Search

Begin New Search Political Geography China Publication Year within 25 Years

51. Laboratories of Autocracy: Centralized Versus Decentralized Policymaking in China

Author:
Kaicheng Luo, Shaoda Wang, and David Y. Yang
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Afundamental question in governance concerns the merits of centralized versus decentralized policymaking. While top-down, centralized policymaking may streamline adoption, enhance efficiency, and improve coordination between regions, it often sacrifices the local suitability of bottom-up, decentralized policy initiatives. This tension is especially relevant when governing large nations with many regional differences. However, measuring centralization in policymaking is difficult because it requires tracing the origin and spread of all policies across layers of government hierarchy; as a result, most studies of centralization and decentralization focus on only one policy. Assessing centralization’s impact on policy outcomes is even more demanding because it involves linking policies to both local conditions and intended outcomes.
Topic:
Governance, Economic Development, Decentralization, Centralization, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

52. Kate Adie: 'A Life in Reporting'

Author:
Kate Adie and Robert Saunders
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
In the Mile End Institute's fifth distinguished Hennessy Lecture, Kate Adie joined ‪Queen Mary University of London's very own ‪Robert Saunders‬ to reflect on her long career as a reporter and explored the challenges facing a reporter in a changing world today. Kate Adie was Chief News Correspondent for BBC News from 1989 to 2003, becoming one of the most famous and respected figures in British journalism. She reported live from the Iranian Embassy Siege in 1980, the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986 and the Lockerbie bombing of 1988. She was at Tiananmen Square in 1989, was shot by a Libyan army commander and reported on the Gulf War and the war in the former Yugoslavia. She has been a freelance journalist since 2003 and presents "From Our Own Correspondent" on BBC Radio 4 and was awarded the CBE in 2018 for services to journalism. She has written five books including "The Kindness of Strangers”, an account of her work as a reporter, "Nobody's Child: The Lives of Abandoned Children" which formed the basis of the BBC series, Found, and "Fighting on the Home Front: The Legacy of Women in World War One".
Topic:
Media, Journalism, Career, and Book Talk
Political Geography:
Britain, China, Iran, Libya, and Yugoslavia

53. Taiwan’s Democratic Backsliding and Resilience: Institutional Backsliding and Sources of Renewal

Author:
Hans H. Tung and Lev Nachman
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Hans H. Tung, Professor at National Taiwan University, and Lev Nachman, Associate Professor at National Taiwan University, examine the signs of democratic backsliding and institutional stress in Taiwan following the 2024 election, highlighting the gridlock between the Legislative Yuan and the Constitutional Court. They point out that this internal polarization, combined with external pressures such as the PRC’s military threats and disinformation campaigns, is undermining Taiwan’s democratic foundations. Ultimately, they underscore that civil society's resilience and international linkages remain the core strengths sustaining Taiwan's democracy, suggesting that protecting the rules of fair competition will determine its future course.
Topic:
Civil Society, Elections, Institutions, Disinformation, Polarization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

54. Assetizing, Trading, Franchising: China's Strategy for Building a National Data Economy

Author:
Ran Guo
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
How can the state harness data as a driver of economic development? This paper examines China’s efforts to expand its data economy since 2022 through a combination of policy and market mechanisms. Two developments signaled this shift. First, the issuance of the Twenty Data Measures in December 2022 articulated a national framework for development-oriented data governance. Second, the establishment of the National Data Administration (NDA) in October 2023 designated a central authority responsible for coordinating data-related economic policymaking. Together, these moves reflect China’s distinctive policy vision — an institutional division of labor in China’s data governance regime, in which developmental functions are increasingly centralized under the NDA, while data security and privacy oversight remain with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and other agencies responsible for enforcing preexisting regulatory frameworks. The paper analyzes three policy experiments aimed at advancing China’s data economy: data assetization, which enables data to be valued and traded as a financial assets; state-owned data exchanges, which provide platforms for the controlled marketization of data; and public data franchising, which grants select entities exclusive rights to commercialize government-held public data. These experiments seek to integrate fragmented local data markets into a unified national market, addressing China’s persistent data fragmentation across jurisdictions and sectors, also called the “data island” problem. While early progress is evident, significant challenges remain, including uneven data quality, weak demand for data products, limited interoperability among domestic data markets, emerging monopolistic tendencies in data franchising, and unresolved privacy and security risks. Globally, China’s state-led data economy is often presented as an alternative to European Union and U.S. approaches to data governance, which tend to frame data governance primarily as a constraint on liberal markets rather than tools to support market construction and development. By examining China’s evolving data governance regime, this paper contributes to comparative debates on data governance and offers insights into why China’s approach may hold particular appeal in non-Western contexts, especially as emerging digital powers actively advance growth-centered political economies around data and AI.
Topic:
Governance, Economic Development, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

55. What to Watch at China's Two Sessions in 2026

Author:
Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s annual “Two Sessions” convene from March 4 to approximately March 11. Thousands of delegates from across the nation will gather in Beijing for one of the most important events on the Chinese political calendar. This year is especially significant because the government will not only announce its annual economic targets but will also publish the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), outlining policy objectives for 2026–2030. Key watchpoints include: How fast does Beijing want the economy to grow this year? How quickly can it shift from old to new growth drivers? Which strategic emerging industries will receive policy support? Is China prioritizing high-tech competition with the United States at the expense of rebalancing toward consumption and services? What signals will Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, send about his personal priorities? Could there be personnel shakeups?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

56. Scam Offensives in Southeast Asia: Comparing Beijing's and Washington's Strategies and Assessing Opportunities for Coordination

Author:
Bryanna Entwhistle
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Disrupting Asia’s cyber scam industry, which is valued at between $88.3 billion and $114.1 billion annually, presents a rare point of mutual interest for the United States and China. Both Chinese and American citizens are both primary targets of complex online fraud schemes run predominantly out of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. To identify where opportunities for cooperation on addressing the issue exist for the United States and China, this paper examines the nature of Beijing's crackdowns on cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia, when Beijing chooses to act, and how. It identifies three core factors driving Chinese action: domestic pressure, reputational damage, and national security concerns. Where these factors converge, as in Myanmar, Beijing has acted swiftly and forcefully. Where reputational pressure collides with countervailing strategic interests, as in Cambodia, Beijing's pressure has been delayed but has grown over time. And where none of the three factors materially apply, as in Laos, Beijing has yet to move against major actors. When Beijing does act, it leverages bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks to conduct joint operations and intelligence gathering with its Southeast Asian partners. Framed under China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), these mechanisms have broadened the country’s security relationships across the region—although partner states have not always welcomed Beijing's inroads. As Beijing conducted raids against scam centers in Myanmar, the industry began redirecting its targeting toward the West: American losses to China-linked criminal groups grew to $10 billion per year by 2024. Washington has responded with a cross-departmental campaign of sanctions, indictments, asset seizures, and takedowns of scam-enabling online infrastructure. Still, the U.S. response is hampered by limited operational capacity on the ground in Southeast Asia and the "whack-a-mole" nature of the industry. Concerns about China’s GSI expansion, intelligence sharing sensitivities, host-state political economies, and Beijing’s treatment of trafficked workers are substantial obstacles that stand in the way of U.S.-China cooperation on this issue. Still, bounded cooperation has the potential to serve the interests of both Beijing and Washington. There appears to be recognition of this on the ministerial level: FBI Director Kash Patel has traveled to Beijing twice in the past year to discuss expanding coordination on tackling cyber scams with China, alongside several other forms of transnational crime. In April, the United States, China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates organized a joint raid on scam centers in Dubai; however, misaligned incentives and strategic distrust have thus far stood in the way of further law enforcement coordination between Beijing and Washington. In support of future law enforcement coordination between China and the United States that takes into account existing obstacles rather than ignoring them, this paper draws on an understanding of Beijing’s cyber scam offensive in Southeast Asia to propose the following recommendations for how Washington could pursue tactical and bounded coordination on the issue: Push for leader-to-leader engagement, drawing on lessons from the fentanyl negotiations; Utilize third countries to mediate and coordinate joint raids and intelligence sharing; Approach Beijing with intelligence-backed asks; Leverage existing channels to facilitate financial intelligence sharing; and Continue using sanctions and indictments to incentivize Beijing to recall key actors.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Law Enforcement, Fraud, Intelligence Sharing, and Scam Centers
Political Geography:
China, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, Myanmar, and United States of America

57. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry

Author:
Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity

Author:
Sungmin Cho
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

60. Global Public Opinion on China: China’s Standing in Southeast Asia’s Swing States

Author:
Kevin Zongzhe Li
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Public opinion toward China across Southeast Asia's swing states has remained net positive over the past two decades, but has steadily declined. The regional average declines from roughly +33 in the 2000s, to +26 in the 2010s, and +20 in the 2020s. The trajectory reflects greater sensitivity to security risks, as China's economic weight and geopolitical presence expanded. The analysis identifies three distinct patterns across the region. In maritime frontline states such as the Philippines and Vietnam, sovereignty confrontations in the South China Sea have been followed by sharp and, sometimes, durable shifts in public sentiment. In maritime tension states such as Indonesia and Malaysia, frictions are present but more tightly managed; public opinion fluctuates but does not experience sustained rupture. In non-frontline states such as Thailand and Singapore, attitudes are comparatively stable, shaped primarily by economic interdependence, domestic political context, and social factors. Attitudes toward China across Southeast Asia's swing states reflect the interaction of economic exposure and sovereignty pressure. Where China is encountered primarily through economic engagement, baseline sentiment tends to remain positive; where territorial disputes become politically salient, attitudes shift more sharply. Public opinion does not move uniformly across Southeast Asia, nor does it point toward simple alignment with or against China. General public perceptions may diverge from the more security-focused views reflected in elite surveys of regional policy, business, and academic communities. While elite responses often emphasize strategic rivalry and risk, public opinion appears to evolve more gradually and remains strongly influenced by economic and social exchange.
Topic:
Economics, Territorial Disputes, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, Elites, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand

61. The Factors That Matter: A Formula for Understanding China’s Use of Force Calculus Over Taiwan

Author:
Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the United States and China enter a prolonged period of instability and tension, how and under what circumstances China may use force, or, alternatively, be deterred from using force, has become of crucial importance to U.S. policymakers seeking to avoid conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the United States can draw on its experience gauging threats and making difficult strategic calculations during the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, the emerging strategic rivalry with China is still in its early stages. The question of how to deter conflict with the PRC will be an increasingly important factor in the strategic calculations in Beijing and Washington, especially in times of heightened instability and crisis between the two powers. This, in turn, raises enormous and complex questions for U.S. policy regarding U.S.-China strategic stability, U.S.-China crisis management, and strategic and conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China. In spite of this emergent challenge, critical gaps remain in the Western understanding of PRC deterrence concepts. Most importantly, and most urgently, there is little understanding of how or why China may be deterred from resorting to military force in the event of a serious confrontation with the United States. To address these critical gaps, this paper explores China’s approach to deterrence in the military and diplomatic domain, in order to inform U.S. understanding of how it might deter China in a crisis or conflict. In particular, this paper introduces a set of key variables that matter most to China’s leadership in contemplating using force to “reunify” Taiwan with mainland China. This study develops a methodological formula that can be used by policy-makers and academics interested in understanding what has deterred Chinese leaders from using force against Taiwan, and what might cause China to change its calculus.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Use of Force
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

62. From Growth to Visibility: Bureaucratic Incentives After China's Cadre Evaluation Reforms

Author:
Zhuoran Li
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
President Xi Jinping has spent more than a decade trying to reform the incentive system of China's bureaucracy, especially the incentives for local governments. Xi launched sweeping reforms of the cadre evaluation system—reducing the emphasis on GDP growth, expanding performance assessments to include social welfare and environmental protection metrics, and strengthening inspections of policy implementation. These reforms were intended to shift bureaucratic incentives away from short-term political performance and toward more balanced governance. Yet a different pattern has emerged. Local governments, especially at the level of township and county, have increasingly devoted resources to highly visible "spotlight projects" (亮点工程) designed to attract the attention of higher-level leaders in municipalities and provinces. This outcome is not a failure of implementation but an unintended consequence of Xi's reforms. By broadening evaluation criteria while tightening fiscal and administrative constraints, the reforms changed how local officials compete for promotion. Instead of maximizing GDP growth, officials increasingly compete by producing politically visible success stories that signal competence and alignment with central priorities. Because these projects also enhance the political standing of provincial and municipal leaders, they are reinforced by complementary incentives at multiple levels of the bureaucracy. The result is not the disappearance of performative governance, but its transformation.
Topic:
Governance, Rural, Economic Development, Bureaucracy, and Local Government
Political Geography:
China and Asia

63. Europe’s “Wake-Up Call”

Author:
Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The European Union's relationship with China is undergoing a transformation. While the EU remains committed to economic engagement, it is increasingly prioritizing economic security, industrial resilience, and technological sovereignty over market access. This shift reflects mounting concerns over widening trade imbalances, China's state-supported industrial expansion, growing dependence on Chinese critical minerals and green technologies, and the erosion of Europe's manufacturing base. This paper argues that the EU and China will go through a very tense period over trade, but that Europe’s lasting competitiveness will depend on addressing structural challenges—including productivity, innovation, energy costs, investment, and industrial coordination—that predate the current deterioration in EU-China relations. Ultimately, China's growing economic influence has become not only an external challenge but a catalyst for Europe's reassessment of its own economic model and long-term industrial strategy.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Innovation, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

64. Strategic Shift in China's Primary Aluminum Industry

Author:
Landon Thomas
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In late 2024, the Chinese government surprised global markets by rescinding export tax rebates for steel, copper, and – most notably – aluminum products. Seen by many as a proactive step to diffuse trade tensions with its major trading partners, this paper argues that the policy speaks to a broader strategy on the part of the Chinese government. Namely, to incentivize aluminum producers to focus less on exports and more on supplying fast growing sectors such as photovoltaics and electric vehicles, both of which rely heavily on aluminum inputs. Although aluminum exports have declined modestly since the policy’s implementation, it remains unclear whether increased domestic absorption will ultimately translate into greater productivity and efficiency gains across the sector.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Economy, Tax Systems, Trade Policy, Industry, and Aluminum
Political Geography:
China and Asia

65. Implementing Effective U.S.-China Economic Engagement Channels

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Scott Shaw
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the state of U.S.-China relations has undergone significant fluctuations over the past decade, so has the structure and frequency of economic engagements between the two countries. The number and scale of such dialogues came under heavy criticism from Republican and Democratic China hawks alike—with one notable critic famously tying the rise of U.S.-China dialogues to the rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some of this criticism misses the mark, however, and underestimates the value of select, well-conceived communication channels. A valid question is whether these dialogues lost the forest for the trees. U.S. officials consistently struggled to move the needle on big trade and investment issues, absent large carrots and sticks, such as WTO accession or significant tariffs. The U.S. government needs to exercise discipline in ensuring that dialogue mechanisms advance U.S. national interests and are not used by China to distract from or delay meaningful progress on core issues. Washington must also be clear-eyed that such dialogues or engagements will likely not “change China” or spur big policy and structural changes. Yet it is equally problematic that from the early stages of the pandemic in 2020 through mid-2023, the governments of the world’s two largest economies, with the world’s most complex trading relationship, had almost no engagement on economic and commercial issues. Just as national security experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military communications to mitigate misunderstandings and security crises, sustained channels for commercial and financial dialogues are critical for managing economic frictions. It is therefore remarkable that for multiple years the two sides lacked any such mechanisms to address commercial, financial and other economic issues. In its last year and a half, the Biden administration broadly addressed these areas through its Economic, Financial and Commercial Issues Working Groups, alongside technical consultations on issues such as export control enforcement, trade secrets, and anti-money laundering. These channels, with select cabinet-level meetings, enabled the U.S. to pursue “competitive actions”—such as export controls, tariffs, and sanctions—while maintaining a largely stable relationship. The Biden administration struggled, however, to make significant progress on the broader obstacles facing U.S. firms and exports in China, even as it was able to resolve certain company-specific issues and defuse some tensions arising from policy misunderstandings. After a sharp deterioration in bilateral economic ties in spring 2025—with tariffs essentially reaching trade embargo levels and export controls shutting down production lines in each economy—the second Trump administration has arrived at a tentative equilibrium with China on trade and technology issues. The Trump administration has an opportunity to strengthen this equilibrium, mitigate volatility, and advance U.S. interests by rebuilding and institutionalizing selective channels on key economic and technology issues. The goal should not be to return to the previous broad dialogue architecture, but rather to establish narrow mechanisms that support U.S. de-risking, reinforce policy discipline, and, with modest expectations, derive economic benefits for the U.S. from the relationship. Cabinet-level relationships with China’s top economic decisionmakers—that also address bureaucratic mismatches and silos in the two systems—are of utmost importance as the leadership dynamics and policy agendas of both governments continue to evolve. Communication mechanisms on macroeconomic, financial sector, and commercial issues have been essential—and as economic and national security issues have moved to the foreground, channels to discuss sanctions, export controls, and investment issues have become necessary as well. The Boards of Trade and Investment proposed by the two governments in recent discussions could serve as an organizing structure for most of these channels, depending on their participants and agenda. This paper reviews the historical evolution of U.S.-China economic dialogues and the key lessons learned—to suggest targeted areas where ongoing communications under these mechanisms can be most important, how these should be structured, and how to make U.S. economic statecraft toward China most effective. We appreciate the insightful inputs and comments on the paper from Craig Allen, Wendy Cutler and Paul Haenle.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Macroeconomics, Trade, Donald Trump, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

66. National Security Without Consensus: Taiwan’s Domestic Politics Through 2028

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the past year, President Lai Ching-te’s administration has faced growing domestic political fragmentation alongside intensifying external pressure. Lai’s announcement of a substantial increase in Taiwan’s defense budget, including discussion of enhanced missile defense capabilities, was blocked repeatedly in the Legislative Yuan by the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), highlighting deep divisions over security policy and relations with China. At the end of March 2026, Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties finally agreed to allow the special defense budget to enter legislative review, though each party presented its own version.1 Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan finally passed a watered-down version of the special defense budget bill on May 8. While many observers frame expanded defense spending as a necessary response to rising external threats, resistance by the opposition reflects a set of politically salient concerns. Among segments of the electorate aligned with the KMT, skepticism persists regarding the effectiveness of increased spending in altering the cross-Strait military balance, frustration over the prolonged freeze in official dialogue with Beijing, and uncertainty linked to U.S. policy — ranging from delays in arms deliveries to broader questions surrounding strategic ambiguity and economic-security trade-offs. In this complicated context, President Lai launched a series of “Ten Talks” from June to August 2025, hoping to use national unity, defense, and identity to build public support for a more robust defense posture. However, rising parliamentary fragmentation and partisan polarization, heightened by the KMT’s shift in leadership and the election of Cheng Li-wun, have so far undercut the government’s ability to finance and implement major defense initiatives (including the proposed multi-layer T-Dome). Such domestic dynamics will play a central role in influencing Taiwan’s domestic and external strategy from now until the 2028 elections. Against this backdrop, the People’s Liberation Army decided to launch a large-scale joint exercise “Justice Mission–2025” on December 29, 2025, mobilizing forces and encircling Taiwan in one of the most wide-ranging displays of force so far employed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The drills took place in the aftermath of Trump’s decision to allow a major arms sale to Taiwan and after the explicit Japanese statements linking a Taiwan contingency to Japan’s own security and survival. Beijing views such developments as external “intrusions” into internal matters with the potential to accelerate the ‘internationalization’ of the Taiwan issue. Together, these dynamics illustrate how China’s growing reliance on military pressure overlaps with Taiwan’s internal political constraints, reinforcing Beijing’s narrative that China’s military pressure is necessary and justified (in view of the external developments), while simultaneously undermining its claim that Taiwan remains a purely internal matter. This paper argues that Taiwan’s greatest security risk has shifted from threat awareness to political coordination, with domestic fragmentation now constituting the primary bottleneck to defense and security policies ahead of 2028.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

67. Seeking Agency in Uncertainty: Asian Middle Powers and the Fragmenting Global Order

Author:
Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The concept of middle powers is not new. What is new, however, is the speed, coordination, and strategic intent with which middle powers, across Asia and the West, are recalibrating their foreign policies. This acceleration reflects growing uncertainty in the global system: the perceived drift and unpredictability of U.S. leadership under the Trump 2.0 administration, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and the fragmentation of the post–Cold War order. Countries increasingly find themselves navigating between two systemic pressures: avoiding entrapment in great power rivalries and safeguarding national autonomy, economic resilience, and security interests. In this emerging order, resistant to simple bipolar or multipolar labels, middle powers are neither passive balancers nor quiet bystanders. They are actively constructing a dense network of partnerships, pursuing selective alignments, and diversifying strategic dependencies. Rather than choosing sides, many are hedging to secure national interests: deepening security ties with Washington while sustaining economic engagement with Beijing, expanding mini-lateral frameworks, and strengthening cross-regional linkages that reduce overreliance on any single pole of power. The growing emphasis on economic security, supply chain resilience, technological cooperation, and defense interoperability reflects a broader shift from ideological alignment to pragmatic, interest-driven statecraft. This paper revisits the concept of Asian middle power diplomacy and assesses the forces driving today’s intensified hedging behavior. It examines why urgency around partnerships and alliance diversification has increased, not only among key Asian middle powers themselves but also in their expanding engagement with actors such as the Gulf states, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Through select country-by-country analysis, the paper evaluates how leading middle powers, in both Asia and beyond, are redefining strategic autonomy, which partnerships warrant close attention, and how these evolving alignments are reshaping the contours of the global order. Finally, it assesses the implications of a more assertive, networked middle power landscape for the United States, and what a strengthened middle power layering means for the future architecture of international politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, International Order, Hedging, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

68. Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure

Author:
Meghan Morris and Sheng-wen Cheng
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In March 2026, Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) accepted an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit China from April 7–12—the first such visit by a sitting KMT chair since 2016. The visit presents both challenges and opportunities for Cheng, who is seeking greater dialogue and stability with China. It also comes just weeks before a scheduled major summit between President Trump and Xi in May and introduces new variables for all three leaders. For Xi, the symbolism of him and Cheng possibly meeting face-to-face to “mend fences” could portray an image of cross-Strait unity that could strengthen Xi’s hand in discussions with Trump. For Cheng, a successful China trip could bolster her political standing among the KMT base in Taiwan, but could also alienate opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voters and swing voters, who may view Cheng as “selling out” Taiwan’s sovereignty in pursuit of easing tensions with mainland China. Finally, for Trump, the visit could complicate Washington’s relations with China. Trump will have to walk an even more delicate tightrope of signaling the United States’ enduring “One China” policy with Xi, while responding to the inevitable message from Xi that cross-Straits are “stabilizing” and that the United States should not intervene in the “internal matters of China.” Given this context, this paper seeks to examine the rise of Cheng Li-wun in Taiwanese politics and implications for her domestic, international, and cross-Strait agenda. We argue that while Cheng’s victory as KMT chair signals symbolic change, it has yet to translate into institutional renewal or political legitimacy. Her early appointments of KMT vice chairs suggest continuity rather than transformation—raising questions about whether the KMT is broadening or narrowing appeal within a younger electoral base. It also contends that Cheng’s rhetoric on China and the United States—calling for deeper alignment and accommodation with Beijing while simultaneously casting doubt on the value of Taiwan’s security ties with Washington—positions Cheng to potentially alter the trajectory of cross-Strait ties if the KMT achieves a majority victory in the 2028 presidential elections.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

69. China’s Property Rebalancing: The Long Road to a New Development Model

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and David Zhang
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s property downturn is now in its fifth year, impairing household, developer, and local government balance sheets. Since peaking in 2021, property investment has nearly halved, dragging on fixed-asset investment, weakening related employment, and exerting a sustained drag on broader economic growth. Beijing’s response has prioritized risk containment over a return to debt-fueled property stimulus. This is captured by the “new property development model,” a long-term blueprint to turn real estate from a growth engine into a source of baseline construction demand and a more socially oriented housing system. Policymakers are currently trapped in a “dual mandate”: stabilizing the property market in the short term while pursuing a longer-term shift toward a smaller, less speculative, and more affordable housing system. In the near term, however, falling property values erode household wealth and weaken confidence, complicating Beijing’s broader consumption-rebalancing goals. The structural transition is complicated by local fiscal constraints. Revenue from selling land-use rights dropped by over 50% between 2021 and 2025, yet local governments face financial obligations to subsidize housing demand and fund the construction of new affordable housing. The most probable trajectory is a tightly managed, prolonged correction, with a true market bottom deferred. As the sector structurally downsizes, its drag on GDP should gradually fade, a cost Beijing likely sees as worth bearing in order to lock in a smaller role for property in the economy. The economy faces the severe downside risk of a deflationary spiral driven by wealth and job destruction. Further declines in home prices would deepen the hit to household balance sheets, while the property downturn is already inflicting significant job losses across construction and related sectors. China’s current transition blueprint lacks mechanisms to fully absorb this structural unemployment and balance-sheet degradation. Any definitive signs of an uncontrolled deflationary spiral would likely force Beijing to deploy stronger market rescue operations.
Topic:
Development, Government, Economy, Investment, Unemployment, and Property Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

70. China’s Strategy in the Ukraine War and the Shaping of a Post-Conflict Order

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Despite ongoing peace talks spearheaded by U.S. President Donald Trump, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues with seemingly no end in sight. While China might not play a primary role in peace negotiations, it nonetheless has an important stake in the outcome of the conflict. This paper seeks to assess Beijing’s calculus and potential role in brokering peace in the Ukraine conflict within the context of great power diplomacy among Moscow, Washington, Kyiv, and Brussels. Faced with Russia’s unrelenting military campaign, Washington, Brussels and Beijing have each adopted distinct positions on the war. The United States, as the key peace broker, continues to shift its policies to accommodate competing peace deal demands from Kyiv and Moscow. Meanwhile, the EU is increasingly aligning itself with Ukraine’s position, while China promotes neutral diplomatic initiatives that merely amplify a pro-Russian stance. Because China’s initiatives largely align with Russia’s position on the war, they have done little to realistically support ceasefire efforts. Rather, they are designed to portray Beijing as a principled international actor committed to peace and non-escalation. At the same time, these positions have not prevented China from establishing significant and highly pragmatic relations with Kyiv, particularly in trade and commerce. Politically, however, China’s stance has distanced Beijing from Kyiv’s key objectives regarding the terms and conditions of a ceasefire. Accordingly, this article seeks to answer the following questions: What are China’s intentions toward Ukraine amid an ongoing stalemate in peace negotiations? And how are China’s diplomatic proposals being received in capitals around the world?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

71. Unpacking China’s 2025 Retail Data: Provincial Divergence and Three Structural Challenges

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee, Huiyan Li, and Shengyu Wang
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Despite overall lackluster growth, China’s 2025 retail data shows signs of a structural shift, a redistribution of domestic demand from the coastal to central and western regions, and from first-tier to lower-tier cities. Demographic structure and migration patterns shape consumption. Provinces with balanced age profiles and slower aging outperform other provinces, underscoring the role of demographic vitality in sustaining demand. Consumption upgrading is diffusing geographically but remains uneven. Higher-quality consumption and domestic brand strength are spreading beyond top-tier cities, yet purchasing power and innovation capacity remain concentrated in coastal hubs. Household income growth is a necessary foundation for stronger consumption, but not sufficient. The Beijing case — rising incomes alongside falling retail sales — shows how wealth effects can break the income-to-consumption link. The property sector remains the central structural drag. Although price declines have moderated in some regions, weak transaction volumes and uneven recovery sustain negative wealth effects. Local initiative and bureaucratic KPI design will shape the outcome. Subnational experimentation has generated promising cases for stimulating demand, but durable rebalancing depends on incentive reform. Rigid outcome-based targets risk distorting behavior and undermining the very reforms they seek to advance. A more household-driven growth model could gradually reduce export dependence and ease trade pressures. Yet current progress is limited and uneven. Core structural imbalances remain unresolved.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Retail, Consumer Behavior, Income, and Property Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

72. Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.–China relations have undergone significant changes in the past decade, moving from deep interdependence to strategic rivalry, and, meanwhile, China’s policy toward the United States has transformed under Xi Jinping. China’s policymaking mechanism has also evolved, and understanding this shift is critical to understanding the broader U.S.–China relationship. This article examines China’s U.S. policymaking and policy consultation system under Xi Jinping. How does policy consultation on foreign relations work in China? What are the most influential policy research institutions in China's America watch? How do they influence China's U.S. policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. The Gen Z Movement and the Future of Nepa2026l

Author:
Rishi Gupta
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Nepal is scheduled to hold snap elections on March 5, 2026, to elect members of the House of Representatives—the lower house of parliament —which will culminate in a new administration and a new Prime Minister. As election day draws closer, the country is experiencing a monumental challenge: choosing between a new generation of Nepalese politicians and an old guard that is seeking reelection. The forthcoming elections are certain to test Nepal’s 17-year-long democratic journey and could pave the way for a “New Nepal” grounded in the aspirations of the country’s youth. In September 2025, Nepal attracted global attention when the nation’s Generation Z population united to protest a government-imposed social media ban—a move that was widely viewed as an attack on freedom of expression, a disruption of free and open communication, and a threat to young people’s main source of financial earnings through online content creation. Besides the implications for digital connection, the ban brought to the fore larger frustrations among Nepalese youth with rampant nepotism, corruption, unemployment, and political instability in the country. As the protests gained strength, so did the Gen Z movement’s push for change, culminating in the resignation of Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli. These developments proved significant, as nowhere in the world had a social media ban prompted the fall of an elected government before. This paper unpacks Nepal’s historic Gen Z movement by understanding and assessing its drivers and their implications. It also provides a nuanced understanding of the movement’s contributions to Nepal’s relations with neighboring India and China. As a way forward, the paper presents several post-election scenarios and identifies four key challenges facing Nepal’s next government.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Social Media, Protests, and Generation Z
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Nepal

74. What Happened at China's Two Sessions in 2026?2026

Author:
Neil Thomas, Lizzi C. Lee, and Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Last week, Beijing wrapped up its annual Two Sessions — the parallel meetings of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and its top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Highlights of this year’s gathering included Premier Li Qiang’s Government Work Report, several closely watched appearances by President Xi Jinping, the removal of several officials from civilian posts and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ahead of the meeting, and the release of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), a blueprint for the country’s development from 2026 to 2030. Below, experts from the Center for China Analysis (CCA) assess the key takeaways across several issue areas. Last week, CCA also co-hosted a webinar on the Two Sessions with the South China Morning Post featuring Lizzi C. Lee, Lyle Morris, and Neil Thomas.
Topic:
Government, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

75. Digital infrastructure in South Asia: China’s role and the potential for Australia–India cooperation

Author:
Shruti Jargad
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Digital infrastructure development in South Asia is gathering pace. It is central not only to economic growth and public service delivery, but also to national and regional security as well as geopolitical competition, particularly between China and India. China has emerged as a significant supplier of digital infrastructure and technology across the region. Through the Digital Silk Road, Chinese entities have become deeply embedded across South Asia’s digital ecosystem, spanning telecommunications, fibre-optic networks, submarine cables, data centres, cloud services, smart cities, surveillance technologies, digital payments and e-commerce. While Chinese investment has helped accelerate connectivity and digital development, it has also created long-term risks like technological dependence, vendor lock-in, unsustainable financing, poor transparency, threats to cybersecurity and strategic autonomy. This report argues that the central challenge for South Asian states is not Chinese involvement in itself, but it is the combination of limited alternatives and weak institutional capacity to address the long-term risks and threats mentioned above. It examines China’s digital engagements across the region, including in strategic locations, maps its presence across different layers of the digital ecosystem and assesses the implications. The report also explores how Australia and India can support more resilient and inclusive digital development in South Asia, despite structural limitations. India brings extensive experience in deploying digital public infrastructure at scale, while Australia offers expertise in e-governance, cybersecurity, infrastructure financing, institutional capacity building and regulatory cooperation. Rather than advocating decoupling from Chinese technology, the report proposes a pragmatic approach centred on diversification, local ownership and institutional resilience. It identifies practical avenues for Australia–India cooperation, including facilitating international financing, digital public infrastructure, sharing governance experience, human capital development, private-sector investment and leveraging regional and multilateral partnerships. By broadening the range of credible partners and strengthening institutional capacity, Australia and India can help ensure that South Asia’s digital transformation is secure, sustainable and responsive to the priorities of regional states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, Information Technology, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia-Pacific

76. Polar security: Strategic competition at the ends of the Earth

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Arctic and Antarctica were strategic theatres in which the Cold War played out, but they were also regions in which concerted efforts were made to bring together the rival superpowers. The polar regions became beacons of global cooperation, Cold War East-West dialogue and best practice statecraft. Today, the polar regions host new ‘players’ or stakeholders and are shaped by increasingly novel forces. The dynamics at the ends of the earth have clearly changed, and the fragile status-quo born from our Cold War system of managing state power (and ambitions) is incredibly brittle. Our polar regions require a modernised system or framework to manage strategic competition, to facilitate the ebbs and flows of geopolitics: the organic state of play between powers. Canberra has enduring, albeit under recognised, national security interests in the polar domains. Australia’s strategic interests in the polar regions will only be protected through enhanced physical presence, deeper security partnerships, and credible investment in deterrent capabilities. Blind faith in liberal institutionalism is no longer an option; indeed, as this report argues, this approach increasingly appears to sustain competitor national interests at the expense of our own. In the Arctic and Antarctica, Canberra confronts a more assertive, and broadly revisionist, strategic climate. Business as usual at either end of the earth will not suffice in this new normal. We need a more holistic approach. With fragmentation and erosion of the specific governance forums and systems in place in the polar regions, it is crucial Canberra leads middle power stakeholders in mounting a collective stand to salvage and ideally, modernise the status quo for Antarctica and the Arctic. Resource insecurity, renewed strategic competition, and environmental change are converging at the poles, determining the future of the Arctic and Antarctica and this Report illustrates why this trinity matters for Canberra.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Cold War, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, Asia-Pacific, Arctic, United States of America, and Antarctica

77. The Sino-Russian partnership: why it matters for Australian security and defence

Author:
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Sino-Russian ‘no limits’ partnership has become central to an emerging anti-Western axis that aims to weaken the West and counter the liberal international order that has buttressed Australia’s post-1945 peace, prosperity and security. Even though it is not a formal alliance, the depth and breadth of strategic cooperations between China and Russia—across military, economic, defence, diplomatic and technological domains—makes the partnership the most important bilateral one for both, and one that has severe strategic consequences for Australia. The partnership between these two totalitarian states is not new, but Beijing and Moscow have intensified their cooperation since the announcement of a ‘no limits’ partnership in February 2022. Their collaboration encompasses joint military exercises including naval, air and combined arms, technology transfers, coordinated propaganda affecting social cohesion and stability, efforts at building alternative parochial technological and economic coalitions. Russia’s combat experience and defence technology transfers have been particularly helpful in accelerating China’s military modernisation, which in turn have exacerbated regional insecurities in the Indo-Pacific. The Sino-Russian partnership is also a critical subset of a wider authoritarian grouping that includes Iran and North Korea, whose combined military power, including nuclear capabilities, have the potential to further destabilise regional and global security. Within this, China has emerged as the decisive enabler of Russia’s and now Iran’s military operations. Overall, the Sino-Russian partnership is durable, gaining more strategic and military muscle power and thus directly threatens Australia’s strategic environment, prompting sustained investment in national defence and foreign alliances. This ASPI report examines the contemporary trajectory and drivers of China-Russia partnership. This will be followed by a detailed analysis of China-Russia defence and security cooperation, which has seen qualitative and quantitative enhancement in the last decade. The final section charts the current trendlines into the future, drawing out the implications for Australia, the liberal international order and strategic stability, while identifying possible pragmatic choices for Canberra to boost its security and defence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, United Nations, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Australia

78. Disruption and opportunity: Australia and critical minerals in a changing global order

Author:
Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In a world defined by accelerating geo‑economic competition aimed at reducing China’s control of critical‑minerals markets and supply chains, Australia’s critical‑minerals ambitions hinge on a powerful but tenuous assumption: that the nation will evolve into a major supplier to the US—its largest investment partner and most consequential strategic ally. Yet today’s market dynamics, policy fragmentation among partners and the US’s own inward‑looking minerals strategy mean that outcome is far from guaranteed. What is clear, however, is that Australia enters this contest with world‑leading geological endowments, a global footprint of successful mining operations, and hard‑won capabilities built over more than 60 years of modern mining and processing. Australian companies aren’t just domestic producers—they’re global investors, operators and technology leaders. Demand for their products is only rising as the energy transition, digitisation, automation and defence modernisation accelerate. But market opportunity alone is no longer enough. Australia’s ability to convert its mineral strength into strategic advantage is being tested by volatile global prices—often shaped by market manipulation—contradictory policies among like‑minded nations and rising competition from other mineral‑rich nations. Domestically, high construction and energy costs, an uncompetitive company tax system, acute skills shortages, regulatory uncertainty and long approval timelines threaten to blunt Australia’s competitive edge. At the same time, commercial and security partners across Europe, Asia and North America increasingly look to Australia not only for resources but also for leadership—technical, environmental, commercial and strategic. Many countries, along with the EU, have signed agreements with Australia to build more secure, sustainable and diversified critical‑minerals supply chains. This report argues that Australia must now pivot from signing partnerships to fully activating them. That means prioritising the like-minded partners and markets where real supply‑chain integration and volume markets are achievable. China, however, will remain an indispensable market for Australian minerals. Crucially, Australia must recalibrate its approach to onshoring. Policies built solely around domestic downstream ambitions risk underestimating the reality of global supply chains and overestimating Australia’s cost competitiveness. The more strategic path is to position Australia as a dominant force across multi‑node critical‑minerals supply chains—linking Australian concentrates and intermediate products, production of Australian companies operating abroad, trusted partners’ processing, manufacturing and technology ecosystems, and of course end users. To seize this moment, Australia should also restore the predictability and competitiveness of its own investment environment. Ultimately, the choice before Australia isn’t whether to be a critical‑minerals superpower—it’s whether to be an indispensable node in the world’s most important supply chains. That requires ambition, disciplined policymaking, deeper strategic partnerships and a relentless focus on execution.
Topic:
European Union, Artificial Intelligence, Research and Development, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

79. Gone with the West: How the transatlantic split helps China and forces Europe to rethink its Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:
Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The erosion of transatlantic unity under a renewed America First strategy has weakened collective Western responses to China and left Europe vulnerable to coercive diplomacy from both Beijing and Washington. Caught between an unreliable America and an assertive China, Europe must strengthen its strategic autonomy by building deeper relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Like-mindedness, previously the linchpin of Western unity, no longer appears to play much of a role in building geostrategic coalitions in the Indo-Pacific region.1 Instead, as the Trump administration jettisons the liberal rules-based international order, Europe is fundamentally reconsidering its partnership with America and consequently its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Even the prevailing transatlantic consensus on China – viewed as a “systemic challenger” that should be tackled together – is now unravelling.2 Against the wider backdrop of a return to an era of great power prerogatives and spheres of influence, Europe therefore finds itself in a tight spot in the Indo-Pacific region – unwelcome to both Washington and Beijing. However, given its economic dynamism and critical manufacturing industries, the Indo-Pacific is far too important to be left to Washington and Beijing’s devices. Indeed, many Indo-Pacific countries share not only Europe’s advocacy of free trade, multilateralism, liberal institutions and a rules-based order, but also its unease about relying too much on either China or the US, which together may foster a renewed sense of like-mindedness with Europe. For its part, Europe urgently needs to extend and deepen its own set of strategic relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region in the face of growing Chinese and American assertiveness. The proposed new EU security strategy will hopefully address this as a geostrategic priority.3
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

80. Military minerals: Europe's new defense industrial capacities demand reliable supply chains

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The geopolitical upheaval of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine coupled with the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House have kick-started massive new defence spending commitments across the European Union. Yet even where EU member states overcome longstanding policy gridlock and red tape to advance rearmament plans, new industrial defence capacities require reliable supply chains for critical minerals and defence materials to ensure future production. The reopening of a mothballed ammunition factory in Denmark offers a window into understanding the political, bureaucratic and supply chain single points of failure that could upend new industrial defence capacities in Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China and Europe

81. Washington’s Influence: The Significance of Taiwan’s Annual Han Kuang 2026 Military Exercises

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On August 5, 2026, Taiwan launched its annual Han Kuang military exercises, a ten-day event continuing through August 14, with the aim of simulating the country’s response should China resort to force to reclaim the self-governing island, which Beijing considers a territory under its jurisdiction. The drills included combat scenarios for troops and reservists to test how they would respond to a potential attack on the island. Taiwanese military circles described the exercises as “exceptional and the first of their kind,” given their comprehensiveness and the scale of the realistic threats they simulate, in addition to coming at a time of escalating military tensions between Beijing and Taipei, as well as continued disagreements between Washington and Beijing over the Taiwan issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

82. Arena of Rivals: China, Taiwan, and the Contest for Africa

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The China-Taiwan file has undergone a notable transformation at the African level. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te concluded his visit to Eswatini on May 5, 2026 — a trip that had originally been scheduled for April 22 to 26 before being postponed, after Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar revoked overflight permits for the Taiwanese presidential aircraft. Beijing, meanwhile, received the President of Mozambique from April 18 to 22, who met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the latter’s invitation, as well as Namibia’s Minister of International Relations and Trade from April 11 to 18.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Taiwan, Asia, and Eswatini

83. Balancing Act: Why China Chose “Pragmatic Neutrality” in the War on Iran

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the American-Israeli war on Iran on February 28, 2026, China has maintained what can best be described as a flexible, carefully calibrated stance. Foreign Ministry statements issued on February 28, March 2, and March 11 condemned the American-Israeli strikes, called for a halt to the escalation, and emphasized that the war serves no party’s interests. Complementing its public statements, Beijing reinforced its diplomatic engagement by dispatching its special envoy for Middle Eastern affairs, Zhai Jun, to the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Neutrality, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
China, Iran, and Asia

84. Strategic Hedging in Motion: Japan’s Trajectory to Counter Growing Chinese Influence

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Japan has recently intensified diplomatic and security efforts to reinforce regional alliances and mitigate the potential repercussions of Beijing’s rising power amid China’s significant expansion of influence across Southeast and East Asia. Expanded security coordination and military cooperation with the United States, South Korea, and the Philippines now characterize these initiatives, raising important questions about their impact on the regional balance in East Asia.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Hedging, Foreign Influence, and Military Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

85. Walking on Two Legs: The Socialism of Chinese Modernisation

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
09-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
The Chinese experience shows that true national independence demands both technological advancement and the constant realignment of economic power, proving that market mechanisms can be directed toward human need rather than profit.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Science and Technology, Modernization, and Socialism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

86. China’s ‘World-Class Military’ in the Indo-Pacific: Scenarios for 2049 and their Consequences for European Security

Author:
Kaspar Pucek, Karen van Loon, and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
China’s resurgence has been one of the defining geopolitical developments of our time. By the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2049, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to have completed its “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. But what, exactly, does Beijing mean by this statement? And what will this entail for the Netherlands, the European Union, and NATO by 2049. The report is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will analyse the meaning of the 2049 centenary for the geopolitical strategy of the Chinese leadership. The second chapter will zoom in on China’s ambitions to build a “world-class military” by 2049 as part of its national rejuvenation strategy, the extent to which it has succeeded so far, and the areas where it still aims to catch up with the United States in particular. Chapter three will present three scenarios as to how China could possibly attain its military goals in the Indo-Pacific by 2049. Finally, the fourth chapter will reflect on the implications of these scenarios for European security and will present policy recommendations for what Europe could do to prepare for and navigate those scenarios. The scenarios are: 1. Forgone Formose: “Peaceful reunification” through a blockade of Taiwan. 2. Thucydides Trapped: A U.S.-China war of attrition along the First Island Chain. 3. Sino-centric Seas: China’s emerging primacy amid U.S. retrenchment. All three scenarios contain profound implications for European security, exposing it to political, geo-economic, and military pressure from both China and the U.S., maritime vulnerabilities, the potential weakening of the U.S. commitment to European security, as well as Chinese cyber and hybrid threats in retaliation for European support for the United States in case of a conflict with China. Europe should contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific by raising the costs of conflict and lowering the risks posed by expanding Chinese influence in the region by reducing its own vulnerabilities, through: • Building a credible and usable European geo-economic deterrent. • Strengthening existing and new partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. • Strengthening economic and supply chain resilience. • Prioritising maritime security, chokepoint resilience, and access diversification. • Rebuilding European security to reduce dependence on the United States, enabling Europe to take more responsibility for its own defence, thereby closing any perceived window of opportunity for Russian aggression during periods of U.S. strategic distraction while also making Europe less vulnerable to coercive leverage by the United States.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Geopolitics, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

87. AI Diplomacy for a Multipolar World: Policy Brief Europe’s Moment to Act on Trusted AI Partnerships

Author:
Maaike Heijmans and Alexandre Ferreira Gomes
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
US and Chinese AI models and their embedded normative biases are spreading, without any clear European counterbalance or alternative. The Netherlands and the EU need an AI diplomacy strategy that builds a modular tech offer to safeguard global AI diversity, openness, and democratic governance. By working on AI diplomacy through the EU’s Global Gateway, the Netherlands can also strengthen its own competitiveness and digital development. Dutch technological niches that are in high global demand and make for concrete sectoral offerings include agritech, cybersecurity, healthtech, and edtech.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Netherlands, and United States of America

88. America, China and the Middle East: Will the Failure in Iran Lead to a Decline in American Power?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
US strategic failure in the Iran war rests on three claims: misreading limits of military power, failing to achieve core war objectives, and allowing the conflict’s effects to spill beyond the Middle East into broader international consequences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

89. US National Security Strategy: The Trump Administration’s Vision for the United States and the World

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Trump's 2025 National Security Strategy marks a shift from post-Cold War US policy, rejecting global hegemony for "America First" realism. It prioritises sovereignty, economic security, reduced intervention, and burden-sharing with allies while focusing on containing China and hemispheric dominance.
Topic:
National Security, Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Economic Security, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
United States of America, North America, and China

90. Changing Tides in the US Approach to Foreign Assistance in the Pacific

Author:
Kelley E. Currie
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Following the dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and dramatic reduction of other foreign assistance programs in 2025, the Trump administration has begun reconstructing foreign assistance programs around an “America First” approach that is tightly focused on national security and economic interests. The small island states of the Pacific have been an early testing ground for this new paradigm. These states are experiencing unique and extreme developmental challenges, including climate-related issues, and are also an intense theater of great power competition due to their strategic geography. Those charged with reconciling US interests and the needs of Pacific Island states within this new model of foreign assistance must be creative, flexible, and consistent, especially as China continues to expand and deepen its presence in the region. As a proving ground for the Trump administration’s new model of foreign assistance, the success or failure of this approach in the Pacific Islands will have important implications for its overall implementation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, Donald Trump, and USAID
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

91. The Wrong Race: The US, China, and AI Competition

Author:
Alvin Wang Graylin
Publication Date:
09-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The conventional wisdom in Washington says the United States and China are locked in an existential race to reach a decisive strategic advantage in developing artificial intelligence, or AI. Take Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s recent comments: “Beating China — there is no day after tomorrow if China wins at this … If they were to pull ahead of us on AI, then nothing else matters.” President Donald Trump has made similar comments lately, citing competition with China as the reason for his refusal to slow down AI growth, stating that “whoever wins AI wins.” Such assumptions about the AI race now underwrite close to a trillion dollars a year in capital expenditure, a comprehensive export control regime, and arguments that AI is a national security matter that should not be subject to the ordinary give-and-take of market competition and government oversight. At the extreme, some in Washington have even raised the possibility of military strikes should China appear poised to gain artificial general intelligence, or AGI, first. But the assumptions behind the “AI race” framework are deeply flawed. While there are legitimate national security concerns around AI, there is no decisive “finish line” to AI innovation that will grant a final victory to either the United States or China. As with previous transformative technologies, we should prepare for the continuing long-term development of AI through competitive markets, not total geopolitical victory for one side. US–China capability gaps at the frontiers of AI technology typically last only a few months, and there is no competitive “moat” that will secure a permanent advantage to either nation. The idea that the greatest AI security threat to the United States lies only in large frontier models sponsored by a nation-state like China is flawed as well. The most dangerous models are often those smaller specialized ones that could be created or utilized by non-state rogue actors for the purpose of deploying biological, chemical, or cyber weapons. The assumption of US–China conflict prevents the exact global cooperation to protect against this very real threat. The upcoming summit between President Trump and President Xi Jinping is an opportunity to chart a cooperative path forward that moves beyond the flawed model of an existential AI race and establishes sensible cooperative measures around shared harm and safety standards. We outline specific proposals for such measures in this brief. Beyond the summit, the United States should reject the idea of any “national security exemption” for AI labs from ordinary market discipline and legal regulation and, instead, take steps to safeguard American workers from the threat of displacement by automation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

92. China’s Evolving Strategy for International Science and Technology Cooperation

Author:
Denis Simon
Publication Date:
09-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
China has been increasing its emphasis on science and technology research as a key priority, including by directly integrating the strategy for international scientific engagement into its broader framework for national power and technological self-reliance. However, even as both China and the United States increase their emphasis on science and technology as central national priorities, the two countries are proceeding in a very different manner from one another. Instead of adopting an intensely securitized approach that hampers international engagement, China is moving toward a more expansive role in global scientific leadership. The United States should meet this approach in kind, safeguarding its global scientific leadership through engagement rather than scientific isolationism. China is transforming from a passive participant to a leading architect of the global innovation ecosystem. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, regional technology platforms, and new international bodies like the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, China has become a premier funder, host, and standard setter for science and technology projects, particularly in the Global South. At the same time, China remains hampered by domestic political controls, ideological oversight, and strict data regulations, which make foreign researchers hesitant to commit fully to Beijing. But if the United States erects its own overly broad, indiscriminate barriers to science and technological cooperation, it will inadvertently mitigate China’s problems by driving top global talent directly into Beijing’s expanding orbit. To protect its strategic interests and maintain global technological preeminence, the United States must avoid treating openness and security as a zero-sum choice. Attempting to outcompete China solely by building walls around American science will prove counterproductive. American scientific leadership has never rested on domestic resources alone; it has also relied on the United States’ unique capacity to attract the brightest international minds, staff cutting-edge laboratories, and lead global discovery. If China becomes the world’s central hub for global scientific collaboration, American influence will erode and its visibility into emerging scientific and technological frontiers will shrink. Washington can avert this outcome by adopting a policy of “smart openness”: establishing precise safeguards around genuinely sensitive dual-use technologies while keeping fundamental research open and welcoming to global scholars. To match the Chinese, the United States will also have to revitalize its scientific diplomacy, actively participate in international standards organizations, and build enduring research partnerships across developing nations.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

93. Workarounding While the International Order Fractures

Author:
Laura Mahrenbach, Gedaliah Afterman, Maximilian Mayer, and Narayanappa Janardhan
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In an increasingly multipolar world, middle powers are resisting their relegation to pawns in the US–China rivalry. Instead, they are forging a path independent of great power competition by building mutual networks of middle power cooperation that “work around” great powers such as the United States and China. This brief outlines initial results from an original new database of such “workarounding” agreements between middle powers. It finds that workarounding agreements among middle powers are rapidly increasing in the technology sphere. Middle powers such as India, Germany, France, South Korea, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan are using workarounding to build a dense network of cooperation across regions and sectors, increasing practical capacity in energy, ports, data, defense, finance, and industrial policy. Workarounding is multifaceted in practice, creating new trade structures and rules, reshaping supply chains via tech and industrial partnerships, shifting industrial capacities and innovation dynamics, developing alternatives to US defense technology, modernizing core state functions, and diversifying payment infrastructures. It may represent the nucleus of emerging new forms of global order arising in response to the US’s rejection of its previous role in the liberal international system. Rather than establishing full autonomy, workarounding provides middle powers with strategic space and maneuverability, working with the US or China when it advances a country’s self-interest while building separate channels to reduce exposure, improve bargaining power, and keep critical sectors moving amid great power instability. Workarounding measures have proven crucial during the global energy crisis caused by the US–Israel war with Iran. The US should resist viewing workarounding as an inherent threat to its national interests. Rather than imposing tech supremacy through coercion, the US should see workarounding as an opportunity for interest-based engagement, particularly related to supply chain diversification, energy security, and regional security. Attempting to block this emerging dynamic in global politics risks increasing disillusionment with the US across the globe.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, International Order, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

94. Competition for US–China Talent Advantage and the US National Interest

Author:
Denis Simon
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief treats the US–China talent competition as one between systems rather than a zero‑sum race for individual scientists. The systemic competitive edge in the American talent development system has been openness — its capacity to attract, integrate, retain, and productively deploy global talent within a high‑performing research ecosystem. Recent policies adopted in the name of pursuing a zero-sum talent competition with China have narrowed this openness. While limiting access may weaken China (Chinese enrollment in US higher education peaked at 372,000 in 2019), as explained in this brief, such limitations risk weakening the US talent infrastructure more than they harm China. For four decades, educational cooperation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China has been consequential yet contested. In Washington, these exchanges are often framed primarily as security risks: Did US universities “train China’s talent?” Did openness accelerate China’s rise? This brief argues these questions miss the more policy-relevant issue: how much the United States has benefited from educational cooperation with China, and what it stands to lose by abandoning openness. The US talent system has been strengthened by decades of engagement with Chinese students and researchers. The American innovation ecosystem has demonstrated an exceptional “capture effect”: attracting high-performing foreign students, integrating them into US research networks, retaining many during their peak productive years, and converting their contributions into domestic scientific output and entrepreneurship. Openness, of course, carries risks, such as IP theft and illicit technology transfer. These are real concerns requiring tighter controls in sensitive areas with dual-use applications. But overly broad restrictions reduce talent inflows, shrink US research capacity, push talent elsewhere, and accelerate China’s drive toward indigenous capacity outside US influence. The brief advances a “smart openness” approach to talent, which combines openness to global talent inflows with targeted safeguards for clearly defined sensitive domains. Smart openness aligns security with competitiveness and centers US interests. An education system open to global talent is not charity but a historically proven source of American strength.
Topic:
Education, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Talent
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

95. Community Guidelines for Smart Openness In US Research Collaboration

Author:
Caroline S. Wagner and Denis Simon
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
China was long perceived as the junior partner in the US–China scientific relationship, but is now at the cutting edge of scientific research in many areas. As China has reached new frontiers, an exclusive focus on security concerns has driven a stark decline in US–China cooperation. This has put the two countries on a path to scientific and research decoupling, which is throttling US visibility into China’s frontier work. It also cuts deeply into the US commitment to scientific openness at a time when US national interests would most benefit from some form of continued engagement. Preventing further damage will require a new paradigm that balances beneficial scientific cooperation among the world’s foremost powers with appropriate attention to both opportunities and security concerns. In other publications, we have outlined the broad conceptual framework and argument for a “smart openness” framework. In this brief, we lay out a path to implementing it. Implementing the smart openness framework, especially in the current atmosphere of mutual suspicion and hostility between Washington and Beijing, will require the participation and buy-in of the research community itself. Government cannot and should not define the frontiers of research. This brief begins the process by proposing an initial classification of field-specific standards for what’s in and what’s out in the major fields of international scientific research. We develop and explain three categories of risk for this classification: a green (low risk) category, a yellow (manageable risk) category, and a red (high security-disqualifying risk) category. Such a categorization allows the research community to make informed, considered decisions about collaboration, rather than relying on vague federal advisories. The framework is intended as a starting point for deliberation among professional societies, research security officers, disciplinary experts, and government liaisons. As we further explain in the brief, agreeing on a smart openness security classification can jump-start a process allowing the scientific community to self-monitor in a unified manner, curtailing the generalized suspicion of all US–China scientific collaboration.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Collaboration, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

96. The Geopolitical Shifts in the Sahel: The Sino-Russian Strengthening vs the Franco- American Decline

Author:
Yoslán Silverio González
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The political changes that have taken place in the Sahel over the past five years have been a result of the sustained context of insecurity experienced in the region and also an expression of a transformation in the dynamics of the international geopolitical arena. The weakening of the Euro-U.S. model of security cooperation and its failure to contain terrorism provoked a wave of coups against the French military presence in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The “coup” governments adopted an anti-French narrative that has had reper-cussions in former Western allied countries, such as Senegal, Chad, and the Ivory Coast, which have also requested the withdrawal of French troops. The political crisis affected the structure of ECOWAS when the Sahel countries decided to withdraw from it and create the Alliance of Sahel States. In this region of the Global South, the traditional Franco-U.S. hegemony has eroded.On the other hand, these changes have allowed, first, the consoli-dation of China’s position, not only in the Sahel, but throughout the entire sub-Saharan region. China has managed to completely displace traditional players — such as France, the United States, and the European Union (EU) — from economic control, in terms of trade volume and foreign direct invest-ment, and has consolidated its position as Africa’s main strategic partner and is advancing its own security agenda. Second, these political changes have allowed a greater Russian involvement in security issues to combat terrorism. Russia has increased its international role not only through its actions in Syria and Ukraine, but also in the Sahel, an area where traditional Euro-American influence is declining.This paper demonstrates how, over the past five years, the Sahel-Saha-ran region has become the African epicenter of changes in the internatio-nal geopolitical order, which is undergoing a transition toward a multipolar system with the loss of Euro-U.S. hegemony. The medium-term scenario presents a strengthening of the Sino-Russian axis in detriment of the Fran-ce-U.S. “bloc” in sub-Saharan Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, International Order, and ECOWAS
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, France, Sahel, and United States of America

97. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Author:
Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

98. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:
Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

99. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

100. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea