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701. China’s Collaboration with the Myanmar Junta: A Case of Strategic Hedging?

Author:
Sudhan Rmachandran
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On June 27, in Kachin State, northern Myanmar, a convoy of vehicles carrying a Chinese delegation, including a consul, came under fire. The convoy was being guarded by Myanmar military and police personnel. While local media blamed the Lisu National Development Party, a military-aligned militia, the Myanmar junta held the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) — an ethnic armed organization (EAO) aligned with the anti-junta resistance— responsible for the attack (The Irrawaddy, June 30). Attacks on Chinese targets have grown in recent months in Myanmar. On May 7, the anti-junta Natogyi Guerrilla Force (NGF) attacked an off-take station in the Mandalay Region’s Natogyi Township due to its China-affiliated oil and gas pipeline. The attack came amid a surge in mass protests on the streets of Yangon, and the townships of Yinmabin, Salingyi and Letpadaung in Sagaing Region. Angry online campaigns criticizing Beijing’s support of “fascist criminals” — referring to the Myanmar generals — gained widespread public backing (Economic Times, May 15). On May 2, the surge in anti-China protests and violence came close on the heels of a meeting in Naypyidaw between Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Myanmar junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Qin is the highest Chinese official to meet Min Aung Hlaing since the 2021 military coup, which overthrew the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government (Frontier Myanmar, May 3). Since the junta’s rise to power, public ire in Myanmar has been directed not only at the military regime but also at China, the junta’s principal foreign backer. In the early days of the coup, crowds gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Yangon to protest against the alleged Chinese role in the insurrection (Times of India, February 14, 2021). Chinese-owned factories in Myanmar were damaged and burned, and Chinese workers were attacked (CGTN, March 14, 2021). With visible collaboration between the PRC and the junta growing, the targeting of Chinese projects and properties in Myanmar has grown in frequency and intensity. To cite one such instance, last April resistance groups fired missiles at factories manufacturing long-range rockets and surface-to-air missiles, specifically when Chinese and Russian military officials were visiting the facilities (Burma News International, April 8). As anti-China sentiment surges in Myanmar, it is likely that resistance groups will continue to deliberately target Chinese interests in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Coup, Strategic Interests, and Junta
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Myanmar

702. PLA Airborne Capabilities and Paratrooper Doctrine for Taiwan

Author:
Daniel Fu
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, PLA airborne troops are likely to assume a substantial role. Decapitation strike scenarios and the prospects of an airborne invasion are widely discussed by analysts, scholars, and policy practitioners in both the US and Taiwan. Despite PLA ambitions to rapidly expand their airborne capabilities, there are a growing number voices that downplay the threat or likelihood of an airborne assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese security analysts such as Liu Tai-ying (劉泰英), founder of the Taiwan Research Institute, have stated that “if paratroopers were used, the losses for China would be very high” and minimized their threat by stating that there are few landing spots available to PLA airborne forces (Taipei Times, September 26, 2022). Notably, many of these conclusions revolve around the viewpoint held by a growing number of military experts, who contend that “mass airborne operations are a thing of the past” (Modern War Institute, December 10, 2016). These views, however, fail to consider the robust drive on part of the PLA to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of its airborne troops. They also ignore substantial progress the PLA has already made towards that goal, both in terms of the training and preparation of its paratroopers and in decisive factors such as heavy airlift. In short, documenting the progress of PLA airborne troops’ capabilities may play a crucial role in assessing Chinese deployment strategies during a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

703. The Long Arm of the Law(less): The PRC’s Overseas Police Stations

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In April, the FBI charged two Chinese-Americans, both U.S. citizens, with conspiring to act as agents of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by establishing an “overseas police station” on behalf of the Fujian Public Security Bureau in New York. The defendants allegedly organized counter-protests against the Falun Gong, harassed a Chinese fugitive to return to the PRC and hassled a pro-democracy activist living in California. On June 6, the UK Government Minister of State for Security, Tom Tugendhat, made a statement with an update on Chinese “Overseas Police Service Stations” reportedly located in Croydon, Glasgow and Hendon (UK Parliament, June 6). He stated that “the Police have visited each of the locations identified by Safeguard Defenders [the NGO that reported the locations], and carefully looked into these allegations to consider whether any laws have been broken and whether any further action should be taken. I can confirm that they have not, to date, identified any evidence of illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese state across these sites.” The reactive approach in the UK is notably different from the US, where proactive intelligence led investigations by the FBI have led to multiple arrests. International concern regarding the extent of law enforcement activity by Chinese agencies outside of their home country jurisdiction has recently increased. Such activity has been reported as “Chinese Overseas Police Service Centers” (Safeguard Defenders, September 2022), “Chinese Assistance Centers” (China Brief, January 5, 2019), joint patrols in Italy with local police, structured training to local police such as in the Solomon Islands, harassment and intimidation of Chinese dissidents, and extra-judicial action to return fugitives from overseas that effectively constitutes extraordinary rendition. These activities are characterized by their diversity and, as a result, should not be considered part of a single strategy. Rather, the multiple purposes served by Chinese police forces’ expanding overseas activities can be better understood by tracing how these efforts have evolved over the past decade.
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Law, and Police
Political Geography:
China and Asia

704. Missile Defense in South Korea: Will President Yoon Heed China’s Concerns?

Author:
Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Earlier this week, some residents of Seoul, South Korea, received an emergency alert to prepare for a potential evacuation following military reports that North Korea had fired a projectile southward (Yonhap, May 31). The alerts, which stemmed from an errant North Korean satellite launch that sparked grave but fleeting alarm, underscore the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) growing apprehensions regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ballistic and cruise missile development and testing, coupled with its expanding nuclear arsenal (NK News, January 1). In addition, North Korea’s long-range artillery systems remain a persistent threat, which not only endanger counter-force targets in South Korea, but also threaten counter-value targets, in particular Seoul, the nation’s capital and largest metropolis.
Topic:
Weapons, Missile Defense, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

705. Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last month, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership (中越全面战略合作伙伴关系), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo Member and Head of the Central Committee Organization Commission Truong Thi Mai and asked her to convey his greetings to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], April 26). [1] The visit to Beijing by Mai, who has headed the VCP’s powerful organization commission since 2021 and was appointed to the Secretariat in March, occurred days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Vietnam (NhanDan, April 15; VN Express, March 6). As the maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has intensified over the past fifteen years, Washington has deepened its ties with Hanoi based on overlapping geostrategic interests. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s ability to achieve its goal of upgrading the U.S. relationship with Vietnam to a “strategic partnership” this year to mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” remains in question (Fulcrum.sg, April 20). Vietnam undoubtedly perceives the PRC’s drive to consolidate control over the South China Sea as its main geopolitical challenge. Moreover, Vietnam’s relationship with its larger northern neighbor is colored by mistrust derived from historical memories of Chinese occupation and a long legacy of conflict, including the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the subsequent series of border and naval clashes in the 1980s. However, the VCP, particularly the conservative faction, now views the U.S. as posing its primary ideological threat and is fearful that Washington aims to undermine its grip on power (Nikkei Asia, May 11, 2022). As two scholars at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences note in a recent analysis, Hanoi’s reluctance to upgrade ties with the U.S. stems not only from fear of angering China but also from concern with “Washington’s excessive focus on press freedom, religious freedom, and human rights as an internal intrusion and potential threat to Vietnam’s political security.” [2] Hence, Beijing is able to arrest Hanoi from drifting towards closer alignment with Washington by leveraging their shared Communist systems and mutual concerns about Western efforts to facilitate the “peaceful evolution” of communist states into liberal democracies. During his meeting with VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing last October, Xi spoke to both Party leaderships’ mutual concern with regime security. He stressed that each side “should stay committed to the socialist orientation” and called for increased party-party exchanges to facilitate “mutual learning in party governance and state administration, maintain high-level communication and strategic dialogue between the two militaries, achieve more outcomes in cooperation on law enforcement and security, and safeguard the political security and social stability of respective countries” (FMPRC, October 31). Party-to-party ties are a key element of the PRC’s relationships with the other three states with ruling Communist Parties: Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. [3] As with the CCP, the Vietnamese, Cuban and Laotian Communist Parties have each adapted and modified Marxist-Leninism to suit their national conditions, regional situations and elite political preferences. Despite their considerable differences, these states’ mutual Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and systems foster shared interests, including maintaining regime security and “stability,” opposing perceived external attempts to define and impose Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, advancing a state-led model of economic development and promoting a more multipolar world.
Topic:
International Relations, Socialism/Marxism, Partnerships, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, and Cuba

706. China’s Emerging Approach to Taiwan: Blockade and Disinformation

Author:
Chihwei Yu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
It has been suggested that China intends to unify Taiwan through a military operation within the next five years. However, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions during the 1945-1949 civil war, military means may not be the most effective way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to achieve its longstanding goal of unification with Taiwan. Since its inception in 1921, the CCP has relied on producing and disseminating disinformation to advance its policy objectives. This strategy is also frequently employed by China towards Taiwan, with the aim of undermining the morale of Taiwanese society through the spread of certain kinds of false information, for example, by claiming that the U.S. will eventually betray Taiwan. In fact, the CCP’s military tactics during the civil war share some similarities with its current Taiwan policy, particularly with regard to the so-called “Peiping Mode” (北平模式). This approach seeks to achieve its goals through a combination of deterring the opponent through superior force and employing United Front work, including deploying agents and spreading fake news to persuade opponents.
Topic:
Security, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Military, and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

707. Taiwan’s Dwindling Diplomatic Allies

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amidst the drama surrounding Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s early April stopover in Southern California, where she met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the subsequent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maneuvers around Taiwan that followed, it can be easy to forget why the Taiwanese President was transiting the U.S. in the first place. Tsai was returning home after a trip to Taiwan’s two remaining diplomatic allies in Central America, Guatemala and Belize, which was organized around the theme of “Meeting Democratic Partners, Fostering Shared Prosperity” (民主夥伴共榮之旅) (Office of the President, Republic of China [ROC] [Taiwan], March 29). Days prior to Tsai’s arrival in the Western Hemisphere, Honduras, which had maintained official relations with the Republic of China (ROC) for 82 years, established formal ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], March 26). The move occurred despite U.S. efforts to dissuade Honduras. On March 18, the Biden administration dispatched senior envoy and special adviser for the Americas, former Senator Chris Dodd, who is also well-regarded in Taipei, to Honduras in a last-minute effort to encourage the Xiomara Castro government to change course in derecognizing Taiwan (Taipei Times March 18). Under the government of Xiomara Castro, who took office early last year, Honduras has sought to pit Taipei and Beijing against each other in a bidding war for diplomatic recognition. While China has offered inducements, Taiwan has both rejected and called out the Castro government’s efforts to condition the continuation of the official relationship on major increases in financial assistance. Foreign Minister Eduardo Enrique Reina initially denied Taipei’s claims that Honduras had asked Taiwan for $2.5 billion but eventually acknowledged to the media that the Castro government had sought to obtain $2 billion in aid (ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Taiwan MOFA], March 23). However, he also claimed his country “never received a substantive response from the Taiwanese side” (TVBS, March 24). In a notice regarding these revelations and regretting the pending shift in recognition, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry warned Honduras not to fall prey to China’s “debt trap diplomacy” (Taiwan MOFA, March 23). Upon announcing the termination of relations with Honduras, Tsai cautioned Taiwan’s other diplomatic allies against following the same course, stressing that “we will not engage in a meaningless contest of ‘dollar diplomacy’ with China.” She also criticized the PRC’s efforts to employ “any and all means to suppress Taiwan’s international participation” (Office of the President, Taiwan, March 26). Earlier this week, the Tsai government averted another diplomatic setback with the election of Santiago Pena of the ruling conservative Colorado Party to the presidency in Paraguay. Pena’s opponent, Efrain Alegre, who led a broad center-left coalition, campaigned on switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC in order to facilitate Paraguay’s access to China’s large agricultural import market (Nikkei Asia, April 18). In a response to a congratulatory tweet from President Tsai, Pena stated that “we are going to continue strengthening our historic ties of brotherhood and cooperation between our countries” (Taiwan News, May 2). However, the Tsai administration is hardly free from the challenge of maintaining the ROC’s dwindling network of official relationships. Guatemala, which is Taiwan’s largest diplomatic ally, will go to the polls to elect a new president in late June. President Alejandro Eduardo Giammattei Falla, who has been a staunch supporter of maintaining close ties with the ROC, is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term. According to long-time China-Latin America analyst R. Evan Ellis the prospect of “a victory by either a center-left-oriented candidate more open to working with the PRC such as Sandra Torres, or a right-oriented candidate such as Zury Rios, whose Presidency might deepen policy conflict with the Biden Administration, could present a small but not insignificant risk of Guatemalan diplomatic recognition of the PRC” (CEEP, March 7).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

708. A Preliminary Survey of PRC United Front Activities in South Korea

Author:
Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) exercises influence over South Korea in multiple ways. Chinese influence operations against Seoul have been characterized as not subtle and even blatant compared to the more covert and subversive methods employed in other countries (China Brief, December 19, 2014). Indeed, the more overt and aggressive ways in which Beijing exercises influence were on full display when the PRC responded to Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2016 with boycotts, military exercises and diplomatic pressure (China Brief, March 31, 2017). Less well known, however, is how China employs other, more subtle means to influence South Korean politics and society. A general presumption exists that influence must be exerted overtly or in forms such as diplomatic protests or through sanctions, yet Beijing’s influence activities also take on a less pronounced and more obscured nature, which is commonly associated with its United Front activities. This article will provide a preliminary assessment of the local Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification of China (CCPPNR, 韩华中国和平统一促进联合总会) and the web of other United Front organizations that operate in South Korea. [1] This article does not seek to offer an exhaustive examination of these organizations, but to provide a preview of the key United Front apparatuses and their activities in South Korea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Diaspora, Soft Power, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

709. U.S.-China Data War Intensifies as Bilateral Relations Nosedive

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S.-China relations appear headed for further deterioration despite the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) efforts to lure back American multinationals and Beijing’s relatively limited support for Russia in its war with Ukraine. Washington has characterized the “existential competition” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an entrenched struggle on all fronts, but the data and information sectors have recently become areas of particularly intense contention. The Xi Jinping leadership has sternly retaliated against purported efforts by the U.S. and its allies to choke off the PRC’s high-tech development pathways. Recent moves targeting American and other foreign firms are also closely linked to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s obsession with cybersecurity and control of data. Last weekend, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the administrative arm of the policy-setting Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) that Xi chairs, announced an investigation into the operations of leading American memory-chip maker Micron Technology. The CAC cited the need to safeguard the supply chains of Chinese IT and data companies. Regardless, Micron, whose China operations account for 11 percent of worldwide sales, has insisted that it “stands by the security of our products” (Straits Times, April 1; South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 31).
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

710. Central African Republic Mine Attack: Can China Protect its Overseas Nationals?

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 19, gunmen stormed a gold mine near Bambari, in the heart of the Central African Republic (CAR), killing nine Chinese workers. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Embassy in the CAR issued successive warnings for Chinese nationals to evacuate all areas outside of Bangui, the capital. On the same day as the attack, the Embassy called on Chinese citizens in the CAR’s external provinces to immediately evacuate themselves and report their whereabouts (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 19). A subsequent Embassy warning on March 22 went further, stressing that the situation in the CAR is now “red” or “extremely high risk,” emphasizing that the March 19 attack demonstrated the “extreme necessity of evacuating Chinese companies and nationals” in areas outside the capital “as soon as possible” (PRC Embassy in CAR, March 22). Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stressed that General Secretary Xi Jinping was closely monitoring the situation and had instructed that immediate action be taken to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals in the CAR and to “severely punish the murderers” (严惩凶手) (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], March 20). Exactly who perpetrated the attack remains, however, unclear. The CAR government faulted the rebel alliance, the Coalition of Patriots for Change, for the gold mine attack. However, the rebel group blamed Russia’s Wagner Group, which has been deployed in the country to protect the central government since 2018 (South China Morning Post [SCMP], March 20). The timing of the attack and subsequent allegations of Wagner’s involvement was inopportune for Xi as he prepared to travel to Moscow the following day for meetings with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, as Beijing sought to position itself as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine War (Xinhuanet, March 21). In a blog post on the CAR attack, the well-known nationalist firebrand and former Global Times editor Hu Xijin observed that in “the chaotic situation in CAR anything can happen,” but rejected Western media conjecture concerning the Wagner Group’s involvement as an attempt to “undermine Sino-Russian relations” (Sohu, March 22). He even claimed that due to Wagner’s cooperative relationship with the CAR government, its operators reportedly “helped the authorities deal with the aftermath of the situation and evacuate the bodies of the dead Chinese miners back to Bangui.” Finally, Hu averred that in the “2020s anyone who kills a Chinese national will face severe punishment and retribution.” A post on Tencent echoed these sentiments, stating: “the Central Africa Republic owes us nine lives” before castigating the U.S.-led West for treating Africa as a “modern colonial territory” and creating conditions for “vicious attacks” on Chinese companies to drive them out of emerging markets (Tencent, March 28). Putting aside the murkiness of the March 19 mine attack in the CAR, the incident highlights a growing problem for China, which is the sheer proliferation of state-owned and private businesses operating overseas, either in conflict zones or in areas with chronic political instability. The population’s widespread expectation that the government will exact swift retribution against the perpetrators of attacks on Chinese nationals overseas also puts Xi in a difficult position, as popular assumptions about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to target armed groups in distant and difficult operational environments do not align with its actual capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Violence, and Mining
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Central African Republic

711. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:
Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

712. The Chinese Steel Industry: Three Pathways to Green Steel

Author:
Chin Hsueh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 6, the China Meteorological Association (CMA) published the 2022 China Climate Bulletin (中国气候公报) (China Climate Bulletin, February 7). The annual report provides an overall analysis of China’s climate conditions and tracks significant meteorological disasters and major climate events from the previous year (CMA, February 24). The newly released China Climate Bulletin noted that the country recorded its second-highest annual mean temperature in history last year. In fact, last year’s spring, summer and autumn temperatures were the highest since record keeping began (China Climate Bulletin, February 7). During the press conference for the release of the bulletin, Jia Xiaolong, deputy director of China’s National Climate Center, stressed the importance of remaining alert to those “low probability, high impact” (小概率, 高影响) climate events, such as the heat wave that hit China in 2013, driving temperatures above 104 degrees Fahrenheit in at least 40 cities and counties (China News Service, February 7; Sohu, July 30, 2013). No plausible path to mitigating global climate change exists without China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, greatly reducing its carbon footprint. Among China’s major GDP drivers, few play a more critical role in the country’s decarbonization efforts than the steel sector (International Energy Agency, September 13, 2021). The steel industry is second only to power generation in terms of its carbon footprint, generating about 17 percent of China’s annual emissions (China Dialogue, May 23, 2022). In fact, the state-owned conglomerate China Baowu Steel Group (中国宝武),which is the world’s largest steel producer, put more CO2 into the atmosphere in 2020 than Pakistan (Jiemian, August 21, 2020).
Topic:
Climate Change, Manufacturing, Industry, Carbon Emissions, and Steel
Political Geography:
China and Asia

713. Why Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election is Wide Open

Author:
Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Shortly after Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered the worst loss in its 37-year history, Nikkei Asia Review published an article entitled “Taiwan’s KMT has a mountain to climb for 2024 presidential race” that cautioned not to read too much into the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) success in the local elections last November (Nikkei Asia, November 29, 2022). The piece argued that voters still perceive the KMT as being too close to China, a liability in a national election focused on cross-Strait relations, and hamstrung by uncertainty about who should serve as its presidential candidate next year. Although the KMT confronts significant challenges heading into Taiwan’s 2024 elections, the difficulties the party faces should not be overestimated. Rather than a mountain, the KMT has a modest hill to climb. Over the past 22 years, Taiwan’s national politics have swung like a pendulum, favoring the DPP from 2000-2008, the KMT from 2008-2016 and the DPP again since 2016. Taiwanese voters, like their counterparts in other thriving democracies, sometimes vote for change even if they are not enamored with a particular candidate. Since Taiwan fully democratized in 1996, no political party has won three consecutive presidential terms, with DPP and KMT presidents alternating every eight years. President Tsai Ing-wen has avoided the kinds of issues, corruption scandals and major popular demonstrations against her policies that undid the presidencies of her predecessors, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, leading to opposition wins in the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections, respectively. Nevertheless, Tsai has been dramatically weakened by the DPP’s crushing defeat in the November 2022 local elections (Jamestown Foundation, November 29, 2022). She stepped down as DPP party chair after the elections as the party has taken a hit for its many pandemic missteps, a flagging economy and a contentious cross-Strait policy (United Daily News, November 27, 2022). The DPP’s likely candidate in the 2024 election, current Vice President Lai Ching-te, while personally popular, would represent continuity with Tsai’s policies (China Brief, March 3). Together, these factors will likely make the 2024 race the closest since 2004, when the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu eked out a victory against the KMT’s Lien Chan and James Soong of the People First Party (PFP) by a margin of just 0.22 percent (Taipei Times, March 21, 2004).
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

714. Ten Years On, How is the Belt and Road Initiative Faring in Indonesia?

Author:
William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
“It is not merely talk, but it is about actually building something. From airports to railways, these are industries we can see and touch. This is exactly the sort of courage and real action the world needs right now.” So said Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in 2017 (BRF, May 14, 2017; Jakarta Globe, May 16, 2017). This year marks the tenth anniversary of this ambitious, globe-spanning infrastructure development project. Today, 151 countries and 32 international organizations have joined the initiative, which Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently described as a “global enterprise to build a belt of prosperity and a road to happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], January 20). A decade ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI with a series of speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia calling for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road,” respectively (Consulate General of the PRC in Toronto, September 7, 2013; China Daily, October 4, 2013). The following year, China announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road fund at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing and a $20 billion Maritime Silk Road fund in Indonesia (China Daily, November 9, 2014). From the BRI’s inception, it has been clear that Southeast Asia and its largest economy— Indonesia—are intended to serve as a centerpiece of the megaproject (Global Times, November 16, 2022). Roughly two-thirds of all people of ethnic Chinese ancestry outside of China are in Southeast Asia. [1] The 142-kilometer (88 mile) Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) is one of the BRI’s flagship projects (China Brief, December 22, 2022). Indonesia also hosts nearly half of the eight overseas industrial parks that China has established across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the China-Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, and the China-Indonesia JuLong Agricultural Industry Cooperation Zone (China Development Institute, June 26, 2019). While Beijing has pulled back its overseas BRI lending—and Xi has exhibited some notable reticence toward hosting a third Belt and Road Forum—Indonesia challenges the broader narrative that the BRI is somehow fading away (Green Finance & Development Center, July 24, 2022). In the world’s fourth-most populous country, Chinese investment has continued apace, and both governments continue to champion the BRI’s ability to deliver “mutual benefit” and “win-win results.” Still, understanding Indonesia’s experience with the BRI requires closer examination of the history behind China-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation, major projects beyond the oft-discussed Jakarta-Bandung HSR and their impacts on the Indonesian public, and the extent of economic engagement between Jakarta and Beijing.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

715. Russia-Ukraine War Compels Japan to Reassess China Challenge, Shift Course on Security

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the grisly Russia-Ukraine war, the security situation in East Asia may appear conducive to the continuation of the long peace that the region has enjoyed for decades. However, the devastating European war has cast a long shadow eastward. While Russia’s military presence in Asia is deeply curtailed as most of its conventional capabilities are redeployed to the Donbas front in Ukraine, the behavior of maverick North Korea has become more reckless and China’s policy has become less predictable and more assertive. As a result, Japan has adopted a more proactive approach to its international security environment predicated on enhancing its military capabilities and deepening security cooperation with key allies and partners, starting with, but not limited to, the U.S.
Topic:
Security, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

716. Assessing the Role of the PLA Southern Theater Command in a China-India Contingency

Author:
Suyash Desai
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Soon after Xi Jinping assumed charge as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman in November 2012, he set the stage for a sweeping military restructuring. On February 1, 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved away from the old Soviet-inspired Military Regions (MR) system to the U.S.-inspired Theater Command (TC) model. Under this new model, the seven Military Regions—Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou—were reorganized into five geographic TCs, each with a specific “strategic direction” (战略方向). [1] Following the force restructuring, the three TCs that concern India are the Western Theater Command (WTC) along with Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts (TMD and XMD), the Southern Theater Command (STC) and the Central Theater Command (CTC). WTC’s 76th and 77th Group Armies (GA) under the PLA Army’s (PLAA) jurisdiction are mandated to ensure the security of China’s land boundaries with Central Asian states, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. The TMD and XMD were retained to oversee security on the Chinese border with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Ladakh, respectively. In addition to the PLAA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the PLA Logistic Support Force (JLSF) are also significant services under the WTC command, while the PLA Navy (PLAN) plays a minor role at Pangong Tso in the Aksai Chin region. Elsewhere, PLAN forces under the STC’s jurisdiction are responsible for securing Chinese interests not only in the South China Sea but also possibly in the Indian Ocean Region and the Western Pacific Ocean. The CTC is mandated to protect the capital but also acts as an anchor to provide additional troops to other theaters in case of a contingency, including WTC. This is an important division of responsibilities for the Chinese armed forces after Xi’s recent military reforms. [2] However, recent developments have highlighted that the STC’s 75th Group Army could also play an important role in securing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial integrity in Tibet, especially in the eastern sector bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore, the troops from the STC’s 75th Group Army could be used for rotation in the Tibetan theater, and the 75th GA’s artillery could be mobilized during a contingency with India. The four major reasons that the STC’s 75th GA could play such a role are improving connectivity between Tibet and the Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan, minor changes to the 75th GA’s force composition, recent military exercises by STC’s 75th GA in Tibet and historical precedent.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Armed Forces, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

717. The Lion, the Wolf Warrior and the Crossroads: UK-China Relations at a Turning Point

Author:
Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May visited China with a British business delegation, seeking a free trade deal and expressing optimism over Beijing’s “one country, two systems” formula for governing Hong Kong (Global Times, January 31, 2018; Zaobao, January 31, 2018). In her first foreign trip since moving into 10 Downing Street, she promised that the “golden era of relations” between the UK and China would be even better after Brexit (Xinhua, February 1, 2018). Since May’s visit, however, a great deal has happened to move UK-China relations in the opposite direction, with the PRC’s suppression of mass demonstrations in Hong Kong (Global Times, July 29, 2020); the implementation of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law that London sees as a breach of “one country, two systems” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], June 12, 2020); the British riposte in offering a path to citizenship for Hong Kongers (Gov.cn, April 14, 2021); and the escalation of tensions between China and its trading partners, particularly the UK’s closest ally, America (FMPRC, September 24, 2021; Xinhua, October 5, 2021). The British establishment, like their American cousins, have changed tack on China of late. In June 2022, MI5 Director Ken McCallum and FBI Director Chris Wray gave a joint address warning business and academic leaders in Britain of the “massive shared challenge” posed by China (MI5, July 6, 2022). Two years earlier, McCallum said that if Russian behavior is like “bursts of bad weather,” then “China is changing the climate” (CIGI, June 2, 2022). Last November, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, referring to UK-China relations, said that “the so-called ‘golden era’ is over, along with the naive idea that trade would lead to social and political reform” in the People’s Republic (ThePrint, November 29. 2022). Even the pro-engagement business weekly Beijing to Britain admits that no one in the UK Parliament “believes that an enriched Chinese middle class will steer the country towards democracy” (Beijing to Britain, January 24, 2021). Britain’s conundrum in stabilizing commercial relations with Beijing while heeding American sensibilities is as difficult as at any time since Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. Meanwhile in Beijing, the decades-old ordeal of striving to play the British off against the Americans has become an increasingly uphill battle. In fact, much of today’s menu of bilateral issues between London and Beijing, with the Washington factor always hovering in the background, might be familiar to Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. That brings some predictability to the rollercoaster ride of UK-China relations, but unsettling variables have changed the course of relations and pushed London, not to mention the rest of NATO, ever closer to Washington. Specific aspects of the PRC’s increasingly destabilizing and aggressive policies that have rankled London include the removal of Hong Kong as a centerpiece of the UK-China bilateral relationship; and Beijing’s announcement immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that “the Sino-Russian cooperation has no limits, no exclusion zone, no ceiling” (中俄合作没有止境 ,没有禁区,没有上限) (Global Times, December 24, 2021; Gov.cn, February 4, 2022).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia

718. China’s New Historic “Leap” Narrative: Coverup for the Zero-COVID Policy Failure?

Author:
Dominik Mierzejewski
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
With Chinese authorities having shifted away from a zero-COVID policy at the end of November, the country now faces an unresolved dilemma as to its future approach to economic development and public health policies. A critical question is: will the Dengist doctrine of “Reform and Opening-up” return to the political discourse? But the most critical issue revealed by People’s Daily is how Chinese propaganda has portrayed the recent chaos, as well as how it has promoted General Secretary Xi Jinping’s image in spite of the failure of the zero-COVID policy. These questions are of particular importance ahead of the second plenum of the 20th Party Congress, which is planned for February 2023. A brief analysis of the theoretical section of the People’s Daily, “An Intersection of Thoughts” (思想纵横), throughout December 2022, may offer some preliminary answers. The critical points introduced in People’s Daily indicate how China is likely to be led moving forward, with major features such as governing within a “one way” approach and a Chinese-style modernization process representing what is seen as a rational path of development going forward.
Topic:
Governance, Public Health, COVID-19, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:
China and Asia

719. China’s Interests in North Korean Denuclearization: Reducing the Northeast Asian Security Dilemma

Author:
Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The existential North Korean nuclear and missile threats negatively impact the Asia-Pacific security environment for the United States, South Korea, Japan and Australia. In response, these countries have taken countermeasures to defend themselves against the growing danger from North Korea. As a result, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities indirectly worsen China’s “security dilemma” by spurring the U.S. and its allies to devote greater resources to maintaining a strong security presence in Northeast Asia. This situation is illustrated by Beijing’s consistent criticism of Seoul for allowing the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system in South Korea since 2017. Although South Korea has sought to reassure China that the system is aimed at counteracting the threat from North Korea, Beijing has maintained that the presence of the U.S. THAAD in Korea “clearly undermines China’s strategic security interests” (PRC Ministry Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], August 10, 2022). Although China has been accused of not putting enough effort into the denuclearization process, achieving success in eliminating nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would serve China’s security interests in several ways, including by removing a powerful justification for the U.S. and China’s neighbors to devote resources to regional security. In part due to North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, South Korea, Japan and Australia have all recent strengthened their respective missile development programs. In 2021, the United States also lifted the restrictions it had imposed on South Korea limiting the range and payload of its ballistic missiles. According to previous South Korea president Moon Jae, this has removed “security shackles”—allowing South Korea to regain its missile autonomy (Korea Herald, May 22, 2021).
Topic:
Weapons, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

720. A Critical Appraisal of China’s Power in South Asia: Strengths and Achievements

Author:
Arfan Mahmood
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
With its rising power, China has been spreading its clout in almost every corner of the world. South Asia, owing to its rising significance, has caused new-found interest of China in this region. Amidst many assumptions, this paper attempts to trace out the rationale behind China‘s increasing presence in South Asia. Then, it primarily tries to analyze China‘s base of power in South Asian region and to explore its strengths and weaknesses. This study is designed to identify the factors that have attracted South Asian countries towards China. This study employs a case study method in general and ‗focused comparison‘ in particular. This method is considered highly appropriate as it brings various perspectives which are rooted in a particular context. China‘s transforming statecraft towards South Asia is the context and focused comparison comes into play while exploring the commonalities and differences associated with Chinese strategies towards South Asian countries. The study concludes that Chinese base of power in the South Asian region comes from the economic, security, and diplomatic support for the South Asian countries and China has capitalized on this opportunity to transform its resources into power.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Power, Statecraft, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, and Asia

721. Iran-Saudi and China Trilateral Agreement: Reshaping the Global World Order

Author:
Rana Eijaz Ahmad, Mahnoor Mansoor, and Muhammad Sajid
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
This research paper explains the changing global world order under the leadership of China. The qualitative method with secondary sources describes the Chinese struggle for peace and interdependence in the post-Covid-19 era, maligned with the Russia-Ukraine war and American support to Ukraine under the banner of NATO. The theory of meditated realism (a third kind of realism, which results from contemplation and introspection, which leads to being proactive instead of reactive.) is used in the paper to explain the trilateral agreement. China is heading towards more alliances and agreements with Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa. It is reshaping the global world order and striving to replace the dollar with the yuan. It may start a new financial war between China and the U.S.
Topic:
NATO, Treaties and Agreements, and Realism
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

722. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Socio-Cultural and Political Implications for Pakistan Amid Covid19 and the Way Forward

Author:
Mubeen Adnan and Reema Murad
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Through the ‘game changer’ project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor, China is aiming to stabilize its western part by promoting investment and economic development in its neighbour to the West, Pakistan, which will lead to a boost in the Pakistani economy through investments in infrastructure and construction of gas and oil pipeline. There is also the aim of reducing extremism in the Xinjiang region. However, there are several social, cultural and political changes that the project has the potential to bring about in Pakistan. This research work has made an attempt to understand the variousimplications of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor on Pakistan as well as how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted CPEC and the path ahead as the world slowly transitions out of COVID-19. This research paper has used secondary sources in order to answer these pertinent topics. Major opportunities which Pakistan and China have gained through this ChinaPakistan economic Corridor as well as some challenges are also discussed.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Investment, Economic Development, COVID-19, and Opportunity
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

723. Social and Historical Investigation of China’s Ethnic Minorities: Based on Political Stability and National Unity

Author:
Bao Longyuan and Mei Jun
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The social and historical investigation of China’s ethnic minorities was a major national political action in 50s-60s of the 20th Century, and it was of particular significance to the governance of the frontier, the maintenance of ethnic equality, and the long-term stability of China. In the era of underdeveloped information technology, the Communist Party of China (CPC) entered ethnic minorities areas, on the one hand, to understand the living conditions of ethnic minorities, and to facilitate the introduction of relevant supporting policies. On the other hand, the investigation process also publicized the CPC’s thought on governing the country, so that the people can more understand and trust the CPC, so as to promote national unity and political stability. Although this investigation has become a history, its significance, value and effect are still prominent for China’s political stability and national development today.Therefore, it is still of important practical significance to study the social and historical investigation of China’s ethnic minorities.
Topic:
Development, Minorities, Political stability, Ethnicity, and National Unity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

724. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Author:
Bonnie L. Rushing and Kyleanne Hunter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.
Topic:
National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Employment, Diversity, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

725. The South China Sea and Indo-Pacific in an Era of “Multipolar” Competition

Author:
Zachary Paikin, Gilang Kembara, Andrew Mantong, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
A longstanding territorial dispute between claimants in the South China Sea now finds itself nested within a new imagined ‘Indo-Pacific’ region, which itself has become a key theatre in a deepening great power conflict. The EU is geographically distant and a relative newcomer to the strategic terrain in these two regions, yet it cannot afford to ignore them given their crucial economic and geopolitical importance. While the EU’s ability to reduce the constraints on its freedom of manoeuvre is limited, the Union should nonetheless gradually nurture its strategic autonomy by carving out a delineated hard security role in the South China Sea while maintaining a degree of distance from the US approach towards China and the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

726. Playing the Long Game in the South China Sea

Author:
Andrew Mantong
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the South China Sea (SCS), as indeed the wider Indo-Pacific, the EU is facing a deepening strategic rivalry between China and the US. In the SCS, China has been able to create physical realities in defiance of international law by constructing artificial islands in the attempt to sustain its claims to the disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagos as well as expand its military projection deep into international waters. The US is still the predominant security player in the Indo-Pacific, but its military presence has an increasingly hard time shoring up American power in the SCS. The security dilemma between the great powers is threatening rules-based multilateralism, which runs deep in the veins of the EU and to a great extent defines its international posture.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Law, European Union, Multilateralism, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

727. Prospects of and Challenges to Arms Control in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective

Author:
Sonia Naz
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3] The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China’s rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India’s hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

728. Timing Is Everything: Italy Withdraws from the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Aurelio Insisa
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy’s participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024. Italy’s subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders’ Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would “examine […] carefully” the MoU.[2] Draghi’s words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing’s assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its “golden power” to veto Beijing’s investments in Italy’s strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU’s outcome.[4] This course correction in Rome’s China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party’s credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and International Politics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

729. The Internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi and China’s Digital Currency Plans

Author:
Lorenzo Bencivelli and Michele Savini Zangrandi
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
China has made major reforms to boost the international standing of its currency. The global presence of the renminbi remains contained, however. This is due to China’s economic structure (a persistent current account surplus and a partially closed financial account) and the government’s grip on the economy. China is also a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) forerunner. The digital yuan (e-cny) is already active in a large scale trial. Many claim that the e-cny could provide a major boost to the internationalisation of the renminbi. However, the internationalisation of the renminbi would require major economic reforms that cannot be bypassed by the deployment of new technologies. The e-cny is therefore unlikely to boost the renminbi’s international presence. Yet, its underlying technology could be exported to other countries wishing to deploy their own-currency CBDCs. Much like with telecommunication equipment, this scenario would put China in the position of being a provider of a critical infrastructure. In the longer run, the export of e-cny technology might also facilitate the creation alternative payment networks, though this scenario is not very likely.
Topic:
Political Economy, Governance, Finance, Currency, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

730. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

731. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South

Author:
Tanina Zappone
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South

732. China and the Global South: Many Initiatives, One Narrative

Author:
Marina Rudyak
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Since its 2013 launch, the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has stirred heated debates. Despite Beijing framing it as win-win cooperation, concerns mounted over BRI’s risks for involved countries, especially in the Global South. China’s narrative merely signals a search for an effective communication strategy and international discourse power, while its understanding of development remains constant. Developing countries play a crucial role in China’s pursuit of global status. Firstly, it positions itself as the advocate for developing nations, promoting “diverse paths to modernisation” and “true multilateralism”. Secondly, China aims to redefine major power by prioritising development and security over liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global South

733. China’s Changing COVID-19 Policies: Market and Public Health

Author:
Zhun Xu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
After the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, China took fast and decisive measures to successfully contain the spread of the virus within its borders. While the rest of the world saw huge human and social costs in the pandemic, the Chinese mainland for about two years was largely free from COVID. The zero-COVID model, however, met great challenges by early 2022. Despite some efforts to save the zero-COVID model, in November 2022, the Chinese government abruptly abandoned its signature COVID controls during the pandemic and switched to the opposite. This article reviews the evolution of the Chinese COVID policies and places the dramatic turns in the context of the changing Chinese political economy. The findings show that the shifting class interests and actions were an important force behind China’s retreat from zero- COVID.
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

734. Chinese Firms and Adherence to Global Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Standards in Developing Countries: Is there Potential to Create Common Ground?

Author:
Mike Morris
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet: 1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers); 2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling); 3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
Topic:
Development, Environment, Governance, Business, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Latin America

735. An Analysis on the Regional Integration of Northeast Asia by Developing NARCI (Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation Index)

Author:
Ji Young Moon, Jehoon Park, and Sung-Hoon Park
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This paper aims to develop an index to analyze regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, which is Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation Index(NARCI). NARCI evaluates intra-regional cooperation and integration in four areas, which are functional cooperation, politico-security cooperation, socio-cultural cooperation, and institutionalization, in order to identify the conflict and cooperation situation in the Northeast Asian region. The analysis of economic integration found that Northeast Asian regional cooperation is characterized by a high level of integration in goods trade and regional value chain cooperation, but a relatively low level of integration in intra-regional direct investment and energy supply chain cooperation. The analysis of the political and security cooperation shows that the intensification of U.S.-China competition and the factional confrontation between Korea, U.S., Japan, and North Korea, China, Russia have had a significant impact on regional cooperation in political and diplomatic security. The result shows that the level of integration is low, with all evaluation indicators being negative. The analysis of the socio-cultural integration shows a relatively low level of integration in civil society cooperation and intergovernmental exchanges, a relatively high level of integration in cultural and educational exchanges and study abroad, and a neutral level of integration in information technology cooperation, labor mobility, and the share of tourists in the region. Finally, the analysis of institutional integration shows a relatively high level of integration in the bilateral channels between governments and the institutionalization of regional cooperation in the socio-cultural field, and half of the countries had institutional integration in financial integration and regional cooperation in the economic field. The level of integration in the political and security field was low due to the existence of only multilateral meetings. The analysis of NARCI shows that the impact of geopolitical conflicts on the economy and socio-culture has been expanding in recent years. However, the low level of political and diplomatic cooperation in the region and related institutional deficiencies are considered to be insufficient to buffer these risks, and efforts are needed to address them.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Regional Cooperation, Economic Growth, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Asia and Northeast Asia

736. Industrial Policy, Rise of Skilled Labor, and Firm Growth in the Early Stage of Economic Development

Author:
Sunghun Cho and Jaehyung Kim
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of education policy in raising specific human capital for industrialization during the period of economic miracle in Korea. As part of the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive, the Korean gov-ernment built technical schools near industrial complexes, resulting in a prompt supply of skilled labor. With practical curricula and training, young and skilled workers were able to enter the new sector. We also document these two patterns by using the Technical School List and the Occupational Wage survey. This government-led education reform led to higher firm-level productivity and growth, which is one of the important aspects explaining the success of the industrial policy. Motivated by historical evidence, we combine the administrative Mining and Manufacturing survey with the Technical School List to study the effec-tiveness of industry-oriented education reform. We incorporate an education layer into the targeted industries under the HCI drive by exploiting the varia-tion in technical school openings at the county level. Our results show that plants in treated regions tend to employ and invest more than those in control regions, but value-added and labor productivity are negatively correlated with our interaction terms. This implies that firms in HCI sectors experienced disproportionate growth and should pay higher on-the-job costs for workers while education reform may reduce the overall cost of hiring industry-specific labor. In contrast, non-HCI sector firms ex-hibit a positive correlation with value added and labor productivity. These firms might benefit from the education reform that improved overall quality of skilled workers. Lastly, the effect of education reform was concentrated before the end of the HCI drive period and did not persist after 1980. In the era of emerging industrial policy, our paper presents a new mecha-nism that encourages more workers to enter a new sector targeted by gov-ernment-led plans. Our results serve as a starting point for re-evaluating con-temporary industrial policy and underscore the need to consider this addi-tional layer in future policy design.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Economic Growth, Economic Development, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

737. Analysis of Trade Pattern Between the EAEU and South Korea

Author:
Zoia Podoba
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a relatively newly-formed regional integration bloc. It evolved on the basis of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in 2015 with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joining the agreement. The foreign economic aspirations of the EAEU as a single market, in the context of tense relations with Western partners, are turned towards Asian countries. The pivot to the East is supported by the ideological concept of “Greater Eurasia” (sometimes translated as “Big Eurasia”), which implies more extensive cooperation with the economies of Central, East, and South Asia. At a time when political efforts to bring the Union and Korea closer together have been put on hold, the paper aims to provide a comprehensive description of the bilateral merchandise trade pattern between the EAEU and the Republic of Korea to verify if statistical evidence on bilateral trade provides ground for the development of guiding actual policy deliberations in the future. Trade Intensity Index (TII), the sectoral bilateral coefficient of revealed comparative advantages, and the standard Grubel-Lloyd index have been used in order to analyze the bilateral trade between the EAEU and the Republic of Korea.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Regional Integration, and Trade
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Asia, and South Korea

738. Enhancing Korea’s Services Trade Statistics: Policy Recommendations

Author:
Jongduk Kim
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study revisits the definition of trade in services, explores the translation of service statistics into the Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC), proposes a method to estimate Korea's services trade by mode of service supply under the WTO trade agreement, and seeks ways to collect data on digital trade in services. It classifies the objectives pertaining to the enhancement of Korea's service trade statistics into short-term, medium-term, and long-term agendas.
Topic:
Economics, Trade, WTO, and Service Delivery
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

739. How Well Does Korea's Employment Insurance System Support Workers Facing Trade Shocks?

Author:
Kyong Hyun Koo
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study uses worker-level longitudinal panel data and trade data to conduct an analysis of the performance of Korea's employment insurance system in supporting trade-affected workers. We find that the rapid economic growth of China and Vietnam since the 2000s has subjected some Korean industries to heightened import competition. The Korean workers who were employed in these industries in their earlier careers tended to experience a long-term (10-year) decline in the growth rate of labor income and a relative deterioration in their employment security as the probability of involuntary job separation increased. With an increased probability of involuntary job separation, workers in import-competing industries were more likely to receive unemployment benefits. This implies that the unemployment benefit system in Korea was relatively effective in the short term to alleviate employment shocks triggered by trade shocks. Nevertheless, the trade adjustment support function of the unemployment benefit system had certain limitations in that the receipt of unemployment benefits could not ultimately counteract the downward trend in long-term labor income for workers in import-competing industries. In contrast to unemployment benefits, government-supported vocational training holds the potential to increase the long-term earnings of workers more exposed to import competition. However, workers employed in import-competing industries were not more likely to participate in government-supported vocational training; on the contrary, workers in export-expanding industries were more likely to participate in government-supported vocational training. This finding implies that the jobs of workers in import-intensive industries were less likely to be covered by employment insurance than those in export-intensive industries. Consequently, workers in import-intensive industries, who are at greater risk of trade shocks, may be less safeguarded than their counterparts in export-growing industries under the prevailing employment insurance system.
Topic:
Economics, Employment, Trade, and Insurance
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

740. Global Perspectives on ESG and Implications for Korea

Author:
Jinyoung Moon, Sang-Ha Yoon, Jiwon Park, Seung Kwon Na, and Sunghee Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
ESG, which stands for Environmental, Social, and Governance, has gained significant importance in recent years. Adoption of Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals and efforts to recover from COVID-19 have contributed to this global trend. Businesses and regulators are now placing more emphasis on the sustainability of economic activities and transparent disclosure of ESG information. In light of this, our study focuses on examining global ESG policy trends and supply chain due diligence regulations. We also compare ESG scores of firms across major countries and analyze the impacts of ESG performances on employment and productivity. Based on our findings, we aim to provide recommendations and implications for the government and private sector to address ESG in practice.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Environment, Governance, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

741. Japan’s New Trade Strategy Focuses on Supply Chain Resilience and Trade Liberalization

Author:
Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Since the inauguration of the U.S Trump administration in January 2017, Japan's trade strategies have been shifting from trade liberalization to protectionism, emphasizing the strengthening of supply chains. The Kishida cabinet, which was launched in October 2021, is strengthening economic cooperation with the United States through bilateral dialogue as well as multilateral cooperation frameworks such as IPEF. It also enacted the Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022, and strengthened industrial policies for strategic industries such as the semiconductors. However, the Japanese government's new trade strategy is not limited to supply chain strengthening measures and industrial policies. It is aiming to take the lead in digital trade, which is a new trade issue, and bolster its leadership in CPTPP. This brief is structured as follows. In the following section we will examine Japan’s new trade strategy in terms of supply chain resilience, focusing on industrial policies represented by reshoring policy and national semiconductor strategy, and supply chain policies of critical materials outlined in the Economic Security Promotion Act enacted in May 2022. And we look at bilateral coopera-tion between the U.S and Japan, and key negotiation agenda on supply chains at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The third section reviews the Japan’s trade liberalization strategy focused on the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), and Digital Trade Agreements. In particular, we derived the direction of Japan’s free trade policy through an analysis of the characteristics of the CPTPP as a 21st-century trade norm, and a comparative analysis of major regulations related to e-commerce in the CPTPP, US-Japan Digital Trade Agreement, and RCEP.
Topic:
Economics, Trade, Resilience, Supply Chains, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

742. Trade and Investment Cooperation between South Korea and the Visegrad Group

Author:
Grzegorz Mazur
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The Visegrad group (V4) is a political alliance of four countries of Central Europe - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, reaching its roots to the beginning of the 1990s, when the countries started reforming their political and economic systems from centrally planned to democratic free market economies. The coalition - consisting of countries with similar historical experience, transformation challenges and level of socio-economic development - aimed at regional co-operation and mutual support on their strategic goal of full membership in the European Union (EU). The V4 countries are currently full members of the EU (since 2004) with dynamic and competitive economies. The four countries form a market of over 60 million consumers with a share of ca. 7.7% of the EU’s GDP (Table 1). Over last three decades V4 countries have experienced high economic growth, closing a development gap with highly developed countries of the EU. Their economies have opened up to the global trading system, changing directions (mostly towards other EU countries) and expanding volumes of their international trade. Liberalizing economies have become attractive destinations for FDIs due to their central location at the continent, well-educated society as well as restructuration and privatization of many economic sectors (Mazur, 2009). Joining the European Union in 2004, V4 countries became part of the European Single Market leading to various consequences for economic policy and business conditions. While membership in the EU brought new economic opportunities and enhanced the countries’ business attractiveness, it has also had relevant consequences for their trade co-operation with third countries. The V4 states adopted all rights and commitments from the EU’s Common Trade Policy and have since been developing their trade and economic co-operation with third countries, including the Republic of Korea, commonly with other EU partners and exclusively at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Investment, Trade, Visegrad Group, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Central Europe

743. Environmental Migration and Labor Market

Author:
Young-ook Jang
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This report highlights the significant impact of climate change on migration patterns and the need for Korea to prepare for the influx of climate migrants. While natural disasters have historically caused population displacement, the effects of climate change-induced slow-onset changes, such as rising sea levels and droughts, are increasingly evident. Environmental migration disrupts social, labor, and industrial structures in sending and receiving countries, particularly through labor migration, which affects wages, employment rates, production costs, commodity prices, and business cycles. The study by Jang et al. (2022) investigates regional patterns of environmental migration and the potential labor market implications. Although Korea is currently unaffected, it is projected to experience an increase in climate migrants in the near future, as Southeast Asian and South Asian countries facing climate and environmental challenges contribute significantly to Korea's migrant population. The report emphasizes the importance of understanding the socio-economic characteristics of potential migrants to develop appropriate policies to mitigate the negative impacts of this anticipated influx. By proactively addressing these challenges, Korea can better prepare for the future dynamics of climate-induced migration and its impact on society, labor markets, and industrial sectors.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Migration, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

744. Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and its Implications for Bilateral Cooperation between India and South Korea

Author:
Shahana Chattaraj
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
South Korea officially launched the Indo-Pacific Strategy on 28 December 2022 highlighting the importance of the region and its significance in the current era. The detailed report on South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is based on the fundamental principles of cooperation with an emphasis on tolerance, trust and mutual benefit. The strategy emphasised the promotion of freedom, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region through the joint establishment of a rule-based order and cooperation on human rights (MOFA 2022). The Indo-Pacific Strategy proposed by the South Korean government is a 37-page document that is considered to be the country’s comprehensive regional strategy and will shape the future foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific region. The target areas of the Indo-Pacific Strategy can be understood as the North Pacific, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, African countries along the Indian Ocean, Europe and Central and South America as highlighted in the report.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
India, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

745. Strategies to Raise Public Awareness on Development Cooperation

Author:
Jeonghwan Yun
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
"From aid recipient to donor” is a slogan commonly used to promote Korea’s development cooperation. The slogan not only represents HOW Korea tries to contribute to the developing world with its unique development experience, but it also shows WHY Korea thinks they should. This report quantitatively evaluates the efficacy of public awareness strategy in Korea. Utilizing a survey experiment data from “Survey for Public Awareness in Korea on Development Cooperation (2022),” I show how better understanding on the international actors of development cooperation makes a difference in the public awareness. Specifically, those with higher level of "trust" on international organization and developing countries are likely to exert complementary effect and show higher support on Korea's contribution, once provided of descriptive news about current challenges in developing world. While negative imagery seems induce more immediate response on ODA support, such complementary effect implies the importance of building a social trust about the global community and promoting better understanding of the developing world, and how the public awareness can lead to a substantial support of Korea's ODA in the long-run, without facing "compassion fatigue."
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

746. India’s Medical Devices Sector: A Window of Opportunity for South Korea

Author:
Ram Singh
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The medical devices sector in India has been rapidly growing and evolving, driven by factors such as increasing healthcare expenditure, rising awareness of advanced medical technologies, government initiatives, and a growing population with a rising demand for healthcare services. The Indian medical devices market was valued at approximately $12 billion in 2021 and is expected to reach $50 billion by 2025, indicating significant growth potential. The sector covers a wide range of products, such as diagnostic imaging equipment, surgical instruments, patient monitoring devices, implants, consumables, and healthcare IT solutions. The market is primarily driven by imports, with domestic manufacturing accounting for a smaller share (Dang and Sharma 2019). However, the government has been promoting domestic manufacturing with an aim to reduce import dependency, the Medical Devices Policy-2023 of India should be seen in the same context.
Topic:
Markets, Trade, Industry, Healthcare System, and Medical Devices
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

747. Mekong Subregion-RoK Cooperation to Build Stable Supply Chains in Southeast Asia

Author:
Sungil Kwak, Jaewan Cheong, Mingeum Shin, and Jegook Kim
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The Mekong subregion has emerged as a key hub in the global value chain (GVC), driven by a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI). This development is rooted in the Mekong subregion's robust economic growth, positioning it strategically amid the ongoing competition between the United States and China for global hegemony. The RoK recognizes the strategic significance of the Mekong subregion and has embarked on cooperative efforts in this context. We delve into the potential of harnessing the Mekong subregion to enhance RoK's supply chain diversity. While it may pose challenges for the Mekong subregion to promptly function as a target for RoK's supply chain diversification due to its developmental and infrastructural status, we proactively explore potential avenues of RoK-Mekong cooperation to determine feasibility.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Growth, Global Value Chains, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

748. EU's Trade Strategies and Korea-EU Cooperation Plans

Author:
Young-ook Jang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Jang et al. (2022) investigate the recent shifts in the European Union's medium- to long-term trade strategies, which have evolved in response to a rapidly changing global trade landscape. We closely examine the policy domains currently in the EU's spotlight, including supply chain resilience, digitalization, tackling climate change, and public health crisis management. Another objective of this study is to identify opportunities for cooperation between Korea and the EU in the above-mentioned areas. Our recommendations include fostering partnerships in Net-zero technology development and multilateral climate discussions, modernizing digital trade agreements, and enhancing pharmaceutical cooperation.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Partnerships, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Korea

749. Policy Implications of the Biden Administration’s Global Supply Chain Reorganization

Author:
Gusang Kang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study indirectly estimates the impact of implementation of the Biden government’s supply chain restructuring policy on the U.S. and Korean economies, and derives policy implications accordingly. For the first analysis to indirectly examine the economic impact of the global supply chain reorganization of the semiconductor and battery industries, we estimate the impact of changes in the export share of the semiconductor or battery industry by country on the change in GDP per capita. Our results show an increase in the export share of semiconductors or batteries has a statistically significant increase in GDP per capita. These results support the reason why the Biden administration is moving to expand its exports through the reorganization of the U.S.-centered supply chain in the industry. By reorganizing the supply chain centered on the U.S., President Biden intends to attract production facilities in weak sectors such as memory semiconductors, foundries, and lithium-ion battery manufacturing to the U.S. through cooperation with partner countries such as Taiwan and Korea in the short term. In conclusion, this policy promotion seems to be part of a strategy to discover sustainable economic growth engines for the U.S. while checking China’s technological rise in key industries, and restoring U.S. leadership. Secondly, we estimate the impact of changes in export concentration or import concentration by semiconductor or battery item in the U.S. and Korea on the change in net exports by the two countries. First of all, in the case of the U.S. semiconductor industry, changes in export concentration and import concentration did not have a statistically significant effect on changes in net exports of the corresponding item. However, in the case of the Korean semiconductor industry, an increase in export concentration had a negative impact on the net export of the item, whereas a change in import concentration did not have a statistically significant effect on the change in Korea’s net export of the same item. In the case of the U.S. battery industry, as the import concentration by item increases, the U.S. net export of the same item decreases. However, we find that both the increase in the concentration of exports and the concentration of imports in the Korean battery industry decrease net exports of the product. Taken together, it can be inferred that the concentration of supply chains in the semiconductor and battery industries in the U.S. or Korea has the potential to hinder economic growth by reducing net exports of the relevant items in both countries. Based on the analysis results, it is necessary to strengthen norms-based supply chain cooperation with the U.S. and efforts are needed to diversify the lithium-ion battery supply chain.
Topic:
Economics, Supply Chains, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

750. The E-Commerce and Global Value Chains

Author:
Sangjun Yea and Seungrae Lee
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study investigates the significance of India's emergence as the world's most populous nation in 2023, surpassing China, and its consequential implications for economic growth. With a focus on the demographic dividend driven by working-age and prime-age populations, we analyze the effects of shifting age distribution on India's labor force, labor market, and economic drivers. Extending the study period by integrating additional datasets, we examine per capita GDP growth, sectoral value-added, and employment shifts at the state level. Results reveal limited influence on per capita output, but significant sectoral effects. Notably, prime age composition within the working-age population emerges as a key driver of economic growth.
Topic:
Demographics, Economic Growth, Global Value Chains, and E-Commerce
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Global Focus