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81. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

82. China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China's Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings

Author:
Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Xi Jinping has played a direct and active role in China’s naval buildup. He is China’s first great navalist statesman, the world’s greatest navalist leader today, and among the world’s greatest navalist statesmen in modern history. Notwithstanding major advances in ships, submarines, aircraft, and other hardware, Chinese military leaders believe that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to lag behind in human factors. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PLAN has dismissed (or is rumored to have dismissed) eleven flag officers. Beyond combating outright dysfunction, these removals are intended to prevent potential disloyalty and factionalism, centralize power, and further modernization and warfighting goals. These high-profile dismissals have had no apparent impact on PLAN operational capabilities, which continue to improve at a remarkable rate. From the Taiwan Strait to the “distant oceans” (远洋), the service is present daily and visible internationally, particularly its surface fleet, indicating reliability, trust, and growing responsibilities and capabilities. Since 2008, the PLAN’s surface fleet has almost doubled. Despite being projected to exceed 400 ships by the end of 2025, China’s Navy continues to successfully crew, operate, and train with them. China’s Navy draws on a massive, sufficiently-capable talent pool and education system. Provincial-level compulsory conscription quotas avoid individual compellence thanks to high levels of volunteerism. Given the demands of increasingly frequent and intense training and missions—often with the austere privations of submarines or remote installations—mental health support is increasingly prioritized. Nevertheless, it remains a weakness for China’s Navy, which views U.S. care as the gold standard yet has treated counseling as a “political” issue. China’s Naval Command College in Nanjing—the Naval War College’s closest equivalent—educates its students differently from its counterpart in Newport by focusing on naval operations and warfighting for top-priority scenarios. The PLAN enjoys unique human capital advantages: educational partnerships as early as elementary school; personal data compiled centrally, available and utilizable without privacy restriction; eldercare benefits; and warfighting-focused naval education. PLAN sources perceive weaknesses in lack of talent for new-domain operations and advanced S&T given rising demand in these burgeoning areas; recruitment and training pipeline supply-demand imbalance and talent-skills mismatches; officers’ overly narrow early-career experience and subsequent aging out of cutting-edge relevance; and youths’ declining commitment to the Communist system. Despite being an improvement on its Soviet progenitor, China’s Political Commissar system could represent a critical weakness, causing real-time decision-making bottlenecks or distraction, particularly in crisis or conflict.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Human Capital, Xi Jinping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Nanjing

83. China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
Julia Famularo
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
People’s Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement operations function as forms of cognitive and legal warfare. They represent a clear effort to undermine international maritime law as well as Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC asserts that the Taiwan Strait comprises multiple “zones,” to include “internal waters, territorial sea, [the] contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone.” While China does not explicitly claim that the waters of the Taiwan Strait wholly constitute PRC sovereign territory, it clearly implies that it has the self-defined right to exercise distinct forms of control over different zones of the Strait. While stressing that China “respects the lawful rights of other countries in relevant waters,” the PRC exploits the absence of the term “international waters” in UNCLOS to assert non-existent sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait. China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and beyond. The overzealous execution of “law enforcement” operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands represents an effort to signal that the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration is incapable of conducing effective patrols. It also reinforces the narrative that the PRC possesses legal jurisdiction over waters within the First Island Chain, thereby undermining the lawful rights of Taiwan and neighboring states. The PRC very likely believes that employing China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) assets to implement a sea-based quarantine would remain below the threshold of conflict, effectively mitigating the risk of escalation and preventing third-party intervention. As joint MSA and CCG operations grow in scope, scale, and complexity, China is gradually exercising the skills necessary to seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands and potentially seek to force Taiwan leaders to the negotiating table. Under China’s revised maritime law enforcement legal framework, leaders in Beijing could authorize the establishment of exclusion zones to prevent foreign vessels from entering into and operating in PRC-claimed waters, as well as board and inspect ships within the exclusion zone. China could also potentially attempt to divert ships to regional PRC ports for customs inspection and clearance. Beijing furthermore could authorize the use of “all necessary means”—to include the use of force—to implement its quarantine and counter perceived threats to its national security and sovereignty. A PRC decision to implement a quarantine, rather than a full military blockade, would force the United States and its key allies and partners to decide how to react effectively while themselves also mitigating the risk of substantial military escalation. Response options could comprise targeted sanctions or military escorts for commercial vessels carrying critical supplies.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Navy, Maritime, Jurisdiction, Coast Guard, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Taiwan Strait

84. China Maritime Report #49: The PLAN Corruption Paradox: Insights from the 1st Destroyer Flotilla

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Like all organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suffers from endemic corruption, defined as the personal abuse of power for selfish ends. Corruption occurs when PLAN leaders use their power to: 1) influence personnel decisions in exchange for money and/or favor; and 2) extract kickbacks for influencing decisions in the contracting/procurement process for equipment and materiel, construction projects, and other service requirements. Despite widespread corruption in the PLAN, the service has continued to grow and modernize at an astonishing rate. One explanation for this paradox is that the PLAN has strived to keep corruption from infecting the personnel selection process in operational units, which matter most for combat power generation. For at least two decades, the PLAN’s anti-corruption “watchdog”—the Discipline Inspection Commission—has prioritized scrutiny over those units and personnel most directly responsible for the “preparation for military struggle.” This top-down approach has combined with efforts by the units themselves—likely driven by the self-interest of the unit Party Committee, which must answer for poor unit performance—to enact policies to ensure that the best candidates are chosen for leadership positions. The case of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla illustrates policies adopted by operational units to ensure the integrity of the personnel selection process. These include formulating clear regulations stipulating minimum qualifications for leadership positions, adopting strict standards for officer evaluation, and carrying out a transparent selection process. The Flotillas’ personnel selection process entails knowledge and skills competitions judged by senior unit members and incorporates feedback and inputs from other members of the unit. Due to the approaches adopted by units such as the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, individuals in positions of power have less leeway to engage in corrupt behavior, thereby increasing the probability that the most capable officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) will be selected for leadership positions.
Topic:
Corruption, Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

85. China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (海上侦察) units. Located in China’s coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called “information boats” (信息船). China’s maritime militia has developed a cadre of intelligence specialists who serve the function of collecting intelligence and reporting it to the PLA. These militia members, called “information personnel” (信息员), generally deploy with militia vessels tasked with reconnaissance missions, but may also embark on boats from other types of militia units. While at sea, maritime militia intelligence personnel maintain close contact with the PLA units that oversee militia operations, called People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). PAFDs direct militia reconnaissance operations and receive incoming intelligence reports, which they then share with operational PLA forces. As part-time soldiers, often with comparatively low education levels, maritime militia intelligence personnel cannot meet the same performance standards as intelligence specialists in the PLA. However, the existence of a large cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists ensures a basic level of competence across the force and guarantees that capable personnel are available for important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Given China’s aspirations to become a global naval power, it makes sense that the PLA leverage the latent ISR capacity of China’s distant-water fishing fleet and Chinese owned/operated merchant vessels. PLA experts have argued for embarking intelligence personnel on Chinese vessels operating abroad, and it is likely that this is already happening.
Topic:
Intelligence, Navy, Maritime, Espionage, Militias, Reconnaissance, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

86. China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.” In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard. Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception. Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective. Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war. American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action. War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures. Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

87. Sea Dragons: Special Operations and Chinese Military Strategy

Author:
John Chen and Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
As China continues to rise as a global sea power, its maritime strategy continues to evolve. Among these critical evolutions is one of the People’s Liberation Army’s naval special operations forces’ most elite units: the Sea Dragons. A small yet highly specialized unit, the Sea Dragons entered the global spotlight and international consciousness with the 2018 film Operation Red Sea, raising several questions for Chinese naval experts. What does Chinese military strategy and doctrine require of special forces, and specifically naval SOF, to be able to accomplish the mission, particularly along the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea? What are their capabilities and limitations? What real-world experience do they have and how might they be employed in the future? This volume attempts to answer those questions and many more regarding one of China’s more enigmatic units and its role in future peacetime and low-intensity conflicts.
Topic:
Maritime, Special Operations, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Sea Dragons
Political Geography:
China and Asia

88. The Bandung Spirit

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
In 1955, the leaders of former Global South colonies met in Bandung, Indonesia, brought together by a common spirit for national liberation and cooperation. Seventy years later, is there any trace of it left?
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, History, Global South, and Internationalism
Political Geography:
Africa, Indonesia, and Asia

89. The Joy of Reading

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
Reading and popular literacy programmes have played an important role in revolutionary processes, from the Mexican, Chinese, and Russian revolutions in the early twentieth century to today.
Topic:
Revolution, Literacy, and Reading
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, Latin America, and Mexico

90. The Geopolitical Impact of USAID’s Retreat on Humanitarian Aid: Towards a Complementary Approach between China and the EU?

Author:
Edouard Xia and Alexandre Piron
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Trump’s decision to cut funding and stop most of USAID’s projects will have lasting consequences. First and foremost, it adds great pressure on an already big funding gap. Forgotten and underfunded crises will suffer from it. But Trump’s action will also bear an effect on the nature of humanitarian aid itself. USAID’s retreat accelerates a geopolitical shift. China, “Champion of the Global South”, will inevitably fill the void and promote its own model of foreign aid. Development, economic and humanitarian rationales are therefore expected to be increasingly mixed at the expense of a principled approach. What could in turn the EU, and Belgium within it, do? Could they play the role of a “missing link” and promote a complementary approach to China? This brief offers insights on some questions ahead of the upcoming European Humanitarian Forum.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

91. Military policy toward China: The case against overreaction

Author:
John Mueller
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
It is often argued that the policies of containment and military deterrence worked against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and many have urged applying these same policies to China today. However, it is not clear that containment was all that successful during the Cold War nor is it clear that it should now be applied to China. Should it pursue the “hegemonic” ambitions often attributed to it, China, like the USSR, may prove its own worst enemy by overstretching its resources and provoking its neighbors. In any case, China does not seem to harbor hegemonic ambitions. Its existing gestures at global influence, like the Belt and Road Initiative, are in disarray and unlikely to work. Rather than rushing to more forcefully contain or balance China, the United States should let China make its own mistakes. Doing nothing or next to nothing against a perceived threat isn’t always wise or politically popular but in this case it’s the most rational choice. The U.S. can wait for China to mellow while warily profiting from China’s economic size and problems to the degree possible and expanding mutually beneficial exchange. The U.S. can also help Taiwan prepare to defend itself while maintaining that the island is independent so long as it doesn’t say so.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Deterrence, and Containment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

92. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

93. Target Taiwan: One China and cross-strait stability

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Washington should not move away from the One China policy, as doing so would increase the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” remains appropriate to the volatile cross-strait situation, but some policymakers overestimate the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Recent administrations have taken steps to undermine the One China policy as part of an American strategy to counter China across the board, but this has had the deleterious effect of causing the U.S. and China to come to the brink of war over Taiwan. A realist approach to the Taiwan issue accepts and even seeks to strengthen both strategic ambiguity and the One China policy. In doing so, it increases the odds of negotiated solutions to disagreements while ensuring U.S. military forces are in a less vulnerable and volatile defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Invasion, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

94. Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific: China’s Use of the Instruments of Power

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The first report in this series examined Chinese and Russian influence and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This report, the second of five in the series, analyzes China’s use of the instruments of power to build its influence and advance its interests in a region it sees as vital to its future. We use a modified version of the DIME framework (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) here, with the modification being that we do not analyze the information instruments separately. Even in an information environment as controlled as China’s, the state has multiple ways to shape the information space—some official and some unofficial, some acknowledged and others unacknowledged. Given these facts, a separate examination of the information instrument is beyond the scope of this report. Although it does not explicitly analyze the information instrument, the report weaves Beijing’s use of information throughout the narrative. The report analyzes Beijing’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments in the Indo-Pacific region, and then examines how Russia perceives China’s activity in the region. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, the report examines Chinese activity in the following subregions: Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Japan/East China Sea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)/South China Sea, and India.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Power Politics, Economy, Strategic Interests, Influence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

95. Clearing the Path for Nuclear Disarmament: Confidence-building in the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper explores possibilities for building confidence in the Korean peninsula to address the conflict dynamics and militarization in the region. It argues that a key reason for the failure of past diplomatic efforts has been the coercive approach in pursuit of immediate nuclear disarmament in North Korea. In addition to a more incremental approach to North Korean–United States nuclear diplomacy focused on arms control, the paper highlights the need for reciprocity in terms of sanctions relief, as well as more robust confidence-building measures aimed at reducing instability and addressing the security rationales behind North Korea’s nuclear policy. At the same time, it proposes embedding nuclear diplomacy into a broader framework of cooperative risk reduction and arms control that also includes South Korea and possibly other regional actors. If sustained over time, such a framework could ultimately also promote nuclear disarmament alongside the normalization of political relations between key conflict parties.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

96. Security Cooperation between Japan and the Nordic States in Uncertain Times

Author:
Fei Su, Jingdong Yuan, and Jiayi Zhou
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Amid rising geopolitical tensions and global uncertainty, security dynamics between Japan and the Nordic states are evolving. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Japanese and Nordic security concerns have increasingly converged. Security cooperation between the two regions has expanded through bilateral initiatives and within broader frameworks such as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite limitations in states’ resources and political will to operate beyond their immediate neighbourhood, there is mutual recognition of the need to engage more actively, individually and collectively, on security matters. This shared awareness provides a foundation for deeper cooperation in support of both regional and global security.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Threat Perception, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Asia, and Nordic Nations

97. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. Current Status of ASEAN Data Governance and Its Implications for the Digital Economy Framework Agreement

Author:
Shota Watanabe, Ema Ogura, and Keita Oikawa
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The transition to data-driven societies has heightened the importance of balancing the free flow of data with robust data protection for privacy, intellectual property, trade secrets, and national security. While different countries have introduced various data governance frameworks, including comprehensive privacy laws, differences in regulations across borders hinder data flow, increasing compliance costs and limiting business expansion, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. The concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), introduced at the G20 in 2019, aims to address this balance by promoting interoperability while respecting national sovereignty. In ASEAN, however, regulatory fragmentation further complicates cross-border data flow. Variations in data localisation policies and personal data governance amongst ASEAN Member States (AMS) create significant challenges for businesses. For instance, differences in requirements for sensitive data, data subject rights, and security measures necessitate additional compliance efforts for companies operating in multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, non-personal data regulations, such as restrictions on supply chain and research and development (R&D) data sharing or mandatory technology transfers, impede global R&D collaboration and discourage investment in certain countries. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of data-related regulations in ASEAN and proposes policy recommendations for the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), set for 2025. It highlights the need for transparency, regulatory alignment, and various mechanisms to ensure smoother cross-border data flow, ultimately fostering regional digital integration.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, ASEAN, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
Asia

99. Harnessing AI for ASEAN’s Future: Governance, Adoption, and Sustainability under the DEFA

Author:
Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI) presents transformative opportunities for ASEAN, as its market is projected to reach US$30.30 billion by 2030. AI adoption is expected to contribute 10%–18% of ASEAN’s gross domestic product, benefiting key sectors such as manufacturing, health care, and energy. However, AI integration also highlights challenges, including governance gaps, disparities in AI readiness amongst ASEAN Member States, data governance issues, and sustainability concerns. While ASEAN has made progress through initiatives like developing the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, policy fragmentation and uneven AI adoption across ASEAN Member States underscore barriers to inclusive growth. The ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) provides an opportunity to align AI governance in ASEAN with global standards, ensuring a regulatory framework that balances innovation with accountability. This brief highlights AI’s role in ASEAN’s digital economy and proposes policy recommendations to strengthen AI governance; enhance the population’s digital skills; support AI adoption amongst micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises; promote culturally diverse datasets; and advance sustainable AI infrastructure. By fostering regional cooperation and embedding AI-related commitments into the DEFA, ASEAN can harness AI’s potential while actively mitigating its risks.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, Sustainability, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia

100. Fostering Inclusive Growth in ASEAN’s Digital Economy Through the DEFA and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Mahirah Mahusin and Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Digital transformation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly its rapidly evolving digital economy, could create significant socio-economic transformation, yet persistent obstacles limit widespread and equitable digital engagement across the region. Amongst others, unequal connectivity, high broadband costs, limited digital literacy, and disparities in access for underserved groups such as women, persons with disabilities, and rural communities may exacerbate the digital divide. This policy brief highlights the digital divide, its impact on financial inclusion, the challenges faced by underserved groups, and the unequal distribution of benefits from digital trade across ASEAN. Despite progress under regional frameworks and external agreements, achieving digital inclusion requires more targeted, development-oriented approaches. The Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) presents an opportunity to harmonise policies, support capacity-building initiatives, and align national and regional objectives for inclusive growth. Policy recommendations include provisions to enhance access, improve digital literacy, and foster public–private partnerships to address the needs of underserved populations.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Digital Economy, Innovation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia