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72. Inside the ICBM Lobby: Special Interests or the Public Interest?
- Author:
- William D. Hartung
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The nuclear weapons lobby is one of the most powerful forces in the military industrial complex. 1 The lobby’s current priority is advocating for the $315 billion Sentinel program to build a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The program has faced controversy over both its utility and its cost, including a cost increase of a whopping 81 percent since 2020. The key champions of the Sentinel program are the Senators from Montana, North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming — states that are home to major ICBM bases or host major work on the Sentinel program. The group — known as the Senate ICBM Coalition — stresses the Sentinel’s purported role in strengthening nuclear deterrence as well as its creation of jobs in the states they represent. However, other members of Congress and ex–defense officials have raised urgent concerns about the Sentinel program, questioning the deterrence rationale that undergirds it and raising the alarm over the risk of accidental nuclear usage. Despite claims about Sentinel’s economic benefits, it remains unclear how many jobs the program will actually create. Weapons contractors — led by the Sentinel’s prime contractor, Northrop Grumman — play a central role in the ICBM lobby. Since 2018, members of the strategic forces subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have received $3.8 million from the 11 major Sentinel contractors. In total, ICBM contractors have donated $87 million to members of Congress in the last four election cycles alone. Contractors’ influence efforts are aided by the fact that senior government officials and members of Congress often secure jobs in the arms industry when they leave government; this provides them the opportunity to lobby former colleagues. In all, the 11 ICBM contractors have spent $226 million on lobbying in the past four election cycles. They currently employ 275 lobbyists, the vast majority of whom have passed through the revolving door from influential positions in government. The Sentinel program should be scrutinized as part of a larger reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. The 2023 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States endorses the program and calls for a comprehensive nuclear weapons build-up, including the possible placement of multiple nuclear warheads on ICBMs — a highly aggressive strategic posture that has not been in place since the Cold War. A high number of Commission members have ties to the nuclear weapons industry, including its co–chair Jon Kyl, who was once a lobbyist for Sentinel prime contractor Northrop Grumman. Congress must weigh the dubious benefits of the Commission’s proposals against the significant risks and costs its recommendations would entail if carried out.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Military-Industrial Complex, Militarism, and Sentinel Program
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America
73. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation
- Author:
- James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
74. Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings are Urgently Needed
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The U.S.–China relationship appears to have stabilized since the November 2023 meeting between U.S. president Joe Biden and China’s president Xi Jinping in San Francisco. The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers. These underlying forces — increased levels of domestic threat inflation in both the United States and China, the worst–casing of the other side’s motives and intentions, and the resulting erosion in the confidence of the original understanding over Taiwan reached in the 1970s — threaten to push Beijing and Washington into a crisis over Taiwan that both sides say they want to avoid. To defuse this worrying dynamic, both the United States and China must reaffirm long standing policy on Taiwan, while also undertaking a set of specific actions to further stabilize the relationship between the two countries. The Biden administration should explicitly reject extreme rhetoric towards China and deviations from longstanding policy on Taiwan, such as the framing of Sino–American competition as a titanic struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, and the contention that an independent Taiwan is strategically crucial to overall Asian security. The administration can further inject stability into U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan by re–affirming and clarifying the One China policy through a series of statements, including: The United States opposes any Chinese effort to coerce Taiwan or compel unification through force. However, the United States would accept any resolution of the cross–Strait issue that is reached without coercion and that is endorsed by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The United States recognizes that the defense of Taiwan is primarily the responsibility of the people of Taiwan. Relatedly, and in accordance with the U.S.–China normalization agreement, Washington is committed to maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan and has no desire to alter this commitment. The United States Government reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan. These statements should be made in combination with actions that bolster cooperative engagement with China, such as the initiation of a combined civilian and military Track 1.5 dialogue with Beijing. We believe that this type of reassurance would lead to corresponding commitments from China that would improve stability in the Taiwan Strait, such as reductions in provocative military exercises and potentially high level Chinese declarations that reject coercive measures towards Taiwan and a specific timeline for reunification. The recent improvements to the Sino–American relationship shouldn’t go to waste. The United States and China should go beyond the mere appearance of stabilization and revitalize the original understanding over Taiwan. Otherwise, they risk a continuous spiral towards full–scale conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Realism, Regional Stability, and Restraint
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
75. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine and James Park
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
76. Washington's and Taiwan's Diverging Interests Doesn't Make War Imminent
- Author:
- Hargisl Shirley Martey
- Publication Date:
- 02-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- We are a month from the Taiwan 2024 election that sent shockwaves around the world. President-elect, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), dared to utter the world ‘independence” in a strike against the longstanding One China Policy (一个中国政策) in his successful campaign to lead the nation. The election was important enough for an increasingly assertive President Xi Jinping (习近平出席) to try (and fail) to influence the election’s outcome. Xi has been rattling cages for the last several years and has made no secret of his desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb without explicitly ruling out the use of force. Meanwhile, a busy President Biden has had his hands full keeping allies committed to Ukraine, battling Putin-sympathetic members of Congress, while also dealing with cascading crises in Israel and the Middle East. With that as our backdrop, does Lai’s election, Xi’s frustration, and Biden’s preoccupation mean we are closer to conflict in the Taiwan Strait? In this brief analysis we argue that at present the answer is “no.” And we make this call by looking at the vantage points and early actions of each country. For America, the Taiwan election has put the country on alert. For Taiwan, domestic concerns are mainly driving voters – not cross-Strait policy. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC; 中华人民共和国), ignore the rhetoric because they’ve followed their Taiwan election disappointment by returning to their standard playbook.1 But stay tuned…. perhaps they’re saving the fireworks for Lai’s May 20 inauguration.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Politics, Elections, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, North America, and United States of America
77. Competing Values Will Shape US-China AI Race
- Author:
- Valerie Shen and Jim Kessler
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- President Biden’s AI executive order reflects a set of values recognizable to all Americans: Privacy, equal treatment and civil rights; free speech and expression; the rule of law; opportunity and free market capitalism; pluralism; and advancement of global leadership as the beacon of a free world. President Xi Jinping’s government has also issued AI regulations with values recognizable to China: Collectivism and obedience to authority; social harmony and homogeneity; market authoritarianism and rule of state; and digital world hegemony to restore China’s rightful place as the Middle Kingdom. The United States and China may share similar broad goals for “winning” AI along the lines of leading innovation and advancement, spurring broad-based economic growth and prosperity, achieving domestic social stability, and becoming the clear global influencer for the rest of the world—but they define those goals and seek to achieve those ends through very different values. Those values embedded in our respective AI policies and underlying technology carry high-stakes, long-term national and economic security implications as US and Chinese companies compete directly to become dominant in emerging global markets. They also share similar fears that reflect each country’s values. China worries that AI could cause social unrest if information to a sheltered population is too real and unfiltered. America fears that AI could cause social unrest if information Americans receive is too fake. And that massive disinformation and algorithms that rile the population could threaten our democratic system. Why do these value differences matter when it comes to the AI race? Below, we outline six contrasting values that we believe will be the most determinative in how the US-China AI competition plays out. We argue that understanding our different values-based approaches illuminates our respective advantages and disadvantages in this competition. It assesses who is currently set up to “win” across key metrics and determines how to lean into our democratic advantages or mitigate some practical disadvantages compared with the PRC, this will ultimately win the AI marathon.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
78. How Has the Ukraine War Changed the China-Russia Relationship?
- Author:
- Yun Sun, Segey Radchenko, Andrew Nathan, and Alexander Cooley
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- The Harriman Institute
- Abstract:
- Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping proclaimed a “no-limits” partnership between their countries. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has had a profound impact on the Sino-Russian relationship. While Putin has sought Beijing’s support for his territorial grab, China’s position, has been famously characterized as “pro-Russia neutrality”. Geopolitics remains the single most important factor in China’s decision regarding the Ukraine war, as Beijing has been torn between the competing agendas of managing its relations with Russia and relations with Europe. And while the Russians have grown increasingly frustrated with what many in Moscow perceive as Beijing’s double-dealing and unwillingness to commit, Putin’s leverage with Xi Jinping remains limited. As the war in Ukraine grinds into its third year, China and Russia continue unsteadily towards an ever closer alignment even while pragmatically looking out for their own interests in an evolving world.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
79. Revitalizing U.S. Trade Remedy Tools for an Era of Industrial Policy in an Interconnected World
- Author:
- Ryan Mulholland
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- To implement an effective industrial policy, the United States needs to update its trade enforcement toolkit to meet the challenges of the modern world and utilize its existing trade authorities differently.
- Topic:
- Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, Economy, and Economic Development
- Political Geography:
- China and United States of America
80. What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy
- Author:
- Julian Baqaee, Julian Hinz, Benjamin Moll, Moritz Schularick, Feodora A. Teti, Joschka Wanner, and Sihwan Yang
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- How would the German economy cope with a hard economic decoupling from China? The authors study a scenario where the global economy fragments into three distinct blocs: the G7 economies and their allies, China and her allies, as well as neutral countries. German trade with China would have to be entirely rerouted to countries within the "Western" block and neutral countries. The authors quantify the costs of such a worst-case hard decoupling using the (Baqaee and Farhi 2021) multi-sector model of the world economy. The key finding is that a total cut-off of trade relations with China would have severe but not devastating effects on the German economy. The welfare loss for Germany (relative to a no-cut-off baseline) would be around 5 percent of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) over the first few months and around 4 percent over the first year, plus additional short run costs due to business-cycle amplification effects. In the medium and long run, the costs would fall to a permanent loss in the 1–2 percent range. Less extreme decoupling or gradual de-risking scenarios (“small yard, high fence") would incur smaller costs. The single most influential assumption relates to the “trade elasticity,", i.e., the ease and speed with which trade can be reorganized away from China to neutral countries and within the “Western” block. The authors´ findings, in particular the critical dependence of economic costs on the time horizon over which adjustments take place, provide some rationale for embarking on a gradual de-risking trajectory to avoid a costly and politically contentious hard decoupling dictated by geopolitical events.
- Topic:
- Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Geoeconomics, Decoupling, and De-Risking
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Germany