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2. The New Development Bank’s Contribution to the Energy Transition Process in the BRICS Countries (2016-2023)
- Author:
- Maria Elena Rodriguez, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá, Octávio Henrique Alves Costa de Oliveira, and Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira
- Publication Date:
- 12-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- BRICS Policy Center
- Abstract:
- Considering the growing relevance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the task of financing the global energy transition process, it is important to understand the efforts of these institutions to establish projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the most diverse sectors of the economy, and especially in the energy sector. This document looks specifically at the role that the New Development Bank (NDB) plays in this process, presenting an overview of its loan portfolio and targets in terms of contributions to the energy transition process. The NDB, also known as the BRICS Bank, stands out in its institutional strategies in the area of Clean Energy, one of its operational objectives, setting a target for the year 2026 of directing 40% of all its financing to projects aimed at climate change, including operations that contribute to the energy transition (NDB, 2022a, p. 28).
- Topic:
- Development, Banks, BRICS, Energy Transition, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates
3. Les étudiants chinois en Europe et l’Etat-parti
- Author:
- Jérôme Doyon
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
- Abstract:
- Chinese Students in Europe and the Party-State -- Why do some Chinese students who choose to study abroad get involved in pro-regime organisations? How does this reflect the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to foster relationships of dependence and allegiance with its overseas nationals? Fieldwork conducted within branches of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in France and the United Kingdom sheds light on the drivers of this form of long-distance authoritarian commitment. An analysis of how the association operates in two different European countries reveals how it adapts to the local environment while functioning as an enclave, isolated from host societies. The organisation’s primary objective is to maintain the Chinese partystate’s hold over its nationals outside national borders rather than influence or develop ties with foreign societies. However, students do not passively allow themselves to be co-opted, and the many pressures they experience can hinder efforts to mobilise them in support of the regime.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Political Science, and Students
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and France
4. Ilham Tohti: Jailed for Fighting for Dialogue, Ethnic Harmony and Rule of Law
- Author:
- Jewher Tohti, Marie Holzman, Dilnur Reyhan, Teng Biao, Enver Can, and Magdalena Slezáková
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Vaclav Havel Library
- Abstract:
- Six of the 13 laureates of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize to date are currently in prison, including Professor Ilham Tohti. He is a well-known Uyghur intellectual from China and the laureate of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize for 2019. For over 20 years, he has been engaged in promoting dialogue and mutual understanding between Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities. As a result, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in a two-day show trial in 2014. His family has not heard from him since 2017, when he was denied contact with both them and his lawyers. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Ilham Tohti’s arrest, the Václav Havel Library organized a commemorative and advocacy event with the participation of his daughter Jewher, who lives in exile and has been actively involved in efforts to secure her father’s release. The somber 12th anniversary of his unjust imprisonment was marked at the Václav Havel Library by French sinologist, journalist, and writer Marie Holzman; senior researcher at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences and president of the European Uyghur Institute Dilnur Reyhan; Chinese lawyer and political activist Teng Biao—who, as a member of the Weiquan Lawyers (Rights Defence Network) in China, was a finalist for the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize in 2013—and Ilham Tohti’s tireless defender and president of the Ilham Tohti Initiative, Enver Can. The discussion was moderated by Magdalena Slezáková, foreign desk editor at Deník N.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Repression, Advocacy, Uyghurs, Ilham Tohti, Dialogue, and Rule of Law
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
5. Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions
- Author:
- Pavel Devyatkin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- In recent years, the Arctic has become the site of both great-power cooperation and competition. While the 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Putin and Trump reflected a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations, U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland has cast doubt on continued U.S. cooperation with both Russia and China in the region. This brief details how a combination of restraint and proactive diplomacy in the Arctic — built upon shared interests and a recognition of competitive coexistence — will best serve the United States. The second Trump administration has called for American Arctic dominance, viewing the region as an energy source and as an opportunity to monopolize resources and to establish its Western Hemisphere force posture. Russia views the Arctic through a similar lens of resources and sovereignty, as it ramps up its military presence while intensifying efforts to extract natural resources. China’s influence in the region has steadily increased, as it collaborates with Russia, while advancing scientific research, sustainable development, and multilateral climate cooperation. The United States has come to see increasing Russia–China collaboration in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national interests. But rather than responding to this deepening relationship through unilateralism, the U.S. should recognize that competitive coexistence and trilateral cooperation are more beneficial. This approach avoids zero-sum confrontation and minimizes accidental escalation while maintaining U.S. force projection, maximizing resource extraction, and promoting scientific collaboration. Toward this end, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Establish trilateral maritime safety and search-and-rescue, SAR, operations, a system that exchanges real-time information, conducts joint training exercises, and invests in port and coast guard infrastructure. Such cooperation would lower shipping costs, improve safety, and encourage economic development — goals shared by the United States, Russia, and China. Institutionalize direct, reliable U.S.–Russia–China communication channels, including a dedicated Arctic hotline for incident reporting and a security digital platform for real-time vessel tracking. Such transparency minimizes the chances of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear assets in the region. Revitalize the Arctic Council to enable communication among the three major powers, the eight Arctic states, and Indigenous representatives. Initiate a trilateral arms control framework, using reductions in Arctic military exercises as a springboard for broader arms control and security arrangements.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
6. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation
- Author:
- Ariel Petrovics
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
7. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica
- Author:
- Xavier Villar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
- Topic:
- Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
8. Ciencia, Industria y Competitividad
- Author:
- Gonzalo León, Francisco Marín, Carlos Marti Sempere, Raquel Jorge, and María Peñate
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- La Fundación Alternativas analiza la evolución del sistema de I+D en España en el contexto internacional y geopolítico, destacando los grandes cambios recientes en ciencia, tecnología e innovación. El informe subraya que España dispone de capacidades competitivas en áreas clave como biotecnología, comunicaciones, software o IA, y puede contribuir al fortalecimiento tecnológico de la UE. Ante el ascenso de China, la inestabilidad global y la creciente importancia de la seguridad y la soberanía tecnológica, el texto defiende la necesidad de reformar el sistema español de I+D, mejorar su gestión y alinearlo con una política industrial europea más ambiciosa. El objetivo final es reforzar la competitividad, la autonomía tecnológica y el papel estratégico de España en Europa.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Youth, Digital Culture, Industry, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Spain
9. What Lies Beneath: Hybrid Threats to Taiwan’s Submarine Cables and the Contest in the Information Domain
- Author:
- Aurelio Insisa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Between 2023 and 2025, multiple disruptions affected Taiwan’s submarine cables, a critical yet vulnerable infrastructure essential to the island’s connectivity and security. Against the backdrop of China’s diplomatic, economic and military pressure targeting Taiwan, these disruptions are generally defined as “grey zone operations”. Yet, reframing them as hybrid threats allows for a better understanding of how specific threats to the infrastructure domain can spill over in the information domain. Disruptions to submarine cables may be exploited by threat actors to erode trust in domestic institutions and destabilise society. Uncertainty in the information domain emerging from these disruption presents opportunities for Taiwanese authorities to mobilise public support, international partners and resources to enhance infrastructure resilience. A strategic communications approach drawing on the experience of the EU can strengthen response through enhanced coordination among institutions, coherent messaging, constructive public engagement and improved awareness of information-domain contestation. An effective adoption of this approach may mitigate risks from threat actors while reinforcing the capacity of Taiwanese authorities to safeguard critical infrastructure and maintain societal trust.
- Topic:
- Infrastructure, Disinformation, Hybrid Threats, and Submarine Cable
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
10. With imports of around €900 million in 2025, is Kosovo moving toward a potential dependency on China’s supply chain?
- Author:
- Ramadan Ilazi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
- Abstract:
- KCSS publishes new paper on Kosovo’s rising imports from China and supply‑chain risks Prishtina, February 20, 2026: The Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) has published a new discussion paper in its Secure Futures Series examining whether Kosovo’s rapidly growing imports from China could be placing the country on a trajectory toward supply‑chain dependency, and what this might mean for Kosovo’s governance, resilience, and Euro‑Atlantic integration and alignment. Authored by Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, the paper notes that Kosovo imported approximately €920 million worth of goods from China in 2025, making China Kosovo’s third‑largest important partner after Germany, and Türkiye, despite Kosovo’s free trade agreement with Ankara, and no diplomatic relations with Beijing. The analysis highlights that Kosovo’s imports from China have expanded steadily and doubled over the past four years, with China now accounting for around 13 percent of Kosovo’s imports. “For KCSS, focusing on unwanted foreign influence in the Kosovo is about anticipating how economic exposure can translate into political leverage, and security and strategic vulnerabilities,” said Mentor Vrajolli, Executive Director of KCSS. “As Kosovo deepens trade ties with China, despite the absence of normal diplomatic relations, this trend deserves serious attention for its potential ramifications on Kosovo’s longer‑term positioning in relation to the United States and the European Union.” The paper situates Kosovo’s evolving trade pattern within the wider Western Balkans context, where several countries have already experienced politically contentious engagement with China through large‑scale infrastructure loans, procurement practices, and technology cooperation. It underscores that, unlike many of its neighbors, Kosovo has remained at political distance from Beijing, however, the paper argues that dependence can develop also quietly through market dynamics and supply chains. “The purpose is not to be alarmist,” said Dr. Ramadan Ilazi, author of the paper. “The concern is the direction of travel of our country, since imports from China have doubled since 2021, while Kosovo has almost no exports to China and no formal mechanisms for economic dispute‑resolution. In a system, such as China’s, where state and economy are not only closely intertwined, but in practice, one, economic cooperation is rarely politically neutral and especially when the country in question does not even recognise Kosovo and consistently supports Serbia’s position in international forums.” The paper points to relevant experiences, such as Lithuania’s trade disruption following tensions over Taiwan representation and South Korea’s economic exposure during the THAAD dispute, to illustrate how economic links can become instruments of pressure when political disagreements arise. The discussion paper also flags the broader normative dimension, arguing that Chinese engagement in the region has often operated in ways that can undercut rule‑of‑law standards, including through practices such as lex specialis in procurement in other Western Balkan contexts.
- Topic:
- Risk, Trade, Imports, Supply Chains, and Dependency
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, Kosovo, and Balkans
11. Letter from Joseon to Korea: International Politics of the Korean Peninsula
- Author:
- Muhammad Eren Yıldırım
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- South Korea has indispensable military relations with the United States (US), especially in the context of its hostile relations with North Korea. In addition, China’s giant economic power makes South Korea reluctant to abandon its relations with China. Yet another significant factor complicating the regional dynamics for South Korea is the unresolved historical issues inherited from the imperial exploitation by the Japanese Empire on the Korean peninsula. This book aims to replace the narrative of South Korea’s as an “agent” in the global arena, considering its historical values and above-mentioned transforming conditions, with a multifaceted approach called “strategic pragmatism.” The author asks the following questions: what resources does South Korea have in its foreign policy-making processes?, what is its strategy based on these resources?, and what are the sources of the fundamental beliefs that construct the policymakers’ perception of South Korea’s foreign policy strategy?
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Book Review, Regional Politics, and Strategic Pragmatism
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
12. Power of Bonding and Non-Western Emerging Great Powers Engagement: Comparing China and India’s Soft Power Strategy in Pakistan
- Author:
- Abdur Rahman Fuad
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- Power of Bonding and Non-Western Emerging Great Powers Engagement: Comparing China and India’s Soft Power Strategy in Pakistan by Md. Nazmul Islam is a scholarly exploration that pioneers new perspectives in International Relations. It offers a unique and fresh insight into how non-Western emerging great powers, specifically China and India, utilize soft power strategies to engage with Pakistan. The significance of this four-chapter book lies in its departure from traditional Western-centric viewpoints, providing a distinct lens to comprehend the geopolitical and cultural strategies of these major Asian powers. This unique perspective on non-Western soft power will intrigue scholars, policymakers, and individuals interested in international relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Book Review, Soft Power, and Emerging Powers
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, China, India, and Asia
13. The Asian 21st Century
- Author:
- Azhar Waqar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Uluslararasi Iliskiler
- Institution:
- International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
- Abstract:
- “The Asian 21st Century” is a compilation of essays and articles by Kishore Mahbubani that covers various topics related to the transition of power especially in the context of the geopolitical and economic rise of Asia. In this book, instead of giving an overarching definition of Asia, the author focuses on certain countries, particularly China, Japan, South Korea, India and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries. The book has been divided into four sections; the first section is titled “The End of Era of Western Domination”, the second “The Asian Renaissance”, the third is comprised of articles related to “The Peaceful Rise of China”, and the last one is titled “The Globalization, Multilateralism and Cooperation.”
- Topic:
- Economics, Geopolitics, Book Review, and ASEAN
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea
14. Understanding Global South Perspectives on Taiwan
- Author:
- Henrietta Levin and Hugh Grant-Chapman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- To develop a better understanding of Global South perspectives on cross-Strait dynamics and Taiwan’s engagement with the developing world, the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies convened an international task force consisting of 20 leading scholars and practitioners from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Over the course of four workshops, task force members analyzed the increasing support that many Global South countries have offered for Beijing’s position on Taiwan, and how U.S. policy affects the position of Global South countries. They also considered opportunities for Taiwan to enhance its economic, diplomatic, and people-to-people engagement across the Global South. This brief summarizes the key takeaways from the task force’s deliberations.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Global South, and Strategic Engagement
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and Global South
15. China's 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan: Continuing the Economic Model and Increasing Self-Reliance
- Author:
- Marcin Przychodniak
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- The latest five-year plan, adopted in March this year by the Chinese parliament, identifies industrial modernisation and the pursuit of technological independence as key to China’s economic development. It mentions increased consumption and improved social conditions, but these are not priorities. The development of modern industries is intended to increase the competitiveness of Chinese companies relative to entities from developed countries, including Poland. The direction outlined by the plan is another argument for strengthening the protection of the EU single market and supporting an active EU industrial policy.
- Topic:
- Economics, European Union, Economic Development, Modernization, Industry, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Poland
16. The EU and Australia strengthen trade and security partnership
- Author:
- Patryk Kugiel
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- On 24 March, during a visit to Australia, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the conclusion of negotiations on a free trade agreement and the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership. These agreements are intended to help both sides diversify their trade, reducing dependence on China, whilst increasing resilience to US political and economic pressure. It also presents an opportunity for Poland to intensify its cooperation with Australia.
- Topic:
- European Union, Partnerships, Free Trade, Trade, and European Commission
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Poland, and Australia
17. The Special Collection of the Extensive Correspondence of Chin-Tang Lo
- Author:
- Juliet Tierney, Allison Bernard, and Chengzhi Wang
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- February 25, 2026 — Chin-Tang Lo, professor emeritus of the Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures of University of Hawaii, donated his papers to Columbia University's C.V. Starr East Asian Library. The special collection includes about 600 letters exchanged with prominent scholars in East Asia such as Hu Shih, Chien Mu, and Masaru Aoki. As a friend of and a researcher on Lo, Juliet Tierney introduces Lo as a multifaceted scholar and a significant contributor to many fields of modern Chinese studies. Speaker: Juliet Tierney (陈艳群) was born in Changsha, Hunan province of the PRC. She graduated from Hunan Normal University majoring in Music. Since 2000 she has lived in Honolulu, Hawaii. She previously worked as a journalist for World Journal（世界日报）and is now a freelance writer. She has published two collections of essays. Discussant: Allison Bernard, MA Program Director and Lecturer in Discipline, EALAC, Columbia University Moderator: Chengzhi Wang, Chinese Studies Librarian, C.V. Starr East Asian Library, Columbia University
- Topic:
- Area Studies, Scholars, and Correspondence
- Political Geography:
- China
18. Paradoxes of Chinese Feminism
- Author:
- Yao Lin and Andrew J. Nathan
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Yao Lin examines the paradoxical aftermaths of the Chinese #MeToo movement under party-state authoritarianism. While it profoundly transformed public discourses on sexual harassment and discrimination, the party-state’s silencing of leading activists created room for the rise of algorithm-savvy, censorship-adapted “jīnǚ (lit. radical feminist)” online opinion leaders who promulgate classist, trans-exclusive, and pro-Party-State versions of feminism. Those developments cannot be fully comprehended within dominant frameworks of intersectional analysis or affective politics, and call for a distinctly regimatic approach of analysis. Speaker: Yao Lin, Visiting Scholar, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, researches and teaches across political theory, comparative politics, philosophy, and law. He currently works on several projects, including studies on Chinese and transnational feminisms, and on diasporic resistance to authoritarianism. He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University Department of Political Science, and J.D. from Yale Law School.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Feminism, Censorship, and #MeToo
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
19. Feeling Political: Art as Public Sphere in the Cross-Strait Worlds
- Author:
- I-Yi Hsieh and Nick Bartlett
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- February 18, 2026 - The recent boom-and-bust of art museums in China has attracted worldwide attention. Revealing the industry’s instability (rooted in entanglements with the financial sector), the wave of museum closures in the People's Republic of China indicates the changing horizon of art institutions as public spaces for political cacophony. I-Yi Hsieh's talk draws on her book "Flora and Fauna: Domestic Nature and Private Collecting in Reform Era Beijing" (2025) and the exhibition "Contested Waters" (2024–2025) to further the conversation by addressing art as public sphere in the cross-strait worlds. Hsieh introduces her book’s ethnographic lens capturing the rise of private collecting as an alternative to the diminishing public realm for political expression, while, on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese artists and art institutions increasingly showcase projects with a focus on geopolitical tensions. It is the worst of times and the best of times for political art in the cross-strait worlds.
- Topic:
- Politics, Arts, Museums, and Public Space
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
20. Social Policy Responses During COVID-19 in East Asia and Beyond from a Comparative Perspective
- Author:
- Julia Shu-Huah Wang and Qin Gao
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- January 21, 2026 — Julia Shu-Huah Wang examines how Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong responded to COVID-19 compared to other countries. Drawing on two projects, she analyzes (1) model family data from East Asia, the U.S., and Europe to trace social policy changes before, during, and after the pandemic, and (2) country-level indicators across two decades from over 140 countries using panel regression. The presentation highlights cross-national differences in the design and effectiveness of social policy responses. Speaker: Julia Shu-Huah Wang, Associate Professor, National Taiwan University Moderator: Qin Gao, Maurice V. Russell Professor of Social Policy and Social Work Practice; Acting Director of the Asian American Initiative; Associate Dean for Doctoral Education; Director of China Center for Social Policy, Columbia School of Social Work
- Topic:
- Social Policy, Crisis Management, Public Health, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and Hong Kong
21. From Mao to Now: China's 20th-Century Global Development Finance
- Author:
- Austin M. Strange and (Zoe) Liu Zongyuan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- March 25, 2026 — The nature, aims, and impacts of Chinese overseas aid and lending have attracted major policy and scholarly attention since 2000. However, the first 50 years of China's international development cooperation are often omitted from discussion. The University of Hong Kong's Austin Strange introduces a dataset on China's 20th-century development finance, including approximately 4,000 projects in over 130 countries, and shows how these data can be analyzed to enrich theoretical and empirical research on Chinese development finance in international relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, International Cooperation, Mao Zedong, and Development Finance
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
22. The Future of China-Russia Relations
- Author:
- Thomas Eder and Elizabeth Wishnick
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- March 26, 2026 — What does China('s leadership) stand to gain or lose by remaining close to Russia? Thomas Eder's presentation explores energy and broader economic ties, Russia's potential role in conflicts involving China in the Indo-Pacific, and the joint promotion of (global) governance ideas. It also address the realities of China’s and Russia’s presence and cooperation in the Arctic, as well as consequences of their deeper bilateral ties for China-Europe ties and China's regional security interests in East Asia.
- Topic:
- Economics, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Energy, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
23. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy
- Author:
- Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
24. Learning Mandarin, Riding the Metro: China’s Street-Level Presence in Bogotá
- Author:
- Tony Kirby
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
- Abstract:
- China’s presence in Colombia is no longer an abstract geopolitical discussion but rather a reality negotiated day by day through construction work, commercial exchange, language learning, and personal relationships.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Construction
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Colombia, and South America
25. From fragmentation to integration: China’s “Vertical-Horizontal Model” for the protection of overseas interests
- Author:
- Zhiqiang Zou, Degang Sun, and Jinan Wang
- Publication Date:
- 07-2026
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
- Institution:
- Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
- Abstract:
- Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China’s overseas interests have been faced with a growing array of multidimensional threats. China has carried out legislative and institutional reforms, forming a “vertical-horizontal model” for interagency cooperation and government-society fusion. The central government of China has passed a series of legislative acts to legalise China’s protection of overseas interests, a top-down vertical governance. Parallel ministries, departments, and offices have formed task-based institutions through consultation to promote China’s overseas interest protection, thereby establishing a cross-sectoral horizontal governance mechanism. The implementation of the “vertical-horizontal model,” however, confronts an array of hurdles, with heavy bureaucracy potentially giving rise to problems such as inefficiency and collective irresponsibility.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Government, Reform, Legislation, Institutions, and Vertical-Horizontal Model
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
26. Countering Russian escalation in space
- Author:
- John Klein and Clementine G. Starling-Daniels
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- This report’s findings are meant to guide policymakers in making important decisions about safety, security, and sustainability in the space domain, as well as to better inform the public on these issues. The report explains why current US space policy, Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs, and commercial integration strategies by themselves are inadequate to address the growing threats from Russia in space. The report makes the case for the development of policies, practical strategies, and more effective acquisition programs to better address a range of potential futures, considering possible space-related actions by Russia’s political leadership. Beyond recommending changes to US declaratory policy, this report details why the United States needs a more resilient space architecture. It examines how Russia’s nuclear threat—specifically, its designs to place a nuclear weapon in orbit, in clear violation of its obligations under international law—could alter the rationale for pursuing proliferated low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations. This report also explores the kind of space architecture the United States would need during a conflict against a major power, and how the United States can further integrate the private sector and allies in pursuit of its national security objectives. Each of these issues carries significant near-term policy and acquisition implications. This report explains why some US policymakers might be reluctant to take the necessary coercive action to compel acquiescence by Russian political and military leaders. This reluctance is driven by a Western sense of morality and “rightness,” an inherent right of self-defense mentality, and current conceptions of international humanitarian law. US anticipatory actions seeking to deter Russian malicious actions might prove unreliable because any anticipatory action will be a political decision based upon a Western mindset and worldview. This observation underscores that deterrence by denial of benefit—including resilience and active defense—should play a substantial role in military strategies, one even more substantial than cost-imposition efforts. Additionally, assurance and reassurance efforts directed toward Chinese and Indian leadership could help dissuade potential Russian aggressive behavior and deescalate crises. This report’s analysis illuminates important defense and force planning considerations. Its three scenarios span a catastrophic nuclear detonation (NUDET) in LEO to debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to less aggressive action against commercial satellites. A qualitative assessment using a detailed framework highlights the relative importance of the methods used to dissuade potential aggression while also prevailing in conflict. In priority order, the relative importance of affecting Russian leadership’s decision calculus is: deterrence by denial of benefit; assurance and reassurance; and deterrence by cost imposition. Finally, this report provides fifteen actionable policy and defense acquisition recommendations for advancing a comprehensive and practical framework to counter potential Russian aggression and escalation in space. Should dissuasion efforts fail and conflict in space occur, it is necessary that the United States, its allies, and commercial partners fight through Russia’s irresponsible and aggressive actions in space, while working to deescalate any crisis and seek a lasting peace.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Space Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America
27. A US strategy for energy competition with China in emerging markets
- Author:
- Steven Burns
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Emerging economies are set to drive the largest share of energy demand growth over the next two decades, making them a central arena for competition over influence in the future of global energy systems. China has positioned itself as the dominant partner for energy and infrastructure development across the Global South, in part by pairing state-backed finance with turnkey project delivery, which allows Chinese firms to shape technical standards and financing norms while securing long-term positions in future procurement and service markets. The United States can compete more effectively by organizing its financing, project development, and technical capabilities into a coherent offer that is closer to the speed and simplicity of competing models, while preserving the transparency and predictability on which partners rely.
- Topic:
- Markets, Governance, Strategic Competition, Energy, and Energy Markets
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
28. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios
- Author:
- Bonnie S. Glaser
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
29. Chinese Loans to Sub-Saharan African countries: BalancingDevelopment and Dependency
- Author:
- Ahmed Salim Vessah
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Nkafu Policy Institute
- Abstract:
- Over the past two decades, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) foremost tradingpartner and the region’s main bilateral creditor, profoundly reshaping its financial and geopoliticallandscape. Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders extended over USD 170 billion in loans toAfrican countries , with major recipients (such as Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia)each receiving between USD 5 and 40 billion. Today, China accounts for around 20% of SSA’sbilateral external debt , underscoring its strategic importance in the continent’s developmenttrajectory. This Policy Brief argues that while Chinese loans are instrumental in addressing Africa’smassive infrastructure deficit, they concurrently heighten debt vulnerabilities and geopoliticaldependence. The attractiveness of Chinese financing is best understood in relation to Africa’spersistent structural needs. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2024) , SSA facesan annual infrastructure financing gap of USD 100-150 billion, far exceeding the capacity ofdomestic revenues and traditional donors. Chinese loans therefore stand out due to their speed of approval focus on large-scale physical infrastructure, and limited policy conditionality’s comparedto Western lenders. For many African governments, this makes Chinese credit an appealing andpragmatic alternative for accelerating development.
- Topic:
- Debt, Development, Infrastructure, Trade, and Dependency
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
30. China’s Solar Industry Is in Upheaval—The Effects Will Be Global
- Author:
- Michael Davidson and Sandy Qian
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Over the past few years, China’s solar industry has entered a period of intense upheaval. Price wars and margin compression have forced industry leaders—including Jinko Solar, Trina Solar, and JA Solar—to report significant losses. These firms, along with LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei—the industry’s top five—slashed their workforce by over 30 percent in 2024. The market is facing industry consolidation and exits not seen in over a decade, as over 40 smaller firms have filed for bankruptcy, been acquired, or exited the market. Chinese regulators are accelerating this process, which will have ripple effects across global solar markets. Several critical questions arise: Does this phase erode China’s leadership in solar, or entrench it further? Is it a window for others to close the gap, or a prelude to deeper market displacement? And when the current wave of capacity consolidation settles, what will the next global competitive order look like? The answer is already emerging. Rather than opening space for rivals to catch up, the current shocks are forging a more resilient Chinese solar core. By embedding deeper into global value chains and securing a technological lead, China is effectively reshaping the industry’s future trajectory to its own long-term advantage.
- Topic:
- Sustainability, Industry, Solar Power, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
31. The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarised World
- Author:
- Thomas Greminger
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
- Abstract:
- The international system is entering a period of intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation. Competition among China, Russia, and the United States is reshaping the global order and redefining spheres of influence. These dynamics create both challenges and opportunities for middle powers, which must navigate contested spaces where alignment with one great power can generate tensions with others. Middle powers face a delicate balance: they seek to preserve their autonomy, influence multilateral institutions and maintain credibility in international networks, and their choices whether to align with a particular great power, hedge their international relationship bets, or engage in principled diplomacy can either stabilise fragmented regions or amplify systemic competition. Yet debates about the future of the international order tend to focus on great powers and institutional reform, leaving the behaviour of middle powers under-explored. This Policy Brief examines how middle powers can exercise strategic autonomy and influence in a fragmented world. It emphasises behaviour, relational positioning, and policy choices rather than material capacity alone by analysing how middle powers balance principles with pragmatism; manage geography and alignment; and engage in bridge-building, coalition-building, and mediation. It then assesses their capacity to stabilise regional and global orders, support multilateralism, and enhance systemic resilience.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, Polarization, and Middle Powers
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America
32. The Impact of Purges in the Chinese Army on Its Effectiveness
- Author:
- Marcin Przychodniak
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- Xi Jinping, as the Party’s secretary general, continues to strengthen his personal oversight of the Chinese armed forces, as evidenced by disciplinary actions against Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Combined with the purges that began in 2022, the growing atmosphere of uncertainty, and the increasing pressure to demonstrate loyalty to Xi, this raises the risk that the authorities will misjudge the condition of their armed forces. This may increase the likelihood of escalation, for example, towards Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Reform, Xi Jinping, Escalation, Loyalty, and Purge
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
33. The European strategic approach to technological security: the challenges posed by China
- Author:
- Earl Wang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- [1] Not only the US, but the EU and its Member States are also facing Chinese restrictions on foreign critical tech infrastructure. European telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson witness a drop by two-thirds in their market shares in China as compared to 2020. On the other way around, Chinese ‘high-risk suppliers’ of telecom networks such as Huawei and ZTE only encountered a 5-10% decline in Europe since EU institution and countries adopted the 5G cybersecurity toolbox in 2020. When it comes to European security in the cyber realm, we can also observe direct Chinese threats. Recent public cases of cyberattacks against France and the Czech Republic reminded us – again – of cybersecurity challenges from China which was also underlined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Among other topics, critical technologies, cyber and digital infrastructure top the EU’s list of tech security preoccupation with regard to China. This paper provides an analysis of the strategic formulation of EU institutions and European countries on tech security vis-à-vis China from 2013 to 2022. Cases of countries covered in the paper include France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. The paper is structured as follows. The first part studies the gradual awareness of security implications of Chinese investment in European critical technologies following China’s Made In China 2025 policy. In the second part, the paper examines the security threats posed by Chinese companies’ engagement in European digital infrastructure and the coordinated approach of the EU to secure 5G networks. The third part introduces the EU framework for investment screening as a new tool to address security concerns deriving from foreign investment in and acquisition of critical technologies and digital infrastructure. In the fourth part, the paper investigates European cybersecurity agencies and how cybersecurity has become a fast-growing concern of the EU and European countries in its relations with China. This paper showcases that the European Union and its Member States have incorporated the increasing link between security and technology in their strategic formulation of policy on China. More importantly, the effectiveness of the EU’s strategy in tech security highly relies on the coordination and cooperation among Member States and between the EU and national levels.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, European Union, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
34. The Structural Transformation of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy and Its Economic Effects
- Author:
- Gusang Kang
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- Over the past decade, U.S. foreign economic policy has undergone a structural transformation that extends beyond partisan political cycles. What initially appeared to be a temporary shift toward protectionism under the first Trump administration has consolidated into a broader orientation centered on economic security, strategic competition with China, and domestic industrial revitalization. The renegotiation of the existing trade agreements, withdrawal from multilateral frameworks, and imposition of Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs marked a clear departure from the liberal trade order that had characterized U.S. policy for decades. Rather than reversing this trajectory, the Biden administration utilized core tariff measures and expanded industrial policy through the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, reinforcing a production-centered strategy aimed at reshaping global supply chains. At the core of this transformation lies a reconfiguration of incentives governing global capital allocation and trade patterns. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) fundamentally restructured the U.S. international tax regime through provisions such as GILTI, FDII, and BEAT while lowering the statutory corporate tax rate, thereby altering firms’ location and investment decisions. At the same time, Section 301 tariffs sought to change relative prices in global value chains, reduce U.S. dependence on China, and induce supply chain realignment. Together, these measures illustrate how U.S. foreign economic policy increasingly integrates trade, tax, and industrial instruments into a coherent framework of economic statecraft. Against this backdrop, this report empirically evaluates the economic effects of these policy instruments. It examines how the TCJA affected U.S. outward and inward foreign direct investment and how Section 301 tariffs influenced trade flows at the product level, particularly with respect to trade diversion involving Korea. By employing panel regression and event-study methodologies, the study aims to identify causal impacts and dynamic adjustment patterns. The findings provide evidence that recent U.S. foreign economic policy has produced measurable structural effects on global investment and trade flows, offering important implications for Korea’s strategic economic positioning.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economy, Global Value Chains, and Structural Transformation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
35. China's Overseas Production-Supply Bases: Network Structure and Implications
- Author:
- Jihyun Jung
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- Global supply chains are undergoing structural change as the prolonged U.S.–China strategic rivalry, the normalization of geopolitical risks, and post pandemic disruptions shift the organizing principle from efficiency to stability, resilience, security, and trust. Major economies such as the United States, EU, and Japan have responded by strengthening policies for supply chain diversification, friend shoring, and strategic management of critical minerals and advanced industries. In response to these environmental changes, China is also strengthening the strategic nature of its overseas economic activities. Whereas Chinese companies' overseas expansion previously focused on market expansion or resource acquisition, it has recently shifted to a structural network expansion strategy aimed at responding to the restructuring of global supply chains. Specifically, China is expanding its global economic network by simultaneously establishing overseas production bases, supply bases, and infrastructure/logistics networks through a combined approach involving Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), overseas contracting projects, and trade activities. This strategy goes beyond merely relocating production bases overseas. China is pursuing a multi-layered strategy: strengthening global market access through overseas production bases, establishing supply bases to secure critical minerals and intermediate goods, and solidifying long-term economic footholds through infrastructure and industrial park development. This can be understood as China's strategic response to maintain its economic influence and enhance industrial competitiveness amid the global supply chain restructuring. Therefore, China's overseas expansion should be analyzed not merely as a phenomenon of increased investment, but as a process of restructuring global production and supply networks. This report approaches China's overseas economic activities from this perspective, understanding them as a strategy for building production and supply networks, and systematically classifies China’s overseas bases into three functional types and identifies core hub countries through standardized indicator analysis.
- Topic:
- Markets, Economy, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Production
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
36. China’s Growth in Transition: Structural Shifts and Medium- to Long-term Prospects
- Author:
- Jiyoung Moon
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- Since the initiation of its reform and opening-up period, China’s economy has experienced continuous high-speed growth despite multiple cycles of expansion and contraction. While China’s economic growth rate steadily declined after peaking at 14.2% in 2007, this deceleration has been stable and predictable, consistently exceeding the Chinese government’s target rate. Recently, however, China’s economic growth trajectory has reached a critical new turning point. Both external uncertainties—including intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, persistent geopolitical tensions, and global supply-chain fragmentation—and internal downward pressures, such as delayed real-estate recovery, local government debt issues, and rising youth unemployment, have exposed the limits of the old economic growth structure and fueled the “Peak China” narrative. Nevertheless, predictions of a sharp economic decline remain tentative. The Chinese government is actively deploying various policy efforts to create a new phase of economic growth. Major economic strategies—such as the “dual circulation strategy,” “new quality productive forces,” “consumption-led economic growth,” and “Chinese-style modernization”—along with strong policy incentives, appear well-directed toward addressing the core challenges of the economic slowdown. Given that Korea maintains deeply interconnected cooperative relationships with China across multiple sectors, a careful examination of China’s economic growth prospects and the recalibration of bilateral cooperation directions is more important than ever. This report comprehensively analyzes the structural changes in China’s economy from supply-side-side perspectives, utilizes rigorous econometric modeling to forecast medium- to long-term growth and derives strategic implications for Korea’s economy.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Reform, Economy, and Economic Growth
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
37. The 2024 Carlisle Conference on the PLA: Protracted War Against the PRC
- Author:
- Joshua Arostegui
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- The US Army War College’s 2024 Carlisle Conference on the People’s Liberation Army was held on October 16 and 17 at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference featured keynote speakers from the US Department of Defense and the think-tank community, and panels focused on assessing the People’s Republic of China’s understanding of and capability to carry out a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. The conference brought together over 100 participants from government, military, US Intelligence Community, academic, and think-tank organizations. The conference papers were authored by expert speakers and panelists and were designed to provide insight into key People’s Republic of China and People’s Liberation Army advances that could enable Chinese forces in a future protracted war against a US-led coalition. The papers were also crafted to enable in-depth seminar discussions following each panel, allowing the authors to garner feedback to improve their analyses. The conference volume is organized into four sections based on the conference panels: understanding the People’s Republic of China’s views on historical and modern protracted wars; assessing the People’s Liberation Army’s operational endurance in the land, maritime, and air domains; analyzing China and the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to command and control a protracted war; and determining how Russia and North Korea could support the People’s Republic of China in a protracted war.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
38. Russia's Fragile Balance of Global and Regional Alliances: The Formation and Evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
- Author:
- Ilias Tasopoulos
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
- Institution:
- Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
- Abstract:
- The article examines the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in shaping regional and international dynamics, with particular attention to Russia’s participation, drawing on insights from the Copenhagen School. It explores how the SCO advances a distinct model of regional governance, thereby influencing the political and strategic trajectories of its member states and neighbouring regions. Russia views the SCO as a platform that reflects its dual strategic orientation: engaging in regional multilateral frameworks to safeguard its immediate interests, while simultaneously seeking to assert greater status within the international system. The expansion of the SCO’s membership is evaluated, as it represents a broadening of its reach and influence. Russia’s engagement within this framework is explored, highlighting its evolving relationship with China in the aftermath of the 2022 Ukraine war. Ultimately, the article positions the SCO within the broader analytical context of international relations theory, assessing its contribution to the configuration of the global balance of power.
- Topic:
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Regional Organizations, and Strategic Alliances
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
39. US-PRC Defense Relations: Looking Back and Looking Forward
- Author:
- David Finkelstein, Thomas J. Christensen, and Elizabeth Wishnick
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- April 15, 2026 — One of the less illuminated dimensions of the US-PRC relationship is that between its two militaries. Over the course of four decades, the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army have gone from Cold War partners to strategic competitors. David Finkelstein provided historical and strategic context for understanding how the two militaries came to the place they are in today, and why it matters for the future of the bilateral relationship and the Indo-Pacific region. Speaker: David Finkelstein, Distinguished Research Fellow for National Security Affairs, CNA Introduction by: Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations; Director, China and the World Program, Columbia University Moderator: Elizabeth Wishnick, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, WEAI; Senior Research Scientist, CNA
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
40. Scrolling in China: A Look at Social Media, Podcasts, and Young People Today
- Author:
- Fang (David) Weng and Duy Linh Tu
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Drawing on his experience as a leading creator of Chinese podcasts, Fang Weng brings an insider perspective to questions that are usually examined from the outside. His talk pays particular attention to the invisible architecture of self-censorship, such as the emojis, homophones, and strategic silences that creators deploy not to evade detection, but simply to keep speaking. The presentation also highlights the audiences who have grown fluent in reading what is absent from a story as much as what is present. Speaker: Fang (David) Weng, Asia Society Fellow; Visiting Scholar, Columbia Journalism School Introduction by Duy Linh Tu, Professor of Professional Practice in the Faculty of Journalism, Graduate School of Journalism Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by Columbia Journalism School.
- Topic:
- Social Media, Youth, Censorship, and Podcast
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
41. Authoritarian Absorption: The Transnational Remaking of Epidemic Politics in China
- Author:
- Yan Long and Qin Gao
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- Abstract:
- April 23, 2026 — Yan Long examines how China absorbed global health norms while remaking epidemic politics through its own authoritarian logics. Her talk highlights the interplay between transnational influences, community activism, bureaucratic control, and digital statecraft in shaping China’s pandemic response. Her analysis draws on archival research, longitudinal ethnography, and interviews tracing China’s evolving epidemic governance across SARS, AIDS, and COVID-19.
- Topic:
- Governance, Authoritarianism, COVID-19, Epidemic, Global Health, and Activism
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
42. Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations
- Author:
- Nicholas Burns and Yasheng Huang
- Publication Date:
- 02-2026
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- Starr Forum: The Future of US-China Relations | Tuesday, February 17, 2026 Speakers: Nicholas Burns is the Goodman Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He is the founder and faculty chair of the Future of Diplomacy Project and a faculty affiliate at Harvard’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Burns worked in the United States government for over three decades, serving six presidents and nine secretaries of state. Most recently, he served as the US ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 2021-2025, leading public servants from forty-eight US government agencies at the US mission to China in overseeing one of America's most important bilateral relationships. Moderator: Yasheng Huang is the Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He also serves as the faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. From 2013 to 2017, he served as an associate dean of MIT Sloan’s GlobalPartnership programs and its Action Learning initiatives. His previous appointments include faculty positions at the University of Michigan and at Harvard Business School. Huang is the author of 11 books in both English and Chinese and of many academic papers. His most recent book, “The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to its Decline”, was a 2023 Best Book of the Year by Foreign Affairs magazine.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
43. The WhatsApp World Order: Learning to Live with the New Global Political Economy
- Author:
- David Henig
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- An inter-connectivity and technology revolution transformed the world over the last 30 years – with AI being the latest instalment. Multiple, interlocking, instant networks now cover the world like an ever-expanding changing set of WhatsApp groups, affecting all countries and governments. Today’s trade is responsive, resilient, diverse, and above all global as a result. Modern globalisation has in turn proved resistant to the many claims of its demise. Yet clearly this is not creating a happy world. Politics has not kept pace with the changes. National control, stability, optimism and trust are as a result particularly in short supply. At a macro level, challenger economies – most notably China – are engaged in mutual suspicion with the former hegemons EU and US, not helped by issues around subsidies and access to markets. All the major powers are undermining existing global rules while simultaneously suggesting an impossible retreat into self-sufficient manufacturing as they seek to come to terms with today’s economy. They are not helped by political debate that largely misunderstands the moment. Meanwhile corporate concentration in global markets has entrenched dominant private actors who navigate diverse regulations but can undermine competitiveness and governments. Political turmoil is enhanced by demographic shifts to ageing populations, social media, and citizen dislocation in the face of intense societal change and financial insecurity. Government failure to deal with challenges they are wrongly assumed to have created is too often simply leading to a search for scapegoats. Matters may even get worse given that the major powers have weaponised trade to a degree in recent years. Many urge them to intensify planning for economic warfare. This is turning dependencies from an inevitable by-product of greater product availability to a dangerous weakness. Such approaches threaten peace and prosperity, reflecting frustration that public demand for control in an inter-connected world cannot be met. Better approaches need to be found, that start with accepting today’s technology-enabled world including a strong China and other emerging economies. Governments must recognise that adaptive institutions will be more effective than trying to second-guess complex supply chains or put in place extensive new national rule-sets, particularly given their diverse public policy objectives. They must then protect where they must, prioritise where they can including for national security, and guide the public through their choices based on the best information that they have. For Europe in particular, long-standing respect for and implementation of rules that balance societal interests is more important than protecting all old industries. Internationally, agreements among friendly countries can be helpful but will not be sufficient. What is required is all countries accepting and enhancing core trade principles which were specifically designed to prevent a 1930s style global descent into mutual suspicion. WTO rules should be modernised to reflect today’s inter-dependencies and the dangers of weaponisation, rebalancing commitments on the basis of a broad definition of reciprocity, and avoiding of concentration of supply when countries grow. This though can only happen satisfactorily when the largest powers understand the need to discipline their own behaviours. Challenges such as dealing with dominant companies and scarce raw materials will never be easily resolved. Improvements will require international cooperation similarly based on trust, and should draw upon global networks of expertise that have developed as another result of today’s inter-connected world. Economies do adjust to new circumstances. Governments must therefore stop decrying resilience as an easy but incorrect way to be seen doing something, and focus instead on rebuilding economies and societies that adjust to today’s emerging inter-connected global order.
- Topic:
- Globalization, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, and Connectivity
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
44. Mind the minds: China’s education strategy and its implications for NATO
- Author:
- Veronica Strina
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Education lies at the heart of China’s grand strategy as it advances its global ambitions and reshapes strategic competition in nontraditional security terms, compelling NATO to rethink the ‘China challenge’ beyond the military domain. China is racing at unprecedented speed to become a global education superpower, fuelling its scientific and technological dominance. Yet deep-seated structural weaknesses within its socio-educational system, together with mounting international mistrust, risk slowing its ascent. NATO in its education and training institutions would be well placed to cultivate the critical thinking necessary for securing the intellectual edge.
- Topic:
- NATO, Education, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
45. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024
- Author:
- Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
46. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech
- Author:
- Arran Hope
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
- Topic:
- Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
47. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat
- Author:
- Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
48. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia
- Author:
- David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea
49. Assad’s Fall Is an Opportunity for a U.S. Win Over China
- Author:
- Grant Rumley
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Beijing consistently supported the regime’s brutal repressive measures, so cozying up to the rebel-led transition government may be more difficult than it expects. In the months since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region. For years, Chinese diplomats had been careful to toe a centrist line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly. Yet as the conflict has dragged on the past year, and as the region’s criticisms of the U.S. have risen, Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own. Chinese officials have regularly omitted mention of Hamas’s atrocities while blasting Israel and the U.S. for its support. Now, however, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has presented the U.S. with a similar opportunity...
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, Bashar al-Assad, 2023 Gaza War, and Transitional Government
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America
50. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China
- Author:
- Aurelio Insisa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
- Topic:
- Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America