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201. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

202. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:
Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

203. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

204. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

205. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

206. Multi-Pole-arity: How Poland can help Europe think big on China

Author:
Alicja Bachulska
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s strategic approach to its industrial policy—particularly its trade surplus and dominance in clean technologies—is a growing risk to Europe’s competitiveness and economic security. Like many other European states, Poland prefers to focus on the bilateral dimension of its relationship with China. But the scale of China’s economic threat means the EU’s only hope is to address it as a unified bloc. Poland should use its growing leadership role in the EU to help shift the bloc towards a more assertive China policy using the available tools. As it confronts the prospect of a trade war with the US, the EU cannot afford vulnerability to China. But first, Warsaw will need to recalibrate its own policies by grasping the realities of its trade relationship with China and assessing its vulnerabilities: investments, critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Topic:
Agriculture, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

207. Digitalisation in Agriculture and Food Systems in ASEAN: Pathways to Its Resilience and Sustainability

Author:
Masanori Kozono, Ari Aji Cahyono, and Siti Mustaqimatud Diyanah
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Digital technologies are transforming the agriculture and food systems of ASEAN, offering new opportunities to enhance productivity, sustainability, and resilience. ASEAN has taken collective steps to accelerate this transition through initiatives such as the ASEAN Guidelines on Promoting the Utilisation of Digital Technologies for ASEAN Food and Agricultural Sector (2021), the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening Food Security and Nutrition in Response to Crises (2023), and the Action Plan for Sustainable Agriculture in ASEAN (2024). To support these regional efforts, this study assesses the current utilisation of digital tools across agricultural value chains, identifies barriers to technology diffusion, and analyses enabling policy frameworks. Based on surveys of 824 respondents across eight ASEAN Member States (AMS), the study finds that smartphone-based solutions – such as advisory applications, digital payments, and marketplaces – are the most widely adopted. However, adoption is primarily driven by economic objectives rather than environmental benefits. The main constraints include limited infrastructure, low digital literacy, and high adoption costs. Looking ahead, digital marketplaces and drones are expected to become the most in-demand technologies. Comprehensive and inclusive policies – anchored in strong infrastructure, skills development, financing mechanisms, and regional co-operation – are critical to advancing sustainable digital transformation in ASEAN’s agri-food systems.
Topic:
Agriculture, Development, Science and Technology, Innovation, ASEAN, and Food Systems
Political Geography:
Asia

208. Putting a Price on Carbon in ASEAN and East Asia: Are Consumers Willing to Pay?

Author:
Ayu Pratiwi Muyasyaroh, Venkatachalam Anbumozhi, Kaliappa Kalirajan, and Veerapandian Karthick
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Carbon pricing is a policy tool designed to account for the external costs of carbon emissions, such as damage to crops, healthcare costs, and property loss due to climate change. It attaches a price to these costs and allocates responsibility to the sources of emissions. This approach helps incentivise the reduction of carbon emissions and encourages the adoption of technologies aimed at achieving a net zero economy. Revenue generated from carbon pricing can be reinvested by companies to support sustainable practices, including employee benefits and health insurance. While a few countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia have implemented carbon pricing mechanisms, there is limited understanding of individual preferences regarding these mechanisms at the national and regional levels. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism of the European Union aims to standardise carbon prices for internationally traded products. However, there is a lack of knowledge about preferences for such policy instruments across key stakeholders and countries. A survey has been conducted to elicit stakeholders’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon price in ASEAN and East Asia. The overall proportion of ‘yes’ answers to the WTP question was around 70%. Mean WTP corresponds to an additional price of US$10–US$15. The analysis of more than 500 consumer responses revealed that several modifiers impact the choice of higher and lower WTP additional costs for climate actions. Amongst the consumer groups, academia and household residents are more concerned about climate change and its harmful consequences but have less knowledge and lower appreciation of external pressures such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This, coupled with the already high electricity price, could have resulted in the lower WTP by the private sector respondents. Three null hypotheses on the effects of WTP on carbon emission reductions, revenue recycling, and regional cooperation are tested. The low WTP underscores the urgency of measures to overcome market size and technical and financing constraints, and to address regulatory hurdles that raise transaction costs, to achieve industrial competitiveness.
Topic:
ASEAN, Carbon Emissions, Green Economy, Net Zero, and Carbon Pricing
Political Geography:
Asia

209. The Double Exposure of Health Impacts and Micro/Nanoplastic Hazards in the Perspective of ASEAN One Health Studies

Author:
Achmad Solikin, Rahayu Susanti, Mirrah Nabighah, Yasuyuki Mitsuhashi, and Manami Uechi
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In ASEAN countries, interest in and publication of research on micro/nanoplastics (MNPs) have significantly increased, reflecting growing political will to understand, regulate, and reduce MNP-related risks. However, the research agenda has largely focused on MNP distribution, exposure pathways, characterisation, and material properties, with limited attention to their toxicological effects. Although there is a rise in MNP-health research outputs, there has not yet been a systemic or holistic application of the One Health approach to assess the health risks of MNPs, nor to evaluate the hazardous nature of MNP constituents and their impacts on humans, animals, and ecosystems. This policy brief calls for the mainstreaming of the One Health Framework into the MNP research agenda across ASEAN. One Health – a transdisciplinary and integrative approach – is particularly suited to addressing the complexity of MNP pollution by accounting for the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health. Integrating One Health into MNP research would foster collaboration across scientific disciplines and enable a more comprehensive evaluation of the implications of MNP exposure. Such integration would allow for robust, multidisciplinary data collection on MNP instrumentations, exposure routes, constituent hazards, and toxicity effects. To this end, ASEAN Member States are strongly encouraged to embed the One Health Framework in national and regional studies on MNPs. Doing so will enhance the capacity of the region to generate actionable evidence and support more informed, effective policy decisions on the intersection of health and micro/nanoplastic pollution.
Topic:
Pollution, ASEAN, Healthcare System, and Microplastics
Political Geography:
Asia

210. Strengthening Open Government Data for Digital Cooperation in ASEAN

Author:
Hilmy Prilliadi and Mahirah Mahusin
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Open Government Data (OGD) can play a pivotal role in advancing data-driven policymaking and fostering innovation, particularly in addressing complex challenges such as climate change, inequality, and urbanisation. Despite progress in several ASEAN Member States, however, OGD development across the region remains fragmented and constrained by regulatory, cultural, technical, and institutional gaps. The absence of regional standardisation and a clear sectoral lead continues to limit cross-border co-operation and the realisation of shared economic and social benefits. Integrating OGD frameworks and provisions into trade and digital economy agreements – most notably the forthcoming ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) – offers a strategic opportunity to establish a common foundation for data accessibility, usability, and protection. Drawing on lessons from international agreements and global open data initiatives, this policy brief provides practical recommendations to strengthen OGD ecosystems in ASEAN, including targeted capacity building, sector-specific applications, and collaborative mechanisms to align national initiatives with regional priorities.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, ASEAN, Data, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
Asia

211. Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: A New Economic Order

Author:
Lili Yan Ing and Gene Grossman
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Various technological advancements have revolutionised how businesses operate and how people live and work. In recent years, significant advancements have occurred regarding industrial robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). The adoption of robotics and AI positively impacts productivity at both firm and national levels through increased precision and cost efficiency. While these technologies have the potential to substantially enhance productivity and to facilitate trade in goods and services, this paper also looks at the research on their impact on workers, wages, and economic welfare. Indeed, the extensive and uneven effects of robotics and AI on different skill sets have become a focus of economic research, which has explored how these technologies may yield outcomes that differ markedly from previous technological advancements.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Robotics
Political Geography:
Asia and Global Focus

212. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

213. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

214. 50 Years of Relationship: Looking to the Future

Author:
CEBRI
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
In 2024, Brazil and China celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations, marked by friendship, cooperation, and shared aspirations for the future. Over this period, the bilateral relationship has evolved from a predominantly trade-based partnership into a comprehensive strategic partnership, encompassing themes such as innovation, sustainability, and global governance. Among these agendas, sustainable development plays a central role, serving as a reference point for understanding the future paths of cooperation. In this context, CEBRI has gathered the main reflections from the China Analysis Group, an initiative carried out in partnership with BOCOM BBM, as well as from the events organized to mark the 50th anniversary of Sino-Brazilian relations. The publication highlights three priority areas for the future agenda: sustainable development, the digital economy, and strategic areas for deepening the bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Trade, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

215. Science Diplomacy in Horizon Europe Program: Taiwan’s TSMC as an Example for strengthening EU-Taiwan Relations

Author:
Adolfo Yinshi Wu
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
In this article, the author first introduces Taiwan's science diplomacy and its initial involvement in the EU's Horizon Europe programme, the EU's current flagship initiative for scientific innovation. Given the requirements of the programme and the market — namely, that the EU seeks to secure the semiconductor supply chain and that Taiwan is a major semiconductor manufacturer — closer cooperation between the EU and Taiwan could enhance the competitiveness and logistical resilience of EU chip production and supply in the global market. Given the current relationship, the Taiwanese government could develop significant research programmes under Horizon Europe and adopt regulations such as the EU Chip Act to gain access to the European market. The author concludes that Taiwan's TSMC could boost the EU's digital innovation and play a role as a science diplomacy tool in Taiwan–EU relations..
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

216. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:
Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:
Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

217. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC

Author:
Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

218. China in Iraq

Author:
Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

219. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:
Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:
GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

220. Japan as a New Strategic Partner in the Three Seas Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

Author:
Sayuri Romei
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In April 2024, Japan joined the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) as a new strategic partner alongside the United States and the European Union. The 3SI was established in 2015 with the objective of strengthening connectivity and reducing the disparities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic states. The initiative promotes the development of infrastructure in the energy, transport, and digital sectors in the region surrounded by the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the relevance of this initiative and has underscored the frail infrastructure in the region and CEE’s economic dependence on Russia. As it becomes increasingly clear that the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions are inseparable, Japan is compelled to serve as an active partner in the 3SI as its role is also closely connected to the quality of assistance and support to Ukraine. As Japan embarks on this new partnership with CEE and Baltic countries, however, moving beyond the rhetoric about the importance of this initiative and taking concrete action is a challenge that all the countries involved will have to grapple with. Japan’s dialogue with CEE, and in particular with the Visegrad-4 (V4) group, i.e., Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, officially started in the early 2000s. For the past twenty years, the relationship has mostly been smooth and without major problems. However, Japan’s engagement with those countries has lacked dynamism, as Japanese foreign policy has mainly been focused on the United States and China. Japan’s investments in CEE have been limited and cautious, and visits from high-ranking Japanese officials have been sporadic. In fact, the visits to Japan by the heads of the states of the V4 and CEE countries have always outnumbered those by their Japanese counterparts. Twenty years later, as CEE countries are realizing that the economic benefit from China is not as great as they had expected, Japan is in a good position to rekindle this relationship. In a January 2022 interview with Nikkei, Akio Miyajima, Ambassador of Japan to Poland, argued that it is crucial for Japan to strengthen relations with these countries. At the time of the interview, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine, and the Ambassador lamented that Japan remained disinterested in the Ukraine issue. Since the invasion a month later, however, Japan has not only taken a clear stance in condemning Russia’s aggression, it has also taken a leadership role in investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine. One of the main concerns about the 3SI is that it currently lacks cohesiveness, as the twelve participating nations are too divided to agree on major joint investments. Another issue is that the initiative mainly takes place on the political level, and cooperation on other levels and dimensions are presently non-existent. How can Japan, in coordination with the United States and Europe, contribute to creating a more systematic approach to non-political partnerships and effective financial support for the participating nations of the 3SI? The topic is still under-researched and as Japan’s strategic partnership was formalized just last year, now is an ideal time for experts from Japan, the United States, and the EU to identify opportunities and common challenges, and discuss ways to jointly implement a roadmap as strategic partners in the 3SI framework. As 2025 marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the 3SI, it is critical for Japan and the other strategic partners to start contributing concretely to the initiative and to deepen their engagement with the participating nations. The tenth summit of the 3SI was held in Warsaw on April 28-29, 2025, and GMF Indo-Pacific partnered with the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, to publish this volume, which gathers the findings and perspectives of five authors from Japan, Europe, and the United States. Prof. Beata Bochorodycz of Adam Mickiewicz University and Dr. Bart Gaens of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs offer a European perspective on Japan’s potential role in the 3SI. Bochorodycz argues that Japan’s engagement will contribute greatly to regional infrastructure development while counterbalancing Russian and Chinese influences in the region. Gaens asserts that Japan’s interest in 3SI is multifold and covers several different areas: business and economics, development and connectivity, and geopolitics. However, he argues that there are also several challenges that impede Tokyo’s stronger involvement, and offers recommendations on its future engagement with the CEE countries. Anthony Kim of the Heritage Foundation and Mirna Galic, formerly with the United States Institute of Peace, contribute to this volume from American perspectives. Kim emphasizes the importance of the 3SI as a platform for attracting private sector investors and encourages Japan to go beyond its political partnership, while Galic reflects on how the 3SI may benefit Japan’s interests and analyzes concrete ways in which Tokyo can support the initiative. Finally, Ambassador Akio Miyajima, who served as Japanese Ambassador to Poland from 2020-2024, leans on his direct experience to recount the strategic evolution of Japan’s engagement with the CEE countries. He examines the Japanese government’s perspective from its first concerns about the expansion of Chinese influence in Europe to the major strategic recalibration that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ambassador Miyajima concludes by analyzing the current global uncertainty stemming from the second Trump administration and offers recommendations on ways to strengthen Japan’s position as a strategic partner to the 3SI.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Defense Cooperation, Strategic Partnerships, and Three Seas Initiative
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

221. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:
Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

222. Russia and China in Central Asia’s Technology Stack

Author:
Dylan Welch
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Central Asia’s role as a geopolitical battleground among Russia, China, Europe, and the United States has grown in recent years as Western countries seek trade and digital connectivity routes that bypass Russian infrastructure. While Western discourse on a “Middle Corridor” through Central Asia has focused on railways, ports and pipelines, China’s Digital Silk Road is quietly reshaping the region’s digital landscape and deepening strategic dependencies on Beijing. At the same time, Central Asian governments are drawing primarily on PRC technologies and Russian regulatory models to strengthen their own digital authoritarian regimes, risking joint domination by the increasingly aligned governments in Beijing and Moscow. China’s increasing control over the region’s “technology stack” could have an outsized impact on the future of digital connectivity, cybersecurity, and geopolitical competition across Eurasia. Russia’s regulatory influence on the region’s governments could shape digital governance norms across Eurasia. For Central Asian actors and Western policymakers invested in preserving the region’s strategic autonomy, it is crucial to understand these vulnerabilities and offer viable alternatives in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Ensuring a resilient and diversified digital landscape in Central Asia is therefore not only a regional concern but a vital issue for global security. This report seeks to shed light on the influence of Russia and China on the ICT sectors of three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It uses the “technology stack” method adapted from two previous reports by GMF’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) on the future internet and the digital information stack released in 2020 and 2022. The framework is used to examine one country’s presence in and penetration of another country’s technology and regulatory ecosystem. The analysis of the resulting dependencies provides an indicative, rather than exhaustive overview of Russia and China’s technological footprint in Central Asia, offering key examples and highlighting areas where policymakers can focus their attention with the goal to de-risk digital technologies and governance in Central Asia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

223. Case Study on Conspiracy to Smuggle U.S.-Origin Military Equipment and Dual-Use Technology to North Korea

Author:
Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A Chinese national, Shenghua Wen, pleaded guilty in 2024 to conspiring with North Korea to export restricted items without a license, violating the U.S. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, and Executive Orders. At the direction of the North Korean government, Wen acted from his private residence in the United States, buying military goods domestically and providing false shipping information to send the items to Hong Kong, and then to North Korea. The case demonstrates that though North Korea can achieve limited success through such schemes, its agents face a high risk of exposure, detainment, and prosecution. Beyond firearms, ammunition, and other military equipment, North Korea sought civilian aircraft engine blueprints to manufacture engines for its drone program. At present, Wen’s scheme does not appear to indicate the presence of a more sophisticated smuggling network. Thus far, Wen’s partners/co-conspirators, the unnamed Hong Kong-based “broker,” and front company mentioned in the criminal complaint have not faced any punitive action from the U.S. government.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Smuggling, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

224. South Korea and the Middle East’s Defense Localization Drive: A New Strategic Fit

Author:
Bonggeun Kim
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Given South Korea’s willingness to offer technology transfer, local production arrangements, and politically flexible partnerships, it has become an attractive alternative to Western and Russian suppliers, presenting both opportunities and competitive challenges for U.S. policy in the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, and Localization
Political Geography:
Middle East, Asia, and South Korea

225. The Republic of Korea’s Contributions to Pacific Maritime Governance

Author:
Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a significant interest in Pacific maritime governance owing to its reliance on maritime trade, its security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region, and how the ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy intersects with its aspirations to become a “Global Pivotal State,” a term coined by the Yoon Suk Yeol government. The ROK's objectives and actions in Pacific maritime governance can be understood through its strategic perspectives, policies, contributions, and the challenges it faces. There are two ROK objectives related to Pacific maritime governance. The first is to ensure freedom of navigation. As a major trading nation, South Korea is highly dependent on sea routes connecting the Korean peninsula to the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Malacca Strait for its exports and imports, including critical energy and other resources. Safeguarding freedom of navigation in the West Pacific along with so-called “like-minded” countries is vital to its economic security, often labeled as protecting supply chains. Second, regional stability and security via enforcing alliance and alignment are critical. South Korea aims to contribute to maritime stability, particularly in response to increasing tensions involving regional power competition between China and the United States alongside Japan. In particular, the hegemonic challenger, China, has aggressively grown its military presence in the West Pacific. For South Korea, guarding against North Korea’s ever-growing military threat remains a priority. Strengthening alliances and security partnerships among like-minded countries in the region is critical. South Korea seeks to enhance security cooperation with key regional players such as the United States, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pacific Island countries such as Fiji to promote maritime governance.
Topic:
Governance, Maritime, Freedom of Movement, Regional Security, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

226. The Winds of Change: How China's Focus on Rare Earth Minerals Reshapes the World

Author:
Ian Murphy and Kevin Johnston
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article examines how rare earth minerals and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic dominance in the global economy affect U.S. national security. The PRC’s near monopoly on rare earth processing and its use of export controls as leverage pose significant risks to global supply chains and U.S. national security interests. This analysis explores contemporary PRC strategies in the rare earth sector and their implications for U.S. national security by explaining how the PRC’s view of international cooperation differs from the United States’ view. In essence, the PRC is using the transition to renewable energy to pursue its broader security goals and enhance its position in the global power hierarchy. Furthermore, the article offers policy recommendations aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring the secure and sustainable supply of resources critical to U.S. interests.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

227. NATO's Long Cold Front:​ Why NATO Must Reorganize Its Approach to Defending the European High North

Author:
Ryan R. Duffy, Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad M. Pillai
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces strategic vulnerabilities in the European high north due to growing Russian and Chinese collaboration. Leveraging scenario planning and enhanced integration of Nordic capabilities into Joint Force Command Norfolk is recommended to bolster Arctic deterrence. Clarified command structures, specialized polar-warfare units, targeted infrastructure investments, and expanded Joint exercises are essential. This would strengthen NATO’s Arctic posture, ensuring regional stability and enabling the U.S. strategic pivot toward countering China’s growing global influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

228. Chinese Arctic Expansion:​ How Beijing Benefits from Moscow’s Isolation

Author:
Mark Vicik
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused immediate disruption to the Arctic’s strategic environment. This shift has caused Russia to partner more closely with China, giving Beijing new opportunities to advance its goals in the region. This article explores the impacts that this shift could have on China’s activity in the Arctic. First, it describes the history of China in the Arctic to define its strategic objectives in the region. Then, it argues that the geopolitical changes following the war in Ukraine have given Beijing new opportunities to advance these Arctic goals. Finally, it assesses this shift’s strategic impact to the United States and its allies. This work provides a critical insight into changing power dynamics in the Arctic in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Civil-Military Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic

229. Power Play: Charging Up Strategic Competition over Lithium Battery Value Chains

Author:
Philip Murray
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article examines the strategic implications of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominance over the global lithium value chain and the resulting vulnerabilities for the U.S. Department of Defense. During several decades, through sustained strategic investments, the PRC has achieved a controlling position in the lithium market, encompassing mining, refining, and battery manufacturing. This control allows the PRC to influence lithium pricing and availability globally, posing significant economic and strategic risks to nations reliant on these supply chains, particularly the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Global Value Chains, Lithium, Batteries, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

230. The Arctic as a Periphery in U.S.-China Competition​

Author:
Charlotte Hulme
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
While China’s Arctic inroads have attracted growing attention from the United States, this article views Arctic competition as a periphery of global great power competition, or as a sideshow to the main theater of U.S.-China competition—the Indo-Pacific. Examining China’s Arctic activity from a peripheral perspective, it ultimately argues that the United States should sustain its current posture of not letting a nonpriority theater become a main event in its competition with China.
Topic:
Strategic Competition, Periphery, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

231. Revisiting Securitization Theory within the Context of North Korea: A Theoretical Analysis of the Success of Trump’s Policy

Author:
Tayyar Arı and Özge Gökçen Çetindişli
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This empirical study, grounded in securitization theory, questions whether the security utterances of former U.S. President Donald Trump on North Korea between January 20, 2017, and June 12, 2018, constituted only a securitizing move or evolved into a successful securitization practice. The research employs a hybrid methodology, combining discourse and content analyses supported by quantitative data. The focus is on analyzing the discourse within a corpus of 44 securitization statements made by the president. These statements were discerned through a comprehensive review of all the president's public remarks throughout the designated period, using queries such as “North Korea,” “Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),” “Kim Jong Un,” etc. Employing discourse analysis, the study reveals the referent objects and securitization arguments in these statements. The data gleaned from these statements is subsequently analyzed utilizing content analysis methodology. This study also evaluates the securitization discourse by examining its compliance with the facilitating conditions of an effective securitization rhetoric, a capable securitizer, and an audience-acceptable threat selection. Subsequently, it discusses the efficacy of the securitization discourse in terms of the two principal parameters proposed by the Copenhagen School: audience acceptance of the threat narrative contained in the securitizing moves, and the adoption of extraordinary measures.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un, and Securitization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

232. The Hegemonic Transition in Latin America: To What Extent is China Challenging US’s Hegemony?

Author:
Andoni Maiza-Larrarte and Ricardo Bustillo-Mesanza
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the geopolitical consequences of China’s enhanced engagement in Latin America. China is increasing its economic weight among Latin American countries, reinforcing its external image to counter the perception that the US is a unique relevant ally. In previous research, some authors have supported the idea that China could become a sort of neocolonial power in Latin America, substituting the hegemony of the United States. In this article, we carry out an in-depth review of Western literature and a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral relationship to discuss China’s role in the region. We apply the principles of the hegemonic stability and the power transition theories, and we also include an assessment of “soft power” components. We conclude that China is eroding US power in Latin America but is still far from becoming the new regional hegemon.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Transition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

233. The Functioning of Normative Power in the Logic of the EU and China

Author:
Emrah Yıldırımçakar
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Normative power has become a critical topic of discussion in International Relations and Political Science scholarship, particularly in the context of the normative power of the European Union (EU) and China. However, academic attention has been excessively directed toward investigating the normative power of the European Union rather than that of China. Given the EU’s unique status as a supranational and multinational entity consisting of multiple member states, its process of diffusion of normative power differs significantly from that of China. In this context, this study aims to explore and compare the normative power dynamics maintained by the EU and China in the international arena, examine the approaches, strategies, and outcomes of both the EU and China by providing a detailed understanding of how each party implements normative power, and explore the inequalities in normative power acquisition strategies between these two actors.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Political Science, and Norms
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

234. Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the Philippines in the South China Sea

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The South China Sea has long been the subject of territorial and maritime disputes between Beijing, Manila, and other claimants. Since late 2022, escalating confrontations between Philippine and Chinese forces over tiny maritime features such as Second Thomas Shoal have posed a serious and growing risk of a military confrontation, which could in turn entangle the United States. Washington can avoid this worst-case scenario by charting a pragmatic approach and upholding its alliance commitment to the Philippines while avoiding military actions that would needlessly provoke China. The data in this brief show a dramatic increase of maritime incidents starting in the third quarter of 2023. China and the Philippines are disputing control over, among other things, what are little more than specks in the ocean, most located a hundred miles or more from the mainland of either country. However, maritime rights and jurisdiction are significant issues, and there is no question that Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea has been provocative and coercive. Moreover, an international tribunal has ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines in the dispute, decisively rejecting China’s “historic” claims around the “nine/ten dash line.” The U.S. relationship with the Philippines represents one of the United States’ oldest treaty alliances in the Global South and is important to America’s Pacific strategy. But the South China Sea conflict does not represent a threat of conquest of the Philippine mainland. Washington should recognize that defending maritime rights and tiny land features in waters half a world away is not a vital U.S. national interest and could become a serious liability should it open the door to a high-intensity conflict with China. An honest assessment of U.S. interests dictates a strategy of restraint in the South China Sea. While recognizing Manila’s agency and continuing to strengthen Philippine capacities, Washington should also encourage Manila to engage constructively with Beijing to prevent escalation. Crucially, U.S. policymakers must also avoid raising the risk of conflict by drawing the Philippines into taking a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. Washington can help preserve and uphold international law in the South China Sea while reducing the risk of war between the United States and China by taking the following steps: Do not pull the U.S.–Philippines alliance into the Taiwan theater. Washington should not add to its nine existing military sites in the Philippines and, ideally, should disband one or more of the new sites located in northern Luzon (closer to Taiwan) in exchange for Chinese concessions. Do not give the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard a frontal role in countering Chinese intrusions in the South China Sea; enable Manila to take the lead instead. Do not seek to draw the military of U.S. allies (particularly extra-regional ones) into South China Sea disputes, in order to avoid needlessly heightening Chinese perceptions of bloc-formation and armed encirclement. Enhance diplomatic support to Manila for its legitimate claims under international law. Provide aid, capabilities, and intelligence for modernizing the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy and enhancing maritime domain awareness. Build on the early success of the July 2024 Philippines–China understanding on Second Thomas Shoal by emphasizing preventive diplomacy and crisis management to stabilize the maritime dispute and reduce the chances of a conflict spiral.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

235. Beyond Strategic Ambiguity: Supporting Taiwan Without a Commitment to War

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The first brief in this series made the case that Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying a war between the United States and China. This second brief outlines how Washington can transition from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity in a manner that continues to deter Beijing from coercing Taipei while ruling out direct American military intervention in defense of the island. This brief recommends that, in the short to medium term, the United States should maintain its standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan while also carrying out necessary preparations for a noninterventionist policy shift. These preparations include: A clear statement from Washington that it opposes any unilateral move by Taipei to achieve formal independence. A revitalization of the eroding One China Policy. A reaffirmation of U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. A bolstering of the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan and nearby treaty allies. Encouragement and support for those in Japan who seek to ease tensions with China and wish to cultivate cooperative Sino–Japanese and Sino–American relationships. The initiation of a results-oriented strategic dialogue with China. The expansion of mutually beneficial trade, investment, and technology exchanges with Taiwanese companies and the offshoring of Taiwanese high-tech capabilities. Once these necessary, gradual preparations have been made, the U.S. president should explicitly state that America will not go to war with China to defend Taiwan but that the United States will support Taiwan — and the development of an improved cross-strait environment — in every other way possible. This policy shift is necessary because ongoing military and political trends are eroding the ability of the United States to deter and reassure China, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The One China Policy is deteriorating, the Taiwanese public increasingly rejects any political association with China, and China is expanding its reliance on military displays, which undermines the credibility of the Chinese commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. More generally, U.S.–China relations continue to worsen. This trajectory renders the standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, which accepts the possibility of a direct U.S. war with China, dangerous and misaligned with U.S. interests. The above preparatory changes will require considerable diplomatic finesse and sustained attention over a considerable period of time. Given the weakened National Security Council and the virtual collapse of the past interagency coordinating process for policy development under President Trump, these required qualities might be in short supply at present. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be able to correct these deficiencies. It is unlikely China would respond to the strategy outlined here by attempting to reunify with Taiwan by force. This is because of the still high — and, in some areas, increased — risks confronting any Chinese use of force and because of the fact that this policy shift would likely increase Beijing’s confidence in eventually reaching a peaceful resolution of the issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

236. Taiwan: An Important but Non-Vital U.S. Interest

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint that could trigger a direct war between the United States and China. It is critical, therefore, to examine whether or not Taiwan constitutes a vital U.S. interest. This brief asserts that Taiwan is an important but not vital U.S. interest. It is not an interest that justifies the United States going to war with China to defend. A direct war between the United States and China would be cataclysmic and cause extraordinary damage to the global economy. It would risk heavy U.S. military losses and possible nuclear escalation. It is also unclear whether the United States would prevail. Taiwan must be a truly vital interest to justify such risks. While it is important to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan and prevent a regional war that would destabilize East Asia, proponents of a U.S. defense of Taiwan by all means necessary exaggerate Taiwan’s strategic value and China’s military threat to East Asia. Taiwan is neither central to America’s ability to ensure a stable and prosperous Asia open to U.S. economic and political engagement nor is it a critical location for the United States to oppose Chinese hegemony in Asia. China views Taiwan primarily through a political lens. Beijing has not expressed the intent to use the annexation of the island as a stepping stone toward regional hegemony. Moreover, possession of Taiwan would not give China that capacity. The United States is not formally obligated to militarily defend Taiwan, in contrast to its security commitments to treaty allies Japan and South Korea. Washington does have a vital interest in maintaining its security commitments to Tokyo and Seoul — two robust economies and major technology innovators that are each more critical geostrategically than Taiwan. Taiwan does possess considerable value in its high-tech capabilities, producing 60 percent of the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors. But replicating this production capacity in the United States and other Western countries would be far less costly than fighting a war with China over Taiwan. Although Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying war and is not a treaty ally, the United States still has a strong interest in preventing Chinese coercion of this U.S.–aligned democracy. An accompanying brief presents an alternative approach to supporting Taiwan while maintaining U.S. credibility with critical Asian allies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Strategic Interests, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

237. Asean y la UE. Estrategias y oportunidades para Indonesia y España

Author:
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti and Alodia Pérez
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
Este documento analiza el potencial de fortalecer las relaciones entre la Unión Europea (UE) y la ASEAN, destacando el rol estratégico de España e Indonesia. Ambos bloques comparten valores como el multilateralismo y enfrentan desafíos comunes como el cambio climático, la tensión entre EE. UU. y China, y la necesidad de integración comercial. España e Indonesia, potencias marítimas y economías emergentes, pueden liderar iniciativas en defensa, comercio, digitalización, educación e innovación. Se propone revitalizar la cooperación bilateral, avanzar en nuevos acuerdos de defensa y vigilancia marítima. Además, se destaca la urgencia de concluir el Acuerdo de Asociación Económica UE-Indonesia, promoviendo el comercio y la inversión verde. En educación y cultura, se plantea intensificar los intercambios universitarios e investigaciones conjuntas. Finalmente, se sugiere elevar la relación bilateral a una Asociación Estratégica y fomentar una agenda común en foros multilaterales para un orden global más justo y cooperativo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Multilateralism, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Spain, United States of America, and ASEAN

238. Asean and the EU. Strategic opportunities for Indonesia and Spain

Author:
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti and Oviedo Pérez
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
This document analyzes the potential for strengthening relations between the European Union (EU) and ASEAN, highlighting the strategic role of Spain and Indonesia. Both blocs share values such as multilateralism and face common challenges, including climate change, tensions between the U.S. and China, and the need for trade integration. Spain and Indonesia, as maritime powers and emerging economies, can lead initiatives in defense, trade, digitalization, education, and innovation. The document proposes revitalizing bilateral cooperation and advancing new agreements in defense and maritime surveillance. It also emphasizes the urgency of concluding the EU-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement to promote trade and green investment. In the fields of education and culture, it suggests intensifying university exchanges and joint research. Finally, it recommends elevating the bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership and promoting a shared agenda in multilateral forums for a more just and cooperative global order.
Topic:
Climate Change, Geopolitics, Economy, Multilateralism, Industry, ASEAN, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Indonesia, Asia, Spain, Southeast Asia, and ASEAN

239. The Japan, China, Iran Triangle: Strategic Implications for Israel

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Japan balances between Iran and the West and China deepens its ties to Tehran, Israel faces a shifting landscape demanding new regional approaches
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

240. The Tehran–Moscow–Beijing Triangle

Author:
Yaakov Lappin
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The revisionist bloc reshaping global power balances—and the dangers it poses for Israel and the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Palestine

241. China’s De-dollarisation Initiatives: Strategies and Constraints

Author:
Zongyuan Zoe Liu
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
A decade ago, renminbi internationalisation was a hot topic; today, it’s part of a broader, more strategic push toward de-dollarisation – accelerated by Western sanctions on Russia. While China’s efforts to globalise its currency began earlier, the risk of financial exclusion has intensified its urgency. Beijing’s approach is pragmatic and multi-pronged: it is deepening engagement with regional and non-Western partners developing renminbi-based infrastructure for cross-border payments, and leveraging its dominance in clean energy supply chains to promote renminbi pricing in key commodities. These strategies aim to enhance the renminbi’s role in trade and settlement while persistent structural factors – shallow capital markets and limited investor confidence – remain stumbling blocks for China’s currency becoming a global store of value. That may just be fine with Beijing, at least in the near to medium term. No evidence suggests China plans to dethrone the US dollar or replace the US dollar with the renminbi as the global dominant currency. China’s immediate goal is to insulate itself from financial sanctions in the dollar-based system. In a world where access to American banks and US dollar can be weaponised, China regards a functional alternative for cross-border settlement as a strategic necessity. With a trade-dependent economy and a leadership wary of volatility, China’s priority is currency stability, not supremacy.
Topic:
Political Economy, Governance, Currency, and Financial Services
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

242. China-EU@50: Assessing the Ups and Downs of the Relationship

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In Europe there co-exist concurrent, and often contradictory, images of China, which explains why Sino-European economic relations continue to thrive notwithstanding the political coldness of the last years. While the EU’s leadership views Xi Jinping’s China as a ‘systemic rival’ and the main enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Beijing continues to be seen also as an opportunity by EU companies, universities and civil society groups. China’s dual image – that of a daunting challenge and a formidable opportunity – has characterised the Sino-European relationship since the mid-1970s.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

243. China's Quiet Footprint: Mapping Chinese Influence on Local Politics and the Economic Landscape in Kosovo

Author:
Adelina Hasani
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
China’s strategy to exert influence in Kosovo primarily centers on economic engagement and disinformation campaigns. However, recently, China has also shown a tendency to organize meetings with local authorities and develop cooperation across various fields, including the economy, culture, and the arts. Despite not recognizing Kosovo’s independence and lacking formal diplomatic relations, China engages through indirect channels, particularly trade, with the tendency to create municipal partnerships and connections with local businesses. This approach aligns with the Tao Guang Yang Hui principle, China’s grand strategy emphasizing the pursuit of national interests while avoiding overt confrontation. In contrast to Russia’s aggressive approach, China quietly expands its influence through soft power mechanisms, minimizing political friction while steadily deepening its economic presence. This approach is rooted in the Tao Guang Yang Hui principle or China’s grand strategy that emphasizes maintaining a low profile while quietly pursuing national interests. Under this doctrine, China seeks incremental gains while avoiding actions that might draw suspicion, provoke resistance, or force political commitments that could undermine its domestic priorities. This stands in sharp contrast to Russia’s more overtly assertive and confrontational strategy. Although China and Russia are often grouped together as external or malign influences in Kosovo, their strategies and objectives differ significantly. Russia pursues a confrontational approach, seeking to maintain a network of allies and proxies across the Western Balkans to counterbalance Western and U.S. influence. Rather than engaging directly in Kosovo, Russia treats the country as a geopolitical flashpoint, advancing its interests through regional partnerships and political alignment. In contrast, China’s approach follows its Tao Guang Yang Hui grand strategy, emphasizing subtle, long-term influence. It utilizes tools such as foreign direct investment, trade, business partnerships, and municipal-level cooperation, depending on what is feasible. By bypassing national institutions and often engaging directly with local actors, China minimizes political pushback while gradually deepening its presence and influence. This paper examines the contrasting strategies of Russia and China in Kosovo, with a particular focus on China’s expanding role through economic cooperation and its growing engagement with local-level institutions. Drawing comparisons with China’s broader involvement across Western Balkan countries - where its presence is often more visible and influential, such as in Serbia - the analysis highlights how China adapts its global grand strategy to regional and local contexts. Although China does not maintain diplomatic relations with Kosovo, lacks investments, and Kosovo is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative’s 16+ framework, China remains active in trade cooperation and increasingly seeks partnerships at the local level, particularly in economic, cultural, and artistic fields. The paper explores how China builds relationships with municipalities and businesses, often operating discreetly, to expand its soft power and influence public perception, especially at the community level. China’s presence in the Western Balkans has increased steadily over the past decade, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, which serves as the primary vehicle for engaging countries in the region. Beyond economic motives, these investments are part of a broader geopolitical strategy that tends to shape global norms and institutions and secure support from smaller states such as those in the Western Balkans in international fora like the UN. This growing influence should also be seen in the context of rising global tensions, where a bifurcated world order, reminiscent of the Cold War, is taking shape. With the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, China has intensified efforts to challenge U.S. financial dominance. Western Balkans thus emerge not only as a strategic corridor into Europe but also as a critical region where China’s expanding influence may directly challenge the EU and broader Western presence. This research analyzes China’s soft influence in the Western Balkans through the lens of its grand strategy, with a particular focus on Kosovo. The analysis begins by exploring how China’s grand strategy is formulated at the global level and how it is adapted regionally, particularly in Kosovo, where China does not maintain diplomatic relations. A key objective is to shed light on China’s approach in the region, especially its efforts to build influence through business ties and local-level engagement. By unpacking China’s global strategy and examining its localized application, the study aims to inform the development of a clear, context-specific response by the government of Kosovo to mitigate China’s influence, particularly that which is pursued through non-transparent means.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Disinformation, Foreign Influence, and Economic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Kosovo, and Balkans

244. Artificial intelligence in financial security: Legal challenges in Japan’s AML/CFT regime and comparative insights from selected EU countries

Author:
Dawid Trela
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This study examines the legal and regulatory challenges in deploying artificial intelligence (AI) within anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing (AML/CFT) systems in Japan (focal case) and in Germany, France, and Poland (purposive comparators). It identifies intra- and cross-jurisdictional gaps; assesses alignment with FATF Recommendations 1 and 15, the GDPR, and the EU AI Act; and distils transferable best practices. Doctrinal legal analysis and normative comparative methodology were employed, with limited functional observations where supervisory practice is documented. Sources include statutes and regulations, supervisory guidance, and case law issued from May 2015–May 2025, notably the EU AML package (Reg. (EU) 2024/1624; Dir. (EU) 2024/1640; Reg. (EU) 2024/1620) and the AI Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1689), as well as FATF materials and national guidance (BaFin, CNIL/Tracfin, JFSA). All jurisdictions permit AI in AML/CFT, yet frameworks remain fragmented and under-specified for algorithmic decision-making. Key gaps concern liability for algorithmic outcomes; tensions between transparency/explainability and tippingoff; and safeguards for automated decisions (GDPR Art. 22). Germany/France show higher supervisory maturity (explainability, auditability, DPIA, human-in-the-loop), whereas Japan/Poland rely chiefly on general data-protection duties with limited AML/AI-specific guidance, indicating the need for governance-heavy, auditable, human-in-the-loop designs. Better coordination of the AML, AI, and data-protection regimes is required to ensure both effectiveness and fundamental-rights protection. Japan could benefit from EU practices by formalising human-in-the-loop requirements for high-impact AML decisions, mandating DPIAs, enhancing auditability/reporting for high-risk models, and expanding regulatory sandboxing. The EU should continue aligning the AI Act with the AML Regulation (via AMLA guidance), clarifying oversight, documentation, and explainability expectations for AML use cases.
Topic:
European Union, Accountability, Artificial Intelligence, Data Protection, and Financial Security
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Poland, Germany, Japan, and Asia

245. When Citizen Action for Accountability Boosts Legislative Oversight: The Multiply-Ed Experience in the Philippines

Author:
Joy Aceron and Abrehet Gebremedhin
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
The Philippines has long been confronting an education crisis. This was exacerbated by Covid-19, which prevented tens of millions of public school students from going to school. As a response, the national government developed a new education system to enable learners to continue learning amid the global health emergency. Such drastic changes in the education system and long-standing systemic problems in education governance prompted accountability checks to be undertaken in state and society to ensure responsiveness to learners and effectiveness in bringing forth education reforms. This Accountability Note on education reform in the Philippines presents an empirical pathway by which two distinct but complementary bodies have interfaced for a shared agenda of systemic education reform. These two parallel processes—an independent, citizen-led civil society organization, Multiply-Ed, and a congressional oversight committee, the Education Commission II (EDCOM II)—emerged with overlapping findings, actions, and agendas, showing the value of synergy between citizen-led action and government oversight. We demonstrate that accountability processes within the state and society can converge and reinforce each other even when there is no normalized collaboration. Common issues are tackled, institutional interfacing paves the way for information and knowledge to be shared, and commitment to the overarching shared goal of education reform is reaffirmed. However, even beyond converging findings, independent citizen-led monitoring like that conducted by Multiply-Ed has a distinct added value for the education sector. Through its movement-based approach to accountability, Multiply-Ed has identified an action-oriented reform agenda overlooked by legislative oversight mechanisms, that can help advance and sustain the reforms. This Accountability Note provides key takeaways for both social constituencies and government duty-bearers seeking to identify and address shared agendas through accountability. • Independent accountability efforts of state oversight bodies such as EDCOM II and citizen-led monitoring initiatives like Multiply-Ed can produce shared agendas and findings that are mutually reinforcing and may lead to progress towards common goals. • In the case of the interface between civil society accountability efforts and government oversight in the education sector in the Philippines, a shared agenda of enhancing the role of local governments, ensuring timely access to learning resources, ensuring teaching quality, and providing an adequate budget for education has been reinforced. • By bringing in the perspectives of citizens through platforms such as school governance councils, independent citizen-led monitoring provides a distinct added value beyond state oversight, offering solutions that are action-oriented and systemic, and sustain accountability amid the dynamics of political elites. • Mutually-reinforcing agendas and processes shared between civil society accountability actors and government oversight bodies can be key to harnessing state-society synergy, and pivotal in enabling progress towards power-shifting reforms.
Topic:
Civil Society, Education, Governance, Reform, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

246. Upwelling: Fishers Organizing for their Rights and Sustainable Fisheries

Author:
Judy Gearhart and Connor Moynihan
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
Fishers face increased risks to their lives and livelihoods. Climate change and overfishing are sending fishers out to sea for longer periods of time or at distances beyond the capacity of their vessels. In response, fishers are pursuing new strategies to organize, build power, and defend their rights. This paper presents lessons from fisher organizing in diverse sectors. It aligns with the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 188 (C 188) on Work in Fishing, which defines fishers as all those working in marine capture, from artisanal fisherfolk to workers on the distant water fleet (DWF). The research reviews organizing trends in six countries and identifies common challenges and factors contributing to fisher organizing. In all six countries—Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand—new organizing initiatives have recently emerged. This research considers a range of dynamics that affect fisher organizing and their ability to access information, seek remedy, and influence policy outcomes. It provides insights from interviews with organizers and other fishery experts. The findings highlight areas where more work and strategizing are needed to build stronger and more influential fisher organizations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Sustainability, Labor Rights, and Fisheries
Political Geography:
Africa, Indonesia, Taiwan, Asia, Latin America, Mexico, Thailand, Ghana, and Ecuador

247. Ten Dimensions of Network Strengthening: Lessons from Health Rights Advocates in Guatemala, Mexico, and the Philippines

Author:
Julia Fischer-Mackey, Joy Aceron, Hilda Argüello Avendaño, Benilda Batzín, Francisco Gómez Guillén, and Rosaura Medina
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
Maintaining and strengthening networks of volunteers is central to the health rights advocacy work of four civil society organizations (CSOs) in Guatemala, Mexico, and the Philippines who have worked through networks to improve reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent healthcare (RMNCAH) services for marginalized communities. Their experience shows that networks of volunteers that represent marginalized populations and have the skills to engage with public authorities at different levels of government can confront the political and policy issues necessary to improve RMNCAH care. This Accountability Note captures the reflections of these CSOs on ten dimensions of network strengthening that they consider critical to their efforts to strengthen volunteer networks.
Topic:
Civil Society, Advocacy, Public Health, Marginalization, and Volunteers
Political Geography:
Asia, Philippines, Latin America, Mexico, and Guatemala

248. Under-utilised Plants as Future Food – Transforming Food Systems to Enhance Food Security

Author:
Paul Teng
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Under-utilised plants have great potential to be the “future food” that transforms food systems to make them more resilient to climate change and supply chain disruptions. What would it take to mainstream them?
Topic:
Climate Change, Food Security, Supply Chains, and Food Systems
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Global Focus

249. China Trying to Strengthen Dialogue with India

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
China sees India as its main rival in Asia. However, the Chinese authorities are maintaining a dialogue with the Indian government, recently even signalling a conciliatory attitude. In this way, they want to prevent an escalation in bilateral relations and try to influence India’s relations with the U.S. and the European Union in a way that is beneficial to China. Although China’s attempts to strengthen dialogue with India are tactical in nature, even a short-term improvement in bilateral relations poses a challenge for the EU. Attempts to reduce Europe’s dependence on China, in which India is to play an important role, are now in question.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

250. China Launches the International Organisation for Mediation

Author:
Stefania Kolarz and Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
China is introducing the International Organisation for Mediation (IOMed), which became operational on 29 August, as a complement to the international dispute resolution system. In practice, it is another initiative to gather countries of the Global South around China and intended to be a counterweight to international institutions they consider to be dominated by Western countries.
Topic:
Global South, International Institutions, Dispute Resolution, and International Organization for Mediation (IOMed)
Political Geography:
China and Asia