Political Geography: Asia - CIAO Search Results

601. Modernizing Sino-U.S. Confidence-building Measures: Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives

Author:: Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Carter Center
Abstract:: Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. This research utilizes the Cold War analogy as a starting point for analyzing how nuclear war between the U.S. and China can be averted.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Rivalry, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

602. The End of North Korean Sanctions Enforcement…and What Comes Next

Author:: Justin V. Hastings
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: Sanctions enforcement against North Korea is collapsing. Alternative strategies are likely to be ineffective, and North Korea is poised to take advantage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Regional Politics, and Enforcement
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

603. Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its Third Plenum from 15 July to 18 July. The Third Plenum is usually a meeting focused on economic reforms and sometimes proposes significant directions related to reforms. After the meeting concludes, a communiqué is typically issued, followed after a few days by the full text of a fuller Resolution. The Communique of this plenum was published on 18 July and the Resolution on 21 July. The full text of the Resolution appears as Appendix 1 On 26 July, the China Studies Centre hosted an online roundtable to discuss the main conclusions and resolutions of the plenum and their implications.
Topic:: Economics, Government, Reform, Domestic Politics, Macroeconomics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

604. Sino-Mozambican Relationship and the Role of Megaprojects in Mozambique's Territorial Development

Author:: Robson Dias da Silva and Thaysa Cunha
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: China’s expanded and deeper involvement in the African continent has led to significant changes in the international order and enabled a new attractive alternative to foster economic growth in African countries. China was considered one of the largest trading partners, investors, and sponsors of African countries in the early 21st century (i.e., in the 2000s), particu-larly for countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Mozambique. The country was the largest investor in Mozambique in 2016; since the end of the civil war – which undermined the national infrastructure of the African country –, infrastructure mega-projects (such as the construction of bridges, roads, dams, airports, commercial establishments, and tourism) were built by Chinese companies and/or with funding and donations from the Chinese government. Furthermore, since colonial times, Mozambique and China have had a close commercial relationship, which included the supply and training of the Mozambican army, the provision of humanitarian aid, the granting of scholarships to Mozambican students, and the sending of doctors and tea-chers, as well as the development of technological centers in Mozambique.
Topic:: Development, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Growth, and Megaprojects
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Mozambique

605. Socio-Economic Impact of the Modernized Nigerian Railway System by the Chinese

Author:: Olaoluwanike Comfort Ogunrinu and Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: Railways in Nigeria date back to the colonial times when the Euro-peans constructed them to foster their economic engagement. After inde-pendence, the railway system in Nigeria almost nosedived not until 1995, which experienced the most efficient modernization attempt through Chinese support.Indeed, various interventions were made under the military regime to revamp the Nigerian Railway, yet none so far have been as impactful as the Chinese intervention. The 1995 China-Nigeria Railway deal, under General Sani Abacha, saw about 87 percent completion of the rehabilitation, which became a pointer in the subsequent years that China could be that foreign investor Nigeria needed in the modernization of the Railway. Through various administrations since 1999, China has become actively involved in the moder-nization of the railway, which has tremendously increased the patronage of the railway in Nigeria. Upsurge in the awareness of railway and high level of patronage has not only boosted economic activities along coastal regions but also had positive implications for development.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Colonialism, Modernization, Socioeconomics, and Railways
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Nigeria

606. China Maritime Report No. 43: Shadow Force, A Look Inside the PLA Navy Reserve

Author:: Tiffany Tat
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The PLA Navy Reserve is an important and understudied element of PRC maritime power that could augment the active-duty force and improve its ability to undertake global operations and wage a protracted war. The PLAN Reserve appears to be transitioning from a substandard backup force to an increasingly well-trained complement to the active-duty force. In the past, the PLAN Reserve suffered from low morale and lackluster participation. Training scandals occurred in which navy reservists did not muster up when recalled for training. It is unclear to what extent these problems persist today. The overhaul of the PLAN’s reserve components, specifically the integration of the PLAN Reserve into a centralized command structure and the introduction of new legislative and policy reforms, constitutes a serious effort to enhance operational effectiveness, increase mobilization speeds, and improve readiness. The PLAN Reserve is remarkably opaque. While little has been publicly revealed about this shadowy force, future research may offer opportunities to develop early-warning indicators and help reveal plans, intentions, and capabilities.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, Maritime, Militias, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Reserves
Political Geography:: China and Asia

607. New War in the South China Sea: Framing China's Unrestricted Warfare and the Role of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy

Author:: Rhisan Morales
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: China’s gray zone campaigns in the South China Sea (SCS) are characterized by incremental advances that do not directly cause war but aggregate tensions to shift the status quo in favor of Chinese territorial claims. These advances include constructing Chinese facilities in uninhabited or unhabitable areas and using nonmilitarized coercions to establish control over maritime territories and enhance China’s national interests. China’s gray zone campaign began in 1987 when UNESCO requested China's assistance to build an observation outpost in Fiery Cross Reef. China took its involvement as an opportunity to establish a sovereignty marker on the reef in the form of a military outpost. Between 1994 and 1995, China continued its gray zone campaigns in the Mischief Reef, which further escalated in 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

608. Making the Case for Women, Peace and Security

Author:: Our Secure Future
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Our Secure Future
Abstract:: Mounting evidence confirms that women’s meaningful engagement in peace and security processes increases the likelihood and sustainability of peace. Our Secure Future’s latest publication, “Making the Case for Women, Peace and Security,” compiles the relevant statistics, figures, and key country examples demonstrating the positive impact of women’s participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. From Colombia to Myanmar to Rwanda, this guide illustrates the critical role that women have played and continue to play in peace and security efforts around the world.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Women, Peace, Sustainability, and Participation
Political Geography:: Africa, Asia, Colombia, South America, Rwanda, and Myanmar

609. The Future of Japan-Africa Cooperation: TICAD

Author:: Habib Badawi
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: Africa will remain relevant to Japan as a necessary means to achieve some of its long-term political, economic, and strategic goals. Additionally, Japan seeks to expand its relations with the continent. However, it is diffi-cult to view Japan’s participation in Africa as part of an integrated policy or a well-thought-out long-term strategy, but only as a set of goals and some of the tools and mechanisms used to achieve those goals. This is largely reflected in Japan’s failure to prioritize its economic and political interests in its relationship with Africa. While Japan views Africa primarily through an economic lens, it has other major political interests. As Japan strives to bolster the dynamism of its ongoing development, production, and trade through a manufacturing and trade strategy designed to adapt to circumstances and mitigate crises, the nation has concurrently hei-ghtened its ambition for strategic hotspots, including resources and wealth. This is evident in its keen interest in the African continent and the ongoing competition between European and American powers for control over it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, International Cooperation, and Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
Political Geography:: Africa, Japan, and Asia

610. The Value of Reporting: National Reporting Practices under the UN Sanctions Regime on North Korea

Author:: David Atwood, Gian Giezendanner, and Sophie Timmermans
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: The UN Security Council has imposed a broad range of sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, requesting member states to report on how they are implementing these measures. Many factors affect the national reporting practices of states, with some having failed to submit any reports. Reporting serves as an important measure of transparency and trust-building concerning state compliance with international commitments in general. The frequency and depth of reporting on national implementation of the sanctions by UN member states help to discern the regime’s effectiveness. Failure to meet reporting deadlines, the use of vague language, and limited information on national implementation all dampen the usefulness of reporting on the implementation of the DPRK sanctions regime. The Value of Reporting: National Reporting Practices under the UN Sanctions Regime on North Korea—a report from the Survey’s Strengthening Implementation and Enforcement of the Arms Embargo on North Korea (SAENK) project—highlights factors that affect reporting, providing a more nuanced picture of national practices. The report also examines national DPRK sanctions regime reporting in relation to reporting on other international arms control instruments, with the aim of revealing potential mutually beneficial synergies.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and Global Focus

611. China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022

Author:: J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

612. China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

Author:: Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Maritime, Port, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Blockade
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

613. China Maritime Report No. 27: PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational Performance

Author:: Roderick Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

614. China Maritime Report No. 28: Bitterness Ends, Sweetness Begins: Organizational Changes to the PLAN Submarine Force Since 2015

Author:: J. Michael Dahm and Alison Zhao
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: “Above-the-neck” reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that began in 2015 directed the development of a new joint operational command system that resulted in commensurate changes to PLA Navy submarine force command and control. Additional changes to tactical submarine command and control were driven by the evolution and expansion of PLA Navy surface and airborne capabilities and the introduction of new longer-range submarine weapons. Follow-on “below-theneck” reforms inspired significant organizational change across most of China’s military services. However, the PLA Navy submarine force, for its part, did not reorganize its command structure but instead focused on significant improvements to the composition and quality of its force. Between 2017 and 2023, the PLA Navy submarine force engaged in a notable transformation, shuffling personnel and crews among twenty-six submarines—eleven newly commissioned and fifteen since retired—relocating in-service submarines to ensure an equitable distribution of newer, more capable submarines across the fleet. Observations of infrastructure improvements at PLA Navy submarine bases portend even more changes to submarine force structure in the coming years.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Reform, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

615. China Maritime Report No. 29: PLAN Mine Countermeasures: Platforms, Training, and Civil-Military Integration

Author:: Brian Waidelich and George Pollitt
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made incremental progress in its mine countermeasures (MCM) program in recent years. The PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 MCM ships and craft includes classes of minehunters and minesweepers mostly commissioned in the past decade as well as unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and remotely operated vehicles with demonstrated explosive neutralization capability. Despite the addition of these advanced MCM platforms and equipment, experts affiliated with the PLAN and China’s mine warfare development laboratory have serious reservations about the PLAN’s current ability to respond to the full range of likely threats posed by naval mines in future contingencies. The PLAN’s MCM forces are currently organized for operations near China’s coastline, but writings by Chinese military and civilian experts contend that to safeguard Beijing’s expanding overseas interests, the PLAN must develop MCM capabilities for operations far beyond the First Island Chain. PLAN and civilian mine warfare experts have proposed various solutions for offsetting perceived shortcomings in the PLAN’s MCM program, including the development of autonomous USVs and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), deployment of modularized MCM mission packages on ships such as destroyers and frigates, and mobilization of civilian assets such as ships and helicopters in support of MCM operations. Although there appears to have been little to no adoption of these proposed solutions to date, the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its biggest challenges, and one can expect the PLAN to continue making measured progress in its MCM program in the years ahead.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Integration, Landmines, Civil-Military Relations, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

616. China Maritime Report No. 30: A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines

Author:: Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

617. China Maritime Report No. 31: China's Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards: Bohai Shipyard, Huludao; Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan; and Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Industry, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

618. The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

Author:: Scott Bentley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, Commerce, and Expansion
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

619. Commercial Satellite Use Catalyzes Nuclear-Armed States to Combat: A Wargame After-Action Report (Occasional Paper 2306)

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Recent reports of Elon Musk’s refusal to allow Ukraine to use his satellites to help it mount strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea pose a basic question: Just how sustainable might military use of commercial satellites be? So far, the United States and other spacefaring nations have deferred or taken a hands-off approach to dealing with this issue. When it comes to space, states are roughly where they were with sea power in the 1600s and air power before World War I: dramatic acts of air war and naval piracy were about to ensue, but instituting national or international regulation hardly seemed urgent… until they were. How prepared are we to deal with such a transition in space? Can we keep non-state and state actors from using space to intensify the pace of military air and ground operations? Or are space Lusitanias, in which the world’s major powers get dragged into wars, more likely? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) designed and conducted a wargame this summer tailored to this purpose. SpaceNews published the game’s results (see below). The game’s play begins in 2027 with a Pakistani terrorist group’s hijacking of “commercial” Chinese satellite services to mount an attack against an Indian nuclear base. The terrorists’ aim is to drag Pakistan into a war with India to help decide the status of Kashmir. Through a number of twists and turns, the game ends with intensified ground operations between Pakistan and India and China and the United States engaging in space combat against a set of each others’ commercial space satellites. Are we ready for this future? The short answer is no. The long answer can be teased from the game’s report and its key takeaways below.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Space, War Games, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: South Asia and Asia

620. Time to say goodbye? The impact of environmental regulation on foreign divestment

Author:: Haiou Mao, Holger Görg, and Guopei Fang
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We look at divestments by foreign firms – a topic that has received comparatively little attention in the literature – and investigate how changes in the regulatory environment in the host country may impact on such divestment decisions. We use the implementation of China’s Two Control Zone (TCZ) policy as a “quasi-natural experiment”, using detailed firm level combined with city level data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that the implementation of TCZ policy has led to higher probabilities of divestments by foreign firms in targeted TCZ cities and industries. The mechanism behind this seems to be a TCZ-induced increase in discharge fees and efforts to reduce SO2 emissions. Allowing for heterogeneity of effects, we find that the effect is particularly strong for firms from source countries with less stringent environmental regulation, and those using less advanced technology. We furthermore show that firms using intermediates from polluting industries also experience a higher probability of divestment.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Foreign Direct Investment, Regulation, Business, and Divestment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

621. China as an International Lender of Last Resort

Author:: Sebastian Horn, Bradley C. Parks, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into China’s growing role in the global financial system. A key finding is that the global swap line network put in place by the People’s Bank of China is increasingly used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in liquidity support extended to crisis countries, including repeated rollovers of swaps coming due. The swaps bolster gross reserves and are mostly drawn by distressed countries with low liquidity ratios. In addition, we show that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have given out an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. Taken together, China’s overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20 percent of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. These findings have implications for the international financial and monetary architecture, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.
Topic:: Debt, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

622. A post-Western global order in the making? Foreign policy goals of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa

Author:: Sinikukka Saari, Toni Alaranta, Bart Gaens, Katariina Mustasilta, and Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa are striving for a more multipolar, post-Western world order in which they would not be seen merely as auxiliary powers to the bigger players, but as independent great powers. For them, a key foreign policy goal is to transform global governance institutions. They all call for a permanent seat for their country on the UN Security Council. To achieve that, the states need backing from more than the Western states – and this logically strengthens the multi-aligned logic of their foreign policies. India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa see Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Western countermeasures from their own perspective. They describe Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law, but see the war primarily as a Western concern, not theirs. Although these states are critical towards the West, they are not anti-Western and they all value multilateral institutions; their foreign policy goals and features offer opportunities for the EU to engage with them, but that needs to happen on a more equal footing than what has traditionally been the case.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, UN Security Council, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Turkey, India, Asia, Brazil, and Latin America

623. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:: Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

624. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:: Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

625. Water diplomacy analysis for Central Asia: Dynamics of insecurity and sources of resilience

Author:: Emma Hakala, Katariina Mustasilta, and Mohammed Hadi
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Climate change, geopolitical tensions and other global crises emphasise the need for water diplomacy, which refers to the prevention and resolution of political tensions with the help of water expertise and diplomatic tools. Disputes over water can contribute to instability, but fair and well-governed management of water resources can serve as a platform for cooperation and peacebuilding. In Central Asia, water has a crucial role as a precondition for economic and social development, but also for relations between the countries in the region due to the largely transboundary and shared character of resources. Questions about water use have been intertwined in disputes about other unresolved issues between the countries in the past. As the impacts of climate change become increasingly visible and are likely to further reduce water access, it is important to better understand the water conflict and resilience dynamics. This analysis traces the potential for water diplomacy in Central Asia. It identifies major conflict factors, peace enablers, regional dynamics and the role of water resources. The analysis takes an anticipatory, forward-looking approach, particularly focusing on sources of resilience and potential points of cooperation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Water, Governance, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Central Asia and Asia

626. Enhancing small state preparedness: Risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and technological dependencies

Author:: Mikael Mattlin, Shaun Breslin, Elina Sinkkonen, Liisa Kauppila, and Annika Björkdahl
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The post-Cold War liberalist view, according to which interdependences supported a virtuous cycle of mutual gains, has given way to a realist-tinged view that regards economic interdependence as a cause of insecurity and an element in conflicts. In this new environment of increasing great power competition and technological decoupling, all states are not created equal. Major states such as the United States and China can be system shapers, whereas small states tend to be system takers. Unlike smaller states, they have a greater ability to use their investment leverage, supply chain dominance and control of core technologies. For smaller states with open economies, such as Finland and Sweden, these capabilities of major powers create vulnerabilities in the form of security risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and critical technological dependencies. The report explores how small states can mitigate such risks. A series of innovative Delphi backcasting exercises in Finland and Sweden brought together 113 sectoral experts and generalists to ponder ways to prevent dystopian scenarios from unfolding. The target years of the scenarios extended from 2027 to 2035, encouraging ideas on both short- and longer-term solutions. Instead of aiming for a consensus of expert views, the process sought to produce a variety of effective means and measures that a small state could choose to adopt. The exercise consisted of nine scenarios, presented as comic art. The narratives on the risks of foreign ownership focused on 1) acquisitions of gaming companies gathering personal data, 2) transfers of real estate ownership in Lapland and 3) venture capital investments in emerging technology start-ups. The scenarios on supply disruptions dealt with 4) discriminatory practices limiting access to antibiotics, 5) political retaliation limiting access to water treatment components and 6) sanctions on wind power materials, components and minerals. As for high technology dependencies, the cases included 7) the maintenance of military technology, 8) the cybersecurity of health technology and 9) the supply of chemicals for research and development activities. According to the report, small states have the least leeway in navigating the risk environments created by technological dependencies, whereas the toolkits to tackle the potential dangers of foreign ownership and supply disruptions are more extensive. Although different issues and insecurities require different bespoke solutions, all the risk categories call for active mitigation efforts. Most of the suggested Finnish and Swedish expert solutions can be clustered into three alternative approaches: protectionist/interventionist, liberal and technologically oriented. Protectionist/interventionist solutions would expand the state’s powers in controlling, guiding and limiting economic activities. Key suggestions included: covering acquisitions and greenfield investments in national foreign direct investment screening screening real estate acquisitions with a wide range of countries of origin imposing country-specific limitations to real estate acquisitions screening venture capital investments in emerging technologies initiating a national security act to limit foreign control rapidly imposing country- and company-specific limitations to bids in critical industries increasing tariffs supporting domestic or EU-level production through subsidies and industrial policy friendshoring the production of critical goods expanding the scope of supply stockpiling in pharmaceuticals and water treatment components The more liberal approach towards national preparedness would focus on solving the challenges primarily through carrots instead of sticks – to avoid limiting entrepreneurial freedoms and interfering with the dynamics of the capitalist market economy. The proposed solutions included: initiating value debates to guide individuals’ choices when accepting investments formulating a national innovation strategy to boost domestic companies’ operating conditions in emerging technology fields teaching “technology literacy” to guide the use of foreign-owned products engaging all stakeholders in making decisions on foreign ownership diversifying the sources of critical goods such as antibiotics enhancing awareness of risks and making “plan Bs” in supply chain management deepening the EU’s single market to offer genuine scalability opportunities for start-ups The third, more technologically oriented approach would rely on new innovations or technical solutions to enhance small state preparedness. Key ideas included: innovating new medicines to replace antibiotics prioritising non-conventional technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) enhancing domestic capacity to produce key components with 3D printing researching alternative materials to replace critical chemicals developing the recycling, recovery and transportation of critical chemicals adopting geofencing and coding solutions to enhance cybersecurity designating emerging technologies as focus areas in higher education increasing the adaptability of technical solutions through standardisation These three approaches prioritise different key solutions for enhancing small state preparedness. However, they represent generic policy preferences rather than ready-made policy recommendations. Ideally, states can formulate their own pick-and-mix toolkit by combining elements from the different approaches. The complementary nature of some of the expert views was also suggested by the fact that many – even most – respondents argued for diversification as a solution to various challenges. For example, and regardless of the chosen strategy, tendering rules could be improved by placing quality over price, taking geopolitical risks into account and allowing multiple winners in contrast to the currently dominant winner-takes-it-all logic, which leads to overly concentrated supply chains. Moreover, at least minor legislative tightenings were widely proposed to be made on foreign ownership – especially with regard to that of nationals of authoritarian states. These changes were, however, typically proposed to be complemented with such balancing acts as long-term leases and incentives to develop and acquire domestic products and companies. Ultimately, by highlighting alternative approaches to small state preparedness, this report seeks to encourage democratic discussion on a broader political choice: what type of state and economy do we want in the future? It is not only their identity that guides what states do; adopted policies and means also shape state identities over time.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Supply, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Finland, Asia, Sweden, and United States of America

627. The Great Supply Chain Shift from China to South Asia?

Author:: Ganeshan Wignaraja
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Global supply chains connect world industry and international trade in manufactures. East Asia’s dominance with China as the preferred assembly hub in global supply chains has brought unprecedented regional prosperity, but South Asia remains a latecomer. However, pandemic-related and post-pandemic continuing disruptions to supply chains and slowing growth are being keenly felt, dampening China’s attractiveness. In an uncertain global economy, increasingly footloose foreign investors are looking for alternative production locations. Is it South Asia’s turn to prosper through supply chains in this uncertain world? This is the topical public policy question facing India and the others in South Asia. This paper discusses the concept of global supply chains, the industrial rise of East Asia, drivers of supply chain relocation from China, South Asia’s prospects, India as a complementary hub and policy lessons from East Asia’s industrial success. For the purposes of this paper, South Asia is broadly defined as the India and its contiguous countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Monetary Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Industrialization, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

628. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

629. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:: Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

630. Chinese Military-Civil Fusion: Sino-Italian Research Cooperation

Author:: N. Lill
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Chinese government exploits foreign academic infrastructure and talent to build a world-class military. Although cooperation with China offers alluring investments, it risks research objectives being mandated by or from China and may result in unintended knowledge transfer in critical areas. Considering the extent of Chinese military-civil fusion, any collaboration—with military and non-military institutions alike—is likely to boost Chinese military capabilities. Utilising academic exchanges to further military ambitions is a coordinated and broad long-term strategy that has benefited from the West’s limited knowledge of Chinese institutions and their links to the military. To repurpose a quote by Nelson Mandela, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” And for now, that weapon is handed out without deep consideration or proper regulation.
Topic:: Education, International Cooperation, Research, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

631. How Russia Brings Its Aggression Against Ukraine to The Global South

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: 2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report explores the evolution of Russia’s relations with the countries in the Global South and the ways Russia cultivates these relationships in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Moscow’s current interactions in the Global South are driven by the demands of its war of aggression, as well as by its long-term goal: to challenge the international order. The latter dictate several manoeuvres found throughout such engagements: strategic communications, market substitution and sanctions evasion, and regime sheltering. This report presents three case studies meant to illustrate how Russia’s relations with the Global South have evolved since 2022. First, Tunisia exemplifies a superficial partner, with Moscow’s main tool in the country being strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion in its favour. Second, India is illustrative of a strategic partner whom Moscow tries to engage in order to substitute for lost energy markets and evade sanctions. Third, Myanmar represents a hierarchical relationship, in which the local regime depends on Moscow for diplomatic support and arms deliveries. Notwithstanding varied perspectives on and responses to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, countries in the Global South have generally sought to prioritise their economy and security by attempting to strike a balance between Russia and the West. Aware of such desires, Moscow has been exploiting this situation to maintain its influence internationally. Challenging Russia in the Global South will put pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to conduct aggressive foreign policy – and wage war against Ukraine. The report concludes with six recommendations on how to counter Russia in the Global South.
Topic:: Cold War, Markets, Science and Technology, Communications, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Asia, Tunisia, Myanmar, United States of America, and Global South

632. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

633. On the Horns of a Dilemma: Will Corruption Bring Down the Chinese Communist Party?

Author:: George A. B. Peirce
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: When the People’s Republic of China’s president and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he publicly acknowledged that the Party faced an existential crisis from pervasive corruption at all levels of Chinese government and business activity. Such corruption has put the Party’s leaders on the horns of a dilemma: If they fail to adopt political reforms that could root out corruption independent of Party control, like a free press, competitive elections, and the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary, then the crisis of corruption will continue to fester; but if the Party were to embrace such reforms, then that would inevitably lead to democratization and the Party’s loss of autocratic control of China. As one Chinese scholar aptly sums up this dilemma: “There’s a commonly used phrase: Not reforming means to wait for death. Reforming means to court death.” China’s crisis of corruption should be of immediate interest to American political and business leaders. China is the world’s largest developing nation with the world’s second largest economy, exceeded only by that of the United States. It may justifiably be said that the United States and China are now the two most significant nations on earth, so American interests will be profoundly affected by China’s future economic and political development. A better understanding of the challenges the Communist Party faces in the coming years may prove invaluable for effective U.S. policy formulation. Such insights may also contribute to enduring and mutually beneficial economic and political relationships with China. Accordingly, this report initially examines the historical development of China’s regime of institutionalized corruption and the toll it has already taken on the Chinese people, economy and governmental process. Then it turns to an evaluation of divergent perspectives on the future for China’s now thoroughly corrupted Communist Party and the extraordinary civilization and people it continues to rule. Finally, the article will conclude by addressing the question of whether the Party can overcome corruption and survive in the 21st century.
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Business, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

634. China Is Finally Making Progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since the 1990s, China has tried to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The railway would advance China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia. Until recently, China has been unable to overcome opposition to the project in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, local concerns about the railway may be giving way since Russia’s war in Ukraine has made new trade routes bypassing Russia more profitable, and a new Uzbek government is looking to expand regional and international engagement.
Topic:: Economics, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan

635. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

636. Japan’s New National Security Strategy Is Making Waves

Author:: Ryan Ashley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) contains several groundbreaking commitments, including plans to deploy long-range counterstrike capabilities and to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product. A slim-but-significant majority of Japan’s public now seemingly supports efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, a political consensus once nearly unthinkable. The United States, India, Taiwan, and others that share Japan’s concern about military aggression from China, North Korea, and Russia have welcomed Japan’s NSS. Some countries in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and certain Southeast Asian nations, have expressed mixed reactions to the NSS, as some still harbor distrust toward Japanese military power due to the historical memory of the Second World War. China and North Korea continue to cultivate anti-Japan sentiment within their domestic populations and within other countries in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

637. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

638. Australia and India’s New Military Bases: Responses to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:: Felix K. Chang
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Australia and India have built and expanded military bases in and around the Indian Ocean in anticipation of a larger Chinese naval presence in its waters. Most of the construction has focused on creating the capacity to monitor the three main passages into the ocean through the Indonesian archipelago, namely the Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits. India has established two new naval air stations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and boosted its maritime patrol forces at others nearby. Australia is working to establish a military base in the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and is beefing up its Stirling naval base near Perth to support and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Topic:: Security, Navy, Military, and Military Bases
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

639. Naval Incident Management in Europe, East Asia and South East Asia

Author:: Ian Anthony, Fei Su, and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Unprecedented global turbulence in 2022 has demonstrated the need to pay increased attention to naval operations. Enhanced military capability allows naval power projection far beyond home waters. New threats and challenges are emerging from technological advances and new applications, not least the vulnerability of warships and naval facilities to cyber intrusions and cyberattacks. As states implement the programmes they need to protect and promote their interests at sea, there is also likely to be an increase in the number of close tracking incidents. How effective current risk reduction mechanisms will be at dealing with incidents at sea is unclear. This Insights Paper provides a preliminary assessment of the existing mechanisms and suggests areas for further improvement.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Navy, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

640. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:: Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

641. Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China

Author:: Michael Roberts
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: For decades, companies outside the United States have dominated the international commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries. At various times since World War II, Japan, Korea, and certain European countries have been able to leverage their export-driven manufacturing economies and government support to become world leaders in commercial shipbuilding and major players in international shipping. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken that strategy to a new level and now produces more than half the large commercial ships delivered annually, controls scores of seaports in dozens of foreign countries, and owns almost one-fifth of the global commercial fleet. American commercial shipbuilders and US flag shipping companies have long faced fierce headwinds in international markets and have seen support from the US government dwindle. The US reset its maritime policies in the 1990s when America was the sole superpower and the security benefits of a robust commercial maritime industry were in doubt. By the end of 2022, Americans owned only 3 percent of the 55,000 ships in the global commercial fleet, including just 178 large US flag cargo ships, 85 of which are committed to international trade (see tables 1 and 2 below for a breakdown of US and global commercial fleets). The emergence of the PRC as a challenger to America’s global leadership has forced sweeping changes in US policy and spending priorities to boost America’s economic and military security. This report recommends that the US reform its policies governing America’s commercial maritime industries because shipping and shipbuilding are core components of national power. These industries remain especially crucial in the twenty-first century, as international trade is more important to a healthy American economy today than ever before. Yet Americans have almost no control over the maritime logistics systems that feed the US economy. The pandemic-induced supply chain crisis showed how much damage can be done when those systems break down.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, National Security, Maritime, Industry, Domestic Policy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

642. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

643. Winning in Ukraine Is Critically Important for Deterring a War in Taiwan

Author:: John P. Walters
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Below are remarks by Hudson President and CEO John P. Walters during a debate over whether winning in Ukraine is important for deterring a war in Taiwan. To view the debate, click here. I support the judgment of the commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Admiral John Aquilino, who was recently asked by Senator Roger Wicker, “There’s some people who feel our support for Ukraine is taking away from our capability and credibility in the Indo-Pacific. . . . What do you say?” Adm. Aquilino replied, “Senator I do not . . . I believe we have to do both to maintain the peace.” Why is Adm. Aquilino correct in linking the defense of Taiwan and deterrence of Communist Chinese aggression to our support for Ukraine? First, US victory in Ukraine is essential for generating support for Taiwan at home. Winning in Ukraine will help generate the domestic resolve to fight for Taiwan. If we pull back from Ukraine, however, the US will strengthen those isolationists who pit baby formula against defense spending. Success creates a slipstream of confidence, which the country is currently lacking after our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. A victory in Ukraine can restore confidence in our ability to win wars—at home and abroad.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

644. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:: Ellen Bork
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

645. The Jeju 4.3 Attacks Were Not a Democracy Movement

Author:: Tara O
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: On April 3, 1948, on the Korean island of Jeju, communist guerrillas went on a rampage, killing police officers, election workers, and others; setting houses on fire; and terrorizing villagers, all to discourage them from voting in the upcoming May 10 elections that would establish the Republic of Korea (ROK). The insurgency—referred to as Jeju 4.3—triggered a government counterinsurgency, forcing the communists into the mountains where they would continue their guerrilla operations for nine more years. In March 2023, the Democratic Party of Korea (Deobureo Minju Party) introduced a bill mandating that citizens refer to the insurgency only as a “democracy struggle,” with punishments of up to five years in prison. But historical documents, eyewitness testimony, and statements from the perpetrators show that the incident was a campaign of irregular and unconventional warfare, a prelude to the communist military invasion of South Korea in June 1950, and part of the larger Korean War.
Topic:: History, Counterinsurgency, Democracy, and Korean War
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

646. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

647. EU-China relations - Will the current crisis change the relationship between the two great powers?

Author:: Eliška Prostřední
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: As part of the Café Evropa debate cycle, one of the discussions took place on the relationship and approach between the European Union and China. Among those invited were Magdaléna Slezáková, Ondřej Wagner, David Gardáš and Zdeněk Beránek. You can read a summary of the outputs of individual guests in the report written by our intern Eliška Prostřední.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Crisis Management, and Debates
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

648. Moving to an Offshore Balancing Strategy for East Asia

Author:: Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Those calling for Washington to expand U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific have misread the regional security environment. The United States can reduce its military footprint in East Asia without jeopardizing its national security or the stability of the region. China is not poised to dominate East Asia or any other part of the Indo-Pacific region. While the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted in favor of Beijing, it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. Regional powers can deter China from launching wars of aggression by investing in the right kinds of defensive weaponry to capitalize on geographic advantages. The United States should play the role of an “offshore balancer” by helping China’s neighbors to become more resilient to coercion from Beijing. The leaders of several prominent states in East Asia are anxious to avoid a “cold war” between the United States and China. Washington should heed their calls for restraint. Pushing these governments to choose a side in the U.S.-China rivalry would needlessly antagonize them. The issue of Taiwanese security presents a special challenge for the United States and its allies. Taiwan has the most to lose from China’s rise and perceives U.S. military support as essential to its survival as a de facto independent entity. However, the United States can retrench from East Asia without “abandoning” Taiwan to China. Peace in East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific does not depend upon the United States enjoying primacy in the region. On the contrary, the pursuit of U.S. military primacy in the Western Pacific will make it more difficult to maintain regional security and promote economic prosperity over the long term.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Deterrence, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

649. Nuclear energy and proliferation in Turkey’s Asian Politics

Author:: Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The share of nuclear power in Asia’s electricity generating capacity has grown significantly over the last two decades. China is one of the dominant players in Asia, developing a robust nuclear power program. In the Middle East, Iran and the United Arab Emirates have introduced nuclear power into the region, with Turkey planning to follow in their footsteps in 2023. The adoption of nuclear power spurs concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear latency. Some countries use their civilian nuclear programs to develop a robust infrastructure that allows them to acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Such dynamics are likely to have a destabilizing effect on international affairs in the Middle East and Asia. The current international situation makes it unlikely that the nuclear non-proliferation regime will become stronger in the near future. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for a new generation of negative security assurances and collective defense that protects countries from nuclear blackmail.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Politics, Electricity, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

650. Is Realism Policy Relevant? Evidence from Ukraine and Taiwan

Author:: Nikolaos Lampas
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Criticism of realism is based on a largely superficial understanding of the paradigm. Critics treat realism as a one-dimensional approach. Realism is a paradigm that encompasses different and sometimes mutually contradictory approaches. Realist scholars strongly opposed U.S. military interventions, such as Iraq, which have proved disastrous. Offensive realism’s rationale is unconvincing in the case of Ukraine. However, the international community’s response falls well within the realist paradigm. Deterrence remains a vital policy recommendation of realism, as evidenced by the U.S. response to the Taiwan debacle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, and Realism
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

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