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1. China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe

Author:
Maria
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that encompasses infrastructure projects, trade and financial agreements, and cultural and defence cooperation with over 140 countries worldwide. Bringing the digital component into the BRI seamlessly advanced Beijing’s ambition of taking a leadership position in the technology sector. The DSR not only speaks across regions but also goes beyond the technology infrastructure, which raises two critical concerns by giving China leverage to advance the digital authoritarian governance model and jeopardizing data privacy. To mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on China, the EU must find alternatives by collaborating with trusted partners and diversifying supply chains. First, the EU can expand its technological landscape and engage nations in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific. Second, it must develop and enforce regulatory mechanisms to prevent Chinese state agencies from misusing sensitive data.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Information Technology, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

2. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Author:
Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:
Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

5. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

6. Assad’s Fall Is an Opportunity for a U.S. Win Over China

Author:
Grant Rumley
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Beijing consistently supported the regime’s brutal repressive measures, so cozying up to the rebel-led transition government may be more difficult than it expects. In the months since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region. For years, Chinese diplomats had been careful to toe a centrist line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly. Yet as the conflict has dragged on the past year, and as the region’s criticisms of the U.S. have risen, Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own. Chinese officials have regularly omitted mention of Hamas’s atrocities while blasting Israel and the U.S. for its support. Now, however, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has presented the U.S. with a similar opportunity...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, Bashar al-Assad, 2023 Gaza War, and Transitional Government
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

7. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
Topic:
Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:
Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

9. From Partners to Rivals: Normative Power Europe Meets Normative Power China?

Author:
Gözde Yilmaz
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) has been promoting its norms, values, and rules for decades. However, in the current international environment, the EU’s normative power is not being received well outside the EU, particularly in reference to the growing power of illiberal states. Within that context, this study explores EU-China relations across time and unpacks the position of normative power Europe towards China and the Chinese response. The study foregrounds the fruitless attempts of the EU to project its transformative power onto China and the growing resistance by China against this, which it expresses by presenting itself to the West as an alternative power with an alternative understanding of international politics.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Rivalry, Strategic Partnerships, and Normative Power
Political Geography:
China and Europe

10. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

11. Foreign Malign Influence Targeting U.S. and Allied Corporations

Author:
Daniel Byman
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
U.S. corporations are regular targets of foreign governments seeking to undermine the United States. These hostile states have both commercial and strategic motives, and they use disinformation, malinformation, and artificial promotion to tarnish the reputations of U.S. companies. U.S. corporations and the U.S. government should take steps to mitigate this threat, including improving corporate counterintelligence, building networks of advocates for use in crisis situations, and sharing more information on the scope and scale of the problem.
Topic:
Terrorism, International Security, Geopolitics, Corporations, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

12. Could Allies Decide the Future of the Indo-Pacific?

Author:
Phillips O'Brien
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Edited by Jude Blanchette, formerly Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The papers are rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Phillips P. O’Brien assesses the critical importance of allies in deciding major conflicts and argues that a potential war between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific would likely go on for an extended period, with the United States needing to lean on its regional allies for logistical support and for their manufacturing capacities. O’Brien argues that the U.S. allies appear strong on paper, but that they are untested, while China’s allies of Russia and North Korea, though weaker, appear much more willing to contribute serious resources to one another. Therefore, a long conflict may hinge more on commitment than on capability.
Topic:
International Security, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China and Indo-Pacific

13. Collateral Effects of the Tariff War on ASEAN Food Security

Author:
Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Kayven Tan
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and China are locked in a cycle of escalating tariffs, with likely knock-on impacts on global food supplies and prices. In response to increases in tariff rates imposed by the US on China’s exports, China hit back with additional tariffs on US$21 billion worth of US agricultural products in March 2025. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs will mean an additional 10 per cent tariff on soybeans, sorghum, beef, pork, aquatic and dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, and an additional 15 per cent tariff on wheat, corn, maize, and chicken from the US. Given the tense words exchanged by leaders and officials on both sides in recent days, neither side appears ready to back down from these trade measures. The food security concern for ASEAN states is whether the trade war will impact the supply and prices of food in a region where 37 per cent, or 251 million people, cannot afford a healthy diet. Many Asian states rely heavily on imports for their food. Wheat is used in household staples such as noodles and bread, while corn and soybeans are used for food and livestock feed.
Topic:
Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

14. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

15. Report: Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire

Author:
Rian Thum
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a report in January 2025, “Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire: How China’s Policies in the Uyghur Region Have and Have Not Changed.” The report is authored by Rian Thum, Senior Lecturer in East Asian History, at the University of Manchester. The report seeks to improve our collective understanding of China’s ongoing repressive policies in the predominantly Uyghur province of Xinjiang in western China. The Simon-Skjodt Center released a report in 2021 detailing multiple crimes against humanity that the Chinese government had committed against the Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority group, and expressing grave concern that the Chinese government may be committing genocide. Since then, detailed reporting on state policies has decreased as Chinese authorities increasingly restricted access to information. Using recent evidence from Chinese state documents, satellite imagery, and survivor testimony, as well as a synthesis of recent academic publications, the report aims to fill a knowledge gap about the current state of mass atrocities targeting the Uyghur community and other Turkic minorities in the Uyghur region. The report finds that, given the available information, all of the policies that led to accusations of mass atrocities in the Uyghur region continue, and some are expanding. These findings should prompt deeper research into the nature of mass atrocities facing the Uyghur population and spark urgent, effective responses. In particular, the report recommends further research into emerging repressive strategies, including the intense network of electronic and human surveillance, curbs on religious practice, and the destruction of cultural heritage.
Topic:
Human Rights, Minorities, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

16. Assessing the Zeitenwende: Implications for Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Security

Author:
John R. Deni, Marina E. Henke, Aylin Matlé, Sophia Besch, and Tim Bosch
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The essays in this volume analyze Germany’s Zeitenwende, a pivotal shift in security policy triggered by Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Key topics include national security strategy, defense policy, energy policy, industrial strategy, and international relations with Russia, China, the United States, NATO, and the EU. Regarding strategy, Germany’s approach lacks focus, offering broad goals without addressing trade-offs or specific threats. On defense policy, the Zeitenwende marked a renewed commitment to defense spending, bolstered by a €100 billion modernization fund. But delays in procurement, operational shortcomings, and an underfunded long-term defense budget hinder Germany. Similar challenges affect the defense industry, despite increased spending and exports. In energy policy, Germany rapidly diversified energy sources and expanded its liquefied natural gas infrastructure to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Still, achieving energy security, affordability, and sustainability remains complex. Internationally, Germany abandoned decades of Ostpolitik, prioritizing Ukraine over ties with Russia. Germany’s evolving China policy focuses on derisking and maintaining economic ties, raising questions about whether Berlin has reduced vulnerabilities. Though Washington supports Germany’s strategic shift, concerns remain about its sustainability, particularly in Germany’s NATO and EU commitments. Each chapter concludes by identifying the implications for the United States as well as the steps to overcome identified challenges.
Topic:
NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Energy Security, Burden Sharing, and Zeitenwende
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Germany, and United States of America

17. Toward a More Effective DoD Contribution to Strategic Competition in the Western Hemisphere

Author:
R. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Innovative new thinking on the security dimension of the challenges posed by the PRC’s engagement in Latin America and the DoD’s role in the whole-of-government US response is needed. This monograph highlights risks from PRC influence networks, digital architectures, and dual-use commercial facilities in the region, particularly at ports and in the space sector; shows how PRC economic engagement and other support sustains illiberal regimes, indirectly contributing to the risks these regimes pose by hosting criminal and terrorist groups and other US adversaries, such as Russia and Iran; and illustrates how commercial, people-to-people, and security engagements create options for the PRC to exploit against the United States in times of war. It advocates for new effects-based strategic concepts for how the DoD can strengthen cooperation with the region and limit PRC access through enhanced security cooperation and leveraging partners’ valuation of their relationships with the United States to influence their choices regarding cooperation with the PRC and gain better situational awareness for responding to China. Finally, it discusses how the United States should work with regional partners to plan for likely PRC actions in the region in times of war, leveraging the presence, relationships, and knowledge created through engagement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, and Caribbean

18. Xi Demands Fealty Despite Domestic And Foreign Woes

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Politburo held a “democratic life meeting (民主生活会)” on December 21–22, 2023, in which President Xi Jinping gave an internal, unpublished speech. According to accounts provided to the author by three officials at the rank of department head or above, Xi admitted that he had repeatedly postponed the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (which according to Party norms should have taken place in October) because he “could not offer any viable solution for the nation’s problems.” Xi, who is general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, went on to blame the other 23 Politburo members and other senior cadres, not only for failing to give him good advice but also for demonstrating signs of disobedience. Reports of Xi’s frank admission of the dire straits of the Party’s leadership were widely circulated on social media. The official Xinhua read-out of the Politburo meeting also cited Xi as demanding “unison of thought” among top-tier officials. This entails adhering closely to the instructions of the “core leadership”—in other words, to Xi himself (Xinhua, December 25, 2023). The supreme leader raised the “two safeguards (两个维护),” a slogan that refers to “safeguarding the authority of comrade Xi Jinping as core of the party” and “safeguarding Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.” President Xi also admonished his close advisors to “take a firm grip on the internal laws of developments [of issues]; accurately distinguish between events and trends, crises and opportunities, and benefits and harms … and effectively combat risks and take action on the basis of stability” (People’s Daily, December 23, 2023). This instruction tallies with caveats given by Xi throughout the past year, in which he has warned that China faces unprecedented challenges and that the party-state apparatus must ready itself to tackle “black swans and gray rhinos.”
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Leadership, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

19. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:
Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

20. Xi’s New Year’s Speech Dismisses Difficulties

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On New Year’s Eve, a prerecorded address from Chinese President Xi Jinping was broadcast across the Party’s global network of official media outlets (Youtube, December 31, 2023). The speech is an annual tradition, delivered from behind a wooden desk in rhetoric that is at once paternalistic and triumphalist, in which Xi surveys the high points of the outgoing year and looks to the year ahead. The form of this year’s set-piece was no different, but the content departed from previous years in ways that are indicative of Xi’s shifting priorities, and the Party’s growing concerns about the state of the nation. The most significant section of the speech addressed the economic difficulties that China has weathered in the last year: “On the road ahead, trials and hardships [lit. ‘wind and rain’] will be the norm. Some enterprises are facing pressures, some of the masses are encountering difficulties finding jobs and meeting basic needs, and some places have hit by floods, typhoons, earthquakes, or other natural disasters (有风有雨是常态 。一些企业面临经营压力，一些群众就业、生活遇到困难，一些地方发生洪涝、台风、地震等自然灾害).”
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:
China and Asia

21. China’s Anti-Corruption Efforts Gain Momentum in Finance and Healthcare

Author:
Alexis Brown
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On September 27, Chinese President Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo, where he announced the end of the current round of finance inspections but suggested that more were to follow (Xinhua, September 27). The authorities may have chosen to focus on financial corruption to coincide with the restructuring of financial regulators in March, in which a central finance commission was created to give the Party center more direct control over the finance sector. This move indicates that the Party has taken a greater interest in the sector. So far in 2023, China’s anti-corruption organs, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC, 中华人民共和国国家监察委员会), have intensified investigations across both the healthcare and finance sectors. Authorities have investigated at least 180 hospital chiefs and 80 senior employees in financial institutions between January and early September. [1] By comparison, the CCDI and NSC only targeted 12 hospital leaders from 2019-2022 (CCDI). Through the anti-corruption campaigns, the party leadership is likely to bolster support among certain demographics, eliminate political opponents, and address some real instances of graft. However, due to the absence of robust institutions and transparency, systemic corruption will persist after the current drives wind down. The Party and state organs carry out anti-corruption in healthcare regularly, but in 2023 they have elevated the importance of this work. This is the first time the CCDI and NSC were involved in the National Health Commission’s annual conference on anti-corruption, where a national centralized campaign to crack down on graft was launched. The campaign will continue until mid-2024 (National Health Commission, July 21). [2] One motivation may be to address public frustrations with healthcare from the COVID-19 pandemic. There was an uproar over incidents like hospitals turning away ER patients for not having negative Covid tests and testing centers generating huge profits but producing fraudulent test results (Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council, December 9 2022 Credit China, December 23 2022). Another reason may be to combat illegal healthcare charges in order to boost household consumption, one of the government’s top economic targets for 2023 (Xinhua, March 14).
Topic:
Corruption, Finance, Public Policy, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
China and Asia

22. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:
Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:
International Relations and Research
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

23. Western-Centric Moments in Homegrown IR Theories: Dependency, Chinese and African Schools

Author:
Engin Sune
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The modern international system has been shaped by long-standing historical practices of unequal power relations, which have positioned the Western world at the center of the political universe. Due to the centrality of the Global North in the international system, any IR theory that aims to portray a true picture of the “globe” necessarily situates the West at the center of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the form of universality generated by Western hegemony has been diffused throughout the world over centuries, spreading Western political institutions, economic structures, and ideological norms in an uneven setting. As a result, the social structures of the Global South have developed through an uneven form of relationship and dialectical interaction with the West. Therefore, homegrown IR theories, which uncover local political, philosophical, or cultural motives as sources for theory-making, in fact, concentrate on stratified forms of the universal reality that is diffused through the uneven spread of Western social structures. In this sense, there is a Western-centric moment in any homegrown IR theory. Accordingly, this article develops a scientific realist account of the structure/agent relationship in order to analyze the material grounds of Western-centrism in the field of international politics and to evaluate the role of non-Western actors. Additionally, it critically evaluates distinctive homegrown theories produced on three different continents to reveal the aforementioned Western-centric moments in these theoretical initiatives. Namely, the Dependency School of Latin America, the Chinese School of International Relations, and the African School are respectively scrutinized to disclose the embedded Western-centrism in these theoretical initiatives.
Topic:
International Relations and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Global South

24. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:
John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

25. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:
Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:
Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China and Asia

26. The Future of the Belt and Road in Europe: How China’s Connectivity Project is Being Reconfigured across the Old Continent – and What It Means for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has entered the twilight zone in the old continent, following a deterioration of bilateral relations between the EU member states and China over the last years. Italy’s official exit from the BRI at the end of 2023 was a further blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy. Yet, the BRI in Europe is being reconfigured rather than being terminated. In Western Europe, the BRI is moving away from physical infrastructure projects and investment in industrial assets – the latter being increasingly protected from Chinese takeovers by both national and EU legislation – to financial and monetary connectivity. This shift is welcomed by various European actors, including some policymakers at the national level, eurozone institutions and major banks. Concurrently, most of Eastern European countries continue to promote BRI projects and seek to attract Chinese investments, suggesting that there is a two-speed Europe when it comes to China, both in terms of geography and sectors.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Currency
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

27. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:
Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

28. China's Trade Strategies and Korea-China Cooperation Plans

Author:
Seung Shin Lee, Sang Baek Hyun, Su Yeob Na, and Young Sun Kim
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As uncertainties in the global trade environment expand, China's trade strategy is changing, and these changes are expected to have a significant impact on our trade environment with China. This paper analyzed China's policies on new trade issues such as supply chain reorganization, digital trade, climate change response and proposed policy implications.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

29. EU's “Open Strategic Autonomy” and its Implications for Korea

Author:
Youngook Jang
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This brief explores the shifting global trade landscape characterized by weakening globalization and rising protectionism, exacerbated by events such as the US-China trade disputes, COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It discusses how these factors have prompted a trend towards 'Open Strategic Autonomy' (OSA) in the European Union (EU), as evidenced by newly suggested industrial and trade policies. The EU's experiences during the pandemic and energy dependence on Russia have emphasized the need for resilient supply chains. The analysis draws from Jang et al. (2023) to examine how the EU's OSA has evolved in response to these changes, offering insights for policy implications for Korea.
Topic:
European Union, Trade, Supply Chains, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

30. Analyzing South Korea’s Semiconductor Industry: Trade Dynamics and Global Position

Author:
Hyung-gon Jeong
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
U.S. sanctions on China's semiconductor industry are causing major shifts in the global supply chain, affecting South Korea's industry due to its reliance on Chinese manufacturing. The Biden administration's increased sanctions, combined with global trends towards semiconductor self-sufficiency, are putting South Korea's semiconductor position at risk. Countries such as the U.S., China, and Japan are building up their domestic semiconductor industries, potentially affecting South Korea's position in the global market. Deeply integrated with China, Korean companies, face the challenge of reducing this dependence and adapting to the evolving supply chain landscape. This paper examines the import and export trends of the South Korean semiconductor industry over the last five years to assess its global standing, identify challenges, and suggest strategic directions. Using data from the Korea Customs Service from 2019 to 2023, the study analyzes trade patterns and supply chain configurations within South Korea's semiconductor industry. The industry is divided into six main categories and 33 subcategories, based on the analysis of 381 semiconductor-related items categorized under the Harmonized System at the 10-digit level. This detailed classification allows for an in-depth examination of trade trends, supply chain structures, and associated risks within the South Korean semiconductor industry. Moreover, this research uses the classification method described and UN Comtrade statistics to create a dataset on global semiconductor trade. This dataset is used to analyze the international presence of the South Korean semiconductor industry and its market shares in China across different segments.
Topic:
Trade, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

31. North Korea’s 2023 Trade with China: Analysis and Forecasts

Author:
Jangho Choi and Yoojeong Choi
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This article analyzes North Korea-China trade trends and statistics in 2023 to evaluate the extent of North Korea's trade normalization and its performance. North Korea's trade with China increased by more than 120% compared to the previous year as the country declared a COVID-19 Endemic and gradually eased border controls, but did not recover to 2018-19 levels, the year before the outbreak of COVID-19. Imports to China recorded 2.00 billion, 124.1% higher than the 0.89 billion in 2022. North Korea's imports from China in 2023 are estimated to be the maximum achievable given the lack of a full resumption of over-land trade. However, as the negative impact of UN sanctions on the North Korean economy is ongoing, making it difficult to normalize industrial production. North Korea mainly imported raw materials for processing trade (textile and garment raw materials), staple foods (rice and sugar), agricultural materials (fertilizer), and construction materials from China in 2023. North Korea’s exports to China stood at 0.29 billion, up 118.4% from 0.13 billion in 2023. Exports remain at the 16.9% of the level before the tightening of UN sanctions on North Korea, as the country has failed to diversify its products and expand exports of major export items. Exports were highly dependent on specific products, wigs and false eyelashes, a labor-intensive industry, accounting for 57.1% of total exports. In spite of increasing wigs export, North Korea failed to further expand its amount and diversify the export items in the second half of the year. According to the analysis of trade statistics, the main goals of North Korea's 2023 US foreign economic policy are: (1) resuming smuggling trade in textiles and clothing, (2) building irrigation canals in preparation for summer floods, (3) implementing state-led grain distribution, (4) building living houses in a rural area, and (5) increasing metal production for Russian arms exports. Despite the increase in imports from China in the transition to the coronavirus pandemic, it is difficult to say that it has yet led to the recovery of industrial production and economic development. The future of North Korea's trade with the rest of the world in 2024 will be determined by whether North Korea fully opens its borders and improves its relations with China. In 2024, both North Korea's exports and imports are expected to be slightly higher than in 2023. North Korea's exports are unlikely to increase significantly, as North Korea-Russia military cooperation is expected to continue and China is likely to maintain its checks on the growing Sino-Russian alignment. Increased imports will lead to a larger trade deficit, but it will be within North Korea's ability to manage for one to two years.
Topic:
Economics, Border Control, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

32. Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The likelihood China will attack Taiwan in the next decade is high and will continue to be so, unless Taipei and Washington take urgent steps to restore deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. This monograph introduces the concept of interlocking deterrents, explains why deterrents lose their potency with the passage of time, and provides concrete recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers can develop multiple, interlocking deterrents that will ensure Taiwanese security in the short and longer terms. By joining deterrence theory with an empirical analysis of Taiwanese, Chinese, and US policies, the monograph provides US military and policy practitioners new insights into ways to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan without relying exclusively on the threat of great-power war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Security, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

33. International Competition in the High North: Kingston Conference on International Security 2022

Author:
Michael E. Lynch and Howard Coombs
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The 16th annual Kingston Consortium on International Security conference, “International Competition in the High North,” took place on October 11–13, 2022, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The conference examined the Arctic region in the context of ongoing climate change and against the backdrop of war in Ukraine. Over the past several years, the United States has acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic as a strategic region, and the Department of Defense and each of the US military services have published Arctic policies or strategies. In addition, the Department of Defense has created a new regional study center, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies in Alaska. Canada and the other Arctic Council nations have also acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic region and revised strategic frameworks and changed institutional approaches to ensure Arctic security challenges arising from great-power competition and other threats, like those to the environment, are addressed. This volume captures these ideas for the United States and its allies so all can benefit from this experience.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Indigenous, Strategic Competition, Arctic Council, Military, Dual Use Infrastructure, Environmental Security, and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
Political Geography:
China and Arctic

34. Arming Allies and Partners: How Foreign Military Sales Can Change the China Problem

Author:
Brennan Devereaux
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Allies and partners are “a center of gravity” for the DoD National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific.1 But are regional nations building military capacity to help the United States prepare for and deter a potential clash with the People’s Republic of China, or are they solely focused on defending their own territories? Although regional nations’ aims may often overlap, they also diverge in some cases. Partner-capacity development must therefore reflect the distinction between deterrence and territorial defense. The US military has been diligently building relationships and developing partner capacity in the Indo-Pacific region for years, conducting dozens of exercises annually and recently establishing the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center.2 These efforts in the Indo-Pacific region have increased with the US military’s attempt to shift away from the Middle East, and President Joe Biden’s declaration that China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”3 Regardless of efforts in the region, not all relationships with partners are equal; the potential assistance each partner would be willing to provide the US military in a conflict with China will vary for myriad reasons. Although each nation’s support requirements and development goals are distinct, assistance through military sales is a foundational aspect of building capacity, providing allies and partners a venue for acquiring military equipment. The Foreign Military Sales program, often critiqued for its inefficiencies, is being revamped by the US Department of State and Department of Defense.4 Partner nations purchasing US military equipment will remain focused on their own national interests, which for many partners remain security and the defense of sovereign territory. Updates to how the United States approaches military sales can also be tailored to support US military interests more effectively. In other words, US strategic objectives should underpin the prioritization of sales to specific countries, and US efforts should extend beyond financial benefits or the intangibles of building partnerships. To account for the unique and distinct challenges the US military faces in the Indo-Pacific theater, the modernization of Foreign Military Sales should aim to provide the United States with a relative military advantage over China by tailoring the program’s approach to arming allies in a way that complements US military efforts in the region. Modernizing Foreign Military Sales begins by categorizing nations based on their expected roles in a potential clash between the United States and China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

35. A Baseline Assessment of the PLA Army's Border Reinforcement Operations in the Aksai Chin in 2020 and 2021

Author:
Dennis J. Blasko
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This report analyzes the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) border reinforcement operation throughout the Aksai Chin and adjacent areas from summer 2020 to early 2021. It is based largely on analysis of Google Earth imagery and provides a baseline for further analysis of the PLA deployment along the entire Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Aksai Chin. Chinese Army units appear ready to remain in a defensive posture near the LAC the Aksai Chin indefinitely. This effort is the land domain equivalent of Chinese military maritime operations in the South China Sea and air and sea deterrent operations directed toward Taiwan.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, India, Xinjiang, and Aksai Chin

36. War with China: A View from Early 2024

Author:
Marco J. Lyons
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
US defense analysts are overdue for a fundamental reassessment of the strategic factors that would shape a future Sino-American war. The United States may lower the overall risk of sparking a war between Washington and Beijing by more formally committing advanced US capabilities in intelligence collection and targeting, long-range fires, and theater air and missile defense to Japan and South Korea and by initiating bilateral planning to introduce such capabilities in Taiwan in the future. The US defense community still lacks a broad and integrated national strategy for successfully managing the rivalry with China. A clear-eyed assessment of a possible United States-China war could lead to a national strategy.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

37. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:
George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

38. Episode 04: Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:
Sahar Aziz and Khaled A. Beydoun
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Host Sahar Aziz and Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Professor Khaled Beydoun discuss the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries. The conversation is informed by Professor Beydoun’s new book The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims.
Topic:
Politics, Law, Discrimination, Islamophobia, War on Terror, and Muslims
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

39. The Russia Factor in China’s Relations with the West

Author:
Klaus W. Larres and Lea Thome
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Tension between China and the Western world has been a characteristic of global affairs for the better part of the last decade. Notwithstanding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States continues to view China as its greatest global rival and competitor. In fact, many policymakers in Washington (though by no means all of them) view China as an existential threat to America’s global influence and predominance. As the European Union and its 27 member states are not among the world’s superpowers, the Europeans have a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward China. Still, according to an important policy statement issued by the EU Commission in 2019, Brussels has come to see Beijing not only as a “partner and competitor” but also as a serious “systemic rival.” This refers less to geopolitical concerns but very much to global governance issues and geoeconomic, trade, and investment relations with China. The EU is deeply concerned about the continuing lack of reciprocity of market access, intellectual property theft, and China’s frequently state-subsidized competition regarding cutting-edge technology products, including solar panels, EV vehicles, and many other products, which may soon swamp the EU market. The EU Commission has launched an investigation into China’s production of EV vehicles and also Beijing’s shipbuilding industry, which it suspects may well work on the basis of rather unfair and highly subsidized support from the Chinese state.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Production
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

40. Digital Governance: Technology Tensions with China and Implications

Author:
Alex He and Robert Fay
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
As a superpower that is deeply integrated in global supply chains, China is becoming an economic giant, but its use of technology to capture data using methods that may pose cyber- and national security risks is raising concerns. While some view China’s motivations as an attempt to advance its status from an upper-middle-income economy to a developed economy, others see more nefarious intentions behind its authoritarian, top-down governance model. Further complicating the situation is the growing technology competition between China, the United States and Europe over the control of data, the technologies that use this data and the values upon which they should be used. The Centre for International Governance Innovation’s second annual conference on Digital Governance in China explored these and other issues related to the global implications of China’s governance model in the digital age.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China and Asia

41. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:
Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

42. Is Guanxi Changing? Referral Hiring and Social Networks in China

Author:
Elena Obukhova and Yao Lu
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
What is the role of guanxi in China today? To answer this question, Professor Elena Obukhova examines the relationship between social networks and referral hiring. In the first study, she compares China and the US. In the second study, she explores differences between China’s provinces. This event is part of the 2023-2024 lecture series on “Labor Market Transformations in China" and is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by Columbia's China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:
Markets, Labor Issues, Social Networks, and Hiring
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

43. Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control

Author:
Dali Yang, Qin Gao, Junyan Jiang, and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic, which began as an outbreak in Wuhan in late 2019, has claimed millions of lives and caused unprecedented disruptions. Despite its generation-defining significance, there has been a surprising lack of independent research examining the decisions and measures implemented in the weeks leading up to the Wuhan lockdown, as well as the missteps and shortcomings that allowed the novel coronavirus to spread with minimal hindrance. In this book talk, Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control, Dali L. Yang scrutinizes China's emergency response to the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, delving into the government's handling of epidemic information and the decisions that influenced the scale and scope of the outbreak. Yang's research reveals that China's health decision-makers and experts had an excellent head start when they implemented a health emergency action program to respond to the outbreak at the end of December 2019. With granular detail and compelling immediacy, Yang investigates the political and bureaucratic processes that hindered information flows and sharing, as well as the cognitive framework that limited understanding of the virus's contagiousness and hampered effective decisions and enabled the outbreak to spiral out of control.
Topic:
Government, Crisis Management, Bureaucracy, COVID-19, Decision-Making, Zero-COVID, and Emergencies
Political Geography:
China and Asia

44. China and Latin America: A New Assessment

Author:
Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Parsifal D'Sola, a MARSEA alum, will deliver a presentation offering a general overview of the current state and prospective trends in China-Latin America relations. The talk will explore the evolving interactions and strategic dynamics between China and Latin American countries, highlighting developments over the past two decades. Key areas of discussion include the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the peripheral effects of US-China tensions on the region. An important aspect of the presentation will be examining the diverse perceptions of China across Latin American countries and how these views influence bilateral relations and policy decisions. D'Sola will also share his thoughts on future trends, offering a broad perspective on the likely course of China's engagement with Latin America in the coming years. Speaker's Bio: Parsifal D’Sola is the founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation – China Latin America Research Center in Bogota, Colombia. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Parsifal is a Chinese foreign policy analyst specializing in Sino-Latin American relations with a focus on Venezuela. Between 2019 and 2020, he acted as Chinese foreign policy advisor to the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Interim Government of Venezuela. He holds a BS in Telecommunications Engineering from Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University, an MSc in International Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, and an advance language diploma from Beijing Language and Culture University.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Latin America

45. The White Crane of Alagśa: Legends of the Sixth Dalai Lama in Mongolia

Author:
Sangseraima Ujeed and Gray Tuttle
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
The Sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso (1683-1706/46) was recognized in secrecy, lived in controversy, and passed out of history in mystery. The popular tradition holds that he died whilst travelling to Beijing. Yet in some parts of Mongolia, it is believed that the exiled Sixth Dalai Lama escaped his captors and lived out his life in the dessert Gobi region of Alagśa, Inner Mongolia. To this day in Alagśa, the figure of the Sixth Dalai Lama still serves as a central pillar of the Alagśan identity, religion, and cultural pride among the local Mongolian population. Based on new materials in the form of oral histories, local legends, folk songs, poems, and textual sources which I collected about the Sixth Dalai Lama and the reincarnation of the Desi Sanggye Gyatso in Alagśa during a research trip in 2019, this paper will explore the formation of religio-cultural identity and the invention of tradition in the Alagśa during the early eighteenth century. This is not a paper that tries to solve the mystery of Tsangyang Gyatso’s death, but rather, one that explores the role Tsangyang Gyatso played for the Alagśa Mongols in creating narratives of identity and their realm Alagśa as an authentic Buddhist central place. This is a story of how Tsangyang Gyatso, his identities, and his interpersonal relationships were reborn in Alagśa and the role he played in consolidating Alagśa’s place within the wider geopolitical spheres of the cosmopolitan Buddhist world that spanned the Himalayas, Inner Asia, and the Qing.
Topic:
Religion, History, Geopolitics, Identity, Tradition, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:
China, Mongolia, and Asia

46. Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values and Institutions in Hong Kong

Author:
Michael Davis and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
A lot has been written about the 2019 protests in Hong Kong and the aggressive police crackdown offered in response. Much less has been written about the more severe assault on liberal values and institutions that followed. In his new book Professor Davis takes a forensic look at both the growing Beijing intervention in Hong Kong affairs from the handover forward and its culmination in the more severe crackdown that followed the 2019 protest, the 2020 passage of the National Security Law, and the 2021 Beijing imposition of a patriots-only electoral system. This talk will highlight the comprehensive impact of these developments on Hong Kong’s rule of law, its criminal justice system, and the many freedoms for which the vibrant city was long known—often previously ranking among the highest in the world. The diminution of basic freedoms has touched nearly all sectors of society, including education, the media, public broadcasting, civil society organizations, legal services, and so on. The city long known for a vibrant public debate, its vigorous media landscape, and some of the largest non-violent protests in the world has gone silent. The sheer comprehensiveness of this imposition raises questions not only for Hong Kong but for liberal democratic values globally, as autocratic regimes such as the PRC seek to advance their illiberal agenda.
Topic:
Protests, Institutions, Liberalism, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

47. Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China

Author:
Lynette Ong and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
How do states coerce citizens into compliance while simultaneously minimizing backlash? In Outsourcing Repression, Lynette Ong examines how the Chinese state engages nonstate actors, from violent street gangsters to nonviolent grassroots brokers, to coerce and mobilize the masses to pursue its ambitious urbanization project. She draws on ethnographic research conducted annually from 2011 to 2019--the years from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, a unique and original event dataset, and a collection of government regulations in a study of everyday land grabs and housing demolition in China. Theorizing a counterintuitive form of repression that reduces resistance and backlash, Ong invites the reader to reimagine the new ground state power credibly occupies. Everyday state power is quotidian power acquired through society by penetrating nonstate territories and mobilizing the masses within. After the book’s publication, Lynette has extended the arguments to explain the success, failure, and implications of China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Journal of Democracy, Foreign Affairs and the Economist etc. Outsourcing Repression has won the American Sociology Association’s Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship in Political Sociology, and the Human Rights Best Book Awards from the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Association, and the International Studies Association.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Governance, State, Coercion, Zero-COVID, and State Power
Political Geography:
China and Asia

48. China’s Responsibility, and Ours: The Persecution and Neglect of Stateless North Korean Children

Author:
Rob York, Hannah Cole, and Kaylin Kim
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
What happens to the children of North Korean women who are born in China? What happens when they remain in China, or when they escape to other countries? It is believed that as many as 300,000 North Koreans have fled the country—most of them since the famine of the 1990s, and most of them women. To address China’s “bare branches”—its much larger population of young men than young women—North Korean women are often sold to young Chinese men as brides. The children of these brides will be born stateless, lack legal rights, and face the ever-present danger of their mothers’ deportation back to North Korea because they are considered illegal immigrants in China. These unique challenges persist, despite China being a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other international treaties. Even those children that eventually escape to third-party countries are haunted by their status, as their statelessness caused legal hindrances to their ability to settle and, specifically in South Korea, deprives them of government assistance. This study documents the treatment of “stateless” children born to North Korean and Chinese parents. It delineates the factors that contribute to their mistreatment—China’s unwillingness to anger the North Korean government, South Korea’s growing disinterest in North Korean defectors, and a lack of formal networks for North Korean defectors elsewhere. It further finds that, with China openly hostile toward “meddling” in its internal affairs, the most likely source of relief for these children will be a change in attitudes among South Koreans, the United States, and their allies and partners, resulting in conscious effort by their governments and civil societies to help them, both financially and in assisting with their assimilation.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Children, and Statelessness
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

49. Gender in Strategic Competition: A Non-Traditional Strategy for Building Resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Charity Borg
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Today’s era is defined by strategic competition with “autocrats [who] are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.”[1] The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the leading autocratic force, operating with both the intent to reshape the democratic rules-based international order and the resources to advance those aims. States interested in upholding the international rules-based order must enhance their ability to withstand PRC coercion and invest in cultivating a values-based security alliance against the spread of authoritarianism. International collaboration on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda offers a low-cost, high-return opportunity to bolster national and regional resistance to authoritarian coercion while building a coalition of like-minded allies and partners. Increasing national resilience and building alliances that center on enhancing the security of women is a data-backed approach that ensures elevated state stability, democracy, and economic prosperity while increasing the likelihood of a coalition’s willingness to defend the current international rules-based order from those who seek to dismantle it. An overwhelming body of empirical analysis demonstrates a significant correlation between the security of women and the democratic or authoritarian tendencies of a state. That same analysis also finds that women’s security is a precondition for a state’s level of democracy. Otherwise stated, countries with higher levels of gender equality are more democratic, less corrupt, and more stable. Whereas “states with higher levels of violence against women are less peaceful [internally and] internationally, less compliant with international norms, and less likely to have good relations with neighboring states,” they are also more likely to align with autocratic governance structures.[1] Authoritarian states such as the PRC understand the benefits of empowered societies, which is why their actions on domestic and international fronts actively seek to suppress women. They fear that like-minded allies and partners will successfully improve security for fifty percent of the population and, as a result, will ultimately tip the scales of power and influence to preserve the values-based international order they desire to uproot. Interest and investment in the WPS agenda are growing around the globe, but not fast enough. Thus far, 18 Indo-Pacific states and one regional organization have sought meaningful engagement and integration of the WPS agenda by various means, opening a door for cooperation across the spectrum of civil, diplomatic, and military security cooperation engagements.[2] However, several transformative policy and operational measures must be implemented to achieve the desired end states. To be transformative and enable lasting change in governmental and national behavior, the thoughtful implementation of the WPS agenda at all levels, from national and subnational to the community and household, is required. First, domestic and international policymakers need to clearly define the security of women as a national security imperative. Second, implementing WPS in the defense sector should focus on training defense personnel to apply a gender perspective to enhance mission effectiveness. Last, those advancing WPS must take an inclusive, context-specific, and localized approach to its integration. To defend the current rules-based international order, like-minded countries must accelerate change and follow through by investing in women’s security.
Topic:
Security, Investment, Strategic Competition, Resilience, Gender, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

50. Enhancing the Cooperation between the US and Its Allies in the Mekong Subregion

Author:
Sach Nguyen
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Mekong subregion is experiencing heightened geopolitical competition between the US and China, representing a clash between the international rules-based order and a China-led order. While the US and its allies advocate for the rules-based order, China’s intentions for its own order in the region are debated. China’s increased presence and influence in the Mekong subregion, particularly through upstream control of the Mekong water, reflect its pursuit of this order. In response, the US and its allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, have strengthened cooperation with one another to promote a rules-based system. Despite existing coordination, there is potential for further collaboration to enhance their role in mainland Southeast Asia. Stability and prosperity in the Mekong subregion are being challenged. Weakening international norms in governing transboundary waters threaten downstream countries’ security and livelihoods, exacerbated by climate change-induced droughts. China’s growing engagement in the region aims to establish its sphere of influence, primarily through economic development projects like dams and railways, raising concerns over environmental impacts and expanding Chinese influence. Additionally, non-traditional security threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber security, and human trafficking further complicate the region’s situation. The engagement of the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion is multifaceted, driven by various interests but united in countering China’s growing influence. The US, through initiatives like the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and later the Mekong-US Partnership, seeks to maintain its relevance and preeminence in the region. Japan, South Korea, and Australia also engage with the subregion, for economic interests and to counterbalance China. Japan, for instance, aims to establish production bases and balance China’s influence through high-standard infrastructure projects. South Korea focuses on economic development and diversification of trade amid US-China tensions, while Australia prioritizes promoting a rules-based order and addressing non-traditional security threats. Despite differences in approach, the US and its allies collaborate through platforms like the Friends of the Mekong and initiatives such as the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, challenges remain in realizing these initiatives, particularly in engaging the private sector and ensuring concrete outcomes amidst competing interests and complex negotiations. Recommendations for enhancing cooperation between the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion include strengthening international norms and rules, expanding economic infrastructure projects, focusing on non-traditional security issues, and fostering track 1.5 and track 2 diplomacy to promote mutual understanding and collaboration among all stakeholders, including governments, academia, businesses, and civil society organizations. These efforts, facilitated by the US and its allies, can contribute to a more stable and prosperous Mekong subregion.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, International Order, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Mekong River

51. A Subdued Environment and Missed Opportunities

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Chinese diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula in late 2023 sputtered forward, driven more by a calendar of bilateral anniversaries with North Korea and multilateral gatherings involving South Korea than any sense of strategic purpose. Both relationships seemed preoccupied with off-stage developments such as the September summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin and the momentum of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations, rather than any inherent dynamism of their own. Still, regular Sino-North Korean bilateral exchanges ahead of the 75th anniversary of the bilateral relationship and Sino-South Korean bilateral economic dialogues provide opportunities to overcome resistance and sustain progress in the face of deepening major power rivalries. Senior-level dialogues between China and North Korea occurred on North Korea’s 75th founding anniversary in September, with the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong to Pyongyang, a visit that occurred against the backdrop of the second US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group meeting, North Korea’s first successful indigenous satellite launch, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho’s visit to Beijing. Meanwhile, ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, punctuated by a notable bilateral exchange between Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo in late September on the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou. But these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to have substantive bilateral meetings with President Xi on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco in November. Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko—the first in four years—failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry. Instead, the resumption of China-South Korea or China-Japan-South Korea summitry will depend on developments in 2024.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and North Korea

52. Taiwan Voters Choose Independence

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan’s election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wen’s management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wen’s chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election. Washington has expanded its support for Taiwan’s self-defense, though less vigorously than Republican critics in Congress would like. Taiwan and the US have continued to expand trade ties in ways that will benefit Taiwan businesses though without tariff concessions that Taiwan eagerly wants. Now that Taiwan voters have elected William Lai, as the polls predicted, China will likely respond with increasing coercion. Had Hou Yu-ih been victorious, his challenge would have been to navigate between Beijing’s pressure for cross-Strait concessions and Washington’s suspicions of any such steps by Taiwan.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Sovereignty, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

53. Biden-Xi Woodside Summit and the Slow Rehabilitation of US-PRC Ties

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The “guardrails” that President Biden and President Xi envisaged in Bali in November 2022 began to be emplaced at their November 2023 summit in Woodside, California. In-person, leader-led communication was deepened, reassurances exchanged, and practical—albeit modest—“deliverables” locked down on several fronts, including restarting mil-mil communications, cracking down on fentanyl precursors, addressing the national security harms of artificial intelligence (AI), and increased people-to-people exchanges. The establishment of numerous bilateral working groups will ensure an almost full plate of across-the-board consultations in 2024 as well as the means to troubleshoot irritants on short notice. As stabilizing as the Woodside summit was, it failed to deflect the US-PRC relationship from its larger overall trajectory of “selective decoupling” across a range of advanced technologies and frontier industries (microelectronics; quantum; AI; biomanufacturing; clean energy). Strategic trade controls and other competitive actions were doubled down upon. With a pivotal US presidential election looming in 2024, questions abound on the longer-term durability of a rehabilitating US-PRC relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Xi Jinping, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. Beijing Moderates Criticisms Selectively

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Beijing in this reporting period moderated often shrill rhetoric of the past two years criticizing Joseph Biden administration advances and regional governments cooperating with the US. Emphasizing China’s positive contributions to regional economic growth, Beijing stressed its flexibility, said to be different from Washington in not pressing regional states to choose between the US and China, even as it demonstrated ambitions to develop a new regional and global order favorable to itself. Nevertheless, glaring exceptions included egregious pressures to compel deference to China’s claims in the South China Sea, harsh criticism of the Philippines and Japan cooperating closely with the United States, as well as authoritative foreign policy statements giving regional governments little choice between two paths forward: cooperation with an avowedly beneficial China or America’s purported exploitative, divisive and destructive initiatives. Regarding the Philippines, an unprecedented show of support by the US for the territorial claims of its treaty ally resulted in an equally unprecedented pushback from Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

55. Taiwan and China—Steady As She Goes

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As 2024 dawned, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year Address that Taiwan must unify with China. In her New Year Address, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, with the election of her successor only 14 days away, repeated her offer to meet China on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and without preconditions, echoing themes dating back to her first inaugural address in 2016. On Jan. 14, Tsai’s chosen successor, Vice President Lai Ching-te, won an unprecedented third successive term for the Democratic Progressive Party, promising to uphold the independence of the Republic of China, but the party lost its majority in the legislature. A month later, two Chinese fishermen operating illegally near Kinmen Island died when their boat capsized as they were pursued by the Taiwan Coast Guard. Five days later, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel boarded and inspected a Taiwanese tour boat near Kinmen. Tensions grew but they did not boil over. On Jan. 30, China unilaterally moved its M503 civil aviation flight route closer to the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Premier Li Qiang included the obligatory call for Taiwan reunification in his Work Report to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). Some analysts found that and other NPC references to Taiwan more strident than in recent years, but any change in tone was subtle. In apparent retaliation for Lai’s electoral victory, China persuaded Nauru to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China even as Taiwan continued to strengthen unofficial relations with larger powers. These Taiwan efforts were supported by US President Biden, who used a trilateral meeting with Japan and the Philippines to call for cross-Strait stability. Taiwan’s continuing negotiation with the US of a 21st Century Trade Initiative and TSMC’s decision to expand new facilities under construction in Arizona exemplified Taiwan’s continuing diversification of economic linkages away from China. President-elect Lai will be inaugurated on May 20; his inaugural speech and China’s response could portend the future course of cross-Strait relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

56. China’s New Foreign Policy Moderation—Mixed Regional Implications

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Incorporating major foreign policy initiatives of leader Xi Jinping, Beijing completed its effort from the past two years with instructions in January on China’s new approach to foreign affairs to Chinese foreign policy officials and others concerned. The new approach added authority and momentum to Beijing’s emphasis since Xi’s summit with US President Joe Biden last November on greater Chinese moderation and restraint as a “responsible” great power pursuing peace and development in dealing with Southeast Asian neighbors and elsewhere. Nevertheless, Beijing remains selective in how it applies moderation, and the record of the past two years shows great swings between moderation and truculence in its approach to foreign affairs, depending on circumstances which remain subject to change. The success of China’s regional importance showed in Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies annual survey of regional elites with China viewed as both the leading economic and political-security power, overshadowing the United States, and the judgment that if forced to choose between them, more respondents would select China than the United States. Caveats to these positives for China include continuing strong regional concerns over China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia and the fact that the survey came during the height of the war in Gaza by Israel, which is supported by the US and viewed very negatively in the region. Meanwhile, the defiance of the Philippines, with strong military and political support from the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and other allies and partners, against coercive measures in the disputed South China Sea represented a major test of China’s avowed “restraint” in dealing with foreign differences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China and Southeast Asia

57. Ties Stabilize While Negative Undercurrents Deepen

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
US-China relations were marked by a paradox during the first trimester of 2024. On the one hand, a distinct stabilization was evident in ties. The two sides made concerted efforts to translate their leaders’ ‘San Francisco Vision’ into reality. Cabinet officials exchanged visits across the Pacific, working groups and dialogue mechanisms met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened, sensitive issues such as Taiwan were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in ties continued to deepen. Both sides introduced additional selective decoupling as well as cybersecurity measures in key information and communications technology and services sectors, with US actions bearing the signs of desinicization—rather than mere decoupling—of relevant supply chains. The chasm in strategic perception remained as wide as before. In sum, the “new normal” in US-China relations continued to take form, one piece at a time. What a difference a year makes. At this time in late-April last year, the US and China were barely communicating, still smarting from the balloon incident of February 2023. It was not until US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CPC Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Wang Yi met in Vienna in mid-May 2023 that a semblance of normality began to be restored to the relationship. Twelve months on, there has been an almost across-the-board restoration of communication channels, a deepening of functional cooperation across issues areas, and a concerted effort to manage the political optics of the relationship for the better – this, despite deep differences in strategic perception between the two sides.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

58. Understanding Muslim Countries’ Support for China’s Actions in Xinjiang: A Qualitative-Comparative Analysis

Author:
Bruno Hendler, Marcelo Corrêa, and William Wuttke Martins
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
This study examines why 23 Muslim-majority countries supported China at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN/HRC) in 2019, despite allegations of human rights abuses against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Using a fuzzy-set qualitative-comparative analysis (fsQCA), we compared the factors that led Muslim-majority and non-Muslim countries to support China. Our analysis found that Political Regime Affinity (PRA) was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Muslim-majority countries to support China, while China’s Foreign Aid (ODA) was a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-Muslim countries. These findings suggest that ideological factors, related to the autocratic political regime (PRA), played a significant role in Muslim-majority countries’ decision to support China in the UN/HRC in 2019. However, it is important to note that other factors may have also been involved. These findings have important implications for understanding the complexities of international relations and the factors that shape states behaviour.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Uyghurs, and State Behavior
Political Geography:
China and Xinjiang

59. Chinese Double Effect on Brazilian Foreign Policy (2003-2018)

Author:
Yuri Bravo Coutinho and Júlio César Cossio Rodriguez
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
This research examines contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, and its central concern is to explore how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018. We argue that China has had a double impact on Brazilian foreign policy: (i) restraining its scope due to the restrictive nature of Sino-Brazilian relations, primarily via commerce and political divergence, and (ii) enhancing Brazil’s autonomous insertion in the international system due to the structural gaps produced by Chinese diplomatic support in the global sphere and from the convergence of specific agendas. A case study on Sino-Brazilian relations is conducted with typologies on foreign policy actions elaborated by Schweller (1994). Then, we propose that Brazilian foreign policy, through the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy, sought to interpret a Jackal position within the international system. Our variables are defined based on Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), considering the structural stimulus of China’s rise as the independent variable, the permissiveness, and clarity of the international system as the intervening variable, and the behaviour of Brazilian foreign policy as a dependent variable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Neoclassical Realism
Political Geography:
China, Brazil, and South America

60. Between State Capitalism and Economic State Craft: China INC.

Author:
Sadia Rahman
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
China’s economy underwent regulatory, structural as well as spatial makeovers since the increase of opening up and reforms in 1978. Intermittent policy interventions have been implemented by the Chinese state to ensure that the economy plays a vital role. Relatedly, the Communist leadership’s economic perspective was shaped by two key attributes: ideology and functionality (pp. 8, 11, 42, 119, 148, 313, 314). From an ideological perspective, the legacy of reforms was as crucial as the equitable principle of Communist rule in China, as both ensured the party’s survival and its control over the state. From a functional perspective, the state’s performance remained an essential indicator for China to achieve economic growth and improve the living conditions of its people. In his book, Between State Capitalism and Economic State Craft: China INC, China expert Aravind Yelery captures the systemic reflections of these transitions, mapping how the state fused growth and encouraged further opening to help China manifest its rise. The book delves into China’s growth models examining how these contradictions are ‘chosen ones’ and how China aims to rally its economic statecraft globally. The central crux is the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) authority retention over the economy by preventing the state from giving up control over important sectors and industries. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) played a vital part in achieving this goal in China’s economy, allowing the CPC to control governance. Thus, the chapters are significantly interconnected enlightening on the ascendancy of capitalist approaches in the CPC, exploring how China managed to defy the decline experienced by previous communist regimes. The explanation of SOEs is presented as a key factor in establishing effective domestic economic controls, ultimately enabling China to exert its dominance in global economic affairs.
Topic:
Economics, Regulation, and State Capitalism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

61. Contemporary China in Anglo-American and Chinese Perspectives: Making Sense of a Rising China

Author:
Batuhan Ay
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
In the book Contemporary China in Anglo-American and Chinese Perspectives: Making Sense of a Rising China, Emre Demir aims to analyze China’s rise by displaying the differences and similarities in scholarly discourse in Western and Chinese scholarship. The book examines a collection of 14 approaches from scholars of mainstream United States (U.S.), critical Western, mainstream Chinese, and critical Chinese approaches and seeks to reveal their relevant power-knowledge nexuses and region-centric characteristics in knowledge production, with a particular focus on the current power structure in knowledge production in Chinese and U.S. societies. Demir indicates that every approach occupies a position within the three-layered structure of knowledge production: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Currently, the U.S. assumes the core (hegemonic) position within social sciences knowledge production, which enables it to dominate the means of knowledge production and direct the ways in which knowledge is produced. Therefore, the U.S. can globally reproduce its own theories, which it benefits from, under the guise of universal validity. Moreover, Demir advocates the diversification of intellectual knowledge in the social sciences, a human-centric approach instead of a region-centric one, a focus on the colonial histories of societies, and the decolonization of International Relations (IR).
Topic:
International Relations, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Knowledge Production
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and England

62. The New Cold War Is Sending Tremors through Northeast Asia

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
This dossier looks at how the US-led New Cold War against China is destabilising Northeast Asia, focusing on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Japan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Destabilization, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

63. Can Europe and India deepen ties through critical raw materials cooperation?

Author:
Emil Havstrup and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Europe and India are rapidly embarking on a clean energy transition with the share of renewables skyrocketing in their respective energy mixes. This heightens concerns about dependence on critical raw materials (CRMs), such as cobalt, nickel and graphite, that are needed for renewable energy technologies, and whose supply chains are largely dominated by singular exporters such as China. It is not the case that Europe and India lack reserves of, for instance, lithium, but there are barriers to extracting them, and even if new mining activities are undertaken, it will take time. This policy brief reviews how the two parties are juggling with their dependence on China-dominated CRM dependent value chains. Both realise that derisking, diversification and/or decoupling cannot be easily and quickly achieved. While the EU is nervous about being drawn into a wider regional conflict between the United States and China, India’s attempts to deal with the China threat has drawn it into various issue-based strategic partnerships. It makes sense for the two blocs to reframe the discussion on de-risking and instead cooperate on joint investments into Research & Development into alternatives to some CRMs, developing competitive supply chains for new materials and cooperating on the re-use and recycling of existing materials.
Topic:
International Relations, International Cooperation, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Raw Materials
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Asia

64. Port politics: Strategic autonomy and European ports

Author:
Xiaoxue Martin and Frans-Paul van der Putten
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
European seaports and related logistics are a key part of international trade and logistics. In recent years, foreign involvement by third countries has gained greater significance in this sector, especially where China is concerned. The recent calls for a European port strategy in the European Parliament underline this. Individual Member States and the EU as a whole can actively influence future scenarios by managing the degree of foreign involvement in European seaports and logistics, with special attention for China’s influence. However, a lack of EU cooperation concerning foreign involvement negatively impacts the EU’s strategic autonomy. This limits control over future scenarios. The aim of this report is therefore to conceptualise an EU-wide policy framework for strengthening strategic autonomy in the domain of seaports and related logistics sector systems. China serves as a case study.
Topic:
European Union, Logistics, Strategic Autonomy, and Ports
Political Geography:
China and Europe

65. The G7’s Geoeconomic Future: Insights from Conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran

Author:
Claudia Schmucker, Stormy-Annika Mildner, and Avi Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In an increasingly conflictual global environment, the G7 has become a more and more important geoeconomic actor. Yet looking at the case studies of Russia, Iran, and China reveals that the geoeconomic role the G7 plays has been mixed. For the G7 countries to improve their geoeconomic impact, they need to align their interests and risk perceptions, as well as improve their ability to propose and enact geoeconomic measures. In addition, the G7 should bolster its partnerships with other democracies and like-minded countries.
Topic:
Partnerships, G7, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

66. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: ASEAN Amid Sino-US Competition

Author:
William Choong
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
An area in which the United States has gained traction—at China’s expense—are emerging formal and ad hoc plurilateral collaborations between Quad members and Southeast Asian countries.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

67. Indian Ocean Security Means More Will Be Asked of US Allies

Author:
Benjamin Reilly and Peter Dean
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Ongoing disruptions in the Gulf of Aden and the vulnerability of other key Indian Ocean bottlenecks in the Straits of Hormuz or Malacca... [H]ighlight an inconvenient truth: the country with the most to lose from a disruption of the Indian Ocean today is China...
Topic:
Security, Maritime Commerce, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, India, Australia, West Asia, United States of America, and Indian Ocean

68. The Open Gap in the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific

Author:
Kenneth Gofigan Kuper
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
"For many of us in Guam, a free and open Indo-Pacific cannot be fully accomplished without resolving the paradox of the United States maintaining a modern-day colony even though the local government has supported moving forward with a decolonization process."
Topic:
Politics, Decolonization, Strategy, and Colonization
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and Guam

69. The US Should Enhance Economic Engagement with Taiwan

Author:
Min-Hua Chiang
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Min-Hua Chiang, East-West Center Adjunct Fellow and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Research Hub, explains "Further strengthening Taiwan’s economy will make it more capable of bearing the financial burden of defending the island against a Chinese invasion…," and this imperative is compounded as Taiwan is “a critical player in America’s competition with China in the global semiconductor industry.”
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, Leadership, Regional Economy, and Economic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

70. US Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and Roles for Partners

Author:
Rebecca Pincus
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center, explains that "The development of Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbons is dependent on foreign investment and advanced technologies; as the West has withdrawn from Russia, China is an important, if imperfect, substitute..."
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Hydrocarbons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

71. Sino-Russia Arctic Relations: The View from Singapore

Author:
Hema Nadarajah
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
​Dr. Hema Nadarajah​, ​Program Manager for Southeast Asia at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada​, ​explains that states seeking to deepen their engagement in the Arctic, such as Singapore, may find themselves trying to balance tensions, especially in the wake of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region and US-China strategic competition. ​
Topic:
Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic

72. Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective

Author:
Anurag Bisen
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Capt. (IND) Anurag Bisen (Retd.), Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, explains that "India needs to step up its engagement to secure its increasing national interest in the Arctic" and "must also use its equities with all the Arctic states to facilitate collaboration, ensuring access to infrastructure, research areas, and data."
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Governance, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, India, North America, and Arctic

73. South Korean Perspectives on China-Russia Collaboration in the Arctic

Author:
Young Kil Park
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Young Kil Park, Research Fellow at Korea Maritime Institute, explains that "While the immediate impact of China-Russia collaboration in the Arctic on South Korea is limited, it remains wary of the long-term implications for its economic and security interests."
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Arctic

74. United States, UNESCO, and International Relations through Cultural Heritage

Author:
Neel Kamal Chapagain
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Neel Kamal Chapagain, Professor at Ahmedabad University's Centre for Heritage Management, explains that "[c]ultural heritage is becoming a more prominent vehicle for building international ties" and "support for or opposition to global cultural heritage campaigns, like UNESCO, have been used [in US presidential campaigns] to make political statements."
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Culture, Heritage, UNESCO, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

75. Rise of Economic Nationalism in Emerging Economies and the Influence of Elections

Author:
Michio Ueda
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Mr. Michio Ueda, President of Geopolitics & Strategy and Visiting Lecturer University of Tokyo, examines "the intersection between economic nationalism and recent elections in Indonesia and India" and finds that "industrial policy is not a significant point of political contention" and elections "serve as an opportunity to gain legitimacy for policies supporting economic nationalism."
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Nationalism, and Elections
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, India, Asia, and United States of America

76. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?

Author:
William D. Hartung
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

77. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation

Author:
James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

78. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

79. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and James Park
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

80. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent

Author:
Hargisl Shirley Martey
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America

81. Competing Values Will Shape US-China AI Race

Author:
Valerie Shen and Jim Kessler
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
President Biden’s AI executive order reflects a set of values recognizable to all Americans: Privacy, equal treatment and civil rights; free speech and expression; the rule of law; opportunity and free market capitalism; pluralism; and advancement of global leadership as the beacon of a free world. President Xi Jinping’s government has also issued AI regulations with values recognizable to China: Collectivism and obedience to authority; social harmony and homogeneity; market authoritarianism and rule of state; and digital world hegemony to restore China’s rightful place as the Middle Kingdom. The United States and China may share similar broad goals for “winning” AI along the lines of leading innovation and advancement, spurring broad-based economic growth and prosperity, achieving domestic social stability, and becoming the clear global influencer for the rest of the world—but they define those goals and seek to achieve those ends through very different values. Those values embedded in our respective AI policies and underlying technology carry high-stakes, long-term national and economic security implications as US and Chinese companies compete directly to become dominant in emerging global markets. They also share similar fears that reflect each country’s values. China worries that AI could cause social unrest if information to a sheltered population is too real and unfiltered. America fears that AI could cause social unrest if information Americans receive is too fake. And that massive disinformation and algorithms that rile the population could threaten our democratic system. Why do these value differences matter when it comes to the AI race? Below, we outline six contrasting values that we believe will be the most determinative in how the US-China AI competition plays out. We argue that understanding our different values-based approaches illuminates our respective advantages and disadvantages in this competition. It assesses who is currently set up to “win” across key metrics and determines how to lean into our democratic advantages or mitigate some practical disadvantages compared with the PRC, this will ultimately win the AI marathon.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

82. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?

Author:
Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

83. Revitalizing U.S. Trade Remedy Tools for an Era of Industrial Policy in an Interconnected World

Author:
Ryan Mulholland
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
To implement an effective industrial policy, the United States needs to update its trade enforcement toolkit to meet the challenges of the modern world and utilize its existing trade authorities differently.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, Economy, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

84. What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy

Author:
Julian Baqaee, Julian Hinz, Benjamin Moll, Moritz Schularick, Feodora A. Teti, Joschka Wanner, and Sihwan Yang
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
How would the German economy cope with a hard economic decoupling from China? The authors study a scenario where the global economy fragments into three distinct blocs: the G7 economies and their allies, China and her allies, as well as neutral countries. German trade with China would have to be entirely rerouted to countries within the "Western" block and neutral countries. The authors quantify the costs of such a worst-case hard decoupling using the (Baqaee and Farhi 2021) multi-sector model of the world economy. The key finding is that a total cut-off of trade relations with China would have severe but not devastating effects on the German economy. The welfare loss for Germany (relative to a no-cut-off baseline) would be around 5 percent of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) over the first few months and around 4 percent over the first year, plus additional short run costs due to business-cycle amplification effects. In the medium and long run, the costs would fall to a permanent loss in the 1–2 percent range. Less extreme decoupling or gradual de-risking scenarios (“small yard, high fence") would incur smaller costs. The single most influential assumption relates to the “trade elasticity,", i.e., the ease and speed with which trade can be reorganized away from China to neutral countries and within the “Western” block. The authors´ findings, in particular the critical dependence of economic costs on the time horizon over which adjustments take place, provide some rationale for embarking on a gradual de-risking trajectory to avoid a costly and politically contentious hard decoupling dictated by geopolitical events.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Geoeconomics, Decoupling, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Germany

85. Mild Deglobalization: Foreign Investment Screening and Cross-Border Investment

Author:
Vera Z. Eichenauer and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Openness to foreign investments is associated with risks. To mitigate these risks, many high-income countries have strengthened the control of foreign investments over the last decade in an increasing number of sectors considered critical. Investment screening distorts the market for cross-border investments in controlled sectors, which might lead to unintended economic effects. This is the first cross-country panel study to examine the economic effects of investment screening mechanisms. We combine deal-level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for the period 2007–2022 with information on sectoral investment screening. Using a staggered triple difference design, we estimate a reduction of 11.7 to 16.0 percent in the number of M&A in a newly screened sector. The effects are driven by minority acquisitions and deals involving a foreign government or state-owned enterprises or US firms as investors. There is no reduction in the number of deals within the EU/EFTA, most of which are not subject to screening. The findings call policymakers’ attention to weighing the benefits of national security and the economic costs of introducing investment screening.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment, Geoeconomics, Global Capital Allocation, and Deglobalization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

86. What role for Chinese FDI in Africa? New survey evidence from Ethiopia and Ghana

Author:
Charles Ackah, Alemayehu Geda, Holger Görg, and Federico Merchan
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Foreign investments bring in not only new employment but also novel technology, managerial skill and know-how, that may also dissipate into the local economy. It is not clear whether this effect differs by the nationality of source countries, in particular between Chinese and non-Chinese firms. Based on a firm level survey on Ethiopia and Ghana, we found that all types of firms are engaged in limited R&D and innovation activity and their transfer to host countris in both countries. There is little difference between Chinese and non-Chinese foreign firms in such technology and managerial skill transfer once controlling for firm size and industry characteristics in the majority of metrices (R&D activities, horizontal & vertical spillover, directly adopting techniques). However, we found for Ghana that Chinese firms have more suppliers but are less likely to transfer technology to them. Chinese firms are more likely to transfer managerial skills than non-Chinese firms in Ghana though not in Ethiopia. Also, there is little evidence that foreign firms transfer technology via horizontal or backward spillovers in either countries. Finally, Chinese firms are much more likely to receive host country policy support than other foreign firms in Ghana but not in Ethiopia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Economy, and Technological Transfer
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Ethiopia, and Ghana

87. Foul Play? On the Scale and Scope of Industrial Subsidies in China

Author:
Frank Bickenbach, Dirk Dohse, Rolf Langhammer, and Wan-Hsin Liu
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
China makes extensive use of subsidies in order to take a leading role on the global markets in the green technology sectors of electric vehicles, wind turbines and railway rolling stock. According to DiPippo et al. (2022) and recent OECD studies, the industrial subsidies in China are at least three to four times or even up to nine times higher than in the major EU and OECD countries. According to a very conservative estimate, industrial subsidies in China amounted to around EUR 221 billion or 1.73% of Chinese GDP in 2019. According to recent data of 2022, direct government subsidies for some of the dominant Chinese manufacturers of green technology products had also increased significantly - the electric car manufacturer BYD alone received EUR 2.1 billion. The authors point out that Chinese companies are benefiting from further support measures, including subsidized inputs, preferential access to critical raw materials, forced technology transfers, the strategic use of public procurement and the preferential treatment of domestic firms in administrative procedures. The authors recommend the EU to use its anti-subsidy proceeding against BEV imports from China to enter into negotiations with the Chinese government and persuade it to abolish public support measures that are particularly harmful to the EU.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Business, Renewable Energy, Industry, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
China and Europe

88. The Motives for Chinese and Western Countries’ Sovereign Lending to Africa

Author:
Eckhardt Bode
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper is one of the first to show systematically that the motives for sovereign lending to African countries differed considerably between China and Western countries during the last two decades. While Chinese lending mainly served its own economic or geopolitical objectives, which is well-known from the existing literature, Western countries’ lending also pursued objectives that appear to be at odds with their self-interests but whose precise nature is not yet well-understood. Using a new, da-taset on loans from China, Western countries and multilateral organizations to African countries, I empirically examine a broad variety of potential motives, aim at separating the motives pursued by the national governments from those pursued by their lending agencies, and employ an estimation strategy with increasingly complex fixed effects that yields additional interesting insights into the specificities of the motives.
Topic:
Economics, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Geopolitics, and Sovereign Lending
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Global West

89. African Sovereign Defaults and the Common Framework: Divergent Chinese Interests Grant Western Countries a “Consumer Surplus”

Author:
Eckhardt Bode
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
• China has become a major player in sovereign lending towards Africa during the past two decades but has recently been faced with increasing defaults. A new African debt crisis is looming. • Differences in the motives of sovereign lending between China and Western creditor countries contribute to preventing effective global sovereign debt management under the “Common Framework for Debt Treatment” in this looming African debt crisis. Chi-nese lending during the past two decades was motivated primarily by its own economic interests while most of the Western countries’ lending appears to be at odds with their self-interests but is not yet well-understood. • Debt settlements under the Common Framework that involve China are less generous than past settlements with the Paris Club alone. This is an obstacle to a rapid and sus-tainable economic recovery of financially distressed African countries. • Western countries derive a kind of “consumer surplus” from the agreements under the Common Framework because they are prepared to make greater concessions than Chi-na. They could transfer this hypothetical surplus as additional (conditional) Official De-velopment Assistance to the defaulted African countries to alleviate social hardship.
Topic:
Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Lending, Economic Crisis, Sovereign Debt, Consumer Behavior, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa and China

90. EU-China Trade Relations: Where Do We Stand, Where Should We Go?

Author:
Alexander Sandkamp
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
• In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s share in European trade has fallen continuously. Nevertheless, the country remains the EU’s largest source of imports (20.5 percent in 2023) and its third largest export destination (8.7 percent). • This apparent dominance of China is put into perspective when incorporating intra-EU trade. For example, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – sent 6.1 percent of its ex-ports to China, but 55 percent to EU members states. For imports, the Chinese and Euro-pean shares are 11.5 percent and 52.7 percent, respectively. • Decoupling the EU from China (i.e. almost eliminating bilateral trade) would permanent-ly reduce European real income by 0.8 percent in the long-run. In terms of gross domes-tic product in 2023, the EU would forego 136 billion EUR of value added every year. Short-term effects are likely to be stronger. • China dominates global production of important products such as laptops and mobile phones as well as raw materials including Germanium and Gallium that are critical for the green energy transition. A trade disruption might thus both delay the energy transi-tion and increase its costs. • To reduce specific dependencies, the EU should intensify its efforts to diversify procure-ment by increasing the attractiveness of alternative suppliers. Finding the courage to move forward in the negotiation of free trade agreements with potential strategic part-ners such as Australia and the Mercosur countries would strengthen the EU’s geopolitical position and increase prosperity among partners.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Germany

91. When the Exception Overtakes the Rule: COVID-19, Security Exemption Clauses, and International Investment Agreements

Author:
Kayla Maria Rolland
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
In the trade and investment law regimes built in the post-war period, “security exemption clauses” were included within trade and investment agreements as a safety valve, permitting States to deviate from their commitments in the event that their security interests were implicated. Initially, these clauses were understood to be narrowly limited to instances of war and interstate conflict. With the rise of the national security state in the decades since, however, the concept of security interests has ballooned to encompass an ever-growing set of issues, with some fearing that the rules may become irrelevant. This has been particularly facilitated through “third generation” security exemption clauses and their inclusion of self-judging language. The COVID-19 pandemic in particular adds a new dimension to this phenomenon. As a case study analysis of the text of the Chile-Hong Kong, China SAR bilateral investment treaty (BIT) will demonstrate, it may be feasible for States to invoke security exemption clauses to justify measures taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in some contexts, particularly with third generation, self-judging security exemption clauses. The expanding notions of security exemption clauses have significant implications for the investor-State dispute system as a whole.
Topic:
Security, International Law, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, COVID-19, and International Investment Agreements
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

92. China as the second nuclear peer of the United States: Implications for deterrence in Europe

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China’s nuclear build-up will make it a nuclear peer adversary of the United States in the 2030s. The US will have to deter both Russia and China, as well as other regional adversaries, with forces geared to engage in one major war at a time. If two major wars occur either simultaneously or sequentially, US military capability will be put under great stress. In the event of a second war, the US may find itself in a situation of conventional military inferiority, which it might have to compensate for with greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Since the US remains the ultimate guarantor of European security, its deterrence challenges elsewhere affect European security as well. Thus, even the possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific is a European security issue. European NATO allies can help mitigate the two-peer problem by permanently taking on a greater share of the burden of Europe’s conventional defence. At the same time, the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear capability must be enhanced. A strategic defeat for Russia in the war in Ukraine would postpone Russia’s ability to pose a military threat to Europe. Ukraine’s NATO membership would further serve to reduce the threat of another major war in Europe.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

93. China’s approach to AI standardisation: State-guided but enterprise-led

Author:
Junhua Zhu
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
AI standardisation is a major battleground in the international AI race, in which states compete against each other for standard-setting power. China sees AI standardisation as a sector in which it could become a norm-maker rather than a norm-taker. The global landscape of AI standardisation is undergoing a phase of reconstruction. The US and China are discussing new bilateral standardisation frameworks, while the significance of pre-existing multilateral standardisation frameworks is declining. The Chinese approach to AI standardisation is found to be heavily reliant on the corporate sector, following an enterprise-led and state-guided pattern. The state cooperates closely with the private sector in a community of practice, acting as a catalyst in the early stage, a supporter in the mid-stage, and a supervisor in the later stage of the AI standardisation process. Enhancing a contextualised understanding of the fast-changing landscape of AI standardisation in China is critical for European policymakers to safeguard Europe’s competitiveness, preserve European values, and engage in dialogue on global AI governance.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Policy, Artificial Intelligence, and Standardization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

94. The Liquidity Crisis at the United Nations: How We Got Here and Possible Ways Out

Author:
Eugene Chen
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) is suffering from an acute liquidity crisis because its member states have not been paying the assessed contributions required to finance the budgets they have approved. A major part of the problem is the fact that the United States does not pay in full or on time. However, late payments in recent years by China and the closure of several large peacekeeping operations are exacerbating the liquidity challenges. The Secretary-General has proposed several measures to improve the financial position of the organization, but these are stopgap measures at best. The ongoing financial difficulties can only be resolved by member states paying in full and on time but getting there requires understanding the policy decisions and member state dynamics that led us to the current situation and developing recommendations designed around the constraints of the intergovernmental process.
Topic:
United Nations, Budget, Finance, and Liquidity
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

95. China: New Hegemonic Power after the War in Ukraine?

Author:
Zeno Leoni and Veronica Strina
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The War in Ukraine has had international order implications, deepening previously existing fault lines between West and East (Leoni & Tzinieris, 2024). As China’s grand strategy does also have an impact on the international order, the conflict in Eastern Europe provides an opportunity to pause and reflect on what this means from a perspective of China’s engagement with the world. While the literature on Chinese grand strategy has been prolific in recent years, lessons from Ukraine have yet to be captured in a systematic manner. Hence, this article examines China’s behaviour in relation to the war in Ukraine to evaluate whether this case study offers valuable insights into China’s grand strategy and foreign policy. The contribution concludes that the war in Ukraine has confirmed that China is not yet willing or capable of taking a role of leadership over international controversies, and thus is not directly challenging US hegemony. However, it is actively seeking to build a sphere of interests that involves non-Western countries and the developing world, as highlighted by our discourse analysis of the communications on the “Ukraine issue” from the Foreign Ministry through its spokespersons. To assess whether there is evidence that the war in Ukraine has provided China with an opportunity to pursue a hegemonic project and whether it has been successful at it so far, the article adopts a critical IR approach and delves into the study of communications by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople on the “Ukraine issue” as key to building a hegemonic discourse. Articles published from the 24th of February 2022 until the 24th of February 2024 have been extracted from the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and imported into software for qualitative and mixed methods data analysis to examine keywords’ frequency and correlations.
Topic:
Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Olympics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, and Asia

96. China Maritime Report No. 42: Invasion Plans: Operation Causeway and Taiwan's Defense in World War II

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
During World War II, the United States and the Empire of Japan each developed plans and marshaled forces for a climactic battle over Taiwan. Both sides regarded the island as an area of strategic consequence. Code-named Operation CAUSEWAY, the American invasion of Taiwan would have been the largest amphibious campaign in the Pacific Theater and the largest sea-air-land engagement in world history. Strategists in Japan believed the attack was coming and designed a blueprint for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands called SHO-GO(捷 2 号作戦, or “Operation Victory No. 2”), which envisioned a bloody campaign of annihilation. Japanese camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in Taiwan were effective at hiding many capabilities from American intelligence. In recent years, Taiwanese military officers have drawn lessons from Taiwan’s wartime history to improve their defense plans. They highlight the need to stockpile, update beach defenses, mobilize whole-of-society support, expand underground bunker complexes, and prepare for a long fight and layered defense campaign. One important lesson of this history for the U.S. Navy and Joint Force is that deterrence worked before. It can work again. Under certain circumstances, the United States and Taiwan may be capable of preventing a PRC invasion of the island. But a tremendous amount of hard work will be needed to realize that goal. By revisiting the history of Taiwan-focused war plans, we may better assess current challenges and develop insights that could inform future strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.
Topic:
History, Military Affairs, Maritime, World War II, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Invasion, and Operation Causeway
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

97. China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: PLA Navy Blue Force Development for Realistic Combat Training

Author:
J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training. This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four sections. Part one provides background on PLAN efforts to professionalize its maritime blue force. Part two describes the PLAN’s blue force training units. Part three examines companies producing equipment and virtual environments for China’s blue force units, while part four discusses current blue force capabilities. The report concludes with a summary of findings and implications for the United States, its allies, and partners.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

98. China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control - The Ship Political Commissar in Chinese Merchant Shipping

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.
Topic:
History, Political Parties, Shipping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

99. China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, and Cultural Practices Aboard PLAN Submarines

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life and duty in the “Dragon Palace,” both an internal joke and the overarching embodiment of PLAN submarine culture, reveals a professional community focused on secrecy, safety, and expertise that is working to enhance its human performance.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

100. China Maritime Report No. 38: PLAN Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft - Sensors, Weapons, and Operational Concepts

Author:
Eli Tirk and Daniel Salisbury
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The PLA Navy recognizes the importance of a robust anti-submarine warfare (ASW) system to counter adversaries seeking undersea asymmetric advantages, and its aviation component is a key part of that system. This report discusses the PLAN's efforts to improve its airborne ASW platforms and equipment and describes how PLAN-affiliated sources discuss the employment of those assets. The PLAN's significant buildup and growing employment of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft in recent years are key indicators of the importance it attaches to the airborne ASW mission set, as is its push to acquire improved sensors on both fixed and rotary wing ASW platforms. PLAN-affiliated authors show that its academic and operational components are coordinating to explore best practices and maximize the effectiveness of these assets across a wide array of ASW scenarios.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Warfare, and Aircraft
Political Geography:
China and Asia