Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 1 Year and within 25 Years

1. China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe

Author:: Maria
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that encompasses infrastructure projects, trade and financial agreements, and cultural and defence cooperation with over 140 countries worldwide. Bringing the digital component into the BRI seamlessly advanced Beijing’s ambition of taking a leadership position in the technology sector. The DSR not only speaks across regions but also goes beyond the technology infrastructure, which raises two critical concerns by giving China leverage to advance the digital authoritarian governance model and jeopardizing data privacy. To mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on China, the EU must find alternatives by collaborating with trusted partners and diversifying supply chains. First, the EU can expand its technological landscape and engage nations in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific. Second, it must develop and enforce regulatory mechanisms to prevent Chinese state agencies from misusing sensitive data.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Information Technology, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

2. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Author:: Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:: Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:: Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

5. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

6. Assad’s Fall Is an Opportunity for a U.S. Win Over China

Author:: Grant Rumley
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Beijing consistently supported the regime’s brutal repressive measures, so cozying up to the rebel-led transition government may be more difficult than it expects. In the months since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region. For years, Chinese diplomats had been careful to toe a centrist line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly. Yet as the conflict has dragged on the past year, and as the region’s criticisms of the U.S. have risen, Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own. Chinese officials have regularly omitted mention of Hamas’s atrocities while blasting Israel and the U.S. for its support. Now, however, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has presented the U.S. with a similar opportunity...
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, Bashar al-Assad, 2023 Gaza War, and Transitional Government
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

7. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
Topic:: Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:: Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

9. From Partners to Rivals: Normative Power Europe Meets Normative Power China?

Author:: Gözde Yilmaz
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) has been promoting its norms, values, and rules for decades. However, in the current international environment, the EU’s normative power is not being received well outside the EU, particularly in reference to the growing power of illiberal states. Within that context, this study explores EU-China relations across time and unpacks the position of normative power Europe towards China and the Chinese response. The study foregrounds the fruitless attempts of the EU to project its transformative power onto China and the growing resistance by China against this, which it expresses by presenting itself to the West as an alternative power with an alternative understanding of international politics.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Rivalry, Strategic Partnerships, and Normative Power
Political Geography:: China and Europe

10. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

11. Foreign Malign Influence Targeting U.S. and Allied Corporations

Author:: Daniel Byman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: U.S. corporations are regular targets of foreign governments seeking to undermine the United States. These hostile states have both commercial and strategic motives, and they use disinformation, malinformation, and artificial promotion to tarnish the reputations of U.S. companies. U.S. corporations and the U.S. government should take steps to mitigate this threat, including improving corporate counterintelligence, building networks of advocates for use in crisis situations, and sharing more information on the scope and scale of the problem.
Topic:: Terrorism, International Security, Geopolitics, Corporations, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

12. Could Allies Decide the Future of the Indo-Pacific?

Author:: Phillips O'Brien
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Edited by Jude Blanchette, formerly Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The papers are rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Phillips P. O’Brien assesses the critical importance of allies in deciding major conflicts and argues that a potential war between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific would likely go on for an extended period, with the United States needing to lean on its regional allies for logistical support and for their manufacturing capacities. O’Brien argues that the U.S. allies appear strong on paper, but that they are untested, while China’s allies of Russia and North Korea, though weaker, appear much more willing to contribute serious resources to one another. Therefore, a long conflict may hinge more on commitment than on capability.
Topic:: International Security, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China and Indo-Pacific

13. Collateral Effects of the Tariff War on ASEAN Food Security

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Kayven Tan
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and China are locked in a cycle of escalating tariffs, with likely knock-on impacts on global food supplies and prices. In response to increases in tariff rates imposed by the US on China’s exports, China hit back with additional tariffs on US$21 billion worth of US agricultural products in March 2025. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs will mean an additional 10 per cent tariff on soybeans, sorghum, beef, pork, aquatic and dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, and an additional 15 per cent tariff on wheat, corn, maize, and chicken from the US. Given the tense words exchanged by leaders and officials on both sides in recent days, neither side appears ready to back down from these trade measures. The food security concern for ASEAN states is whether the trade war will impact the supply and prices of food in a region where 37 per cent, or 251 million people, cannot afford a healthy diet. Many Asian states rely heavily on imports for their food. Wheat is used in household staples such as noodles and bread, while corn and soybeans are used for food and livestock feed.
Topic:: Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

14. Xi Demands Fealty Despite Domestic And Foreign Woes

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Politburo held a “democratic life meeting (民主生活会)” on December 21–22, 2023, in which President Xi Jinping gave an internal, unpublished speech. According to accounts provided to the author by three officials at the rank of department head or above, Xi admitted that he had repeatedly postponed the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (which according to Party norms should have taken place in October) because he “could not offer any viable solution for the nation’s problems.” Xi, who is general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, went on to blame the other 23 Politburo members and other senior cadres, not only for failing to give him good advice but also for demonstrating signs of disobedience. Reports of Xi’s frank admission of the dire straits of the Party’s leadership were widely circulated on social media. The official Xinhua read-out of the Politburo meeting also cited Xi as demanding “unison of thought” among top-tier officials. This entails adhering closely to the instructions of the “core leadership”—in other words, to Xi himself (Xinhua, December 25, 2023). The supreme leader raised the “two safeguards (两个维护),” a slogan that refers to “safeguarding the authority of comrade Xi Jinping as core of the party” and “safeguarding Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.” President Xi also admonished his close advisors to “take a firm grip on the internal laws of developments [of issues]; accurately distinguish between events and trends, crises and opportunities, and benefits and harms … and effectively combat risks and take action on the basis of stability” (People’s Daily, December 23, 2023). This instruction tallies with caveats given by Xi throughout the past year, in which he has warned that China faces unprecedented challenges and that the party-state apparatus must ready itself to tackle “black swans and gray rhinos.”
Topic:: Financial Crisis, Leadership, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Banking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

15. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:: John Dotson
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:: Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:: China and Asia

16. Xi’s New Year’s Speech Dismisses Difficulties

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On New Year’s Eve, a prerecorded address from Chinese President Xi Jinping was broadcast across the Party’s global network of official media outlets (Youtube, December 31, 2023). The speech is an annual tradition, delivered from behind a wooden desk in rhetoric that is at once paternalistic and triumphalist, in which Xi surveys the high points of the outgoing year and looks to the year ahead. The form of this year’s set-piece was no different, but the content departed from previous years in ways that are indicative of Xi’s shifting priorities, and the Party’s growing concerns about the state of the nation. The most significant section of the speech addressed the economic difficulties that China has weathered in the last year: “On the road ahead, trials and hardships [lit. ‘wind and rain’] will be the norm. Some enterprises are facing pressures, some of the masses are encountering difficulties finding jobs and meeting basic needs, and some places have hit by floods, typhoons, earthquakes, or other natural disasters (有风有雨是常态。一些企业面临经营压力，一些群众就业、生活遇到困难，一些地方发生洪涝、台风、地震等自然灾害).”
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:: China and Asia

17. China’s Anti-Corruption Efforts Gain Momentum in Finance and Healthcare

Author:: Alexis Brown
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On September 27, Chinese President Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo, where he announced the end of the current round of finance inspections but suggested that more were to follow (Xinhua, September 27). The authorities may have chosen to focus on financial corruption to coincide with the restructuring of financial regulators in March, in which a central finance commission was created to give the Party center more direct control over the finance sector. This move indicates that the Party has taken a greater interest in the sector. So far in 2023, China’s anti-corruption organs, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC, 中华人民共和国国家监察委员会), have intensified investigations across both the healthcare and finance sectors. Authorities have investigated at least 180 hospital chiefs and 80 senior employees in financial institutions between January and early September. [1] By comparison, the CCDI and NSC only targeted 12 hospital leaders from 2019-2022 (CCDI). Through the anti-corruption campaigns, the party leadership is likely to bolster support among certain demographics, eliminate political opponents, and address some real instances of graft. However, due to the absence of robust institutions and transparency, systemic corruption will persist after the current drives wind down. The Party and state organs carry out anti-corruption in healthcare regularly, but in 2023 they have elevated the importance of this work. This is the first time the CCDI and NSC were involved in the National Health Commission’s annual conference on anti-corruption, where a national centralized campaign to crack down on graft was launched. The campaign will continue until mid-2024 (National Health Commission, July 21). [2] One motivation may be to address public frustrations with healthcare from the COVID-19 pandemic. There was an uproar over incidents like hospitals turning away ER patients for not having negative Covid tests and testing centers generating huge profits but producing fraudulent test results (Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council, December 9 2022 Credit China, December 23 2022). Another reason may be to combat illegal healthcare charges in order to boost household consumption, one of the government’s top economic targets for 2023 (Xinhua, March 14).
Topic:: Corruption, Finance, Public Policy, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:: China and Asia

18. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:: Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:: International Relations and Research
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

19. Western-Centric Moments in Homegrown IR Theories: Dependency, Chinese and African Schools

Author:: Engin Sune
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: The modern international system has been shaped by long-standing historical practices of unequal power relations, which have positioned the Western world at the center of the political universe. Due to the centrality of the Global North in the international system, any IR theory that aims to portray a true picture of the “globe” necessarily situates the West at the center of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the form of universality generated by Western hegemony has been diffused throughout the world over centuries, spreading Western political institutions, economic structures, and ideological norms in an uneven setting. As a result, the social structures of the Global South have developed through an uneven form of relationship and dialectical interaction with the West. Therefore, homegrown IR theories, which uncover local political, philosophical, or cultural motives as sources for theory-making, in fact, concentrate on stratified forms of the universal reality that is diffused through the uneven spread of Western social structures. In this sense, there is a Western-centric moment in any homegrown IR theory. Accordingly, this article develops a scientific realist account of the structure/agent relationship in order to analyze the material grounds of Western-centrism in the field of international politics and to evaluate the role of non-Western actors. Additionally, it critically evaluates distinctive homegrown theories produced on three different continents to reveal the aforementioned Western-centric moments in these theoretical initiatives. Namely, the Dependency School of Latin America, the Chinese School of International Relations, and the African School are respectively scrutinized to disclose the embedded Western-centrism in these theoretical initiatives.
Topic:: International Relations and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Global South

20. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:: John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

21. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:: Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:: Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. The Future of the Belt and Road in Europe: How China’s Connectivity Project is Being Reconfigured across the Old Continent – and What It Means for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has entered the twilight zone in the old continent, following a deterioration of bilateral relations between the EU member states and China over the last years. Italy’s official exit from the BRI at the end of 2023 was a further blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy. Yet, the BRI in Europe is being reconfigured rather than being terminated. In Western Europe, the BRI is moving away from physical infrastructure projects and investment in industrial assets – the latter being increasingly protected from Chinese takeovers by both national and EU legislation – to financial and monetary connectivity. This shift is welcomed by various European actors, including some policymakers at the national level, eurozone institutions and major banks. Concurrently, most of Eastern European countries continue to promote BRI projects and seek to attract Chinese investments, suggesting that there is a two-speed Europe when it comes to China, both in terms of geography and sectors.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Currency
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

23. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:: Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

24. China's Trade Strategies and Korea-China Cooperation Plans

Author:: Seung Shin Lee, Sang Baek Hyun, Su Yeob Na, and Young Sun Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: As uncertainties in the global trade environment expand, China's trade strategy is changing, and these changes are expected to have a significant impact on our trade environment with China. This paper analyzed China's policies on new trade issues such as supply chain reorganization, digital trade, climate change response and proposed policy implications.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

25. EU's “Open Strategic Autonomy” and its Implications for Korea

Author:: Youngook Jang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This brief explores the shifting global trade landscape characterized by weakening globalization and rising protectionism, exacerbated by events such as the US-China trade disputes, COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It discusses how these factors have prompted a trend towards 'Open Strategic Autonomy' (OSA) in the European Union (EU), as evidenced by newly suggested industrial and trade policies. The EU's experiences during the pandemic and energy dependence on Russia have emphasized the need for resilient supply chains. The analysis draws from Jang et al. (2023) to examine how the EU's OSA has evolved in response to these changes, offering insights for policy implications for Korea.
Topic:: European Union, Trade, Supply Chains, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

26. Analyzing South Korea’s Semiconductor Industry: Trade Dynamics and Global Position

Author:: Hyung-gon Jeong
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: U.S. sanctions on China's semiconductor industry are causing major shifts in the global supply chain, affecting South Korea's industry due to its reliance on Chinese manufacturing. The Biden administration's increased sanctions, combined with global trends towards semiconductor self-sufficiency, are putting South Korea's semiconductor position at risk. Countries such as the U.S., China, and Japan are building up their domestic semiconductor industries, potentially affecting South Korea's position in the global market. Deeply integrated with China, Korean companies, face the challenge of reducing this dependence and adapting to the evolving supply chain landscape. This paper examines the import and export trends of the South Korean semiconductor industry over the last five years to assess its global standing, identify challenges, and suggest strategic directions. Using data from the Korea Customs Service from 2019 to 2023, the study analyzes trade patterns and supply chain configurations within South Korea's semiconductor industry. The industry is divided into six main categories and 33 subcategories, based on the analysis of 381 semiconductor-related items categorized under the Harmonized System at the 10-digit level. This detailed classification allows for an in-depth examination of trade trends, supply chain structures, and associated risks within the South Korean semiconductor industry. Moreover, this research uses the classification method described and UN Comtrade statistics to create a dataset on global semiconductor trade. This dataset is used to analyze the international presence of the South Korean semiconductor industry and its market shares in China across different segments.
Topic:: Trade, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

27. North Korea’s 2023 Trade with China: Analysis and Forecasts

Author:: Jangho Choi and Yoojeong Choi
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This article analyzes North Korea-China trade trends and statistics in 2023 to evaluate the extent of North Korea's trade normalization and its performance. North Korea's trade with China increased by more than 120% compared to the previous year as the country declared a COVID-19 Endemic and gradually eased border controls, but did not recover to 2018-19 levels, the year before the outbreak of COVID-19. Imports to China recorded 2.00 billion, 124.1% higher than the 0.89 billion in 2022. North Korea's imports from China in 2023 are estimated to be the maximum achievable given the lack of a full resumption of over-land trade. However, as the negative impact of UN sanctions on the North Korean economy is ongoing, making it difficult to normalize industrial production. North Korea mainly imported raw materials for processing trade (textile and garment raw materials), staple foods (rice and sugar), agricultural materials (fertilizer), and construction materials from China in 2023. North Korea’s exports to China stood at 0.29 billion, up 118.4% from 0.13 billion in 2023. Exports remain at the 16.9% of the level before the tightening of UN sanctions on North Korea, as the country has failed to diversify its products and expand exports of major export items. Exports were highly dependent on specific products, wigs and false eyelashes, a labor-intensive industry, accounting for 57.1% of total exports. In spite of increasing wigs export, North Korea failed to further expand its amount and diversify the export items in the second half of the year. According to the analysis of trade statistics, the main goals of North Korea's 2023 US foreign economic policy are: (1) resuming smuggling trade in textiles and clothing, (2) building irrigation canals in preparation for summer floods, (3) implementing state-led grain distribution, (4) building living houses in a rural area, and (5) increasing metal production for Russian arms exports. Despite the increase in imports from China in the transition to the coronavirus pandemic, it is difficult to say that it has yet led to the recovery of industrial production and economic development. The future of North Korea's trade with the rest of the world in 2024 will be determined by whether North Korea fully opens its borders and improves its relations with China. In 2024, both North Korea's exports and imports are expected to be slightly higher than in 2023. North Korea's exports are unlikely to increase significantly, as North Korea-Russia military cooperation is expected to continue and China is likely to maintain its checks on the growing Sino-Russian alignment. Increased imports will lead to a larger trade deficit, but it will be within North Korea's ability to manage for one to two years.
Topic:: Economics, Border Control, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

28. Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The likelihood China will attack Taiwan in the next decade is high and will continue to be so, unless Taipei and Washington take urgent steps to restore deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. This monograph introduces the concept of interlocking deterrents, explains why deterrents lose their potency with the passage of time, and provides concrete recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers can develop multiple, interlocking deterrents that will ensure Taiwanese security in the short and longer terms. By joining deterrence theory with an empirical analysis of Taiwanese, Chinese, and US policies, the monograph provides US military and policy practitioners new insights into ways to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan without relying exclusively on the threat of great-power war.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Security, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

29. International Competition in the High North: Kingston Conference on International Security 2022

Author:: Michael E. Lynch and Howard Coombs
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The 16th annual Kingston Consortium on International Security conference, “International Competition in the High North,” took place on October 11–13, 2022, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The conference examined the Arctic region in the context of ongoing climate change and against the backdrop of war in Ukraine. Over the past several years, the United States has acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic as a strategic region, and the Department of Defense and each of the US military services have published Arctic policies or strategies. In addition, the Department of Defense has created a new regional study center, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies in Alaska. Canada and the other Arctic Council nations have also acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic region and revised strategic frameworks and changed institutional approaches to ensure Arctic security challenges arising from great-power competition and other threats, like those to the environment, are addressed. This volume captures these ideas for the United States and its allies so all can benefit from this experience.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Indigenous, Strategic Competition, Arctic Council, Military, Dual Use Infrastructure, Environmental Security, and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
Political Geography:: China and Arctic

30. Arming Allies and Partners: How Foreign Military Sales Can Change the China Problem

Author:: Brennan Devereaux
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Allies and partners are “a center of gravity” for the DoD National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific.1 But are regional nations building military capacity to help the United States prepare for and deter a potential clash with the People’s Republic of China, or are they solely focused on defending their own territories? Although regional nations’ aims may often overlap, they also diverge in some cases. Partner-capacity development must therefore reflect the distinction between deterrence and territorial defense. The US military has been diligently building relationships and developing partner capacity in the Indo-Pacific region for years, conducting dozens of exercises annually and recently establishing the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center.2 These efforts in the Indo-Pacific region have increased with the US military’s attempt to shift away from the Middle East, and President Joe Biden’s declaration that China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”3 Regardless of efforts in the region, not all relationships with partners are equal; the potential assistance each partner would be willing to provide the US military in a conflict with China will vary for myriad reasons. Although each nation’s support requirements and development goals are distinct, assistance through military sales is a foundational aspect of building capacity, providing allies and partners a venue for acquiring military equipment. The Foreign Military Sales program, often critiqued for its inefficiencies, is being revamped by the US Department of State and Department of Defense.4 Partner nations purchasing US military equipment will remain focused on their own national interests, which for many partners remain security and the defense of sovereign territory. Updates to how the United States approaches military sales can also be tailored to support US military interests more effectively. In other words, US strategic objectives should underpin the prioritization of sales to specific countries, and US efforts should extend beyond financial benefits or the intangibles of building partnerships. To account for the unique and distinct challenges the US military faces in the Indo-Pacific theater, the modernization of Foreign Military Sales should aim to provide the United States with a relative military advantage over China by tailoring the program’s approach to arming allies in a way that complements US military efforts in the region. Modernizing Foreign Military Sales begins by categorizing nations based on their expected roles in a potential clash between the United States and China.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

31. A Baseline Assessment of the PLA Army's Border Reinforcement Operations in the Aksai Chin in 2020 and 2021

Author:: Dennis J. Blasko
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This report analyzes the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) border reinforcement operation throughout the Aksai Chin and adjacent areas from summer 2020 to early 2021. It is based largely on analysis of Google Earth imagery and provides a baseline for further analysis of the PLA deployment along the entire Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Aksai Chin. Chinese Army units appear ready to remain in a defensive posture near the LAC the Aksai Chin indefinitely. This effort is the land domain equivalent of Chinese military maritime operations in the South China Sea and air and sea deterrent operations directed toward Taiwan.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, India, Xinjiang, and Aksai Chin

32. War with China: A View from Early 2024

Author:: Marco J. Lyons
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: US defense analysts are overdue for a fundamental reassessment of the strategic factors that would shape a future Sino-American war. The United States may lower the overall risk of sparking a war between Washington and Beijing by more formally committing advanced US capabilities in intelligence collection and targeting, long-range fires, and theater air and missile defense to Japan and South Korea and by initiating bilateral planning to introduce such capabilities in Taiwan in the future. The US defense community still lacks a broad and integrated national strategy for successfully managing the rivalry with China. A clear-eyed assessment of a possible United States-China war could lead to a national strategy.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

33. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:: George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

34. Episode 04: Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:: Sahar Aziz and Khaled A. Beydoun
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Host Sahar Aziz and Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Professor Khaled Beydoun discuss the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries. The conversation is informed by Professor Beydoun’s new book The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims.
Topic:: Politics, Law, Discrimination, Islamophobia, War on Terror, and Muslims
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

35. The Russia Factor in China’s Relations with the West

Author:: Klaus W. Larres and Lea Thome
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Tension between China and the Western world has been a characteristic of global affairs for the better part of the last decade. Notwithstanding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States continues to view China as its greatest global rival and competitor. In fact, many policymakers in Washington (though by no means all of them) view China as an existential threat to America’s global influence and predominance. As the European Union and its 27 member states are not among the world’s superpowers, the Europeans have a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward China. Still, according to an important policy statement issued by the EU Commission in 2019, Brussels has come to see Beijing not only as a “partner and competitor” but also as a serious “systemic rival.” This refers less to geopolitical concerns but very much to global governance issues and geoeconomic, trade, and investment relations with China. The EU is deeply concerned about the continuing lack of reciprocity of market access, intellectual property theft, and China’s frequently state-subsidized competition regarding cutting-edge technology products, including solar panels, EV vehicles, and many other products, which may soon swamp the EU market. The EU Commission has launched an investigation into China’s production of EV vehicles and also Beijing’s shipbuilding industry, which it suspects may well work on the basis of rather unfair and highly subsidized support from the Chinese state.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Production
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

36. Digital Governance: Technology Tensions with China and Implications

Author:: Alex He and Robert Fay
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: As a superpower that is deeply integrated in global supply chains, China is becoming an economic giant, but its use of technology to capture data using methods that may pose cyber- and national security risks is raising concerns. While some view China’s motivations as an attempt to advance its status from an upper-middle-income economy to a developed economy, others see more nefarious intentions behind its authoritarian, top-down governance model. Further complicating the situation is the growing technology competition between China, the United States and Europe over the control of data, the technologies that use this data and the values upon which they should be used. The Centre for International Governance Innovation’s second annual conference on Digital Governance in China explored these and other issues related to the global implications of China’s governance model in the digital age.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China and Asia

37. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:: Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

38. Is Guanxi Changing? Referral Hiring and Social Networks in China

Author:: Elena Obukhova and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: What is the role of guanxi in China today? To answer this question, Professor Elena Obukhova examines the relationship between social networks and referral hiring. In the first study, she compares China and the US. In the second study, she explores differences between China’s provinces. This event is part of the 2023-2024 lecture series on “Labor Market Transformations in China" and is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by Columbia's China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:: Markets, Labor Issues, Social Networks, and Hiring
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

39. Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control

Author:: Dali Yang, Qin Gao, Junyan Jiang, and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic, which began as an outbreak in Wuhan in late 2019, has claimed millions of lives and caused unprecedented disruptions. Despite its generation-defining significance, there has been a surprising lack of independent research examining the decisions and measures implemented in the weeks leading up to the Wuhan lockdown, as well as the missteps and shortcomings that allowed the novel coronavirus to spread with minimal hindrance. In this book talk, Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control, Dali L. Yang scrutinizes China's emergency response to the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, delving into the government's handling of epidemic information and the decisions that influenced the scale and scope of the outbreak. Yang's research reveals that China's health decision-makers and experts had an excellent head start when they implemented a health emergency action program to respond to the outbreak at the end of December 2019. With granular detail and compelling immediacy, Yang investigates the political and bureaucratic processes that hindered information flows and sharing, as well as the cognitive framework that limited understanding of the virus's contagiousness and hampered effective decisions and enabled the outbreak to spiral out of control.
Topic:: Government, Crisis Management, Bureaucracy, COVID-19, Decision-Making, Zero-COVID, and Emergencies
Political Geography:: China and Asia

40. China and Latin America: A New Assessment

Author:: Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Parsifal D'Sola, a MARSEA alum, will deliver a presentation offering a general overview of the current state and prospective trends in China-Latin America relations. The talk will explore the evolving interactions and strategic dynamics between China and Latin American countries, highlighting developments over the past two decades. Key areas of discussion include the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the peripheral effects of US-China tensions on the region. An important aspect of the presentation will be examining the diverse perceptions of China across Latin American countries and how these views influence bilateral relations and policy decisions. D'Sola will also share his thoughts on future trends, offering a broad perspective on the likely course of China's engagement with Latin America in the coming years. Speaker's Bio: Parsifal D’Sola is the founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation – China Latin America Research Center in Bogota, Colombia. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Parsifal is a Chinese foreign policy analyst specializing in Sino-Latin American relations with a focus on Venezuela. Between 2019 and 2020, he acted as Chinese foreign policy advisor to the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Interim Government of Venezuela. He holds a BS in Telecommunications Engineering from Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University, an MSc in International Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, and an advance language diploma from Beijing Language and Culture University.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Latin America

41. The White Crane of Alagśa: Legends of the Sixth Dalai Lama in Mongolia

Author:: Sangseraima Ujeed and Gray Tuttle
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso (1683-1706/46) was recognized in secrecy, lived in controversy, and passed out of history in mystery. The popular tradition holds that he died whilst travelling to Beijing. Yet in some parts of Mongolia, it is believed that the exiled Sixth Dalai Lama escaped his captors and lived out his life in the dessert Gobi region of Alagśa, Inner Mongolia. To this day in Alagśa, the figure of the Sixth Dalai Lama still serves as a central pillar of the Alagśan identity, religion, and cultural pride among the local Mongolian population. Based on new materials in the form of oral histories, local legends, folk songs, poems, and textual sources which I collected about the Sixth Dalai Lama and the reincarnation of the Desi Sanggye Gyatso in Alagśa during a research trip in 2019, this paper will explore the formation of religio-cultural identity and the invention of tradition in the Alagśa during the early eighteenth century. This is not a paper that tries to solve the mystery of Tsangyang Gyatso’s death, but rather, one that explores the role Tsangyang Gyatso played for the Alagśa Mongols in creating narratives of identity and their realm Alagśa as an authentic Buddhist central place. This is a story of how Tsangyang Gyatso, his identities, and his interpersonal relationships were reborn in Alagśa and the role he played in consolidating Alagśa’s place within the wider geopolitical spheres of the cosmopolitan Buddhist world that spanned the Himalayas, Inner Asia, and the Qing.
Topic:: Religion, History, Geopolitics, Identity, Tradition, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:: China, Mongolia, and Asia

42. Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values and Institutions in Hong Kong

Author:: Michael Davis and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: A lot has been written about the 2019 protests in Hong Kong and the aggressive police crackdown offered in response. Much less has been written about the more severe assault on liberal values and institutions that followed. In his new book Professor Davis takes a forensic look at both the growing Beijing intervention in Hong Kong affairs from the handover forward and its culmination in the more severe crackdown that followed the 2019 protest, the 2020 passage of the National Security Law, and the 2021 Beijing imposition of a patriots-only electoral system. This talk will highlight the comprehensive impact of these developments on Hong Kong’s rule of law, its criminal justice system, and the many freedoms for which the vibrant city was long known—often previously ranking among the highest in the world. The diminution of basic freedoms has touched nearly all sectors of society, including education, the media, public broadcasting, civil society organizations, legal services, and so on. The city long known for a vibrant public debate, its vigorous media landscape, and some of the largest non-violent protests in the world has gone silent. The sheer comprehensiveness of this imposition raises questions not only for Hong Kong but for liberal democratic values globally, as autocratic regimes such as the PRC seek to advance their illiberal agenda.
Topic:: Protests, Institutions, Liberalism, and Autocracy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

43. Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China

Author:: Lynette Ong and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: How do states coerce citizens into compliance while simultaneously minimizing backlash? In Outsourcing Repression, Lynette Ong examines how the Chinese state engages nonstate actors, from violent street gangsters to nonviolent grassroots brokers, to coerce and mobilize the masses to pursue its ambitious urbanization project. She draws on ethnographic research conducted annually from 2011 to 2019--the years from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, a unique and original event dataset, and a collection of government regulations in a study of everyday land grabs and housing demolition in China. Theorizing a counterintuitive form of repression that reduces resistance and backlash, Ong invites the reader to reimagine the new ground state power credibly occupies. Everyday state power is quotidian power acquired through society by penetrating nonstate territories and mobilizing the masses within. After the book’s publication, Lynette has extended the arguments to explain the success, failure, and implications of China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Journal of Democracy, Foreign Affairs and the Economist etc. Outsourcing Repression has won the American Sociology Association’s Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship in Political Sociology, and the Human Rights Best Book Awards from the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Association, and the International Studies Association.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Governance, State, Coercion, Zero-COVID, and State Power
Political Geography:: China and Asia

44. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

45. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:: Marie Krpata
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

46. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:: Marc Julienne
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and France

47. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:: Brad Setser
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum

Author:: Megumi Faith Mallari and Saleh Naas
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Despite their known and indisputable need for protection, North Koreans often have their applications for asylum rejected. This paper outlines the differing interpretations of North Koreans’ right to asylum and investigates the rationales and justifications behind them through the case studies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and China (PRC). The paper argues that the rationale of the European countries analyzed is based on their generally restrictive view on asylum, independent from their political positioning on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Contrastingly, the rationales of the United States and the PRC are grounded in interests directly related to the Korean peninsula and Cold War narratives.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Asylum, and Refugee Policy
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, France, Germany, Netherlands, and United States of America

49. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

50. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations

Author:: Matt Sheehan
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, East Asia, and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS