Political Geography: Asia - CIAO Search Results

1. Les étudiants chinois en Europe et l’Etat-parti

Author:: Jérôme Doyon
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:: Chinese Students in Europe and the Party-State -- Why do some Chinese students who choose to study abroad get involved in pro-regime organisations? How does this reflect the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to foster relationships of dependence and allegiance with its overseas nationals? Fieldwork conducted within branches of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in France and the United Kingdom sheds light on the drivers of this form of long-distance authoritarian commitment. An analysis of how the association operates in two different European countries reveals how it adapts to the local environment while functioning as an enclave, isolated from host societies. The organisation’s primary objective is to maintain the Chinese partystate’s hold over its nationals outside national borders rather than influence or develop ties with foreign societies. However, students do not passively allow themselves to be co-opted, and the many pressures they experience can hinder efforts to mobilise them in support of the regime.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Political Science, and Students
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and France

2. Ilham Tohti: Jailed for Fighting for Dialogue, Ethnic Harmony and Rule of Law

Author:: Jewher Tohti, Marie Holzman, Dilnur Reyhan, Teng Biao, Enver Can, and Magdalena Slezáková
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Vaclav Havel Library
Abstract:: Six of the 13 laureates of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize to date are currently in prison, including Professor Ilham Tohti. He is a well-known Uyghur intellectual from China and the laureate of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize for 2019. For over 20 years, he has been engaged in promoting dialogue and mutual understanding between Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities. As a result, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in a two-day show trial in 2014. His family has not heard from him since 2017, when he was denied contact with both them and his lawyers. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Ilham Tohti’s arrest, the Václav Havel Library organized a commemorative and advocacy event with the participation of his daughter Jewher, who lives in exile and has been actively involved in efforts to secure her father’s release. The somber 12th anniversary of his unjust imprisonment was marked at the Václav Havel Library by French sinologist, journalist, and writer Marie Holzman; senior researcher at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences and president of the European Uyghur Institute Dilnur Reyhan; Chinese lawyer and political activist Teng Biao—who, as a member of the Weiquan Lawyers (Rights Defence Network) in China, was a finalist for the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize in 2013—and Ilham Tohti’s tireless defender and president of the Ilham Tohti Initiative, Enver Can. The discussion was moderated by Magdalena Slezáková, foreign desk editor at Deník N.
Topic:: Human Rights, Repression, Advocacy, Uyghurs, Ilham Tohti, Dialogue, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:: China and Asia

3. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Author:: Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:: Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

6. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:: Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

7. Shipment of a Controlled Vacuum Furnace to North Korea via Multiple States: An HS Code Case Study

Author:: David Albright
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: In tracking trade data and trade flows, Harmonized System (HS) codes are routinely used to aid searches for dual-use commodities and to help guide the identification of dual-use items that require a license or greater scrutiny. A recurring concern is shipper falsification of HS codes to evade detection or payment of duties. An illustration of such falsifications is a case we learned about via government sources from around 2022 that involved North Korea and a dual-use vacuum furnace suitable for uranium melting that wound its way from Spain to North Korea, via Mexico, South Africa, and China. Such a furnace is typically controlled under the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Part 2 list and is banned for export to North Korea under United Security Council resolutions. This type of furnace is a mainstay of a nuclear weapons program, particularly one that uses weapon-grade uranium as the nuclear explosive material, as North Korea is known to do. With North Korea expanding its uranium enrichment program and producing greater quantities of weapon-grade uranium, this new furnace would be especially important.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Trade, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

8. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

9. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China

Author:: Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
Topic:: Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:: Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

11. Collateral Effects of the Tariff War on ASEAN Food Security

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Kayven Tan
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and China are locked in a cycle of escalating tariffs, with likely knock-on impacts on global food supplies and prices. In response to increases in tariff rates imposed by the US on China’s exports, China hit back with additional tariffs on US$21 billion worth of US agricultural products in March 2025. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs will mean an additional 10 per cent tariff on soybeans, sorghum, beef, pork, aquatic and dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, and an additional 15 per cent tariff on wheat, corn, maize, and chicken from the US. Given the tense words exchanged by leaders and officials on both sides in recent days, neither side appears ready to back down from these trade measures. The food security concern for ASEAN states is whether the trade war will impact the supply and prices of food in a region where 37 per cent, or 251 million people, cannot afford a healthy diet. Many Asian states rely heavily on imports for their food. Wheat is used in household staples such as noodles and bread, while corn and soybeans are used for food and livestock feed.
Topic:: Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

12. Protecting Food Security in the Face of Tariffs and Trade Wars

Author:: Paul Teng
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The uncertainty caused by tariffs and trade disputes affects food security. Increases in geopolitical tensions will undermine the best plans to maintain global supply chains, encouraging countries to develop alternative ones. Consumers in Southeast Asia, even though far from the geographic areas of dispute, will ultimately suffer from interruptions in food availability and price hikes. National strategies to ensure food security are needed.
Topic:: Food Security, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

13. Biosecurity Awareness and Education in Southeast Asia

Author:: Julius Caesar Trajano and Jeselyn
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN leaders recognise the critical importance of biosecurity. But there is a need to enhance the security culture and biosecurity awareness among life science, medical, and biotechnology professionals to mitigate the misuse of biological materials.
Topic:: Security, Education, Biosecurity, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

14. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

15. Overcoming silos for One Health: key determinants of One Health governance platforms in low- and lower middle-income countries

Author:: Christoph Strupat
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This study addresses a critical gap in One Health governance literature by providing a comprehensive review of cross-sectoral One Health governance platforms in low- and lower-middle-income countries across Asia and Africa. These platforms are pivotal for building resilience and improving governance at the human–animal–environment interface. Using a scoping review methodology, the study identifies 34 One Health platforms established across 52% of these countries, with a primary focus on zoonotic diseases and a growing emphasis on antimicrobial resistance and food safety. A polycentric governance lens was applied to analyse the interplay of authority, resources and information in shaping platform functionality. Key findings highlight that authority imbalances and single-sector dominance undermine stakeholder engagement, insufficient financial and human resources hinder operational capacity. Furthermore, weak data-sharing protocols limit timely coordination and evidence-based decision-making. The review identifies critical entry points for enhancing platform efficacy: clarifying governance frameworks, investing in cross-sectoral human capacity-building and strengthening data-sharing infrastructures with robust protocols and interoperable platforms.
Topic:: Development, Governance, and Public Health
Political Geography:: Africa and Asia

16. Report: Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire

Author:: Rian Thum
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: The Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a report in January 2025, “Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire: How China’s Policies in the Uyghur Region Have and Have Not Changed.” The report is authored by Rian Thum, Senior Lecturer in East Asian History, at the University of Manchester. The report seeks to improve our collective understanding of China’s ongoing repressive policies in the predominantly Uyghur province of Xinjiang in western China. The Simon-Skjodt Center released a report in 2021 detailing multiple crimes against humanity that the Chinese government had committed against the Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority group, and expressing grave concern that the Chinese government may be committing genocide. Since then, detailed reporting on state policies has decreased as Chinese authorities increasingly restricted access to information. Using recent evidence from Chinese state documents, satellite imagery, and survivor testimony, as well as a synthesis of recent academic publications, the report aims to fill a knowledge gap about the current state of mass atrocities targeting the Uyghur community and other Turkic minorities in the Uyghur region. The report finds that, given the available information, all of the policies that led to accusations of mass atrocities in the Uyghur region continue, and some are expanding. These findings should prompt deeper research into the nature of mass atrocities facing the Uyghur population and spark urgent, effective responses. In particular, the report recommends further research into emerging repressive strategies, including the intense network of electronic and human surveillance, curbs on religious practice, and the destruction of cultural heritage.
Topic:: Human Rights, Minorities, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

17. Korea’s Strategy for Critical Minerals: Navigating New Trade Rules and Global Challenges

Author:: Cheon-Kee Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Since the establishment of the GATT in 1947 and the WTO multilateral trading system in 1995, trade liberalization has led to an increase in global trade and the internationalization of production through global supply chains. In recent years, however, as non-trade values including national security, labor rights, and environmental protection have become important considerations, supply chains have become an end in themselves rather than a means of pursuing efficiency. Additionally, major trading partners such as the U.S, the EU, and China have sought to regulate global supply chain by leveraging market access to their domestic markets or critical minerals. The proliferation of such unilateral measures has posed significant challenges, as traditional WTO/FTA trade rules have failed to effectively address these new regulatory dynamics. The increasing compliance costs for companies, stemming from emerging supply chain regulations, are exacerbated by the legal constraints and loopholes in existing international trade frameworks, despite previously promised market access in multilateral and bilateral agreements. Against this backdrop, this Brief reviews the current state of disciplines in bilateral and multilateral trade rules and disciplines, with a particular focus on unilateral supply chain regulations. It will explore the critical minerals sector in light of recent sector-specific agreements and arrangements, including the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement, the U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement or “CMA”, and the EU's Strategic Partnership. While many supply chain issues are emerging in relation to various non-trade values, the critical minerals sector has been the first to see the emergence of more flexible and pragmatic sector-specific agreements and MoUs that depart from the traditional FTA model. This is likely due to the fact that the security of mineral resources is crucial to the competitiveness of domestic industries in many countries. Moreover, the recent trend of resource-owning countries requiring foreign and foreign-owned mining companies to uphold environmental and labor rights during the mineral extraction process has led to the emergence of new ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) obligations. The ability to address these elements in a stand-alone agreements or MoUs specific to critical minerals—rather than within the framework of a traditional FTA—marks a key strength of this approach. The evolution of these agreements, especially in the critical minerals sector, is of particular relevance to Korea. As the country faces increasing reliance on the global supply of critical minerals and is deeply impacted by evolving international regulations, it is crucial for Korea to explore its own strategy for securing access to these resources. This Brief will focus on the development of Korea's critical mineral strategy, while drawing the lessons from international agreements.
Topic:: Economics, World Trade Organization, Multilateralism, Trade, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

18. Korea’s Trade Policy Priorities with Latin America: Future Directions

Author:: Sungwoo Hong
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Despite Latin America’s potential as a trading partner, Korea’s exports to Latin America have continuously decreased over the past 10 years, while imports from Latin America have been increasing. The fact that Korea’s exports to these countries have decreased since the conclusion of FTAs with Chile, Peru, and Colombia suggests that it is time to identify the cause of Korea’s decline in exports to Latin America and seek opportunities to expand exports. One reason for the decline in Korea’s exports to Latin America is the decline in Korean companies' investment in Latin America. The correlation coefficient between Korea’s investment in Latin America and exports is quite high, indicating that the decline in investment since the mid-2010s has had a direct impact on the decline in exports to Latin America. As a short-term trade policy goal to consider, I propose establishing and activating a channel for cooperation between Korea and Latin America. It is possible to establish new dialogue channels and revive existing ones, centered on countries where consultative bodies such as the Resources Cooperation Committee, Senior Policy Council, and Joint Economic Committee have already been established, making this a more cost-effective approach compared to other initiatives As a task to be pursued from a long-term perspective, I propose preparing for the possibility of economic integration between the United States and Central America. Assuming that the conflict between the United States and China will continue in the future, expanding economic integration between the United States and Central America can be positive for Korea in that it can alleviate some of the uncertainty Mexico currently has as a bridgehead targeting the US export market. However, expanding economic integration between the United States and Central America is not only difficult for Korea to directly intervene in, but also requires economic and diplomatic efforts in parallel, meaning it may be difficult to achieve in the short or medium term, and thus needs to be pursued as a long-term task. Central American countries, excluding Nicaragua, may be countries that currently have a demand for increasing the level of economic integration with the United States, and the United States may also consider expanding economic integration with them.
Topic:: Investment, Exports, Trade Policy, and Economic Integration
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and Latin America

19. State Enterprises as Enablers of Economic Cooperation in India

Author:: Kyunghoon Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This Brief discusses the role of state enterprises in India's economy, emphasizing their pivotal contribution to the government's development strategy. It also highlights cases where Indian state enterprises have formed cooperative relationships with global companies, as well as foreign and international development agencies. The Brief concludes with implications for the Korean government and businesses.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Economic Cooperation, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

20. Intermediary models to advance locally led humanitarian action

Author:: Alejandro Posada, Alice Obrecht, Courtenay Cabot Venton, Sarah Selby, and Edith Macharia
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: This paper summarises the most promising models for intermediary structures that support locally led action in humanitarian settings. This includes locally led intermediary structures (both LNAs acting as intermediaries and locally owned/ managed pooled funds) and reformed international intermediary structures that are most conducive to locally led action. The examples provided in this paper were identified through three short country case studies undertaken by ALNAP (focused on Sudan, the Philippines and Myanmar) and existing research on local and international intermediaries by the Share Trust. This paper aims to focus on examples that are not well known or have been underrepresented in existing studies, and are therefore illustrative rather than exhaustive. A separate annex provides a more detailed account of local intermediary examples identified in this study, including their models, challenges, scope and the opportunities they present. Further useful examples could be identified in a more thorough review.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Reform, and Localization
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, Asia, Philippines, and Myanmar

21. The Political Process Involved in Formulating Healthcare Policy in Japan: With a Particular Focus on Advisory Councils, Interest Groups and Medical Officers

Author:: Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Japan’s healthcare policy is defined by a universal health insurance system that guarantees affordable healthcare for all citizens at any time and in any location. The system was established in 1961 and has since undergone a process of evolution through the implementation of national healthcare policies. Despite the existence of conflicts and issues, the mechanism of the Central Social Insurance Medical Council (“Chuikyo”) has continued to advance national healthcare interests. Nevertheless, this resulted in the commencement of criminal proceedings in 2004. The current demographic shifts present a challenge to the long-term sustainability of the national health insurance system, the long-term care insurance system, and the public pension system. This is occurring against a backdrop of rising costs associated with healthcare and long-term care, as well as an unsustainable national budget. The Chuikyo system is confronted with a multitude of challenges. This paper analyses the roles of three key actors in the Japanese national healthcare policy-making process. These actors include advisory councils such as Chuikyo, interest groups such as the Japan Medical Agency, and medical officers of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, who play a pivotal role in the policy-making process. The incremental improvements that Chuikyo produces are insufficient to address the long-term challenges facing the national healthcare policy. Japan’s healthcare model requires reconstruction to align it with the needs of an ageing society with a declining birthrate. Prior to embarking on this important policy work, it is essential to determine who should lead it. It is recommended that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office spearhead a study on radical reform, with strong political leadership and a capable technocrat team to facilitate collaboration with the National Diet and the public. Furthermore, it would be crucial to achieve a consensus through national forums on the fundamental concepts that citizens, as consumers, desire and are prepared to forego from a bottom-up approach. It is essential that the governance structure of the national healthcare system is changed to a decentralised structure so that citizens can be proactively involved in healthcare issues and make autonomous decisions.
Topic:: Politics, Insurance, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

22. Exhibitionist Japan: The Spectacle of Modern Development

Author:: Angus Lockyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: On April 13, Osaka opened its third and Japan's sixth international exhibition, or expo. This talk draws on a new book to sketch how the latest exhibition emerges from more than a century and a half of exhibitionism, which has included over 1,000 expos in Japan. This history offers a useful, corrective lens on standard accounts of both spectacle and modern Japanese development. Angus Lockyer has taught Japanese, East Asian, and global history in North Carolina and London. "Exhibitionist Japan: The Spectacle of Modern Development" was published by Cambridge University Press earlier this year. "Japan: A History in Objects," based on the collection of the British Museum, will come out in 2026. Lockyer currently lives in Rhode Island and teaches at RISD. Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute.
Topic:: Development, History, and Museums
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

23. Precarious Geographies: Migrant Labor in China’s Network Production

Author:: Na Fu
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: As industrial production decentralizes, rural China has become a new hub for networked manufacturing, blurring the boundaries between factory and home. Migrant workers are returning to their hometowns to set up workshop-style facilities, driven by labor shortages, infrastructure improvements, and digital connectivity. Na Fu's study examines how mobility, once seen as a path to opportunity, now reinforces labor precarity, reshaping spatial and economic relations under China’s evolving network production system. Na Fu holds a Ph.D. in Politics from the New School for Social Research and is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at China Initiative at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. Her research explores the intersections of digital labor, political economy, and smart production, focusing on how technological advancements reinforce social inequities and drive resource extraction in industrial transformations. This event is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute.
Topic:: Economics, Manufacturing, Migrant Workers, and Production
Political Geography:: China and Asia

24. Left to Live and Die: Resource Security and the Biopolitics of Land Stockpiling in China

Author:: Ross Doll
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: February 27, 2025 — Beginning in 2007 the Chinese state used liberalizing policy and funding to encourage the expansion of large-scale grain farming. Despite this support, many of the new farms have financially struggled and folded. Drawing on Foucauldian biopolitics and resource security literature, Ross Doll argues that with modernized agriculture the state primarily sought to create not commercial farms but redundant farming infrastructure, which it needed to buffer its growing reliance on food imports while abiding by the global trade regulations needed to sustain its urban export manufacturing economy. Ross Doll is a lecturer in the UC-Berkeley Blum Center for Developing Economies. He researches agrarian change in Asia drawing on political ecology, cultural geography, and resilience ecology. Based on longterm ethnography, his current research considers the origins and influence of contemporary state-led agricultural modernization in the Yangzi Delta region of China, focusing on food security, landscape, and rural politics. Dr. Doll teaches courses on the geographies of natural resources, global and Asian development, and global poverty. He holds a PhD in Geography and a MA in China Studies from the University of Washington. This event is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:: Agriculture, Manufacturing, Imports, Farming, Biopolitics, Political Ecology, and Resources
Political Geography:: China and Asia

25. From the Country to the City, Life Today in Chengdu

Author:: Ning Yuan
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Ning Yuan is the author of several widely circulated works of fiction, owns a bookstore in Chengdu, has a clothing line made of natural fibers, and has led in the redevelopment of a village in Sichuan that was devastated by the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Ning Yuan will introduce her various activities as described above and relate them to her observations on Chinese society, especially in Chengdu and environs.
Topic:: Development, Rural, and Cities
Political Geography:: China and Asia

26. Public Expectations of Government Responses to Security Contingencies Around Japan

Author:: Satoshi Machidori, Harukata Takenaka, Amy Catalinac, and Kenneth McElwain
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: In this workshop, scholars Satoshi Machidori and Harukata Takenaka speak on Japanese public attitudes toward possible geopolitical contingencies in the light of changing international environment in East Asia. Their new, large-scale survey experiment examines voter assessments of possible government responses to security crises, including a possible Taiwan contingency. The report also analyzes how perceptions of shared ethnicity may affect public reactions to a hypothetical threat from a democratic regime, expanding the research on the relationship between ethnicity and democratic peace. This research is part of a multi-year study project by ROLES (Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies, University of Tokyo). Speakers: Satoshi Machidori, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University, Japan Harukata Takenaka, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies = GRIPS, Japan Discussant: Amy Catalinac, Associate Professor of Politics, NYU Moderator: Kenneth Mori McElwain, Visiting Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University Hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and co-sponsored by China and the World Program and APEC Study Center.
Topic:: Security, Public Opinion, Geopolitics, and Ethnicity
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

27. Ronnie C. Chan: The Past, Present, and Future of U.S.-China Relations

Author:: Ronnie C. Chan and Lien-Hang Nguyen
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: December 2, 2024 — Ronnie C. Chan, Honorary Chair of Hang Lung Properties and Chair Emeritus of the Asia Society, speaks with Lien-Hang Nguyen, Director of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University, about the implications of the 2024 U.S. presidential election for the future of U.S.-China relations and global stability. Columbia University Interim President Katrina Armstrong and University Professor Jeffrey Sachs contribute introductory remarks.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Political stability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. From Trade to Supply Chain Investments: China’s Three Roles in the Solar Surge of the Gulf Region

Author:: Qi Wang
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: This paper examines China’s evolving role in the solar energy surge of the Gulf region, with a focus on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. It identifies three approaches through which China has progressively deepened its participation: (1) large-scale export of solar products, (2) investment and construction of solar power projects, and (3) offshore investment in local solar manufacturing bases in the Gulf. These approaches reflect not only China’s response to ambitious green energy commitments and rising solar demand in the Gulf, but also the strategic efforts of China’s solar industry to address domestic overcapacity under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and mitigate growing trade protectionism. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for China and the Gulf countries to strengthen solar cooperation, tackle trade barriers, and ensure a balanced, transparent, and sustainable energy transition.
Topic:: Investment, Trade, Solar Power, Supply Chains, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

29. The Fight Over Gender Equality in South Korea

Author:: Cecilia Hyunjung Mo and Soosun You
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: As more South Korean men perceive marriage as unattainable, their politics disfavor gender equality and reinforce sexism. These attitudes likely make marriage less appealing to women, which in turn fuels backlash among men.
Topic:: Demographics, Survey, Marriage, Gender, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

30. Forecasting Nuclear Escalation Risks: Cloudy With a Chance of Fallout

Author:: Jamie Kwong, Anna Bartoux, and James M. Acton
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Forecasting—that is, estimating the probability of specified events’ occurring—can contribute to efforts to better understand and address the challenge of managing escalation.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Forecast, Escalation, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

31. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India

Author:: Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
Topic:: International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America

32. Impacts of the Artificial Intelligence on International Relations: Towards a Global Algorithms Governance

Author:: Vicente Garrido Rebolledo
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This article examines the transformative impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on international relations (IR) and global governance. It begins by presenting a conceptual framework that situates AI within the theoretical and practical dimensions of IR, and explores how AI influences global power dynamics, alters state behaviour, and reshapes institutional frameworks. The study highlights the ethical and regulatory challenges of AI governance, focusing first on the efforts of the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU). Later, the article discusses the "AI technology race" between the United States and China and their regulations. Finally, the article highlights the need for ethical and responsible AI development to foster global cooperation and address the challenges and opportunities that this technology presents in contemporary international relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Science and Technology, United Nations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Council of Europe
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. A vision from China on Artificial Intelligence. Implications for Soft Power in Global Cultural Exchange

Author:: Sonia Valle, Yi Wang, and Deng Lian
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This article examines China's vision of AI, its efforts to use it as a tool to promote its soft power, and the implications this has for digital diplomacy and global cultural exchange. As key findings, we highlight that through AI-powered platforms and digital diplomacy, China can adjust global narratives on sensitive issues such as human rights, economic development, and its role in global trade. China's AI expansion on the world stage serves not only as a tool for economic growth, but also as a strategic tool for enhancing its soft power. By offering technological solutions to global challenges and fostering meaningful partnerships, China is enhancing its global image as a responsible, innovative and forwardlooking actor in the international community.
Topic:: Foreign Exchange, Global South, Soft Power, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Diplomacy
Political Geography:: China and Asia

34. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

35. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

36. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Brazil

Author:: Ruby Scanlon and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The second case study focuses on Brazil. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing local policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics, along with U.S. diplomats, development experts, and companies. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Brazil’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:: National Security, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

37. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

38. ASEAN People-Centered Regionalism and Strategy To Build Its People’s Identity Through Social Media Discourse

Author:: Sugito Sugito
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: ASEAN has a great interest in creating a regional identity as a consequence of the people-centered regionalism goal. Although this identity creation is vital, the awareness of ASEAN identity is still relatively weak in ASEAN countries, even among elites and long-standing member countries. As an organization, ASEAN has the power to shape identity and norms for its people. Therefore, this study aims to reveal ASEAN’s strategy in shaping its identity through Facebook. This research argues that social media, which has become an interactive, participatory, and democratic media, should be able to be utilized by ASEAN in building agreement on its identity among its users. Through a qualitative approach by utilizing data processing and analysis software of NVIVO 12 Plus, this study concluded that ASEAN was concerned more with creating shared values than exploring the cultural heritage in its member countries. ASEAN also was serious about displaying prosperity, mutual respect, and unity in diversity values as its identity.
Topic:: Social Media, Regionalism, ASEAN, and Identity
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

39. Kangaroo Concerns About Swiming Dragon Ambitions

Author:: Saira Aquil and Waheed Ur Rehman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: China has accelerated its naval modernization in recent years. There are multiple factors behind this modernization drive. The rise of China in many ways is impacting political, economic, and security dynamics around the world but particularly in Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific). Australia is one of the country in this region which is not an exception in this regard. This study looks for implications of China’s naval modernization on Australia. The study makes an important contribution to the literature because this part of the world has not been looked into while analyzing Chinese naval modernization. Data is collected through primary and secondary sources. Besides reviewing the existing literature data is collected through key informant interviews and policy documents of China and Australia. Australian threat perception is evaluated by analyzing Australian Defense White Papers, speeches of Australian leaders and analysis of the country’s security analysts. The study finds that challenges posed by other nations in the region is prompting China to modernize its navy. This in turn enhances security concerns in Australia which is always wary of securing its territorial integrity, economic interests, and global liberal world order which has contributed to its development and security. Australia, in response to these developments, has embarked on the path of modernizing its own forces. It has bolstered its alliances with the US and other partners.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Modernization, Strategic Interests, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

40. Astropolitics and USA-China’s New Geopolitical Rivalry Area

Author:: Seyedmohammad Seyedi Asl
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Space has always been a place for geopolitical competition, and concepts such as astropolitics have even emerged in the scientific world. However, in the last two decades, technological advances have led to an increase in interest in space activities and new global space competition involving many public and private organizations. In addition to political and commercial competition in the world, China and America have expanded the scope of their competition to somewhere outside the world, that is, outer space, and they are trying not to lag behind their competitors in this field. A new round of competition between China and the United States to return to space was formed, which was reminiscent of the space program competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The purpose of this research is to analyze the space competition between America and China from the perspective of space geopolitics, using the concept of Astropolitics. Therefore, this study illustrates the role of contemporary geopolitics in today’s space based on the dynamic nature of astropolitics, and assesses the emerging geopolitical competition behind the rise of international interest in space.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Space, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Astropolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

41. Mackinder’s Heartland Thesis and the Belt and Road Initiative: Russia’s Growing Dependence on China in the Aftermath of the Ukraine War

Author:: Hanna Samir Kassab
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This paper focuses on Russia’s current economic isolation due to the war in Ukraine. The more western states punish Russia, the more likely it will become economically dependent on China. H. J. Mackinder argues that whoever controls, or organises, the heartland of the Eurasian continent, controls the world’s political system. The more dependent Russia is on China, the more China will exercise control over Russia. If China were to gain this political leverage over Russia, it would be in a good position to organise the heartland, and possible become global hegemon.
Topic:: Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-Ukraine War, International Politics, and Dependence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

42. GR&P Seminar: US-China Science Cooperation and Chinese American Scientists in the Trump 2.0 Era

Author:: Yasheng Huang, Gang Chen, David Goldston, and Mihaela Papa
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Global Research & Policy Seminar: US-China Science Cooperation and Chinese American Scientists in the Trump 2.0 Era: Tuesday, February 11, 2025. As the new Trump administration shapes its China policies, how is the United States navigating scientific collaboration with China? What are the implications for Chinese American and China-focused scientists? Two Chinese American MIT faculty members and the Director of the MIT Washington Office shared their insights on the opportunities and challenges of advancing scientific progress in the context of an increasingly complex and contested US-China relationship. Speakers: Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan; Faculty Director MIT-China Program Gang Chen, Carl Richard Soderberg Professor of Power Engineering, MechE; Director, Pappalardo Micro and Nano Engineering Laboratories David Goldston, Director, MIT Washington Office Moderator: Mihaela Papa, Director of Research and Principal Research Scientist, MIT Center for International Studies
Topic:: Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Donald Trump, and Collaboration
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. Why Did Inflation Rise and Fall So Rapidly? Lessons from the Korean War

Author:: Joseph Gagnon and Asher Rose
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The speed of both the rise and fall of US inflation in 2021–23 took many economists by surprise. This paper shows that the rise of COVID era inflation reflects three independent shocks: a plethora of pandemic-related shifts in demand patterns and supply disruptions; the largest commodity price surge in 40 years caused by the Ukraine war; and strong monetary and fiscal responses to the pandemic, which kept labor markets tight. This paper documents the transmission of these shocks through the main components of private consumption: durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. The rapid fall of inflation reflects the credibility of the Federal Reserve’s commitment to low inflation, something that was not apparent during the inflationary shocks of the 1970s but that was important during the Korean War inflation of 1950–51. Another similarity with the Korean War episode is the temporary surge in demand for durable goods.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, Korean War, COVID-19, and Goods and Services
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

44. Managing an Aging Society: Learning the Right Lessons from Japan

Author:: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: As the world and especially other Asian and European economies enter the accelerated process of aging that Japan experienced from the mid-1990s onwards, learning the right policy lessons from Japan’s response is crucial. This paper argues that, overall, Japan has done relatively well by implementing a response that—even if often belatedly so—has mitigated some of the worst economic effects of aging. Japan has successfully raised domestic labor utilization and immigration levels, integrated its economy more with the rest of the world, and implemented a fiscal policy based on debt expansion that has seen debt costs decline. Other advanced Asian economies and China now face aging processes materially faster than Japan’s and will age simultaneously rather than alone like Japan. In addition, many advanced economies will age during a period of much slower global economic growth and less rather than more global trade and investment opening than what Japan faced from the mid-1990s. These less benign international economic and political circumstances mean that many advanced economies will likely not age with the same relative political and economic stability seen in Japan in the last 30 years. In time, this paper argues, “Japanification” will no longer mean a slowly developing economic disaster but will come to mean competent management of a very difficult economic transition.
Topic:: Debt, Demographics, Labor Issues, Immigration, Fiscal Policy, Aging, and Productivity
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

45. The Effects of US-China Cooperation on Fentanyl Markets and Overdose Deaths

Author:: Marcus Noland, Julieta Contreras, and Lucas Rengifo-Keller
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Drug overdose is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 15–44, exceeding heart disease, cancer, suicide, vehicular accidents, and COVID-19 in 2023. Most drug deaths are associated with fentanyl. This paper uses data on illicit drug prices to estimate reduced-form price equations of fentanyl, oxycodone, and alprazolam based on supply and demand, including hedonic characteristics. The results are used to estimate the relationship between fentanyl prices and overdoses. They suggest that the Chinese embargo on fentanyl shipments to the United States beginning in May 2019 raised street prices for a limited period, reducing fentanyl overdose deaths in the United States by roughly one-quarter over a three- to five-month period after the announcement.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Drugs, Opioid Crisis, Cooperation, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. Alignment or Misalignment? US and EU High-Tech Trade and Sanctions Policies toward China

Author:: Antonio Calcara and Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief focuses on the alignment or misalignment of the European Union and the United States on high-technology trade and sanctions vis-à-vis China. The Trump administration is likely to continue the aggressive US stance toward China in the technological realm, putting increasing pressure on its European allies to align with US policy. The Europeans, for their part, are in a difficult position: On the one hand, they are under pressure from the US government; on the other hand, the more Washington restricts Chinese trade, the more Chinese exporters will look to the European market to sell their manufactured goods. Increased competition from Chinese imports in Europe, especially in the automotive sector, could in turn trigger a political backlash that weakens support for transatlantic coordination on China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, European Union, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and European Union

47. Significant, but Not Systemic: The Challenge of China’s Efforts to Rival Western Financial Predominance

Author:: Martin Chorzempa and Lukas Spielberger
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Despite worldwide concerns about the US dollar, the Chinese renminbi is not yet ready to be a serious contender for leading international currency status. This Policy Brief examines three of the most important Chinese approaches to increasing the renminbi’s role as an international settlement currency: promote bilateral swap agreements between the People's Bank of China and other central banks; create international payment systems that do not involve the dollar, most notably the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System; and develop a central bank digital currency for alternative payment infrastructures. The authors find that Beijing’s efforts fall short of posing a systemic challenge to the dollar or to infrastructures like SWIFT. Nevertheless, these approaches have enabled China to use its currency for bilateral foreign policy. US and European policymakers should consider countering or attenuating these efforts, even though they have had limited success in increasing renminbi usage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Central Bank, Currency, Digital Currency, and SWIFT
Political Geography:: China and Asia

48. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:: Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

49. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

50. Why democracies stick together: The theory and empirics behind alliance formation

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Domestic regime type affects both inter-state conflict and alliance formation. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies do not go to war with one another, while democratic alliance theory suggests that they rarely, if ever, join nondemocratic alliances (or alliances led by nondemocratic powers). Empirical evidence strongly supports both theories. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes further reinforces the hypothesis that economically prosperous democracies tend to align with one another, whereas authoritarian states gravitate toward similarly nondemocratic and less prosperous partners. If these theories hold, they carry significant implications for Western and especially US foreign policy. First, global democratization would reduce the number of potential conflicts, at least among an increasing number of democracies. Second, it would expand the pool of democratic alliance partners, while at the same limiting the alliance options available to nondemocratic powers. This strategic logic underscores the importance of upholding democratic norms abroad and promoting democratization in nondemocratic states. However, advocating for democratization of nondemocratic great powers will be perceived as both a geopolitical and domestic political challenge aimed at weakening their international position and threatening their governments’ domestic grip on power. Efforts to democratize nondemocratic great-power like Russia and China therefore provoke intense countermeasures. If such a strategy is deemed to be too high risk or too difficult to pursue successfully, a less provocative, “peripheral” strategy may focus on fostering democracy and economic development in authoritarian regimes’ weaker, less prosperous partners, thereby depriving them of potential allies.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

51. How China sees the future and what it means for NATO

Author:: Alice Politi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China’s military expansion and its geopolitical ambitions, especially in the Indo-Pacifi c macro-area, potentially present growing challenges for NATO. Offi cial documents show that the reunifi cation with Taiwan plays a critical role in China’s 2049 “Great Rejuvenation” goals. However, China’s military capabilities are still too limited to allow for an intervention in Taiwan in the short term. Despite China’s rapid progress in outer space and military sectors, internal challenges such as slowing economic growth and demographic issues raise doubts about its ability to achieve long-term ambitions.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

52. Friends with benefits: Assessing Russian-Chinese military exercises

Author:: Narantsatsral Enkhbat
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: China-Russia joint strategic air patrols and naval manoeuvres near U.S. territory in the Pacifi c have become a growing trend, serving as geopolitical messaging. China is likely to become more involved in maritime security and power projection in the Arctic, as evidenced by its Coast Guard’s manoeuvres with Russia in the Northern Pacifi c. Russia conducts military drills and manoeuvres with China in the South China Sea (and potentially in the Taiwan Strait) to show support to China on territorial issues.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Navy, Maritime, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

53. Climate Change, Vulnerable Groups, and Data-Driven Policymaking

Author:: Selahattin Selsah Pasali
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: More than four in five people in Asia and the Pacific reportedly face multi‑hazard risks associated with slow or sudden onset climate events, according to the latest Asia‑Pacific Disaster Report published by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Many existing hotspots of climate‑related multi‑hazards are forecast to intensify. Individuals residing in these hotspots, often already low‑income and with limited access to basic services and infrastructure, will likely be exposed to more frequent and intense sudden‑ and slow‑onset natural disasters. Noteworthy is the assessment that migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and stateless persons residing in many parts of these vast geographic areas reportedly face even more daunting challenges in this category, due to their vulnerable legal status, limited coping capacity, and access to basic services and opportunities.
Topic:: Climate Change, Inequality, Displacement, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Asia

54. The New Geopolitical Scramble for Corridors

Author:: Velina Tchakarova
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The geopolitical landscape in winter 2024- 2025 is marked by significant transformation, uncertainty, and fierce competition for influence. The geopolitical hotspots of this new contest are most visible in the regions that bridge Europe and Asia—what the editors of Baku Dialogues call the “Silk Road region.” Central to this dynamic is the growing intersection of interests between major regional players against the backdrop of a Cold War 2.0, putting the West against what I was the first to call the “DragonBear” alliance of China and Russia. These corridors are not just infrastructural undertakings; they are the arteries of global power, trade, and connectivity, reflecting deeper geopolitical ambitions and contestations. This extensive analysis elaborates on today’s most significant connectivity projects, exploring their strategic implications and the new power dynamics they are fostering. In the traditional sense, empires have always relied on transport and trade corridors to project power and expand influence. From the ancient Silk Roads to the West’s colonial sea routes, the ability to control the flow of goods and resources has often equated to geopolitical dominance. Today, this principle remains unchanged, though the scale and stakes have reached unprecedented levels.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and International Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

55. Back to the Future: The Rise of Militarization in China in the 2020s

Author:: Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: In this policy brief, IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung analyzes Chinese militarization efforts as the country seeks tighter integration of the civilian and defense economies and a strong sense of national security, and whether such efforts lead to China being more prone to going to war in the near future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Militarization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

56. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

57. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

58. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

59. India-China rapprochement: what are the long-term prospects?

Author:: Nayanima Basu and Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: China-India relations, which have long been fraught, were further complicated by the 2020 military standoff on the Himalayan border. The political disruption had a significant impact on Chinese companies’ presence in India. And yet, India’s dependence on Chinese imports has increased since. The Indian economy is decelerating at a challenging time for Prime Minister Modi, who governs in a coalition. China could offer a partial solution to India’s economic woes by providing manufacturing FDI and creating jobs. The Modi-Xi ‘rapprochement’ after their encounter at the October 2024 BRICS summit signals that relations could improve. India may be willing to accept targeted investment from China, but relations are unlikely to fully normalise, particularly since the 2025 India-Pakistan military stand-off. There are three main reasons for this. First, the Indian army remains cautious about the situation at the border and security risks relating to China. Second, the United States under President Trump will exert pressure on Modi not to depend further on China. This is even more relevant in the context of Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on India. Third, Indian public opinion on China and the Belt and Road Initiative remains negative. India is predicted to experience greater growth than China in the coming decades, meaning China could lose its upper hand in economic relations between the two countries. This, however, will depend on how dependent India might have become on China for imports or for jobs through FDI and other channels. The militarised border, India’s asymmetric economic dependence on China and China’s leadership in the Global South will still shape the relationship even if the Indian economy grows to a similar size to China’s. India-China ‘rapprochement’ is possible but will remain fragile and unlikely to be maintained in the long run.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Governance, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

60. Will China’s economy follow the same path as Japan’s?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Since the bursting of China’s real-estate bubble in mid-2021, there has been a growing concern that the Chinese economy could end up like that of Japan in the early 1990s. Some structural patterns are strikingly similar: low private consumption over a long period, especially when compared to the rest of the world, and an excessively high savings ratio, though China’s imbalances now are even larger that Japan’s were then. Initial policy responses to the bursting of their respective bubbles have also been similar. Both China now and Japan then were initially hesitant to ease monetary and fiscal policies, and opted to expand manufacturing, with an eye on external demand, supported by more research and development expenditure. In both cases, the outcomes were stubborn trade surpluses and a mercantilist attitude to their growth problems, leading to the United States taking protectionist measures. China also seems to be following Japan’s offshoring of production to mitigate the impact of protectionism. The main difference, though, is that China now is a poorer country than Japan was then, with still more convergence opportunities ahead. China is also a much bigger military and geopolitical contender than Japan ever was. China’s geopolitical weight is behind the US technological containment of China, but also gives China more room for manoeuvre globally, especially in the Global South. It remains unclear – though globally significant – whether China will be able to deviate from the path followed by Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Growth, Innovation, and Real Estate
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

61. Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain

Author:: Jennifer Hong Whetsell
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is rising as a prominent player in the space domain. The size of its space program makes its current position as an emerging space power even more impressive and promising. The United States, one of South Korea's closest political and defense allies, and South Korea share a considerable history in space cooperation since the late 1980s. Despite the long history of collaboration between the United States and South Korea, fundamental differences have slowed their progress toward a deeper and more meaningful cooperation in this domain. As space becomes an integral aspect of national security and a coveted frontier for scientific endeavor and exploration, the two capitals have much to gain through enhanced cooperation. “Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain” examines the landscape of South Korea’s space ecosystem and provides a broad overview of its accomplishments and challenges in the space domain. It then highlights significant milestones of space cooperation between Washington and Seoul and analyzes the cooperative landscape, noting areas of differences and opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The paper then presents recommendations for U.S. and ROK policymakers to help overcome those barriers and strengthen their cooperation in the space domain.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

62. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:: Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

63. Trapped in debt: China’s role in Laos’ economic crisis

Author:: Keith Barney, Roland Rajah, and Mariza Cooray
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: Laos is trapped in a severe debt crisis with no resolution in sight, threatening a decade of economic and social malaise. Recent global shocks were key triggers. Yet a crisis was almost inevitable, driven by poor planning and over-investment in the domestic energy sector, financed mostly by Chinese loans and exacerbated by broader fiscal and governance problems. Exiting the crisis will require China to provide substantial debt relief. However, the politics appear unfavourable, as neither side wants to admit failure and accept the consequences. Whether by design or neglect, China has created a debt trap in Laos. The crisis illustrates some of the most troubling pathologies of Chinese lending under the Belt and Road Initiative, and its unwillingness to provide sufficient debt relief, despite the clear-cut need.
Topic:: Debt, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Crisis, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Laos

64. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:: Asia Sociey
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:: Exports, Manufacturing, Industry, ASEAN, Supply Chains, Regional Economy, and De-Risking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

65. China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Asia Sociey
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”1 This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

66. Xi’s Personal Priorities: What Matters Most to China’s Leader?

Author:: Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Time is a politician’s most precious resource. Every decision to attend a meeting, launch an initiative, or deliver a speech involves trade-offs. Unlike budgets or personnel, time cannot be expanded or replenished. How a leader allocates their time reveals their priorities. Xi Jinping is acutely aware of this reality. “To realize the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must race against time,” he declared in January 2020. State media claimed that on an “ordinary day,” Xi sleeps just six hours and works through every meal. Li Zhanshu, Xi’s former chief of staff, summarized his work tempo in one word: “fast.” This urgency helps explain why Xi wants to become the “chairman of everything,” replacing collective leadership with personalized rule, sidelining colleagues, and centralizing decision-making within Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bodies under his direct control. Yet even a leader as powerful and driven as Xi cannot do everything. So how does Xi spend his time? It is impossible to know for sure, but a useful proxy could be official statements about actions that he has taken “personally” (qinzi). In particular, CCP media have mentioned several policies that Xi has “personally planned, personally arranged, and personally promoted” (qinzi mouhua, qinzi bushu, qinzi tuidong). The Center for China Analysis has compiled a database of these policies. Analysis suggests that Xi pays special attention to regional development projects, internal CCP governance, and environmental protection. Notably absent are indications of personal involvement in key political economy issues such as consumption, demographics, healthcare, public finance, and welfare reform. For policymakers and businesses seeking leverage or opportunity in China, understanding Xi’s priorities is a critical starting point.
Topic:: Leadership, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

67. The People’s Republic of Wellness: Why Beijing Worries About Well-Being

Author:: G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Wellness is booming in China as more people engage in activities that promote healthier living, emotional balance, and spiritual growth. Interest in living well has grown steadily as living standards rise and China undergoes radical social and economic change. More people are facing financial distress amid a slowing economy, and younger generations struggle with intense academic pressure and limited employment opportunities. Wellness trends gained steam during the COVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated the shift from materialism toward a search for spirituality and meaning. Maintaining a harmonious and stable social environment is central to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. Beijing recognizes the value of many popular wellness trends and actively encourages those that align with its interest in fostering citizens’ well-being and improving public morale. As people struggle to manage the stress of daily living and define wellness and the good life on their own terms, building a harmonious society has become a major challenge for China’s leaders. In an attempt to manage this friction, they increasingly focus propaganda efforts on highlighting the country’s economic and technological achievements and their assertiveness in the trade conflict with the United States.
Topic:: Economy, Public Health, Society, and Well-Being
Political Geography:: China and Asia

68. A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Author:: Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally). What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific? Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland. In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support. Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,3 as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.4 This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015. On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.5 In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support? This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:: China, Europe, India, and Asia

69. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

70. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:: Brendan Kelly and Shay Wester
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Exports, ASEAN, Supply Chains, and De-Risking
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

71. What to Watch at China’s Two Sessions in 2025

Author:: Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: The annual Two Sessions is the closest thing to a carnival in Chinese politics. Thousands of leaders, bureaucrats, experts, reporters, and celebrities from across the country flock to Beijing for a week of political pageantry. While the premier’s annual “state of the union” address is more restrained than its American counterpart — U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress just a day earlier — it remains a key indicator of China’s economic direction. The Two Sessions refers to the concurrent annual meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which opens on March 4, and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which begins on March 5. These meetings are expected to conclude on or around March 11. Both institutions answer to the Chinese Communist Party, led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The CPPCC National Committee, with 2,169 members, serves as the overarching organization of the United Front system, which mobilizes various social groups to support and advise the Party. Meanwhile, the NPC, with 2,977 delegates, functions as a single-chamber parliament that is, at least notionally, the supreme organ of state power. Anticipation surrounding this year’s event has been heightened by a rare “symposium on private enterprises” that Xi hosted on February 17, attended by some of the country’s top entrepreneurs. This uncommon symposium, last held in 2018, raised hopes for China’s struggling economy — particularly following the January return of President Trump, a self-proclaimed “tariff king” who has already imposed an additional 10% levy on Chinese imports. Now, attention shifts to how much Beijing is willing to boost stimulus, support businesses, and respond to Trump’s trade policies. The Two Sessions is expected to reveal a more pro-growth agenda compared to last year, with approximate targets of 5% for GDP growth, 4% of GDP for the fiscal deficit ratio, and 2% for consumer inflation. Further stimulus will come from roughly 3 trillion yuan in ultralong special treasury bonds and 4.5–5 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds. Measures to boost consumer spending and encourage private-sector innovation will also be introduced. While Beijing aims to stabilize growth, it is unlikely to unleash the proverbial “bazooka” stimulus, as it needs to conserve fiscal resources for a potential trade war. Similarly, sweeping structural reforms remain improbable as the government remains committed to Xi’s vision of high-tech industrial self-reliance.
Topic:: Reform, Economic Growth, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

72. China’s Middle Class Searches for Faith and Meaning

Author:: John Osburg
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Members of China’s urban middle class — long assumed to be the most secular segment of Chinese society — are turning to religion and spirituality in greater numbers. Rejecting officially sanctioned religious institutions and state-promoted ideology, many urbanites are seeking alternatives considered less tainted by party-state interference. Independent Christian churches, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, and New Age workshops are attracting increasing numbers of affluent, well-educated urban Chinese looking for authentic spiritual experiences and a sense of community, some of whom mix aspects of different religions to create their own personal spiritual practices. Growing interest in religious communities at the margins of state control reflects the failure of official ideology to provide spiritual comfort and the party-state’s lack of moral authority. Attempts by Beijing to co-opt religious institutions through “Sinicization” have undermined their spiritual authority. “Boss Christians” fund their own churches to gain social status and legitimize their wealth, while a growing number of intellectuals see Christian values as a model for reforming China’s government and society. Members of China’s elite who convert to Tibetan Buddhism say they value its purity and intellectually rigorous philosophy, which they contrast to the corrupted, diluted teachings of Han Chinese Buddhism.
Topic:: Religion, Christianity, Secularism, Buddhism, Middle Class, and Society
Political Geography:: China and Asia

73. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:: Lyle Morris
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

74. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Chinese Foreign Policy in 2025: Absorbing Blows & Profiting from Others’ Mistakes

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2025, decision-makers in Austria and the EU should prioritize three highly topical questions that are at the forefront for China researchers: Will China respond severely to US tariffs? Will China contribute to peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine War? Will China fill the vacuum as the US retreats from global governance leadership? Among other trends in China research, there will be further work on how China’s technological and industrial progress—including on electric vehicles, AI, and quantum computing—will impact relations with the US and EU (ReConnect China 2025). Moreover, there will be more research on how integrated the Chinese economy is with the EU and others, and how resilient Europe is in this context (China Horizons 2025). Lastly, among rising regional focal areas, scholars will publish more on China’s rise as a research, economic, and geopolitical actor in the polar regions (Funaiole et al 2024; Paul 2024).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Tariffs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Austria

76. China's Green Belt and Road

Author:: Yang Jiang
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In the past 15 years, green industries have developed rapidly in China, and China has assumed a leading position in several global supply chains of renewable energy. Because the domestic solar, wind and biomass markets have become quite saturated, Chinese companies have intensified their search for overseas markets, and the Chinese government is strengthening its support for that pursuit under the Green Belt and Road Initiative. For the governments and businesses in the green industries in the West, the Green Belt and Road Initiative could result in more competition over market shares and geopolitical influence, but it also encompasses opportunities for cooperation. For developing countries, more competition and diversification between foreign partners can be an advantage, allowing them to negotiate with the development partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Business, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

77. Okinawa and Thule US military bases

Author:: Minori Takahashi and Ulrik Pram Gad
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Dialogue is key to building trust and legitimacy around US military bases. A comparison of the bases in Okinawa and Thule reveals that the outcome of such dialogues is shaped by who is included in the conversation. Involving regional governments can enhance inclusivity but lead to political instability, while relying on central authorities may offer stability but at the cost of excluding local communities.
Topic:: Legitimacy, Dialogue, Trust, and Military Bases
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Greenland

78. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

79. How China Collateralizes

Author:: Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, Sebastian Horn, Paulina Kintzinger, Bradley C. Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). We present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio to EMDEs is effectively collateralized - amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. We document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20% of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. Our findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower’s reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Topic:: Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Americas

80. Identifying Mutual Interests: How Donor Countries Benefit from Foreign Aid

Author:: Tobias Heidland, Maximilian Michael, Moritz Schularick, and Rainer Thiele
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Official development assistance (ODA) is widely studied for its impact on recipient countries, but its effects on donor countries remain underexplored. To address this gap systematically, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding when foreign aid generates measurable returns for donor countries as well as those cases when donor and recipient interests align—what we term mutual interest ODA. We categorize potential donor benefits into three domains: economic, geopolitical, and security-related, and distinguish these benefits by their timing and degree of directness. We then systematically survey the empirical evidence on donor benefits, assessing the empirical credibility and magnitude of estimated effects and pointing out research gaps. We find consistent evidence of substantial donor benefits across all three domains. A key insight is that aggregate aid flows often mask significant variation: The returns to donors depend critically on the type of aid, delivery modality, and recipient context. These findings have important implications for both academic and policy debates on the effectiveness, political sustainability, and future direction of development aid.
Topic:: Climate Change, Globalization, Health, International Trade and Finance, Migration, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Asia, and Americas

81. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:: Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

82. China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China's Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings

Author:: Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Xi Jinping has played a direct and active role in China’s naval buildup. He is China’s first great navalist statesman, the world’s greatest navalist leader today, and among the world’s greatest navalist statesmen in modern history. Notwithstanding major advances in ships, submarines, aircraft, and other hardware, Chinese military leaders believe that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to lag behind in human factors. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PLAN has dismissed (or is rumored to have dismissed) eleven flag officers. Beyond combating outright dysfunction, these removals are intended to prevent potential disloyalty and factionalism, centralize power, and further modernization and warfighting goals. These high-profile dismissals have had no apparent impact on PLAN operational capabilities, which continue to improve at a remarkable rate. From the Taiwan Strait to the “distant oceans” (远洋), the service is present daily and visible internationally, particularly its surface fleet, indicating reliability, trust, and growing responsibilities and capabilities. Since 2008, the PLAN’s surface fleet has almost doubled. Despite being projected to exceed 400 ships by the end of 2025, China’s Navy continues to successfully crew, operate, and train with them. China’s Navy draws on a massive, sufficiently-capable talent pool and education system. Provincial-level compulsory conscription quotas avoid individual compellence thanks to high levels of volunteerism. Given the demands of increasingly frequent and intense training and missions—often with the austere privations of submarines or remote installations—mental health support is increasingly prioritized. Nevertheless, it remains a weakness for China’s Navy, which views U.S. care as the gold standard yet has treated counseling as a “political” issue. China’s Naval Command College in Nanjing—the Naval War College’s closest equivalent—educates its students differently from its counterpart in Newport by focusing on naval operations and warfighting for top-priority scenarios. The PLAN enjoys unique human capital advantages: educational partnerships as early as elementary school; personal data compiled centrally, available and utilizable without privacy restriction; eldercare benefits; and warfighting-focused naval education. PLAN sources perceive weaknesses in lack of talent for new-domain operations and advanced S&T given rising demand in these burgeoning areas; recruitment and training pipeline supply-demand imbalance and talent-skills mismatches; officers’ overly narrow early-career experience and subsequent aging out of cutting-edge relevance; and youths’ declining commitment to the Communist system. Despite being an improvement on its Soviet progenitor, China’s Political Commissar system could represent a critical weakness, causing real-time decision-making bottlenecks or distraction, particularly in crisis or conflict.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, Human Capital, Xi Jinping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Nanjing

83. China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Julia Famularo
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: People’s Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement operations function as forms of cognitive and legal warfare. They represent a clear effort to undermine international maritime law as well as Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC asserts that the Taiwan Strait comprises multiple “zones,” to include “internal waters, territorial sea, [the] contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone.” While China does not explicitly claim that the waters of the Taiwan Strait wholly constitute PRC sovereign territory, it clearly implies that it has the self-defined right to exercise distinct forms of control over different zones of the Strait. While stressing that China “respects the lawful rights of other countries in relevant waters,” the PRC exploits the absence of the term “international waters” in UNCLOS to assert non-existent sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait. China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and beyond. The overzealous execution of “law enforcement” operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands represents an effort to signal that the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration is incapable of conducing effective patrols. It also reinforces the narrative that the PRC possesses legal jurisdiction over waters within the First Island Chain, thereby undermining the lawful rights of Taiwan and neighboring states. The PRC very likely believes that employing China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) assets to implement a sea-based quarantine would remain below the threshold of conflict, effectively mitigating the risk of escalation and preventing third-party intervention. As joint MSA and CCG operations grow in scope, scale, and complexity, China is gradually exercising the skills necessary to seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands and potentially seek to force Taiwan leaders to the negotiating table. Under China’s revised maritime law enforcement legal framework, leaders in Beijing could authorize the establishment of exclusion zones to prevent foreign vessels from entering into and operating in PRC-claimed waters, as well as board and inspect ships within the exclusion zone. China could also potentially attempt to divert ships to regional PRC ports for customs inspection and clearance. Beijing furthermore could authorize the use of “all necessary means”—to include the use of force—to implement its quarantine and counter perceived threats to its national security and sovereignty. A PRC decision to implement a quarantine, rather than a full military blockade, would force the United States and its key allies and partners to decide how to react effectively while themselves also mitigating the risk of substantial military escalation. Response options could comprise targeted sanctions or military escorts for commercial vessels carrying critical supplies.
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Navy, Maritime, Jurisdiction, Coast Guard, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and Taiwan Strait

84. China Maritime Report #49: The PLAN Corruption Paradox: Insights from the 1st Destroyer Flotilla

Author:: Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Like all organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suffers from endemic corruption, defined as the personal abuse of power for selfish ends. Corruption occurs when PLAN leaders use their power to: 1) influence personnel decisions in exchange for money and/or favor; and 2) extract kickbacks for influencing decisions in the contracting/procurement process for equipment and materiel, construction projects, and other service requirements. Despite widespread corruption in the PLAN, the service has continued to grow and modernize at an astonishing rate. One explanation for this paradox is that the PLAN has strived to keep corruption from infecting the personnel selection process in operational units, which matter most for combat power generation. For at least two decades, the PLAN’s anti-corruption “watchdog”—the Discipline Inspection Commission—has prioritized scrutiny over those units and personnel most directly responsible for the “preparation for military struggle.” This top-down approach has combined with efforts by the units themselves—likely driven by the self-interest of the unit Party Committee, which must answer for poor unit performance—to enact policies to ensure that the best candidates are chosen for leadership positions. The case of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla illustrates policies adopted by operational units to ensure the integrity of the personnel selection process. These include formulating clear regulations stipulating minimum qualifications for leadership positions, adopting strict standards for officer evaluation, and carrying out a transparent selection process. The Flotillas’ personnel selection process entails knowledge and skills competitions judged by senior unit members and incorporates feedback and inputs from other members of the unit. Due to the approaches adopted by units such as the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, individuals in positions of power have less leeway to engage in corrupt behavior, thereby increasing the probability that the most capable officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) will be selected for leadership positions.
Topic:: Corruption, Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

85. China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia

Author:: Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (海上侦察) units. Located in China’s coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called “information boats” (信息船). China’s maritime militia has developed a cadre of intelligence specialists who serve the function of collecting intelligence and reporting it to the PLA. These militia members, called “information personnel” (信息员), generally deploy with militia vessels tasked with reconnaissance missions, but may also embark on boats from other types of militia units. While at sea, maritime militia intelligence personnel maintain close contact with the PLA units that oversee militia operations, called People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). PAFDs direct militia reconnaissance operations and receive incoming intelligence reports, which they then share with operational PLA forces. As part-time soldiers, often with comparatively low education levels, maritime militia intelligence personnel cannot meet the same performance standards as intelligence specialists in the PLA. However, the existence of a large cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists ensures a basic level of competence across the force and guarantees that capable personnel are available for important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Given China’s aspirations to become a global naval power, it makes sense that the PLA leverage the latent ISR capacity of China’s distant-water fishing fleet and Chinese owned/operated merchant vessels. PLA experts have argued for embarking intelligence personnel on Chinese vessels operating abroad, and it is likely that this is already happening.
Topic:: Intelligence, Navy, Maritime, Espionage, Militias, Reconnaissance, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

86. China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario

Author:: Ian Easton
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.” In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard. Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception. Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective. Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war. American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action. War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures. Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

87. Sea Dragons: Special Operations and Chinese Military Strategy

Author:: John Chen and Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: As China continues to rise as a global sea power, its maritime strategy continues to evolve. Among these critical evolutions is one of the People’s Liberation Army’s naval special operations forces’ most elite units: the Sea Dragons. A small yet highly specialized unit, the Sea Dragons entered the global spotlight and international consciousness with the 2018 film Operation Red Sea, raising several questions for Chinese naval experts. What does Chinese military strategy and doctrine require of special forces, and specifically naval SOF, to be able to accomplish the mission, particularly along the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea? What are their capabilities and limitations? What real-world experience do they have and how might they be employed in the future? This volume attempts to answer those questions and many more regarding one of China’s more enigmatic units and its role in future peacetime and low-intensity conflicts.
Topic:: Maritime, Special Operations, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Sea Dragons
Political Geography:: China and Asia

88. The Bandung Spirit

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: In 1955, the leaders of former Global South colonies met in Bandung, Indonesia, brought together by a common spirit for national liberation and cooperation. Seventy years later, is there any trace of it left?
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, History, Global South, and Internationalism
Political Geography:: Africa, Indonesia, and Asia

89. The Joy of Reading

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: Reading and popular literacy programmes have played an important role in revolutionary processes, from the Mexican, Chinese, and Russian revolutions in the early twentieth century to today.
Topic:: Revolution, Literacy, and Reading
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, Latin America, and Mexico

90. The Geopolitical Impact of USAID’s Retreat on Humanitarian Aid: Towards a Complementary Approach between China and the EU?

Author:: Edouard Xia and Alexandre Piron
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Trump’s decision to cut funding and stop most of USAID’s projects will have lasting consequences. First and foremost, it adds great pressure on an already big funding gap. Forgotten and underfunded crises will suffer from it. But Trump’s action will also bear an effect on the nature of humanitarian aid itself. USAID’s retreat accelerates a geopolitical shift. China, “Champion of the Global South”, will inevitably fill the void and promote its own model of foreign aid. Development, economic and humanitarian rationales are therefore expected to be increasingly mixed at the expense of a principled approach. What could in turn the EU, and Belgium within it, do? Could they play the role of a “missing link” and promote a complementary approach to China? This brief offers insights on some questions ahead of the upcoming European Humanitarian Forum.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

91. Military policy toward China: The case against overreaction

Author:: John Mueller
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: It is often argued that the policies of containment and military deterrence worked against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and many have urged applying these same policies to China today. However, it is not clear that containment was all that successful during the Cold War nor is it clear that it should now be applied to China. Should it pursue the “hegemonic” ambitions often attributed to it, China, like the USSR, may prove its own worst enemy by overstretching its resources and provoking its neighbors. In any case, China does not seem to harbor hegemonic ambitions. Its existing gestures at global influence, like the Belt and Road Initiative, are in disarray and unlikely to work. Rather than rushing to more forcefully contain or balance China, the United States should let China make its own mistakes. Doing nothing or next to nothing against a perceived threat isn’t always wise or politically popular but in this case it’s the most rational choice. The U.S. can wait for China to mellow while warily profiting from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible and expanding mutually beneficial exchange. The U.S. can also help Taiwan prepare to defend itself while maintaining that the island is independent so long as it doesn’t say so.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Deterrence, and Containment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

92. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

93. Target Taiwan: One China and cross-strait stability

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Washington should not move away from the One China policy, as doing so would increase the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” remains appropriate to the volatile cross-strait situation, but some policymakers overestimate the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Recent administrations have taken steps to undermine the One China policy as part of an American strategy to counter China across the board, but this has had the deleterious effect of causing the U.S. and China to come to the brink of war over Taiwan. A realist approach to the Taiwan issue accepts and even seeks to strengthen both strategic ambiguity and the One China policy. In doing so, it increases the odds of negotiated solutions to disagreements while ensuring U.S. military forces are in a less vulnerable and volatile defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Invasion, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

94. Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific: China’s Use of the Instruments of Power

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The first report in this series examined Chinese and Russian influence and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This report, the second of five in the series, analyzes China’s use of the instruments of power to build its influence and advance its interests in a region it sees as vital to its future. We use a modified version of the DIME framework (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) here, with the modification being that we do not analyze the information instruments separately. Even in an information environment as controlled as China’s, the state has multiple ways to shape the information space—some official and some unofficial, some acknowledged and others unacknowledged. Given these facts, a separate examination of the information instrument is beyond the scope of this report. Although it does not explicitly analyze the information instrument, the report weaves Beijing’s use of information throughout the narrative. The report analyzes Beijing’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments in the Indo-Pacific region, and then examines how Russia perceives China’s activity in the region. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, the report examines Chinese activity in the following subregions: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Japan/East China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)/South China Sea, and India.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Power Politics, Economy, Strategic Interests, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

95. Clearing the Path for Nuclear Disarmament: Confidence-building in the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This paper explores possibilities for building confidence in the Korean peninsula to address the conflict dynamics and militarization in the region. It argues that a key reason for the failure of past diplomatic efforts has been the coercive approach in pursuit of immediate nuclear disarmament in North Korea. In addition to a more incremental approach to North Korean–United States nuclear diplomacy focused on arms control, the paper highlights the need for reciprocity in terms of sanctions relief, as well as more robust confidence-building measures aimed at reducing instability and addressing the security rationales behind North Korea’s nuclear policy. At the same time, it proposes embedding nuclear diplomacy into a broader framework of cooperative risk reduction and arms control that also includes South Korea and possibly other regional actors. If sustained over time, such a framework could ultimately also promote nuclear disarmament alongside the normalization of political relations between key conflict parties.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

96. Security Cooperation between Japan and the Nordic States in Uncertain Times

Author:: Fei Su, Jingdong Yuan, and Jiayi Zhou
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Amid rising geopolitical tensions and global uncertainty, security dynamics between Japan and the Nordic states are evolving. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Japanese and Nordic security concerns have increasingly converged. Security cooperation between the two regions has expanded through bilateral initiatives and within broader frameworks such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite limitations in states’ resources and political will to operate beyond their immediate neighbourhood, there is mutual recognition of the need to engage more actively, individually and collectively, on security matters. This shared awareness provides a foundation for deeper cooperation in support of both regional and global security.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Threat Perception, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, Asia, and Nordic Nations

97. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. Current Status of ASEAN Data Governance and Its Implications for the Digital Economy Framework Agreement

Author:: Shota Watanabe, Ema Ogura, and Keita Oikawa
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: The transition to data-driven societies has heightened the importance of balancing the free flow of data with robust data protection for privacy, intellectual property, trade secrets, and national security. While different countries have introduced various data governance frameworks, including comprehensive privacy laws, differences in regulations across borders hinder data flow, increasing compliance costs and limiting business expansion, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. The concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), introduced at the G20 in 2019, aims to address this balance by promoting interoperability while respecting national sovereignty. In ASEAN, however, regulatory fragmentation further complicates cross-border data flow. Variations in data localisation policies and personal data governance amongst ASEAN Member States (AMS) create significant challenges for businesses. For instance, differences in requirements for sensitive data, data subject rights, and security measures necessitate additional compliance efforts for companies operating in multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, non-personal data regulations, such as restrictions on supply chain and research and development (R&D) data sharing or mandatory technology transfers, impede global R&D collaboration and discourage investment in certain countries. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of data-related regulations in ASEAN and proposes policy recommendations for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), set for 2025. It highlights the need for transparency, regulatory alignment, and various mechanisms to ensure smoother cross-border data flow, ultimately fostering regional digital integration.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Economy, ASEAN, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: Asia

99. Harnessing AI for ASEAN’s Future: Governance, Adoption, and Sustainability under the DEFA

Author:: Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Artificial intelligence (AI) presents transformative opportunities for ASEAN, as its market is projected to reach US$30.30 billion by 2030. AI adoption is expected to contribute 10%–18% of ASEAN’s gross domestic product, benefiting key sectors such as manufacturing, health care, and energy. However, AI integration also highlights challenges, including governance gaps, disparities in AI readiness amongst ASEAN Member States, data governance issues, and sustainability concerns. While ASEAN has made progress through initiatives like developing the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, policy fragmentation and uneven AI adoption across ASEAN Member States underscore barriers to inclusive growth. The ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) provides an opportunity to align AI governance in ASEAN with global standards, ensuring a regulatory framework that balances innovation with accountability. This brief highlights AI’s role in ASEAN’s digital economy and proposes policy recommendations to strengthen AI governance; enhance the population’s digital skills; support AI adoption amongst micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises; promote culturally diverse datasets; and advance sustainable AI infrastructure. By fostering regional cooperation and embedding AI-related commitments into the DEFA, ASEAN can harness AI’s potential while actively mitigating its risks.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, Sustainability, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Asia

100. Fostering Inclusive Growth in ASEAN’s Digital Economy Through the DEFA and Regional Cooperation

Author:: Mahirah Mahusin and Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Digital transformation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly its rapidly evolving digital economy, could create significant socio-economic transformation, yet persistent obstacles limit widespread and equitable digital engagement across the region. Amongst others, unequal connectivity, high broadband costs, limited digital literacy, and disparities in access for underserved groups such as women, persons with disabilities, and rural communities may exacerbate the digital divide. This policy brief highlights the digital divide, its impact on financial inclusion, the challenges faced by underserved groups, and the unequal distribution of benefits from digital trade across ASEAN. Despite progress under regional frameworks and external agreements, achieving digital inclusion requires more targeted, development-oriented approaches. The Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) presents an opportunity to harmonise policies, support capacity-building initiatives, and align national and regional objectives for inclusive growth. Policy recommendations include provisions to enhance access, improve digital literacy, and foster public–private partnerships to address the needs of underserved populations.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Digital Economy, Innovation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS