Political Geography: Asia - CIAO Search Results

101. Enhancing ASEAN’s Competitiveness: Strategies for Talent Mobility and Cooperation in the Digital Economy

Author:: Mahirah Mahusin and Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: This policy paper examines the critical role of talent mobility and cooperation in fostering innovation and addressing the growing digital skills gap in ASEAN. Despite rapid growth in the region’s digital economy, the talent pool remains insufficient to meet the demands of information and communications technology and knowledge-based industries. Current ASEAN efforts, such as the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons and various mutual recognition arrangements, have not fully addressed these challenges. This paper argues that integrating talent mobility and development provisions into the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) will enhance regional competitiveness. By promoting regional cooperation, addressing skill gaps, and creating a unified framework for talent development, the DEFA can support ASEAN’s transition towards an innovation-driven economy. Key recommendations include the establishment of a regional dialogue platform, creation of a region-wide ‘tech pass’, and increased private sector involvement in workforce development.
Topic:: Digital Economy, Mobility, Innovation, ASEAN, and Competition
Political Geography:: Asia

102. China's Investment Pivot and Africa’s Industrial Prospects: Any Hope for African “Flying Geese”?

Author:: Charles Kenny
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:: This paper examines the changing shape of Chinese investment in Africa, as it evolves from large scale infrastructure toward small scale manufacturing. It looks at the opportunity for the region in the context of a deepening manufacturing labor shortage in China; discusses barriers to that opportunity in both China and the Africa region; and the potential response of Western countries. It may be possible for at least some economies in Africa to benefit from a combination of Chinese investment in manufactured export and processed commodity industries and preferential access to economies including the US and China if geopolitics allow, but there are many reasons this could fail and the geopolitics are increasingly hostile. A backup plan for regional growth would be wise.
Topic:: Debt, Investment, Trade, Industry, and Development Policy
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

103. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics

Author:: Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
Topic:: International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

104. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

105. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Saudi Arabia

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The fourth case study focuses on Saudi Arabia. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team traveled to the country to interview U.S. and Saudi policymakers, personnel in technology firms, members of civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Saudi Arabia’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

106. Understanding China’s New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa

Author:: Jason Warner
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, Foreign Influence, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

107. Consular Protection in Crisis: Vietnam’s Response During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:: Hanh Thi Nguyen and Linh Hoang Vo
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Consular protection represents a core function through which states uphold their responsibilities and deliver essential services to citizens residing or traveling abroad, particularly during times of crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic posed unprecedented challenges to these efforts, testing the capacity of governments worldwide. Vietnam, despite being a middle-income country with limited resources, mounted an effective response to protect its citizens overseas. This article presents Vietnam’s experience as an instructive case study, analyzed through the lens of Tindall and ’t Hart’s general analytical framework for consular protection in emergency situations. The findings highlight the importance of adapting existing theoretical frameworks to better reflect the constraints faced by developing countries and to address the complexities introduced by globally disruptive crises.
Topic:: Developing World, Crisis Management, COVID-19, Middle-Income Countries, and Consular Protection
Political Geography:: Asia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

108. India–Japan Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Geopolitical Prospects and Challenges Under Trump

Author:: Yen Pham Thi
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This article examines the India–Japan defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on its geopolitical prospects and challenges under the Trump administration. Strengthened by shared concerns over China’s rising influence and the convergence of their Indo-Pacific strategies, the partnership has evolved beyond symbolic engagement to include joint exercises, technology sharing, and defense dialogues aimed at preserving a free and rules-based regional order. At the same time, India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment, Japan’s dependence on US security guarantees, and the “America First” policy under Trump pose significant constraints. To sustain and deepen cooperation, both nations must enhance bilateral mechanisms, pursue strategic autonomy, expand multilateral engagements, and promote regional norms. These steps are essential for building a resilient, sustainable, and strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific amid a shifting US foreign policy landscape.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

109. Rethinking Aid in a Contested World

Author:: Stefan Dercon
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Development aid faces a crisis of budgets, legitimacy, and political alignment. Framed in recent decades as technocratic and benevolent, aid has always been political, shaped by donor and recipient incentives. Its post–Cold War expansion reflected a permissive era of unipolarity and globalization, when Western foreign policy, business, and security establishments provided broad support. That equilibrium has now collapsed. Multipolar rivalry, protectionism, and fragmented domestic coalitions have left aid vulnerable, shallowly supported, and increasingly driven by narrow donor interests. The paper calls for recognition of the need for a globalization 2.0 that enables poorer countries to grow, warning that without such a framework, remaining aid will become more fragmented and ineffective. It also cautions against a euphemistic reliance on “mutual interest,” as evidence of genuine donor–recipient benefits is limited; trade facilitation and post-conflict stabilization are rare exceptions. Finally, the paper advances four propositions: aid must be selective, avoid entrenching dependency, balance short-term results with long-term system building, and support reformers willing to challenge the status quo. Only by acknowledging its political nature and aligning incentives within a reconfigured global order can aid remain relevant to development.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, and North America

110. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:: Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:: Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

111. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:: Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

112. China Maritime Report No. 44: Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng's Downfall Amid Increasing PLAN Readiness

Author:: Christopher Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: Although corruption runs deep in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and across China’s armed forces, disciplinary-related removals appear not to have a major impact on naval capabilities or operations. The fight against corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has General Secretary Xi Jinping’s attention and appears to be picking up steam for 2025. The Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a report on 25 December 2024 identifying Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) as one of eight NPC deputies removed for “serious violations of discipline and the law.” Li was an officer on the fast track and identified early in his career by PLA press as one to watch. He had the unprecedented distinction of having command of two separate Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort task force deployments, extensive international maritime experience, and involvement in some of the PLAN’s most significant international navy accomplishments. Li’s career and his operations in the Mediterranean Sea had the personal attention of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi. Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng replaced Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) as the Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Navy roughly a year ago. Admiral Ju suffered Admiral Li’s same fate. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a revealing dataset to analyze the impact of sacking the commander, and of corruption more broadly, on PLAN operational capabilities and how they affect the force. The PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper. Regardless of corruption’s pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.
Topic:: Corruption, Leadership, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Ju Xinchun, Southern Theater Command, and Readiness
Political Geography:: China and Asia

113. China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy's Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects

Author:: Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Hospital Ship
Political Geography:: China and Asia

114. Stepping up Engagement in the Sahel: Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States

Author:: Nina Wilén
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have strategically realigned and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long, 13,000 troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense partnership with the US. In a second wave of expulsion, yet different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024. This recent expulsion of Western and multilateral partners has been accompanied by a turn by Sahelian states to old and new, predominantly authoritarian, actors. This shift reflects an effort by the military regimes to project independence, diversify their partners and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Traditional partners like China and Russia have intensified economic and security relationships with their Sahelian partners during the past few years, while newer partners like Turkey and the Gulf states have increased their presence and influence in the region through infrastructure projects, arms exports and natural resource deals. At the same time, the exit by the AES states from the regional organisation ECOWAS has resulted in both new partnerships and new tensions among member states, profoundly reshaping the regional landscape. This article, the second in a two-part series examining the security and political context in the Sahel, explores these evolving partnerships with non-Western actors, focusing in particular on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It examines the broader lines of cooperation and engagement by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states and identifies both similarities and important differences in their approaches. The aim is to provide a clearer overview of the Sahel’s shifting international relationships and to deepen our understanding of the dynamics, tensions and strategic choices among non-Western partners. differences and tensions between the non-Western partners. With a growing number of external actors competing for influence in the Sahel, Europe must base its recalibrated (re)engagement on a solid understanding of these dynamics.
Topic:: Politics, Coup, Engagement, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, Asia, Sahel, and Gulf Nations

115. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

116. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

117. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:: Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

118. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:: Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

119. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:: Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

120. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:: Bart Gaens
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

121. Deterrence and Hybrid Warfare: Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine for Taiwan and the Nordic-Baltic Region

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Eric Chan, Tony Lawrence, and Jyun-yi Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Deterrence is once more at the centre of discussions on national security. Faced with larger revisionist neighbours driven by aggressive foreign policies, Taiwan and states in the Nordic-Baltic region are drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to understand how to enhance deterrence in their respective theatres. These lessons, properly executed, drastically raise the costs for any aggressor. By involving both the military and civil society in the defence of the nation, territorially small states can redesign defence in depth to deter an aggressor across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

122. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

123. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

124. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:: Tanner Greer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

125. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:: Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

126. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

127. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:: Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

128. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:: Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

129. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:: Nury Turkel
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

130. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:: Mark Siegel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

131. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:: Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

132. Multi-Pole-arity: How Poland can help Europe think big on China

Author:: Alicja Bachulska
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: China’s strategic approach to its industrial policy—particularly its trade surplus and dominance in clean technologies—is a growing risk to Europe’s competitiveness and economic security. Like many other European states, Poland prefers to focus on the bilateral dimension of its relationship with China. But the scale of China’s economic threat means the EU’s only hope is to address it as a unified bloc. Poland should use its growing leadership role in the EU to help shift the bloc towards a more assertive China policy using the available tools. As it confronts the prospect of a trade war with the US, the EU cannot afford vulnerability to China. But first, Warsaw will need to recalibrate its own policies by grasping the realities of its trade relationship with China and assessing its vulnerabilities: investments, critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Topic:: Agriculture, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

133. Digitalisation in Agriculture and Food Systems in ASEAN: Pathways to Its Resilience and Sustainability

Author:: Masanori Kozono, Ari Aji Cahyono, and Siti Mustaqimatud Diyanah
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Digital technologies are transforming the agriculture and food systems of ASEAN, offering new opportunities to enhance productivity, sustainability, and resilience. ASEAN has taken collective steps to accelerate this transition through initiatives such as the ASEAN Guidelines on Promoting the Utilisation of Digital Technologies for ASEAN Food and Agricultural Sector (2021), the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening Food Security and Nutrition in Response to Crises (2023), and the Action Plan for Sustainable Agriculture in ASEAN (2024). To support these regional efforts, this study assesses the current utilisation of digital tools across agricultural value chains, identifies barriers to technology diffusion, and analyses enabling policy frameworks. Based on surveys of 824 respondents across eight ASEAN Member States (AMS), the study finds that smartphone-based solutions – such as advisory applications, digital payments, and marketplaces – are the most widely adopted. However, adoption is primarily driven by economic objectives rather than environmental benefits. The main constraints include limited infrastructure, low digital literacy, and high adoption costs. Looking ahead, digital marketplaces and drones are expected to become the most in-demand technologies. Comprehensive and inclusive policies – anchored in strong infrastructure, skills development, financing mechanisms, and regional co-operation – are critical to advancing sustainable digital transformation in ASEAN’s agri-food systems.
Topic:: Agriculture, Development, Science and Technology, Innovation, ASEAN, and Food Systems
Political Geography:: Asia

134. Putting a Price on Carbon in ASEAN and East Asia: Are Consumers Willing to Pay?

Author:: Ayu Pratiwi Muyasyaroh, Venkatachalam Anbumozhi, Kaliappa Kalirajan, and Veerapandian Karthick
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Carbon pricing is a policy tool designed to account for the external costs of carbon emissions, such as damage to crops, healthcare costs, and property loss due to climate change. It attaches a price to these costs and allocates responsibility to the sources of emissions. This approach helps incentivise the reduction of carbon emissions and encourages the adoption of technologies aimed at achieving a net zero economy. Revenue generated from carbon pricing can be reinvested by companies to support sustainable practices, including employee benefits and health insurance. While a few countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia have implemented carbon pricing mechanisms, there is limited understanding of individual preferences regarding these mechanisms at the national and regional levels. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism of the European Union aims to standardise carbon prices for internationally traded products. However, there is a lack of knowledge about preferences for such policy instruments across key stakeholders and countries. A survey has been conducted to elicit stakeholders’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon price in ASEAN and East Asia. The overall proportion of ‘yes’ answers to the WTP question was around 70%. Mean WTP corresponds to an additional price of US$10–US$15. The analysis of more than 500 consumer responses revealed that several modifiers impact the choice of higher and lower WTP additional costs for climate actions. Amongst the consumer groups, academia and household residents are more concerned about climate change and its harmful consequences but have less knowledge and lower appreciation of external pressures such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This, coupled with the already high electricity price, could have resulted in the lower WTP by the private sector respondents. Three null hypotheses on the effects of WTP on carbon emission reductions, revenue recycling, and regional cooperation are tested. The low WTP underscores the urgency of measures to overcome market size and technical and financing constraints, and to address regulatory hurdles that raise transaction costs, to achieve industrial competitiveness.
Topic:: ASEAN, Carbon Emissions, Green Economy, Net Zero, and Carbon Pricing
Political Geography:: Asia

135. The Double Exposure of Health Impacts and Micro/Nanoplastic Hazards in the Perspective of ASEAN One Health Studies

Author:: Achmad Solikin, Rahayu Susanti, Mirrah Nabighah, Yasuyuki Mitsuhashi, and Manami Uechi
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: In ASEAN countries, interest in and publication of research on micro/nanoplastics (MNPs) have significantly increased, reflecting growing political will to understand, regulate, and reduce MNP-related risks. However, the research agenda has largely focused on MNP distribution, exposure pathways, characterisation, and material properties, with limited attention to their toxicological effects. Although there is a rise in MNP-health research outputs, there has not yet been a systemic or holistic application of the One Health approach to assess the health risks of MNPs, nor to evaluate the hazardous nature of MNP constituents and their impacts on humans, animals, and ecosystems. This policy brief calls for the mainstreaming of the One Health Framework into the MNP research agenda across ASEAN. One Health – a transdisciplinary and integrative approach – is particularly suited to addressing the complexity of MNP pollution by accounting for the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health. Integrating One Health into MNP research would foster collaboration across scientific disciplines and enable a more comprehensive evaluation of the implications of MNP exposure. Such integration would allow for robust, multidisciplinary data collection on MNP instrumentations, exposure routes, constituent hazards, and toxicity effects. To this end, ASEAN Member States are strongly encouraged to embed the One Health Framework in national and regional studies on MNPs. Doing so will enhance the capacity of the region to generate actionable evidence and support more informed, effective policy decisions on the intersection of health and micro/nanoplastic pollution.
Topic:: Pollution, ASEAN, Healthcare System, and Microplastics
Political Geography:: Asia

136. Strengthening Open Government Data for Digital Cooperation in ASEAN

Author:: Hilmy Prilliadi and Mahirah Mahusin
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Open Government Data (OGD) can play a pivotal role in advancing data-driven policymaking and fostering innovation, particularly in addressing complex challenges such as climate change, inequality, and urbanisation. Despite progress in several ASEAN Member States, however, OGD development across the region remains fragmented and constrained by regulatory, cultural, technical, and institutional gaps. The absence of regional standardisation and a clear sectoral lead continues to limit cross-border co-operation and the realisation of shared economic and social benefits. Integrating OGD frameworks and provisions into trade and digital economy agreements – most notably the forthcoming ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) – offers a strategic opportunity to establish a common foundation for data accessibility, usability, and protection. Drawing on lessons from international agreements and global open data initiatives, this policy brief provides practical recommendations to strengthen OGD ecosystems in ASEAN, including targeted capacity building, sector-specific applications, and collaborative mechanisms to align national initiatives with regional priorities.
Topic:: Government, Science and Technology, ASEAN, Data, and Data Governance
Political Geography:: Asia

137. Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: A New Economic Order

Author:: Lili Yan Ing and Gene Grossman
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Various technological advancements have revolutionised how businesses operate and how people live and work. In recent years, significant advancements have occurred regarding industrial robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). The adoption of robotics and AI positively impacts productivity at both firm and national levels through increased precision and cost efficiency. While these technologies have the potential to substantially enhance productivity and to facilitate trade in goods and services, this paper also looks at the research on their impact on workers, wages, and economic welfare. Indeed, the extensive and uneven effects of robotics and AI on different skill sets have become a focus of economic research, which has explored how these technologies may yield outcomes that differ markedly from previous technological advancements.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Robotics
Political Geography:: Asia and Global Focus

138. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

139. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

140. 50 Years of Relationship: Looking to the Future

Author:: CEBRI
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: In 2024, Brazil and China celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations, marked by friendship, cooperation, and shared aspirations for the future. Over this period, the bilateral relationship has evolved from a predominantly trade-based partnership into a comprehensive strategic partnership, encompassing themes such as innovation, sustainability, and global governance. Among these agendas, sustainable development plays a central role, serving as a reference point for understanding the future paths of cooperation. In this context, CEBRI has gathered the main reflections from the China Analysis Group, an initiative carried out in partnership with BOCOM BBM, as well as from the events organized to mark the 50th anniversary of Sino-Brazilian relations. The publication highlights three priority areas for the future agenda: sustainable development, the digital economy, and strategic areas for deepening the bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Trade, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

141. Science Diplomacy in Horizon Europe Program: Taiwan’s TSMC as an Example for strengthening EU-Taiwan Relations

Author:: Adolfo Yinshi Wu
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: In this article, the author first introduces Taiwan's science diplomacy and its initial involvement in the EU's Horizon Europe programme, the EU's current flagship initiative for scientific innovation. Given the requirements of the programme and the market — namely, that the EU seeks to secure the semiconductor supply chain and that Taiwan is a major semiconductor manufacturer — closer cooperation between the EU and Taiwan could enhance the competitiveness and logistical resilience of EU chip production and supply in the global market. Given the current relationship, the Taiwanese government could develop significant research programmes under Horizon Europe and adopt regulations such as the EU Chip Act to gain access to the European market. The author concludes that Taiwan's TSMC could boost the EU's digital innovation and play a role as a science diplomacy tool in Taiwan–EU relations..
Topic:: Diplomacy, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

142. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:: Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:: Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

143. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC

Author:: Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

144. China in Iraq

Author:: Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

145. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:: Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

146. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:: Marie Krpata
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

147. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:: Marc Julienne
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and France

148. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:: Brad Setser
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

149. South Korea’s Emergence as a Defense Industrial Powerhouse

Author:: Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In recent years, South Korea’s ascent in the global arms market has been remarkable. This surge, particularly amid a shifting geopolitical landscape and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia War, has captured the attention of security watchers worldwide. This paper delves into the intricacies of the South Korean defense industry’s rapid emergence, wherein arms sales skyrocketed to 17.3 billion USD in 2022, and provides an in-depth analysis of its portfolio, capacity, and the rationales guiding its development over the last five decades. It explores how South Korea has capitalized on critical opportunities, including overcoming steep barriers to entry to major contracts with Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland. It sheds light on South Korea’s competitive technologies, mass production capacity, and cost-effectiveness, and addresses the crucial role played by the government’s diplomatic support and coordination with key allies and partners. Against that backdrop, it concludes with some implications for the global defense industry and security architecture.
Topic:: Security, Defense Industry, Armament, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Poland

150. Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum

Author:: Megumi Faith Mallari and Saleh Naas
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: Despite their known and indisputable need for protection, North Koreans often have their applications for asylum rejected. This paper outlines the differing interpretations of North Koreans’ right to asylum and investigates the rationales and justifications behind them through the case studies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and China (PRC). The paper argues that the rationale of the European countries analyzed is based on their generally restrictive view on asylum, independent from their political positioning on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Contrastingly, the rationales of the United States and the PRC are grounded in interests directly related to the Korean peninsula and Cold War narratives.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Asylum, and Refugee Policy
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, France, Germany, Netherlands, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS