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1. Les étudiants chinois en Europe et l’Etat-parti

Author:
Jérôme Doyon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Chinese Students in Europe and the Party-State -- Why do some Chinese students who choose to study abroad get involved in pro-regime organisations? How does this reflect the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to foster relationships of dependence and allegiance with its overseas nationals? Fieldwork conducted within branches of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in France and the United Kingdom sheds light on the drivers of this form of long-distance authoritarian commitment. An analysis of how the association operates in two different European countries reveals how it adapts to the local environment while functioning as an enclave, isolated from host societies. The organisation’s primary objective is to maintain the Chinese partystate’s hold over its nationals outside national borders rather than influence or develop ties with foreign societies. However, students do not passively allow themselves to be co-opted, and the many pressures they experience can hinder efforts to mobilise them in support of the regime.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Political Science, and Students
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and France

2. Ilham Tohti: Jailed for Fighting for Dialogue, Ethnic Harmony and Rule of Law

Author:
Jewher Tohti, Marie Holzman, Dilnur Reyhan, Teng Biao, Enver Can, and Magdalena Slezáková
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Vaclav Havel Library
Abstract:
Six of the 13 laureates of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize to date are currently in prison, including Professor Ilham Tohti. He is a well-known Uyghur intellectual from China and the laureate of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize for 2019. For over 20 years, he has been engaged in promoting dialogue and mutual understanding between Uyghurs and the Chinese authorities. As a result, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in a two-day show trial in 2014. His family has not heard from him since 2017, when he was denied contact with both them and his lawyers. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Ilham Tohti’s arrest, the Václav Havel Library organized a commemorative and advocacy event with the participation of his daughter Jewher, who lives in exile and has been actively involved in efforts to secure her father’s release. The somber 12th anniversary of his unjust imprisonment was marked at the Václav Havel Library by French sinologist, journalist, and writer Marie Holzman; senior researcher at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences and president of the European Uyghur Institute Dilnur Reyhan; Chinese lawyer and political activist Teng Biao—who, as a member of the Weiquan Lawyers (Rights Defence Network) in China, was a finalist for the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize in 2013—and Ilham Tohti’s tireless defender and president of the Ilham Tohti Initiative, Enver Can. The discussion was moderated by Magdalena Slezáková, foreign desk editor at Deník N.
Topic:
Human Rights, Repression, Advocacy, Uyghurs, Ilham Tohti, Dialogue, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. Military Implications of PLA Aircraft Incursions in Taiwan’s Airspace 2024

Author:
Cheng-kun Ma and K. Tristan Tang
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In 2024, the number of days and sorties involving Chinese military aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line reached a peak, but the total sorties of Chinese aircraft around Taiwan and the number of peak incursion periods were not significantly higher than in 2023. While the number of Chinese military aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s airspace has surged, the operational capacity of the PLA Eastern Theater Command Air Force is likely already at its maximum peacetime readiness level. The sharp increase in Chinese military aircraft incursions targeting Taiwan is not solely aimed at President Ching-te Lai but also reflects changes in the scope and intensity of the PLA’s training and exercises around Taiwan. Unless new airbases are constructed or logistical support capabilities are significantly improved within the PLA Eastern Theater Command, the number of sorties into Taiwan’s airspace is unlikely to increase substantially in 2025.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Air Force, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. Dreams Deferred in Xi’s New Year’s Speech

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Xi Jinping’s New Year’s speech hinted at weaknesses in the People’s Republic of China. The speech emphasized the many hardships that people are currently facing at home while acknowledging fears about a turbulent external environment. Xi did not mention “national rejuvenation” and he conceded that the “China dream” was far from being realized. Doubling down on the ideology of struggle, a hard work ethic, and enforcing nationalist sentiment as crucial factors for escaping the current malaise, Xi’s speech suggested a shortage of tangible solutions for the country’s problems.
Topic:
Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

7. Shipment of a Controlled Vacuum Furnace to North Korea via Multiple States: An HS Code Case Study

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In tracking trade data and trade flows, Harmonized System (HS) codes are routinely used to aid searches for dual-use commodities and to help guide the identification of dual-use items that require a license or greater scrutiny. A recurring concern is shipper falsification of HS codes to evade detection or payment of duties. An illustration of such falsifications is a case we learned about via government sources from around 2022 that involved North Korea and a dual-use vacuum furnace suitable for uranium melting that wound its way from Spain to North Korea, via Mexico, South Africa, and China. Such a furnace is typically controlled under the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Part 2 list and is banned for export to North Korea under United Security Council resolutions. This type of furnace is a mainstay of a nuclear weapons program, particularly one that uses weapon-grade uranium as the nuclear explosive material, as North Korea is known to do. With North Korea expanding its uranium enrichment program and producing greater quantities of weapon-grade uranium, this new furnace would be especially important.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Trade, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

8. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

9. The US TikTok Ban, the RedNote Moment and China

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
On 23 April 2024, the US Senate passed a bill forcing the Chinese company ByteDance to choose between divesting from its prized social platform TikTok, one of the dominant apps among Americans aged 18-29,[1] or accepting its ban on US soil. Following ByteDance’s refusal to divest, the US Supreme Court upheld the ban on 17 January 2025. The ban on TikTok rested on national security grounds. TikTok is technically a limited liability corporation registered in Delaware and with headquarters in Singapore and Los Angeles. Yet, its parent company ByteDance, while incorporated in the Cayman Islands, is based in Beijing and subject to a domestic legal framework legally requiring it to “provide assistance” to the Chinese government, including, crucially, giving up the data of TikTok users.[2] Further highlighting the limited autonomy of the company vis-à-vis Chinese authorities, “cells” of the Chinese Communist Party have been embedded within the structures of the company since 2017.[3] In short, ByteDance cannot guarantee that the personal data of its users could be kept at arm’s length from Beijing. While the Senate’s bill enjoyed bipartisan support, then President-elect Donald J. Trump publicly stated that he would not enforce the ban. Throughout the 2024 electoral campaign, Trump had announced – in contrast with most of the Republican Party members of Congress – his opposition to the bill, acknowledging how the platform had been a relevant tool for re-election.[4] On 19 January, Trump announced that he would consider imposing a 90-day delay of the ban and search for a joint-venture between ByteDance and a US company.[5] Two days later, he suggested the possibility that either Elon Musk (CEO of Tesla, owner of X, and Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency in the new administration), or Larry Ellison (chairman of Oracle) would buy the social media platform.[6]
Topic:
Social Media, Digital Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:
Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia