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2. China: Briefing sheet
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, Outlook, and Briefing sheet
- Political Geography:
- China
3. China: Economic structure
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, Economic structure, Charts and tables, and Monthly trends charts
- Political Geography:
- China
4. China: Political structure
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, and Political structure
- Political Geography:
- China
5. China: Country fact sheet
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Summary, Economy, Background, and Fact sheet
- Political Geography:
- China
6. China: Country forecast summary
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Summary, Economy, 5-year summary, and Key indicators
- Political Geography:
- China
7. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy
- Author:
- Jihwan Hwang
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
8. U.S. Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative
- Author:
- Hyun-wook Kim
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Hyun-wook Kim, Professor at Korean National Diplomatic Academy, assesses that North Korea is advocating a new Cold War discourse to strengthen its strategic solidarity with China. However, the intensified Cold War dynamic would lead the United States to prioritize its strategic competition with China, and the Biden administration should turn to a more passive approach toward North Korea. In this context, Dr. Kim anticipates that Washington would not offer incentives to Pyongyang for engaging in dialogue, which would lead Pyongyang to continue its military provocations to influence the direction of Washington’s policy course and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Given the volatility of the situation, Dr. Kim emphasizes the importance of reaffirming the ROK-US military alliance to counter the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
- Topic:
- Cold War, International Cooperation, Deterrence, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
9. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023
- Author:
- Kyung-joo Jeon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
10. China’s Stance on North Korea’s “New Cold War” Narrative
- Author:
- Dong Ryul Lee
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- East Asia Institute (EAI)
- Abstract:
- Dong Ryul Lee, Chair of the China Research Center at EAI (Professor at Dongduk Women’s University), highlights that although China and North Korea might seem to have a close relationship, Beijing maintains a reserved stance regarding the North’s perspective on its strategic value amid the US-China competition. Professor Lee explains that Xi Jinping prioritizes political stability by boosting the economy and tries to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the US. Accordingly, China seeks to manage the risk spurred on by Pyongyang’s military provocations, given that they legitimize stronger US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Cold War, Xi Jinping, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
11. East Vs. West: A New Cold War?
- Author:
- Richard Sakwa
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- Cold War has returned to dominate international politics. Expectations that the end of the Cold War in 1989 would lead to a more inclusive and comprehensive peace seems to be practically failed, and instead, by 2014, the centenary of the start of the First World War, Europe was once again wracked by conflict. On the one side, the U.S.-led Political West shaped by the Cold War remained the main protagonist. In contrast, on the other hand, a much-weakened Russia took the place of the former Soviet Union, now accompanied by a China intent on restoring its status as a great power. The article examines why a new cold war emerges again, and analyses how such a ‘Cold War II’ differs from the original.
- Topic:
- Cold War, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
12. The Role of Democracy Discourse in the Emerging "New Cold War"
- Author:
- Emre Demir and Sirma Altun
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Institution:
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
- Abstract:
- In the first three decades after China initiated reform and opening-up policies in 1978, its relations with the United States (U.S.) improved steadily. However, in the post-2007/2008 global financial crisis period, both countries’ attitudes toward each other began to change. Particularly since the Trump administration, as the U.S. started to define China as its main competitor, their bilateral relations deteriorated further. As a result, scholars, diplomats, and politicians worldwide began to talk about the emergence of a new Cold War between China and the U.S., encompassing economic, ideological, military, and political aspects. The ideological aspect of this emerging “new Cold War” revolves around the discourse of democracy.
- Topic:
- Cold War, Hegemony, Democracy, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
13. Global business environment improves
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam
14. Global business environment improves
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam
15. China: Political and institutional effectiveness
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Background, Forecast, and Political and institutional effectiveness
- Political Geography:
- China
16. China: Political forces at a glance
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, Background, and Political forces at a glance
- Political Geography:
- China
17. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Turkey, Canada, India, Israel, France, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Italy, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Angola, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, and Russian Federation
18. China's Political-Economy, Foreign and Security Policy: 2023
- Author:
- Center for China Analysis
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- It has now been three months since the 20th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15. While the Congress set Xi Jinping’s ideological, strategic, and economic direction for the next five years, much has happened since then that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate. Principal among these surprises was the spontaneous eruption in late November of public protests across multiple Chinese cities against the economic and social impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. These protests resulted in an unprecedented U-turn on December 8 from China’s relentless pursuit of its three-year-long national pandemic containment strategy to the Party now seeking desperately to restore economic growth and social calm. This shift has in turn generated major public pressures on the Chinese health system as hospitals struggle to cope with surging caseloads and mortalities. All of these developments stand in stark contrast to the political, ideological, and nationalist self-confidence on display at the 20th Party Congress. In October, Xi Jinping swept the board by removing any would-be opponents from the Politburo and replacing them with long-standing personal loyalists. Xi also proclaimed China’s total victory over COVID-19, contrasting the Party’s success with the disarray its propaganda apparatus had depicted across the United States and the collective West. Despite faltering economic growth, Xi had doubled down in his embrace of a new, more Marxist approach to economic policy which prioritized planning over the market, national self-sufficiency over global economic integration, the centrality of the public sector over private enterprise, and a new approach to wealth distribution under the rubric of the Common Prosperity doctrine. At the same time, Xi’s 2022 Work Report, delivered at the Congress, abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing foreign policy framework that “peace and development are the principal themes of the time” and instead warned of growing strategic threats and the need for the military to be prepared for war. As part of a continuing series on China’s evolving political economy and foreign policy, this paper’s purpose is threefold: to examine the political and economic implications of this dramatic change in China’s COVID-19 strategy; to analyze what, if any, impact it may have on China’s current international posture; and to assess whether this represents a significant departure from the Party’s strategic direction set at the 20th Party Congress last October. The paper concludes that the Party changed course on COVID-19 for two reasons: (1) it feared that not doing so would threaten its unofficial social contract with the Chinese people based on long-term improvements in jobs and living standards; and (2) that a structural slowdown in growth could also undermine China’s long-term strategic competition against the United States. This paper also concludes that the stark nature of the December 8 policy backflip, together with the Chinese health system’s lack of preparedness for it, has dented Xi Jinping’s political armor for the medium term. This setback comes on top of internal criticism of Xi’s broader ideological assault on the Deng-Jiang-Hu historical economic growth formula that Xi has prosecuted since 2017, as well as Xi’s departure from Deng’s less confrontational foreign policy posture that characterized previous decades. Nonetheless, these policy errors remain manageable within Chinese elite politics, where Xi still controls the hard levers of power. Furthermore, many of these changes on both the economy and external policy are more likely to be short-to-medium term and therefore tactical in nature, rather than representing a strategic departure from the deep ideological direction laid out for the long-term in Xi’s October 2022 Work Report. While these changes to current economic and foreign policy settings are significant in their own right, there is no evidence to date that Xi Jinping’s ideological fundamentals have changed.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
19. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies
- Author:
- Andrew Chubb
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
20. General Equilibrium Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts of China’s Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System
- Author:
- Xianling Long, Da Zhang, Lawrence Goulder, and Chenfei Qu
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- China introduced the world's largest emissions trading system in 2021 which is intended to help cost-effectively achieve its pledges of reaching a peak in CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060. The system is a tradable performance standard (TPS) with a bottom-up intensity-based emissions cap, unlike a top-down absolute cap approach commonly used globally. General Equilibrium Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts of China’s Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System developed and applied a multi-sector, multi-period general equilibrium model to assess the emissions, energy mix, and economic impacts of a series of options for the future development of this policy. These included cap-setting, benchmark design, auction design, and sectoral expansion, with valuable insights provided on the potential future evolution of this policy.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
21. The Transition From an Intensity to an Absolute Emissions Cap in China’s National Emissions Trading System
- Author:
- Duan Maosheng
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The unique characteristics of China's economic development and electricity marketization have resulted in the implementation of a bottom-up intensity-based emissions cap in China’s national emissions trading system (ETS) in its early stages. However, the efficacy of the bottom-up cap-setting approach remains controversial, particularly with regard to achieving emission reduction goals and cost-effectiveness. In response to China's "dual carbon" targets and updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), China’s national ETS shall gradually shift towards a real cap-and-trade system, with a transition period when a hybrid system, which has an absolute control cap beside the intensity cap, is implemented. The Transition from an Intensity to an Absolute Emissions Cap in China’s National Emissions Trading System examines the cap-setting approaches used in ETSs in China, the underlying reasons for choosing intensity caps in China, and major issues related to the transition from an intensity cap to an absolute cap in China’s national ETS.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
22. Economic and Environmental Impacts of China’s New Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System
- Author:
- Lawrence Goulder, Xianling Long, Chenfei Qu, and Da Zhang
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- China’s National Emissions Trading System (ETS) has already become the world’s largest ETS and is expected to contribute substantially toward meeting China’s pledge to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. The new system is based on a tradable performance standard (TPS), a rate-based system under which each covered facility receives from the government in each compliance period a certain number of emissions allowances based on its output and the government’s assigned “benchmark” ratio of emissions per unit of output. Economic and Environmental Impacts of China’s New Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System describes the results from a multi-sector multi-period general equilibrium model designed to assess the potential economic, energy mix, and emissions impacts of different future policy options under China’s National ETS over the period 2020–2035, by sector and province and in the aggregate
- Topic:
- Environment, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
23. De-risking authoritarian AI: A balanced approach to protecting our digital ecosystems
- Author:
- Simeon Gilding
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Artificial intelligence (AI)–enabled systems make many invisible decisions affecting our health, safety and wealth. They shape what we see, think, feel and choose, they calculate our access to financial benefits as well as our transgressions, and now they can generate complex text, images and code just as a human can, but much faster. So it’s unsurprising that moves are afoot across democracies to regulate AI’s impact on our individual rights and economic security, notably in the European Union (EU). But, if we’re wary about AI, we should be even more circumspect about AI-enabled products and services from authoritarian countries that share neither our values nor our interests. And, for the foreseeable future, that means the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a revisionist authoritarian power demonstrably hostile to democracy and the rules-based international order, which routinely uses AI to strengthen its own political and social stability at the expense of individual human rights. In contrast to other authoritarian countries such as Russia, Iran and North Korea, China is a technology superpower with global capacity and ambitions and is a major exporter of effective, cost-competitive AI-enabled technology into democracies.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia-Pacific
24. Countering China’s coercive diplomacy: Prioritising economic security, sovereignty and the rules-based order
- Author:
- Fergus Hunter, Daria Impiombato, Yvonne Lau, Adam Triggs, Albert Zhang, and Urmika Deb
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly using a range of economic and non-economic tools to punish, influence and deter foreign governments in its foreign relations. Coercive actions have become a key part of the PRC’s toolkit as it takes a more assertive position in international disputes and seeks to reshape the global order in its favour. This research finds that the PRC’s use of coercive tactics is now sitting at levels well above those seen a decade ago, or even five years ago. The year 2020 marked a peak, and the use of trade restrictions and state-issued threats have become favoured methods. The tactics have been used in disputes over governments’ decisions on human rights, national security and diplomatic relations.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Economic Security, and Coercion
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
25. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment
- Author:
- Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Pacific
26. China, climate change and the energy transition
- Author:
- Professor Xu Yi-Chong
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- This report surveys China’s enormous energy transition to renewables. It begins by sketching the energy challenges China faces and its climate-change-related energy policies, in the context of the global geopolitics of the energy transformation. Next the report focuses on conventional energy sources (oil and natural gas), followed by electricity, and energy technologies. Although the report is intended primarily to survey developments to date, it concludes with some brief observations about the considerable energy challenges China faces in the years ahead.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, and Energy Transition
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
27. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Anastasia Kapetas
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
28. Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations
- Author:
- Albert Zhang, Tilla Hoja, and Jasmine Latimore
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) embrace of large-scale online influence operations and spreading of disinformation on Western social-media platforms has escalated since the first major attribution from Silicon Valley companies in 2019. While Chinese public diplomacy may have shifted to a softer tone in 2023 after many years of wolf-warrior online rhetoric, the Chinese Government continues to conduct global covert cyber-enabled influence operations. Those operations are now more frequent, increasingly sophisticated and increasingly effective in supporting the CCP’s strategic goals. They focus on disrupting the domestic, foreign, security and defence policies of foreign countries, and most of all they target democracies. Currently—in targeted democracies—most political leaders, policymakers, businesses, civil society groups and publics have little understanding of how the CCP currently engages in clandestine activities online in their countries, even though this activity is escalating and evolving quickly. The stakes are high for democracies, given the indispensability of the internet and their reliance on open online spaces, free from interference. Despite years of monitoring covert CCP cyber-enabled influence operations by social-media platforms, governments, and research institutes such as ASPI, definitive public attribution of the actors driving these activities is rare. Covert online operations, by design, are difficult to detect and attribute to state actors. Social-media platforms and governments struggle to devote adequate resources to identifying, preventing and deterring increasing levels of malicious activity, and sometimes they don’t want to name and shame the Chinese Government for political, economic and/or commercial reasons.
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Social Media, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
29. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink
- Author:
- Thomas Eder
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
30. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans
31. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine
32. Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China
- Author:
- Zichong Chen and Daniel Jacob
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions released its first publication in May 2023: a research brief titled “Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China.” The Initiative is one of five interdisciplinary research clusters funded by the Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability at Harvard University. The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements collaborates in the implementation of the Initiative. The brief summarizes research by Professor Daniel Jacob and postdoctoral fellow Zichong Chen, atmospheric scientists at Harvard University, with their colleagues. Jacob and Chen use high-resolution data from the TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI), onboard a satellite launched in 2017, to estimate national and sectoral methane emissions more accurately than has been possible in the past. They draw upon atmospheric transport models to invert the satellite observations of methane concentrations, using advanced statistical methods, and infer emissions quantities and locations from the observed atmospheric concentrations. This method has yielded generally higher estimates of emissions than in previous reports, including in the case of China. Future methane-initiative briefs will address similar research the authors and their colleagues are conducting in the United States, Latin America, North Africa, and other countries and regions. An accurate picture of aggregate and sector-level methane emissions is important to better target mitigation policies. It is hoped that the results of the research described here and in subsequent briefs will advance national efforts and international collaboration aimed at reducing methane emissions. The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions seeks meaningful and sustained progress in global methane-emissions reductions through research and effective engagement with policymakers in government and key stakeholders in business, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions. Reduced methane emissions can significantly reduce, in the near term, the magnitude of climate change and its associated impacts. The Initiative’s objectives span the full range of disciplines and topics associated with this challenge. Among its objectives are to build on scientific research on measurement and attribution of emissions; understand legal, regulatory, and political opportunities and constraints to methane-emissions reductions in the United States; design policies that might best contribute to methane emissions reduction; work effectively through existing international venues, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and define roles that business and international and multilateral organizations can play in this effort.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Methane, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
33. Outsiders Wanting In: Asian States and Arctic Governance
- Author:
- Calvin Heng and Eyck Freymann
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- The strategic interests of Asian countries in the Arctic continue to grow despite the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have their eye on Russia’s Arctic energy resources, and China is further seeking to leverage Russian weakness to expand its operational presence in the Arctic Ocean. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are less prominent in Arctic regional institutions, yet they have distinctive interests in Arctic science, governance, and resources and are resuming dialogue about Arctic matters amongst themselves. This policy brief reviews the key differences in how Asian states are approaching the Arctic through a survey of their strategic documents, public statements, and diplomatic and commercial activities.
- Topic:
- Governance, Multilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Asia, South Korea, Singapore, and Arctic
34. Global business environment improves
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam
35. Global business environment improves
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Ukraine, Canada, India, Israel, Finland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Greece, South Korea, Kuwait, France, Poland, Lithuania, Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Germany, Estonia, Algeria, Cuba, Belgium, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Spain, Australia, Italy, Dominican Republic, Croatia, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile, Austria, Angola, Peru, New Zealand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovakia, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Russian Federation, Taiwan, Province of China, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, and Viet Nam
36. China: Political and institutional effectiveness
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Background, Forecast, and Political and institutional effectiveness
- Political Geography:
- China
37. China: Political forces at a glance
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Politics, Summary, Background, and Political forces at a glance
- Political Geography:
- China
38. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Country Data and Maps
- Institution:
- Economist Intelligence Unit
- Abstract:
- No abstract is available.
- Topic:
- Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Turkey, Canada, India, Israel, France, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Italy, Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Angola, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, UK, Iran, Islamic Republic of, and Russian Federation
39. China's response to the US tech war: The closing of detours
- Author:
- Yang Jiang
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- In the US-China rivalry, no battle is currently more fierce than the one over technology, with both countries ramping up efforts to pursue global technological leadership. The tech war has intensified under President Joe Biden, with the US’s strangling of China’s technological bottleneck getting tighter and tighter. The US’s stated aims are protecting its national security and foreign policy interests and preventing sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by China. Some analysts point to Beijing’s Made in China 2025 as the trigger of the tech war because that is China’s plan to upgrade manufacturing and seek the top positions in global value chains. The US is pursuing a strategy to outcompete and outmanoeuvre China, as is stated in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy in October 2022: “this decade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our [the US’s] competition with the PRC”. Especially in the sector of semiconductors or chips, where the West controls China’s access to the most advanced technology, US restrictions and its ability to bring its allies into line have been destructive to China’s development. On 21 May 2023, Beijing’s ban of American chipmaker Micron from critical information infrastructure in China signals a first direct retaliation from Beijing. China has also realised that some of its hitherto measures—turning to alternative sources of import, utilising policy loopholes, and sufficing with lower-level technology—are just detours. They are not long-term solutions; nor can they be the foundation of China’s national security. The US restrictions have forced China to adopt new measures to accelerate domestic innovation with more focus on basic research and market forces. How the tech war will play out has important implications for Western countries and global supply chains. This policy brief will focus on China’s responses to the US-waged tech war, specifically: What have been China’s domestic measures to respond to the tech restrictions from the US, and what is China’s potential for technological breakthrough? What have been China’s international responses, and what are China’s options for retaliation?
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
40. Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China
- Author:
- Rob York, David Camroux, Kelly Grieco, and Bradley Jensen Murg
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order. As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons. That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge. Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe. Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition. Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.” Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe. No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and North America
41. The World After Taiwan’s Fall
- Author:
- David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
- Topic:
- Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America
42. Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications
- Author:
- David Dorman and John Hemmings
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy. In the first installment of a three-part research project, Dr. Dorman and Dr. Hemmings lay out the rise of China’s overall digital grand strategy, Xi’s role in it, and how it has been organized to fulfil Party objectives. The report tracks the rise of the strategy over the past 10 years, the acceleration of that rise during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the current state of the strategy. In particular, it finds Digital China has been supported and designed by General Secretary Xi Jinping himself, and is a bid to make China more competitive vis a vis the West through the digital transformation of rules, institutions, and infrastructure at the national level. Over the past few years, the strategy has risen to become the “overall” strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, bigger than the Digital Silk Road, deeper than the Belt and Road Initiative, more far reaching than 5G or AI, more important than Made in China: 2025, and wider than Cyber Great Power. A renewed Digital China seeks to challenge a hegemonic global system anchored to a previous age. A successful Digital China has profound implications for China’s developmental path, great power competition, and for the norms that will undergird the international system for decades to come. The Party leadership has re-written Marxist economic theory in its bid to incorporate “data” as the basis of its digital economy and in order to foster a Chinese “Digital Marxism”. Digital China seeks to whet the “sharp weapon” of innovation to facilitate its great power rise and challenge to the West. Beijing is testing whether innovative thinking can be created through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning. The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
43. Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Carl W Baker
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Strategic Interests, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
44. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines
- Author:
- William Piekos
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America
45. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing
- Author:
- Yu Bin
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
46. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy
- Author:
- Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and South Korea
47. Confrontation Muted, Tensions Growing
- Author:
- David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- As 2023 began, cross-Strait confrontation was muted. Travel began returning to pre-COVID levels across the Strait and between the mainland and Taiwan’s offshore islands. At China’s annual National People’s Congress, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang and reanointed President Xi Jinping eschewed inflammatory rhetoric about reunification with Taiwan. Taiwan and the US kept Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the US low-key. Tsai met House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, deflecting the speaker’s expressed interest in visiting Taiwan and avoiding the destabilizing Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that followed Speaker Pelosi’s visit last August. Despite this calm, seeds of confrontation proliferated. China cut a communications cable to Taiwan’s offshore islands and announced a coast guard drill to inspect commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, both interpreted as practice for gray-zone coercion. China persuaded Honduras to sever its longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan increased its military budget and expanded training with US forces. Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou visited China and met Chinese officials, endorsing the 1992 Consensus and signaling that the upcoming election campaign for Taiwan’s president will again offer two very different visions of Taiwan’s future relationship with mainland China.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Coercion, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
48. China Strengthens Regional Leadership Countering US Challenges
- Author:
- Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Southeast Asia featured prominently in Beijing’s increasingly strong international efforts to portray China as a source of strategic stability and economic growth with comprehensive global governance plans supportive of interests of developing countries and opposing the United States. These efforts intensified after the landmark 20th Party Congress in October and the 14th National People’s Congress in March. They were reinforced as Xi Jinping emerged from COVID restrictions and preoccupation with domestic matters to engage actively in summitry with leaders of Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. China’s economic importance for regional countries grew as did its dominance over the contested South China Sea. Its show of force against Taiwan in April had little discernible impact on China-Southeast Asia relations, while notable US advances in military cooperation with the Philippines warranted Chinese warnings that escalated during the reporting period.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Leadership, Economic Growth, Strategic Stability, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Southeast Asia
49. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident
- Author:
- Sourabh Gupta
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
50. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?
- Author:
- Yu Bin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific