countries with only moderate development needs — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand — appear to be playing the field of development partners the most opportunistically and politically. Amid weakening demand for Chinese development financing in Southeast Asia, Beijing is recalibrating its offering, transitioning to fewer, smaller, and more targeted projects. In 2022, China implemented $3 billion in development financing in the region, a sharp drop from more than $9 billion in 2015. However, Southeast Asia’s success in reshaping their development ties with China could be undone if Western cuts to development budgets lead to a drastic reduction in financing to the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, and Myanmar

78. The future of Indonesia’s green industrial policy

Author:
Robert Walker and Hilman Palaon
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Indonesia now supplies more than half of the world’s nickel. Under its green industrial policy, it has also become a leading destination for foreign investment in critical minerals, electric vehicles (EVs), and the battery supply chain. While this strategy has offered some concentrated economic gains, rapid industry expansion has also been costly. Nickel processing has had damaging environmental, labour, and governance impacts, and has increased reliance on Chinese investment, technology, and demand, which presents vulnerabilities. Indonesia can strengthen its industrial policy by improving environmental and labour standards in the nickel industry, fostering a more competitive and export-oriented EV industry, and diversifying trade and investment partners.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Industry, Green Economy, Nickel, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia

79. Global Futures Bulletin: The BRICS and the Decarbonization and Biodiversity Protection Challenges

Author:
Igarapé Institute
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Igarapé Institute
Abstract:
The world faces an unprecedented convergence of environmental crises – climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss – that collectively threaten the planet’s ecological balance and humanity’s future. Reversing the Triple Planetary Crisis necessitates urgent and coordinated action across all sectors and countries, accelerating the transition to low-carbon economies while protecting biodiversity are key challenges for the coming years. Countries that have joined the BRICS in its inception (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are increasingly an important geopolitical force in current global politics, and their individual and collective action is key to the success of concerted global action. The group’s recent expansion – BRICS+ includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Indonesia joining in 2025 and Saudi Arabia finally formalizing its membership – offers an opportunity to boost the role of their New Development Bank (NDB) in bridging climate, biodiversity, and development finance, and aim for greater policy coherence for concerted global action across these agendas. Combined, BRICS countries are not only biodiversity and energy-rich but also contribute to a large share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This Strategic Paper examines the role of the expanded BRICS+ and explores whether and how this “mini-multilateral” grouping, with its considerable human and technological capacity, can address two major global challenges: accelerating decarbonization and protecting biological diversity. The discussion is framed around the opportunities and challenges faced by the member countries to increase their ambitions and become leading voices in these agendas – not only for BRICS countries (some of which are among the most biodiverse in the world) but also for the wider international community. Without a strong commitment by BRICS countries (individually and as a group) the world will fail to accelerate action on decarbonization and biodiversity protection.
Topic:
Climate Change, Pollution, BRICS, Decarbonization, Biodiversity, and Minilateralism
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and Global Focus

80. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:
Exports, Manufacturing, Industry, ASEAN, Supply Chains, Regional Economy, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China and Asia