Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Asia

101. Harnessing AI for ASEAN’s Future: Governance, Adoption, and Sustainability under the DEFA

Author:
Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI) presents transformative opportunities for ASEAN, as its market is projected to reach US$30.30 billion by 2030. AI adoption is expected to contribute 10%–18% of ASEAN’s gross domestic product, benefiting key sectors such as manufacturing, health care, and energy. However, AI integration also highlights challenges, including governance gaps, disparities in AI readiness amongst ASEAN Member States, data governance issues, and sustainability concerns. While ASEAN has made progress through initiatives like developing the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, policy fragmentation and uneven AI adoption across ASEAN Member States underscore barriers to inclusive growth. The ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) provides an opportunity to align AI governance in ASEAN with global standards, ensuring a regulatory framework that balances innovation with accountability. This brief highlights AI’s role in ASEAN’s digital economy and proposes policy recommendations to strengthen AI governance; enhance the population’s digital skills; support AI adoption amongst micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises; promote culturally diverse datasets; and advance sustainable AI infrastructure. By fostering regional cooperation and embedding AI-related commitments into the DEFA, ASEAN can harness AI’s potential while actively mitigating its risks.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Artificial Intelligence, Sustainability, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia

102. Fostering Inclusive Growth in ASEAN’s Digital Economy Through the DEFA and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Mahirah Mahusin and Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Digital transformation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly its rapidly evolving digital economy, could create significant socio-economic transformation, yet persistent obstacles limit widespread and equitable digital engagement across the region. Amongst others, unequal connectivity, high broadband costs, limited digital literacy, and disparities in access for underserved groups such as women, persons with disabilities, and rural communities may exacerbate the digital divide. This policy brief highlights the digital divide, its impact on financial inclusion, the challenges faced by underserved groups, and the unequal distribution of benefits from digital trade across ASEAN. Despite progress under regional frameworks and external agreements, achieving digital inclusion requires more targeted, development-oriented approaches. The Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) presents an opportunity to harmonise policies, support capacity-building initiatives, and align national and regional objectives for inclusive growth. Policy recommendations include provisions to enhance access, improve digital literacy, and foster public–private partnerships to address the needs of underserved populations.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Digital Economy, Innovation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia

103. Trajectory of Southeast Asian Production Fragmentation

Author:
David Christian and Lili Yan Ing
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper examines recent trends in production fragmentation within ASEAN’s manufacturing sector in the context of shifting global trade dynamics and rising economic nationalism. Using the OECD’s Trade in Value Added (Ti VA) database, we construct two key indicators: (i) the input fragmentation ratio (FRI), which measures overall reliance on intermediate inputs, and (ii) the import fragmentation ratio (FRM), which captures the extent of cross-border input sourcing. Our analysis reveals that, unlike North America and Europe, ASEAN has not experienced a decline in input fragmentation since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). However, signs of import defragmentation have emerged since 2010. We also find notable variation in fragmentation patterns across countries and industries. These results highlight the need for further research into the drivers of these trends, including investment and production relocation to ASEAN, market positioning, industry specialisation, and technological factors.
Topic:
Manufacturing, Resilience, Global Value Chains, ASEAN, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Asia

104. Good Regulatory Practice (GRP) in ASEAN – Towards Vision 2045 and Beyond

Author:
Intan Murnira Ramli and Mohamad Izahar Mohamad Izham
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In realising a resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centred ASEAN by 2045, the region must be guided by the Core Elements of the ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 Vision – endorsed at the 42nd ASEAN Summit in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia. To this end, ASEAN has adopted a strategic plan known as ‘Vision 2045, ’ which outlines its transformation into a globally influential, interconnected, and prosperous region. Vision 2045 expands upon the current ASEAN Community Vision 2025 by addressing contemporary challenges such as digital transformation, environmental sustainability, and socio-economic inequities. This Policy Brief examines the requirements for the next phase of ASEAN’s evolution. Their focus is on ensuring that the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and the ASEAN Connectivity Strategic Plan 2026–2030 are achieved, particularly through the integration of Good Regulatory Practice (GRP).
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, ASEAN, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Asia

105. Enhancing ASEAN’s Competitiveness: Strategies for Talent Mobility and Cooperation in the Digital Economy

Author:
Mahirah Mahusin and Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This policy paper examines the critical role of talent mobility and cooperation in fostering innovation and addressing the growing digital skills gap in ASEAN. Despite rapid growth in the region’s digital economy, the talent pool remains insufficient to meet the demands of information and communications technology and knowledge-based industries. Current ASEAN efforts, such as the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons and various mutual recognition arrangements, have not fully addressed these challenges. This paper argues that integrating talent mobility and development provisions into the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) will enhance regional competitiveness. By promoting regional cooperation, addressing skill gaps, and creating a unified framework for talent development, the DEFA can support ASEAN’s transition towards an innovation-driven economy. Key recommendations include the establishment of a regional dialogue platform, creation of a region-wide ‘tech pass’, and increased private sector involvement in workforce development.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Mobility, Innovation, ASEAN, and Competition
Political Geography:
Asia

106. China's Investment Pivot and Africa’s Industrial Prospects: Any Hope for African “Flying Geese”?

Author:
Charles Kenny
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
This paper examines the changing shape of Chinese investment in Africa, as it evolves from large scale infrastructure toward small scale manufacturing. It looks at the opportunity for the region in the context of a deepening manufacturing labor shortage in China; discusses barriers to that opportunity in both China and the Africa region; and the potential response of Western countries. It may be possible for at least some economies in Africa to benefit from a combination of Chinese investment in manufactured export and processed commodity industries and preferential access to economies including the US and China if geopolitics allow, but there are many reasons this could fail and the geopolitics are increasingly hostile. A backup plan for regional growth would be wise.
Topic:
Debt, Investment, Trade, Industry, and Development Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

107. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics

Author:
Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
Topic:
International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

108. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

109. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Saudi Arabia

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The fourth case study focuses on Saudi Arabia. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team traveled to the country to interview U.S. and Saudi policymakers, personnel in technology firms, members of civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Saudi Arabia’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

110. Understanding China’s New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa

Author:
Jason Warner
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, Foreign Influence, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

111. The Fragmentation Paradox: De-risking Trade and Global Safety

Author:
Thierry Mayer, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathias Thoenig
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We develop a model of international trade and geopolitical disputes, embedding a diplomatic game of escalation to conflict within a quantitative model of trade. Bilateral disputes arise exogenously, and rival countries engage in negotiations to avoid war. In equilibrium, negotiations may fail, resulting in conflict. All welfare-relevant geoeconomic factors, such as the realized costs of war, the concessions to prevent it, and the probability of escalation, depend on the opportunity cost of war, itself shaped by observed trade flows. We provide a simple procedure to estimate these factors in a model of trade calibrated to current data. This approach is then used to quantify the geoeconomic factors characterizing the US-China relationship, both historically and under various ``decoupling'' scenarios. We find that the growing US dependence to Chinese products and markets over the past thirty years has increased the cost of geopolitical disputes with China for the US. In this context, decoupling from China through increased tariffs may offer geopolitical benefits. Yet, the analysis highlights a fundamental security dilemma: because export and import dependencies influence bargaining power in negotiations, decoupling may reduce the diplomatic concessions needed to maintain peace but can paradoxically raise the risk of escalation by weakening incentives for restraint.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, Economy, Risk, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

112. The State(s) of Foreign Information Operations

Author:
Krystyna Sikora and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
It is easy to dismiss foreign information operations as playing out at the national level, designed to influence federal policymakers and Beltway insiders. But these threats transcend the “Beltway Bubble”. Increasingly, foreign nation-state actors are running operations that exploit trust in local sources and impact state and local communities. US adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran are refining their information tools and tactics to better target individuals and exacerbate divisions within the United States to destabilize the country at home and weaken it on the world stage. These nation states are increasingly exploiting domestic actors to launder and manipulate content that originates in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran and ultimately reaches American audiences who have no way of knowing they are on the receiving end of foreign information operations. They are also experimenting with generative artificial intelligence (AI), which, according to the US intelligence community, has allowed nation-state actors to “improve and accelerate” their operations, potentially enabling them to reach more Americans with more targeted content. Adversaries understand that state and local governments and communities are foundational to the strength of American democracy, so it is no surprise that they have targeted individuals and issues at the local level. In some cases, adversarial nations seek favorable outcomes around local policy issues; in others, they use local debates as Trojan horses to advance their broader geopolitical agendas. In others still, they attempt to influence views on the integrity of US elections and institutions or disenfranchise American citizens in specific communities to destabilize and erode trust in American democracy. But in all cases, American democratic discourse and the country’s information space—messy as they can sometimes be—are being used as primary vectors to advance foreign interests. If Americans lack that understanding, their communities—and the country—are left vulnerable. This report outlines an example of a foreign information operation targeting each of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Each case study indicates the foreign threat actor (if known) and explains the tools, tactics, and motivations for targeting Americans at the state and local level.
Topic:
Security, Threat Assessment, Foreign Influence, and Information Manipulation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

113. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In an increasingly fractured world where authoritarianism is gaining ground, Taiwan stands as one of the strongest and most resilient democracies. Taiwan placed first in Asia and 12th globally in the 2025 democracy index compiled by the London-based Economic Intelligence Unit. This year, Freedom House ranked Taiwan as the sixth-freest country in the world with a score of 94 out of 100. These are remarkable achievements for a relatively young democracy that experienced decades of authoritarian rule, lifted martial law in 1987, and conducted its first direct presidential election in 1996. Taiwan is also an economic powerhouse. With just 23.5 million people, Taiwan has a GDP of nearly $760 billion, which puts it close to the top 20 economies of the world. Its crucial role in global technology supply chains is unquestionable, especially in semiconductor manufacturing, where Taiwanese companies produce close to 70% of the world’s chips and over 90% of the most advanced ones. Taiwan is also driving innovation and delivering state-of-the-art solutions in artificial intelligence, information technology, and renewable energy. Taiwan is a global leader in public health, including medical technology, public hygiene, and transplants. It has one of the best national health care systems in the world and among the most competitive biomedical industries. Taiwan is also among the world’s leading nations in scientific research to improve prevention and detection of diseases. Another area where Taiwan excels is in the provision of disaster preparedness and relief, both domestically and internationally. Taiwan’s government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) frequently provide aid to countries affected by disasters, donating supplies, offering financial assistance, and dispatching search and rescue teams. After Japan’s massive Tohoku earthquake in 2011, Taiwan donated over $250 million in combined aid. Following the 2023 earthquake in Türkiye, Taiwan provided financial aid along with a search-and-rescue team. Taiwan’s importance to the international community is undeniable. As a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Taiwan has demonstrated that it is a valuable and reliable partner. Yet Taiwan is largely excluded from participating in the United Nations System, including the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Kimberley Process aimed at ensuring that diamonds are not used to fund violent conflicts or undermine legitimate governments. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) actively thwarts Taiwan’s participation in international organizations by exerting pressure within those organizations and on individual member countries. The Taiwan-US-Europe Policy Program (TUPP) encourages young professionals from the United States and Europe to include Taiwan in their research and activities and help Taiwan to expand its global networks. Established in 2017, annual TUPP delegations were originally composed only of Americans, but expanded to include Europeans in 2022 in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the world. Delegation members are selected through a rigorous application process. The annual program begins in Washington, DC, where the cohort (5 Americans and 5 Europeans) meets with officials and experts, and continues with a week-long visit to Taiwan to gain firsthand exposure to Taiwan’s politics, culture, and history. Through their participation in TUPP and especially their experience in Taiwan, participants are instilled with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history, its commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order, and its potential to contribute more actively to international organizations. They also gain a deeper understanding of the importance of strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Over time, TUPP aims to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. It is my earnest hope that all the TUPP participants will be inspired to work both on and with Taiwan. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of these goals. The contributions here, written by the members of the 2025 TUPP cohort, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate greater transatlantic and global attention to Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Democracy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

114. Risky Configuration: China’s Footprint in Germany’s Technology Stack

Author:
Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Germany—just like the EU as a whole—has recognized the strategic importance of reducing unilateral dependencies in digital technologies. In the face of geopolitical threats and economic uncertainty, the new German government has vowed to strengthen the country’s technological growth and resilience. Germany confronts a changing global order, in which it faces a growing threat from Russia while traditional security guarantees under the transatlantic alliance have weakened. While the threat from Russia dominates Berlin’s immediate strategic concerns, the growing alignment between Moscow and Beijing demands that this challenge cannot be viewed in isolation. As Germany recalibrates its national security posture from a peacetime orientation to one prepared for potential war, it is crucial to address the deepening strategic ties between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as part of a broader, interconnected threat. The PRC’s growing dominance in the German technology landscape threatens both Germany’s national security and its long-term economic resilience. Germany’s new government should now make increased efforts to effectively implement its China strategy, especially in the technology sector. Reducing exposure to systemic risks and de-risking the technological ecosystem is an urgent economic need and should be a security priority. This analysis examines the digital footprint of PRC entities in Germany’s technology ecosystem. It applies a “tech stack” framework to assess this footprint and its associated risks across five technology layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. The report illustrates the PRC’s involvement within each layer, situates this engagement within the PRC’s broader strategic objectives and identifies key vulnerabilities that could undermine Germany’s security and competitiveness if left unaddressed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

115. The New Political Economy of Supply: resources, rare earths and finance

Author:
Philip Andrews-Speed
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
China is the dominant player in the global low-carbon energy transition in two respects: it has deployed the largest fleet of low-carbon electricity generation capacity in the world, and it dominates several international supply chains for clean energy minerals, metals and equipment. China has installed a massive amount of infrastructure for both solar and wind energy since 2010. The total capacity reached 1,300 GW by the end of 2024, which is more than 45% of the global total. Investment in hydro power and nuclear power also continues. These non-fossil fuels accounted for about 40% of the nation’s power generation in 2024. At the same time, the country has built up the world’s largest electric vehicle industry and is likely to take the lead in the manufacture and use of green hydrogen. This success has been built upon several foundations. Most important are the various policies of central and local government that supported investment and innovation along the clean energy supply chains over two decades or more. In the early days, this relied on technology transfer from abroad. More recently, the development of technology and manufacturing clusters have assisted scaling up and innovation, all supported by abundant and skilled human capital (Hove, 2024). All this adds credibility to Xi Jinping’s pledge to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and ‘strive for’ carbon neutrality by 2060. However, energy and fossil fuel consumption are still rising, as are carbon emissions. Coal is the main culprit as the country has large reserves, and the government sees coal as providing the foundation for energy security. Coal accounted for about 55% of power generation in 2024 and remains an important fuel in some industries. The continued increase in the use of coal will result in the peak of carbon emissions being significantly higher than might have been projected ten years ago. The good news is that the declining rate of GDP growth combined with the increasing electrification of the economy may result in emissions peaking in the next two-to-three years.
Topic:
Political Economy, Natural Resources, Finance, Carbon Emissions, Rare earth elements (REEs), and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

116. The Inevitability of Tokyo? Japan’s Tourism Boom and Urban Centralisation

Author:
Maximilien Xavier Rehm
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:
Japan welcomed over 36.8 million tourists in 2024, a new record. This influx, along with a growing foreign resident population, is seemingly intensifying the centralisation of people in Tokyo, despite ongoing government efforts to counteract regional depopulation.
Topic:
Demographics, Tourism, Urban, Rural, and Centralization
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Tokyo

117. How Does China’s Rising Defence Budget Affect India?

Author:
Neeraj Singh Manhas
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:
China’s 2025 defence budget increased by 7.2%, totalling $245 billion, continuing military modernisation under Xi Jinping. Over the past decade, spending has doubled, focusing on advanced tech. This escalates challenges for India in border security and regional balance.
Topic:
Modernization, Xi Jinping, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

118. China’s Long Game in Iran’s Short War

Author:
Pierre Pahlavi
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:
Following the twelve-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, China has quietly accelerated its strategic partnership with a weakened Islamic Republic through renewed infrastructure commitments, expanded technological cooperation, and deepened diplomatic alignment. This calculated entrenchment represents Beijing’s broader ambition to reshape the post-American architecture of influence across Eurasia, potentially shifting the future of Middle Eastern geopolitics away from Western capitals toward Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

119. Foreign Policy of China: Pursuing the Resources in Afghanistan

Author:
Naqibullah Mashwani
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
China, a major power playing the peripheral diplomacy to bring developing countries to a table of dialogues, negotiations and international conferences to express their interests and form new relations.Thus, it has always been friendly and supportive to Afghanistan; providing humanitarian aid, investing in infrastructure, and extracting natural resources. However, China spent more on the minerals of Afghanistan during the new acting government than in the previous government. China was not deeply involved economically with the former government though they had signed some significant agreements.This was also one of the reasons China did not resist and took part in the 20 years long war in Afghanistan, instead, China supported, hosted and mediated Taliban. After the fall of Kabul and the return of the Taliban, China turned its policy and filled the vacuum, gave them de facto recognition and backed them in terms of security and economic development. This paper deeply explores the foreign policy of China towards Afghanistan and how they invested in extracting natural resources, infrastructure and tightened major economic agreements with the Taliban and contributed to the internal security and stability.China, a pioneer in oil extraction in Afghanistan has signed significant agreements and contracts with the interim government of Afghanistan for mineral extraction and refinery development.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Natural Resources, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, and Asia

120. Constructive Role of State-Owned Broadcaster in Elevating Economic Development and Peacebuilding: The Case Study of China Radio International and CGTN-Radio (2024-2025)

Author:
Muhammad Ahmad Sheikh and Muhammad Yousaf
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Constructive or solutions-focused news is often promoted as a way to lessen the conflicts based news and encourage audience to participate in national development, rather than reporting negative, conflict-driven news. (Djerf-Pierre, M., & Ekström, M. (2025) The study analyzes CRI/ CGTN -Radio news, podcast and talk shows highlighting positive economic frames while suggesting a need for stronger constructive journalism practices in prevailing world economic and peace situation. The thematic analysis of the main themes development, peace, and stability in the programmes of CR/CGTN -Radio (state-owned broadcaster) of China show mostly positive coverage. The programming content reveals that the news coverage of china radio international and CGTN-Radio emphasizes the economic development and peace initiatives of Pakistan and China. This study employs qualitative content analysis. Furthermore, the research highlights the necessity for constructive journalism globally, with a particular focus on China. The results indicate that state media prioritizes solutions to issues, social and economic stability, sustainability, and prosperous development.
Topic:
Journalism, Economic Development, Peacebuilding, and Radio
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

121. Artificial Intelligence and the New World Order: A Comparative Study of US-China Technological Rivalry

Author:
Adnan Nawaz, Syed Raghab Ali, Naudir Bakht, and Zosha Noor
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The power rivalry between the United States and China in the twenty-first century has been significantly influenced by advancements in artificial intelligence. This technology not only transforms economic markets but also enhances military capabilities and shapes political governance. This research explores the historical progression of AI development across these countries by showing how their unique political frameworks, alongside economic tables and strategic visions, created separate paths toward AI domination. During the Cold War years, the United States paced ahead through governmental investments combined with university innovation and its flexible private sector activity yet China obtained its growth through state-mandated direction and national planning alongside substantial financial allocations in line with initiatives like the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. China's Belt and Road initiative employs AI surveillance tools to construct new infrastructure as the United States depends on autonomous private enterprise operations without state control and freedom to conduct independent research. The competition between China and the United States targets multiple areas including semiconductor manufacturing technology together with quantum computing research and ethical standards creation which exposes weaknesses for each side. This study qualitatively evaluates the competition between US and China and analytically elucidates the key challenges which are posing threats to the global power hierarchy.AI operates as an accelerating force that shapes future power dynamics while determining digital sovereignty principles and deepening global ideological conflicts.
Topic:
Governance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

122. Strategic Vulnerabilities in Space: U.S.-China Militarization and the Risks to Global Strategic Stability

Author:
Ameema Khalid
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This study investigates the militarization of space by the United States and China using the theoretical frameworks of technological determinism and the security dilemma. Data analysis of policy documents, military doctrines, and strategic literature reveals how technological advancements, mutual distrust, and dual-use technologies have transformed space into a contested domain. Findings indicate that the lack of international regulations and transparency exacerbates the risks of miscalculation and conflict. The study suggests actionable measures, including binding treaties, enhanced transparency, and conflict resolution mechanisms to promote peaceful space exploration. This research contributes to the broader discourse on space security by offering insights into managing militarization challenges in a rapidly advancing technological era.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Space, Strategic Stability, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

123. Machinery production networks that bridge East Asia and Europe: A case against ‘near-shoring’ in the post-COVID-19 era

Author:
Mitsuyo Ando, Kazunobu Hayakawa, and Fukunari Kimura
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This study examines recent changes in international production networks facing various risks. We primarily investigate how import sources of the European Union (EU) countries in machinery industries have changed from the pre-pandemic to the post-pandemic period using monthly and annual international trade data at the finely disaggregated level, with a particular focus on East Asia. We confirm that Factory Asia experienced a much smaller negative impact and had a more rapid recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic compared with Factory America and Factory Europe, showing its robust and resilient nature. At least until 2023, the inter-regional linkages of East Asia as a supplier did not weaken. Moreover, we reveal that the two directions of links between East Asia and the EU are asymmetric. East Asian countries are important suppliers for the EU, particularly in general and electrical machinery industries, and the relative importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, in particular, as EU import sources strengthened further in the post-pandemic period. We also demonstrate that EU countries increased imports from longer-distance countries, indicating no quantitative evidence of intensifying near-shoring in machinery industries in the post-COVID-19 era. Furthermore, we demonstrate that EU countries have prioritised friend-shoring from an economic perspective but not necessarily from a political perspective when purchasing machinery products in the post-pandemic period.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, COVID-19, Production, and Near-Shoring
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, and Asia

124. Consular Protection in Crisis: Vietnam’s Response During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Hanh Thi Nguyen and Linh Hoang Vo
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Consular protection represents a core function through which states uphold their responsibilities and deliver essential services to citizens residing or traveling abroad, particularly during times of crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic posed unprecedented challenges to these efforts, testing the capacity of governments worldwide. Vietnam, despite being a middle-income country with limited resources, mounted an effective response to protect its citizens overseas. This article presents Vietnam’s experience as an instructive case study, analyzed through the lens of Tindall and ’t Hart’s general analytical framework for consular protection in emergency situations. The findings highlight the importance of adapting existing theoretical frameworks to better reflect the constraints faced by developing countries and to address the complexities introduced by globally disruptive crises.
Topic:
Developing World, Crisis Management, COVID-19, Middle-Income Countries, and Consular Protection
Political Geography:
Asia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

125. India–Japan Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Geopolitical Prospects and Challenges Under Trump

Author:
Yen Pham Thi
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This article examines the India–Japan defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on its geopolitical prospects and challenges under the Trump administration. Strengthened by shared concerns over China’s rising influence and the convergence of their Indo-Pacific strategies, the partnership has evolved beyond symbolic engagement to include joint exercises, technology sharing, and defense dialogues aimed at preserving a free and rules-based regional order. At the same time, India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment, Japan’s dependence on US security guarantees, and the “America First” policy under Trump pose significant constraints. To sustain and deepen cooperation, both nations must enhance bilateral mechanisms, pursue strategic autonomy, expand multilateral engagements, and promote regional norms. These steps are essential for building a resilient, sustainable, and strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific amid a shifting US foreign policy landscape.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

126. Rethinking Aid in a Contested World

Author:
Stefan Dercon
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Development aid faces a crisis of budgets, legitimacy, and political alignment. Framed in recent decades as technocratic and benevolent, aid has always been political, shaped by donor and recipient incentives. Its post–Cold War expansion reflected a permissive era of unipolarity and globalization, when Western foreign policy, business, and security establishments provided broad support. That equilibrium has now collapsed. Multipolar rivalry, protectionism, and fragmented domestic coalitions have left aid vulnerable, shallowly supported, and increasingly driven by narrow donor interests. The paper calls for recognition of the need for a globalization 2.0 that enables poorer countries to grow, warning that without such a framework, remaining aid will become more fragmented and ineffective. It also cautions against a euphemistic reliance on “mutual interest,” as evidence of genuine donor–recipient benefits is limited; trade facilitation and post-conflict stabilization are rare exceptions. Finally, the paper advances four propositions: aid must be selective, avoid entrenching dependency, balance short-term results with long-term system building, and support reformers willing to challenge the status quo. Only by acknowledging its political nature and aligning incentives within a reconfigured global order can aid remain relevant to development.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, and North America

127. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:
Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

128. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

129. China Maritime Report No. 44: Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng's Downfall Amid Increasing PLAN Readiness

Author:
Christopher Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Although corruption runs deep in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and across China’s armed forces, disciplinary-related removals appear not to have a major impact on naval capabilities or operations. The fight against corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has General Secretary Xi Jinping’s attention and appears to be picking up steam for 2025. The Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a report on 25 December 2024 identifying Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) as one of eight NPC deputies removed for “serious violations of discipline and the law.” Li was an officer on the fast track and identified early in his career by PLA press as one to watch. He had the unprecedented distinction of having command of two separate Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort task force deployments, extensive international maritime experience, and involvement in some of the PLAN’s most significant international navy accomplishments. Li’s career and his operations in the Mediterranean Sea had the personal attention of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi. Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng replaced Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) as the Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Navy roughly a year ago. Admiral Ju suffered Admiral Li’s same fate. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a revealing dataset to analyze the impact of sacking the commander, and of corruption more broadly, on PLAN operational capabilities and how they affect the force. The PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper. Regardless of corruption’s pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.
Topic:
Corruption, Leadership, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Ju Xinchun, Southern Theater Command, and Readiness
Political Geography:
China and Asia

130. China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy's Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects

Author:
Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Hospital Ship
Political Geography:
China and Asia

131. Stepping up Engagement in the Sahel: Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States

Author:
Nina Wilén
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have strategically realigned and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long, 13,000 troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense partnership with the US. In a second wave of expulsion, yet different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024. This recent expulsion of Western and multilateral partners has been accompanied by a turn by Sahelian states to old and new, predominantly authoritarian, actors. This shift reflects an effort by the military regimes to project independence, diversify their partners and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Traditional partners like China and Russia have intensified economic and security relationships with their Sahelian partners during the past few years, while newer partners like Turkey and the Gulf states have increased their presence and influence in the region through infrastructure projects, arms exports and natural resource deals. At the same time, the exit by the AES states from the regional organisation ECOWAS has resulted in both new partnerships and new tensions among member states, profoundly reshaping the regional landscape. This article, the second in a two-part series examining the security and political context in the Sahel, explores these evolving partnerships with non-Western actors, focusing in particular on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It examines the broader lines of cooperation and engagement by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states and identifies both similarities and important differences in their approaches. The aim is to provide a clearer overview of the Sahel’s shifting international relationships and to deepen our understanding of the dynamics, tensions and strategic choices among non-Western partners. differences and tensions between the non-Western partners. With a growing number of external actors competing for influence in the Sahel, Europe must base its recalibrated (re)engagement on a solid understanding of these dynamics.
Topic:
Politics, Coup, Engagement, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Turkey, Asia, Sahel, and Gulf Nations

132. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

133. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

134. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

135. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:
Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

136. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:
Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

137. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

138. Deterrence and Hybrid Warfare: Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine for Taiwan and the Nordic-Baltic Region

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Eric Chan, Tony Lawrence, and Jyun-yi Lee
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Deterrence is once more at the centre of discussions on national security. Faced with larger revisionist neighbours driven by aggressive foreign policies, Taiwan and states in the Nordic-Baltic region are drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to understand how to enhance deterrence in their respective theatres. These lessons, properly executed, drastically raise the costs for any aggressor. By involving both the military and civil society in the defence of the nation, territorially small states can redesign defence in depth to deter an aggressor across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

139. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

140. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:
Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

141. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:
Tanner Greer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

142. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:
Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

143. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

144. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

145. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:
Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

146. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

147. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

148. Sino-Russian Interactions Regarding Kazakhstan

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many Russian strategists see Kazakhstan, the largest Central Asia country and a border state of Russia, as a strategic buffer shielding the Russian Federation from external threats. Russia derives considerable leverage over Kazakhstan from the two countries’ shared history, geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and defense ties. The Chinese government has cultivated extensive diplomatic, economic, and energy ties with Kazakhstan; Beijing has approached security ties more cautiously, not wishing to antagonize Russia. Kazakhstan is a critical participant in Beijing’s trans-Eurasian transportation initiatives due to the country’s pivotal location between China and Europe. Trilateral security cooperation remains modest while Russian-Chinese-Kazakhstani trade is increasing due to expanding rail, pipeline, and dual-use transfer networks connecting all three countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

149. Multi-Pole-arity: How Poland can help Europe think big on China

Author:
Alicja Bachulska
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s strategic approach to its industrial policy—particularly its trade surplus and dominance in clean technologies—is a growing risk to Europe’s competitiveness and economic security. Like many other European states, Poland prefers to focus on the bilateral dimension of its relationship with China. But the scale of China’s economic threat means the EU’s only hope is to address it as a unified bloc. Poland should use its growing leadership role in the EU to help shift the bloc towards a more assertive China policy using the available tools. As it confronts the prospect of a trade war with the US, the EU cannot afford vulnerability to China. But first, Warsaw will need to recalibrate its own policies by grasping the realities of its trade relationship with China and assessing its vulnerabilities: investments, critical infrastructure and supply chains.
Topic:
Agriculture, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

150. Digitalisation in Agriculture and Food Systems in ASEAN: Pathways to Its Resilience and Sustainability

Author:
Masanori Kozono, Ari Aji Cahyono, and Siti Mustaqimatud Diyanah
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Digital technologies are transforming the agriculture and food systems of ASEAN, offering new opportunities to enhance productivity, sustainability, and resilience. ASEAN has taken collective steps to accelerate this transition through initiatives such as the ASEAN Guidelines on Promoting the Utilisation of Digital Technologies for ASEAN Food and Agricultural Sector (2021), the ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening Food Security and Nutrition in Response to Crises (2023), and the Action Plan for Sustainable Agriculture in ASEAN (2024). To support these regional efforts, this study assesses the current utilisation of digital tools across agricultural value chains, identifies barriers to technology diffusion, and analyses enabling policy frameworks. Based on surveys of 824 respondents across eight ASEAN Member States (AMS), the study finds that smartphone-based solutions – such as advisory applications, digital payments, and marketplaces – are the most widely adopted. However, adoption is primarily driven by economic objectives rather than environmental benefits. The main constraints include limited infrastructure, low digital literacy, and high adoption costs. Looking ahead, digital marketplaces and drones are expected to become the most in-demand technologies. Comprehensive and inclusive policies – anchored in strong infrastructure, skills development, financing mechanisms, and regional co-operation – are critical to advancing sustainable digital transformation in ASEAN’s agri-food systems.
Topic:
Agriculture, Development, Science and Technology, Innovation, ASEAN, and Food Systems
Political Geography:
Asia

151. Putting a Price on Carbon in ASEAN and East Asia: Are Consumers Willing to Pay?

Author:
Ayu Pratiwi Muyasyaroh, Venkatachalam Anbumozhi, Kaliappa Kalirajan, and Veerapandian Karthick
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Carbon pricing is a policy tool designed to account for the external costs of carbon emissions, such as damage to crops, healthcare costs, and property loss due to climate change. It attaches a price to these costs and allocates responsibility to the sources of emissions. This approach helps incentivise the reduction of carbon emissions and encourages the adoption of technologies aimed at achieving a net zero economy. Revenue generated from carbon pricing can be reinvested by companies to support sustainable practices, including employee benefits and health insurance. While a few countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia have implemented carbon pricing mechanisms, there is limited understanding of individual preferences regarding these mechanisms at the national and regional levels. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism of the European Union aims to standardise carbon prices for internationally traded products. However, there is a lack of knowledge about preferences for such policy instruments across key stakeholders and countries. A survey has been conducted to elicit stakeholders’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for a carbon price in ASEAN and East Asia. The overall proportion of ‘yes’ answers to the WTP question was around 70%. Mean WTP corresponds to an additional price of US$10–US$15. The analysis of more than 500 consumer responses revealed that several modifiers impact the choice of higher and lower WTP additional costs for climate actions. Amongst the consumer groups, academia and household residents are more concerned about climate change and its harmful consequences but have less knowledge and lower appreciation of external pressures such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This, coupled with the already high electricity price, could have resulted in the lower WTP by the private sector respondents. Three null hypotheses on the effects of WTP on carbon emission reductions, revenue recycling, and regional cooperation are tested. The low WTP underscores the urgency of measures to overcome market size and technical and financing constraints, and to address regulatory hurdles that raise transaction costs, to achieve industrial competitiveness.
Topic:
ASEAN, Carbon Emissions, Green Economy, Net Zero, and Carbon Pricing
Political Geography:
Asia

152. The Double Exposure of Health Impacts and Micro/Nanoplastic Hazards in the Perspective of ASEAN One Health Studies

Author:
Achmad Solikin, Rahayu Susanti, Mirrah Nabighah, Yasuyuki Mitsuhashi, and Manami Uechi
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In ASEAN countries, interest in and publication of research on micro/nanoplastics (MNPs) have significantly increased, reflecting growing political will to understand, regulate, and reduce MNP-related risks. However, the research agenda has largely focused on MNP distribution, exposure pathways, characterisation, and material properties, with limited attention to their toxicological effects. Although there is a rise in MNP-health research outputs, there has not yet been a systemic or holistic application of the One Health approach to assess the health risks of MNPs, nor to evaluate the hazardous nature of MNP constituents and their impacts on humans, animals, and ecosystems. This policy brief calls for the mainstreaming of the One Health Framework into the MNP research agenda across ASEAN. One Health – a transdisciplinary and integrative approach – is particularly suited to addressing the complexity of MNP pollution by accounting for the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health. Integrating One Health into MNP research would foster collaboration across scientific disciplines and enable a more comprehensive evaluation of the implications of MNP exposure. Such integration would allow for robust, multidisciplinary data collection on MNP instrumentations, exposure routes, constituent hazards, and toxicity effects. To this end, ASEAN Member States are strongly encouraged to embed the One Health Framework in national and regional studies on MNPs. Doing so will enhance the capacity of the region to generate actionable evidence and support more informed, effective policy decisions on the intersection of health and micro/nanoplastic pollution.
Topic:
Pollution, ASEAN, Healthcare System, and Microplastics
Political Geography:
Asia

153. Strengthening Open Government Data for Digital Cooperation in ASEAN

Author:
Hilmy Prilliadi and Mahirah Mahusin
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Open Government Data (OGD) can play a pivotal role in advancing data-driven policymaking and fostering innovation, particularly in addressing complex challenges such as climate change, inequality, and urbanisation. Despite progress in several ASEAN Member States, however, OGD development across the region remains fragmented and constrained by regulatory, cultural, technical, and institutional gaps. The absence of regional standardisation and a clear sectoral lead continues to limit cross-border co-operation and the realisation of shared economic and social benefits. Integrating OGD frameworks and provisions into trade and digital economy agreements – most notably the forthcoming ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) – offers a strategic opportunity to establish a common foundation for data accessibility, usability, and protection. Drawing on lessons from international agreements and global open data initiatives, this policy brief provides practical recommendations to strengthen OGD ecosystems in ASEAN, including targeted capacity building, sector-specific applications, and collaborative mechanisms to align national initiatives with regional priorities.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, ASEAN, Data, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
Asia

154. Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: A New Economic Order

Author:
Lili Yan Ing and Gene Grossman
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Various technological advancements have revolutionised how businesses operate and how people live and work. In recent years, significant advancements have occurred regarding industrial robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). The adoption of robotics and AI positively impacts productivity at both firm and national levels through increased precision and cost efficiency. While these technologies have the potential to substantially enhance productivity and to facilitate trade in goods and services, this paper also looks at the research on their impact on workers, wages, and economic welfare. Indeed, the extensive and uneven effects of robotics and AI on different skill sets have become a focus of economic research, which has explored how these technologies may yield outcomes that differ markedly from previous technological advancements.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Robotics
Political Geography:
Asia and Global Focus

155. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

156. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

157. 50 Years of Relationship: Looking to the Future

Author:
CEBRI
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
In 2024, Brazil and China celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations, marked by friendship, cooperation, and shared aspirations for the future. Over this period, the bilateral relationship has evolved from a predominantly trade-based partnership into a comprehensive strategic partnership, encompassing themes such as innovation, sustainability, and global governance. Among these agendas, sustainable development plays a central role, serving as a reference point for understanding the future paths of cooperation. In this context, CEBRI has gathered the main reflections from the China Analysis Group, an initiative carried out in partnership with BOCOM BBM, as well as from the events organized to mark the 50th anniversary of Sino-Brazilian relations. The publication highlights three priority areas for the future agenda: sustainable development, the digital economy, and strategic areas for deepening the bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Trade, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

158. Science Diplomacy in Horizon Europe Program: Taiwan’s TSMC as an Example for strengthening EU-Taiwan Relations

Author:
Adolfo Yinshi Wu
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
In this article, the author first introduces Taiwan's science diplomacy and its initial involvement in the EU's Horizon Europe programme, the EU's current flagship initiative for scientific innovation. Given the requirements of the programme and the market — namely, that the EU seeks to secure the semiconductor supply chain and that Taiwan is a major semiconductor manufacturer — closer cooperation between the EU and Taiwan could enhance the competitiveness and logistical resilience of EU chip production and supply in the global market. Given the current relationship, the Taiwanese government could develop significant research programmes under Horizon Europe and adopt regulations such as the EU Chip Act to gain access to the European market. The author concludes that Taiwan's TSMC could boost the EU's digital innovation and play a role as a science diplomacy tool in Taiwan–EU relations..
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

159. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:
Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:
Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

160. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC

Author:
Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

161. China in Iraq

Author:
Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

162. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:
Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:
GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

163. Japan as a New Strategic Partner in the Three Seas Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

Author:
Sayuri Romei
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In April 2024, Japan joined the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) as a new strategic partner alongside the United States and the European Union. The 3SI was established in 2015 with the objective of strengthening connectivity and reducing the disparities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic states. The initiative promotes the development of infrastructure in the energy, transport, and digital sectors in the region surrounded by the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the relevance of this initiative and has underscored the frail infrastructure in the region and CEE’s economic dependence on Russia. As it becomes increasingly clear that the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions are inseparable, Japan is compelled to serve as an active partner in the 3SI as its role is also closely connected to the quality of assistance and support to Ukraine. As Japan embarks on this new partnership with CEE and Baltic countries, however, moving beyond the rhetoric about the importance of this initiative and taking concrete action is a challenge that all the countries involved will have to grapple with. Japan’s dialogue with CEE, and in particular with the Visegrad-4 (V4) group, i.e., Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, officially started in the early 2000s. For the past twenty years, the relationship has mostly been smooth and without major problems. However, Japan’s engagement with those countries has lacked dynamism, as Japanese foreign policy has mainly been focused on the United States and China. Japan’s investments in CEE have been limited and cautious, and visits from high-ranking Japanese officials have been sporadic. In fact, the visits to Japan by the heads of the states of the V4 and CEE countries have always outnumbered those by their Japanese counterparts. Twenty years later, as CEE countries are realizing that the economic benefit from China is not as great as they had expected, Japan is in a good position to rekindle this relationship. In a January 2022 interview with Nikkei, Akio Miyajima, Ambassador of Japan to Poland, argued that it is crucial for Japan to strengthen relations with these countries. At the time of the interview, Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine, and the Ambassador lamented that Japan remained disinterested in the Ukraine issue. Since the invasion a month later, however, Japan has not only taken a clear stance in condemning Russia’s aggression, it has also taken a leadership role in investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine. One of the main concerns about the 3SI is that it currently lacks cohesiveness, as the twelve participating nations are too divided to agree on major joint investments. Another issue is that the initiative mainly takes place on the political level, and cooperation on other levels and dimensions are presently non-existent. How can Japan, in coordination with the United States and Europe, contribute to creating a more systematic approach to non-political partnerships and effective financial support for the participating nations of the 3SI? The topic is still under-researched and as Japan’s strategic partnership was formalized just last year, now is an ideal time for experts from Japan, the United States, and the EU to identify opportunities and common challenges, and discuss ways to jointly implement a roadmap as strategic partners in the 3SI framework. As 2025 marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the 3SI, it is critical for Japan and the other strategic partners to start contributing concretely to the initiative and to deepen their engagement with the participating nations. The tenth summit of the 3SI was held in Warsaw on April 28-29, 2025, and GMF Indo-Pacific partnered with the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, to publish this volume, which gathers the findings and perspectives of five authors from Japan, Europe, and the United States. Prof. Beata Bochorodycz of Adam Mickiewicz University and Dr. Bart Gaens of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs offer a European perspective on Japan’s potential role in the 3SI. Bochorodycz argues that Japan’s engagement will contribute greatly to regional infrastructure development while counterbalancing Russian and Chinese influences in the region. Gaens asserts that Japan’s interest in 3SI is multifold and covers several different areas: business and economics, development and connectivity, and geopolitics. However, he argues that there are also several challenges that impede Tokyo’s stronger involvement, and offers recommendations on its future engagement with the CEE countries. Anthony Kim of the Heritage Foundation and Mirna Galic, formerly with the United States Institute of Peace, contribute to this volume from American perspectives. Kim emphasizes the importance of the 3SI as a platform for attracting private sector investors and encourages Japan to go beyond its political partnership, while Galic reflects on how the 3SI may benefit Japan’s interests and analyzes concrete ways in which Tokyo can support the initiative. Finally, Ambassador Akio Miyajima, who served as Japanese Ambassador to Poland from 2020-2024, leans on his direct experience to recount the strategic evolution of Japan’s engagement with the CEE countries. He examines the Japanese government’s perspective from its first concerns about the expansion of Chinese influence in Europe to the major strategic recalibration that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ambassador Miyajima concludes by analyzing the current global uncertainty stemming from the second Trump administration and offers recommendations on ways to strengthen Japan’s position as a strategic partner to the 3SI.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Defense Cooperation, Strategic Partnerships, and Three Seas Initiative
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

164. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:
Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

165. Russia and China in Central Asia’s Technology Stack

Author:
Dylan Welch
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Central Asia’s role as a geopolitical battleground among Russia, China, Europe, and the United States has grown in recent years as Western countries seek trade and digital connectivity routes that bypass Russian infrastructure. While Western discourse on a “Middle Corridor” through Central Asia has focused on railways, ports and pipelines, China’s Digital Silk Road is quietly reshaping the region’s digital landscape and deepening strategic dependencies on Beijing. At the same time, Central Asian governments are drawing primarily on PRC technologies and Russian regulatory models to strengthen their own digital authoritarian regimes, risking joint domination by the increasingly aligned governments in Beijing and Moscow. China’s increasing control over the region’s “technology stack” could have an outsized impact on the future of digital connectivity, cybersecurity, and geopolitical competition across Eurasia. Russia’s regulatory influence on the region’s governments could shape digital governance norms across Eurasia. For Central Asian actors and Western policymakers invested in preserving the region’s strategic autonomy, it is crucial to understand these vulnerabilities and offer viable alternatives in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Ensuring a resilient and diversified digital landscape in Central Asia is therefore not only a regional concern but a vital issue for global security. This report seeks to shed light on the influence of Russia and China on the ICT sectors of three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It uses the “technology stack” method adapted from two previous reports by GMF’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) on the future internet and the digital information stack released in 2020 and 2022. The framework is used to examine one country’s presence in and penetration of another country’s technology and regulatory ecosystem. The analysis of the resulting dependencies provides an indicative, rather than exhaustive overview of Russia and China’s technological footprint in Central Asia, offering key examples and highlighting areas where policymakers can focus their attention with the goal to de-risk digital technologies and governance in Central Asia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

166. Case Study on Conspiracy to Smuggle U.S.-Origin Military Equipment and Dual-Use Technology to North Korea

Author:
Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A Chinese national, Shenghua Wen, pleaded guilty in 2024 to conspiring with North Korea to export restricted items without a license, violating the U.S. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, and Executive Orders. At the direction of the North Korean government, Wen acted from his private residence in the United States, buying military goods domestically and providing false shipping information to send the items to Hong Kong, and then to North Korea. The case demonstrates that though North Korea can achieve limited success through such schemes, its agents face a high risk of exposure, detainment, and prosecution. Beyond firearms, ammunition, and other military equipment, North Korea sought civilian aircraft engine blueprints to manufacture engines for its drone program. At present, Wen’s scheme does not appear to indicate the presence of a more sophisticated smuggling network. Thus far, Wen’s partners/co-conspirators, the unnamed Hong Kong-based “broker,” and front company mentioned in the criminal complaint have not faced any punitive action from the U.S. government.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Smuggling, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

167. South Korea and the Middle East’s Defense Localization Drive: A New Strategic Fit

Author:
Bonggeun Kim
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Given South Korea’s willingness to offer technology transfer, local production arrangements, and politically flexible partnerships, it has become an attractive alternative to Western and Russian suppliers, presenting both opportunities and competitive challenges for U.S. policy in the region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, and Localization
Political Geography:
Middle East, Asia, and South Korea

168. The Republic of Korea’s Contributions to Pacific Maritime Governance

Author:
Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a significant interest in Pacific maritime governance owing to its reliance on maritime trade, its security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region, and how the ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy intersects with its aspirations to become a “Global Pivotal State,” a term coined by the Yoon Suk Yeol government. The ROK's objectives and actions in Pacific maritime governance can be understood through its strategic perspectives, policies, contributions, and the challenges it faces. There are two ROK objectives related to Pacific maritime governance. The first is to ensure freedom of navigation. As a major trading nation, South Korea is highly dependent on sea routes connecting the Korean peninsula to the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Malacca Strait for its exports and imports, including critical energy and other resources. Safeguarding freedom of navigation in the West Pacific along with so-called “like-minded” countries is vital to its economic security, often labeled as protecting supply chains. Second, regional stability and security via enforcing alliance and alignment are critical. South Korea aims to contribute to maritime stability, particularly in response to increasing tensions involving regional power competition between China and the United States alongside Japan. In particular, the hegemonic challenger, China, has aggressively grown its military presence in the West Pacific. For South Korea, guarding against North Korea’s ever-growing military threat remains a priority. Strengthening alliances and security partnerships among like-minded countries in the region is critical. South Korea seeks to enhance security cooperation with key regional players such as the United States, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pacific Island countries such as Fiji to promote maritime governance.
Topic:
Governance, Maritime, Freedom of Movement, Regional Security, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

169. The Winds of Change: How China's Focus on Rare Earth Minerals Reshapes the World

Author:
Ian Murphy and Kevin Johnston
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article examines how rare earth minerals and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic dominance in the global economy affect U.S. national security. The PRC’s near monopoly on rare earth processing and its use of export controls as leverage pose significant risks to global supply chains and U.S. national security interests. This analysis explores contemporary PRC strategies in the rare earth sector and their implications for U.S. national security by explaining how the PRC’s view of international cooperation differs from the United States’ view. In essence, the PRC is using the transition to renewable energy to pursue its broader security goals and enhance its position in the global power hierarchy. Furthermore, the article offers policy recommendations aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring the secure and sustainable supply of resources critical to U.S. interests.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

170. NATO's Long Cold Front:​ Why NATO Must Reorganize Its Approach to Defending the European High North

Author:
Ryan R. Duffy, Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad M. Pillai
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces strategic vulnerabilities in the European high north due to growing Russian and Chinese collaboration. Leveraging scenario planning and enhanced integration of Nordic capabilities into Joint Force Command Norfolk is recommended to bolster Arctic deterrence. Clarified command structures, specialized polar-warfare units, targeted infrastructure investments, and expanded Joint exercises are essential. This would strengthen NATO’s Arctic posture, ensuring regional stability and enabling the U.S. strategic pivot toward countering China’s growing global influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

171. Chinese Arctic Expansion:​ How Beijing Benefits from Moscow’s Isolation

Author:
Mark Vicik
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused immediate disruption to the Arctic’s strategic environment. This shift has caused Russia to partner more closely with China, giving Beijing new opportunities to advance its goals in the region. This article explores the impacts that this shift could have on China’s activity in the Arctic. First, it describes the history of China in the Arctic to define its strategic objectives in the region. Then, it argues that the geopolitical changes following the war in Ukraine have given Beijing new opportunities to advance these Arctic goals. Finally, it assesses this shift’s strategic impact to the United States and its allies. This work provides a critical insight into changing power dynamics in the Arctic in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Civil-Military Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Arctic

172. Power Play: Charging Up Strategic Competition over Lithium Battery Value Chains

Author:
Philip Murray
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
This article examines the strategic implications of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) dominance over the global lithium value chain and the resulting vulnerabilities for the U.S. Department of Defense. During several decades, through sustained strategic investments, the PRC has achieved a controlling position in the lithium market, encompassing mining, refining, and battery manufacturing. This control allows the PRC to influence lithium pricing and availability globally, posing significant economic and strategic risks to nations reliant on these supply chains, particularly the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Global Value Chains, Lithium, Batteries, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

173. The Arctic as a Periphery in U.S.-China Competition​

Author:
Charlotte Hulme
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
While China’s Arctic inroads have attracted growing attention from the United States, this article views Arctic competition as a periphery of global great power competition, or as a sideshow to the main theater of U.S.-China competition—the Indo-Pacific. Examining China’s Arctic activity from a peripheral perspective, it ultimately argues that the United States should sustain its current posture of not letting a nonpriority theater become a main event in its competition with China.
Topic:
Strategic Competition, Periphery, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

174. Revisiting Securitization Theory within the Context of North Korea: A Theoretical Analysis of the Success of Trump’s Policy

Author:
Tayyar Arı and Özge Gökçen Çetindişli
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This empirical study, grounded in securitization theory, questions whether the security utterances of former U.S. President Donald Trump on North Korea between January 20, 2017, and June 12, 2018, constituted only a securitizing move or evolved into a successful securitization practice. The research employs a hybrid methodology, combining discourse and content analyses supported by quantitative data. The focus is on analyzing the discourse within a corpus of 44 securitization statements made by the president. These statements were discerned through a comprehensive review of all the president's public remarks throughout the designated period, using queries such as “North Korea,” “Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),” “Kim Jong Un,” etc. Employing discourse analysis, the study reveals the referent objects and securitization arguments in these statements. The data gleaned from these statements is subsequently analyzed utilizing content analysis methodology. This study also evaluates the securitization discourse by examining its compliance with the facilitating conditions of an effective securitization rhetoric, a capable securitizer, and an audience-acceptable threat selection. Subsequently, it discusses the efficacy of the securitization discourse in terms of the two principal parameters proposed by the Copenhagen School: audience acceptance of the threat narrative contained in the securitizing moves, and the adoption of extraordinary measures.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un, and Securitization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

175. The Hegemonic Transition in Latin America: To What Extent is China Challenging US’s Hegemony?

Author:
Andoni Maiza-Larrarte and Ricardo Bustillo-Mesanza
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the geopolitical consequences of China’s enhanced engagement in Latin America. China is increasing its economic weight among Latin American countries, reinforcing its external image to counter the perception that the US is a unique relevant ally. In previous research, some authors have supported the idea that China could become a sort of neocolonial power in Latin America, substituting the hegemony of the United States. In this article, we carry out an in-depth review of Western literature and a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral relationship to discuss China’s role in the region. We apply the principles of the hegemonic stability and the power transition theories, and we also include an assessment of “soft power” components. We conclude that China is eroding US power in Latin America but is still far from becoming the new regional hegemon.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Transition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

176. The Functioning of Normative Power in the Logic of the EU and China

Author:
Emrah Yıldırımçakar
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Normative power has become a critical topic of discussion in International Relations and Political Science scholarship, particularly in the context of the normative power of the European Union (EU) and China. However, academic attention has been excessively directed toward investigating the normative power of the European Union rather than that of China. Given the EU’s unique status as a supranational and multinational entity consisting of multiple member states, its process of diffusion of normative power differs significantly from that of China. In this context, this study aims to explore and compare the normative power dynamics maintained by the EU and China in the international arena, examine the approaches, strategies, and outcomes of both the EU and China by providing a detailed understanding of how each party implements normative power, and explore the inequalities in normative power acquisition strategies between these two actors.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Political Science, and Norms
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

177. Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the Philippines in the South China Sea

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The South China Sea has long been the subject of territorial and maritime disputes between Beijing, Manila, and other claimants. Since late 2022, escalating confrontations between Philippine and Chinese forces over tiny maritime features such as Second Thomas Shoal have posed a serious and growing risk of a military confrontation, which could in turn entangle the United States. Washington can avoid this worst-case scenario by charting a pragmatic approach and upholding its alliance commitment to the Philippines while avoiding military actions that would needlessly provoke China. The data in this brief show a dramatic increase of maritime incidents starting in the third quarter of 2023. China and the Philippines are disputing control over, among other things, what are little more than specks in the ocean, most located a hundred miles or more from the mainland of either country. However, maritime rights and jurisdiction are significant issues, and there is no question that Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea has been provocative and coercive. Moreover, an international tribunal has ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines in the dispute, decisively rejecting China’s “historic” claims around the “nine/ten dash line.” The U.S. relationship with the Philippines represents one of the United States’ oldest treaty alliances in the Global South and is important to America’s Pacific strategy. But the South China Sea conflict does not represent a threat of conquest of the Philippine mainland. Washington should recognize that defending maritime rights and tiny land features in waters half a world away is not a vital U.S. national interest and could become a serious liability should it open the door to a high-intensity conflict with China. An honest assessment of U.S. interests dictates a strategy of restraint in the South China Sea. While recognizing Manila’s agency and continuing to strengthen Philippine capacities, Washington should also encourage Manila to engage constructively with Beijing to prevent escalation. Crucially, U.S. policymakers must also avoid raising the risk of conflict by drawing the Philippines into taking a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. Washington can help preserve and uphold international law in the South China Sea while reducing the risk of war between the United States and China by taking the following steps: Do not pull the U.S.–Philippines alliance into the Taiwan theater. Washington should not add to its nine existing military sites in the Philippines and, ideally, should disband one or more of the new sites located in northern Luzon (closer to Taiwan) in exchange for Chinese concessions. Do not give the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard a frontal role in countering Chinese intrusions in the South China Sea; enable Manila to take the lead instead. Do not seek to draw the military of U.S. allies (particularly extra-regional ones) into South China Sea disputes, in order to avoid needlessly heightening Chinese perceptions of bloc-formation and armed encirclement. Enhance diplomatic support to Manila for its legitimate claims under international law. Provide aid, capabilities, and intelligence for modernizing the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy and enhancing maritime domain awareness. Build on the early success of the July 2024 Philippines–China understanding on Second Thomas Shoal by emphasizing preventive diplomacy and crisis management to stabilize the maritime dispute and reduce the chances of a conflict spiral.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Asia, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

178. Beyond Strategic Ambiguity: Supporting Taiwan Without a Commitment to War

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The first brief in this series made the case that Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying a war between the United States and China. This second brief outlines how Washington can transition from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity in a manner that continues to deter Beijing from coercing Taipei while ruling out direct American military intervention in defense of the island. This brief recommends that, in the short to medium term, the United States should maintain its standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan while also carrying out necessary preparations for a noninterventionist policy shift. These preparations include: A clear statement from Washington that it opposes any unilateral move by Taipei to achieve formal independence. A revitalization of the eroding One China Policy. A reaffirmation of U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. A bolstering of the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan and nearby treaty allies. Encouragement and support for those in Japan who seek to ease tensions with China and wish to cultivate cooperative Sino–Japanese and Sino–American relationships. The initiation of a results-oriented strategic dialogue with China. The expansion of mutually beneficial trade, investment, and technology exchanges with Taiwanese companies and the offshoring of Taiwanese high-tech capabilities. Once these necessary, gradual preparations have been made, the U.S. president should explicitly state that America will not go to war with China to defend Taiwan but that the United States will support Taiwan — and the development of an improved cross-strait environment — in every other way possible. This policy shift is necessary because ongoing military and political trends are eroding the ability of the United States to deter and reassure China, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The One China Policy is deteriorating, the Taiwanese public increasingly rejects any political association with China, and China is expanding its reliance on military displays, which undermines the credibility of the Chinese commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. More generally, U.S.–China relations continue to worsen. This trajectory renders the standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, which accepts the possibility of a direct U.S. war with China, dangerous and misaligned with U.S. interests. The above preparatory changes will require considerable diplomatic finesse and sustained attention over a considerable period of time. Given the weakened National Security Council and the virtual collapse of the past interagency coordinating process for policy development under President Trump, these required qualities might be in short supply at present. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be able to correct these deficiencies. It is unlikely China would respond to the strategy outlined here by attempting to reunify with Taiwan by force. This is because of the still high — and, in some areas, increased — risks confronting any Chinese use of force and because of the fact that this policy shift would likely increase Beijing’s confidence in eventually reaching a peaceful resolution of the issue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

179. Taiwan: An Important but Non-Vital U.S. Interest

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint that could trigger a direct war between the United States and China. It is critical, therefore, to examine whether or not Taiwan constitutes a vital U.S. interest. This brief asserts that Taiwan is an important but not vital U.S. interest. It is not an interest that justifies the United States going to war with China to defend. A direct war between the United States and China would be cataclysmic and cause extraordinary damage to the global economy. It would risk heavy U.S. military losses and possible nuclear escalation. It is also unclear whether the United States would prevail. Taiwan must be a truly vital interest to justify such risks. While it is important to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan and prevent a regional war that would destabilize East Asia, proponents of a U.S. defense of Taiwan by all means necessary exaggerate Taiwan’s strategic value and China’s military threat to East Asia. Taiwan is neither central to America’s ability to ensure a stable and prosperous Asia open to U.S. economic and political engagement nor is it a critical location for the United States to oppose Chinese hegemony in Asia. China views Taiwan primarily through a political lens. Beijing has not expressed the intent to use the annexation of the island as a stepping stone toward regional hegemony. Moreover, possession of Taiwan would not give China that capacity. The United States is not formally obligated to militarily defend Taiwan, in contrast to its security commitments to treaty allies Japan and South Korea. Washington does have a vital interest in maintaining its security commitments to Tokyo and Seoul — two robust economies and major technology innovators that are each more critical geostrategically than Taiwan. Taiwan does possess considerable value in its high-tech capabilities, producing 60 percent of the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors. But replicating this production capacity in the United States and other Western countries would be far less costly than fighting a war with China over Taiwan. Although Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying war and is not a treaty ally, the United States still has a strong interest in preventing Chinese coercion of this U.S.–aligned democracy. An accompanying brief presents an alternative approach to supporting Taiwan while maintaining U.S. credibility with critical Asian allies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Strategic Interests, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

180. Trump Could Get a Win with North Korea This Time, by Taking Lessons from His First Term

Author:
Stephen Costello
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
All indications are that the Trump administration will once again pursue direct talks with North Korea. In doing so, it should learn from the mistakes of the failed 2018–19 U.S.–North Korea negotiations and seize the opportunity for a transformative nuclear agreement with Pyongyang. During the previous negotiations, it appears that North Korea offered ending the production of new nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian sanctions relief. In part due to the participation of hard-liners such as John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, who were hostile to President Trump’s desire for a deal during his previous term, this offer was rejected and the talks failed. However, stopping the production of new fissile material, nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles would be highly beneficial to the United States and our allies and well worth ending nonmilitary sanctions. A similar deal should be pursued in new talks. Beyond the immediate benefits of ending the production of new weapons, such a deal could set up a diplomatic framework to address and diminish the North Korean nuclear arsenal over the long term. Building trust by concluding and adhering to an initial deal would be critical to any such effort. Adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 2016 and 2017, the current nonmilitary sanctions on North Korea amount to collective civilian punishment without any productive purpose. Rather than providing leverage, these sanctions have prevented diplomacy, intensifying Kim Jong Un’s intransigence and desire to further bolster his regime’s nuclear program. By lifting these nonmilitary sanctions, the Trump administration could chart a new path forward toward North Korean buy-in to the international nonproliferation regime, International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, and, possibly, the long-term goal of denuclearization. South Korea should be integrally involved from the planning stages to the deal’s signing and management. Such support will help to diffuse tensions with North Korea toward the long-term goal of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. The United States should also seek Chinese backing of the deal, offering a credible guarantor of its implementation, while opening space for further U.S.–China nuclear diplomacy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

181. From Punishment to Denial: Stabilizing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
James Park
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief argues for a more flexible, proactive, and credible approach to the U.S.–South Korea alliance’s deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea. The current punishment strategy is provocative and likely to be ineffective. We argue for pivoting to a strategy of “deterrence by denial” in response to North Korean uses of force short of invasion and nuclear attack (so-called “gray zone” aggression). The alliance’s strategy of “deterrence by punishment” should only be used as a last resort to deter a North Korean invasion or nuclear attack, and South Korea should also roll back its preemptive strike posture. Deterrence by denial aims to minimize the success of an act of aggression, building up defense capabilities and overall military resilience. Such an approach offers a level of flexibility, proportionality, and predictability that is not possible with deterrence by punishment and its strict threat of massive retaliation. Aspects of denial in the U.S.–South Korea alliance would include enhancing Seoul’s basing infrastructure and missile defense, reshaping the alliance’s joint exercises program to emphasize defensive functions, and a retaliatory posture based on proportionality. To maximize stability in their deterrence relationship with North Korea, the United States and South Korea should also vigorously pursue diplomacy and arms control negotiations, based on realistic goals and expectations that drop the demand for immediate North Korean denuclearization. While it would be the ideal long-term policy outcome, denuclearization is unrealistic as a near-term goal. Negotiations should instead center on tension reduction and arms control, aimed at lowering escalation risks and limiting North Korean nuclear capabilities and use. In return for North Korea accepting limits on its nuclear program, the United States and South Korea may offer sanctions relief initially and then further economic and political inducements, pending progress in arms control. Overall, the U.S.–South Korea alliance would benefit greatly from the more diverse set of policy tools associated with deterrence by denial, enhancing the alliance’s proactivity, assuaging North Korea’s existential fears of regime destruction, and strengthening the deterrent’s overall credibility. Combined with successful arms control negotiations, this new approach to deterrence would create a more durable foundation for stable coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

182. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

183. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:
Marie Krpata
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

184. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:
Marc Julienne
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and France

185. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:
Brad Setser
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

186. South Korea’s Emergence as a Defense Industrial Powerhouse

Author:
Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In recent years, South Korea’s ascent in the global arms market has been remarkable. This surge, particularly amid a shifting geopolitical landscape and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia War, has captured the attention of security watchers worldwide. This paper delves into the intricacies of the South Korean defense industry’s rapid emergence, wherein arms sales skyrocketed to 17.3 billion USD in 2022, and provides an in-depth analysis of its portfolio, capacity, and the rationales guiding its development over the last five decades. It explores how South Korea has capitalized on critical opportunities, including overcoming steep barriers to entry to major contracts with Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland. It sheds light on South Korea’s competitive technologies, mass production capacity, and cost-effectiveness, and addresses the crucial role played by the government’s diplomatic support and coordination with key allies and partners. Against that backdrop, it concludes with some implications for the global defense industry and security architecture.
Topic:
Security, Defense Industry, Armament, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Poland

187. Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum

Author:
Megumi Faith Mallari and Saleh Naas
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Despite their known and indisputable need for protection, North Koreans often have their applications for asylum rejected. This paper outlines the differing interpretations of North Koreans’ right to asylum and investigates the rationales and justifications behind them through the case studies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and China (PRC). The paper argues that the rationale of the European countries analyzed is based on their generally restrictive view on asylum, independent from their political positioning on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Contrastingly, the rationales of the United States and the PRC are grounded in interests directly related to the Korean peninsula and Cold War narratives.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Asylum, and Refugee Policy
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, France, Germany, Netherlands, and United States of America

188. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

189. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations

Author:
Matt Sheehan
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, East Asia, and Asia

190. The risk of artificial intelligence: China edition

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:
We should be worried about China’s AI capacities, not only because it enhances the powers of the Party-state, but also because it is exporting its population control technology and policy abroad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Social Control, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

191. Starr Forum: China: The Rise and Fall of the EAST

Author:
Yasheng Huang and Will Knight
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speaker: Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, and faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. Discussant: Will Knight, senior writer, Wired magazine, covers artificial intelligence and other emerging technology. He was previously a senior editor at MIT Technology Review, where he wrote about fundamental advances in AI and China’s AI boom.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

192. Why can ASEAN Promote Sustainable Development Cooperation?

Author:
Cao Ting and Luo Yongkun
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
ASEAN has arguably been one of the most successful regionalisms, which since its inception has undergone several profound challenges, including the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In response to the fierce competition among major powers and the economic and social challenges, ASEAN has concentrated on sustainable development to promote unity and centrality. Sustainable development cooperation aligns with the interests of ASEAN states and helps to promote the construction of the ASEAN community and strike a balance of power on the world stage. Nevertheless, there may be a need for more efforts to resolve the challenges facing sustainable development.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Financial Crisis, Sustainable Development Goals, Regionalism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

193. Lessons from China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic

Author:
Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Expansionary fiscal policy helped China's economy grow in 2020, a year in which most economies contracted because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid a broader pivot to policy and regulatory tightening, fiscal support was withdrawn in 2021. In 2022, government budget turned expansionary to ensure economic stability ahead of the Communist Party Congress, but the execution fell short and fiscal policy ended up being weaker than planned. A recurrent problem during the pandemic, however, was that local governments did not fully spend their budgets. Aside from the sharp drop in local governments' land sale revenue in 2022, which dragged down their spending, it was also caused by local governments' failure to fully utilize their special bond quotas approved by the central government for capital investment. China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic highlights four issues with implications for fiscal policy making. First, the government needs to avoid projecting unrealistically high land sale revenue in its budgets. Second, it needs to reconsider its problematic use of local-government special bond as a major fiscal stimulus instrument. Third, it needs to make sure its deficit, growth, and inflation targets are consistent. Last, Beijing needs to be more tolerant of higher fiscal deficits, at a minimum ensuring that overall fiscal spending grows at least as rapidly as nominal output.
Topic:
Budget, Economic Growth, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
China and Asia

194. Japanese Economic Security as “Derisking”

Author:
Kazuto Suzuki
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the concept of “derisking” and how the Japanese Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) has responded to it within the framework of deterrence theory. It explores how ESPA allows deterrence by denial against economic coercion by other states and is itself a derisking measure. It contends that deterrence by denial, which means reducing dependency and improving resilience, could include stockpiling strategic materials, diversifying sources of supply, developing alternative materials, and developing alternative products. However, this paper argues that there is a need to strengthen the mechanism for collaborative deterrence by denial, such as the “Coordination Platform” presented at the G7 Hiroshima Summit. As for other forms of deterrence, such as institutional deterrence and deterrence by punishment, their effectiveness is insufficient, and they face many implementation problems. Therefore, this paper argues that the most optimal derisking strategy at this point is the combination of ESPA and the “Coordination Platform” to strengthen the capabilities of deterrence by denial.
Topic:
Risk, Deterrence, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

195. Is Economic Security National Security? Defining South Korea’s Economic Security for Future Industries

Author:
June Park
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper explores how South Korea defines “economic security.” Amidst geopolitical turbulence, the framing of this concept by governments and policy circles around the globe is reflective of the changes in the global economy post-pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine, two critical junctures that have revealed the geo-economic impact of weaponized interdependence. While the Biden administration has laid out U.S. policy intent to combine national security with economic security, specifically on future industries of dual-use nature ranging from chips to EVs, batteries, and generative AI, countries that are on the receiving end of policy implementation are formulating their response to the shifting geoeconomics. This paper unravels South Korea’s framing of economic security and policy response by analyzing legislation on future industries that is critical to the country’s economic growth and standing and the concerted efforts by the state bureaucracy and industry in shaping the concept. The paper draws specifically upon semiconductors in addition to other future industries that are central to the South Korean economy and related legislation in the South Korean National Assembly. It argues that South Korea’s policy response and framing of its economic security has more to do with the protection of industries for the future amid geopolitical turbulence and the reshuffling of global supply chains than traditional security issues related to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Moreover, public anxiety on the pressures toward U.S.-driven trilateral cooperation reveals concerns on a possible backlash from China and the lagging potential of Japan in future industries.
Topic:
National Security, Geopolitics, Industry, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

196. China’s Perspective on Economic Security

Author:
Audrye Wong
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines how Beijing views economic security as well as other countries’ actions in this realm. Economic security is not a new or foreign concept to Chinese thinkers and policymakers, but the emphases, concerns, and priorities have evolved, due in part to changes in the international environment as well as in China’s own economic and geopolitical situation. This paper examines how Chinese leaders and scholars have approached the definition and scope of economic security, as well as recent and proposed policy responses. It draws on a range of Chinese-language official documents and scholarly writings, as well as broader secondary source analyses. The paper explores that while Chinese discussions of economic security tend to be framed as ensuring economic development and stability, development is implicitly and explicitly linked to national security. Many writings emphasize that economics is the foundation for national strength (including military capabilities). As such, it is more than just economic survival and growth for the economy’s sake; it also has implications for China’s geopolitical position in the international order. In that respect, economic stability and national security may be hard to separate. Indeed, we see a resurgence in today’s rhetoric about the notions of development and security as inextricably linked, along with the need to coordinate the two—and in service of maintaining CCP rule and regime stability. Finally, the paper shows Beijing is taking concrete steps toward increased legalization and institutionalization of economic security measures. This represents a shift, at least in the domain of retaliatory countermeasures, from its usually more “informal” approach to economic coercion, which has afforded more flexibility and minimized political costs for the regime. At the same time, actual implementation has been relatively limited thus far.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Trade Wars, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China and Asia

197. South Korea: Caught in the Crosshairs of U.S.−China Competition Over Semiconductors

Author:
Paul Triolo
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper explores how countries with advanced semiconductor industries are caught in the middle of the growing U.S.-China competition in technology that is focused on advanced computing. Among them, South Korea and its national champions, Samsung and SK Hynix, have arguably incurred some of the most significant pressure. This paper explores how those firms have billions of dollars of sunk investment in China-based facilities producing cutting-edge memory, and the future of these facilities remains in doubt after a series of U.S. export control measures unleashed by the U.S. Commerce Department starting in October 2022. South Korean companies are also players in other parts of the global semiconductor supply chain, including semiconductor manufacturing tools, and China remains an important market for both components and electronic devices. This paper argues that each country caught between the United States and China in technology competition faces difficult trade-offs in determining how best to support its leading companies while navigating changing and often what is viewed as arbitrary decisions coming from Washington that have already significantly disrupted global supply chains. Finally, at the same time as U.S. export controls are having a major impact on the ability of South Korean companies to retain business operations and market access in China, major front-end manufacturers, particularly Samsung, are also looking to expand their operations in the United States and benefit from U.S. CHIPS Act funding. This paper argues that all of the above dynamics put South Korea in one of the more complex positions as the industry faces continued restructuring, buffeted by both export controls and industrial policies.
Topic:
Supply Chains, Economic Security, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

198. The Raw Materials of Economic Security: South Korea’s Evolving Energy and Critical Minerals Policies in an Era of Disruption

Author:
James Bowen
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper argues that resource security is central to South Korea’s broader economic security and President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region. The paper contends that postwar Korea has maintained an energy and minerals-intensive economy despite domestic resource scarcity and import dependence. Recent disruptions have, however, threatened the resilience of this relationship. These disruptions include COVID-19, Russia’s war in Ukraine, the escalating climate change crisis and energy transition, and the geoeconomic and geopolitical erosion of the liberal order. Korea’s most important energy security priority is diversifying its energy mix towards cleaner energy—what this paper calls “green security.” This will be a difficult task given the intense national dependence on fossil fuels and policymakers’ desire to avoid disrupting Korea’s manufacturing-heavy, export-focused development model. Korea’s idiosyncratic decarbonization pathway, including a strong presence of hydrogen and, under Yoon, a downgrading of renewables in favor of nuclear, could provide additional challenges. Critical minerals are another rising resource security concern for Seoul. The major priority is to accelerate the development and diversification of international supply chains, particularly away from China. A major obstacle to progress is intense competition across the value chain, influenced by disparate economic and strategic priorities. The paper argues that Seoul must find ways to manage its energy and critical minerals security challenges in a way that is consistent with its preferred development model. The alternative is to accept a new equilibrium in which it has less domestic dependence on foreign resources and on resources-intensive economic activity in aggregate.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Minerals, Economic Security, and Energy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

199. Economic Security and U.S.-China Competition: The View from North Korea

Author:
Rachel Minyoung Lee
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper argues that while North Korea does not discuss “economic security” in domestic contexts or have an established definition of the term, it thoroughly understands that the economy and national security are inseparable. North Korea is essentially unaffected by the typical economic issues that many major economies are grappling with in relation to economic security, but like other countries, it has closely tracked economic security developments and deepening U.S.-China strategic competition for potential political fallout and what opportunities and challenges that may generate. The paper shows that U.S.-China strategic competition has offered unique opportunities to North Korea, including China’s cover against fresh and existing sanctions against North Korea, and economic assistance. Moreover, deteriorating U.S.-China ties provide Pyongyang extra space to consider and put into motion alternative foreign and economic policy paths, namely, shifting away from its three-decade policy of nonalignment with China and normalization of relations with the United States. Also, China appears to be a factor in North Korea’s shift to a more conservative economic policy. Despite the opportunities presented by the U.S.-China divide, however, North Korea is wary of the risks of dependence on China and has tried to build economic resilience at home, for example by launching a national campaign on domestic production and recycling. North Korea’s somewhat cooler handling of China and its proportionately warm treatment of Russia since the Armistice Day celebrations in July is a clear example of North Korea’s China dilemma. This is where North Korea’s recent strengthening of ties with Russia comes into the picture. The paper contends that it is hard to conclude at this point whether North Korea’s moves are aimed at short-term, tactical gains or are part of a longer-term, strategic calculus, but we can be certain of this: it has just as much to gain or lose as any other country affected by economic security and U.S.-China strategic competition, though not in the same ways as other countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

200. Labour market inequality in two Asian giants Indonesia and India compared

Author:
Kunal Sen
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
We examine the nature of labour market inequality in Indonesia and India, using a common conceptual approach drawing from the job ladder framework. In the framework, we differentiate between self-employment and wage-informal and between formal, upper tier informal, and lower tier informal jobs. We find that both countries have a large proportion of workers in lower tier jobs, though the importance of wage-employment is larger in Indonesia. There are more workers in formal wage-employment in Indonesia than India. There are also sharp disparities in the earnings of workers in different tiers of the labour market in Indonesia and India, and there is limited evidence of convergence of the earnings of the lower tier informal workers to that of formal workers, at least for Indonesia. We also find that gender and educational level are important correlates of work status in both countries. Females and less educated workers occupy the lower tiers of the labour markets in the two countries.
Topic:
Employment, Inequality, Economy, Labor Market, and Informal Economy
Political Geography:
South Asia, Indonesia, India, and Asia