Political Geography: Asia - CIAO Search Results

151. Trump Could Get a Win with North Korea This Time, by Taking Lessons from His First Term

Author:: Stephen Costello
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: All indications are that the Trump administration will once again pursue direct talks with North Korea. In doing so, it should learn from the mistakes of the failed 2018–19 U.S.–North Korea negotiations and seize the opportunity for a transformative nuclear agreement with Pyongyang. During the previous negotiations, it appears that North Korea offered ending the production of new nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian sanctions relief. In part due to the participation of hard-liners such as John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, who were hostile to President Trump’s desire for a deal during his previous term, this offer was rejected and the talks failed. However, stopping the production of new fissile material, nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles would be highly beneficial to the United States and our allies and well worth ending nonmilitary sanctions. A similar deal should be pursued in new talks. Beyond the immediate benefits of ending the production of new weapons, such a deal could set up a diplomatic framework to address and diminish the North Korean nuclear arsenal over the long term. Building trust by concluding and adhering to an initial deal would be critical to any such effort. Adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 2016 and 2017, the current nonmilitary sanctions on North Korea amount to collective civilian punishment without any productive purpose. Rather than providing leverage, these sanctions have prevented diplomacy, intensifying Kim Jong Un’s intransigence and desire to further bolster his regime’s nuclear program. By lifting these nonmilitary sanctions, the Trump administration could chart a new path forward toward North Korean buy-in to the international nonproliferation regime, International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, and, possibly, the long-term goal of denuclearization. South Korea should be integrally involved from the planning stages to the deal’s signing and management. Such support will help to diffuse tensions with North Korea toward the long-term goal of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. The United States should also seek Chinese backing of the deal, offering a credible guarantor of its implementation, while opening space for further U.S.–China nuclear diplomacy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

152. Beyond the Pivot: Expanding South Korea’s Global Role and G7 Cooperation in a New Era

Author:: Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: South Korea’s engagement with the G7 reflects a pragmatic response to a fragmented international environment. As the G7 has evolved into a forum for high-level political coordination, Seoul has emerged as a quasi-regular and consequential partner without pursuing formal membership. Under President Yoon, G7 outreach was framed as part of South Korea’s emergence as a global pivotal state; under President Lee, this approach has been largely sustained, though recalibrated through pragmatic diplomacy. G7 participation complements, rather than substitutes for, South Korea’s alliance with the US and its partnerships with NATO and the European Union, while offering a flexible venue for agenda-setting on global governance, technology and security. A less visible but politically significant benefit lies in the G7’s contribution to sustaining JapanKorea normalisation by lowering coordination costs. Stress-tested by US volatility and North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia, the G7 provides South Korea with strategic leverage.
Topic:: International Relations, NATO, Governance, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and G7
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

153. How Does China View the Western Balkans, Kosovo, and the Normalization Dialogue?

Author:: Ramadan Ilazi, Delmin Saljunovic, and Matt Delvoye
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: A mix of ideological and pragmatic approaches shapes China’s engagement in the Western Balkans. While the region of the Western Balkans is not central to Beijing’s foreign policy, it offers a critical discursive and geopolitical space through which China challenges the West and tests elements of its broader international relations strategy. In other words, China aspires to rival the West in the Balkans, primarily through economic competition in an effort to preach its political values over international order (or its view of the world) as a model that is, according to the Chinese, better than the model of regional and European integration that the Western Balkans pursues jointly with the West. In this context, Kosovo stands out as an important case. For China, Kosovo is not simply a state that is contested by Serbia but means through which it articulates its opposition to the West and liberal democracy while consolidating its alliance with Serbia. This paper argues that China’s stance on Kosovo is not driven by legal principle but by political utility. Kosovo is treated as a “Western project” to be delegitimized rather than a dispute to be resolved. The paper is structured into five sections. It begins with sections one and two by outlining a conceptual discussion of Chinese foreign policy, aiming to provide a foundation for understanding the underlying principles that drive Chinese foreign policy philosophy. Section three discusses China’s presence in the Western Balkans and discusses the path dependency approach of Chinese foreign policy. Section four presents a discourse analysis of Chinese foreign policy to examine the specific language China employs when discussing Kosovo, Serbia, and the normalization process, based on an analysis of 82 texts totaling over 30,000 words, that include official statements, speeches and interviews from officials largely from 2008 to 2024. Section five adopts a more critical, attitudinal perspective, situating China’s approach within its broader interests in the Western Balkans. Drawing from official Chinese statements, UN Security Council speeches, MFA briefings, and diplomatic visits, the paper traces China’s positioning toward Kosovo, a subject which, to date, has been largely unexplored in Kosovo. At its core, the paper also identifies a consistent pattern of rhetorical distance paired with alignment with Serbia. The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, China’s discourse on Kosovo is grounded in a legalistic framework in appearance or rhetoric and opportunistic in practice. However, even in its legalistic appearance China always ignores ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence in 2010. Second, China’s foreign policy toward the Western Balkans is not neutral, but explicitly aligned with Serbia, both rhetorically and technically, and this makes Serbia a key platform for Chinese influence in our region, as other studies have shown.1 Third, despite its support for the EU-led normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in principle, China undermines the process by refusing to endorse its objectives, distancing itself from the notion of “normalization,” and promoting a status quo that favors ambiguity over resolution. For China, Kosovo is not an issue that needs to be resolved, but a Western design liberal-democratic project that needs to fail. In other words, China’s position on Kosovo has largely remained the same since 1998, and viewing Kosovo’s “solution” in a way that best fits interests of Sebia, which, as this paper seeks to show, is largely because of Taiwan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Normalization, International Order, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Kosovo, and Western Balkans

154. How Does the Serbian Security Doctrine View Kosovo, the West, Russia, and China?

Author:: Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes Serbia’s security doctrine as outlined in its National Security Strategy (2021), focusing on how it perceives Kosovo, the West (EU, NATO, and the US), Russia, and China. Serbia’s security posture is shaped by a balancing act— engaging both the West (EU, U.S., NATO) security structures while at the same time maintaining strong strategic relations with Russia and China. Despite its proclaimed military neutrality, Serbia’s security doctrine reflects an aggressive posture toward Kosovo, a skeptical stance on the West, and a deepening strategic alignment with Moscow and Beijing. The strategy frames Kosovo’s independence as a direct challenge to Serbia’s territorial integrity and national security. Serbia’s security apparatus is engaged in diplomatic efforts, intelligence operations, and hybrid warfare to undermine Kosovo’s sovereignty and prevent its international recognition. While Serbia rejects NATO membership, it cooperates with NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Serbia maintains strong defense and energy ties with Russia, benefiting from diplomatic backing on Kosovo while avoiding Western sanctions on Moscow. China is emerging as a key economic and security partner, providing investments in infrastructure, digital surveillance, and military technology. Serbia has significantly expanded its military capabilities, acquiring weapons from Russia and China while participating in joint drills with both NATO and CSTO. The adoption of the Total Defense concept—mobilizing the entire population and resources for national security—raises concerns about escalation and arms races in the Western Balkans. Serbia’s strategy frames Western influence as a security challenge, particularly regarding media, civil society, and foreign-backed democratization efforts. The West is seen as a hybrid threat, accused of interfering in Serbia’s internal affairs, while Russia and China are portrayed as strategic allies. Serbia’s approach contributes to a geopolitical divide in the Western Balkans, where Kosovo is aligned fully with the West, while Serbia hedges between the EU and authoritarian states, as well as grappling internally with authoritarian practices. Serbia’s influence campaigns portray Kosovo as a source of instability, using disinformation, cyber-attacks, and lobbying efforts to stall Kosovo’s state-consolidation process as well as EU and NATO aspirations. Kosovo’s reactive foreign policy and languishing partnership with the U.S., and the EU create an enabling environment for Serbia’s efforts against Kosovo’s statehood.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Kosovo

155. Climate Change and Livestock in India: Impacts, Adaptation, and Policy Needs for Marginalized Communities

Author:: Shouvik Chakraborty, Debanjana Dey, and Anjana Thampi
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This study examines the complex relationship between climate change and livestock holding patterns in India, focusing on coastal regions and marginalized communities. The research investigates whether landless and marginalized households, who constitute the majority of livestock holders in rural India, are adequately equipped to adapt to climate uncertainties. Analyses of Livestock Census data reveal a significant shift in livestock holding patterns in coastal India, with a 2.7 percent decline in the bovine population and a 22.1 percent increase in the sheep and goat populations between 2012 and 2019. This trend indicates an emerging adaptation strategy as farmers shift toward smaller ruminants, indicating greater resilience to heat stress and extreme weather conditions. We find that while large and medium landowners possess the financial resources to implement advanced adaptation strategies, marginal and landless households remain highly vulnerable due to their limited resources and heavy dependence on bovine livestock. The research concludes that region-specific livestock policies supporting indigenous breed development, traditional adaptation practices, and direct economic assistance are urgently needed to protect the livelihoods of these communities and prevent a rise in food insecurity among already undernourished populations. Furthermore, effective adaptation requires integrating local knowledge systems with scientific approaches to develop climate-resilient livestock management practices suitable for India’s diverse agro-ecological regions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Political Economy, Adaptation, and Livestock
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and Asia

156. Signals in the Swarm: The Data Behind China’s Maritime Gray Zone Campaign Near Taiwan

Author:: Jose M. Macias and Benjamin Jensen
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Under the guise of fishing, Beijing is using dual-use and unmarked vessels to surveil, harass, and assert presence around Taiwan. Analysis of AIS tracks, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) drill zones, and Global Fishing Watch data narrowed a subset of 12,000 vessels traveling near Taiwan on days likely to coincide with maritime drills down to 315 vessels that were both flying the Chinese flag and identified as fishing vessels. The classification framework developed at the Futures Lab flagged 128 likely gray zone actors. Institutionalizing this framework inside a Coalition Joint-Maritime Anomaly Cell (CJ-MAC) would automate anomaly detection and scale coverage across the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific. CJ-MAC should be leveraged to fuse intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), publish suspect-vessel alerts, and cue real-time monitoring and patrols. Many suspect vessels manipulate identity and visibility—going dark, switching names, or masking movements—behavior consistent with covert tasking. Publishing and punishing a rolling blacklist of repeat offenders through sanctions on owners, insurers, and operators would raise costs and shrink deniability. To support this effort, U.S. and allied intelligence agencies should map corporate ownership networks tied to suspicious vessels—identifying shell companies and economic exposure in allied jurisdictions. Gray zone tactics exploit ambiguity, with mixed fleets and massive automatic identification system (AIS) volumes making it hard to separate commerce from covert operations. A Taiwan Transparency Dashboard and an annual Gray Zone Maritime Threat Estimate would give policymakers and partners a clear, shared operating picture.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Maritime, and Gray Zone
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

157. CRINK Security Ties: Growing Cooperation, Anchored by China and Russia

Author:: Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, Hugh Grant-Chapman, Truly Tinsley, and Feifei Hung
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Military and security cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) accelerated significantly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This includes a surge in transfers of arms and dual-use goods, a new mutual defense pact, and more frequent and diversified joint military exercises. Observable security cooperation has taken place bilaterally or trilaterally, with no discernable official cooperation taking place quadrilaterally. However, there have been instances of Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean players working together in diffuse ways to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Overall, the China-Russia security partnership is the most robust, but North Korea and Iran have quickly strengthened security cooperation as well, primarily with Russia. Despite strengthened ties among CRINK countries, the four countries are not always on the same page. To date, limited overt military support for Iran following attacks by Israel and the United States showcased how various factors—transactional calculations, power asymmetries, geographic distance, simultaneity of conflict and fatigue, U.S. military involvement, different interests, and elements of distrust—affect the willingness of CRINK countries to directly support one another via military means. Overall, the two larger powers—China and Russia—anchor CRINK cooperation. They have much more to offer to incentivize others to support them, and they are the most closely aligned bilateral actors. China, Russia, and North Korea are the trio most likely to support one another in times of need.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Ukraine, and Asia

158. Identifying Pathways for U.S. Shipbuilding Cooperation with Northeast Asian Allies

Author:: Henry H. Carroll and Cynthia R. Cook
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Military conflict in the Indo-Pacific would demand overwhelming U.S. naval power. Yet the shipbuilding sector faces capacity shortages, industrial base constraints, cost overruns, and delayed delivery, suggesting that Washington should explore alternative pathways for delivering naval capability. One approach is to enhance cooperation with close allies such as Japan and South Korea. Options for cooperation include allied participation in maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); allied purchase and revitalization of U.S. shipyards; various methods of coproduction, including modular construction; and U.S. purchase of allied-built ships. Novel strategies that leverage the United States’ strong and unique network of allies and partners will require thoughtful implementation of industrial cooperation policy, which has historically been challenging. For the United States to strike the right balance between leaning on its allies and partners to alleviate its shipbuilding problems and investing in its own capabilities at home—for these approaches are not mutually exclusive—it should understand the implications of its various cooperative options with its allies.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Navy, Defense Industry, and Shipbuilding
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

159. Improving Cooperation with Allies and Partners in Asia

Author:: Daniel Byman
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: The rise of China and its growing assertiveness present both a challenge and an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its alliances and partnerships across Asia. While countries like Japan, South Korea, India, and the Philippines are increasingly alarmed by Chinese actions, U.S. efforts to coordinate with these allies are hindered by misaligned interests, weak institutions, occasionally overbearing American leadership, and China’s countercoercive strategies. Problems such as poor intelligence sharing, burdensome arms sales procedures, and limited multinational strategic planning hinder overall cooperation. The United States should institute a White House–led prioritization of China coordination, implement reforms to better respect allied political and economic needs, expand regional institutions like AUKUS and the Quad, and strengthen personal ties among defense and intelligence officials. Implementing these steps is essential to enhancing deterrence and warfighting capability in a rapidly shifting Indo-Pacific security environment.
Topic:: Intelligence, International Cooperation, International Security, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Asia

160. Beyond Rare Earths: China’s Growing Threat to Gallium Supply Chains

Author:: Aidan Powers-Riggs, Brian Hart, Matthew Funaiole, Scott Thomsett, Simon Zieleniewski, and Tim Rose
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: China is increasingly weaponizing its chokehold over critical minerals amid intensifying economic and technological competition with the United States. The critical mineral gallium, which is crucial to defense industry supply chains and new energy technologies, has been at the front line of China’s strategy. To date, China’s chokehold on rare earth metals has attracted more attention than its restrictions on gallium, and some have downplayed the potential consequences of disruptions to gallium supply chains. Yet CSIS analysis reveals the extent to which China can wield gallium to impose significant economic harm on the United States and its allies and partners. This CSIS Brief unpacks the scope of the problem and offers policy recommendations on how to bolster U.S. and allied economic security and deny China a key tool of economic warfare.
Topic:: Exports, Supply Chains, Rare earth elements (REEs), Geoeconomics, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China and Asia

161. CRINK Economic Ties: Uneven Patterns of Collaboration

Author:: Maria Snegovaya, Nicholas Fenton, and Tina Dolbaia
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) face obstacles to economic collaboration such as geographic distance, sanctions, mutual mistrust, and self-sufficiency goals. Reliable data on CRINK’s economic and trade ties is limited due to lack of reported data from Iran and North Korea and the rise of informal and shadow trade since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Existing data reveals uneven patterns, although expanding bilateral agreements, strengthening energy ties, and increasing trade in dual-use technologies point to growing economic cooperation among the CRINK countries. CRINK also seeks to integrate their financial and payment systems to bypass Western sanctions by prioritizing national currencies over the U.S. dollar. The post-2022 China-Russia relationship drives most of the momentum, while Iran and North Korea exhibit expanding but considerably weaker integration with the rest of the group. China is nevertheless a cautious actor that hedges its bets in energy trade with Russia and Iran, avoids flagrant sanctions violations, and faces constraints from its own economic slowdown.
Topic:: Economics, Trade, Treaties and Agreements, Economic Security, Geopolitics, International Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Middle East, Russia, and Europe

162. Planetary Health and the Perils of Progress: A Framework for Governing the Global Commons

Author:: Pey Peili
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: As the Planetary Health movement marks its tenth anniversary, the global community faces a critical dilemma, exemplified by the debate over deep-sea mining for the green transition. This NTS Insight argues that this is not a new challenge but a recurring historical pattern of progress-driven environmental degradation, with a clear precedent in the 19th-century annihilation of the American bison. This analysis demonstrates how the Planetary Health framework, by integrating principles of systems thinking, precaution, and justice, provides the essential governance lens needed to diagnose and break this destructive cycle. The piece concludes with policy pathways for embedding a Planetary Health approach into the governance of the global commons, including navigating regional norms like ASEAN’s non-interference principle, to ensure that the pursuit of sustainability does not create new zones of ecological sacrifice and geopolitical inequity.
Topic:: Environment, Governance, Mining, Sustainability, ASEAN, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Asia and Global Focus

163. Artificial Intelligence and Energy Transition in Southeast Asia

Author:: Margareth Sembiring and Danielle Lynn Goh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The transition to low-carbon energy sources in the region is facing opposition from local communities adversely affected by the infrastructure development projects. The use of digital technologies, especially Artificial Intelligence, in social mobilisation has complicated the milieu, presenting both opportunities and risks for the energy transition.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Artificial Intelligence, Energy Transition, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:: Asia and Southeast Asia

164. Addressing the Nexus of Planetary Health and Mental Health in Asia

Author:: Pey Peili
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: On World Mental Health Day, it is pertinent to examine the growing psychological impact of environmental degradation in Asia. This commentary assesses the phenomenon and argues that climate policies, such as integrating nature into urban planning and empowering local communities, can serve as effective public mental health strategies.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Mental Health, Empowerment, and Urban Planning
Political Geography:: Asia

165. China Facing Domestic Economic Challenges and Trade War with the U.S.

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:: A session of China’s parliament in March confirmed that the main source of the country’s economic growth in 2025 is to be state-supported industrial production, including the development of the high-tech sector, along with increasing domestic consumption and exports. The shape of China’s economic policy will be influenced by, among other things, the course of the trade conflict with the United States. For the EU, China’s economic plans imply the need to further protect the single market and increase competitiveness.
Topic:: Economy, Economic Growth, Trade Wars, and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

166. Report: Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire

Author:: Rian Thum
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: The Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a report in January 2025, “Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire: How China’s Policies in the Uyghur Region Have and Have Not Changed.” The report is authored by Rian Thum, Senior Lecturer in East Asian History, at the University of Manchester. The report seeks to improve our collective understanding of China’s ongoing repressive policies in the predominantly Uyghur province of Xinjiang in western China. The Simon-Skjodt Center released a report in 2021 detailing multiple crimes against humanity that the Chinese government had committed against the Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority group, and expressing grave concern that the Chinese government may be committing genocide. Since then, detailed reporting on state policies has decreased as Chinese authorities increasingly restricted access to information. Using recent evidence from Chinese state documents, satellite imagery, and survivor testimony, as well as a synthesis of recent academic publications, the report aims to fill a knowledge gap about the current state of mass atrocities targeting the Uyghur community and other Turkic minorities in the Uyghur region. The report finds that, given the available information, all of the policies that led to accusations of mass atrocities in the Uyghur region continue, and some are expanding. These findings should prompt deeper research into the nature of mass atrocities facing the Uyghur population and spark urgent, effective responses. In particular, the report recommends further research into emerging repressive strategies, including the intense network of electronic and human surveillance, curbs on religious practice, and the destruction of cultural heritage.
Topic:: Human Rights, Minorities, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

167. Strategic Approaches to Critical Minerals and Korea-Africa Cooperation

Author:: Seoni Han
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The global green transition has intensified competition for critical minerals essential to renewable energy and electric vehicles, which require significantly more minerals than traditional technologies. The demand for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements has surged, leading to supply chain vulnerabilities due to the concentration of production and processing in a few countries. Africa, with its abundant mineral reserves, is emerging as a key player in global supply chains of critical minerals, possessing about 20% of the world’s reserves needed for green transition. Many African governments are reforming mining laws to enhance state control while offering incentives to attract investment. In response, major global players such as the US., the EU, China, Japan, and Canada are increasing cooperation with Africa, each adopting distinctive strategies to secure supply chains. In its partnership with Africa, Korea should pursue a comprehensive strategy across the critical mineral value chains, ensuring ESG compliance, and promoting industrial cooperation aimed at upgrading local processing capabilities. Three key strategies are recommended: (1) tailoring cooperation to Africa’s evolving policy context and infrastructure needs; (2) strengthening resource diplomacy and enhancing multilateral and bilateral cooperation through platforms such as the Korea-Africa Critical Minerals Dialogue; and (3) expanding financial and non-financial support to promote greater private sector engagement.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Renewable Energy, Value Chains, Green Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Africa, Asia, and South Korea

168. North America’s Supply Chain Integration and Implications for Korea

Author:: Hyok Jung Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes the evolution of North American supply chain integration and its implications for Korea. After being suspended under Trump, the North American Leaders’ Summit was revived by the Biden administration with agendas on health, competitiveness, and migration, later expanding to initiatives such as the Semiconductor Forum and critical minerals mapping. Despite political strains during the Trump years, cross-border investment among the United States, Canada, and Mexico remained resilient, and Biden’s term saw renewed growth. Under Trump 2.0, “America First” tariffs imposed via IEEPA and Section 232 have hindered integration, but respect for the USMCA and anti-China measures may paradoxically reinforce regional ties. Input–output analysis shows deepening supply chain linkages in autos, batteries, and especially semiconductors, with positive spillovers for Korea’s exports. Korea benefits most directly from batteries, chemicals, and autos, and indirectly from semiconductors, suggesting its optimal strategy is to act as a complementary partner to North American integration.
Topic:: Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North America

169. The Impact of Trade Shocks on Labor Reallocation in South Korea

Author:: Kyong Hyun Koo
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study analyzes how workers were reallocated across industries or occupations during the process of labor demand adjustment in South Korean domestic industries following exogenous trade shocks caused by the economic rise of China and Vietnam. It examines whether Korea's labor market was sufficiently effective in terms of labor movement from comparative disadvantage sectors to comparative advantage sectors in response to changes in trade. Through this analysis, the study aims to understand the mechanisms by which inefficiencies in Korea's labor reallocation process lead to workers' income decline and derive policy implications.
Topic:: Economy, Trade, Labor Market, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

170. Russia’s Global South Strategy and Policy Implications for Korea

Author:: Joungho Park
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study examined the direction, key contents, and progress of Russia's Global South strategy in a multilateral (BRICS) and regional (Middle East, Africa, and Latin America) context, and sought to derive useful policy implications based on this analysis. In particular, the main purpose of the study was to examine the structural changes and reorganization of the world order since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and to analyze the new foreign strategic direction of the Russian government amid the structural changes in the foreign strategic environment.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Global South, Multilateralism, and BRICS
Political Geography:: Russia, Asia, and South Korea

171. Refugees in Korea: Challenges in Settlement and Social Integration

Author:: Jeonghwan Yun
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study examines the current challenges associated with refugee settlement and the social integration of refugees in Korea. Using the case of Ukrainian war evacuees in Korea, we quantitatively assess both their economic stability and their intentions to contribute to the local community. Additionally, we evaluate the perceptions of native residents toward refugees and migrants within these communities. The findings suggest that an organized, community-based approach to refugee settlement represents a viable policy alternative for achieving long-term social integration.
Topic:: Refugees, Economy, Resettlement, and Social Integration
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

172. India's Infrastructure Development and Korea-India Cooperation

Author:: Jeong Gon Kim
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: As the Indian government continues to expand investment in infrastructure, infrastructure development not only holds significant market potential but also serves as a crucial factor supporting Korean companies' entry into the Indian market. This report examines the infrastructure development plans of the Indian government, regional development needs, and surveys of Korean companies operating in India. It proposes implications for identifying the direction, key sectors, and regions for Korea-India infrastructure development cooperation, along with policy measures.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

173. Digital Content Exports and Copyright Protection through FTA

Author:: Hyunsoo Kim
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: Korea has continuously made efforts to secure overseas markets and enhance industrial competitiveness. The government is actively pursuing trade agreements with around 10 more countries, including those in Africa where FTAs have yet to be established, thereby continuing its FTA policy. The growing market for digital content and trade volume are accompanied by the international spread of IPR protection for digital content, and that one of the main channels driving this spread is FTAs. Strong IPR provisions for digital content in FTAs are no longer limited to agreements among high-income countries. FTAs with middle- and lower-income countries are also increasingly including more robust IPR protection measures. Moreover, the strengthening of IPR protection through FTAs has a positive effect on digital content trade. Given the rapid expansion of Korea’s digital content market and trade, such trade policy tools—including FTAs—can play a valuable role in sustaining this upward trend. Countries with which Korea is currently pursuing Economic Partnership Agreements(EPAs) can be broadly categorized into three groups based on the level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in their existing FTAs and their current domestic IPR legal frameworks. The first group includes countries such as the Dominican Republic and Morocco, which have already concluded FTAs containing relatively high-level IPR protection provisions and whose domestic legal systems also provide comparatively strong protection for IPR. The second group includes countries like Thailand, which have signed FTAs that broadly cover various aspects of IPR protection, but whose domestic legal frameworks remain insufficient for effectively protecting digital content copyright. The third group consists of countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Kenya, which have not previously concluded FTAs that contain substantial IPR protection provisions and whose domestic legal systems are currently inadequate for the practical enforcement of digital content copyright. This classification allows Korea to calibrate the direction of its FTA policies with each partner and assess the appropriate level of IPR protection that should be pursued in the EPA negotiations. Promoting digital content copyright protection—regardless of the partner country’s classification—has a positive effect on the trade of digital content-related services. Therefore, it would be desirable to include high-standard IPR protection provisions in EPAs. However, as noted above, it would be more realistic to adopt differentiated approaches that take into account each EPA partner’s policy direction in existing FTAs and their current level of IPR protection.
Topic:: Intellectual Property/Copyright, Industry, Competition, and Digital Content
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

174. China's Strategic Finance Drive: Considerations for Korea’s Next Steps

Author:: Jiyoung Moon
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: At the Central Financial Work Conference in 2023, China emphasized the importance of developing “Financial development with Chinese characteristics” for the nation's economic structural transition, and announced “building a financial powerhouse” as a key national strategic objective. The strategy, termed “Financial development with Chinese characteristics,” emphasizes strengthened Communist Party leadership over the financial industry, aiming to ensure stability, mitigate risks, and support high-quality economic growth. The Chinese government has undertaken significant institutional reforms around three main pillars: (1) building a comprehensive control framework to reinforce financial stability through enhanced Party supervision, (2) enhancing mechanisms to support the real economy by channeling financial resources into strategic industries such as technology, green finance, inclusive finance, pension finance, and digital finance, and (3) advancing market-oriented financial reforms, particularly interest rate liberalization, to improve capital allocation and address chronic credit constraints, especially for small and medium private enterprises. However, challenges persist, including excessive investment in real estate, local government debt, and underdeveloped capital markets. China is addressing these through supply-side reforms of capital markets, improved regulatory oversight, and efforts to foster world-class investment banks. For Korea, these developments imply both opportunities and risks. As China increases financial support for strategic industries and consolidates regulatory control, Korean companies and financial institutions must adapt their strategies to navigate evolving market entry barriers and geopolitical uncertainties. The report recommends that Korea formulate targeted economic cooperation strategies, closely monitor regulatory changes, assess financial risks, and strengthen bilateral policy coordination to ensure resilient and transparent business partnerships with China.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Reform, Finance, Business, Economic Development, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

175. Satellite-Based Analysis of North Korea’s Market System

Author:: Jangho Choi
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The findings of this study suggest that satellite imagery enables a disaggregated analysis of North Korean markets by region, subregion, and economic actor, offering a multi-dimensional perspective on market dynamics. Specifically, the results indicate that North Korea’s markets have been expanding over the medium to long term. While COVID-19 containment measures and border closures led to a temporary contraction in market activity, they did not fundamentally reverse the trajectory of market growth. Market activity was observed to increase in correlation with improved logistics and supply flows—that is, as more goods were delivered to markets, prices tended to fall, and commercial activity expanded. This suggests that the expansion of the state commercial system under the North Korean government—characterized by greater administrative control and intervention in markets—does not aim to suppress or dismantle markets. Rather, it appears to reflect an effort to regulate and integrate increasingly active markets by partially substituting private sector functions with the state-run commercial network. The intended outcomes include increased fiscal revenue and the provision of stable commodity supplies to the population. Satellite imagery analysis remains at a relatively early stage of development in the context of North Korea. As a result, some of the derived indicators have shown inconsistencies or produced controversial findings, underscoring the need for continuous methodological improvement through sustained research. Further validation is also required to ensure that the various satellite-based indicators convey consistent and non-contradictory information.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Economic Development, and Satellites
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

176. Advancing the ASEAN-ROK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Insights from ASEAN Experts' Perspectives

Author:: Ina Choi and Kyunghoon Kim
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: ASEAN and the Republic of Korea established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in October 2024, marking a turning point toward a more future-oriented and strategic relationship. ASEAN has emphasized that the CSP must go beyond existing frameworks to foster cooperation that is truly meaningful, substantive, and mutually beneficial. The ASEAN–ROK Plan of Action (2026–2030), to be unveiled at the upcoming summit later this year, will serve as a roadmap for translating the CSP into concrete action. To ensure the effective advancement of the ASEAN–ROK CSP, it is important to understand how ASEAN perceives Korea as a dialogue partner. Against this backdrop, this paper draws strategic insights to guide Korea’s approach to ASEAN, based on key findings from an online survey of ASEAN-based experts. The survey, jointly conducted with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Indonesia, targeted foreign policy experts from ASEAN member states.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, ASEAN, Dialogue, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

177. Shift in Central Asia’s Global Value Chains after the Ukraine War and Policy Implications for Korea-Central Asia Economic Cooperation

Author:: Minhyeon Jeong
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This report rigorously analyzes the structural shifts in Central Asia’s global value chains (GVCs) following the Russia–Ukraine war and derives new directions for economic cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. As unprecedented Western economic sanctions against Russia have persisted and are likely to remain in place for an extended period, it is essential to examine how these sanctions structurally affect Central Asia’s GVC participation. Central Asian economies are currently mobilizing national efforts to strengthen export competitiveness in pursuit of stable economic growth. Reflecting this, the study focuses on the export side of Central Asian trade and identifies how sanctions on Russia have re-shaped the region’s trade structure. At the same time, in a global environment marked by deepening trade fragmentation, raising the quality of Korea–Central Asia economic cooperation requires cooperation strategies that explicitly take into account how sanctions are altering Central Asia’s GVC linkages. Accordingly, the report pursues two main objectives. First, it provides an econometrically rigorous analysis of the structural changes in Central Asia’s GVCs since the Russia–Ukraine war, treating major geopolitical shocks as external shocks to the region’s trade structure. Second, based on these analytical findings, it proposes a new strategic direction for Korea–Central Asia economic cooperation that responds to the altered trade environment and supports Central Asia’s long-term growth and industrial upgrading.
Topic:: Exports, Economic Cooperation, Global Value Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, Asia, and South Korea

178. Korea’s Green Economy Agreement Roadmap: A Strategy for Climate Action and Economic Growth

Author:: Jukwan Lee
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The global trade environment is rapidly shifting due to the deepening climate crisis and escalating protectionism, characterized by major nations implementing unilateral trade measures—such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the U.S.'s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)—that prioritize domestic economic interests. In response to this trend, international cooperation is evolving into new forms, notably the Green Economy Agreement (GEA), which seeks to pursue both climate crisis response and economic growth simultaneously. This study confirms the necessity of establishing a Korean-style GEA roadmap to effectively manage the evolving nexus of global climate-trade measures. Korea, with its large manufacturing sector, faces the critical dual challenge of achieving carbon neutrality while securing industrial competitiveness. GEAs serve as a crucial mechanism for enhancing strategic cooperation, ensuring climate policy continuity against domestic political volatility (acting as a "policy anchor"), and generating new market opportunities. The key objectives of this study are: first, to systematically analyze the definition, status, and features of existing GEAs globally and in Korea; second, empirically evaluate the economic impact of GEA elements on Korean exports and the macroeconomy; and third, propose a comprehensive, phased roadmap and implementation strategy (short, medium, and long term) based on a strategic modular GEA model.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economic Growth, Trade, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

179. China's Digital Trade Development Strategy and Its Implications

Author:: Seung Shin Lee
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: In recent years, the Chinese government has announced a series of digital trade development plans and applied to join high standard trade agreements, aiming to gradually expand external openness in line with global digital trade cooperation standards. Since 2023, major government documents have repeatedly emphasized the development of digital trade and e-commerce. This trend reflects not only the growing weight of the digital economy in China’s overall economy, but also the government’s attempt to offset sluggish domestic growth momentum by accelerating digital transformation. According to data, digital sectors have grown by approximately 3.3 times since 2014, accounting for 42.8% of China’s GDP. This indicates that the digital economy has become one of the key growth drivers of the Chinese economy. With the acceleration of digital transformation and the rapid development of digital trade, frequent trade barriers of various kinds are emerging. This has increased the need for active discussions on digital economy governance and trade rules to effectively manage such barriers. As China’s influence in global digital trade continues to expand, understanding and responding to its strategies has become a pressing task for Korea and other trading partners.
Topic:: Development, Economy, E-Commerce, and Digital Trade
Political Geography:: China and Asia

180. AI Standard Choices Under Geopolitical Competition

Author:: Sangjun Yea
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study examines how global competition over artificial intelligence (AI) standards is unfolding amid growing geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. It develops a theoretical model to analyze how a third country decides whether to align its domestic AI standard with the U.S. or Chinese framework once both standards exist. The analysis highlights that the choice depends primarily on global and local network effects, market competition, and the role of domestic platforms intermediating AI services. The findings suggest that the technological superiority of foundation AI models and the expanding global user base are key determinants of international standards adoption, implying that AI standardization has become a strategic domain of global economic and political competition.
Topic:: Economics, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

181. Consular Protection in Crisis: Vietnam’s Response During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:: Hanh Thi Nguyen and Linh Hoang Vo
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Consular protection represents a core function through which states uphold their responsibilities and deliver essential services to citizens residing or traveling abroad, particularly during times of crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic posed unprecedented challenges to these efforts, testing the capacity of governments worldwide. Vietnam, despite being a middle-income country with limited resources, mounted an effective response to protect its citizens overseas. This article presents Vietnam’s experience as an instructive case study, analyzed through the lens of Tindall and ’t Hart’s general analytical framework for consular protection in emergency situations. The findings highlight the importance of adapting existing theoretical frameworks to better reflect the constraints faced by developing countries and to address the complexities introduced by globally disruptive crises.
Topic:: Developing World, Crisis Management, COVID-19, Middle-Income Countries, and Consular Protection
Political Geography:: Asia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

182. India–Japan Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Geopolitical Prospects and Challenges Under Trump

Author:: Yen Pham Thi
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This article examines the India–Japan defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on its geopolitical prospects and challenges under the Trump administration. Strengthened by shared concerns over China’s rising influence and the convergence of their Indo-Pacific strategies, the partnership has evolved beyond symbolic engagement to include joint exercises, technology sharing, and defense dialogues aimed at preserving a free and rules-based regional order. At the same time, India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment, Japan’s dependence on US security guarantees, and the “America First” policy under Trump pose significant constraints. To sustain and deepen cooperation, both nations must enhance bilateral mechanisms, pursue strategic autonomy, expand multilateral engagements, and promote regional norms. These steps are essential for building a resilient, sustainable, and strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific amid a shifting US foreign policy landscape.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

183. Rethinking Aid in a Contested World

Author:: Stefan Dercon
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Development aid faces a crisis of budgets, legitimacy, and political alignment. Framed in recent decades as technocratic and benevolent, aid has always been political, shaped by donor and recipient incentives. Its post–Cold War expansion reflected a permissive era of unipolarity and globalization, when Western foreign policy, business, and security establishments provided broad support. That equilibrium has now collapsed. Multipolar rivalry, protectionism, and fragmented domestic coalitions have left aid vulnerable, shallowly supported, and increasingly driven by narrow donor interests. The paper calls for recognition of the need for a globalization 2.0 that enables poorer countries to grow, warning that without such a framework, remaining aid will become more fragmented and ineffective. It also cautions against a euphemistic reliance on “mutual interest,” as evidence of genuine donor–recipient benefits is limited; trade facilitation and post-conflict stabilization are rare exceptions. Finally, the paper advances four propositions: aid must be selective, avoid entrenching dependency, balance short-term results with long-term system building, and support reformers willing to challenge the status quo. Only by acknowledging its political nature and aligning incentives within a reconfigured global order can aid remain relevant to development.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, and North America

184. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:: Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

185. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:: Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

186. China Maritime Report No. 44: Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng's Downfall Amid Increasing PLAN Readiness

Author:: Christopher Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Although corruption runs deep in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and across China’s armed forces, disciplinary-related removals appear not to have a major impact on naval capabilities or operations. The fight against corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has General Secretary Xi Jinping’s attention and appears to be picking up steam for 2025. The Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a report on 25 December 2024 identifying Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) as one of eight NPC deputies removed for “serious violations of discipline and the law.” Li was an officer on the fast track and identified early in his career by PLA press as one to watch. He had the unprecedented distinction of having command of two separate Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort task force deployments, extensive international maritime experience, and involvement in some of the PLAN’s most significant international navy accomplishments. Li’s career and his operations in the Mediterranean Sea had the personal attention of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi. Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng replaced Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) as the Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Navy roughly a year ago. Admiral Ju suffered Admiral Li’s same fate. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a revealing dataset to analyze the impact of sacking the commander, and of corruption more broadly, on PLAN operational capabilities and how they affect the force. The PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper. Regardless of corruption’s pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.
Topic:: Corruption, Leadership, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Ju Xinchun, Southern Theater Command, and Readiness
Political Geography:: China and Asia

187. China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy's Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects

Author:: Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Hospital Ship
Political Geography:: China and Asia

188. Stepping up Engagement in the Sahel: Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have strategically realigned and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long, 13,000 troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense partnership with the US. In a second wave of expulsion, yet different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024. This recent expulsion of Western and multilateral partners has been accompanied by a turn by Sahelian states to old and new, predominantly authoritarian, actors. This shift reflects an effort by the military regimes to project independence, diversify their partners and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Traditional partners like China and Russia have intensified economic and security relationships with their Sahelian partners during the past few years, while newer partners like Turkey and the Gulf states have increased their presence and influence in the region through infrastructure projects, arms exports and natural resource deals. At the same time, the exit by the AES states from the regional organisation ECOWAS has resulted in both new partnerships and new tensions among member states, profoundly reshaping the regional landscape. This article, the second in a two-part series examining the security and political context in the Sahel, explores these evolving partnerships with non-Western actors, focusing in particular on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It examines the broader lines of cooperation and engagement by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states and identifies both similarities and important differences in their approaches. The aim is to provide a clearer overview of the Sahel’s shifting international relationships and to deepen our understanding of the dynamics, tensions and strategic choices among non-Western partners. differences and tensions between the non-Western partners. With a growing number of external actors competing for influence in the Sahel, Europe must base its recalibrated (re)engagement on a solid understanding of these dynamics.
Topic:: Politics, Coup, Engagement, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, Asia, Sahel, and Gulf Nations

189. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

190. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

191. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

192. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:: Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

193. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:: Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

194. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:: Bart Gaens
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

195. Deterrence and Hybrid Warfare: Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine for Taiwan and the Nordic-Baltic Region

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Eric Chan, Tony Lawrence, and Jyun-yi Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Deterrence is once more at the centre of discussions on national security. Faced with larger revisionist neighbours driven by aggressive foreign policies, Taiwan and states in the Nordic-Baltic region are drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to understand how to enhance deterrence in their respective theatres. These lessons, properly executed, drastically raise the costs for any aggressor. By involving both the military and civil society in the defence of the nation, territorially small states can redesign defence in depth to deter an aggressor across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

196. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

197. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

198. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:: Tanner Greer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

199. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:: Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

200. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS