Political Geography: Asia - CIAO Search Results

501. A Taiwan crisis is a China crisis

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The European Union needs a China contingency. Government and corporate decision-makers may be preparing for a possible Chinese military attack on Taiwan, but they must also focus on how a Taiwan crisis will impact China and, consequently, the EU’s economic security. Largely on account of Taiwan’s prominent position in the global semiconductor industry, a Chinese attack on the island will inflict trillions of dollars in costs on the global economy. But a Taiwan crisis also threatens to disrupt China-centered production and supply chains for green technologies, such as electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, as well as create unprecedented geopolitical risk for European companies in China.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

502. Whaling politics: two worlds that never meet

Author:: Minori Takahashi
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The arrest and detention of environmental activist Paul Watson in Greenland drew renewed attention to Japan’s whaling, specifically the commercial whaling that resumed in July 2019. Japan stopped commercial whaling of large whales in the Antarctic in 1986-87 and coastal whaling by March 1988, following decisions in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). With the stated aim of gaining sufficient knowledge to re-start commercial whaling, Japan conducted research whaling for ecological and resource data, as IWC regulations permit member states to do. In 2010, Watson’s group physically interfered with a ship contributing to Japan’s Whale Research Program near Antarctica, leading Japan to issue a red notice against him through Interpol. 14 years later, in response to Japan’s request, Danish authorities in Greenland, constitutionally linked to Denmark but with extensive autonomy, detained Watson during a refuelling stop. The arrest prompted protests in Europe and an online petition with over 720,000 signatures for his release. Joining the cause are renowned actors, acclaimed filmmakers and even parliamentarians and city mayors. Watson’s legal team claimed the incident was political and that Japan was exploiting Greenland. Faced with intense opposition from otherwise friendly nations, why does Japan continue to engage in whaling?
Topic:: Environment, Politics, European Union, Conservation, and Whaling
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, and Asia

503. Pragmatic Considerations: Analyzing Why is China Concerned About North Korea-Russia Growing Military Cooperation?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On November 11, 2024, North Korea’s Central News Agency reported that Pyongyang had ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia. This agreement, signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in June, stipulates that both parties will provide support to each other in the event of an armed attack. In October 2024, reports suggested that North Korea dispatched several thousand troops to Russia to assist in its war effort in Ukraine. Although both Moscow and Pyongyang have neither confirmed nor denied this action outright, China’s silence and ambiguous stance on the matter have been equally enigmatic. The increasing military alignment between North Korea and Russia has raised significant concerns in China, a key strategic ally of both nations. These concerns stem from the potential repercussions on Beijing’s regional and global influence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

504. New Destinations: Is Asia Replacing Europe as Migrants’ Preferred Destination?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Many Asian countries with major and emerging economies have witnessed remarkable economic growth over the past decades. This progress has not been limited to rapid growth rates and expanding financial markets; it has also encompassed the development of infrastructure, the enhancement of innovation, the improvement of the business environment, and the adoption of more open and flexible policies to attract migrants. These measures aim to address demographic challenges and meet the need for larger workforces to keep up with economic transformation and development. As a result, these countries have seen a significant shift in their position within global migration trends, leading to speculation that Asia could, within a few years, replace traditional major destinations for migrants, such as Europe and the United States.
Topic:: Migration, Labor Issues, Income Inequality, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:: Asia

505. Moscow and Beijing at the Dawn of A Grave New World of Trump 2.0

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The election of Donald Trump as the 47th US president changed the chemistry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing so much and yet so little. It was so much because the war-ending rhetoric of the president-elect was in sharp contrast to his predecessor’s steadfast support of Ukraine. It was so little because the war in Ukraine not only continued but even escalated after Trump’s decisive electoral win in early November as the Biden administration rushed arms to Ukraine with much relaxed restrictions (on ATACMS, etc.). Meanwhile, Beijing-Moscow relations continued to broaden and deepen throughout 2024 despite Trump’s repeated vows to split the Russia-China entente. Xi and Putin met three times in six months (May, July, and October). Their joint enterprises (SCO, BRICS, etc.) also expanded steadily while experiencing growing pains. Meanwhile, the two large powers considerably stepped up their mil-mil interactions with more exercises, exchanges, and joint patrols. It remains to be seen how Trump would operationalize his campaign rhetorics not just to capture a pivotal position within the Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle, but more importantly, to avert the Kissingerian dark prophecy of a grave new world of WMD and AI racing toward World War III.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

506. Trump 2.0, South Korea’s Martial Law, and Future of Seoul-Tokyo Relations

Author:: Andy Lim and Ji-Young Lee
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. It was originally expected to be a milestone year for bilateral ties and a fitting culmination of nearly three years of hard work by two leaders: President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. But that outlook now seems hung in the balance, with new unknowns on the horizon—both expected and unexpected. In this final issue on Japan-Korea relations, we discuss the key factors that are likely to impact the future of bilateral ties and the Camp David trilateral in four major areas: 1) Trump 2.0, 2) political uncertainty in Seoul, 3) weak political support in Tokyo, and 4) resurfacing history issues. The final months of 2024 have brought new unknowns in the shape of leadership changes in the United States, Japan, and potentially South Korea. It is now possible that come January 2025, the leadership trio—President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon that has made the Korea-Japan rapprochement and the unprecedented trilateral partnership possible will be gone from office. What happens next is impossible to predict, but one hopes that the hard-fought and laboriously planned institutionalization of bilateral and trilateral ties will withstand these changes in leadership. This will be the first true test for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership since the Camp David summit in August 2023. Japan’s new prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, and President Yoon agreed in mid-November to “further elevate the bilateral relationship to new heights” towards 2025 and to promote comprehensive cooperation in areas such as “politics, security, economy, culture and social security.” However, following President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, the future of Seoul-Tokyo relations faces a great deal of uncertainty. Given that it was President Yoon’s political will that initially facilitated rapproachment, depending on what happens to his political future and who comes into office in South Korea, Seoul-Tokyo relations may experience challenges. While conflicts over long-standing history issues have been consciously minimized during this period of rapproachment, they have not gone away, as demonstrated by their inability to reach a consensus on a joint event on the controversial Sado mine.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Donald Trump, and Martial Law
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

507. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

508. China and the Two Koreas’ Triangular Games

Author:: See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: A rebound in China-ROK diplomacy raised optimism after a slow start to 2024, paving the way for the summit between Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 15. They met on the sidelines of APEC Peru before attending the G20 summit in Brazil. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul met in Beijing on May 13, facilitating the China-ROK-Japan trilateral summit and Yoon’s meeting with Premier Li Qiang in Seoul. As China-DPRK exchanges dwindled compared to the first third of this year, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s summits with Putin in May and June raised questions about the direction of China’s Korea policy. Donald Trump’s reelection in November intensified debate on the regional security and economic implications of US-China competition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

509. Rubbish Balloons, Mutual Repudiation: Is This How It Ends?

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Inter-Korean relations, already bad, got worse in 2024. North Korea launched a bizarre new campaign, sending balloons bearing trash. South Korea reacted by fully suspending the already defunct North-South military pact and resuming propaganda broadcasts at the DMZ. In August, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol announced a new policy of unification under liberal democracy, which despite offering dialogue left no place for the DPRK or Kim Jong Un. The latter took umbrage at Seoul for exaggerating flood casualties in the North, but offered no figure of his own. It is unclear whether North Korea has revised its constitution to declare South Korea irredeemably hostile, as no text has been published. In October the North blew up inter-Korean road and rail links. In December. Yoon blew up his own presidency by briefly declaring martial law, plunging South Korea into political chaos. As of now the North has not taken advantage of this.
Topic:: Government, Natural Disasters, Bilateral Relations, Democracy, and Constitution
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

510. Increasing Perils Ahead

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Lai Ching-te insisted at his May inauguration that Taiwan is sovereign and not subordinate to China. Beijing reacted by increasing cross-Strait tensions. China’s latest rounds of military exercises make clear that it is preparing to use force or at least gray-zone intimidation to effect reunification. Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang continued unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, seeking reconciliation but risking aiding China’s efforts to fragment Taiwan. Taiwan’s TSMC continues to expand in Taiwan and overseas in ways that keep it at the center of the global high-tech economy. Taiwan has increased its purchases of military equipment from the US and opened negotiations on a bilateral tax agreement. Beijing views US support for Taiwan as collaboration in Lai’s separatism. US President-elect Donald Trump has said that Taiwan stole the production of semiconductors from the US and should pay for US military support. However, this animus may be balanced by the outspoken Taiwan supporters he has chosen for his national security team. Can Taiwan overcome its internal divisions and Trump’s Taiwan skepticism? Can China, Taiwan, and the US step back from a confrontational spiral? None of this will be easy, but failure may put Taiwan’s future at risk.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

511. Beijing Seeks Advantage in US Competition, Leadership Change

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China marked the end of 2024 and four years of often intense competition for regional influence with the Biden administration and its allies and partners by continuing strong opposition to outside interference and working to advance China’s leading position among most Southeast Asian governments. The Biden government made significant gains at China’s expense, notably in the Philippines, a contrast with the decline in US regional influence and China’s ascendance that occurred during the first Trump administration. Looking forward, Beijing will seek to advance Chinese influence as a reliable partner and stabilizing presence amid widespread regional and global uncertainties caused by growing economic protectionism, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and perceived negative implications of a second Trump administration.
Topic:: Leadership, Strategic Competition, Influence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

512. The Worst Angels of Our Nature

Author:: Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last several reporting periods of Comparative Connections have featured little drama in US relations with the two Koreas. A lot of important changes happened—a burgeoning Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral, Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear weapons program, etc.—but these developments were mostly incremental. However, the June-December 2024 reporting period—the final Comparative Connections—has featured bombshells, both metaphorically and literally. The most spectacular event was South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol going full rogue authoritarian and recklessly declaring martial law at 11pm on December 3 in order to carry out a military “self-coup d’état.” That is, Yoon annulled democratic processes and civil constitutional protections, arrogated all political and executive power to himself and the military, and attempted to suspend the national assembly. This shocking step toward tyranny—considered long-relegated to the distant past of South Korea’s developmental dictatorships of the 1950s-1980s—was as badly conceived as it was executed, farcically falling apart after less than three hours, when legislators (mostly from the opposition) breached the cordon of deployed soldiers around the national assembly, entered the plenary chamber, and voted 190-0 to revoke the martial law decree.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Domestic Politics, Coup, Donald Trump, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

513. Trump’s Return Scrambles Outlook

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: US-China relations through 2024 remained marked by a paradox. On the one hand, ties displayed a distinct stabilization. The two sides translated their leaders’ modest “San Francisco Vision” into reality. Cabinet officials and the numerous working groups met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened though differences emerged, sensitive issues were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. US electoral politics, or threat of Chinese interference in the elections, did not materially impinge on ties. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in US-China relations deepened. With its time in office winding down, the Biden administration went into regulatory overdrive to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two countries’ advanced technology ecosystems. China methodically responded in kind using its now-robust economic lawfare toolkit. The chasm in strategic perceptions remained just as wide. Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office portends a period of disruptive unpredictability in ties, although “Tariff Man” Trump can reliably be expected to enact additional impositions on Chinese imports. Two years to the day that they met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia to place a floor under their troubled relationship and initiate a process of emplacing guardrails, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met for their third in-person meeting as presidents in Lima, Peru, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. In Lima, the two presidents took stock of the gradual rehabilitation of ties over the past two years, despite its early interruption by the balloon incident, and pledged to consolidate the fragile stability and make the relationship more predictable. They also patted themselves for harvesting some of the low-hanging fruit since their summit in Woodside, California, 12 months ago. US-China relations have made important incremental progress over the past 18 months, starting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June 2023 (Blinken returned to Beijing again this April). In Spring 2023, aside from meetings of their senior-most officials, there was practically no active communication channel between the two sides. Fast forward to today and there are more than 20 dialogue frameworks that span the range from diplomacy, security, economy, trade, fiscal affairs, finance and military to counternarcotics, law enforcement, agriculture, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

514. Once Again, Leadership Transitions Challenge US-Japan Alliance

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well. While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term. The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Elections, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

515. Regional Overview: The Year of Elections (Finally) Ends

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The “year of elections” culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) “too close to call” US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump’s scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing (to us, at least), although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While we would not be bold (or foolish) enough to make firm predictions regarding future policy, we will speculate on expected trends and characteristics, while acknowledging at the onset that Trump prides himself on being unpredictable (and has largely succeeded in this quest). While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government. Elsewhere (and largely overlooked), the usual spate of multilateral meetings took place in the second half of the year—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, the G20 gathering, the East Asia Summit and companion ministerial-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the BRICS Summit, etc. —amid enhanced military activity and enhanced trilateral/minilateral cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

516. ‘The Search for People’s Well-Being’: Mainstreaming a Psychosocial Approach to Transitional Justice

Author:: Virginie Ladisch and Shayna Lewis
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: The field of transitional justice is increasingly recognizing the relevance of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in contexts of massive human rights violations. Despite growing advocacy and awareness at the global policy level, however, the field lacks a systematic approach to the issue, signified by the persistent conception of MHPSS solely as a form of service provision to victims and survivors. This study contributes to the development of such an approach, one that applies a psychosocial lens to analyze contexts, assess needs, and design and implement programming that has a positive, transformative impact on the well-being of victims and communities, as well as broader social systems. Drawing on experiences in contexts such as Australia, Canada, Colombia, The Gambia, Nepal, Uganda, and Syria, the report also offers guidance for supporting the mental health and well-being of transitional justice practitioners and addresses practical considerations as they operationalize MHPSS within their own work. At the level of formal transitional justice processes, a psychosocial approach can be integrated into reparative justice, truth-telling initiatives, and judicial processes seeking criminal accountability. Beyond formal processes, though, a psychosocial lens should be a foundational component of all aspects of transitional justice work. It requires a deep understanding of context and the psychosocial needs of a given society, community, or group. It also requires the development of responses that address those needs across different interventions. This study therefore offers guidance regarding key points of consideration for both civil society and government actors involved in transitional justice: embedding work in local communities, creating conditions for positive participation, overcoming stigma, identifying clear roles, building collaboration across silos, developing a long-term process, focusing on all stages of work, considering trauma among leaders and institutions, securing adequate funding, and measuring progress. The report argues that a psychosocial approach needs to be outward to inform analysis of the overall context, design of the intervention, and support for victims, as well as inward to consider how trauma affects organizational structures, team dynamics, and individuals’ ability to do their work.
Topic:: Sustainable Development Goals, Criminal Justice, Memory, Justice, Reparations, Gender, Violence Prevention, Youth Engagement, and Institutional Reform
Political Geography:: Uganda, Africa, Middle East, Canada, Asia, Colombia, South America, Nepal, Syria, North America, and Gambia

517. Transforming Social Relations: Restorative Responses to Massive Human Rights Violations

Author:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: Restorative justice and transitional justice are closely and fundamentally related responses to crime. They emphasize shared values and promote similar frameworks that seek to clarify responsibilities, and they both address the inherent limitations of existing institutions: for restorative justice, the limitations of retributive systems in dealing with domestic crimes; for transitional justice, the additional limitations of conventional or compromised rule of law institutions in dealing with serious and massive international crimes. In many ways, restorative justice is at the center of transitional justice. While scholars and practitioners of transitional justice have consistently applied the concepts of restorative justice, in practical terms, there are few examples of restorative justice practices being explicitly integrated into transitional justice processes, specifically those aimed at criminal accountability. There is also a general lack of understanding within both fields about what such integration means or requires. This report offers reflection, clarity, and guidance on the application of a restorative justice framework in contexts of massive human rights violations, including the advantages, risks, opportunities, and challenges of such an approach. The analysis is based on the experiences of Colombia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and the Bangsamoro region of the Philippines, which represent a range of different processes that all either integrated or reflected the practices or principles of restorative justice. These principles include stakeholder participation and repair of harm, and the practices include the use of direct or indirect dialogue or engagement between victims and perpetrators to resolve crimes. The study's findings address the role of dialogue between victims and perpetrators; the importance of engagement with communities and society in establishing a link between the micro and macro levels; the contribution of alternative or restorative sanctions in facilitating participation and repair; the need for integrity, legitimacy, and efficacy of process; and the coherence of restorative justice with other justice, peacebuilding, and transitional processes.
Topic:: Human Rights, Reform, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Institutions, Reparations, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Asia, Colombia, South America, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia

518. Repairing from the Bench: From Finding Responsibility to Fashioning Judicial Redress

Author:: Adriana Garcia Garcia, Fatima Yasmin Bokhari, and Masha Lisitsyna
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: Violence perpetrated by the police and the military is dominating news around the world. Survivors, victims, activists, and lawyers on all continents have filed lawsuits against these violations in judicial processes. Among the key objectives for victims are to seek the truth and confirmation from authorities that a wrong was done to them and to obtain reparations. The premise that harm should be repaired is routine in domestic legal systems around the world. But what does the obligation to provide reparations mean, particularly when serious human rights violations are at issue? While reparations may be narrowly defined as the relief afforded to a successful claimant in a given proceeding, in practice they can take a range of forms. The right to reparation has expanded in recent decades through interpretations of international norms, in particular, the right of victims of human rights violations to an effective remedy. This report draws on that evolving interpretation of international law and jurisprudence, much of it developed by regional human rights institutions in Africa, the Americas, and Europe; UN treaty bodies; and some innovative domestic courts. It identifies a series of judicial decisions interpreting international human rights law that have affirmed the content of the right to reparation for serious human rights violations that have upheld the rights of victims as much as possible. More than an analysis of the state of the field of the recognition of the right to reparation, the report provides guidance to human rights defenders and courts that are trying to respond to victims of such violations in ways that affirm their dignity and rights. This guide also explores how domestic courts have provided judicial reparations at the national level. Two relevant questions are considered: Have they in fact complied with international decisions and relevant norms regarding reparations? Have they delivered by doing those things that we believe courts are better suited to do on behalf of victims? At the domestic level, very few analyses exist on how domestic judges grant reparations or the compliance of their decisions with international law, jurisprudence of international human rights courts, and decisions by international human rights bodies that govern reparations. This guide seeks to fill this gap through the analysis of decisions of domestic courts around the world with different specialties.
Topic:: Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Memory, Judiciary, and Reparations
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Asia, South America, and North America

519. Spring 2024 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS SUREN TADEVOSYAN BALANCING POWERS: AZERBAIJAN’S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AMIDST REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES ………………………….. 6 TIANPING CHE JAPAN JOINS AUKUS: MOTIVATIONS, PROGRESS, AND IMPACT ..………. 22 KNARIK SARGSYAN BETWEEN BLOCS AND BLOCKADES: QATAR’S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA AND STRATEGIC MANEUVERS ……………………………….……………….. 44 GUO SONG THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPT TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE ………………….…………... 64 BOOK REVIEW: ARTYOM TONOYAN AHMED ZAHID SHAHAB AND ALI AKBAR. (2023). IRAN’S SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ……………………………….………………. 84
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Role Conceptions, AUKUS, Regional Security, Alliance, GCC, Diplomacy, Security, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Eurasia, Japan, Asia, United States of America, Qatar, Gulf Nations, Middle East, Palestine, and Israel

520. Peace mediation in the age of geopolitical contestation: Navigating the new reality

Author:: Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Violent conflict increasingly operates as an intertwined set of local, national and transnational conflicts. Peace processes need to acknowledge the tensions between geopolitics, power machinations and mediation. Traditional mediation models aimed at achieving settlements between belligerents are rare. Instead, diplomatic efforts often seek mainly to manage flashpoints, signal red lines and avoid mishaps and miscalculations. Emerging actors from the Gulf, Turkey, China and ASEAN are reshaping diplomacy in a multipolar world and directly impacting the peace mediation scene, once the playing field of the UN and primarily Western actors. While third parties have long played an integral role in official peace mediation, a range of non-governmental organisations has emerged in recent years to act as go-betweens, provide analysis and build the capacities of negotiating parties. AI is playing an increasing role in peace mediation. It can help process and analyse vast amounts of data, including historical conflict data, socio-political dynamics and cultural nuances, giving mediators a greater understanding of complex conflict settings and helping them formulate more effective strategies.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Multilateralism, Science and Technology, United Nations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Turkey, China, Asia, Gulf Nations, and Middle East

521. China’s global initiatives: Common security in the service of national interest

Author:: Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Between 2021 and 2023, China introduced three global initiatives, namely the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. China has also put forward a proposal for the reform and development of global governance. Together, they constitute a major goodwill campaign and are presented as examples of China’s contribution towards “a global community of shared future”, China’s slogan envisioning an ideal world. At least at the rhetorical level, the initiatives are aimed at cooperation rather than rivalry. China deserves credit for attempting to introduce constructive and positive thinking into international relations. However, the initiatives are closely related to China’s core interests, such as maintaining state sovereignty and safeguarding Communist Party rule. Expectations about the initiatives can only be low, given the lack of concrete roadmaps and the anti-Chinese sentiments among many of the Western nations.
Topic:: Security, Development, Economy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China and Asia

522. Examining the Value of a “Soft Power” Net Assessment: Comparing Chinese and U.S. Power Projection in Africa

Author:: Michael J. McNerney, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, and Daniel Egel
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has entered an era in which it is no longer willing to be second fiddle to the United States. After many years of quietly growing China’s economy, following Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to “hide your strength and bide your time,”1 the CCP and President Xi Jinping are overseeing a plan for a more assertive China that uses its political and economic power to influence international relations. Underpinning China’s more assertive approach is a new concept that Xi has called zonghe guoli or “comprehensive national power.” This is a concept that seeks to describe “China’s combined military, economic, and technological power and foreign policy influence,”2 particularly as it compares to that of the United States and its allies.3 Xi’s conclusion, it seems, is that China’s zonghe guoli has grown such that China no longer needs to stand in America’s shadow. The United States is well-aware of the challenge posed by China. The 2022 National Security Strategy emphasized that China “is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”4 Given such high stakes, it should be no surprise that the U.S. government’s strategy argues for including “all elements of national power” in “out-competing China.”5 Competing effectively against China requires a nuanced understanding – a net assessment – of the relative strengths of China and the United States.6 There are now robust U.S.-China net assessments focused on military capabilities,7 key emergent technologies,8 defense industrial base,9 and overall national competitiveness.10 But how effective are the non-military components of U.S. efforts to project power abroad in comparison to those of China? Comparable analyses of America’s “soft power” vis-à-vis China are far more limited.11
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Economy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

523. The Twentieth Century, the Global South, and China’s Historical Position

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: Chinese scholar Wang Hui looks back at the twentieth century, which was born out of the multiple revolutions in the peripheral areas of the world, including China.
Topic:: History, Global South, and Revolution
Political Geography:: China and Asia

524. Allies balancing: A safer strategy for the U.S. in Asia

Author:: Daniel Depetris and Rajan Menon
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: As China’s wealth and military power have increased, the United States has responded with a combination of military deployments in East Asia, regular military exercises in regional waterways, and stronger alliances. These steps have been accompanied by restrictions on the Chinese economy, including sanctions, export controls, and bans on U.S. investments in sectors deemed sensitive from the standpoint of U.S. security. These policies reflect the idea that only though primacy—military preponderance—can the United States protect its key interests in East Asia. These interests are traditionally seen as: (1) avoiding war with China unless it is essential for defending vital U.S. national security interests, (2) preserving access to the region’s markets, and (3) ensuring that China cannot dominate the region. Yet the balance of power in Asia is stabler than conventional wisdom suggests. Given Asia’s geography, China’s internal constraints, and resistance from Asia’s middle powers, Beijing cannot easily dominate East Asia. The best way forward is to maintain a favorable regional balance of power that does not rest on U.S. hegemony. This approach would shift defense burdens onto capable allies, especially South Korea and Japan, and better safeguard U.S. interests by ensuring regional stability while lowering the risk of war.
Topic:: Strategic Competition, Military, National Security, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

525. China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe

Author:: Maria
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that encompasses infrastructure projects, trade and financial agreements, and cultural and defence cooperation with over 140 countries worldwide. Bringing the digital component into the BRI seamlessly advanced Beijing’s ambition of taking a leadership position in the technology sector. The DSR not only speaks across regions but also goes beyond the technology infrastructure, which raises two critical concerns by giving China leverage to advance the digital authoritarian governance model and jeopardizing data privacy. To mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on China, the EU must find alternatives by collaborating with trusted partners and diversifying supply chains. First, the EU can expand its technological landscape and engage nations in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific. Second, it must develop and enforce regulatory mechanisms to prevent Chinese state agencies from misusing sensitive data.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Information Technology, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

526. How Weakness in the Social Safety Net Undermines the Political Compact in China

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg and Alexander Aibel
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This policy memo details China’s approach to social welfare and its impact on the nation’s socioeconomic stability. Xi Jinping and other Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have an aversion to being “welfarist,” which historically aligns with China’s tendency to view its citizens as a source for labor and tax revenue rather than as human resources to be cultivated and assisted when in need. This has resulted in a social safety net that considerably lags international standards, especially those of developed and even middle-income countries. High debt levels burden Chinese local governments, and shrinking revenues, declining birthrates, falling marriage rates, and aging populations further fuel the deterioration of government finances. These problems contribute to the growing financial vulnerability of Chinese households and create significant concerns for future generations. Families often shoulder the costs of caring for their elderly, educating their children, and paying for healthcare. China’s public healthcare spending is limited, with around 7 percent of gross domestic product devoted to the national system. Families, on average, spend at least 27 percent out-of-pocket of their total health costs to make up for shortfalls in their health insurance, compared to just 11 percent in the United States. Local governments are responsible for more than 90 percent of China’s social services costs but only receive about 50 percent of tax revenues. For decades, they have relied on land sales and related real estate revenues to meet their budgets, but both sources have declined precipitously as the housing boom has reversed course. According to the Rhodium Group, more than half of Chinese cities face difficulties paying down their debt, or even meeting interest payments, severely limiting their resources for social services. China’s total debt levels are estimated to be around 140 percent of GDP, limiting budget flexibility for supporting social services. China’s household savings rates are high by global standards, as Chinese increasingly use personal resources to cover shortfalls in the national safety net. As a result, consumer spending and confidence are down. China has seen lower wage growth in recent years, especially in the private sector, reversing the trend of elevated growth in the first part of the 2010s. Through his dual circulation model of growth, Xi Jinping hopes to shift the country away from an export- and investment-driven economy to a consumption-driven model. But the growing burdens on youth and families undermine this shift. There are major shortfalls in access to, and quality of, education and healthcare systems, especially in rural areas. The hukou system of residency compounds these problems, stopping many rural migrants from obtaining urban residency and thus preventing them from accessing higher quality urban social services. Due to severe wealth inequality, low tax revenues, and the decision to prioritize resources for national security and investment in manufacturing and technology, Beijing has limited resources to improve social welfare programs. Low public confidence in the economy and consumer market—fueled by the COVID lockdowns—has reinforced falling birth and marriage rates. Youth unemployment and public dissent have also increased, with the so-called lying flat movement and white hair demonstrations exemplifying public rejection of China’s attitudes toward overworking, professional achievement, and CCP handling of elder care and other social services. Xi and the CCP have chosen to maintain a limited social services system. Their reluctance to improve the system has contributed to a cycle of slowing economic growth, massive debt levels, stressed personal finances, and declining public confidence. China’s ambitions to become a consumption-driven economy will face significant challenges, possibly further straining the implied social contract that has for decades resulted in social and political stability.
Topic:: Debt, Inequality, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Safety Net, and Social Welfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

527. A Strategy to Free Political Prisoners in China

Author:: Olivia Enos
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has placed hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Chinese citizens behind bars as political prisoners. The scale of this brutal practice reveals something about the CCP: there are few things it fears more than its people. Taking political prisoners is one of the CCP’s core tactics for maintaining power. The United States Department of State estimates that the CCP currently detains thousands of political prisoners, in addition to an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political prison camps. The CCP’s practice of extrajudicial imprisonment is uniquely unjust. The party targets anyone it believes does not align with CCP ideals. That means political activists, human rights lawyers, and in particular, religious and ethnic populations that CCP leadership views as a threat to its core interests. Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, and Christians are among the most targeted. Although there have been notable successes in securing political prisoners’ release from China recently, there remains a need to strengthen the US political prisoner advocacy apparatus. Political prisoner advocacy may seem tangential to US foreign policy objectives. But it is one of the most practical steps the US government can take to offer relief to persecuted populations when Washington cannot easily fix the system that extrajudicially targets these populations, as is certainly the case in China. As it stands, the US executive branch does not have a centralized system focused on freeing political prisoners. Such a system could help the government craft policies that advance US interests while safeguarding and securing the freedom and human rights of the imprisoned. Of course, US efforts to free political prisoners are not limited to China. The US rightfully seeks to aid any person extrajudicially imprisoned globally. While the focus of this paper is on China, many of the recommendations in this paper are intended to advance US policy toward freeing political prisoners more generally. The next Trump administration should prioritize political prisoner advocacy in its overarching policy toward China. To that end: Congress should create an office for political prisoner advocacy within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the Department of State and appoint a special envoy for political prisoner advocacy of ambassador rank who would be responsible for prioritizing political prisoner release. Congress and the executive branch should institute a standard process for coordinating political prisoner advocacy and release. The executive branch should evaluate tools to punish key nodes of the Chinese government responsible for persecuting political prisoners. The executive branch should refine its options for permanently resettling political prisoners who want to come to the US.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Political Prisoners, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

528. Modernizing Sino-U.S. Confidence-building Measures: Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives

Author:: Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Carter Center
Abstract:: Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. This research utilizes the Cold War analogy as a starting point for analyzing how nuclear war between the U.S. and China can be averted.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Rivalry, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

529. The End of North Korean Sanctions Enforcement…and What Comes Next

Author:: Justin V. Hastings
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: Sanctions enforcement against North Korea is collapsing. Alternative strategies are likely to be ineffective, and North Korea is poised to take advantage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Regional Politics, and Enforcement
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

530. China Maritime Report No. 43: Shadow Force, A Look Inside the PLA Navy Reserve

Author:: Tiffany Tat
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The PLA Navy Reserve is an important and understudied element of PRC maritime power that could augment the active-duty force and improve its ability to undertake global operations and wage a protracted war. The PLAN Reserve appears to be transitioning from a substandard backup force to an increasingly well-trained complement to the active-duty force. In the past, the PLAN Reserve suffered from low morale and lackluster participation. Training scandals occurred in which navy reservists did not muster up when recalled for training. It is unclear to what extent these problems persist today. The overhaul of the PLAN’s reserve components, specifically the integration of the PLAN Reserve into a centralized command structure and the introduction of new legislative and policy reforms, constitutes a serious effort to enhance operational effectiveness, increase mobilization speeds, and improve readiness. The PLAN Reserve is remarkably opaque. While little has been publicly revealed about this shadowy force, future research may offer opportunities to develop early-warning indicators and help reveal plans, intentions, and capabilities.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, Maritime, Militias, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Reserves
Political Geography:: China and Asia

531. New War in the South China Sea: Framing China's Unrestricted Warfare and the Role of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy

Author:: Rhisan Morales
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: China’s gray zone campaigns in the South China Sea (SCS) are characterized by incremental advances that do not directly cause war but aggregate tensions to shift the status quo in favor of Chinese territorial claims. These advances include constructing Chinese facilities in uninhabited or unhabitable areas and using nonmilitarized coercions to establish control over maritime territories and enhance China’s national interests. China’s gray zone campaign began in 1987 when UNESCO requested China's assistance to build an observation outpost in Fiery Cross Reef. China took its involvement as an opportunity to establish a sovereignty marker on the reef in the form of a military outpost. Between 1994 and 1995, China continued its gray zone campaigns in the Mischief Reef, which further escalated in 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

532. The Value of Reporting: National Reporting Practices under the UN Sanctions Regime on North Korea

Author:: David Atwood, Gian Giezendanner, and Sophie Timmermans
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: The UN Security Council has imposed a broad range of sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, requesting member states to report on how they are implementing these measures. Many factors affect the national reporting practices of states, with some having failed to submit any reports. Reporting serves as an important measure of transparency and trust-building concerning state compliance with international commitments in general. The frequency and depth of reporting on national implementation of the sanctions by UN member states help to discern the regime’s effectiveness. Failure to meet reporting deadlines, the use of vague language, and limited information on national implementation all dampen the usefulness of reporting on the implementation of the DPRK sanctions regime. The Value of Reporting: National Reporting Practices under the UN Sanctions Regime on North Korea—a report from the Survey’s Strengthening Implementation and Enforcement of the Arms Embargo on North Korea (SAENK) project—highlights factors that affect reporting, providing a more nuanced picture of national practices. The report also examines national DPRK sanctions regime reporting in relation to reporting on other international arms control instruments, with the aim of revealing potential mutually beneficial synergies.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, and Global Focus

533. China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022

Author:: J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

534. China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

Author:: Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Maritime, Port, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Blockade
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

535. China Maritime Report No. 27: PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational Performance

Author:: Roderick Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

536. China Maritime Report No. 28: Bitterness Ends, Sweetness Begins: Organizational Changes to the PLAN Submarine Force Since 2015

Author:: J. Michael Dahm and Alison Zhao
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: “Above-the-neck” reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that began in 2015 directed the development of a new joint operational command system that resulted in commensurate changes to PLA Navy submarine force command and control. Additional changes to tactical submarine command and control were driven by the evolution and expansion of PLA Navy surface and airborne capabilities and the introduction of new longer-range submarine weapons. Follow-on “below-theneck” reforms inspired significant organizational change across most of China’s military services. However, the PLA Navy submarine force, for its part, did not reorganize its command structure but instead focused on significant improvements to the composition and quality of its force. Between 2017 and 2023, the PLA Navy submarine force engaged in a notable transformation, shuffling personnel and crews among twenty-six submarines—eleven newly commissioned and fifteen since retired—relocating in-service submarines to ensure an equitable distribution of newer, more capable submarines across the fleet. Observations of infrastructure improvements at PLA Navy submarine bases portend even more changes to submarine force structure in the coming years.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Reform, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

537. China Maritime Report No. 29: PLAN Mine Countermeasures: Platforms, Training, and Civil-Military Integration

Author:: Brian Waidelich and George Pollitt
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made incremental progress in its mine countermeasures (MCM) program in recent years. The PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 MCM ships and craft includes classes of minehunters and minesweepers mostly commissioned in the past decade as well as unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and remotely operated vehicles with demonstrated explosive neutralization capability. Despite the addition of these advanced MCM platforms and equipment, experts affiliated with the PLAN and China’s mine warfare development laboratory have serious reservations about the PLAN’s current ability to respond to the full range of likely threats posed by naval mines in future contingencies. The PLAN’s MCM forces are currently organized for operations near China’s coastline, but writings by Chinese military and civilian experts contend that to safeguard Beijing’s expanding overseas interests, the PLAN must develop MCM capabilities for operations far beyond the First Island Chain. PLAN and civilian mine warfare experts have proposed various solutions for offsetting perceived shortcomings in the PLAN’s MCM program, including the development of autonomous USVs and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), deployment of modularized MCM mission packages on ships such as destroyers and frigates, and mobilization of civilian assets such as ships and helicopters in support of MCM operations. Although there appears to have been little to no adoption of these proposed solutions to date, the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its biggest challenges, and one can expect the PLAN to continue making measured progress in its MCM program in the years ahead.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Integration, Landmines, Civil-Military Relations, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

538. China Maritime Report No. 30: A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines

Author:: Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Maritime, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

539. China Maritime Report No. 31: China's Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards: Bohai Shipyard, Huludao; Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan; and Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Navy, Industry, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

540. The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea

Author:: Scott Bentley
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, Commerce, and Expansion
Political Geography:: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and South China Sea

541. Commercial Satellite Use Catalyzes Nuclear-Armed States to Combat: A Wargame After-Action Report (Occasional Paper 2306)

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Recent reports of Elon Musk’s refusal to allow Ukraine to use his satellites to help it mount strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea pose a basic question: Just how sustainable might military use of commercial satellites be? So far, the United States and other spacefaring nations have deferred or taken a hands-off approach to dealing with this issue. When it comes to space, states are roughly where they were with sea power in the 1600s and air power before World War I: dramatic acts of air war and naval piracy were about to ensue, but instituting national or international regulation hardly seemed urgent… until they were. How prepared are we to deal with such a transition in space? Can we keep non-state and state actors from using space to intensify the pace of military air and ground operations? Or are space Lusitanias, in which the world’s major powers get dragged into wars, more likely? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) designed and conducted a wargame this summer tailored to this purpose. SpaceNews published the game’s results (see below). The game’s play begins in 2027 with a Pakistani terrorist group’s hijacking of “commercial” Chinese satellite services to mount an attack against an Indian nuclear base. The terrorists’ aim is to drag Pakistan into a war with India to help decide the status of Kashmir. Through a number of twists and turns, the game ends with intensified ground operations between Pakistan and India and China and the United States engaging in space combat against a set of each others’ commercial space satellites. Are we ready for this future? The short answer is no. The long answer can be teased from the game’s report and its key takeaways below.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Space, War Games, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: South Asia and Asia

542. Time to say goodbye? The impact of environmental regulation on foreign divestment

Author:: Haiou Mao, Holger Görg, and Guopei Fang
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We look at divestments by foreign firms – a topic that has received comparatively little attention in the literature – and investigate how changes in the regulatory environment in the host country may impact on such divestment decisions. We use the implementation of China’s Two Control Zone (TCZ) policy as a “quasi-natural experiment”, using detailed firm level combined with city level data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that the implementation of TCZ policy has led to higher probabilities of divestments by foreign firms in targeted TCZ cities and industries. The mechanism behind this seems to be a TCZ-induced increase in discharge fees and efforts to reduce SO2 emissions. Allowing for heterogeneity of effects, we find that the effect is particularly strong for firms from source countries with less stringent environmental regulation, and those using less advanced technology. We furthermore show that firms using intermediates from polluting industries also experience a higher probability of divestment.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Foreign Direct Investment, Regulation, Business, and Divestment
Political Geography:: China and Asia

543. China as an International Lender of Last Resort

Author:: Sebastian Horn, Bradley C. Parks, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into China’s growing role in the global financial system. A key finding is that the global swap line network put in place by the People’s Bank of China is increasingly used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in liquidity support extended to crisis countries, including repeated rollovers of swaps coming due. The swaps bolster gross reserves and are mostly drawn by distressed countries with low liquidity ratios. In addition, we show that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have given out an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. Taken together, China’s overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20 percent of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. These findings have implications for the international financial and monetary architecture, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.
Topic:: Debt, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

544. A post-Western global order in the making? Foreign policy goals of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa

Author:: Sinikukka Saari, Toni Alaranta, Bart Gaens, Katariina Mustasilta, and Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa are striving for a more multipolar, post-Western world order in which they would not be seen merely as auxiliary powers to the bigger players, but as independent great powers. For them, a key foreign policy goal is to transform global governance institutions. They all call for a permanent seat for their country on the UN Security Council. To achieve that, the states need backing from more than the Western states – and this logically strengthens the multi-aligned logic of their foreign policies. India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa see Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Western countermeasures from their own perspective. They describe Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law, but see the war primarily as a Western concern, not theirs. Although these states are critical towards the West, they are not anti-Western and they all value multilateral institutions; their foreign policy goals and features offer opportunities for the EU to engage with them, but that needs to happen on a more equal footing than what has traditionally been the case.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, UN Security Council, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Turkey, India, Asia, Brazil, and Latin America

545. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:: Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

546. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:: Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

547. Water diplomacy analysis for Central Asia: Dynamics of insecurity and sources of resilience

Author:: Emma Hakala, Katariina Mustasilta, and Mohammed Hadi
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Climate change, geopolitical tensions and other global crises emphasise the need for water diplomacy, which refers to the prevention and resolution of political tensions with the help of water expertise and diplomatic tools. Disputes over water can contribute to instability, but fair and well-governed management of water resources can serve as a platform for cooperation and peacebuilding. In Central Asia, water has a crucial role as a precondition for economic and social development, but also for relations between the countries in the region due to the largely transboundary and shared character of resources. Questions about water use have been intertwined in disputes about other unresolved issues between the countries in the past. As the impacts of climate change become increasingly visible and are likely to further reduce water access, it is important to better understand the water conflict and resilience dynamics. This analysis traces the potential for water diplomacy in Central Asia. It identifies major conflict factors, peace enablers, regional dynamics and the role of water resources. The analysis takes an anticipatory, forward-looking approach, particularly focusing on sources of resilience and potential points of cooperation.
Topic:: Climate Change, Water, Governance, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Central Asia and Asia

548. Enhancing small state preparedness: Risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and technological dependencies

Author:: Mikael Mattlin, Shaun Breslin, Elina Sinkkonen, Liisa Kauppila, and Annika Björkdahl
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The post-Cold War liberalist view, according to which interdependences supported a virtuous cycle of mutual gains, has given way to a realist-tinged view that regards economic interdependence as a cause of insecurity and an element in conflicts. In this new environment of increasing great power competition and technological decoupling, all states are not created equal. Major states such as the United States and China can be system shapers, whereas small states tend to be system takers. Unlike smaller states, they have a greater ability to use their investment leverage, supply chain dominance and control of core technologies. For smaller states with open economies, such as Finland and Sweden, these capabilities of major powers create vulnerabilities in the form of security risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and critical technological dependencies. The report explores how small states can mitigate such risks. A series of innovative Delphi backcasting exercises in Finland and Sweden brought together 113 sectoral experts and generalists to ponder ways to prevent dystopian scenarios from unfolding. The target years of the scenarios extended from 2027 to 2035, encouraging ideas on both short- and longer-term solutions. Instead of aiming for a consensus of expert views, the process sought to produce a variety of effective means and measures that a small state could choose to adopt. The exercise consisted of nine scenarios, presented as comic art. The narratives on the risks of foreign ownership focused on 1) acquisitions of gaming companies gathering personal data, 2) transfers of real estate ownership in Lapland and 3) venture capital investments in emerging technology start-ups. The scenarios on supply disruptions dealt with 4) discriminatory practices limiting access to antibiotics, 5) political retaliation limiting access to water treatment components and 6) sanctions on wind power materials, components and minerals. As for high technology dependencies, the cases included 7) the maintenance of military technology, 8) the cybersecurity of health technology and 9) the supply of chemicals for research and development activities. According to the report, small states have the least leeway in navigating the risk environments created by technological dependencies, whereas the toolkits to tackle the potential dangers of foreign ownership and supply disruptions are more extensive. Although different issues and insecurities require different bespoke solutions, all the risk categories call for active mitigation efforts. Most of the suggested Finnish and Swedish expert solutions can be clustered into three alternative approaches: protectionist/interventionist, liberal and technologically oriented. Protectionist/interventionist solutions would expand the state’s powers in controlling, guiding and limiting economic activities. Key suggestions included: covering acquisitions and greenfield investments in national foreign direct investment screening screening real estate acquisitions with a wide range of countries of origin imposing country-specific limitations to real estate acquisitions screening venture capital investments in emerging technologies initiating a national security act to limit foreign control rapidly imposing country- and company-specific limitations to bids in critical industries increasing tariffs supporting domestic or EU-level production through subsidies and industrial policy friendshoring the production of critical goods expanding the scope of supply stockpiling in pharmaceuticals and water treatment components The more liberal approach towards national preparedness would focus on solving the challenges primarily through carrots instead of sticks – to avoid limiting entrepreneurial freedoms and interfering with the dynamics of the capitalist market economy. The proposed solutions included: initiating value debates to guide individuals’ choices when accepting investments formulating a national innovation strategy to boost domestic companies’ operating conditions in emerging technology fields teaching “technology literacy” to guide the use of foreign-owned products engaging all stakeholders in making decisions on foreign ownership diversifying the sources of critical goods such as antibiotics enhancing awareness of risks and making “plan Bs” in supply chain management deepening the EU’s single market to offer genuine scalability opportunities for start-ups The third, more technologically oriented approach would rely on new innovations or technical solutions to enhance small state preparedness. Key ideas included: innovating new medicines to replace antibiotics prioritising non-conventional technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) enhancing domestic capacity to produce key components with 3D printing researching alternative materials to replace critical chemicals developing the recycling, recovery and transportation of critical chemicals adopting geofencing and coding solutions to enhance cybersecurity designating emerging technologies as focus areas in higher education increasing the adaptability of technical solutions through standardisation These three approaches prioritise different key solutions for enhancing small state preparedness. However, they represent generic policy preferences rather than ready-made policy recommendations. Ideally, states can formulate their own pick-and-mix toolkit by combining elements from the different approaches. The complementary nature of some of the expert views was also suggested by the fact that many – even most – respondents argued for diversification as a solution to various challenges. For example, and regardless of the chosen strategy, tendering rules could be improved by placing quality over price, taking geopolitical risks into account and allowing multiple winners in contrast to the currently dominant winner-takes-it-all logic, which leads to overly concentrated supply chains. Moreover, at least minor legislative tightenings were widely proposed to be made on foreign ownership – especially with regard to that of nationals of authoritarian states. These changes were, however, typically proposed to be complemented with such balancing acts as long-term leases and incentives to develop and acquire domestic products and companies. Ultimately, by highlighting alternative approaches to small state preparedness, this report seeks to encourage democratic discussion on a broader political choice: what type of state and economy do we want in the future? It is not only their identity that guides what states do; adopted policies and means also shape state identities over time.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Supply, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, Finland, Asia, Sweden, and United States of America

549. The Great Supply Chain Shift from China to South Asia?

Author:: Ganeshan Wignaraja
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:: Global supply chains connect world industry and international trade in manufactures. East Asia’s dominance with China as the preferred assembly hub in global supply chains has brought unprecedented regional prosperity, but South Asia remains a latecomer. However, pandemic-related and post-pandemic continuing disruptions to supply chains and slowing growth are being keenly felt, dampening China’s attractiveness. In an uncertain global economy, increasingly footloose foreign investors are looking for alternative production locations. Is it South Asia’s turn to prosper through supply chains in this uncertain world? This is the topical public policy question facing India and the others in South Asia. This paper discusses the concept of global supply chains, the industrial rise of East Asia, drivers of supply chain relocation from China, South Asia’s prospects, India as a complementary hub and policy lessons from East Asia’s industrial success. For the purposes of this paper, South Asia is broadly defined as the India and its contiguous countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Topic:: Industrial Policy, Monetary Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Industrialization, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

550. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS