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651. North Korea's Advanced Technologies

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter DPRK or North Korea) has been pursuing technological development in a very different way from the standard path of global technology growth due to its unique historical background and other factors and sought to develop its own science and technology to establish a complete socialist nation in line with its self-reliance (juche) philosophy. Its isolation was intensified by the international sanctions imposed as a consequence of its weapons-of-mass-destruction development programs since 2006. Throughout its existence, it has been leading the life of a recluse nation with a closed economy, resulting in a low level of technology compared to that of advanced economies. In the meantime, its political structure bestows absolute power that allows the supreme leader to allocate resources in whichever sector he wants. Major industries, such as power, mining, metal, machinery, and coal, are being developed. The DPRK is also attempting to transition to a digital economy. Evidence suggests, for example, that the DPRK is raising human capital in software, which appears to have brought positive outcomes in artificial intelligence.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Sanctions, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

652. Investigating China’s economic coercion: The reach and role of Chinese corporate entities

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s economic statecraft has expanded in line with Beijing’s vision for an international environment that is more conducive to its interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are willing to use every means at their disposal to achieve this goal, bringing the full force of the party-state to bear in support of Xi’s objectives abroad and against perceived enemies of the Chinese government. Economic statecraft—the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals—has been a consistent feature of Xi’s dealings with CCP competitors and adversaries. Intensifying US-China strategic competition and Beijing’s increasingly overt attempts to assert its preferences only further emphasize the importance of confronting China’s use of economic coercion and influence and understanding the reach of Chinese companies. The deliberate use of economic ties to achieve geopolitical objectives is underpinned by corporate entities that facilitate trade, investment, and financial flows.1 Beijing’s preference for plausible deniability and nontransparency in theory makes corporate entities an attractive mechanism through which to signal its displeasure and to achieve strategic goals. Understanding the reach and role of such entities is, therefore, key to identifying where Beijing might be best positioned to advance its economic statecraft. To that end, this report explores avenues through which researchers can investigate these issues, considers industries that could be vulnerable to future coercion and influence, and offers policy recommendations to counter China’s economic statecraft.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Global Markets, Economy, Trade, Norms, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

653. The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis

Author:
Gregory Weaver
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The potential for a conflict over Taiwan is increasing due to China’s nuclear and conventional military buildup and the threat of two simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, which would severely stress the ability of US and allied conventional forces to win in both theaters. Nuclear weapons will cast a long shadow over a Taiwan conflict and could play multiple roles in the deterrence and warfighting strategies and operations of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A conflict over Taiwan has a number of attributes that will shape those roles. Those attributes make the potential for limited nuclear escalation real and uncontrolled nuclear escalation possible. In order to prevent war and escalation in war, US policymakers and military planners must take the role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict seriously. The United States should communicate four focused deterrent messages to China and reassure its allies and partners that it can deter Chinese nuclear use. The United States should reevaluate its theater nuclear capability requirements for a Taiwan conflict and carefully analyze options to defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan with limited nuclear strikes if necessary. Finally, the United States must credibly address the potential for collaborative or opportunistic aggression by China and Russia in an environment in which both are peer nuclear adversaries. This requires determining what the US strategy should be to address the two-peer threat, optimizing US and allied conventional forces to address it, and reshaping US nuclear capabilities if necessary. The United States needs to know now whether it is going to require a nuclear force that is larger, or different, or both, because changing the current modernization program requires immediate action to address the threats in time.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

654. EU–ASEAN: Shared Objectives, Severed Trust

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
After 45 years of diplomatic dialogue, EU-ASEAN relations continue to dawdle, lacking real ambition or political will from either side to invest more in the relationship. Even after a recent upgrade in the relationship to a strategic partnership (and continued pressure from the business communities on both sides to do more),the potentialof the EU-ASEAN relationship is still not well understood by policymakers. Due to factors that are largely outside of EU’s control, the region-to-region engagement has settled on incrementalism on technical issues (like air transport) or selective bilateral engagement on trade and digital economy. Meanwhile, China has been making inroads with its Belt and Road Initiative; Japan leans on CPTPP and bilateral assistance, and the Biden administration has launched the IPEF. Due to the many trade disputes, it was no surprise that ASEAN granted strategic partner status to even Russia and New Zealand before considering the EU. The palm oil conflict with ASEANs largest democracies (Indonesia, Malaysia) has been allowed to escalate to a point where it can no longer be compartmentalised to a trade issue. The absence of actual economic injury among Malaysian and Indonesian farmers also proves that the palm oil conflict is not an economic issue that can be settled financially, but about high politics and a matter of principles. New EU legislation on due diligence for deforestation and corporate sustainability, market regulation on forced labour, carbon border adjustment measures, foreign subsidies, and data governance are likely to result in further retaliation and escalation. Rightly or wrongly, ASEAN democracies do not perceive that the EU has yet earned the right to be heard. Hence, the EU needs to be aware of how it projects its values and interests in the region, understanding that it does not command moral authority; or that ASEAN operates differently based on personal engagement between leaders and shared interests. Conversely, ASEAN leaders should not simply write off EU-engagement as a middle-management preoccupation due to its technical nature, but rather see the EU as a counterweight in the region. ASEAN as a collective can serve as a strategic and transformative instrument. Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and even London, are all shifting their focus to the region, concluding that the race for influence over the Indo-Pacific ultimately boils down to influence over ASEAN.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

655. Water Dilemmas: The cascading impacts of water insecurity in a heating world

Author:
Padmini Iyer
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
This briefing paper presents findings from Oxfam’s recently commissioned research on climate predictions for 2040 and 2050 in the Middle East, the Horn, East and Central Africa (HECA), West Africa and Asia regions. Analyses show how temperature increases will influence water insecurity in these regions and the potential impacts on food security, the spread of diseases, and other factors. This briefing paper also reveals severe under-investment by national governments and donors in water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) systems, with critical implications not only for water security but also for poverty and inequality. Oxfam is calling for urgent action to increase investments in sustainable, climate-adapted water management for the people who are most at risk from the worsening climate crisis.
Topic:
Climate Change, Natural Resources, Water, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and Asia

656. Gendered Dimensions of Loss and Damage in Asia

Author:
Nidhi Tewari, Alex Bush, Myrah Butt, Elizabeth Stevens, and Sarah Zafar
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Setting up a fund for loss and damage is one of the achievements of COP28, the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference. However, ambiguity remains regarding its functions and set-up. This briefing paper emphasizes the importance of understanding the gendered dimensions of both economic and non-economic losses and damages in Asia. It draws from case studies in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, the Philippines and Timor-Leste to advocate for an intersectional feminist approach to be embedded in the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund.
Topic:
Climate Change, Feminism, Intersectionality, Flood, Loss and Damage (L&D), Conference of the Parties (COP), and Care work
Political Geography:
Asia

657. The Economic Impact of China PNTR Repeal

Author:
David Schockenhoff and Michael Kleiman
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
As scepticism towards China is rising among policymakers, businesses grow more concerned about the potential economic fallout from an escalation in US-China tariff policy. Oxford Economics was commissioned by the US-China Business Council (USCBC) to help inform the policymaking process by examining two scenarios that could materialize if China’s Permanent Normalized Trade Relations (PNTR) status was revoked – including the increase of US tariffs on Chinese goods to column 2 rates as well as a Chinese retaliation imposing pre-WTO rates on US goods. Our analysis incorporates state-of-the art trade and economic models, including the Oxford Economics GEM, and finds that the US could lose up to $1.9trn in output over the five-year period following a China PNTR repeal. This is our third study for USCBC after examining the impact of the US-China relationship and associated scenarios in two previous reports (2017 and 2021).
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Regulation, Tariffs, Trade, Supply Chains, Policymaking, Decoupling, and Goods and Services
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

658. Third time lucky? China’s push to internationalise the renminbi

Author:
Alessia Amighini and Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Western concerns that the renminbi could rival the dollar as an international currency contrast with underwhelming numbers in terms of global settlements in renminbi and with the experience of China’s two main previous failed attempts to achieve renminbi internationalisation. However, China is moving towards a more realistic plan for renminbi internationalisation, focusing on China’s strengths in trade and financing. China is now the main trading partner for a very large number of countries and has become a major creditor for a good part of the Global South. This, together with the increasingly frequent restrictions on the use of the dollar, is strengthening the renminbi. The cross-border use of the renminbi for trade settlements and financing (Chinese banks’ overseas loans denominated in renminbi and official renminbi swap lines offered by the People’s Bank of China) has been on the rise since 2022, coinciding with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the related Western sanctions. The increase is notable considering that the renminbi has been depreciating since January 2023 and China’s economic performance has been underwhelming. However, the use of the renminbi as investment currency has declined since 2022, in terms of both the share of foreign-exchange reserves denominated in renminbi and the share of Chinese onshore assets held by foreign investors. The current push is so far proving successful compared to previous attempts, but it remains hard to tell if China will succeed in this renewed attempt to internationalise its currency through use of its heavy weight among trading nations. Obvious constraints remain that could hold back full internationalisation of the renminbi, especially the absence of full capital account convertibility. Nevertheless, China’s somewhat heterodox approach to internationalising its currency could succeed given the ongoing placing of restrictions on use of the dollar. How the dollar, the euro or the international monetary system may be further affected by the rise of the renminbi is a major policy question that must be explored further.
Topic:
Finance, Currency, Trade, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

659. De-risking and decarbonising: a green tech partnership to reduce reliance on China

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Heather Grabbe, and Axel Källenius
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Trade in renewable energy goods is a global public good; all countries gain when others cut emissions, and all suffer from climate change if decarbonisation is delayed. Yet this trade depends on China, which controls most of the world’s production of solar panels and electric vehicle batteries, and some of the global trade in wind turbines. These supply chains are vulnerable to disruption, natural disasters and weaponisation by China, which has already exercised its dominant position in some critical raw materials to put pressure on other countries. Part of the European Union and United States response to reduce reliance on China is reshoring production, but this is economically inefficient given their limited access to critical raw materials and high production costs. Moreover, Chinese firms are far ahead of the rest of the world in green tech manufacturing and innovation, and in extraction and processing. To reduce reliance on China, incentive-aligned governments and businesses should form a green tech partnership. This would produce green tech with the aim of decarbonising faster, while ensuring greater diversification of resources and improving security of supply. Each partnership economy would use its comparative advantage within a new green-tech supply chain. The aim is to supplement, not substitute, the Chinese supply chain, since both will be needed to meet rising global demand for green tech, including in China. Although such international coordination is difficult, the partnership would offers benefits to many different countries. Emerging economies that are rich in critical raw materials and/or have moderate wages would gain economic development opportunities. The US and the EU should share technology and provide financing, as they will gain from reduced dependence on China and from sourcing than is still cheaper than reshoring. China would have more room to use its clean tech to meet its own decarbonisation targets. The partnership could be organised through a combination of trade and investment agreements, together with tech transfer and financial agreements, under some form of inter-governmental oversight. The dependence of all countries on China for green tech is so great that non-market incentives might also be needed, such as subsidies or, preferably, a system of carbon pricing within the partnership.
Topic:
Partnerships, Green Technology, Risk, Renewable Energy, Supply, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

660. To what extent can urbanisation mitigate the negative impact of population ageing in China?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
China is experiencing population ageing caused by a rapidly declining fertility rate and increased life expectancy. This demographic transition poses economic challenges, yet the intensity of these challenges depends on a number of factors, with the move of people from rural to urban areas being of central importance. To gain a clearer understanding of how urbanisation interacts with population ageing, we investigate changes in the Chinese labour force in both rural and urban areas. Our findings suggest a modest shrinking of the overall labour force up until 2035. However, until 2035, the labour force is projected to contract only in rural areas, while the urban labour force will continue to grow. As urban employment is more productive than rural employment, the combined effect of demographic change and urbanisation on growth will remain moderately positive (0.4 percent per year). Beyond 2035, fertility rate decline will begin to affect the working-age population in both rural and urban areas, especially since the urbanisation process is expected to level off by then. In such circumstances, China’s shrinking population will shave off 1.4 percent from GDP growth annually. These results, however, do not take into account the impact of population aging on labour productivity. China’s fast move towards robotisation and artificial intelligence might help mitigate any negative impacts by increasing productivity, but there is no sign yet that this is the case.
Topic:
Demographics, Urbanization, Economic Growth, and Aging
Political Geography:
China and Asia

661. Before Zero Day: Taiwan’s Evolving Defense Strategy and the Struggle for Peace

Author:
Eric Lee, Ian Easton, Grace Price, Colby Ferland, Cathy Fang, Mark Stokes, and Alice Cho
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The invasion of Ukraine has upended long-held assumptions of the liberal international order, and as tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese leaders are watching Ukraine with their futures in mind. The objective of this report is to provide insights into how Taiwanese policymakers, military officers, diplomats, strategists, and everyday citizens are responding to the evolving threat picture in the Taiwan Strait and offer ideas for the policy debate in Washington. This report examines leadership speeches, strategy reports, military writings, and media articles, as well as recounts findings from interviews with Taiwanese and U.S. government officials, military officers, and civil society.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Peace, and International Order
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

662. Taiwan’s Urgent Need for Asymmetric Defense

Author:
Eric Gomez
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Amid deteriorating US-China relations, senior US officials have begun suggesting that a Chinese attack against Taiwan could happen soon. The conventional wisdom in Washington is that this urgent threat requires an urgent response, but too much attention has focused on the US-China military balance and too little on Taiwan’s military efforts. Taiwan’s future would likely be determined in the opening days, if not hours, of a conflict. Taiwan must prevail in two critical military operations: surviving China’s conventional bombardment and preventing the first wave of amphibious ground forces from establishing a beachhead. Taiwan would be fighting these two operations alone, but Taiwan’s military does not have the right mix of equipment, manpower, and strategy to mount an effective defense, despite the fact that the results of these operations could prove decisive for the rest of the conflict. US policymakers must press Taipei to focus on improving Taiwan’s ability to execute this narrow set of military missions and to reorient its overall strategy to one of asymmetric defense to counter Chinese advantages. If Taiwan does not or cannot do so, it is unlikely that any amount of potential US assistance or intervention could salvage the island’s position in the event of a conflict. Because these shortfalls are so important, Washington should create a sense of urgency in Taipei through security assistance measures such as conditional arms sales and limited joint training. The United States should also take care not to back Beijing into a corner where it concludes that using force is its only viable option to achieve unification with Taiwan. American assurances to China are a tough sell given Washington’s bipartisan hawkishness on China, but keeping time on Taiwan’s side is essential for the success of Taipei’s self-defense transformation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Asymmetric Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

663. Enhancing Australia’s Taiwan ties

Author:
Benjamin Herscovitch and Mark Harrison
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia should articulate and pursue a disciplined Taiwan strategy that uses the flexibility of its one-China policy to increase engagement with Taipei in service of Australian economic and security interests. Canberra should support Taipei’s bid for entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and start negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. It should also establish regular ministerial exchanges with Taiwan. The Taiwan strategy advocated in this paper is likely to be a net negative for Australia’s relations with China. But it strikes a reasonable balance between Australia’s interests and the stabilisation of the Australia–China relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Regional Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

664. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

665. Strengthening South Korean Value Diplomacy for U.S.-South Korean Normative Alignment

Author:
Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The foreign policy of any state is formulated by calculating national interest and normative ideals. If national interest is based on tangible economic and security gains, normative ideals are often understood as universal and transformative values. However, this distinction is often blurred in reality, as normative choices are made in the context of long-term national interest. Furthermore, a state’s normative alignment can change due to ideologically different new governments or contentious domestic challenges. The worst-case scenario occurs when a strong state withdraws from leadership of a normative coalition of like-minded states. Like-minded states tend to disperse when they lose their leader; the decline of the Community of Democracies after the United States’s neglect is such a case. States fail to pursue consistent foreign policy because normative politics are in flux domestically and internationally. Despite this complexity, a strong power can exercise normative foreign policy more effectively than a weaker power, as it can employ both hard and soft power. The United States played such an enforcement role during the post–Cold War unipolar world. A newly emerging strong state, such as China, can challenge an existing norm or establish a new norm. What about middle powers? Lacking unilaterally exercisable power, middle powers frequently champion multilateral rules and norms that can protect their interests from great power coercion. Professor Andrew Cooper characterizes a middle power as normatively more virtuous and trustworthy in the global order and describes its preferred diplomacy as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, and adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” (Cooper et al. 1993, 116). The government of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak pursued middle powermanship under the Global Korea slogan, emphasized value-based international contributions by expanding foreign aid, and hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) and other global meetings. Now, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has scaled up its middle-power ambitions to those of being a global pivotal state by highlighting South Korea’s international contributions and values-based diplomacy (Yoon 2022a). Like the Lee government, the Yoon government is building its proactive multilateral diplomacy while deepening its long-standing alliance with the United States. But the U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly between the Lee and Yoon governments: geopolitical competition between the United States and China has intensified during the intervening fifteen years, expanding beyond the economic and military spheres to include technology and ideology. Under U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, an ideological narrative dividing the world between democracies and autocracies has set in. The Russian war in Ukraine has caused Western European countries to merge democratic unity and collective security. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten not only South Korea but also the faraway United States. Facing all these high-risk challenges, the Yoon government has tightened military and economic ties with the United States. The two countries’ shared democratic values and liberal norms have emerged as a crucial component of deepening bilateral ties. This normative alignment has invited criticism from Beijing, but the Yoon government has so far not rolled back its advocacy for those values—although it has carefully dubbed them as “universal values” rather than liberal or democratic values. The national confidence gained by globally successful popular Korean culture and deteriorating public opinion against China have helped fuel this value assertiveness.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Norms, and Freedom
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

666. Diverging Perspectives on Improving Bilateral Relations: Analysis of the 2023 Korea-Japan Joint Opinion Poll

Author:
Yul Sohn, Yang Gyu Kim, and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2023, relations between South Korea and Japan began to thaw. Since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea announced the solution to address disputes regarding forced labor under Japanese colonial rule in March, six bilateral summits were held in the following six months. Intergovernmental exchange has also rapidly increased. With mediation from the United States, South Korea and Japan established consultative groups to address various issues, creating channels of communication between their foreign affairs, defense, industry, finance, and national security offices. People-to-people exchanges, primarily driven by tourism, have also returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Since 2012, they have been stuck over the issue of Comfort Women, and after the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, they were in a standoff over the issue of forced labor, a period that can be considered a “crisis of trust” between the two governments. Is 2023 really a year for both countries to put the “lost decade” behind them and usher in a new era? How do the citizens of both countries assess the changes in relations between their two governments? What do they think is the driving force behind the improvement in relations? Has mutual perception improved as relations have improved? Do they perceive that the historical issues, the culprits of the “lost decade,” are being resolved? The results of this year’s survey, marking the 11th year since initiated in 2013, are very interesting and carry significant potential interpretations and policy implications. Firstly, citizens of both countries perceived an improvement in their bilateral relations. Positive evaluations have reached their highest levels, while negative evaluations have hit their lowest points since the survey began. Secondly, there is a noticeable difference in the way citizens of both countries view the progress in bilateral relations. In the case of Japan, favorable opinions have increased with rising favorability toward South Korea, the importance of Korea-Japan relations, support for trilateral security cooperation with the United States and South Korea, and support for a solution to the issue of forced labor. On the other hand, South Korean public opinion has not seen a corresponding increase in positive sentiment regarding these issues, despite increased awareness of an improved relations. Thirdly, these result disparities are reflected in how citizens of both countries assess their governments’ efforts to improve relations. Japanese public opinion supports the efforts of both their own government and the South Korean government to improve relations, while South Korean public opinion has not shown strong support for them. Fourthly, historical issues continue to be a major variable affecting bilateral relations. Citizens of both countries consider historical issues as the primary factor in the development of bilateral relations. South Korea focuses on Japan’s historical perceptions, including issues related to wars, history textbooks, forced labor, and Comfort Women. Japan, on the other hand, is concerned with South Korea’s stance, including anti-Japanese education, statements by South Korean politicians and media about Japan, and excessive anti-Japanese actions by South Koreans. From this survey, it can be interpreted that South Korea believes Japan’s historical perceptions have not changed, while Japan believes that South Korea’s anti-Japanese stance is being corrected. However, the fact remains that there are still significant differences in historical perceptions between the two countries. The implications of the survey results are clear. Both countries need to expand and strengthen functional cooperation in areas such as security and the economy while also making progress towards reconciliation in historical perceptions. Only when these two wheels of functional cooperation and historical reconciliation move together can the South Korea-Japan relationship truly move onto the right track.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Polls, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

667. 2023 EAI-Genron NPO Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan and the ROK-Japan Relations

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO conducted the 11th Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Poll in August and September 2023 to gauge the attitudes of people in both countries regarding their bilateral relations. EAI has presented the survey findings in chart format within the "EAI Public Opinion Briefing." According to the results, citizens of both South Korea and Japan assessed that their bilateral relations have advanced and expressed positive opinions about strengthening cooperation in areas like security and economics, both bilaterally and multilaterally. However, there were contrasting viewpoints between Koreans and Japanese on whether this progress and the importance of bilateral relations have resulted in favorable perceptions of each other`s countries.
Topic:
Security, History, Culture, Public Opinion, Economy, and Perception
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

668. 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll on the International Affairs: ② China and the ROK-China Relations

Author:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Amid the deepening U.S.-China strategic competition, East Asia Institute (EAI) conducted a public opinion poll to discern the Korean people’s perception of China and ROK-China relations. EAI presents the survey results in chart form in the “EAI Public Opinion Briefing.” Despite predominantly negative impressions of China and President Xi Jinping, over 80 percent of respondents believe that Korea-China relations is crucial for Korea. The survey results unveiled public opinion that separately recognizes the favorability and significance of China.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Polls
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

669. Young Asians’ Attitude and Behavior Toward Democracy

Author:
Ganbat Damba and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
As we approach the second quarter of this century, millennials have firmly established themselves as the mainstream of society. The subsequent generation, often referred to as Generation Z, has taken their initial steps into the workforce. This trend is also evident in the political landscape of democratic countries in Asia. As time passes, the proportion of new generations among voters naturally increases, prompting political parties to consider their demands when formulating election strategies and policies. Several Asian countries underwent democratization during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This wave allowed the new generations in these countries to embrace democracy as an inherent value and norm. As democracy has progressed towards consolidation, it has not only become “the only game in town” but also “the only game in a lifetime” for the new generations. Furthermore, significant advancements in information and communication technologies have opened up new avenues for accessing information and taking into actions for political change. This has led to a widespread belief that younger citizens are generally more pro-democratic compared to their elders. On the flip side, there are concerns that younger generations are relatively less engaged and apathetic towards politics. These concerns often stem from worrisome indicators such as lower voter turnout and occasionally result in a skeptical outlook on the future of democracy. Therefore, it has been increasingly important to delve into the perspectives of the younger generation on democracy, as well as the factors influencing their attitudes toward politics. This brief article reviews previous research conducted through survey analysis and examine youth participation in the Asian region as a case study.
Topic:
Democracy, Youth, Representation, Political Participation, and Attitudes
Political Geography:
Asia

670. [Global NK Update] August 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals. 2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security. 3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Cooperation, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and North Korea

671. Historical Background and Current State of the Grassroots Democracy: Case Study of Four Asian Regions

Author:
Sri Nuryanti and Hansu Park
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Democracy’s authority and legitimacy relies on people’s participation. In modern democracies, representatives elected by the people are the main actors in political processes, as society has been more complex and policies have become increasingly specialized. Nevertheless, people’s direct participation is an essential part of democratic governance, especially at the local level. This direct democracy includes referendums, recalls, petitions, as well as participatory planning and budgeting. Moreover, active approaches such as mobilizing civil society organizations (CSOs) or protesting can be considered “grassroots democracy.” The word “grassroots” is mostly used as a metaphor for ‘sub-national level’ or ‘marginalized sectors,’ but citizens’ direct and collective actions for bringing about political change and improving democracy are not confined to a certain region or group. Citizens in several Asian countries have struggled to resist against authoritarian regimes and establish democratic constitutions and governments. Movements against dictatorship, military regimes, or the suppression of fundamental rights are still ongoing in some regions. In addition, people under democratic regimes continue spontaneous actions to oversee officials, ensure and solidify civil rights, and push politicians to implement policies and budgets in favor of citizens’ common interests. This article will cover cases from four Asian countries, demonstrating how grassroots democracy efforts have incited more democratic and participatory regimes.
Topic:
Civil Society, Protests, Legitimacy, and Democratic Institutions
Political Geography:
Asia

672. Progress & Priorities for Asia’s Climate Finance en Route to COP28

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The Asian region is warming faster than the global average, making it comparatively vulnerable to the effects of climate change. At the same time, Asia remains a disproportionate contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, with its annual emissions now accounting for more than half of the global total. Yet countries are reluctant to make ambitious climate pledges unless they are confident that they can secure the finance needed to implement such targets. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic, unsustainable debt, and climate change itself have complicated the amount of finance that will be needed and countries’ ability to access it. In light of these challenges, a new report on behalf of the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero articulates a regional vision for Asia’s unique climate finance needs and what needs to be done to address them. Progress & Priorities for Asia’s Climate Finance en Route to COP28 identifies priority actions to assemble the finance to get Asia to net zero by mid-century while empowering the region to prosper and thrive through the clean transition. The 28th United Nations Climate Conference (COP28) next month will be hosted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Dubai on behalf of the UN’s Asia-Pacific Group. Action to meet Asia’s climate finance needs could help unlock the ambition levels needed to set the world on track, especially as countries look to update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2025 with targets out to 2035 and even 2040. Lack of finance should not be a barrier to Asia’s climate action. Instead, sufficient finance could be the key to unlocking the “course correction” needed for Asia to help the world meet the Paris Agreement’s goals — and for ensuring a more sustainable, livable, and interconnected region and world.
Topic:
Climate Change, Finance, Conference of the Parties (COP), and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Asia

673. The New Domestic Politics of U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Evan S. Medeiros
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The U.S.-China relationship has come to largely define geopolitics in the 21st century, and the bilateral relationship is today often conceived primarily in terms of geopolitical tensions and great power jockeying on the global stage. However, there is more to U.S.-China strategic competition than the geopolitical level. In particular, the influence of domestic political dynamics in both countries is a widely underappreciated factor driving both U.S. and Chinese foreign policy decision-making, including vis-à-vis each other. What are these shifting domestic forces in both countries that are most influencing the relationship, in what ways, and to what effect? In this groundbreaking new report, The New Domestic Politics of U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy Evan S. Medeiros conducts an in-depth investigation and analysis of these questions. He finds substantial new dynamics at play in both countries that have had an increasingly negative impact on U.S.-China ties. In the United States, Congressional activism, electoral politics, public opinion, and shifting roles for interest groups are all influencing U.S. debates, policymaking, and actions — governmental and nongovernmental alike. In China, centralization of decision-making processes, constraints on formerly key actors, shifting national-level priorities, and other structural political and personnel changes are today directly and indirectly influencing Chinese perceptions, policies, and behaviors toward the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

674. Benchmarking Asia's Climate Action

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the source of over half of the world's annual greenhouse gas emissions, Asia is uniquely positioned to influence global climate outcomes. With the United Nations (UN) Climate Ambition Summit fast approaching on September 20 and the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake due at COP28 in December 2023, this year offers critical leadership opportunities for accelerating Asia’s climate action. The Benchmarking Asia's Climate Action report on behalf of the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero analyzes Asia's progress in relation to UN Secretary-General António Guterres' Acceleration Agenda, which aims to accelerate climate action to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The report finds that over three-quarters of Asia's emissions are now covered by net zero targets that are enshrined into Long-Term Strategies under the Paris Agreement. In addition, 16 Asian economies already have net zero targets in law or policy documents that align with the Acceleration Agenda. This group encompasses some notable emitters, including Vietnam, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates, the host of this year's COP28 climate talks. Yet no developed economies in Asia have moved their net zero targets earlier than midcentury to align with the Acceleration Agenda. Eight countries' targets still lag behind midcentury, and a further 13 countries have yet to propose any sort of net zero target. The report also highlights areas of progress and critical gaps in Acceleration Agenda priorities apart from net zero, including preparing updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and presenting energy transition plans. Amongst a group of Asian G20 members and other key Asian emitters that together account for almost half of global emissions, the vast majority of emissions are not yet covered by absolute emissions reductions targets in current NDCs. This means that even if countries' targets are achieved, these emissions — over 40% of the global total — could still continue increasing between now and 2030. Meanwhile, the UN's climate science body finds that global GHG emissions must peak by 2025 in order to achieve both the 1.5°C and 2°C goals set out in the Paris Agreement. Taking more ambitious climate action sooner could enhance Asia's economic and social development. Modeling previously commissioned by the High-level Policy Commission on Getting Asia to Net Zero shows that achieving net zero emissions by 2050 could boost GDP in the Asia-Pacific region by as much as 6.3% above the levels predicated under a baseline scenario, while creating up to 36.5 million additional jobs by the 2030s.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Cooperation, Carbon Emissions, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Asia

675. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms, Carbon Pricing Policy, and the Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
Alistair Ritchie and Yi Chen
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As Korea seeks to achieve a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 2018 levels by 2030 to meet its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, significant climate policy developments are taking place in the European Union (EU) and United States (U.S.). The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) continues to advance and is aiming to achieve a 62% reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by 2030, in combination with implementation of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The United States is actively considering its own CBAM policy and has triggered massive investment in clean energy technology through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, organized a study tour to the EU and the U.S. in which seven young Korean leaders in climate and energy policy participated in meetings and networking events in July 2023. The project was aimed at equipping the participants with knowledge, insights, and networks to understand the implications of EU and U.S. policies related to ETS, CBAM, and broader climate and energy policies, and to help them in developing strategies to align its K-ETS with more ambitious emission targets, comply with EU's CBAM, and implement emission reduction technologies to meet its NDC and net zero goals. This summary report presents key learning points from the study tour to support Korea in achieving its GHG emission targets and responding to evolving trends in EU and U.S. climate policies.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Carbon Emissions, and Paris Agreement
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

676. Where next for the Australia–South Korea partnership?

Author:
Afeeya Akhand and Alex Bristow
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The strategic partnership between Australia and South Korea holds great potential in an increasingly challenging time. The two nations have many common strategic interests and both can rightly claim to be regional powers. However, the relationship remains a relative underperformer compared with other key regional relationships and has suffered from inconsistency. When Canberra’s contemporary relationship with Seoul receives attention from Australian analysts, it tends to be framed largely in the context of the threats posed by Pyongyang. While some uncertainties remain over the long-term trajectory of South Korea’s foreign and security policy due to concerns that Seoul’s current vision is tied to the Yoon government as opposed to being embedded in longer-term statecraft, the structural basis for deeper engagement between Seoul and Canberra is sound. Investing in the relationship is in both nations’ interests. Building bureaucratic and commercial frameworks for cooperation now would help ensure that bilateral strategic alignment is less prone to future changes in government. This paper assesses the Australia–South Korea partnership through the three-pillar structure outlined in the 2021 Australia-South Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and offers recommendations for strengthening the relationship. These recommendations include furthering strategic cooperation by incrementally aligning key trilateral formats, developing bilateral cooperation in critical technologies including those relevant to AUKUS Pillar 2, and nurturing collaboration with respect to the Indo-Pacific clean energy transition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, Artificial Intelligence, ASEAN, AUKUS, and ANZUS
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Australia

677. Export controls effectively constrain China's advance in microchip production

Author:
Lisa Fuller
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
American and allied export controls have been successful in slowing the advance of China’s equipment for semiconductor chip production. Chinese players have been increasingly cut off from a global industry where customer-client interaction is essential. The US and its allies should continue with the controls and subsidies they have in place but expanding them further, as some advocate, would be excessively punitive.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Exports, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

678. Why does Germany maintain its rapprochement with China?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
During a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Frankfurt in early October 2023, German Finance Minister Christian Lindner emphasized the importance of developing economic ties between Berlin and Beijing and enhancing joint cooperation on some critical issues, particularly poverty alleviation and climate change.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Economics, Poverty, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

679. Examining China’s Grand Strategy For RISC-V

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On November 24, 2023, DAMO Academy (達摩院; literally “Dharma”), Alibaba’s research division, unveiled three ground-breaking processors rooted in the open-source RISC-V architecture. The Xuantie (玄铁) C920, Xuantie C907, and Xuantie R910 processors promise to accelerate application of RISC-V technology into diverse sectors, from autonomous vehicles and artificial intelligence (AI) to enterprise hard drives and network communications (Mydrivers News, November 24). These processors signify a strategic attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to break out of the technological containment led by the United States through leveraging open-source hardware (OSHW). RISC-V products are proliferating around the world at a compound annual growth rate of 40 percent. Projections suggest that by 2030, RISC-V chips could attain a 25 percent market share in the system-on-chip (SoC) sector (WSJ, December 14). RISC-V therefore has a pivotal role in shaping the future of the industry. The Chinese government’s rapid, focused, and coordinated investment in RISC-V suggests that a closer examination of this understudied and emerging technology is warranted, especially in light of the limited policy coordination and discussions around RISC-V in other countries, particularly the United States.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
China and Asia

680. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The PRC’s New “Patriotic Education Law”

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On October 24, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委) officially codified the country’s existing initiatives for “patriotic education (PE; 爱国主义教育)” by promulgating the People’s Republic of China Patriotic Education Law (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). This mandates indoctrination in state-directed ideological content throughout all sectors of society (PRC Government, October 25). While CCP policy documents are always more important than formal PRC law, the Party-state does use formal laws passed by the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会) to codify and emphasize Party policies. This law appears to be no exception. [1] The unveiling of the new Patriotic Education Law has been accompanied by a campaign of predictably laudatory coverage in PRC state media. For example, the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily ran a flowery editorial that quoted a professor from the China University of Political Science and Law as stating that “implementing the patriotic education law will enhance the daily practice of patriotic spirit” among the Chinese people. The editorial itself opined that the NPC had, “on the basis of the rule of law, promoted and guaranteed New Era patriotic education, inspiring the nation’s spirit, concentrating the people’s strength, advancing the building of a strong country [and] national revival with extremely significant and profound meaning” (People’s Daily, November 23). Such coverage has appeared alongside other official messaging emphasizing the need for enhanced focus on ideological instruction. For example, the mid-October issue of the CCP’s official journal Qiushi (求实) was a themed issue focused on ideology. It featured a lead article under Xi’s name titled “Open New Frontiers for the Sinicization and Modernization of Marxism.” It also included a list of articles on supporting themes, such as a Central Party School article titled “In the New Era and New Journey, Unceasingly Advance the Party’s Innovations in Theory” (Qiushi, October 16).
Topic:
Education, Law, Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

681. PLA Air Force Increases Flexibility of Combat Support Units

Author:
Derek Solen
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early November, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) published photographs of army helicopters taking off from an “air force station” of the Eastern Theater Command during a “trans-regional operation” in late October (China Military Online, November 10). “Air force station” likely refers to the “field station” or combat support unit that services the airbase from which the helicopters took off. The photographs visually substantiate an article from June in which it was reported that all the field stations of an unspecified air defense base of the Eastern Theater Air Force had developed the capability to conduct joint combat support. The report mentioned that the field stations were servicing aircraft of various types from different services, even including a vignette of one field station conducting “combat sustainment” for an army helicopter in addition to servicing fighters and special mission aircraft (PLA Daily, June 16). The field stations’ actual joint combat support capability is likely to be nascent, but it rests on a foundation of greater flexibility that the field stations have achieved over the past decade to operate outside their routines and to service various types of aircraft. That foundation should also make the combat support units of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) a more resilient force that is better able to support agile aviation units.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Air Force, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

682. Contradictions Within The PRC’s Climate Strategy

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The 28th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) drew to a close earlier this week (UNEP, December 13). The COP meetings always produce a mixture of successes and disappointments, and only constitute a portion of the myriad processes that impact the global energy transition and race to stabilize the planetary system. This year’s conference was no different. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was actively engaged throughout, hosting a variety of events at their pavilion reflecting the breadth and depth of the country’s critical engagement with the issues (National Climate Strategy Center, November 28). However, the PRC’s is still appraised as falling far short of what is required to meet the Paris climate goals and is not commensurate with its position in the international system (Climate Action Tracker, November 22). This year, the PRC ranks first in the world for total annual emissions, and second in both cumulative (historical) emissions and GDP. Meanwhile, it has failed to advance its ambitions or provide leadership to match its rhetoric of being—to use Xi Jinping’s words from his Party Congress speech—an “important participant, contributor, and torchbearer” in addressing climate change (Xinhua, November 3, 2017). The PRC delegation constituted the joint-third largest at the conference, and was led by Zhao Yingmin (赵英民), vice-minister at the Ministry of Environment and Ecology (MEE). Also present were minister Huang Runqiu (黄润秋), special climate envoy Xie Zhenhua (解振华), and UN under-secretary-general for economic and social affairs Liu Zhenmin (刘振民), who is expected to replace Xie as he steps down after 25 years as the PRC’s top climate negotiator. Crucially, Executive Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), a Politburo Standing Committee member who holds real power over China’s climate policy (in a way that the MEE officials do not), also attended.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

683. The Sino-French Relationship At 60: China’s Losing Bet On A Reset

Author:
Juliana Bouchard
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Against a background of increasingly fraught relations with the European Commission, China has been doubling down on its outreach to member states, with France chief among them. The two countries have been gearing up to the 60th anniversary of their bilateral relationship in January 2024 with a flurry of diplomatic exchanges. These have included high-level visits by President Emmanuel Macron in April, Economic Minister Bruno Le Maire in July, diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne in late October, and most recently Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna (FMPRC, November 22). On the Chinese side, Premier Li Qiang traveled to Paris in June to take part in the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact. However, this year also saw Paris deal some blows to China’s economic ambitions, with Macron being one of the driving forces behind Brussels’ ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into China-made electric vehicles and revamping its own EV purchase credits to exclude Chinese-made models (Service Public, October 10). During Bonne’s visit, Wang Yi framed his expectations for the anniversary in no uncertain terms, calling on China and France to “revisit the original intention (重温建交初衷)” of their bilateral ties and “consolidate and reset (巩固和再出发) the relationship” (FMPRC, October 30). Paris’ appetite for meeting Beijing halfway in “resetting” the relationship is far less certain. Most likely, China’s lofty ambitions for a reset will be met with more ambiguity from France, continuing its diplomatic outreach to safeguard economic opportunities in China, all the while pushing for more assertive policies within Brussels to achieve its vision of “strategic autonomy.” While some scholars are not entirely immune to the “dual-faced (两面性)” nature of French diplomacy (Fudan Development Institute, March 2), a prevalent view—or hope—among officials in Beijing is that Macron’s vision of strategic autonomy is primarily about asserting an independent foreign policy from the United States. However, in reality, strategic autonomy also informs France’s own de-risking agenda toward China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and France

684. Decoding China’s Dilemma: The Difficulties Of Economic Reform

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On November 27, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) unveiled a new policy, titled “Notice on Strengthening Financial Support Measures for the Private Economy (关于强化金融支持举措 助力民营经济发展壮大的通知)” (People’s Bank of China, November 27). The notice introduces a set of 25 measures crafted to reinvigorate the private sector. These prioritize key areas such as technological innovation, green initiatives, and primary support for small to medium-sized enterprises. The package includes increasing financial assistance and gradually enhancing the proportion of loans to private businesses. It underscores the importance of facilitating credit, lowering interest rates, issuing bonds, and other kinds of financial instruments to meet the varied financing needs of private enterprises. This policy measure echoes mandates put forth during the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 and Central Financial Work Conference held at the end of October 2023 in response to China’s deepening economic woes (Xinhua, November 1). This backdrop has prompted policies aimed at addressing the challenges facing the Chinese economy. In October, the PRC National Bureau of Statistics announced that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell by 0.2 percent year-on-year—worse than expected and marking a contraction since July (RTHK, November 9). This ominous data, which includes price deflation for both July and October this year, is indicative of significant weakness in domestic demand, particularly due to the underperforming real estate market, which affects citizens’ expectations for asset prices. The ongoing economic downturn in China also refutes the notion that economic chaos would clear up after the abandonment of the Zero-Covid policy. This situation is also similar to the Japan-style recession in the 90s in which consumption and investment are further repressed in favor of paying down debt. China’s recent response has been to implement a series of economic stimulus measures in an attempt to revive its weakening national economy.
Topic:
Economics, Reform, Business, and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

685. Moonshot vs. Long March: Contrasting the United States’s and China’s Space Programs

Author:
Katherine Kurata and David Lin
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On the morning of November 2, 2023, the Gobi Desert’s silence was shattered: From a remote launchpad at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (中国酒泉卫 星发射中心), the Hyperbola-2 (双曲线二号), a slender rocket bearing the iSpace emblem (星际荣耀), surged upwards, before gracefully alighting back on Earth (iSpace WeChat, November 2; CNSA, November 2). This suborbital hop marked a major achievement for iSpace as the company progresses towards developing reusable medium-lift rockets. The test demonstrated key technologies like the methalox engine and landing capabilities that will enable iSpace’s larger reusable rocket plans with Hyperbola-3. In China’s rapidly growing commercial space industry, iSpace, alongside other ambitious startups like Galactic Energy (星河动力), CAS Space (中科宇航探索技术), and Deep Blue Aerospace (深蓝航天), are striving to replicate the success of American pioneers such as SpaceX (Galactic Energy WeChat, July 24; CAS Space WeChat, April 4; Deep Blue Aerospace WeChat, May 7, 2022). Their goal: to revolutionize orbital access with reusable rocket technology. The success on November 2 was more than an engineering accomplishment; it was a testament to China’s emerging “innovation power”—its capacity to create, adopt, and seamlessly integrate new technologies (Foreign Affairs, February 28; US House of Representatives, May 17). This successful launch marks not just a step forward in technological capability but also a strategic shift in the global space race. With a unique mix of state guidance and entrepreneurial zeal, China is charting an alternate path in space exploration, contrasting sharply with the United States’s focus on private sector innovation. As the United States and China advance their respective space programs, their differing approaches are reshaping the landscape of space leadership. While America champions private sector innovation, China exerts centralized state control. Yet amidst an increasingly congested orbital environment, it is clear that the future trajectory of space exploration hinges not solely on innovation itself, but specifically on the capacity for nations to effectively combine government direction with commercial dynamism. The country that strikes this balance will harness the strengths of both its public and private sectors to accelerate advancement, and will be positioned to spearhead humanity’s future in the final frontier.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, Innovation, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

686. China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace

Author:
Scott B. MacDonald
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In October 2023, Nicaragua signed an agreement with China’s CAMC Engineering Company (中工国际工程) for the reconstruction, expansion, and upgrading of the Punta Huete International Airport (Yicai, October 18). The company is a subsidiary of the conglomerate China National Machinery Industry Corporation (国际集团), also known as Sinomach (Sinomach, accessed November 15). Local and Chinese officials are touting the $492 million project as part of China’s Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting a deepening of Daniel Ortega’s regime’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Global Times, October 18). Closer links between Beijing and Managua demonstrate that China’s economic statecraft remains central to its strategy to further penetrate Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of significant geopolitical importance to the United States. The sustainability of China’s economic statecraft, and BRI in particular, have come into question in recent months due to the country’s domestic economic problems. However, the Nicaraguan airport announcement signals that the PRC remains economically active in the region, and its ambitions have not wavered. This is something of which the remaining handful of countries that officially recognize Taiwan are well aware: Beijing’s attention to regional infrastructure continues, if more selectively than before, but only to those countries who have decided to forgo relations with Taiwan. Beijing is further extending its reach into the strategic underbelly of the United States. For Nicaragua, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China serves the geopolitical needs of President Daniel Ortega in distancing his regime from the United States and softening the blow of sanctions (imposed due to fraudulent elections and gross human rights violations), while providing a source of non-Western funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Central America, and Nicaragua

687. The Cross-Strait Intelligence Contest Continues Without Quarter

Author:
Peter Mattis and Zoë Moore
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last week, the Taiwan High Court found retired air force Colonel Liu Sheng-shu (劉聖恕) and five serving military officers guilty of espionage for China. The court sentenced Colonel Liu and two of his co-conspirators to approximately 20 years in prison, marking some of the harshest sentencing for espionage in recent years (Taipei Times, October 26). Liu’s spy ring is one of at least 11 rings Taiwanese authorities have broken up over the last two years. These Chinese spies targeted Taiwan’s military, civilian government, industry, and the overseas communities of Chinese minorities. In some cases they were able to operate for years. Although it is tempting to read these cases as simply more examples of Beijing’s relentless intelligence operations against Taiwan, these cases and the tradecraft employed suggest some positive developments—or the relative absence of dangerous trends—in the cross-strait intelligence contest. The cost in trust of Chinese intelligence operations, the requirements of deterrence, and the potential costs of a cross-strait conflict combine to suggest that a wider international effort to counter Chinese intelligence operations is warranted.
Topic:
Intelligence, Espionage, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

688. Money Alone Is Not Enough: The Future Of The China-Argentina Relationship

Author:
Román D. Ortiz
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Observers assessed the outcome of the first round of Argentina’s presidential elections held on October 22 as good news for the Chinese government (VOA, October 26). Against the odds, Sergio Massa, the Peronist candidate and current minister of economy, emerged on top, despite his overseeing an annual inflation rate of almost 140 percent. Meanwhile, Javier Milei, the libertarian opposition candidate, took the second place (Yahoo Noticias, October 23). These two politicians will compete for the presidency in the second round of the election scheduled for November 19. At first glance, the victory of Massa should be an encouraging sign for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since it keeps open the possibility that the China-friendly Peronist party remains in government. However, a more granular analysis suggests two alternative outcomes: First, Milei is likely to be the eventual winner after the second round of voting, which would make the new occupant of the Casa Rosada (the Argentinian presidential palace) a politician who has called the PRC an “assassin” and who plans to freeze relations with Beijing. Second, if Massa wins the presidency, his more moderate Peronism is far from the Third-World foreign policy promoted by the outgoing president, Alberto Fernandez, and his vice-president and former president, Cristina Fernandez. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, Beijing’s desires to increase political influence over Buenos Aires, which have focused particularly on its defense policy, are likely to be curtailed. A decrease in political influence with Buenos Aires would deal a serious blow to the Chinese strategy in Latin America, in which Argentina plays a critical role. Argentina is the only large country in the region to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It also exports food, minerals, and oil needed by the Chinese industrial sector. Argentina’s expansive territory represents a natural platform to project power within South America and to the South Atlantic. Buenos Aires’s geopolitics makes it particularly attractive for Beijing, which is exploring opportunities to secure rights for a naval base on the west coast of Africa in order to gain access to the Atlantic. Argentina also forms a key part of PRC efforts to consolidate its hegemony over the Global South. Specifically, the PRC views Argentina as a counterbalance to Brazilian regional hegemony, which motivated China’s interest in Argentina joining the BRICS grouping of countries, against Brazilian opposition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

689. Hong Kong: The Keystone in China’s Economic Statecraft

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The recent decision by Hong Kong to join China in banning Japanese seafood took many observers by surprise (Reuters, August 23). At first glance, the ban seemed an overblown reaction to Japan’s handling of nuclear wastewater, which many international bodies have deemed safe and compliant with established procedures. And while it is commonly understood that Hong Kong’s government is politically influenced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), many still believe in its economic autonomy. Considering the significant economic reliance of Japan on Hong Kong for its seafood trade, among other sectors, the ban startled numerous stakeholders (Nikkei Asia, August 25). However, the move is less shocking when Hong Kong is viewed as an integral cog in China’s economic statecraft machine. Traditionally, Western governments lack strategic foresight regarding Hong Kong’s long-term position. Often, this oversight stems from an inadequate comprehension of Hong Kong’s pivotal financial role relative to China, as well as an underestimation of its potential as a node for strategic leverage, both for and against China. China’s rise as a global superpower is inextricably linked to its adept use of economic statecraft, a fusion of economic might and strategic prowess. Its pressure on South Korea to stop the production of Taiwanese military submarines provides a recent example (Reuters, October 16). Hong Kong is a pulsating metropolis at the heart of this strategy. It not only exemplifies China’s ambitions but also acts as a crucial conduit for realizing them. There are two key strands of Hong Kong’s centrality to Beijing: its function as an economic lifeline to the global financial system and its role in the clandestine acquisition of technology and intellectual assets for China from overseas. The US and its allies must focus more on Beijing’s overt and covert leveraging of Hong Kong and think harder about what the city’s function should be in an era of de-risking, geoeconomic competition, and weaponized interdependence.
Topic:
Economy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Superpower
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

690. Chinese National Security Laws Hinder Foreign Companies’ Operations in China

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Investigations into alleged misconduct and criminality by companies are to be expected, and welcomed, in any country. However, the problems facing foreign companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) depart from normal legal checks and balances. The lack of separation between the judiciary and the state, and the uncertainty around China’s interpretation of the “rule of law,” is a risk factor for companies doing business there (See: China Brief, September 8). In addition, “state secrets” in the PRC are defined widely in relation to national interest. Consequently, a foreign company can inadvertently breach the law by obtaining and using commercial data. This week the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced updated export controls on advanced computing semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and supercomputing items to the PRC (BIS, October 17). Foreign companies doing business in the PRC are likely to face continued uncertainty as a consequence. The response from the PRC was swift, stating that the United States has constantly “overstretched the concept of national security” and resorted to “unilateral bullying” (China Daily, October 18), which suggests that there is a risk the PRC will take retaliatory measures against foreign companies. Western companies involved in the PRC have long understood that when investing in China they must lose a little bit of money in the short term to win a lot of money in the long term. Doing business in China has always been complex, but with the continued expansive approach to national security, it may now be increasingly untenable (See: China Brief, September 22). After three decades of huge investment in the PRC by international companies, there are growing concerns that the growing emphasis on national security is harming the confidence of overseas investors. As the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China reports, “the politicisation of business, and ambiguous laws and regulations…increases risk for companies operating in Chinas” (EU Chamber, September 20). In recent weeks, this ambiguity has been exacerbated by the growing number of “exit bans,” whereby PRC authorities forbid specific business executives at international companies, such as Kroll and Nomura, from leaving the country (Stratfor, September 29).
Topic:
National Security, Law, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia

691. Characterizing China’s Rule of Law

Author:
Ben Lowsen
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping is working in earnest to develop for China what his government calls “rule by law” (法治). It is sometimes translated into English as “rule of law,” though this is misleading, as Chinese law cannot restrict arbitrary exercise of power at the highest levels: the Party leads everything. As such, an awareness of the term’s precise meaning in the PRC’s legal-political context is crucial for understanding Xi’s intent. The Chinese president has stated that “the rule of law is an important component of the country’s core competitiveness” (People’s Daily, November 22, 2020). In light of this, the recently promulgated Foreign Relations Law (对外关系法), which emphasizes China’s competitiveness, provides an opportunity to interrogate Xi’s conception of the rule of law. [1] The Foreign Relations Law (henceforth, the Law) is timely. The head of the powerful Legislative Affairs Committee said in an interview that out of the PRC’s 297 national laws, 52 were dedicated to foreign relations and 150 more had provisions relating to foreign relations. [2] The Law is therefore an important addition, “consolidating and describing the major policies and principles of China’s foreign affairs,” in the words of current (and former) foreign minister Wang Yi. [3] Moreover, it comes at a moment in which China is at once increasingly emboldened on the international stage, and whose relations with many developed countries are increasingly fraught. Support from abroad could be helpful for China as it attempts to navigate out of a mismanaged end to the Covid-19 pandemic, but there is little to reassure foreign partners that their investments in the country will be protected by its laws.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
China and Asia

692. Coalitions of the Week: BRICS, ASEAN, the G20

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Supreme leader Xi Jinping’s failure to attend the G20 summit in New Delhi this weekend (September 9-10) — thus nullifying the possibility of a meeting with top Western leaders including American counterpart President Joe Biden — is symptomatic of the isolation that China is facing on the international stage. Instead, Xi is sending Premier Li Qiang, not only to New Delhi but also to a series of meetings between Western and Asian powerhouses, including between the United States, Japan, and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta, Indonesia. ASEAN members seem eager to seize the opportunity to promote free trade and high-tech cooperation with the United States and its Western allies, agreeing this week to inject more funds into projects under the U.S.—ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (InvestASEAN.org, September 7; The White House, September 5). By contrast, China’s recent business ties with ASEAN nations has been dominated by a continuous exodus of multinational corporations moving production bases from China and into countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Xi’s absence has raised eyebrows, particularly due to the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary has pulled out all the stops when it comes to expanding the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) clout on the global stage, even while ignoring worsening socio-economic conditions at home, such as rising youth unemployment, declining exports and consumer spending, and disappointing new home sales. Deemed a crypto-Maoist by China’s critics, the CCP chief remains convinced that, in the words of both Mao and himself, “the East is rising and the West is declining,” conditions which would allow the PRC to seize the geopolitical high ground given “opportunities that only come once in a century” (Gov.cn, June 23 ; Xinhua, March 23).
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, G20, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and BRICS
Political Geography:
Asia

693. The Chinese Debate on Economic Reform

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
A steady drumbeat of ominous data and troubling commentary on the state of China’s economy has punctuated the summer months. Reports from the commentariat in the anglosphere have provided diagnostic analysis and detailed potential policy solutions that the Chinese government might pursue. However, China’s central decision makers in the Politburo or in the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), are more likely to take their cues from internal advisors and domestic experts within the PRC than from those outside. As such, one fruitful exercise is to take the temperature of voices within the system to determine the extent to which their perceptions align or diverge from those in the West, and to ascertain which views carry weight with the final arbiters of economic policy in Beijing. By doing so, analysts outside of China may better comprehend the future (mis)steps that China will take as it struggles to achieve its aim of “basically realizing socialist modernization.” In July, the Chinese government held several meetings and released documents pertaining the economy. On July 24 the Politburo met to discuss the economy as it usually does this time of year. But on the same day, a 17-point plan was issued by the NDRC, following on from a 31-point plan co-issued by the State Council and the Central Committee ten days prior. These send a clear message about the concern in government over China’s straitened circumstances. Indeed, just this week, the NDRC announced a new “private economy development bureau” to further support private industry (NDRC, September 4). The assessment of the situation is put bluntly in the Politburo readout: “the current economic system is facing new challenges… insufficient domestic demand, difficulties in some enterprise’s operations, multiple risks in key areas, and a complex and severe external environment.”
Topic:
Development, Economics, and Reform
Political Geography:
China and Asia

694. A Belt and Road to Nowhere? Italy on the Frontlines of Europe’s Changing Strategy Toward China

Author:
Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
During her tenure as Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni has been far more active on the international scene than most observers predicted. Within the first ten months of her tenure, she has traveled to capitals across Europe, Asia, and North Africa and has hosted numerous foreign leaders on official visits. In July, Meloni visited Washington, D.C. where she and President Biden affirmed their commitment to deepening collaboration across various areas of shared interests. Meloni’s foreign policy agenda has touched on a range of issues including, but not limited to, European security, migration, energy policy, and international trade. It is on this last issue that Italy’s decision-making might be most impactful. As the Meloni administration reassesses its economic partnerships around the world, Italy’s relations—and by extension the European Union’s (EU) overarching position—towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could witness lasting changes. At the heart of the new government’s economic policy lies its choice of whether to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Meloni—along with many members of her cabinet—have voiced skepticism towards the agreement. As such, everything is on the table in the run-up to the decision at the end of the year.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

695. The No Limits Partnership: PRC Weapons Support for Russia

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is growing concern about the possible involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in supplying Russia with weapons, munitions, and various other technology that could have dual-use applications. Notably, no significant provision of large-scale military hardware from the PRC to Russia is evident, as such equipment would have been easily identified on the battlefield amongst the major equipment losses suffered by Russian forces. There are, however, consistent reports substantiating the claim that Chinese companies are providing military and dual-use equipment to Russia. In the PRC’s political system, this type of transaction would be difficult to conduct without the government’s tacit approval or—at the very least—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities turning a blind eye. In February 2022, following a meeting ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the dimensions of their two countries’ strategic partnership (Global Times, February 5, 2022). Xi and Putin reiterated that “friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, [and the] strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (The Kremlin, February 4, 2022). The closing ceremony for the Beijing Winter Olympics was held on February 20. Four days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, there has been widespread speculation that the PRC leadership knew about the Russian invasion. Additionally, there have been heightened concerns regarding the extent of Chinese support for Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. In July, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported on the “Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia”, with indications of increased Russian reliance on the PRC (ODNI, July 2023). In 2022 total Russian imports from the PRC increased by 13 percent to $76 billion. In the same year, PRC chip exports to Russia increased by 19 percent. Many of these transactions were facilitated by shell companies in Hong Kong acting as agents of secondary sales from international suppliers via the PRC to Russia. The ODNI report stated that “the PRC is providing some dual-use technology that Moscow’s military uses to continue the war in Ukraine, despite an international cordon of sanctions and export controls. The customs records show PRC state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies” (ODNI, July 2023). French diplomats further corroborated this report, notifying the public of intelligence indicating that the PRC has been supplying Russia with dual-use technologies as well as non-lethal assistance equipment, such as helmets and body armor (SCMP, July 22). When asked if the PRC is assisting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, French presidential advisor Emmanuel Bonne responded by saying “there are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do” (SCMP, July 22). The PRC government has emphatically denied allegations that it has provided any weapons or military assistance to Russia. Former PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang was reported by his own ministry as saying that “China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations. Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10). The second part of Qin Gang’s statement is significant, as he clearly states that exchanges between Chinese and Russian enterprises—such as commercial ties—are not be impacted by the war in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, his comments appear to suggest that dual-use technologies and equipment could be subject to the PRC government turning a blind eye.
Topic:
Partnerships, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

696. China’s Floods and Party Priorities

Author:
Arran Hope
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Typhoon Doksuri (杜苏芮) crashed onto the Chinese mainland over Fujian Province on Friday, July 28. From there it pushed northward, where a constellation of meteorological factors led it to slow down over North China, where it unleashed huge volumes of rain over the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Over 1600 weather stations in Hebei Province, which surrounds Beijing, recorded rainfall in excess of 250 mm across a 72 hour period, with one station in Xingtai City recording a maximum of over 1003 mm. Beijing saw the highest rainfall since its meteorological records began in 1860 (Xinhua, August 9). The storm was the proximate cause for severe flooding. Already by Tuesday, August 1, state media was reporting that 20 people had been killed in the floods, and 127,000 had already been evacuated from the capital (Global Times, August 1). However, the full-scale of the human impact is unlikely to be clarified by the government any time soon: much information about the floods has already been censored or deleted from China’s internet, and official statistics, when they have been released, are almost certainly underplaying the costs. [1] Perhaps most unhelpfully, the website for China’s Ministry of Water Resources, has been inaccessible all week (水利部, Ministry of Water Resources). Nevertheless, drawing on the information that has been forthcoming from China’s central and regional governments, as well as firsthand accounts posting on Chinese social media and Twitter (X), we can make a preliminary assessment of the potential political and economic consequences of this event.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Crisis Management, and Flood
Political Geography:
China and Asia

697. The Demise of Diplomatic Ambiguity: Parsing South Korea’s Estrangement From China

Author:
Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In July, the US Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) visited South Korea for the first time since 1981. Not one, but two of the 560-foot-long warships—which carried a payload of 24 long-range Trident ballistic missiles—surfaced in South Korean waters (Korea JoongAn Daily, July 24, 2023). From Washington and Seoul’s perspective, the SSBN deployment was a pointed reminder to the mercurial North Korean regime to exercise restraint, but the symbolism of the SSBN visit was not lost on China—Pyongyang’s closest ally. For all its military modernization efforts, Beijing has no effective defense against the Ohio-class sub. That South Korea would support the deployment of the SSBNs to its territory illustrates both its concern about rising North Korean brinkmanship and newfound willingness to risk Beijing’s ire. Indeed, after three decades of stable ties anchored in economic interdependence, major changes are afoot in the South Korea-China relationship. Compared to Japan, which also counts China as its largest trading partner, South Korea has historically been less willing to stand its ground in the face of political pressure from Beijing. On the one hand, Seoul and Beijing have no major territorial disputes, but more importantly, South Korea had previously calculated that its political deference—especially on China’s “core interests” like Taiwan—would encourage Beijing to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) top foreign policy objective. For many years, South Korea handled Beijing with kid gloves, irrespective of who was in the Blue House. While the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) is traditionally more China-friendly, it was the conservative President Park Geun-hye who attended China’s jingoistic September 2015 military parade. After a summit between Xi Jinping and Park, both leaders made a commitment to oppose any unilateral actions that could lead to tension on the Korean Peninsula. The following day, President Park joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in China’s military parade. South Korea was the only US ally to attend the event (The Korea Herald, September 3, 2015). Since then, however, the two countries have drifted apart. The catalyst for this change was Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in 2017, which China views as a security threat and South Korea deems essential for self-defense. China has repeatedly demanded that South Korea dismantle its THAAD system (Xinhua, September 21, 2017). When those demands failed to bear fruit, it resorted to sanctions against South Korea (The Korea Herald, March 8, 2017). Furthermore, both China’s imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong and its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic have hurt its reputation in South Korea (The South China Morning Post, October 20, 2020). It is against this backdrop that the ROK’s anti-China sentiment has surged to an all-time high—a development that will inevitably spill over into Seoul’s foreign policy. According to a 2021 survey conducted by SisaIN, for the first time since the ROK and the PRC normalized relations in 1992, South Koreans view China even more negatively than they do Japan (SisaIN, November 29, 2021). China’s ruling Communist Party seems oblivious to the existential threat that South Korea feels in the face of surging missile tests by North Korea. The JoongAng Daily noted in June that it takes just two minutes for a North Korean missile to hit Seoul. According to the editorial, “South Korea is technically still at war with North Korea. The government and people must not forget that” (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2023). Concluding that political appeasement and economic engagement with China have failed to pay off, South Korea is taking two significant steps: strengthening its ties with its top security partner, the US, and mending fences with its former rival, Japan. The implications of Seoul’s estrangement from Beijing could have far-reaching implications for geopolitics in the broader Indo Pacific region.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

698. Water Warriors: How China’s River Chiefs Aim to Tackle Water Pollution

Author:
Genevieve Donnellon-May
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In many ways, China’s history is one of water management. As Chinese historiographers often remark, the unique hydrological conditions within China led to the creation of three historical miracles: China, Chinese civilisation, and the Chinese people. In both ancient and modern times, Chinese rulers have acknowledged the importance of water for its role in maintaining social stability as well securing their legitimacy. Beijing’s leaders are acutely aware of the importance of water in maintaining social stability and ensuring the regime’s survival. The government has focused on engineering its way to water security, an approach traceable in part to Mao Zedong’s idea that man must conquer nature. This is reflected in the Chinese state’s construction of large-scale hydroengineering projects, encompassing numerous dams and inter-basin water-transfer projects. More recently, water governance was explicitly tied to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “ecological civilization” (生态文明) concept (China Brief, June 23) and his published book titled “The In-depth Learning and Implementation of Xi Jinping’s Important Discourse on Water Governance” (People’s Daily, July 19). In May, China announced new plans to improve water quality. According to the “Guideline on Water Ecology and Environmental Protection in Major River Basins”, by 2025 China’s water governance aims to accomplish two main objectives: first, eliminate surface water below Grade V quality, and second, raise the proportion of “fairly good quality” surface water to 85 percent—an increase of 1.6 percentage points from 2020 (Ministry of Ecology and the Environment, May 5; State Council, May 5). China has a six-tier water quality system, with water below Grade V classified as the worst quality. At Grade III or above, surface water is considered to be of “fairly good quality”. As a core convention of the central government, guidelines on the water management of major river basins are typically issued once every five years. In contrast to older guidelines, the most recent guidelines explicitly specificizes the improvement of surface water quality as an obligatory target and includes projected targets for the conservation of water resources and ecosystems. By 2025, for instance, China has set ambitious plans to recover waters levels in 53 dried-up water bodies and restore native fish species to a stable population in 107 major water bodies. China also aims to create an additional 213 square kilometers of wetlands by 2025.
Topic:
Water, Governance, Pollution, and Rivers
Political Geography:
China and Asia

699. The PRC Eyes Vietnam: Chinese Assessments of Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy

Author:
Nathan Waechter
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In July, the Barbie movie––an ostensibly apolitical and innocuous film––­­was banned by the Vietnamese Department of Cinema over real-world tensions between Vietnam and China. According to the state film council, the new Barbie movie was barred from the Vietnamese market over its inclusion of a map purportedly showing China’s preferred territorial “Nine-Dash” line in the South China Sea (Vietnam News, July 7). As the head of the national film evaluation council stated, “Vietnam’s stance has been clear. It does not accept movies that are ambiguous in matters related to territorial sovereignty” (Vietnam News, July 7). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the incident by asserting that “China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are solidly grounded in history and law” (Global Times, July 7). Accusing the Vietnamese government of overstating the issue, the Chinese state media outlet Global Times urged all “relevant parties to control domestic hype and nationalist sentiment” (Global Times, July 7). Viewed within a broader context, the Barbie movie incident is only the most recent expression of the historical baggage between Vietnam and China. Many PRC military officials and academics largely perceive Southeast Asia as China’s proverbial “backyard” that should rightfully remain in its sphere of influence. Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam occupies an important position directly on China’s periphery. Publicly, China considers Vietnam’s governing regime to be close “comrades and brothers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28). However, Vietnam has a long, acrimonious history with China. Vietnam has been invaded by China numerous times and subjugated to Chinese rule and the exaction of tribute for thousands of years. The “Vietnam Military Museum in Hanoi … lists 13 “Vietnamese Resistance Wars Against Invaders,” with the majority fought against the Chinese. To some extent, Vietnam has also benefited from its contact with China. The Chinese written script, ideas of ethics and governance, and even chopsticks were absorbed from China. [1] During America’s war in Vietnam, China provided Vietnam with vast amounts of material support. From 1965-1969, a total of 320,000 Chinese troops covertly served in North Vietnam. [2] Despite this, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 in a war that the PRC refers to as the “Self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam” (对越自卫还击保卫边疆作战) (Baidu Encyclopedia). In more recent years, Vietnam and China have clashed rhetorically over islands in the South China Sea and had a tense standoff over a Chinese oil exploration rig in Vietnamese-claimed waters in 2014 (CSIS, December 23, 2014). With its historical domination by China and its position as a small, weak, and still developing country, Vietnam has pursued a strategy of hedging. Research by Thi Bich Tran and Yoichiro Sato, Le Hong Hiep, and Tuan Uy Tran provide robust definitions of Vietnam’s hedging strategy from Vietnamese and Western perspectives (Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2013; Asian Politics and Policy, January 2018; Naval Post-Graduate School Monterey, March 1, 2018). However, it is important to understand how China views Vietnam’s strategy as well. Further analysis is needed to examine primary Chinese sources and understand Chinese elite perceptions, their conclusions, and what “countermeasures” they believe China should take against Vietnam’s approach. On balance, while Chinese security analysts have a clear understanding of Vietnam’s hedging strategy, they exhibit a modern version of historical Chinese paternalism towards Vietnam. Many contemporary Chinese analysts believe that Vietnam, as a developing country, will inevitably fall into China’s sphere of influence as it remains dependent on Chinese economic ties for growth. While Vietnam does benefit from its economic relations with China, however, the Chinese analyses fail to fully recognize Hanoi’s fundamental apprehensions and insecurity caused by the historical enmity between the two countries, as well as China’s modern-day rise and its aggressive actions in the South China Sea. To a certain degree, China is guilty of exhibiting a degree of the same imperial hubris towards Vietnam as it has often accused the US of in the latter’s relations with other countries. While PRC strategists appear to have concluded that time is on their side, Beijing’s paternalistic complex may ultimately handicap China’s ability to pull Vietnam closer into its orbit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hedging, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Vietnam

700. Xi Jinping’s Hidden Goals for the PRC Law on Foreign Relations

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping has promulgated a new law on foreign affairs to legitimize tough measures that Beijing is taking against the “bullying” of the “hegemonic West.” The statute, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” which takes effect on July 1, will also anchor the supreme leader’s long-standing aspiration to build a China-centric global order that will challenge the framework established by the US-led Western Alliance since the end of World War II. The law also codifies the total control that Xi, who is Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chairman of its Central Military Commission (CMC), exercises on all policies regarding diplomacy and national security (People’s Daily, June 30; Xinhua, June 28). The law states that the PRC “stays true to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global security, and endeavors to strengthen international security cooperation and its participation in mechanisms of global security governance.” It stresses Beijing’s right to “take corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures” against acts that violate international law and norms and that “endanger China’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” The official Global Times said the statute was a response to “new challenges in foreign relations, especially when China has been facing frequent external interference in its internal affairs under the western hegemony with unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction” (The Global Times, June 28). The legislation legalizes measures such as counter-sanctions and blacklisting of foreign nationals and institutions in retaliation against similar measures that the US and other Western countries have taken against PRC firms (New York Times Chinese Edition, December 16, 2022).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Law, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia