Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Asia

61. Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain

Author:
Jennifer Hong Whetsell
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is rising as a prominent player in the space domain. The size of its space program makes its current position as an emerging space power even more impressive and promising. The United States, one of South Korea's closest political and defense allies, and South Korea share a considerable history in space cooperation since the late 1980s. Despite the long history of collaboration between the United States and South Korea, fundamental differences have slowed their progress toward a deeper and more meaningful cooperation in this domain. As space becomes an integral aspect of national security and a coveted frontier for scientific endeavor and exploration, the two capitals have much to gain through enhanced cooperation. “Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain” examines the landscape of South Korea’s space ecosystem and provides a broad overview of its accomplishments and challenges in the space domain. It then highlights significant milestones of space cooperation between Washington and Seoul and analyzes the cooperative landscape, noting areas of differences and opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The paper then presents recommendations for U.S. and ROK policymakers to help overcome those barriers and strengthen their cooperation in the space domain.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

62. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:
Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

63. Trapped in debt: China’s role in Laos’ economic crisis

Author:
Keith Barney, Roland Rajah, and Mariza Cooray
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Laos is trapped in a severe debt crisis with no resolution in sight, threatening a decade of economic and social malaise. Recent global shocks were key triggers. Yet a crisis was almost inevitable, driven by poor planning and over-investment in the domestic energy sector, financed mostly by Chinese loans and exacerbated by broader fiscal and governance problems. Exiting the crisis will require China to provide substantial debt relief. However, the politics appear unfavourable, as neither side wants to admit failure and accept the consequences. Whether by design or neglect, China has created a debt trap in Laos. The crisis illustrates some of the most troubling pathologies of Chinese lending under the Belt and Road Initiative, and its unwillingness to provide sufficient debt relief, despite the clear-cut need.
Topic:
Debt, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Economic Crisis, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Laos

64. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:
Exports, Manufacturing, Industry, ASEAN, Supply Chains, Regional Economy, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

65. China-Russia Relations Since the Start of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Asia Sociey
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In the 19th century, like Western powers and Japan, Russia participated in the “Scramble for China”; however, unlike the others, it never returned the vast territories it annexed. After a long and turbulent history of Sino-Russian relations, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the Soviet “turn to Asia” policy in July 1986 with his Vladivostok speech. Addressing the Chinese directly, he declared: “I would like to dwell on the most important issue in our relations. These relations are extremely important for several reasons, starting from the fact that we are neighbors, that we share the world’s longest land border, and that we, our children, and grandchildren are destined to live near each other ‘forever and ever.’”1 This policy was reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin after he came to power in 2000, reinforced during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and further intensified following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That year, China and Russia signed lengthy and grandiloquent declarations celebrating their “no-limits friendship,” prominently showcased during commemorations in Moscow marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Yet this no-limits friendship, while rhetorically expansive, has never been formalized and contains several clear limitations — limitations the current U.S. administration has unsuccessfully attempted to exploit. This paper examines the China-Russia relationship and its often-contradictory evolution. The strategic dynamic between these two Eurasian powers has produced a partnership further solidified by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, despite Beijing’s attempts to mediate the conflict. While the strength of this partnership may make it appear unbreakable, it should not preclude continued dialogue between China and the West — particularly the European Union and its member states. The EU–China summit held in Beijing on July 24, however, did not yield the expected results in this regard.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

66. Xi’s Personal Priorities: What Matters Most to China’s Leader?

Author:
Neil Thomas and Lobsang Tsering
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Time is a politician’s most precious resource. Every decision to attend a meeting, launch an initiative, or deliver a speech involves trade-offs. Unlike budgets or personnel, time cannot be expanded or replenished. How a leader allocates their time reveals their priorities. Xi Jinping is acutely aware of this reality. “To realize the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must race against time,” he declared in January 2020. State media claimed that on an “ordinary day,” Xi sleeps just six hours and works through every meal. Li Zhanshu, Xi’s former chief of staff, summarized his work tempo in one word: “fast.” This urgency helps explain why Xi wants to become the “chairman of everything,” replacing collective leadership with personalized rule, sidelining colleagues, and centralizing decision-making within Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bodies under his direct control. Yet even a leader as powerful and driven as Xi cannot do everything. So how does Xi spend his time? It is impossible to know for sure, but a useful proxy could be official statements about actions that he has taken “personally” (qinzi). In particular, CCP media have mentioned several policies that Xi has “personally planned, personally arranged, and personally promoted” (qinzi mouhua, qinzi bushu, qinzi tuidong). The Center for China Analysis has compiled a database of these policies. Analysis suggests that Xi pays special attention to regional development projects, internal CCP governance, and environmental protection. Notably absent are indications of personal involvement in key political economy issues such as consumption, demographics, healthcare, public finance, and welfare reform. For policymakers and businesses seeking leverage or opportunity in China, understanding Xi’s priorities is a critical starting point.
Topic:
Leadership, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

67. The People’s Republic of Wellness: Why Beijing Worries About Well-Being

Author:
G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Wellness is booming in China as more people engage in activities that promote healthier living, emotional balance, and spiritual growth. Interest in living well has grown steadily as living standards rise and China undergoes radical social and economic change. More people are facing financial distress amid a slowing economy, and younger generations struggle with intense academic pressure and limited employment opportunities. Wellness trends gained steam during the COVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated the shift from materialism toward a search for spirituality and meaning. Maintaining a harmonious and stable social environment is central to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. Beijing recognizes the value of many popular wellness trends and actively encourages those that align with its interest in fostering citizens’ well-being and improving public morale. As people struggle to manage the stress of daily living and define wellness and the good life on their own terms, building a harmonious society has become a major challenge for China’s leaders. In an attempt to manage this friction, they increasingly focus propaganda efforts on highlighting the country’s economic and technological achievements and their assertiveness in the trade conflict with the United States.
Topic:
Economy, Public Health, Society, and Well-Being
Political Geography:
China and Asia

68. A New Triangle: The Interplay Between China and EU-India Relations

Author:
Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China has shaped the U.S.-India relationship for decades.1 Today, another significant triangle is emerging: the China-EU-India relationship. Indian and European leaders are strengthening ties. Both view China as a formidable economic and security rival while regarding the United States as a key security partner (and, for Europe, a long-standing ally). What is the current state of EU-China and EU-India relations? As India’s influence and economic appeal grow, could it become a viable alternative to China for European business leaders and policymakers? How is Brussels incorporating India into its strategies to address a potential crisis in Asia or the broader Indo-Pacific? Twenty-five years ago, the European Union viewed China as a top priority for business, cultural exchanges, and diplomacy. Following the introduction of Beijing’s open-door policy in 1978 and with strong encouragement from Chinese authorities, European companies flocked to China. Initially, many Europeans used Hong Kong as an intermediary for business, but by the mid-1990s, Guangdong Province and Shanghai became key gateways to the Chinese market, particularly for Germany and France.2 Trade and investment surged, especially after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which was widely supported by European political and business elites. Today, China remains the EU’s largest trading partner, with substantial European investments across the mainland. In contrast, India was long viewed as a potential partner, but only a few EU member states took steps to forge a strategic partnership with New Delhi. European investments in India were — and still are — limited, with many corporations citing challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, market access barriers, and bureaucratic red tape, which make it difficult to operate in most Indian states. However, the mood has begun to shift. On the EU side, the European Commission’s 2019 China strategy characterized Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.” The COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted direct links between Europe and China from 2020 to 2022, caused significant strain. This was followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an event many on the continent perceive as having Beijing’s tacit support. Additional factors, including an increasingly authoritarian regime at home and a more assertive China abroad, have contributed to European perceptions,3 as explained at length by the Center for China Analysis’s latest Global Public Opinion on China project.4 This, in turn, has affected the EU-China relationship, which has been gradually downgraded from the “honeymoon” period of 1995–2015. On the other hand, the strengthening EU-India relationship is a relatively recent development, driven by several factors that have emerged in the wake of the pandemic. These include the rise of the ambitious Bharatiya Janata Party under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first took office in 2014 and is now serving his third term, as well as a broader diversity of partnerships between the EU and India. Other factors influencing EU-India relations include the growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China and the United States’ shift away from multilateralism during President Donald Trump’s first term (2017–2021). Since January 2025, the increasing probability of a break in the transatlantic alliance under the new Trump administration is leading the EU to look for new partners, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, India’s robust GDP growth — 6.6% in 2025 and a projected 6.7% in 2026 — has attracted European businesses.5 In a global environment defined by multipolarity, could the previously low-profile EU-India relationship evolve into a closer partnership? With EU-China relations facing significant challenges, might India emerge as a viable alternative Asian partner for Europe? The current EU-India relationship is described as “strategic.” In reality, it is partial and uneven, and there are major differences in the nature of relations between India and individual EU member states. Meanwhile, how does Beijing view its competitor in the Global South as it seeks to win over Europe’s support? This paper explores the dynamics of the interaction among these three powers in the rapidly changing geopolitical context. It examines India’s political and economic challenges in the context of the EU-China relationship, how the EU-India relationship is evolving, and whether an EU-India partnership could take center stage if tensions with China escalate. European countries have kept strong ties with the Global South, and some see a strong India as a potential bridge for fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, and Asia

69. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Simona Grano
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

70. ASEAN Caught Between China’s Export Surge and Global De-Risking

Author:
Brendan Kelly and Shay Wester
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
ASEAN, long a beneficiary of China’s rapid growth and global supply chain integration, now faces mounting pressures as Chinese industrial overcapacity spills into the region. ASEAN has thus far largely stayed out of growing global trade tensions around China’s industrial policies, much as it did during earlier U.S.-China trade disputes, while benefiting from investment and trade from all sides and deeper integration into Chinese supply chains that support growing exports to global markets. However, ASEAN faces increasing pressures from four key trends, each of which is accelerating, pointing to a more challenging time ahead for ASEAN policymakers and businesses. These developments are increasingly putting ASEAN in the middle of economic challenges and global reactions to China and its industrial overcapacity. China’s exports to ASEAN are growing rapidly, exceeding its exports to the United States and the European Union (EU) since 2023, and up a further 12% in 2024. While most of this growth has been in intermediate goods, supporting ASEAN’s own exports to advanced economies, increasingly it is also in final goods, displacing local industry and jobs. Meanwhile, ASEAN exports to China have declined 3% since 2022, contributing to growing trade deficits and incipient trade tensions. China’s industrial overcapacity, in lower-end as well as advanced manufacturing sectors—manifesting in surging volumes of artificially low-priced Chinese exports—is displacing ASEAN exports to third markets, threatening the region’s broader industrial health and development. ASEAN is increasingly becoming the key offshore manufacturing base for Chinese companies, particularly in the clean energy sector. While this investment can support the region’s energy transition and enhance global competitiveness in these important technologies, these products are at the center of overcapacity tensions with China, threatening to put ASEAN in the crosshairs of global trade responses. While ASEAN has benefited from integration into Chinese supply chains, the United States, the EU, and other economies, including Japan and India, are intensifying their scrutiny of exports from Chinese companies operating in or processed through third countries. ASEAN governments now face a double balancing act: managing growing economic integration with China while contending with mounting pressure from advanced economies to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains. At the same time, ASEAN must balance leveraging Chinese cheap imports and growing investments to drive industrial growth against the risk of these inputs overwhelming domestic industries and limiting their own industrial development. These tensions ASEAN faces are already building and are likely to be sharpened and accelerated under new Trump administration tariffs and China’s decoupling efforts. These evolving tensions also cast doubt on the extent to which China can meaningfully shift exports to ASEAN and other emerging markets as it faces growing trade restrictions from the United States and the EU. To address these challenges, ASEAN must prioritize strengthening trade tools and enhancing regional coordination to manage import surges, while continuing to invest in its own competitiveness. Diversifying its supply chains from increasing reliance on China will be critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Leveraging institutional frameworks under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) and the Regional and Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can help ASEAN navigate external pressures while safeguarding its industrial growth. At the same time, the U.S. and other major economies should proactively engage ASEAN on their overcapacity and de-risking concerns related to China, to help ASEAN remain a key partner in their own supply chain diversification efforts.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Exports, ASEAN, Supply Chains, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

71. What to Watch at China’s Two Sessions in 2025

Author:
Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The annual Two Sessions is the closest thing to a carnival in Chinese politics. Thousands of leaders, bureaucrats, experts, reporters, and celebrities from across the country flock to Beijing for a week of political pageantry. While the premier’s annual “state of the union” address is more restrained than its American counterpart — U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress just a day earlier — it remains a key indicator of China’s economic direction. The Two Sessions refers to the concurrent annual meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which opens on March 4, and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which begins on March 5. These meetings are expected to conclude on or around March 11. Both institutions answer to the Chinese Communist Party, led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The CPPCC National Committee, with 2,169 members, serves as the overarching organization of the United Front system, which mobilizes various social groups to support and advise the Party. Meanwhile, the NPC, with 2,977 delegates, functions as a single-chamber parliament that is, at least notionally, the supreme organ of state power. Anticipation surrounding this year’s event has been heightened by a rare “symposium on private enterprises” that Xi hosted on February 17, attended by some of the country’s top entrepreneurs. This uncommon symposium, last held in 2018, raised hopes for China’s struggling economy — particularly following the January return of President Trump, a self-proclaimed “tariff king” who has already imposed an additional 10% levy on Chinese imports. Now, attention shifts to how much Beijing is willing to boost stimulus, support businesses, and respond to Trump’s trade policies. The Two Sessions is expected to reveal a more pro-growth agenda compared to last year, with approximate targets of 5% for GDP growth, 4% of GDP for the fiscal deficit ratio, and 2% for consumer inflation. Further stimulus will come from roughly 3 trillion yuan in ultralong special treasury bonds and 4.5–5 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds. Measures to boost consumer spending and encourage private-sector innovation will also be introduced. While Beijing aims to stabilize growth, it is unlikely to unleash the proverbial “bazooka” stimulus, as it needs to conserve fiscal resources for a potential trade war. Similarly, sweeping structural reforms remain improbable as the government remains committed to Xi’s vision of high-tech industrial self-reliance.
Topic:
Reform, Economic Growth, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

72. China’s Middle Class Searches for Faith and Meaning

Author:
John Osburg
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Members of China’s urban middle class — long assumed to be the most secular segment of Chinese society — are turning to religion and spirituality in greater numbers. Rejecting officially sanctioned religious institutions and state-promoted ideology, many urbanites are seeking alternatives considered less tainted by party-state interference. Independent Christian churches, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, and New Age workshops are attracting increasing numbers of affluent, well-educated urban Chinese looking for authentic spiritual experiences and a sense of community, some of whom mix aspects of different religions to create their own personal spiritual practices. Growing interest in religious communities at the margins of state control reflects the failure of official ideology to provide spiritual comfort and the party-state’s lack of moral authority. Attempts by Beijing to co-opt religious institutions through “Sinicization” have undermined their spiritual authority. “Boss Christians” fund their own churches to gain social status and legitimize their wealth, while a growing number of intellectuals see Christian values as a model for reforming China’s government and society. Members of China’s elite who convert to Tibetan Buddhism say they value its purity and intellectually rigorous philosophy, which they contrast to the corrupted, diluted teachings of Han Chinese Buddhism.
Topic:
Religion, Christianity, Secularism, Buddhism, Middle Class, and Society
Political Geography:
China and Asia

73. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:
Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

74. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Chinese Foreign Policy in 2025: Absorbing Blows & Profiting from Others’ Mistakes

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2025, decision-makers in Austria and the EU should prioritize three highly topical questions that are at the forefront for China researchers: Will China respond severely to US tariffs? Will China contribute to peace talks in the Russia-Ukraine War? Will China fill the vacuum as the US retreats from global governance leadership? Among other trends in China research, there will be further work on how China’s technological and industrial progress—including on electric vehicles, AI, and quantum computing—will impact relations with the US and EU (ReConnect China 2025). Moreover, there will be more research on how integrated the Chinese economy is with the EU and others, and how resilient Europe is in this context (China Horizons 2025). Lastly, among rising regional focal areas, scholars will publish more on China’s rise as a research, economic, and geopolitical actor in the polar regions (Funaiole et al 2024; Paul 2024).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Tariffs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Austria

76. China's Green Belt and Road

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the past 15 years, green industries have developed rapidly in China, and China has assumed a leading position in several global supply chains of renewable energy. Because the domestic solar, wind and biomass markets have become quite saturated, Chinese companies have intensified their search for overseas markets, and the Chinese government is strengthening its support for that pursuit under the Green Belt and Road Initiative. For the governments and businesses in the green industries in the West, the Green Belt and Road Initiative could result in more competition over market shares and geopolitical influence, but it also encompasses opportunities for cooperation. For developing countries, more competition and diversification between foreign partners can be an advantage, allowing them to negotiate with the development partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Environment, Natural Resources, Business, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

77. Okinawa and Thule US military bases

Author:
Minori Takahashi and Ulrik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Dialogue is key to building trust and legitimacy around US military bases. A comparison of the bases in Okinawa and Thule reveals that the outcome of such dialogues is shaped by who is included in the conversation. Involving regional governments can enhance inclusivity but lead to political instability, while relying on central authorities may offer stability but at the cost of excluding local communities.
Topic:
Legitimacy, Dialogue, Trust, and Military Bases
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Greenland

78. Strengthening Alliances: The strategic importance of the Russian foreign minister's Asian tour

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On Friday, July 11, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov embarked on a high-level diplomatic tour encompassing North Korea and China, aiming to coordinate efforts on several pressing issues of mutual concern. Lavrov's visit to Pyongyang occurred as part of the second round of strategic dialogue between senior diplomats. Meanwhile, his trip to China coincided with his participation in the ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The meeting served as preparation for the anticipated Russian-Chinese presidential summit scheduled for August 2025, during which officials are expected to discuss the current state and future prospects of the SCO's activities, along with regional and international developments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

79. How China Collateralizes

Author:
Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, Sebastian Horn, Paulina Kintzinger, Bradley C. Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). We present a new dataset and detailed case studies of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions in EMDEs between 2000 and 2021. Almost half of China's total PPG loan portfolio to EMDEs is effectively collateralized - amounting to $420 billion in collateralized debt across 57 countries. We document that Chinese lenders use techniques adapted from export and project finance to build multi-layered legal safety nets, which help ensure that risky EMDE loans will be repaid. As security, they use liquid, easily accessible assets, such as cash in bank accounts located in China. They rarely take infrastructure project assets as collateral, but often rely for repayment on established commodity revenue streams unrelated to the project. Typically, EMDE governments and state-owned enterprises commit to route foreign currency proceeds from commodity sales through bank accounts controlled by the lender. The cash balances in these accounts can be very large; in low-income, commodity-exporting countries, they average more than 20% of annual PPG debt service to all external creditors. The same revenue source can secure multiple successive borrowings over many years. Our findings reveal a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries. Revenues routed overseas secure priority repayment for the creditor; they remain out of public sight and largely beyond the borrower’s reach until the secured debts are repaid. These findings raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Financial Markets, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Americas

80. Identifying Mutual Interests: How Donor Countries Benefit from Foreign Aid

Author:
Tobias Heidland, Maximilian Michael, Moritz Schularick, and Rainer Thiele
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Official development assistance (ODA) is widely studied for its impact on recipient countries, but its effects on donor countries remain underexplored. To address this gap systematically, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding when foreign aid generates measurable returns for donor countries as well as those cases when donor and recipient interests align—what we term mutual interest ODA. We categorize potential donor benefits into three domains: economic, geopolitical, and security-related, and distinguish these benefits by their timing and degree of directness. We then systematically survey the empirical evidence on donor benefits, assessing the empirical credibility and magnitude of estimated effects and pointing out research gaps. We find consistent evidence of substantial donor benefits across all three domains. A key insight is that aggregate aid flows often mask significant variation: The returns to donors depend critically on the type of aid, delivery modality, and recipient context. These findings have important implications for both academic and policy debates on the effectiveness, political sustainability, and future direction of development aid.
Topic:
Climate Change, Globalization, Health, International Trade and Finance, Migration, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, and Americas