Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 1 Year and within 25 Years

1. China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe

Author:: Maria
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that encompasses infrastructure projects, trade and financial agreements, and cultural and defence cooperation with over 140 countries worldwide. Bringing the digital component into the BRI seamlessly advanced Beijing’s ambition of taking a leadership position in the technology sector. The DSR not only speaks across regions but also goes beyond the technology infrastructure, which raises two critical concerns by giving China leverage to advance the digital authoritarian governance model and jeopardizing data privacy. To mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on China, the EU must find alternatives by collaborating with trusted partners and diversifying supply chains. First, the EU can expand its technological landscape and engage nations in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific. Second, it must develop and enforce regulatory mechanisms to prevent Chinese state agencies from misusing sensitive data.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Information Technology, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

2. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Author:: Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:: Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

4. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:: Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

5. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

6. Assad’s Fall Is an Opportunity for a U.S. Win Over China

Author:: Grant Rumley
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Beijing consistently supported the regime’s brutal repressive measures, so cozying up to the rebel-led transition government may be more difficult than it expects. In the months since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region. For years, Chinese diplomats had been careful to toe a centrist line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly. Yet as the conflict has dragged on the past year, and as the region’s criticisms of the U.S. have risen, Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own. Chinese officials have regularly omitted mention of Hamas’s atrocities while blasting Israel and the U.S. for its support. Now, however, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has presented the U.S. with a similar opportunity...
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, Bashar al-Assad, 2023 Gaza War, and Transitional Government
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

7. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
Topic:: Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:: Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

9. From Partners to Rivals: Normative Power Europe Meets Normative Power China?

Author:: Gözde Yilmaz
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) has been promoting its norms, values, and rules for decades. However, in the current international environment, the EU’s normative power is not being received well outside the EU, particularly in reference to the growing power of illiberal states. Within that context, this study explores EU-China relations across time and unpacks the position of normative power Europe towards China and the Chinese response. The study foregrounds the fruitless attempts of the EU to project its transformative power onto China and the growing resistance by China against this, which it expresses by presenting itself to the West as an alternative power with an alternative understanding of international politics.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Rivalry, Strategic Partnerships, and Normative Power
Political Geography:: China and Europe

10. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial Innovation for Great Power Competition

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The U.S. government has not adequately leveraged the commercial sector to conduct irregular warfare against China, Russia, Iran, and other competitors because of significant risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions processes, and a failure to adequately understand technological advances. There is an urgent need to rethink how the United States works with the commercial sector in such areas as battlefield awareness, placement and access, next-generation intelligence, unmanned and autonomous systems, influence operations, and precision effects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, Competition, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

11. Foreign Malign Influence Targeting U.S. and Allied Corporations

Author:: Daniel Byman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: U.S. corporations are regular targets of foreign governments seeking to undermine the United States. These hostile states have both commercial and strategic motives, and they use disinformation, malinformation, and artificial promotion to tarnish the reputations of U.S. companies. U.S. corporations and the U.S. government should take steps to mitigate this threat, including improving corporate counterintelligence, building networks of advocates for use in crisis situations, and sharing more information on the scope and scale of the problem.
Topic:: Terrorism, International Security, Geopolitics, Corporations, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

12. Could Allies Decide the Future of the Indo-Pacific?

Author:: Phillips O'Brien
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Edited by Jude Blanchette, formerly Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The papers are rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Phillips P. O’Brien assesses the critical importance of allies in deciding major conflicts and argues that a potential war between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific would likely go on for an extended period, with the United States needing to lean on its regional allies for logistical support and for their manufacturing capacities. O’Brien argues that the U.S. allies appear strong on paper, but that they are untested, while China’s allies of Russia and North Korea, though weaker, appear much more willing to contribute serious resources to one another. Therefore, a long conflict may hinge more on commitment than on capability.
Topic:: International Security, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China and Indo-Pacific

13. Collateral Effects of the Tariff War on ASEAN Food Security

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Kayven Tan
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and China are locked in a cycle of escalating tariffs, with likely knock-on impacts on global food supplies and prices. In response to increases in tariff rates imposed by the US on China’s exports, China hit back with additional tariffs on US$21 billion worth of US agricultural products in March 2025. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs will mean an additional 10 per cent tariff on soybeans, sorghum, beef, pork, aquatic and dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, and an additional 15 per cent tariff on wheat, corn, maize, and chicken from the US. Given the tense words exchanged by leaders and officials on both sides in recent days, neither side appears ready to back down from these trade measures. The food security concern for ASEAN states is whether the trade war will impact the supply and prices of food in a region where 37 per cent, or 251 million people, cannot afford a healthy diet. Many Asian states rely heavily on imports for their food. Wheat is used in household staples such as noodles and bread, while corn and soybeans are used for food and livestock feed.
Topic:: Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

14. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

15. Report: Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire

Author:: Rian Thum
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: The Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a report in January 2025, “Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire: How China’s Policies in the Uyghur Region Have and Have Not Changed.” The report is authored by Rian Thum, Senior Lecturer in East Asian History, at the University of Manchester. The report seeks to improve our collective understanding of China’s ongoing repressive policies in the predominantly Uyghur province of Xinjiang in western China. The Simon-Skjodt Center released a report in 2021 detailing multiple crimes against humanity that the Chinese government had committed against the Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority group, and expressing grave concern that the Chinese government may be committing genocide. Since then, detailed reporting on state policies has decreased as Chinese authorities increasingly restricted access to information. Using recent evidence from Chinese state documents, satellite imagery, and survivor testimony, as well as a synthesis of recent academic publications, the report aims to fill a knowledge gap about the current state of mass atrocities targeting the Uyghur community and other Turkic minorities in the Uyghur region. The report finds that, given the available information, all of the policies that led to accusations of mass atrocities in the Uyghur region continue, and some are expanding. These findings should prompt deeper research into the nature of mass atrocities facing the Uyghur population and spark urgent, effective responses. In particular, the report recommends further research into emerging repressive strategies, including the intense network of electronic and human surveillance, curbs on religious practice, and the destruction of cultural heritage.
Topic:: Human Rights, Minorities, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

16. Assessing the Zeitenwende: Implications for Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic Security

Author:: John R. Deni, Marina E. Henke, Aylin Matlé, Sophia Besch, and Tim Bosch
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The essays in this volume analyze Germany’s Zeitenwende, a pivotal shift in security policy triggered by Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Key topics include national security strategy, defense policy, energy policy, industrial strategy, and international relations with Russia, China, the United States, NATO, and the EU. Regarding strategy, Germany’s approach lacks focus, offering broad goals without addressing trade-offs or specific threats. On defense policy, the Zeitenwende marked a renewed commitment to defense spending, bolstered by a €100 billion modernization fund. But delays in procurement, operational shortcomings, and an underfunded long-term defense budget hinder Germany. Similar challenges affect the defense industry, despite increased spending and exports. In energy policy, Germany rapidly diversified energy sources and expanded its liquefied natural gas infrastructure to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Still, achieving energy security, affordability, and sustainability remains complex. Internationally, Germany abandoned decades of Ostpolitik, prioritizing Ukraine over ties with Russia. Germany’s evolving China policy focuses on derisking and maintaining economic ties, raising questions about whether Berlin has reduced vulnerabilities. Though Washington supports Germany’s strategic shift, concerns remain about its sustainability, particularly in Germany’s NATO and EU commitments. Each chapter concludes by identifying the implications for the United States as well as the steps to overcome identified challenges.
Topic:: NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Energy Security, Burden Sharing, and Zeitenwende
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Germany, and United States of America

17. Toward a More Effective DoD Contribution to Strategic Competition in the Western Hemisphere

Author:: R. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Innovative new thinking on the security dimension of the challenges posed by the PRC’s engagement in Latin America and the DoD’s role in the whole-of-government US response is needed. This monograph highlights risks from PRC influence networks, digital architectures, and dual-use commercial facilities in the region, particularly at ports and in the space sector; shows how PRC economic engagement and other support sustains illiberal regimes, indirectly contributing to the risks these regimes pose by hosting criminal and terrorist groups and other US adversaries, such as Russia and Iran; and illustrates how commercial, people-to-people, and security engagements create options for the PRC to exploit against the United States in times of war. It advocates for new effects-based strategic concepts for how the DoD can strengthen cooperation with the region and limit PRC access through enhanced security cooperation and leveraging partners’ valuation of their relationships with the United States to influence their choices regarding cooperation with the PRC and gain better situational awareness for responding to China. Finally, it discusses how the United States should work with regional partners to plan for likely PRC actions in the region in times of war, leveraging the presence, relationships, and knowledge created through engagement.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, and Caribbean

18. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

19. Xi Demands Fealty Despite Domestic And Foreign Woes

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Politburo held a “democratic life meeting (民主生活会)” on December 21–22, 2023, in which President Xi Jinping gave an internal, unpublished speech. According to accounts provided to the author by three officials at the rank of department head or above, Xi admitted that he had repeatedly postponed the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (which according to Party norms should have taken place in October) because he “could not offer any viable solution for the nation’s problems.” Xi, who is general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, went on to blame the other 23 Politburo members and other senior cadres, not only for failing to give him good advice but also for demonstrating signs of disobedience. Reports of Xi’s frank admission of the dire straits of the Party’s leadership were widely circulated on social media. The official Xinhua read-out of the Politburo meeting also cited Xi as demanding “unison of thought” among top-tier officials. This entails adhering closely to the instructions of the “core leadership”—in other words, to Xi himself (Xinhua, December 25, 2023). The supreme leader raised the “two safeguards (两个维护),” a slogan that refers to “safeguarding the authority of comrade Xi Jinping as core of the party” and “safeguarding Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.” President Xi also admonished his close advisors to “take a firm grip on the internal laws of developments [of issues]; accurately distinguish between events and trends, crises and opportunities, and benefits and harms … and effectively combat risks and take action on the basis of stability” (People’s Daily, December 23, 2023). This instruction tallies with caveats given by Xi throughout the past year, in which he has warned that China faces unprecedented challenges and that the party-state apparatus must ready itself to tackle “black swans and gray rhinos.”
Topic:: Financial Crisis, Leadership, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Banking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

20. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:: John Dotson
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:: Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:: China and Asia

21. Xi’s New Year’s Speech Dismisses Difficulties

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On New Year’s Eve, a prerecorded address from Chinese President Xi Jinping was broadcast across the Party’s global network of official media outlets (Youtube, December 31, 2023). The speech is an annual tradition, delivered from behind a wooden desk in rhetoric that is at once paternalistic and triumphalist, in which Xi surveys the high points of the outgoing year and looks to the year ahead. The form of this year’s set-piece was no different, but the content departed from previous years in ways that are indicative of Xi’s shifting priorities, and the Party’s growing concerns about the state of the nation. The most significant section of the speech addressed the economic difficulties that China has weathered in the last year: “On the road ahead, trials and hardships [lit. ‘wind and rain’] will be the norm. Some enterprises are facing pressures, some of the masses are encountering difficulties finding jobs and meeting basic needs, and some places have hit by floods, typhoons, earthquakes, or other natural disasters (有风有雨是常态。一些企业面临经营压力，一些群众就业、生活遇到困难，一些地方发生洪涝、台风、地震等自然灾害).”
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. China’s Anti-Corruption Efforts Gain Momentum in Finance and Healthcare

Author:: Alexis Brown
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On September 27, Chinese President Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo, where he announced the end of the current round of finance inspections but suggested that more were to follow (Xinhua, September 27). The authorities may have chosen to focus on financial corruption to coincide with the restructuring of financial regulators in March, in which a central finance commission was created to give the Party center more direct control over the finance sector. This move indicates that the Party has taken a greater interest in the sector. So far in 2023, China’s anti-corruption organs, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC, 中华人民共和国国家监察委员会), have intensified investigations across both the healthcare and finance sectors. Authorities have investigated at least 180 hospital chiefs and 80 senior employees in financial institutions between January and early September. [1] By comparison, the CCDI and NSC only targeted 12 hospital leaders from 2019-2022 (CCDI). Through the anti-corruption campaigns, the party leadership is likely to bolster support among certain demographics, eliminate political opponents, and address some real instances of graft. However, due to the absence of robust institutions and transparency, systemic corruption will persist after the current drives wind down. The Party and state organs carry out anti-corruption in healthcare regularly, but in 2023 they have elevated the importance of this work. This is the first time the CCDI and NSC were involved in the National Health Commission’s annual conference on anti-corruption, where a national centralized campaign to crack down on graft was launched. The campaign will continue until mid-2024 (National Health Commission, July 21). [2] One motivation may be to address public frustrations with healthcare from the COVID-19 pandemic. There was an uproar over incidents like hospitals turning away ER patients for not having negative Covid tests and testing centers generating huge profits but producing fraudulent test results (Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council, December 9 2022 Credit China, December 23 2022). Another reason may be to combat illegal healthcare charges in order to boost household consumption, one of the government’s top economic targets for 2023 (Xinhua, March 14).
Topic:: Corruption, Finance, Public Policy, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:: China and Asia

23. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:: Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:: International Relations and Research
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

24. Western-Centric Moments in Homegrown IR Theories: Dependency, Chinese and African Schools

Author:: Engin Sune
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: The modern international system has been shaped by long-standing historical practices of unequal power relations, which have positioned the Western world at the center of the political universe. Due to the centrality of the Global North in the international system, any IR theory that aims to portray a true picture of the “globe” necessarily situates the West at the center of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the form of universality generated by Western hegemony has been diffused throughout the world over centuries, spreading Western political institutions, economic structures, and ideological norms in an uneven setting. As a result, the social structures of the Global South have developed through an uneven form of relationship and dialectical interaction with the West. Therefore, homegrown IR theories, which uncover local political, philosophical, or cultural motives as sources for theory-making, in fact, concentrate on stratified forms of the universal reality that is diffused through the uneven spread of Western social structures. In this sense, there is a Western-centric moment in any homegrown IR theory. Accordingly, this article develops a scientific realist account of the structure/agent relationship in order to analyze the material grounds of Western-centrism in the field of international politics and to evaluate the role of non-Western actors. Additionally, it critically evaluates distinctive homegrown theories produced on three different continents to reveal the aforementioned Western-centric moments in these theoretical initiatives. Namely, the Dependency School of Latin America, the Chinese School of International Relations, and the African School are respectively scrutinized to disclose the embedded Western-centrism in these theoretical initiatives.
Topic:: International Relations and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Global South

25. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:: John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

26. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:: Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:: Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China and Asia

27. The Future of the Belt and Road in Europe: How China’s Connectivity Project is Being Reconfigured across the Old Continent – and What It Means for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has entered the twilight zone in the old continent, following a deterioration of bilateral relations between the EU member states and China over the last years. Italy’s official exit from the BRI at the end of 2023 was a further blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy. Yet, the BRI in Europe is being reconfigured rather than being terminated. In Western Europe, the BRI is moving away from physical infrastructure projects and investment in industrial assets – the latter being increasingly protected from Chinese takeovers by both national and EU legislation – to financial and monetary connectivity. This shift is welcomed by various European actors, including some policymakers at the national level, eurozone institutions and major banks. Concurrently, most of Eastern European countries continue to promote BRI projects and seek to attract Chinese investments, suggesting that there is a two-speed Europe when it comes to China, both in terms of geography and sectors.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Currency
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

28. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:: Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

29. China's Trade Strategies and Korea-China Cooperation Plans

Author:: Seung Shin Lee, Sang Baek Hyun, Su Yeob Na, and Young Sun Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: As uncertainties in the global trade environment expand, China's trade strategy is changing, and these changes are expected to have a significant impact on our trade environment with China. This paper analyzed China's policies on new trade issues such as supply chain reorganization, digital trade, climate change response and proposed policy implications.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

30. EU's “Open Strategic Autonomy” and its Implications for Korea

Author:: Youngook Jang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This brief explores the shifting global trade landscape characterized by weakening globalization and rising protectionism, exacerbated by events such as the US-China trade disputes, COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It discusses how these factors have prompted a trend towards 'Open Strategic Autonomy' (OSA) in the European Union (EU), as evidenced by newly suggested industrial and trade policies. The EU's experiences during the pandemic and energy dependence on Russia have emphasized the need for resilient supply chains. The analysis draws from Jang et al. (2023) to examine how the EU's OSA has evolved in response to these changes, offering insights for policy implications for Korea.
Topic:: European Union, Trade, Supply Chains, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

31. Analyzing South Korea’s Semiconductor Industry: Trade Dynamics and Global Position

Author:: Hyung-gon Jeong
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: U.S. sanctions on China's semiconductor industry are causing major shifts in the global supply chain, affecting South Korea's industry due to its reliance on Chinese manufacturing. The Biden administration's increased sanctions, combined with global trends towards semiconductor self-sufficiency, are putting South Korea's semiconductor position at risk. Countries such as the U.S., China, and Japan are building up their domestic semiconductor industries, potentially affecting South Korea's position in the global market. Deeply integrated with China, Korean companies, face the challenge of reducing this dependence and adapting to the evolving supply chain landscape. This paper examines the import and export trends of the South Korean semiconductor industry over the last five years to assess its global standing, identify challenges, and suggest strategic directions. Using data from the Korea Customs Service from 2019 to 2023, the study analyzes trade patterns and supply chain configurations within South Korea's semiconductor industry. The industry is divided into six main categories and 33 subcategories, based on the analysis of 381 semiconductor-related items categorized under the Harmonized System at the 10-digit level. This detailed classification allows for an in-depth examination of trade trends, supply chain structures, and associated risks within the South Korean semiconductor industry. Moreover, this research uses the classification method described and UN Comtrade statistics to create a dataset on global semiconductor trade. This dataset is used to analyze the international presence of the South Korean semiconductor industry and its market shares in China across different segments.
Topic:: Trade, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

32. North Korea’s 2023 Trade with China: Analysis and Forecasts

Author:: Jangho Choi and Yoojeong Choi
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This article analyzes North Korea-China trade trends and statistics in 2023 to evaluate the extent of North Korea's trade normalization and its performance. North Korea's trade with China increased by more than 120% compared to the previous year as the country declared a COVID-19 Endemic and gradually eased border controls, but did not recover to 2018-19 levels, the year before the outbreak of COVID-19. Imports to China recorded 2.00 billion, 124.1% higher than the 0.89 billion in 2022. North Korea's imports from China in 2023 are estimated to be the maximum achievable given the lack of a full resumption of over-land trade. However, as the negative impact of UN sanctions on the North Korean economy is ongoing, making it difficult to normalize industrial production. North Korea mainly imported raw materials for processing trade (textile and garment raw materials), staple foods (rice and sugar), agricultural materials (fertilizer), and construction materials from China in 2023. North Korea’s exports to China stood at 0.29 billion, up 118.4% from 0.13 billion in 2023. Exports remain at the 16.9% of the level before the tightening of UN sanctions on North Korea, as the country has failed to diversify its products and expand exports of major export items. Exports were highly dependent on specific products, wigs and false eyelashes, a labor-intensive industry, accounting for 57.1% of total exports. In spite of increasing wigs export, North Korea failed to further expand its amount and diversify the export items in the second half of the year. According to the analysis of trade statistics, the main goals of North Korea's 2023 US foreign economic policy are: (1) resuming smuggling trade in textiles and clothing, (2) building irrigation canals in preparation for summer floods, (3) implementing state-led grain distribution, (4) building living houses in a rural area, and (5) increasing metal production for Russian arms exports. Despite the increase in imports from China in the transition to the coronavirus pandemic, it is difficult to say that it has yet led to the recovery of industrial production and economic development. The future of North Korea's trade with the rest of the world in 2024 will be determined by whether North Korea fully opens its borders and improves its relations with China. In 2024, both North Korea's exports and imports are expected to be slightly higher than in 2023. North Korea's exports are unlikely to increase significantly, as North Korea-Russia military cooperation is expected to continue and China is likely to maintain its checks on the growing Sino-Russian alignment. Increased imports will lead to a larger trade deficit, but it will be within North Korea's ability to manage for one to two years.
Topic:: Economics, Border Control, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

33. Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The likelihood China will attack Taiwan in the next decade is high and will continue to be so, unless Taipei and Washington take urgent steps to restore deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. This monograph introduces the concept of interlocking deterrents, explains why deterrents lose their potency with the passage of time, and provides concrete recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers can develop multiple, interlocking deterrents that will ensure Taiwanese security in the short and longer terms. By joining deterrence theory with an empirical analysis of Taiwanese, Chinese, and US policies, the monograph provides US military and policy practitioners new insights into ways to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan without relying exclusively on the threat of great-power war.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Security, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

34. International Competition in the High North: Kingston Conference on International Security 2022

Author:: Michael E. Lynch and Howard Coombs
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The 16th annual Kingston Consortium on International Security conference, “International Competition in the High North,” took place on October 11–13, 2022, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The conference examined the Arctic region in the context of ongoing climate change and against the backdrop of war in Ukraine. Over the past several years, the United States has acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic as a strategic region, and the Department of Defense and each of the US military services have published Arctic policies or strategies. In addition, the Department of Defense has created a new regional study center, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies in Alaska. Canada and the other Arctic Council nations have also acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic region and revised strategic frameworks and changed institutional approaches to ensure Arctic security challenges arising from great-power competition and other threats, like those to the environment, are addressed. This volume captures these ideas for the United States and its allies so all can benefit from this experience.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Indigenous, Strategic Competition, Arctic Council, Military, Dual Use Infrastructure, Environmental Security, and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
Political Geography:: China and Arctic

35. Arming Allies and Partners: How Foreign Military Sales Can Change the China Problem

Author:: Brennan Devereaux
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Allies and partners are “a center of gravity” for the DoD National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific.1 But are regional nations building military capacity to help the United States prepare for and deter a potential clash with the People’s Republic of China, or are they solely focused on defending their own territories? Although regional nations’ aims may often overlap, they also diverge in some cases. Partner-capacity development must therefore reflect the distinction between deterrence and territorial defense. The US military has been diligently building relationships and developing partner capacity in the Indo-Pacific region for years, conducting dozens of exercises annually and recently establishing the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center.2 These efforts in the Indo-Pacific region have increased with the US military’s attempt to shift away from the Middle East, and President Joe Biden’s declaration that China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”3 Regardless of efforts in the region, not all relationships with partners are equal; the potential assistance each partner would be willing to provide the US military in a conflict with China will vary for myriad reasons. Although each nation’s support requirements and development goals are distinct, assistance through military sales is a foundational aspect of building capacity, providing allies and partners a venue for acquiring military equipment. The Foreign Military Sales program, often critiqued for its inefficiencies, is being revamped by the US Department of State and Department of Defense.4 Partner nations purchasing US military equipment will remain focused on their own national interests, which for many partners remain security and the defense of sovereign territory. Updates to how the United States approaches military sales can also be tailored to support US military interests more effectively. In other words, US strategic objectives should underpin the prioritization of sales to specific countries, and US efforts should extend beyond financial benefits or the intangibles of building partnerships. To account for the unique and distinct challenges the US military faces in the Indo-Pacific theater, the modernization of Foreign Military Sales should aim to provide the United States with a relative military advantage over China by tailoring the program’s approach to arming allies in a way that complements US military efforts in the region. Modernizing Foreign Military Sales begins by categorizing nations based on their expected roles in a potential clash between the United States and China.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

36. A Baseline Assessment of the PLA Army's Border Reinforcement Operations in the Aksai Chin in 2020 and 2021

Author:: Dennis J. Blasko
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This report analyzes the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) border reinforcement operation throughout the Aksai Chin and adjacent areas from summer 2020 to early 2021. It is based largely on analysis of Google Earth imagery and provides a baseline for further analysis of the PLA deployment along the entire Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Aksai Chin. Chinese Army units appear ready to remain in a defensive posture near the LAC the Aksai Chin indefinitely. This effort is the land domain equivalent of Chinese military maritime operations in the South China Sea and air and sea deterrent operations directed toward Taiwan.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, India, Xinjiang, and Aksai Chin

37. War with China: A View from Early 2024

Author:: Marco J. Lyons
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: US defense analysts are overdue for a fundamental reassessment of the strategic factors that would shape a future Sino-American war. The United States may lower the overall risk of sparking a war between Washington and Beijing by more formally committing advanced US capabilities in intelligence collection and targeting, long-range fires, and theater air and missile defense to Japan and South Korea and by initiating bilateral planning to introduce such capabilities in Taiwan in the future. The US defense community still lacks a broad and integrated national strategy for successfully managing the rivalry with China. A clear-eyed assessment of a possible United States-China war could lead to a national strategy.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

38. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:: George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

39. Episode 04: Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:: Sahar Aziz and Khaled A. Beydoun
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Host Sahar Aziz and Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Professor Khaled Beydoun discuss the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries. The conversation is informed by Professor Beydoun’s new book The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims.
Topic:: Politics, Law, Discrimination, Islamophobia, War on Terror, and Muslims
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

40. The Russia Factor in China’s Relations with the West

Author:: Klaus W. Larres and Lea Thome
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Tension between China and the Western world has been a characteristic of global affairs for the better part of the last decade. Notwithstanding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States continues to view China as its greatest global rival and competitor. In fact, many policymakers in Washington (though by no means all of them) view China as an existential threat to America’s global influence and predominance. As the European Union and its 27 member states are not among the world’s superpowers, the Europeans have a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward China. Still, according to an important policy statement issued by the EU Commission in 2019, Brussels has come to see Beijing not only as a “partner and competitor” but also as a serious “systemic rival.” This refers less to geopolitical concerns but very much to global governance issues and geoeconomic, trade, and investment relations with China. The EU is deeply concerned about the continuing lack of reciprocity of market access, intellectual property theft, and China’s frequently state-subsidized competition regarding cutting-edge technology products, including solar panels, EV vehicles, and many other products, which may soon swamp the EU market. The EU Commission has launched an investigation into China’s production of EV vehicles and also Beijing’s shipbuilding industry, which it suspects may well work on the basis of rather unfair and highly subsidized support from the Chinese state.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Production
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

41. Digital Governance: Technology Tensions with China and Implications

Author:: Alex He and Robert Fay
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: As a superpower that is deeply integrated in global supply chains, China is becoming an economic giant, but its use of technology to capture data using methods that may pose cyber- and national security risks is raising concerns. While some view China’s motivations as an attempt to advance its status from an upper-middle-income economy to a developed economy, others see more nefarious intentions behind its authoritarian, top-down governance model. Further complicating the situation is the growing technology competition between China, the United States and Europe over the control of data, the technologies that use this data and the values upon which they should be used. The Centre for International Governance Innovation’s second annual conference on Digital Governance in China explored these and other issues related to the global implications of China’s governance model in the digital age.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China and Asia

42. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:: Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

43. Is Guanxi Changing? Referral Hiring and Social Networks in China

Author:: Elena Obukhova and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: What is the role of guanxi in China today? To answer this question, Professor Elena Obukhova examines the relationship between social networks and referral hiring. In the first study, she compares China and the US. In the second study, she explores differences between China’s provinces. This event is part of the 2023-2024 lecture series on “Labor Market Transformations in China" and is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by Columbia's China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:: Markets, Labor Issues, Social Networks, and Hiring
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

44. Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control

Author:: Dali Yang, Qin Gao, Junyan Jiang, and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic, which began as an outbreak in Wuhan in late 2019, has claimed millions of lives and caused unprecedented disruptions. Despite its generation-defining significance, there has been a surprising lack of independent research examining the decisions and measures implemented in the weeks leading up to the Wuhan lockdown, as well as the missteps and shortcomings that allowed the novel coronavirus to spread with minimal hindrance. In this book talk, Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control, Dali L. Yang scrutinizes China's emergency response to the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, delving into the government's handling of epidemic information and the decisions that influenced the scale and scope of the outbreak. Yang's research reveals that China's health decision-makers and experts had an excellent head start when they implemented a health emergency action program to respond to the outbreak at the end of December 2019. With granular detail and compelling immediacy, Yang investigates the political and bureaucratic processes that hindered information flows and sharing, as well as the cognitive framework that limited understanding of the virus's contagiousness and hampered effective decisions and enabled the outbreak to spiral out of control.
Topic:: Government, Crisis Management, Bureaucracy, COVID-19, Decision-Making, Zero-COVID, and Emergencies
Political Geography:: China and Asia

45. China and Latin America: A New Assessment

Author:: Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Parsifal D'Sola, a MARSEA alum, will deliver a presentation offering a general overview of the current state and prospective trends in China-Latin America relations. The talk will explore the evolving interactions and strategic dynamics between China and Latin American countries, highlighting developments over the past two decades. Key areas of discussion include the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the peripheral effects of US-China tensions on the region. An important aspect of the presentation will be examining the diverse perceptions of China across Latin American countries and how these views influence bilateral relations and policy decisions. D'Sola will also share his thoughts on future trends, offering a broad perspective on the likely course of China's engagement with Latin America in the coming years. Speaker's Bio: Parsifal D’Sola is the founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation – China Latin America Research Center in Bogota, Colombia. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Parsifal is a Chinese foreign policy analyst specializing in Sino-Latin American relations with a focus on Venezuela. Between 2019 and 2020, he acted as Chinese foreign policy advisor to the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Interim Government of Venezuela. He holds a BS in Telecommunications Engineering from Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University, an MSc in International Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, and an advance language diploma from Beijing Language and Culture University.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Latin America

46. The White Crane of Alagśa: Legends of the Sixth Dalai Lama in Mongolia

Author:: Sangseraima Ujeed and Gray Tuttle
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso (1683-1706/46) was recognized in secrecy, lived in controversy, and passed out of history in mystery. The popular tradition holds that he died whilst travelling to Beijing. Yet in some parts of Mongolia, it is believed that the exiled Sixth Dalai Lama escaped his captors and lived out his life in the dessert Gobi region of Alagśa, Inner Mongolia. To this day in Alagśa, the figure of the Sixth Dalai Lama still serves as a central pillar of the Alagśan identity, religion, and cultural pride among the local Mongolian population. Based on new materials in the form of oral histories, local legends, folk songs, poems, and textual sources which I collected about the Sixth Dalai Lama and the reincarnation of the Desi Sanggye Gyatso in Alagśa during a research trip in 2019, this paper will explore the formation of religio-cultural identity and the invention of tradition in the Alagśa during the early eighteenth century. This is not a paper that tries to solve the mystery of Tsangyang Gyatso’s death, but rather, one that explores the role Tsangyang Gyatso played for the Alagśa Mongols in creating narratives of identity and their realm Alagśa as an authentic Buddhist central place. This is a story of how Tsangyang Gyatso, his identities, and his interpersonal relationships were reborn in Alagśa and the role he played in consolidating Alagśa’s place within the wider geopolitical spheres of the cosmopolitan Buddhist world that spanned the Himalayas, Inner Asia, and the Qing.
Topic:: Religion, History, Geopolitics, Identity, Tradition, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:: China, Mongolia, and Asia

47. Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values and Institutions in Hong Kong

Author:: Michael Davis and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: A lot has been written about the 2019 protests in Hong Kong and the aggressive police crackdown offered in response. Much less has been written about the more severe assault on liberal values and institutions that followed. In his new book Professor Davis takes a forensic look at both the growing Beijing intervention in Hong Kong affairs from the handover forward and its culmination in the more severe crackdown that followed the 2019 protest, the 2020 passage of the National Security Law, and the 2021 Beijing imposition of a patriots-only electoral system. This talk will highlight the comprehensive impact of these developments on Hong Kong’s rule of law, its criminal justice system, and the many freedoms for which the vibrant city was long known—often previously ranking among the highest in the world. The diminution of basic freedoms has touched nearly all sectors of society, including education, the media, public broadcasting, civil society organizations, legal services, and so on. The city long known for a vibrant public debate, its vigorous media landscape, and some of the largest non-violent protests in the world has gone silent. The sheer comprehensiveness of this imposition raises questions not only for Hong Kong but for liberal democratic values globally, as autocratic regimes such as the PRC seek to advance their illiberal agenda.
Topic:: Protests, Institutions, Liberalism, and Autocracy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

48. Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China

Author:: Lynette Ong and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: How do states coerce citizens into compliance while simultaneously minimizing backlash? In Outsourcing Repression, Lynette Ong examines how the Chinese state engages nonstate actors, from violent street gangsters to nonviolent grassroots brokers, to coerce and mobilize the masses to pursue its ambitious urbanization project. She draws on ethnographic research conducted annually from 2011 to 2019--the years from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, a unique and original event dataset, and a collection of government regulations in a study of everyday land grabs and housing demolition in China. Theorizing a counterintuitive form of repression that reduces resistance and backlash, Ong invites the reader to reimagine the new ground state power credibly occupies. Everyday state power is quotidian power acquired through society by penetrating nonstate territories and mobilizing the masses within. After the book’s publication, Lynette has extended the arguments to explain the success, failure, and implications of China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Journal of Democracy, Foreign Affairs and the Economist etc. Outsourcing Repression has won the American Sociology Association’s Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship in Political Sociology, and the Human Rights Best Book Awards from the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Association, and the International Studies Association.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Governance, State, Coercion, Zero-COVID, and State Power
Political Geography:: China and Asia

49. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:: Marie Krpata
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

50. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:: Marc Julienne
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and France

51. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:: Brad Setser
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

52. Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum

Author:: Megumi Faith Mallari and Saleh Naas
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Despite their known and indisputable need for protection, North Koreans often have their applications for asylum rejected. This paper outlines the differing interpretations of North Koreans’ right to asylum and investigates the rationales and justifications behind them through the case studies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and China (PRC). The paper argues that the rationale of the European countries analyzed is based on their generally restrictive view on asylum, independent from their political positioning on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Contrastingly, the rationales of the United States and the PRC are grounded in interests directly related to the Korean peninsula and Cold War narratives.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Asylum, and Refugee Policy
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, France, Germany, Netherlands, and United States of America

53. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

54. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations

Author:: Matt Sheehan
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, East Asia, and Asia

55. The risk of artificial intelligence: China edition

Author:: Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:: We should be worried about China’s AI capacities, not only because it enhances the powers of the Party-state, but also because it is exporting its population control technology and policy abroad.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Social Control, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

56. Starr Forum: China: The Rise and Fall of the EAST

Author:: Yasheng Huang and Will Knight
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Speaker: Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, and faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. Discussant: Will Knight, senior writer, Wired magazine, covers artificial intelligence and other emerging technology. He was previously a senior editor at MIT Technology Review, where he wrote about fundamental advances in AI and China’s AI boom.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Autocracy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

57. US Hegemony in Latin America: Think Tanks and the Formation of Consensus about the Chinese Presence

Author:: Luciana Wietchikoski and Livia Peres Milani
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: In recent years, U.S. government agencies have defined the Chinese presence in Latin America as a challenge, which has organized foreign policy towards the region. Departing from a neo-Gramscian approach, this paper investigates the bibliographical production of U.S. think tanks and seeks to understand the construction of consensus about the Chinese presence in Latin America. The methodology is based on content analysis and we identified two main narratives: in the first, the Chinese presence is presented as a threat to U.S. regional hegemony; in the second, the Chinese adaptation to liberal precepts is sought. There are therefore nuances in how the Chinese power is perceived, although the discourses remain restricted to the promotion of capitalism and neoliberalism under U.S. leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, and Think Tanks
Political Geography:: China, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

58. Palestine: Public Opinion Report 2023, Part 2

Author:: Khalil Shikaki
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Palestinians see the Israeli occupation as the most critical threat facing Palestine and their most preferred countries are Turkey, Qatar, and China. In a comparison between China's and U.S. foreign policies, the Palestinian public views China's policies more positively than those of the U.S. on all issues at hand. Wide-ranging opposition to Arab normalization with Israel remains as strong as it was two years ago, but most express optimism about the world's solidarity with the Palestinians, and the vast majority expresses opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side. The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize SaudiIsraeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement. This report is the second in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB. It addresses one important issues covered by AB8: Palestinian perception of various international and regional actors and other international relations issues. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier, and one poll conducted after AB8.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Normalization, and October 7
Political Geography:: China, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Qatar

59. Lessons from China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic

Author:: Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Expansionary fiscal policy helped China's economy grow in 2020, a year in which most economies contracted because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid a broader pivot to policy and regulatory tightening, fiscal support was withdrawn in 2021. In 2022, government budget turned expansionary to ensure economic stability ahead of the Communist Party Congress, but the execution fell short and fiscal policy ended up being weaker than planned. A recurrent problem during the pandemic, however, was that local governments did not fully spend their budgets. Aside from the sharp drop in local governments' land sale revenue in 2022, which dragged down their spending, it was also caused by local governments' failure to fully utilize their special bond quotas approved by the central government for capital investment. China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic highlights four issues with implications for fiscal policy making. First, the government needs to avoid projecting unrealistically high land sale revenue in its budgets. Second, it needs to reconsider its problematic use of local-government special bond as a major fiscal stimulus instrument. Third, it needs to make sure its deficit, growth, and inflation targets are consistent. Last, Beijing needs to be more tolerant of higher fiscal deficits, at a minimum ensuring that overall fiscal spending grows at least as rapidly as nominal output.
Topic:: Budget, Economic Growth, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:: China and Asia

60. China’s Perspective on Economic Security

Author:: Audrye Wong
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper examines how Beijing views economic security as well as other countries’ actions in this realm. Economic security is not a new or foreign concept to Chinese thinkers and policymakers, but the emphases, concerns, and priorities have evolved, due in part to changes in the international environment as well as in China’s own economic and geopolitical situation. This paper examines how Chinese leaders and scholars have approached the definition and scope of economic security, as well as recent and proposed policy responses. It draws on a range of Chinese-language official documents and scholarly writings, as well as broader secondary source analyses. The paper explores that while Chinese discussions of economic security tend to be framed as ensuring economic development and stability, development is implicitly and explicitly linked to national security. Many writings emphasize that economics is the foundation for national strength (including military capabilities). As such, it is more than just economic survival and growth for the economy’s sake; it also has implications for China’s geopolitical position in the international order. In that respect, economic stability and national security may be hard to separate. Indeed, we see a resurgence in today’s rhetoric about the notions of development and security as inextricably linked, along with the need to coordinate the two—and in service of maintaining CCP rule and regime stability. Finally, the paper shows Beijing is taking concrete steps toward increased legalization and institutionalization of economic security measures. This represents a shift, at least in the domain of retaliatory countermeasures, from its usually more “informal” approach to economic coercion, which has afforded more flexibility and minimized political costs for the regime. At the same time, actual implementation has been relatively limited thus far.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Trade Wars, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China and Asia

61. South Korea: Caught in the Crosshairs of U.S.−China Competition Over Semiconductors

Author:: Paul Triolo
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper explores how countries with advanced semiconductor industries are caught in the middle of the growing U.S.-China competition in technology that is focused on advanced computing. Among them, South Korea and its national champions, Samsung and SK Hynix, have arguably incurred some of the most significant pressure. This paper explores how those firms have billions of dollars of sunk investment in China-based facilities producing cutting-edge memory, and the future of these facilities remains in doubt after a series of U.S. export control measures unleashed by the U.S. Commerce Department starting in October 2022. South Korean companies are also players in other parts of the global semiconductor supply chain, including semiconductor manufacturing tools, and China remains an important market for both components and electronic devices. This paper argues that each country caught between the United States and China in technology competition faces difficult trade-offs in determining how best to support its leading companies while navigating changing and often what is viewed as arbitrary decisions coming from Washington that have already significantly disrupted global supply chains. Finally, at the same time as U.S. export controls are having a major impact on the ability of South Korean companies to retain business operations and market access in China, major front-end manufacturers, particularly Samsung, are also looking to expand their operations in the United States and benefit from U.S. CHIPS Act funding. This paper argues that all of the above dynamics put South Korea in one of the more complex positions as the industry faces continued restructuring, buffeted by both export controls and industrial policies.
Topic:: Supply Chains, Economic Security, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

62. Economic Security and U.S.-China Competition: The View from North Korea

Author:: Rachel Minyoung Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper argues that while North Korea does not discuss “economic security” in domestic contexts or have an established definition of the term, it thoroughly understands that the economy and national security are inseparable. North Korea is essentially unaffected by the typical economic issues that many major economies are grappling with in relation to economic security, but like other countries, it has closely tracked economic security developments and deepening U.S.-China strategic competition for potential political fallout and what opportunities and challenges that may generate. The paper shows that U.S.-China strategic competition has offered unique opportunities to North Korea, including China’s cover against fresh and existing sanctions against North Korea, and economic assistance. Moreover, deteriorating U.S.-China ties provide Pyongyang extra space to consider and put into motion alternative foreign and economic policy paths, namely, shifting away from its three-decade policy of nonalignment with China and normalization of relations with the United States. Also, China appears to be a factor in North Korea’s shift to a more conservative economic policy. Despite the opportunities presented by the U.S.-China divide, however, North Korea is wary of the risks of dependence on China and has tried to build economic resilience at home, for example by launching a national campaign on domestic production and recycling. North Korea’s somewhat cooler handling of China and its proportionately warm treatment of Russia since the Armistice Day celebrations in July is a clear example of North Korea’s China dilemma. This is where North Korea’s recent strengthening of ties with Russia comes into the picture. The paper contends that it is hard to conclude at this point whether North Korea’s moves are aimed at short-term, tactical gains or are part of a longer-term, strategic calculus, but we can be certain of this: it has just as much to gain or lose as any other country affected by economic security and U.S.-China strategic competition, though not in the same ways as other countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

63. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:: Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

64. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:: Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

65. Geoeconomic fragmentation and net-zero targets

Author:: Shirin Hakim and Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The second half of the twentieth century experienced significant economic integration. International trade, cross-border migration, capital flows, and technological diffusion increased per capita incomes across countries and reduced global poverty. However, events such as the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic—all against the backdrop of escalating great power rivalry and tensions between the United States and China—have demonstrated the rise of geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF). Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a growing numberof world leaders have addressed the impacts of GEF on global energy and agricultural markets. For one, higher and increasingly volatile food and energy prices have made it increasingly difficult for developing nations to prioritize environmental concerns and implement sustainable development initiatives.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, International Trade and Finance, Economy, Economic Growth, Inclusion, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

66. How Huawei Weathered the Storm: Resilience, Market Conditions or Failed Sanctions?

Author:: Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robin Baker
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Huawei is exhibiting stoic resilience in the face of US sanctions, economic downturns, and the slow pace of 5G investments. There is a narrative that the company has been propped up by the Chinese government, but the key to Huawei’s resilience is multifaceted. Through pre-emptive stockpiling and ingenuity, the company has continued to fulfil its base station orders and defend its market shares abroad. Concurrently, Huawei has made an autonomous business decision to reinvest its earnings and intensify R&D to secure its supply chains against political risks and diversify into new business areas. Successful forays into semiconductors, cloud services and energy grids have also been facilitated by a capital structure that lends itself to long-term planning. Huawei’s survival is not necessarily a lesson in the futility of sanctions to stifle technological progress. However, it does show that muddled political objectives and inconsistent implementation will yield potentially contrary outcomes. At the same time, factors that contribute to Huawei’s resilience also highlight the infighting and vulnerabilities of listed firms like Mavenir, Ericsson and Nokia.
Topic:: Markets, Sanctions, Digital Economy, Resilience, and Huawei
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

67. What if…? 12 Dragon King scenarios for 2028

Author:: Florence Gaub
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: At first glance, this publication appears to be a collection of Early Warning essays – they are, to some extent, but they should not be exclusively read as such. Conventional Early Warning systems have a much shorter time horizon – normally hours, perhaps months at most – than these scenarios, and they are solely mitigation mechanisms, that is to say they provide no insight into how the event they are warning of can be avoided. They are thus not an intellectual thought exercise, but solely an alarm bell. Our Dragon Kings in this volume provide insight into how they can be avoided, but they also challenge our assumptions in more ways than one. They are therefore awareness-raisers no matter how credible or plausible you will find them. Just reading them will have a readiness-increasing effect. (In fact, the more absurd you find them, the more pronounced this is because your mind will learn more when the emotion they generate is greater.) These scenarios can become even more useful, however, if you use them for simulation exercises in a team. You can use them as a blueprint for a wider scenario exercise, whether one wishes to adopt a blue or red team approach to them, and ask questions such as: how could this have been prevented, what would have to be done? What are alternative pathways of this scenario that are even worse, and how can we prevent those? The most important aspect is that every exercise of this kind must lead to some concrete policy steps. Merely thinking about improbable futures is never enough – doing something about them is what makes them a useful policy-tool. In that case, they lead to active, rather than passive, engagement with the content, foster collaboration, encourage innovation, practice decision-making, provide a space for failure and experimentation with alternative courses of action. It is precisely because of this that scenarios are a common feature in military education, but they work just as well in any other strategic context – provided, time and space is made for it. If yes, they contribute to increasing preparedness and readiness, and accelerate the response time to surprise. What’s more, generally engaging in fringe thinking about the future will strengthen these capabilities no matter what kind of surprise eventually occurs. Much like how vaccines teach the immune system, disruptive thinking strengthens our neural networks, making us more resilient for extreme situations.
Topic:: NATO, Natural Disasters, Elections, Crisis Management, Coup, UN Security Council, Biological Weapons, Resilience, Arctic Council, and Readiness
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iraq, Europe, India, Taiwan, Latin America, Nigeria, and Tunisia

68. The history of China’s future Lessons from the CIA

Author:: Dylan Levi King
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Predictions about China’s future made in the years since the Communist Party took power in 1949 have routinely cycled between two extremes of improbability: imminent collapse and indomitable ascent. These cycles came more slowly in the age before cable news and social media. The idea of the capture of the People’s Republic of China by Republic of China forces, or of the country tearing itself apart with political violence, held for years, before being wiped out by a popular impression of China’s meteoric rise and future economic domination.1 These cycles have now become supercharged for the attention economy. As one wave of forecasts of unstoppable lift-off and financial supremacy breaks, it is chased immediately by predictions of terminal economic dysfunction and social disintegration. For the expert, in danger of having their voice drowned out by amateur forecasters, it is difficult to inject the necessary rigour and nuance. For the layperson, it is hard to make any sense of the incessant deluge of contradictory and often extreme predictions. To wade into the forecast cycle is to risk being swept off one’s feet. To step away, and to simply avoid making any predictions is tempting, but it would be a grave error, given China’s economic gravity, immense population, status as a superpower and potential rival of NATO and allied countries. To get the future of the country wrong is to get the future of the planet wrong.
Topic:: History, Forecast, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Readiness
Political Geography:: China and Asia

69. NATO and a Taiwan contingency

Author:: James Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: This paper Discusses the conditions under which a Taiwan contingency could trigger Article 5. Explains how individual NATO countries already play a role in Taiwan’s security. Outlines scenarios under which individual NATO countries could become directly involved in a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

70. Decoding China’s Technology and Industrial Policy: Seven Terms You Need to Know

Author:: Barry Naughton, Siwen Xiao, and Yaosheng Xu
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: China’s technology and industrial policy programs have grown in scope and intensity since 2020, but the vocabulary used to describe them is vague and often misleading. This policy brief decodes seven essential terms and shows that they have concrete and complementary meanings. When understood in concert, they reveal the establishment of a large-scale, government-directed program of mission-oriented research, development, and application. Together these terms outline a substantial expansion of the Chinese government’s direct role in organizing economic activity, and hint at some of the limits of that expansion.
Topic:: Economics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Research and Development, and Terminology
Political Geography:: China and Asia

71. The Quantum Race: U.S.-Chinese Competition for Leadership in Quantum Technologies

Author:: Juljan Krause
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Quantum computing is poised to unleash innovation across various sectors, from materials science to pharmaceutical and medical research, finance, logistics, and even climate change management. Quantum computing also has the potential to provide the backbone for future artificial intelligence and autonomous systems that cannot be realized with digital hardware alone, while quantum communication can strengthen security in cyberspace. For these reasons, quantum technologies feature prominently in the emerging technologies race between the United States and China. In this policy brief, IGCC postdoctoral fellow Juljan Krause analyzes China’s advances in quantum communication, which aim to signal China’s technological leadership while protecting Chinese communications from foreign surveillance. He argues that Chinese leadership in quantum communication will have strategic repercussions, particularly as it is likely to give China’s efforts to shape global industry standards additional momentum. Even if quantum communication has no immediate military implications, policymakers should consider how the technology could embolden China further.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

72. The Sky Is Not the Limit. Geopolitics and Economics of the New Space Race

Author:: Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Space is a contested domain for its very nature and today it is evidently becoming an increasingly important enabler of economic and military power. An increasing number of actors, infrastructures and technologies deployed in space also raises concerns for safety and security, especially in cyberspace. Many countries are striving to achieve space capabilities and autonomous access to space, and this is having a tremendous geopolitical impact, especially since space is emerging as an increasingly critical military and strategic domain. The development of the new space economy, which is increasingly involving the private sector and many industrial actors and services, will also be a game changer for the international economy. The space race likewise implies disruptive technologies that could contribute massively to the energy and digital transitions, accelerating solutions that could benefit humanity. A new international governance system for space is therefore needed urgently, considering that the current rules are no longer able to respond to a sector evolving at such a rapid pace. Which actors are leading the race? Which economic sectors could benefit the most and what could the new space economy mean for the world? How is space emerging as a military domain against a backdrop of increasing international tensions? What would a new system of global governance for space look like?
Topic:: Economics, Politics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, India, Italy, Global Focus, United States of America, and Space

73. Unpacking China’s industrial policy and its implications for Europe

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: China is often credited with a successful application of industrial policy. One important particularity of China’s industrial policy is that it aims at levelling the playing field between the state economy and the private economy in access to finance, yet within a framework of strategic goals. This aim is not relevant for market economies, such as those of the European Union, but only for those where state enterprises are clearly privileged. Notwithstanding the difficulties in making valid comparisons, our analysis of how China conducts industrial policy in a variety of sectors points to success in some sectors but not all. More importantly, productivity growth in China has already been declining for two decades. Given the very large resources that China has put into industrial policy, with subsidies being only one part, it is surprising that success is not more evident. This relates partly to factors including cronyism and regional protectionism. While the former might be less relevant for the EU given the different institutional background, the latter certainly is relevant since the EU faces the potential consequences of member country-level industrial policy for its single market. A lesson from China seems to come from the sectoral focus, with a long-term and economic-security mindset. The EU is far from this, but it is in the process of linking economic security to industrial policy. Finally, responding to China’s industrial policy involves diverse investigations and challenges in measuring subsidies accurately. Understanding China’s very diverse and complex approach to helping companies achieve the government’s industrial policy goals is crucial for anticipating the consequences of China’s actions. These could be positive, such as cheaper imports of green technology, or negative, such as Chinese overcapacity spilling over to the EU single market.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Markets, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

74. How to de-risk: European economic security in a world of interdependence

Author:: Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Pandemic-related supply disruptions, the energy crisis provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and economic coercion by China have put economic security high on the European Union policy agenda. The question is how exactly the EU should ‘de-risk’ its external economic relationships without foregoing the benefits of trade. The standard answer is that it should identify product-level trade dependencies, mainly on the import side, and reduce them, mainly through diversification of suppliers, while otherwise maintaining maximum trade integration. This Policy Brief argues that this answer falls short. First, product-level dependencies cannot be identified reliably even with sophisticated analysis and data. As a result, both ‘missed dependencies’ and ‘false positives’ are inevitable. Second, external shocks and coercion could be propagated through exports, productive assets held abroad and financial channels as much as through imports. The analysis has five main implications Import de-risking should focus on a few product categories for which the costs of supply interruptions would be unquestionably large. This reduces false positives. De-risking and/or buffers to deal with exports and financial coercion require more attention. De-risking must be complemented by raising resilience against all shocks, whatever theirorigin. This requires a deeper and broader European single market. De-risking and resilience must be complemented by deterrence. A sufficiently high probability of chronic trade conflict – or one very large conflict – may justify reducing overall integration with a large trading partner, on both the export andimport sides. EU economic security policies have been right to emphasise the reduction of import dependence on chips and critical raw materials, and the creation of a powerful legal instrument to deter coercion (the Anti-Coercion Instrument). In most other respects, there is room for improvement.
Topic:: European Union, Risk, Trade, Imports, Economic Security, and Interdependence
Political Geography:: China and Europe

75. Global supply chains: lessons from a decade of disruption

Author:: Luca Léry Moffat and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: This paper explores both the character and impact of three recent shocks to global supply chains: the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the US-China trade war. These were large shocks which have had significant impacts on domestic and international supply chains, but these impacts have differed in their longevity, economic impact and policy responses. We show that supply chains were remarkably resilient against shocks of such magnitude. However, this resilience was also achieved thanks to the equally remarkable size and scope of policy responses and global supply chain reorganisation. We recommend that pre-emptive policies may be justified to shield households and industry from future shocks. Given the entangled nature of these shocks and that their effects continue to reverberate, we emphasise the need for extensive future research to understand the nature of these shocks and the effectiveness of policy responses.
Topic:: Global Markets, Trade Wars, Trade, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

76. Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage

Author:: Meg Keen and Alan Tidwell
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Pacific Islands Countries are leveraging geopolitical rivalries to maximise their development options. But unmanaged competition for influence among key development partners can compromise good governance and privilege geopolitical posturing over local priorities. Australia, the United States, and other traditional donors can capitalise on areas of strength, such as social inclusion and regional and multilateral initiatives. Joint efforts along these lines and the pooling of resources would scale up impact and set higher accountability standards. Despite the risk that higher standards will open gaps for non-traditional donors with less burdensome criteria, there is much long-term value in traditional development partners collaborating in a “race to the top” in meeting the region’s needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Regional Cooperation, Foreign Aid, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:: China, Australia, Australia/Pacific, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

77. China Threats and the Exploitation of China Threats: The 2024 Taiwan General Election

Author:: Chin-en Wu
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%. Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication. The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.
Topic:: Elections, Domestic Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

78. Climate Change in China’s Governance: Agenda, Agents, and International Collaboration

Author:: Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China is the world's leading emitter and a key player in the international community's fight against climate change, but its climate action remains underpinned by a black box of policies, actors, and international influences. As China accelerates action to achieve domestic and international climate goals, it is more important than ever to detangle these webs and peer into the black box, to develop an understanding of what motivates China's decision-makers and how climate policy choices are made. In this insightful new report, Climate Change in China’s Governance: Agenda, Agents, and International Collaboration, Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics Guoguang Wu conducts an in-depth investigation of China’s climate-related policies, politics, governance, and international relations. He finds that the Xi Jinping administration has paid special attention to climate action by advancing the green technology revolution and reducing energy dependence. However, at the same time, there are signs that China may be relaxing rather than strengthening its climate commitment. By conducting a deep dive into the evolving political actors and departments working on China’s climate agenda, Guoguang finds that ultra-concentrated political power and fragmented governance under Xi and the Chinese Communist Party pose obstacles to China’s climate action over the next five years.
Topic:: International Relations, Climate Change, Governance, and Green Technology
Political Geography:: China and Asia

79. Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia's Industrial Giants

Author:: Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Asia’s transformation in recent decades into a global manufacturing hub has fueled economic growth and lifted millions out of poverty. However, this success has also massively increased the region’s emissions footprint, making it essential for Asia’s industries to rapidly transition to green technologies and processes. “Green Hydrogen for Decarbonizing Asia’s Industrial Giants” assesses the future potential and trajectory for electrolyzers needed to meet green hydrogen (H2) demand in Asia’s four largest economies: China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The report, which was commissioned by the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero and carried out by Global Efficiency Intelligence, highlights the role of manufacturers as agents of change in the Asia’s net zero transition. The study focuses on the role of green H2 in three priority industries — steel, ammonia, and methanol — under various decarbonization scenarios. In these sectors, green H2 has the capacity to significantly reduce emissions by replacing carbon-intensive processes with renewable energy-powered electrolysis. Should the four countries adhere to their declared net zero targets, the collective market potential of electrolyzers for these industries is expected to skyrocket to $180 billion by 2050, with a compound annual growth rate as high as 12% between 2030 and 2040. This is nearly five times as large as the market potential under a business-as-usual scenario. The report offers a suite of recommendations for policymakers, industry players, investors, and think thanks aimed at accelerating the development and adoption of green H2 and electrolyzer manufacturing. These targeted strategies aim to collectively support a robust ecosystem for green H2 production and use in these countries toward a net zero industry.
Topic:: Industry, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, and South Korea

80. The Limits of Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Japan-ROK-China Relations After the Fukushima Wastewater Release

Author:: Daria Kurushina
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: More than a decade after the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, causing the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the aftermath of the “triple disaster” continues to shape perceptions of Japan among its neighbors. The Japanese government’s decision to release into the sea more than a million tons of treated radioactive wastewater stored at the wrecked Fukushima plant beginning on August 24, 2023, decisively shifted the narrative of Japan’s experience: whereas the country was once viewed as the victim of one of the world’s worst nuclear disasters, it came to be seen by many in Northeast Asia as an atomic chemical antagonist. Following the announcement of the wastewater release, Japan faced an immediate backlash from neighboring countries and the international community over environmental and health concerns. The decision divided public opinion in both Japan and the broader Asia-Pacific region and threatened Japan’s attempts to position itself as the leader of a free, fair, and open Indo-Pacific. The Japanese government’s decision particularly roiled the public in Northeast Asia, where anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from the collective memory of Japan’s military ambition, colonialism, and atrocities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries persists. Meanwhile, authorities in some countries, especially China, intentionally stirred historical grievances and distrust in an attempt to undermine the trilateral relationship among Japan, Korea, and the United States. However, are concerns about the wastewater release warranted? In a Comprehensive Safety Review[1] the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the United Nations nuclear watchdog – determined that the release had no radiological impact on public health and the marine environment. Emphasizing the Fukushima plant’s compliance with “international safety standards,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi focused on the ongoing process of wastewater release and the Japanese’s government accountability for the water’s treatment, while also expressing concerns about the accumulation of tritium (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that cannot be removed) in the water and the importance of further research on the effects of the wastewater on marine life. Driven by health concerns, geopolitical dynamics, and the absence of regional consultation, the Japanese decision provoked a furious public backlash among Asia-Pacific nations, particularly in South Korea and China. Relations among Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and China have deteriorated in recent years amid rising security concerns over North Korea’s volatility, tensions between China and the United States, and wartime forced-labor reparations that caused long-term damage to Japan-ROK relations long before the rapprochement of 2023.[2] Participants in the Japan-ROK-China trilateral summit now have wastewater as another contentious topic to discuss during the renewed dialogue, which is scheduled to be convened in 2024. As the nuclear wastewater decision seems to have surfaced many thorny issues among the three countries, this paper seeks to explain the regional reaction to Japan’s decision, why this reaction matters, and how the trilateral relationship might evolve alongside the wastewater issue.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Crisis Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Fukushima

81. China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030

Author:: Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Southeast Asia stands at a critical juncture in its energy transition, grappling with the need to foster clean energy development while confronting infrastructure and investment challenges. A series of engagements in 2023 organized by the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) brought together key stakeholders to strategize on enhancing China's role in the region's shift towards renewable energy, focusing on targeted investments and policy synergy with regional initiatives. This policy report, China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030, introduces the "Clean Prosperity Plan," a blueprint advocating socio-economic and climate resilience through joint China-Southeast Asia efforts. The plan highlights project-specific recommendations, green industrialization, and renewable energy projects expedited by policy support, poised to catalyze investment and job creation, thereby sparking a positive feedback loop that could amplify regional clean energy ambitions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

82. The geopolitics of water: how the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

Author:: Neely Haby
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations. To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.
Topic:: Water, Geopolitics, Rivers, Competition, Regional Security, and Brahmaputra River
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

83. Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention. This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica. Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing's actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia's strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty. China's domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT's military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo. With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing's growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT. With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China's presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants' cooperation. It's time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Antarctica

84. Chinese foreign policy in 2024: crisis management and global governance

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: This Trend Report examines key aspects of Chinese foreign policy in 2024, emphasizing three critical questions: the Taiwan situation, China’s stance in the Ukraine conflict, and its global governance reform proposals. The analysis suggests that the likelihood of a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan remains low due to electoral outcomes and various deterrent factors. China is expected to intensify non-physical threats. Economic considerations, including reliance on exports and partnerships with Europe, deter China from escalating support for Russia. The "Global South" is likely to support China’s global governance reforms, driven by resentment against perceived US double standards. European decision-makers are advised to align strategies with China’s nuanced approach, emphasizing reassurances on Taiwan, clear red lines on Russia, and increased engagement with the "Global South" while upholding UN principles.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China and Asia

85. The European Union can go green and lower dependencies on China

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Some Western pundits see the ongoing policy push from the European Union to de-risk supply chain dependencies on China as a threat to gains from decades of economic globalisation. Others regard Chinese industrial strengths in green technologies as unbreakable and see attempts to diversify the EU’s reliance as setting back global efforts to fight climate change. Yet, diversifying sources of critical minerals away from China and other large suppliers is a necessity in today’s volatile geopolitical climate. As well as actively pursuing new partnerships overseas to lower large dependencies on single sources, EU member states should fully harness new regulatory tools, such as the Critical Raw Materials Act, to diversify sources of critical minerals and exploit the Net-Zero Industry Act to support the production of green technologies and leverage European resources, capabilities and know-how. Contrary to conventional thinking, Europe is not starting from scratch when it comes to developing strategic supply chains in green, digital and defence technologies. Over time, there is ample potential for de-risking critical minerals to have a positive impact on the EU’s supply chain resilience and its contribution to lowering global emissions.
Topic:: European Union, Green Technology, Supply Chains, Energy Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China and Europe

86. Forecasting Chinese expansion into Central Asia

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In early April 2024, China signed a two-year enhanced security cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan, which was reached during a meeting between Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Interior Minister Pulat Bobojonov in Tashkent. Some believe this pact was prompted by escalating international and regional competition for Central Asia, mainly because it came amid moves by international and regional powers in the five countries. Moreover, as China expands activities in this region to capitalize on cooperation potentials and opportunities, its influence in the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is steadily rising, mainly encouraged by Moscow's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. The development is raising questions about the future of China's presence in Central Asia in the coming years.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, and Asia

87. China’s Responsibility, and Ours: The Persecution and Neglect of Stateless North Korean Children

Author:: Rob York, Hannah Cole, and Kaylin Kim
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: What happens to the children of North Korean women who are born in China? What happens when they remain in China, or when they escape to other countries? It is believed that as many as 300,000 North Koreans have fled the country—most of them since the famine of the 1990s, and most of them women. To address China’s “bare branches”—its much larger population of young men than young women—North Korean women are often sold to young Chinese men as brides. The children of these brides will be born stateless, lack legal rights, and face the ever-present danger of their mothers’ deportation back to North Korea because they are considered illegal immigrants in China. These unique challenges persist, despite China being a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other international treaties. Even those children that eventually escape to third-party countries are haunted by their status, as their statelessness caused legal hindrances to their ability to settle and, specifically in South Korea, deprives them of government assistance. This study documents the treatment of “stateless” children born to North Korean and Chinese parents. It delineates the factors that contribute to their mistreatment—China’s unwillingness to anger the North Korean government, South Korea’s growing disinterest in North Korean defectors, and a lack of formal networks for North Korean defectors elsewhere. It further finds that, with China openly hostile toward “meddling” in its internal affairs, the most likely source of relief for these children will be a change in attitudes among South Koreans, the United States, and their allies and partners, resulting in conscious effort by their governments and civil societies to help them, both financially and in assisting with their assimilation.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Children, and Statelessness
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

88. Gender in Strategic Competition: A Non-Traditional Strategy for Building Resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Charity Borg
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Today’s era is defined by strategic competition with “autocrats [who] are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.”[1] The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the leading autocratic force, operating with both the intent to reshape the democratic rules-based international order and the resources to advance those aims. States interested in upholding the international rules-based order must enhance their ability to withstand PRC coercion and invest in cultivating a values-based security alliance against the spread of authoritarianism. International collaboration on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda offers a low-cost, high-return opportunity to bolster national and regional resistance to authoritarian coercion while building a coalition of like-minded allies and partners. Increasing national resilience and building alliances that center on enhancing the security of women is a data-backed approach that ensures elevated state stability, democracy, and economic prosperity while increasing the likelihood of a coalition’s willingness to defend the current international rules-based order from those who seek to dismantle it. An overwhelming body of empirical analysis demonstrates a significant correlation between the security of women and the democratic or authoritarian tendencies of a state. That same analysis also finds that women’s security is a precondition for a state’s level of democracy. Otherwise stated, countries with higher levels of gender equality are more democratic, less corrupt, and more stable. Whereas “states with higher levels of violence against women are less peaceful [internally and] internationally, less compliant with international norms, and less likely to have good relations with neighboring states,” they are also more likely to align with autocratic governance structures.[1] Authoritarian states such as the PRC understand the benefits of empowered societies, which is why their actions on domestic and international fronts actively seek to suppress women. They fear that like-minded allies and partners will successfully improve security for fifty percent of the population and, as a result, will ultimately tip the scales of power and influence to preserve the values-based international order they desire to uproot. Interest and investment in the WPS agenda are growing around the globe, but not fast enough. Thus far, 18 Indo-Pacific states and one regional organization have sought meaningful engagement and integration of the WPS agenda by various means, opening a door for cooperation across the spectrum of civil, diplomatic, and military security cooperation engagements.[2] However, several transformative policy and operational measures must be implemented to achieve the desired end states. To be transformative and enable lasting change in governmental and national behavior, the thoughtful implementation of the WPS agenda at all levels, from national and subnational to the community and household, is required. First, domestic and international policymakers need to clearly define the security of women as a national security imperative. Second, implementing WPS in the defense sector should focus on training defense personnel to apply a gender perspective to enhance mission effectiveness. Last, those advancing WPS must take an inclusive, context-specific, and localized approach to its integration. To defend the current rules-based international order, like-minded countries must accelerate change and follow through by investing in women’s security.
Topic:: Security, Investment, Strategic Competition, Resilience, Gender, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

89. Enhancing the Cooperation between the US and Its Allies in the Mekong Subregion

Author:: Sach Nguyen
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The Mekong subregion is experiencing heightened geopolitical competition between the US and China, representing a clash between the international rules-based order and a China-led order. While the US and its allies advocate for the rules-based order, China’s intentions for its own order in the region are debated. China’s increased presence and influence in the Mekong subregion, particularly through upstream control of the Mekong water, reflect its pursuit of this order. In response, the US and its allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, have strengthened cooperation with one another to promote a rules-based system. Despite existing coordination, there is potential for further collaboration to enhance their role in mainland Southeast Asia. Stability and prosperity in the Mekong subregion are being challenged. Weakening international norms in governing transboundary waters threaten downstream countries’ security and livelihoods, exacerbated by climate change-induced droughts. China’s growing engagement in the region aims to establish its sphere of influence, primarily through economic development projects like dams and railways, raising concerns over environmental impacts and expanding Chinese influence. Additionally, non-traditional security threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber security, and human trafficking further complicate the region’s situation. The engagement of the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion is multifaceted, driven by various interests but united in countering China’s growing influence. The US, through initiatives like the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and later the Mekong-US Partnership, seeks to maintain its relevance and preeminence in the region. Japan, South Korea, and Australia also engage with the subregion, for economic interests and to counterbalance China. Japan, for instance, aims to establish production bases and balance China’s influence through high-standard infrastructure projects. South Korea focuses on economic development and diversification of trade amid US-China tensions, while Australia prioritizes promoting a rules-based order and addressing non-traditional security threats. Despite differences in approach, the US and its allies collaborate through platforms like the Friends of the Mekong and initiatives such as the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, challenges remain in realizing these initiatives, particularly in engaging the private sector and ensuring concrete outcomes amidst competing interests and complex negotiations. Recommendations for enhancing cooperation between the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion include strengthening international norms and rules, expanding economic infrastructure projects, focusing on non-traditional security issues, and fostering track 1.5 and track 2 diplomacy to promote mutual understanding and collaboration among all stakeholders, including governments, academia, businesses, and civil society organizations. These efforts, facilitated by the US and its allies, can contribute to a more stable and prosperous Mekong subregion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, International Order, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Mekong River

90. A Subdued Environment and Missed Opportunities

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Chinese diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula in late 2023 sputtered forward, driven more by a calendar of bilateral anniversaries with North Korea and multilateral gatherings involving South Korea than any sense of strategic purpose. Both relationships seemed preoccupied with off-stage developments such as the September summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin and the momentum of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations, rather than any inherent dynamism of their own. Still, regular Sino-North Korean bilateral exchanges ahead of the 75th anniversary of the bilateral relationship and Sino-South Korean bilateral economic dialogues provide opportunities to overcome resistance and sustain progress in the face of deepening major power rivalries. Senior-level dialogues between China and North Korea occurred on North Korea’s 75th founding anniversary in September, with the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong to Pyongyang, a visit that occurred against the backdrop of the second US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group meeting, North Korea’s first successful indigenous satellite launch, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho’s visit to Beijing. Meanwhile, ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, punctuated by a notable bilateral exchange between Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo in late September on the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou. But these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to have substantive bilateral meetings with President Xi on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco in November. Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko—the first in four years—failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry. Instead, the resumption of China-South Korea or China-Japan-South Korea summitry will depend on developments in 2024.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, and North Korea

91. Taiwan Voters Choose Independence

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Taiwan’s election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wen’s management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wen’s chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election. Washington has expanded its support for Taiwan’s self-defense, though less vigorously than Republican critics in Congress would like. Taiwan and the US have continued to expand trade ties in ways that will benefit Taiwan businesses though without tariff concessions that Taiwan eagerly wants. Now that Taiwan voters have elected William Lai, as the polls predicted, China will likely respond with increasing coercion. Had Hou Yu-ih been victorious, his challenge would have been to navigate between Beijing’s pressure for cross-Strait concessions and Washington’s suspicions of any such steps by Taiwan.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Sovereignty, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

92. Biden-Xi Woodside Summit and the Slow Rehabilitation of US-PRC Ties

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The “guardrails” that President Biden and President Xi envisaged in Bali in November 2022 began to be emplaced at their November 2023 summit in Woodside, California. In-person, leader-led communication was deepened, reassurances exchanged, and practical—albeit modest—“deliverables” locked down on several fronts, including restarting mil-mil communications, cracking down on fentanyl precursors, addressing the national security harms of artificial intelligence (AI), and increased people-to-people exchanges. The establishment of numerous bilateral working groups will ensure an almost full plate of across-the-board consultations in 2024 as well as the means to troubleshoot irritants on short notice. As stabilizing as the Woodside summit was, it failed to deflect the US-PRC relationship from its larger overall trajectory of “selective decoupling” across a range of advanced technologies and frontier industries (microelectronics; quantum; AI; biomanufacturing; clean energy). Strategic trade controls and other competitive actions were doubled down upon. With a pivotal US presidential election looming in 2024, questions abound on the longer-term durability of a rehabilitating US-PRC relationship.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Xi Jinping, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. Beijing Moderates Criticisms Selectively

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Beijing in this reporting period moderated often shrill rhetoric of the past two years criticizing Joseph Biden administration advances and regional governments cooperating with the US. Emphasizing China’s positive contributions to regional economic growth, Beijing stressed its flexibility, said to be different from Washington in not pressing regional states to choose between the US and China, even as it demonstrated ambitions to develop a new regional and global order favorable to itself. Nevertheless, glaring exceptions included egregious pressures to compel deference to China’s claims in the South China Sea, harsh criticism of the Philippines and Japan cooperating closely with the United States, as well as authoritative foreign policy statements giving regional governments little choice between two paths forward: cooperation with an avowedly beneficial China or America’s purported exploitative, divisive and destructive initiatives. Regarding the Philippines, an unprecedented show of support by the US for the territorial claims of its treaty ally resulted in an equally unprecedented pushback from Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

94. Taiwan and China—Steady As She Goes

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As 2024 dawned, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year Address that Taiwan must unify with China. In her New Year Address, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, with the election of her successor only 14 days away, repeated her offer to meet China on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and without preconditions, echoing themes dating back to her first inaugural address in 2016. On Jan. 14, Tsai’s chosen successor, Vice President Lai Ching-te, won an unprecedented third successive term for the Democratic Progressive Party, promising to uphold the independence of the Republic of China, but the party lost its majority in the legislature. A month later, two Chinese fishermen operating illegally near Kinmen Island died when their boat capsized as they were pursued by the Taiwan Coast Guard. Five days later, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel boarded and inspected a Taiwanese tour boat near Kinmen. Tensions grew but they did not boil over. On Jan. 30, China unilaterally moved its M503 civil aviation flight route closer to the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Premier Li Qiang included the obligatory call for Taiwan reunification in his Work Report to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). Some analysts found that and other NPC references to Taiwan more strident than in recent years, but any change in tone was subtle. In apparent retaliation for Lai’s electoral victory, China persuaded Nauru to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China even as Taiwan continued to strengthen unofficial relations with larger powers. These Taiwan efforts were supported by US President Biden, who used a trilateral meeting with Japan and the Philippines to call for cross-Strait stability. Taiwan’s continuing negotiation with the US of a 21st Century Trade Initiative and TSMC’s decision to expand new facilities under construction in Arizona exemplified Taiwan’s continuing diversification of economic linkages away from China. President-elect Lai will be inaugurated on May 20; his inaugural speech and China’s response could portend the future course of cross-Strait relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

95. China’s New Foreign Policy Moderation—Mixed Regional Implications

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Incorporating major foreign policy initiatives of leader Xi Jinping, Beijing completed its effort from the past two years with instructions in January on China’s new approach to foreign affairs to Chinese foreign policy officials and others concerned. The new approach added authority and momentum to Beijing’s emphasis since Xi’s summit with US President Joe Biden last November on greater Chinese moderation and restraint as a “responsible” great power pursuing peace and development in dealing with Southeast Asian neighbors and elsewhere. Nevertheless, Beijing remains selective in how it applies moderation, and the record of the past two years shows great swings between moderation and truculence in its approach to foreign affairs, depending on circumstances which remain subject to change. The success of China’s regional importance showed in Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies annual survey of regional elites with China viewed as both the leading economic and political-security power, overshadowing the United States, and the judgment that if forced to choose between them, more respondents would select China than the United States. Caveats to these positives for China include continuing strong regional concerns over China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia and the fact that the survey came during the height of the war in Gaza by Israel, which is supported by the US and viewed very negatively in the region. Meanwhile, the defiance of the Philippines, with strong military and political support from the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and other allies and partners, against coercive measures in the disputed South China Sea represented a major test of China’s avowed “restraint” in dealing with foreign differences.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China and Southeast Asia

96. Ties Stabilize While Negative Undercurrents Deepen

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: US-China relations were marked by a paradox during the first trimester of 2024. On the one hand, a distinct stabilization was evident in ties. The two sides made concerted efforts to translate their leaders’ ‘San Francisco Vision’ into reality. Cabinet officials exchanged visits across the Pacific, working groups and dialogue mechanisms met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened, sensitive issues such as Taiwan were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in ties continued to deepen. Both sides introduced additional selective decoupling as well as cybersecurity measures in key information and communications technology and services sectors, with US actions bearing the signs of desinicization—rather than mere decoupling—of relevant supply chains. The chasm in strategic perception remained as wide as before. In sum, the “new normal” in US-China relations continued to take form, one piece at a time. What a difference a year makes. At this time in late-April last year, the US and China were barely communicating, still smarting from the balloon incident of February 2023. It was not until US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CPC Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Wang Yi met in Vienna in mid-May 2023 that a semblance of normality began to be restored to the relationship. Twelve months on, there has been an almost across-the-board restoration of communication channels, a deepening of functional cooperation across issues areas, and a concerted effort to manage the political optics of the relationship for the better – this, despite deep differences in strategic perception between the two sides.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

97. Understanding Muslim Countries’ Support for China’s Actions in Xinjiang: A Qualitative-Comparative Analysis

Author:: Bruno Hendler, Marcelo Corrêa, and William Wuttke Martins
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This study examines why 23 Muslim-majority countries supported China at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN/HRC) in 2019, despite allegations of human rights abuses against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Using a fuzzy-set qualitative-comparative analysis (fsQCA), we compared the factors that led Muslim-majority and non-Muslim countries to support China. Our analysis found that Political Regime Affinity (PRA) was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Muslim-majority countries to support China, while China’s Foreign Aid (ODA) was a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-Muslim countries. These findings suggest that ideological factors, related to the autocratic political regime (PRA), played a significant role in Muslim-majority countries’ decision to support China in the UN/HRC in 2019. However, it is important to note that other factors may have also been involved. These findings have important implications for understanding the complexities of international relations and the factors that shape states behaviour.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Uyghurs, and State Behavior
Political Geography:: China and Xinjiang

98. Chinese Double Effect on Brazilian Foreign Policy (2003-2018)

Author:: Yuri Bravo Coutinho and Júlio César Cossio Rodriguez
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This research examines contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, and its central concern is to explore how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018. We argue that China has had a double impact on Brazilian foreign policy: (i) restraining its scope due to the restrictive nature of Sino-Brazilian relations, primarily via commerce and political divergence, and (ii) enhancing Brazil’s autonomous insertion in the international system due to the structural gaps produced by Chinese diplomatic support in the global sphere and from the convergence of specific agendas. A case study on Sino-Brazilian relations is conducted with typologies on foreign policy actions elaborated by Schweller (1994). Then, we propose that Brazilian foreign policy, through the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy, sought to interpret a Jackal position within the international system. Our variables are defined based on Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), considering the structural stimulus of China’s rise as the independent variable, the permissiveness, and clarity of the international system as the intervening variable, and the behaviour of Brazilian foreign policy as a dependent variable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Neoclassical Realism
Political Geography:: China, Brazil, and South America

99. Between State Capitalism and Economic State Craft: China INC.

Author:: Sadia Rahman
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: China’s economy underwent regulatory, structural as well as spatial makeovers since the increase of opening up and reforms in 1978. Intermittent policy interventions have been implemented by the Chinese state to ensure that the economy plays a vital role. Relatedly, the Communist leadership’s economic perspective was shaped by two key attributes: ideology and functionality (pp. 8, 11, 42, 119, 148, 313, 314). From an ideological perspective, the legacy of reforms was as crucial as the equitable principle of Communist rule in China, as both ensured the party’s survival and its control over the state. From a functional perspective, the state’s performance remained an essential indicator for China to achieve economic growth and improve the living conditions of its people. In his book, Between State Capitalism and Economic State Craft: China INC, China expert Aravind Yelery captures the systemic reflections of these transitions, mapping how the state fused growth and encouraged further opening to help China manifest its rise. The book delves into China’s growth models examining how these contradictions are ‘chosen ones’ and how China aims to rally its economic statecraft globally. The central crux is the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) authority retention over the economy by preventing the state from giving up control over important sectors and industries. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) played a vital part in achieving this goal in China’s economy, allowing the CPC to control governance. Thus, the chapters are significantly interconnected enlightening on the ascendancy of capitalist approaches in the CPC, exploring how China managed to defy the decline experienced by previous communist regimes. The explanation of SOEs is presented as a key factor in establishing effective domestic economic controls, ultimately enabling China to exert its dominance in global economic affairs.
Topic:: Economics, Regulation, and State Capitalism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

100. Contemporary China in Anglo-American and Chinese Perspectives: Making Sense of a Rising China

Author:: Batuhan Ay
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: In the book Contemporary China in Anglo-American and Chinese Perspectives: Making Sense of a Rising China, Emre Demir aims to analyze China’s rise by displaying the differences and similarities in scholarly discourse in Western and Chinese scholarship. The book examines a collection of 14 approaches from scholars of mainstream United States (U.S.), critical Western, mainstream Chinese, and critical Chinese approaches and seeks to reveal their relevant power-knowledge nexuses and region-centric characteristics in knowledge production, with a particular focus on the current power structure in knowledge production in Chinese and U.S. societies. Demir indicates that every approach occupies a position within the three-layered structure of knowledge production: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Currently, the U.S. assumes the core (hegemonic) position within social sciences knowledge production, which enables it to dominate the means of knowledge production and direct the ways in which knowledge is produced. Therefore, the U.S. can globally reproduce its own theories, which it benefits from, under the guise of universal validity. Moreover, Demir advocates the diversification of intellectual knowledge in the social sciences, a human-centric approach instead of a region-centric one, a focus on the colonial histories of societies, and the decolonization of International Relations (IR).
Topic:: International Relations, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Knowledge Production
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and England

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS