Political Geography: Asia - CIAO Search Results

501. The United Nations and Human Rights in North Korea

Author:: Raymond Ha
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Despite the emergence of geopolitical trends that threaten global stability, the United Nations is—and will remain—indispensable for the promotion of human rights in North Korea. Domestic political changes in South Korea and the United States have set the stage for robust multilateral coordination on North Korean human rights, including at the United Nations. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea remains the focal point of relevant activity within the United Nations, as the Seoul office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights continues its work in the field. Moreover, the Security Council held a public discussion on North Korean human rights in August 2023 after a six-year hiatus, as South Korea, the United States, and other like-minded countries emphasized the connection between human rights and security issues. It will be vital to keep human rights at the forefront as North Korea reengages with the world following its COVID-19 lockdown. Finally, North Korea’s fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in November 2024 will not only enable states and civil society organizations to spotlight Pyongyang’s human rights record, but also reveal opportunities for engagement going forward.
Topic:: Human Rights, United Nations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

502. Sin Ch’ae-ho’s Toksa Sinron and Anti-Flunkeyism as the Heart of Korean Nationalist Historiography

Author:: Kyu-hyun Jo
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: This article will analyze three main features of Sin Ch’ae-ho’s Toksa Sinron (A New Interpretation of History), first focusing on his interpretation of Pu-yo and Tan-kun’s lineage in the formation of Korean identity. Next, it will explore how Sin Ch’ae-ho highlighted ancient figures like General Ŭlchi Muntok and Yŏn Kaesomun, challenging the Sino-centric view of Korea’s past. The discussion will then turn to the Silla Outpost Theory, delineating Sin Ch’ae-ho’s criticisms and presenting his arguments for its rejection. The article will conclude that these three essential features of Toksa Sinron form the core of emphasizing the Korean essence of ancient Korean history and that the displacement of China and Japanese colonial historiography in this process was the principal mission of Sin Ch’ae-ho, which Toksa Sinron successfully accomplished. These qualities explain why Sin Ch’ae-ho occupies the exclusive position in Korean historiography as the father of modern Korean nationalist historiography
Topic:: History, Identity, and Historiography
Political Geography:: Asia and Korea

503. Competing for the Global South: Asia and the Quest for Leadership in a Multipolar World

Author:: Filippo Fasulo and Nicola Missaglia
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: As the world transitions into a multipolar era, an increasing number of nations are challenging Western dominance and reshaping the global order. Central to this shift is the rise of the Global South, led by Asia’s powerhouses - India and China. These two nations, each offering distinct governance, development, and security models, are in a growing competition for influence. Countries across the Global South are advocating for a more equitable international system, demanding debt restructuring, climate action, and solutions to emerging security challenges. What strategies will India and China propose to address these demands? And how will their rivalry shape the future of the Global South as a unified force on the world stage?
Topic:: Leadership, Global South, Multipolarity, International System, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

504. China’s influence at the United Nations: words and deeds

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Théo Storella, and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: We investigate China’s influence at the United Nations by focusing on the promotion of its narratives (words) and its voting behaviour (deeds). For the former, we assess the extent to which China’s global initiatives have become embedded in UN discourse compared to Western initiatives. For the latter, we assess the degree to which countries, regions and voting coalitions align their UN General Assembly votes with China compared to the US. When it comes to words, China’s global initiatives are sometimes louder than the West’s. More specifically, the Belt and Road Initiative has had a much greater impact on UN discourse than any Western initiative. Other Chinese global initiatives do not clearly stand out from those of the West, with the Global Compact for Migration mentioned more frequently at the UN than any Chinese initiative other than the BRI. We also find that Chinese initiatives are more self-referential. Thematically, both Chinese and Western initiatives are very focused on security as well as aid and human rights. Moving to voting patterns, countries’ income levels are a key determinant of alignment in voting. Poorer countries are much more aligned with China than with the US. North America and the European Union, in that order, are generally more aligned with the US than with China and these trends are much more stable than one could expect given China’s growing economic influence.
Topic:: United Nations, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

505. Updating the EU strategy on China: co-existence while derisking through partnerships

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Abigaël Vasselier
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union-China relationship has deteriorated markedly since the EU introduced a three-part strategy in 2019 based on partnership, competition and systemic rivalry. Th e relationship has been undermined by China’s support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its increasingly anti-Western foreign policy that aims to alter the international rules-based system. Meanwhile, the economic relationship is changing because of China’s structural deceleration and increasing self-reliance, coupled with the EU’s growing critical dependence on China, especially for digitalisation and decarbonisation. Europe must accept that relations with China will not return to their pre-pandemic state. While there is no need to change the overall strategy, the EU should seek co-existence with China while preserving EU values and interests. Cooperation is still needed to address global problems, including climate change, in which China plays an important role in finding solutions, but on which the EU cannot accept Chinese cooperation at any price. In terms of co-existence, the EU must continue to pursue de-risking – or reducing its exposure to China – especially for its energy and digital transitions. De-risking has started but more needs to be done to understand how it can be continued while not creating conflict. The EU should pursue a three-part approach: increase coherence and coordination with all European stakeholders, refi ne the EU economic-security strategy while accepting trade-offs, and seek partnerships as the best offensive tool. The 2024-2029 European Commission should foster discussion of China and coordination of strategic issues within a larger constituency. EU countries, with Commission coordination, need to be more involved in building a comprehensive approach, including by conducting national risk assessments and by shaping and implementing de-risking measures. On economic security, full implementation of current defensive instruments is needed, along with new protections, such as better coordination of export controls and a new outbound-investment screening mechanism. The trade-offs stemming from pursuing more security will need to be made explicit in order to mitigate them. On partnerships, the EU must look beyond the United States, working within the G7 and with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and South Korea, which have valuable experience of de-risking. Mutually beneficial and strategic cooperation agreements need to be brokered with relevant emerging and developing economies.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Economy, Risk, Trade, and Coexistence
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

506. Xi Transforms the Party: Senior Cadre Selection in a New Era

Author:: Mark Stokes, Eric Lee, Cathy Fang, and Marek Haar
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Due to the challenges associated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise, anticipating who will lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a major concern. General Secretary Xi Jinping has reshuffled the deck around norms for succession. With old patterns woven out of the CCP’s banner, studying the new framework for promoting new senior leaders and the sub-factional politics lying underneath will aid in identifying who will lead the CCP and govern the PRC in the future. To that end, this report offers a summary of the leader promotion process within the CCP, a guide to identifying rising CCP leadership in the future, and a map of the current six sub-factions competing for Xi’s favor.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

507. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence

Author:: Rahman Yaacob
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Cambodia

508. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi

Author:: Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, and East China

509. Who Briefs Xi Jinping? How Politburo Study Sessions Help to Decode Chinese Politics

Author:: Neil Thomas and Feifei Hung
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China’s politicians are lifelong learners. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls itself a “learning party” (xuexi dang) because its members participate in regular study sessions. These are designed to enhance organizational discipline and to instill practical knowledge. Even the Party’s top leaders, the 24 members of the Politburo, dedicate a half-day almost every month to the “collective study” (jiti xuexi) of a topic chosen by General Secretary Xi Jinping. This practice is unusual compared to most Western governments. It is rare that a U.S. president would convene their cabinet for lectures on employment policy, political theory, or World Trade Organization reform — all recent topics of Politburo study sessions. So why do Party leaders spend so much of their limited time doing collective study? What do they study? Who briefs from? How can we use this information to better understand Beijing? This paper first explains the nature and importance of Politburo study sessions. It then uses a unique dataset to analyze changes in topics and briefers over time before presenting case studies of how sessions focused on technology and foreign affairs relate to policymaking. The conclusion summarizes our findings about the value and limits of using these sessions to decode Chinese politics.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

510. The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan

Author:: Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan. What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan? This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”1 The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Regional Integration, Economic Development, and Identity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

511. Ishiba Takes the Helm: A New Kind of Leader for Japan

Author:: Asia Sociey
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) leadership elections are normally staid and predictable affairs. But scandals in the LDP and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s radical decision to dissolve powerful party factions disrupted business as usual. In an unusually dramatic election on September 27, Shigeru Ishiba emerged as the new party president — and automatically became prime minister of Japan. Ishiba, a long-standing fixture in the ruling LDP who had run for the position four times before, surprised many observers by defeating eight other contenders including powerful party veterans, popular “young Turks,” and a prominent female lawmaker. He immediately called for a general election on October 27 as an opportunity to secure a mandate for his policies during the often short-lived “honeymoon” for a new prime minister. For the United States, Ishiba brings a strong commitment to the security relationship, albeit from an approach and perspective that have the potential to disrupt the current progress in modernizing the alliance. He has advocated for a more equal partnership and for revisiting the foundational documents that govern the status of the U.S. troops stationed throughout the archipelago. It is an open question whether that element of his campaign rhetoric will translate into governing policies; indeed, he has already appeared to walk back some of his positions, including calling for an “Asian NATO” ahead of the general election. With the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of many regional security arrangements, any significant change to the bilateral relationship could alter the stability and order of the broader Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Elections, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Prime Minister, and Fumio Kishida
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

512. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:: Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:: Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

513. On Science & Tech Diplomacy

Author:: Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

514. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:: Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

515. On Alliances in Northeast Asia

Author:: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Duyeon Kim, and Yuka Koshino
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Over the past two years, delegations to Washington from Japan and South Korea have one predominant question for their interlocutors: What would a Trump 2.0 administration mean for their countries and for U.S. global leadership more broadly? Both Asian capitals appreciate the upgrades to their bilateral pacts with the United States under the Biden administration’s alliance-centric foreign policy, and express anxiety about the possible return of Trump as commander-in-chief. Even before his election in 2016, Trump had expressed open disdain for U.S. alliances and that skepticism could be amplified in a second term by his “America First” approach. With Kamala Harris now at the top of the Democratic ticket, Washington analysts assume broad continuity in her foreign policy approach, although nuances may yet emerge. But while a Harris election and a second Trump presidency contrast sharply on policy and style, the views from Seoul and Tokyo point to enduring elements of American foreign policy that are likely in either outcome. In many ways, Trump and Harris share an approach to U.S. economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Upon taking office in 2017, Trump fractured the Obama administration’s core economic pillar of the so-called rebalance to Asia by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This divorce drew dismay particularly from Japan; Tokyo had seen the 12-nation free trade pact as its primary tool to blunt China’s rising economic sway over the region and to reinforce its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP). The Biden-Harris administration has similarly expressed little enthusiasm for re-joining the reformed version that Japan salvaged after the U.S. withdrawal, and its signature regional economic policy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IFEP) lacks the market access that the region’s economies crave. Japan and South Korea also had misgivings about the passage of domestic economic legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act that would have penalized South Korean and Japanese investment in the United States. “Friend-shoring” rhetoric aside, both Seoul and Tokyo see either leader forging an industrial policy that defaults to protectionist trade practices. Both Japan and South Korea are also concerned about diminishing American leadership of the world and the ascendance of illiberal, authoritarian blocs. Biden and the Democratic Party have generally promoted U.S. alliances as underpinning a world order that promotes stability and the rule of law. Yet during Biden’s presidency, wars in Europe and the Middle East have flared, threatening to distract Washington from its Indo-Pacific priorities and driving deep divisions in public opinion both domestically and internationally. Trump and his Republican colleagues, on the other hand, mostly disapprove of U.S. military involvement in international conflict and fidelity to international alliances, particularly NATO. A Trump administration could undermine the rules-based system by brokering deals with authoritarian leaders, neglecting multilateral institutions that seek to quell conflict, and reinforcing the rising ideological isolationism in U.S. politics. Trump and Biden policy convergences aside, Seoul’s and Tokyo’s experiences with each president are starkly different. A Trump presidency would almost certainly present deeper challenges to each country and disrupt the web of security partnerships that both countries view as broadly stabilizing. How Trump would approach the China challenge is likely to be the central question: Will he be relatively supportive of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific if he sees them as amplifying U.S. power and deterrence? Or will he seek to cut his own deals with Beijing that excludes allies’ interests? Would he demand multifold increases in the burden-sharing agreements supporting the U.S. military presence in the region that allies would resist? A separate set of questions arises considering a Democratic victory. Would Harris opt to continue Biden’s approach to alliances? Would her administration see the Indo-Pacific as equally important to the trans-Atlantic partnership? Would Harris’s foreign policy team have a different view of how to handle strategic competition with China? All of these yet-unanswered questions loom large for Japan and South Korea over the coming months.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Alliance, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Presidential Elections, and Kamala Harris
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia

516. On U.S.-China Relations & Security

Author:: Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

517. On the Road of Excess: How Startups Are Driving China’s Electric Vehicle Boom

Author:: G. A. Donovan
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: A complex mix of ingredients came together to create China's electric vehicle boom, but government subsidies alone cannot explain the emergence of the industry's sophisticated ecosystem and vast manufacturing capacity. An alternate explanation is that Chinese carmakers could scale up and rapidly expand production of electric vehicles because they have access to the deep pools of flexible financing provided by capital markets, sovereign wealth funds, and private equity and venture capital investors, both in China and from overseas. China’s electric vehicle startups have raised billions from investors eager to finance potential unicorns in innovative, environmentally friendly industries. Taking inspiration from Tesla, Google, and other Silicon Valley pioneers, the founders of these startups have relied on rising valuations to attract new investment to sustain their operations despite years of losses. However, many of China's electric vehicle startups now find it hard to raise funds as their valuations have plummeted, and the market forces that drove the industry's breakneck growth may now be slowing it down.
Topic:: Investment, Manufacturing, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:: China and Asia

518. Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration Speech: Reactions from China, Civil Unrest in Taiwan

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: After winning Taiwan’s presidential election with 40% of the vote in January,1 Lai Ching-te faced his first major test on May 20, 2024: his inaugural address. The speech incited a strong military reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, the largest civil protests since the Sunflower Student Movement2 have gripped the island in reaction to a bill passed by opposition parties — a bill that some fear could expand the legislature’s power and undermine the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency. For a number of reasons, Lai’s address, the protests, and his cross-Strait policies are crucial to understanding the continuing evolution of cross-Strait relations as well as the PRC-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. First and foremost, cross-Strait relations are at an all-time low; second, the U.S. presidential election in November could shift U.S. policy toward Taiwan; and third, Lai will govern with a divided Legislative Yuan, presenting challenges to his domestic agenda. This paper will first deal with President Lai’s address and how it framed cross-strait issues, Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC, and other important topics. It will then cover China’s response and likely posture in the upcoming months. The paper then analyzes the current civil protests in Taiwan and how a divided legislature will impact politics over the next four years. The penultimate section looks at the expected differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency for Beijing, Taipei, and the world. A conclusion sums up the paper’s key points.
Topic:: Protests, Presidential Elections, Regional Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

519. Politics First: The Key to Understanding China’s Third Plenum

Author:: Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Anticipation is growing for one of the most important events in Chinese politics this year. On June 27, General Secretary Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the 24-man Politburo that announced the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its Third Plenum in Beijing on July 15–18. A plenum is a plenary meeting of the committee’s 205 members and 171 non-voting alternate members. The meeting is important because the Central Committee will issue an authoritative “decision” (jueding) that will guide policymaking for years to come. The document will center on “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” amid concerns both at home and abroad about the Party’s ability to steward China’s economic, geopolitical, and social development. However, expectations should be modest. Historically, third plenums are often overrated as catalysts for transformational change and instead introduce plans that expand on existing policy themes. Xi’s first third plenum in 2013 appeared unusually ambitious, raising hopes for economic and political liberalization, but its true significance was in enabling Xi’s centralization of power. The policy signals for this month’s plenum suggest a strong emphasis on Xi’s goals of achieving technological self-reliance, addressing financial risks, streamlining central-local relations, and improving social welfare. There are also hints that Beijing may try to ease conditions for private firms and foreign investors in high-tech sectors, as well as efforts to enhance internal Party governance. Additionally, several previously sacked officials are expected to lose their seats on the Central Committee. This article analyzes the historical context, policy signals, personnel movements, and key documents related to the upcoming Third Plenum.
Topic:: Government, Politics, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

520. Persuasive technologies in China: Implications for the future of national security

Author:: Daria Impiombato, Nathan Attrill, Albert Zhang, Fergus Ryan, and Bethany Allen
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The rapid adoption of persuasive technologies—any digital system that shapes users’ attitudes and behaviours by exploiting physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities—will challenge national security in ways that are difficult to predict. Emerging persuasive technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), ambient technologies and neurotechnology interact with the human mind and body in far more intimate and subconscious ways, and at far greater speed and efficiency, than previous technologies. This presents malign actors with the ability to sway opinions and actions without the conscious autonomy of users. Regulation is struggling to keep pace. Over the past decade, the swift development and adoption of these technologies have outpaced responses by liberal democracies, highlighting the urgent need for more proactive approaches that prioritise privacy and user autonomy. That means protecting and enhancing the ability of users to make conscious and informed decisions about how they’re interacting with technology and for what purpose. China’s commercial sector is already a global leader in developing and using persuasive technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls China’s private sector and mandates that Chinese companies—especially technology companies—work towards China’s national-security interests. This presents a risk that the CCP could use persuasive technologies commercially developed in China to pursue illiberal and authoritarian ends, both domestically and abroad, through such means as online influence campaigns, targeted psychological operations, transnational repression, cyber operations and enhanced military capabilities. ASPI has identified several prominent Chinese companies that already have their persuasive technologies at work for China’s propaganda, military and public-security agencies. They include: Midu—a language intelligence technology company that provides generative AI tools used by Chinese Government and CCP bureaus to enhance the party-state’s control of public opinion. Those capabilities could also be used for foreign interference (see page 4). Suishi—a pioneer in neurotechnology that’s developing an online emotion detection and evaluation system to interpret and respond to human emotions in real time. The company is an important partner of Tianjin University’s Haihe Lab (see page 16), which has been highly acclaimed for its research with national-security applications (see page 17). Goertek—an electronics manufacturer that has achieved global prominence for smart wearables and virtual-reality (VR) devices. This company collaborates on military–civil integration projects with the CCP’s military and security organs and has developed a range of products with dual-use applications, such as drone-piloting t
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Persuasion
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

521. A Taiwan crisis is a China crisis

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The European Union needs a China contingency. Government and corporate decision-makers may be preparing for a possible Chinese military attack on Taiwan, but they must also focus on how a Taiwan crisis will impact China and, consequently, the EU’s economic security. Largely on account of Taiwan’s prominent position in the global semiconductor industry, a Chinese attack on the island will inflict trillions of dollars in costs on the global economy. But a Taiwan crisis also threatens to disrupt China-centered production and supply chains for green technologies, such as electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, as well as create unprecedented geopolitical risk for European companies in China.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

522. Whaling politics: two worlds that never meet

Author:: Minori Takahashi
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The arrest and detention of environmental activist Paul Watson in Greenland drew renewed attention to Japan’s whaling, specifically the commercial whaling that resumed in July 2019. Japan stopped commercial whaling of large whales in the Antarctic in 1986-87 and coastal whaling by March 1988, following decisions in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). With the stated aim of gaining sufficient knowledge to re-start commercial whaling, Japan conducted research whaling for ecological and resource data, as IWC regulations permit member states to do. In 2010, Watson’s group physically interfered with a ship contributing to Japan’s Whale Research Program near Antarctica, leading Japan to issue a red notice against him through Interpol. 14 years later, in response to Japan’s request, Danish authorities in Greenland, constitutionally linked to Denmark but with extensive autonomy, detained Watson during a refuelling stop. The arrest prompted protests in Europe and an online petition with over 720,000 signatures for his release. Joining the cause are renowned actors, acclaimed filmmakers and even parliamentarians and city mayors. Watson’s legal team claimed the incident was political and that Japan was exploiting Greenland. Faced with intense opposition from otherwise friendly nations, why does Japan continue to engage in whaling?
Topic:: Environment, Politics, European Union, Conservation, and Whaling
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, and Asia

523. Pragmatic Considerations: Analyzing Why is China Concerned About North Korea-Russia Growing Military Cooperation?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On November 11, 2024, North Korea’s Central News Agency reported that Pyongyang had ratified a mutual defense treaty with Russia. This agreement, signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in June, stipulates that both parties will provide support to each other in the event of an armed attack. In October 2024, reports suggested that North Korea dispatched several thousand troops to Russia to assist in its war effort in Ukraine. Although both Moscow and Pyongyang have neither confirmed nor denied this action outright, China’s silence and ambiguous stance on the matter have been equally enigmatic. The increasing military alignment between North Korea and Russia has raised significant concerns in China, a key strategic ally of both nations. These concerns stem from the potential repercussions on Beijing’s regional and global influence.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

524. New Destinations: Is Asia Replacing Europe as Migrants’ Preferred Destination?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Many Asian countries with major and emerging economies have witnessed remarkable economic growth over the past decades. This progress has not been limited to rapid growth rates and expanding financial markets; it has also encompassed the development of infrastructure, the enhancement of innovation, the improvement of the business environment, and the adoption of more open and flexible policies to attract migrants. These measures aim to address demographic challenges and meet the need for larger workforces to keep up with economic transformation and development. As a result, these countries have seen a significant shift in their position within global migration trends, leading to speculation that Asia could, within a few years, replace traditional major destinations for migrants, such as Europe and the United States.
Topic:: Migration, Labor Issues, Income Inequality, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:: Asia

525. Moscow and Beijing at the Dawn of A Grave New World of Trump 2.0

Author:: Yu Bin
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The election of Donald Trump as the 47th US president changed the chemistry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing so much and yet so little. It was so much because the war-ending rhetoric of the president-elect was in sharp contrast to his predecessor’s steadfast support of Ukraine. It was so little because the war in Ukraine not only continued but even escalated after Trump’s decisive electoral win in early November as the Biden administration rushed arms to Ukraine with much relaxed restrictions (on ATACMS, etc.). Meanwhile, Beijing-Moscow relations continued to broaden and deepen throughout 2024 despite Trump’s repeated vows to split the Russia-China entente. Xi and Putin met three times in six months (May, July, and October). Their joint enterprises (SCO, BRICS, etc.) also expanded steadily while experiencing growing pains. Meanwhile, the two large powers considerably stepped up their mil-mil interactions with more exercises, exchanges, and joint patrols. It remains to be seen how Trump would operationalize his campaign rhetorics not just to capture a pivotal position within the Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle, but more importantly, to avert the Kissingerian dark prophecy of a grave new world of WMD and AI racing toward World War III.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Elections, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

526. Trump 2.0, South Korea’s Martial Law, and Future of Seoul-Tokyo Relations

Author:: Andy Lim and Ji-Young Lee
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. It was originally expected to be a milestone year for bilateral ties and a fitting culmination of nearly three years of hard work by two leaders: President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. But that outlook now seems hung in the balance, with new unknowns on the horizon—both expected and unexpected. In this final issue on Japan-Korea relations, we discuss the key factors that are likely to impact the future of bilateral ties and the Camp David trilateral in four major areas: 1) Trump 2.0, 2) political uncertainty in Seoul, 3) weak political support in Tokyo, and 4) resurfacing history issues. The final months of 2024 have brought new unknowns in the shape of leadership changes in the United States, Japan, and potentially South Korea. It is now possible that come January 2025, the leadership trio—President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon that has made the Korea-Japan rapprochement and the unprecedented trilateral partnership possible will be gone from office. What happens next is impossible to predict, but one hopes that the hard-fought and laboriously planned institutionalization of bilateral and trilateral ties will withstand these changes in leadership. This will be the first true test for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership since the Camp David summit in August 2023. Japan’s new prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, and President Yoon agreed in mid-November to “further elevate the bilateral relationship to new heights” towards 2025 and to promote comprehensive cooperation in areas such as “politics, security, economy, culture and social security.” However, following President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, the future of Seoul-Tokyo relations faces a great deal of uncertainty. Given that it was President Yoon’s political will that initially facilitated rapproachment, depending on what happens to his political future and who comes into office in South Korea, Seoul-Tokyo relations may experience challenges. While conflicts over long-standing history issues have been consciously minimized during this period of rapproachment, they have not gone away, as demonstrated by their inability to reach a consensus on a joint event on the controversial Sado mine.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Donald Trump, and Martial Law
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

527. Movement but Minimal Progress

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

528. China and the Two Koreas’ Triangular Games

Author:: See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: A rebound in China-ROK diplomacy raised optimism after a slow start to 2024, paving the way for the summit between Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 15. They met on the sidelines of APEC Peru before attending the G20 summit in Brazil. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul met in Beijing on May 13, facilitating the China-ROK-Japan trilateral summit and Yoon’s meeting with Premier Li Qiang in Seoul. As China-DPRK exchanges dwindled compared to the first third of this year, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s summits with Putin in May and June raised questions about the direction of China’s Korea policy. Donald Trump’s reelection in November intensified debate on the regional security and economic implications of US-China competition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

529. Rubbish Balloons, Mutual Repudiation: Is This How It Ends?

Author:: Aidan Foster-Carter
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Inter-Korean relations, already bad, got worse in 2024. North Korea launched a bizarre new campaign, sending balloons bearing trash. South Korea reacted by fully suspending the already defunct North-South military pact and resuming propaganda broadcasts at the DMZ. In August, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol announced a new policy of unification under liberal democracy, which despite offering dialogue left no place for the DPRK or Kim Jong Un. The latter took umbrage at Seoul for exaggerating flood casualties in the North, but offered no figure of his own. It is unclear whether North Korea has revised its constitution to declare South Korea irredeemably hostile, as no text has been published. In October the North blew up inter-Korean road and rail links. In December. Yoon blew up his own presidency by briefly declaring martial law, plunging South Korea into political chaos. As of now the North has not taken advantage of this.
Topic:: Government, Natural Disasters, Bilateral Relations, Democracy, and Constitution
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

530. Increasing Perils Ahead

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Lai Ching-te insisted at his May inauguration that Taiwan is sovereign and not subordinate to China. Beijing reacted by increasing cross-Strait tensions. China’s latest rounds of military exercises make clear that it is preparing to use force or at least gray-zone intimidation to effect reunification. Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang continued unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, seeking reconciliation but risking aiding China’s efforts to fragment Taiwan. Taiwan’s TSMC continues to expand in Taiwan and overseas in ways that keep it at the center of the global high-tech economy. Taiwan has increased its purchases of military equipment from the US and opened negotiations on a bilateral tax agreement. Beijing views US support for Taiwan as collaboration in Lai’s separatism. US President-elect Donald Trump has said that Taiwan stole the production of semiconductors from the US and should pay for US military support. However, this animus may be balanced by the outspoken Taiwan supporters he has chosen for his national security team. Can Taiwan overcome its internal divisions and Trump’s Taiwan skepticism? Can China, Taiwan, and the US step back from a confrontational spiral? None of this will be easy, but failure may put Taiwan’s future at risk.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

531. Beijing Seeks Advantage in US Competition, Leadership Change

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: China marked the end of 2024 and four years of often intense competition for regional influence with the Biden administration and its allies and partners by continuing strong opposition to outside interference and working to advance China’s leading position among most Southeast Asian governments. The Biden government made significant gains at China’s expense, notably in the Philippines, a contrast with the decline in US regional influence and China’s ascendance that occurred during the first Trump administration. Looking forward, Beijing will seek to advance Chinese influence as a reliable partner and stabilizing presence amid widespread regional and global uncertainties caused by growing economic protectionism, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and perceived negative implications of a second Trump administration.
Topic:: Leadership, Strategic Competition, Influence, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

532. The Worst Angels of Our Nature

Author:: Mason Richey and Rob York
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last several reporting periods of Comparative Connections have featured little drama in US relations with the two Koreas. A lot of important changes happened—a burgeoning Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral, Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear weapons program, etc.—but these developments were mostly incremental. However, the June-December 2024 reporting period—the final Comparative Connections—has featured bombshells, both metaphorically and literally. The most spectacular event was South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol going full rogue authoritarian and recklessly declaring martial law at 11pm on December 3 in order to carry out a military “self-coup d’état.” That is, Yoon annulled democratic processes and civil constitutional protections, arrogated all political and executive power to himself and the military, and attempted to suspend the national assembly. This shocking step toward tyranny—considered long-relegated to the distant past of South Korea’s developmental dictatorships of the 1950s-1980s—was as badly conceived as it was executed, farcically falling apart after less than three hours, when legislators (mostly from the opposition) breached the cordon of deployed soldiers around the national assembly, entered the plenary chamber, and voted 190-0 to revoke the martial law decree.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Domestic Politics, Coup, Donald Trump, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

533. Trump’s Return Scrambles Outlook

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: US-China relations through 2024 remained marked by a paradox. On the one hand, ties displayed a distinct stabilization. The two sides translated their leaders’ modest “San Francisco Vision” into reality. Cabinet officials and the numerous working groups met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened though differences emerged, sensitive issues were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. US electoral politics, or threat of Chinese interference in the elections, did not materially impinge on ties. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in US-China relations deepened. With its time in office winding down, the Biden administration went into regulatory overdrive to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two countries’ advanced technology ecosystems. China methodically responded in kind using its now-robust economic lawfare toolkit. The chasm in strategic perceptions remained just as wide. Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office portends a period of disruptive unpredictability in ties, although “Tariff Man” Trump can reliably be expected to enact additional impositions on Chinese imports. Two years to the day that they met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia to place a floor under their troubled relationship and initiate a process of emplacing guardrails, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met for their third in-person meeting as presidents in Lima, Peru, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. In Lima, the two presidents took stock of the gradual rehabilitation of ties over the past two years, despite its early interruption by the balloon incident, and pledged to consolidate the fragile stability and make the relationship more predictable. They also patted themselves for harvesting some of the low-hanging fruit since their summit in Woodside, California, 12 months ago. US-China relations have made important incremental progress over the past 18 months, starting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June 2023 (Blinken returned to Beijing again this April). In Spring 2023, aside from meetings of their senior-most officials, there was practically no active communication channel between the two sides. Fast forward to today and there are more than 20 dialogue frameworks that span the range from diplomacy, security, economy, trade, fiscal affairs, finance and military to counternarcotics, law enforcement, agriculture, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

534. Once Again, Leadership Transitions Challenge US-Japan Alliance

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well. While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term. The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Elections, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

535. Regional Overview: The Year of Elections (Finally) Ends

Author:: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The “year of elections” culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) “too close to call” US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump’s scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing (to us, at least), although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While we would not be bold (or foolish) enough to make firm predictions regarding future policy, we will speculate on expected trends and characteristics, while acknowledging at the onset that Trump prides himself on being unpredictable (and has largely succeeded in this quest). While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government. Elsewhere (and largely overlooked), the usual spate of multilateral meetings took place in the second half of the year—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, the G20 gathering, the East Asia Summit and companion ministerial-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the BRICS Summit, etc. —amid enhanced military activity and enhanced trilateral/minilateral cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

536. ‘The Search for People’s Well-Being’: Mainstreaming a Psychosocial Approach to Transitional Justice

Author:: Virginie Ladisch and Shayna Lewis
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: The field of transitional justice is increasingly recognizing the relevance of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in contexts of massive human rights violations. Despite growing advocacy and awareness at the global policy level, however, the field lacks a systematic approach to the issue, signified by the persistent conception of MHPSS solely as a form of service provision to victims and survivors. This study contributes to the development of such an approach, one that applies a psychosocial lens to analyze contexts, assess needs, and design and implement programming that has a positive, transformative impact on the well-being of victims and communities, as well as broader social systems. Drawing on experiences in contexts such as Australia, Canada, Colombia, The Gambia, Nepal, Uganda, and Syria, the report also offers guidance for supporting the mental health and well-being of transitional justice practitioners and addresses practical considerations as they operationalize MHPSS within their own work. At the level of formal transitional justice processes, a psychosocial approach can be integrated into reparative justice, truth-telling initiatives, and judicial processes seeking criminal accountability. Beyond formal processes, though, a psychosocial lens should be a foundational component of all aspects of transitional justice work. It requires a deep understanding of context and the psychosocial needs of a given society, community, or group. It also requires the development of responses that address those needs across different interventions. This study therefore offers guidance regarding key points of consideration for both civil society and government actors involved in transitional justice: embedding work in local communities, creating conditions for positive participation, overcoming stigma, identifying clear roles, building collaboration across silos, developing a long-term process, focusing on all stages of work, considering trauma among leaders and institutions, securing adequate funding, and measuring progress. The report argues that a psychosocial approach needs to be outward to inform analysis of the overall context, design of the intervention, and support for victims, as well as inward to consider how trauma affects organizational structures, team dynamics, and individuals’ ability to do their work.
Topic:: Sustainable Development Goals, Criminal Justice, Memory, Justice, Reparations, Gender, Violence Prevention, Youth Engagement, and Institutional Reform
Political Geography:: Uganda, Africa, Middle East, Canada, Asia, Colombia, South America, Nepal, Syria, North America, and Gambia

537. Transforming Social Relations: Restorative Responses to Massive Human Rights Violations

Author:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: Restorative justice and transitional justice are closely and fundamentally related responses to crime. They emphasize shared values and promote similar frameworks that seek to clarify responsibilities, and they both address the inherent limitations of existing institutions: for restorative justice, the limitations of retributive systems in dealing with domestic crimes; for transitional justice, the additional limitations of conventional or compromised rule of law institutions in dealing with serious and massive international crimes. In many ways, restorative justice is at the center of transitional justice. While scholars and practitioners of transitional justice have consistently applied the concepts of restorative justice, in practical terms, there are few examples of restorative justice practices being explicitly integrated into transitional justice processes, specifically those aimed at criminal accountability. There is also a general lack of understanding within both fields about what such integration means or requires. This report offers reflection, clarity, and guidance on the application of a restorative justice framework in contexts of massive human rights violations, including the advantages, risks, opportunities, and challenges of such an approach. The analysis is based on the experiences of Colombia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and the Bangsamoro region of the Philippines, which represent a range of different processes that all either integrated or reflected the practices or principles of restorative justice. These principles include stakeholder participation and repair of harm, and the practices include the use of direct or indirect dialogue or engagement between victims and perpetrators to resolve crimes. The study's findings address the role of dialogue between victims and perpetrators; the importance of engagement with communities and society in establishing a link between the micro and macro levels; the contribution of alternative or restorative sanctions in facilitating participation and repair; the need for integrity, legitimacy, and efficacy of process; and the coherence of restorative justice with other justice, peacebuilding, and transitional processes.
Topic:: Human Rights, Reform, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Institutions, Reparations, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Asia, Colombia, South America, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia

538. Repairing from the Bench: From Finding Responsibility to Fashioning Judicial Redress

Author:: Adriana Garcia Garcia, Fatima Yasmin Bokhari, and Masha Lisitsyna
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: Violence perpetrated by the police and the military is dominating news around the world. Survivors, victims, activists, and lawyers on all continents have filed lawsuits against these violations in judicial processes. Among the key objectives for victims are to seek the truth and confirmation from authorities that a wrong was done to them and to obtain reparations. The premise that harm should be repaired is routine in domestic legal systems around the world. But what does the obligation to provide reparations mean, particularly when serious human rights violations are at issue? While reparations may be narrowly defined as the relief afforded to a successful claimant in a given proceeding, in practice they can take a range of forms. The right to reparation has expanded in recent decades through interpretations of international norms, in particular, the right of victims of human rights violations to an effective remedy. This report draws on that evolving interpretation of international law and jurisprudence, much of it developed by regional human rights institutions in Africa, the Americas, and Europe; UN treaty bodies; and some innovative domestic courts. It identifies a series of judicial decisions interpreting international human rights law that have affirmed the content of the right to reparation for serious human rights violations that have upheld the rights of victims as much as possible. More than an analysis of the state of the field of the recognition of the right to reparation, the report provides guidance to human rights defenders and courts that are trying to respond to victims of such violations in ways that affirm their dignity and rights. This guide also explores how domestic courts have provided judicial reparations at the national level. Two relevant questions are considered: Have they in fact complied with international decisions and relevant norms regarding reparations? Have they delivered by doing those things that we believe courts are better suited to do on behalf of victims? At the domestic level, very few analyses exist on how domestic judges grant reparations or the compliance of their decisions with international law, jurisprudence of international human rights courts, and decisions by international human rights bodies that govern reparations. This guide seeks to fill this gap through the analysis of decisions of domestic courts around the world with different specialties.
Topic:: Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Memory, Judiciary, and Reparations
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Asia, South America, and North America

539. Spring 2024 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Levon Hovsepyan
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS SUREN TADEVOSYAN BALANCING POWERS: AZERBAIJAN’S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AMIDST REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES ………………………….. 6 TIANPING CHE JAPAN JOINS AUKUS: MOTIVATIONS, PROGRESS, AND IMPACT ..………. 22 KNARIK SARGSYAN BETWEEN BLOCS AND BLOCKADES: QATAR’S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA AND STRATEGIC MANEUVERS ……………………………….……………….. 44 GUO SONG THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S ATTEMPT TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE ………………….…………... 64 BOOK REVIEW: ARTYOM TONOYAN AHMED ZAHID SHAHAB AND ALI AKBAR. (2023). IRAN’S SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ……………………………….………………. 84
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Role Conceptions, AUKUS, Regional Security, Alliance, GCC, Diplomacy, Security, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Eurasia, Japan, Asia, United States of America, Qatar, Gulf Nations, Middle East, Palestine, and Israel

540. Peace mediation in the age of geopolitical contestation: Navigating the new reality

Author:: Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Violent conflict increasingly operates as an intertwined set of local, national and transnational conflicts. Peace processes need to acknowledge the tensions between geopolitics, power machinations and mediation. Traditional mediation models aimed at achieving settlements between belligerents are rare. Instead, diplomatic efforts often seek mainly to manage flashpoints, signal red lines and avoid mishaps and miscalculations. Emerging actors from the Gulf, Turkey, China and ASEAN are reshaping diplomacy in a multipolar world and directly impacting the peace mediation scene, once the playing field of the UN and primarily Western actors. While third parties have long played an integral role in official peace mediation, a range of non-governmental organisations has emerged in recent years to act as go-betweens, provide analysis and build the capacities of negotiating parties. AI is playing an increasing role in peace mediation. It can help process and analyse vast amounts of data, including historical conflict data, socio-political dynamics and cultural nuances, giving mediators a greater understanding of complex conflict settings and helping them formulate more effective strategies.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Multilateralism, Science and Technology, United Nations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Turkey, China, Asia, Gulf Nations, and Middle East

541. China’s global initiatives: Common security in the service of national interest

Author:: Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Between 2021 and 2023, China introduced three global initiatives, namely the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. China has also put forward a proposal for the reform and development of global governance. Together, they constitute a major goodwill campaign and are presented as examples of China’s contribution towards “a global community of shared future”, China’s slogan envisioning an ideal world. At least at the rhetorical level, the initiatives are aimed at cooperation rather than rivalry. China deserves credit for attempting to introduce constructive and positive thinking into international relations. However, the initiatives are closely related to China’s core interests, such as maintaining state sovereignty and safeguarding Communist Party rule. Expectations about the initiatives can only be low, given the lack of concrete roadmaps and the anti-Chinese sentiments among many of the Western nations.
Topic:: Security, Development, Economy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China and Asia

542. Examining the Value of a “Soft Power” Net Assessment: Comparing Chinese and U.S. Power Projection in Africa

Author:: Michael J. McNerney, Oluwatimilehin Sotubo, and Daniel Egel
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has entered an era in which it is no longer willing to be second fiddle to the United States. After many years of quietly growing China’s economy, following Deng Xiaoping’s guidance to “hide your strength and bide your time,”1 the CCP and President Xi Jinping are overseeing a plan for a more assertive China that uses its political and economic power to influence international relations. Underpinning China’s more assertive approach is a new concept that Xi has called zonghe guoli or “comprehensive national power.” This is a concept that seeks to describe “China’s combined military, economic, and technological power and foreign policy influence,”2 particularly as it compares to that of the United States and its allies.3 Xi’s conclusion, it seems, is that China’s zonghe guoli has grown such that China no longer needs to stand in America’s shadow. The United States is well-aware of the challenge posed by China. The 2022 National Security Strategy emphasized that China “is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”4 Given such high stakes, it should be no surprise that the U.S. government’s strategy argues for including “all elements of national power” in “out-competing China.”5 Competing effectively against China requires a nuanced understanding – a net assessment – of the relative strengths of China and the United States.6 There are now robust U.S.-China net assessments focused on military capabilities,7 key emergent technologies,8 defense industrial base,9 and overall national competitiveness.10 But how effective are the non-military components of U.S. efforts to project power abroad in comparison to those of China? Comparable analyses of America’s “soft power” vis-à-vis China are far more limited.11
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Economy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

543. The Twentieth Century, the Global South, and China’s Historical Position

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: Chinese scholar Wang Hui looks back at the twentieth century, which was born out of the multiple revolutions in the peripheral areas of the world, including China.
Topic:: History, Global South, and Revolution
Political Geography:: China and Asia

544. Allies balancing: A safer strategy for the U.S. in Asia

Author:: Daniel Depetris and Rajan Menon
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: As China’s wealth and military power have increased, the United States has responded with a combination of military deployments in East Asia, regular military exercises in regional waterways, and stronger alliances. These steps have been accompanied by restrictions on the Chinese economy, including sanctions, export controls, and bans on U.S. investments in sectors deemed sensitive from the standpoint of U.S. security. These policies reflect the idea that only though primacy—military preponderance—can the United States protect its key interests in East Asia. These interests are traditionally seen as: (1) avoiding war with China unless it is essential for defending vital U.S. national security interests, (2) preserving access to the region’s markets, and (3) ensuring that China cannot dominate the region. Yet the balance of power in Asia is stabler than conventional wisdom suggests. Given Asia’s geography, China’s internal constraints, and resistance from Asia’s middle powers, Beijing cannot easily dominate East Asia. The best way forward is to maintain a favorable regional balance of power that does not rest on U.S. hegemony. This approach would shift defense burdens onto capable allies, especially South Korea and Japan, and better safeguard U.S. interests by ensuring regional stability while lowering the risk of war.
Topic:: Strategic Competition, Military, National Security, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

545. China’s Digital Silk Road: Outlines and Implications for Europe

Author:: Maria
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that encompasses infrastructure projects, trade and financial agreements, and cultural and defence cooperation with over 140 countries worldwide. Bringing the digital component into the BRI seamlessly advanced Beijing’s ambition of taking a leadership position in the technology sector. The DSR not only speaks across regions but also goes beyond the technology infrastructure, which raises two critical concerns by giving China leverage to advance the digital authoritarian governance model and jeopardizing data privacy. To mitigate these risks and reduce reliance on China, the EU must find alternatives by collaborating with trusted partners and diversifying supply chains. First, the EU can expand its technological landscape and engage nations in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific. Second, it must develop and enforce regulatory mechanisms to prevent Chinese state agencies from misusing sensitive data.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Information Technology, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

546. How Weakness in the Social Safety Net Undermines the Political Compact in China

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg and Alexander Aibel
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This policy memo details China’s approach to social welfare and its impact on the nation’s socioeconomic stability. Xi Jinping and other Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have an aversion to being “welfarist,” which historically aligns with China’s tendency to view its citizens as a source for labor and tax revenue rather than as human resources to be cultivated and assisted when in need. This has resulted in a social safety net that considerably lags international standards, especially those of developed and even middle-income countries. High debt levels burden Chinese local governments, and shrinking revenues, declining birthrates, falling marriage rates, and aging populations further fuel the deterioration of government finances. These problems contribute to the growing financial vulnerability of Chinese households and create significant concerns for future generations. Families often shoulder the costs of caring for their elderly, educating their children, and paying for healthcare. China’s public healthcare spending is limited, with around 7 percent of gross domestic product devoted to the national system. Families, on average, spend at least 27 percent out-of-pocket of their total health costs to make up for shortfalls in their health insurance, compared to just 11 percent in the United States. Local governments are responsible for more than 90 percent of China’s social services costs but only receive about 50 percent of tax revenues. For decades, they have relied on land sales and related real estate revenues to meet their budgets, but both sources have declined precipitously as the housing boom has reversed course. According to the Rhodium Group, more than half of Chinese cities face difficulties paying down their debt, or even meeting interest payments, severely limiting their resources for social services. China’s total debt levels are estimated to be around 140 percent of GDP, limiting budget flexibility for supporting social services. China’s household savings rates are high by global standards, as Chinese increasingly use personal resources to cover shortfalls in the national safety net. As a result, consumer spending and confidence are down. China has seen lower wage growth in recent years, especially in the private sector, reversing the trend of elevated growth in the first part of the 2010s. Through his dual circulation model of growth, Xi Jinping hopes to shift the country away from an export- and investment-driven economy to a consumption-driven model. But the growing burdens on youth and families undermine this shift. There are major shortfalls in access to, and quality of, education and healthcare systems, especially in rural areas. The hukou system of residency compounds these problems, stopping many rural migrants from obtaining urban residency and thus preventing them from accessing higher quality urban social services. Due to severe wealth inequality, low tax revenues, and the decision to prioritize resources for national security and investment in manufacturing and technology, Beijing has limited resources to improve social welfare programs. Low public confidence in the economy and consumer market—fueled by the COVID lockdowns—has reinforced falling birth and marriage rates. Youth unemployment and public dissent have also increased, with the so-called lying flat movement and white hair demonstrations exemplifying public rejection of China’s attitudes toward overworking, professional achievement, and CCP handling of elder care and other social services. Xi and the CCP have chosen to maintain a limited social services system. Their reluctance to improve the system has contributed to a cycle of slowing economic growth, massive debt levels, stressed personal finances, and declining public confidence. China’s ambitions to become a consumption-driven economy will face significant challenges, possibly further straining the implied social contract that has for decades resulted in social and political stability.
Topic:: Debt, Inequality, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Safety Net, and Social Welfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

547. A Strategy to Free Political Prisoners in China

Author:: Olivia Enos
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has placed hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Chinese citizens behind bars as political prisoners. The scale of this brutal practice reveals something about the CCP: there are few things it fears more than its people. Taking political prisoners is one of the CCP’s core tactics for maintaining power. The United States Department of State estimates that the CCP currently detains thousands of political prisoners, in addition to an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political prison camps. The CCP’s practice of extrajudicial imprisonment is uniquely unjust. The party targets anyone it believes does not align with CCP ideals. That means political activists, human rights lawyers, and in particular, religious and ethnic populations that CCP leadership views as a threat to its core interests. Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, and Christians are among the most targeted. Although there have been notable successes in securing political prisoners’ release from China recently, there remains a need to strengthen the US political prisoner advocacy apparatus. Political prisoner advocacy may seem tangential to US foreign policy objectives. But it is one of the most practical steps the US government can take to offer relief to persecuted populations when Washington cannot easily fix the system that extrajudicially targets these populations, as is certainly the case in China. As it stands, the US executive branch does not have a centralized system focused on freeing political prisoners. Such a system could help the government craft policies that advance US interests while safeguarding and securing the freedom and human rights of the imprisoned. Of course, US efforts to free political prisoners are not limited to China. The US rightfully seeks to aid any person extrajudicially imprisoned globally. While the focus of this paper is on China, many of the recommendations in this paper are intended to advance US policy toward freeing political prisoners more generally. The next Trump administration should prioritize political prisoner advocacy in its overarching policy toward China. To that end: Congress should create an office for political prisoner advocacy within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the Department of State and appoint a special envoy for political prisoner advocacy of ambassador rank who would be responsible for prioritizing political prisoner release. Congress and the executive branch should institute a standard process for coordinating political prisoner advocacy and release. The executive branch should evaluate tools to punish key nodes of the Chinese government responsible for persecuting political prisoners. The executive branch should refine its options for permanently resettling political prisoners who want to come to the US.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Political Prisoners, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

548. Modernizing Sino-U.S. Confidence-building Measures: Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives

Author:: Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Carter Center
Abstract:: Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. This research utilizes the Cold War analogy as a starting point for analyzing how nuclear war between the U.S. and China can be averted.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Rivalry, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

549. The End of North Korean Sanctions Enforcement…and What Comes Next

Author:: Justin V. Hastings
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:: Sanctions enforcement against North Korea is collapsing. Alternative strategies are likely to be ineffective, and North Korea is poised to take advantage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Regional Politics, and Enforcement
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

550. Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Author:: The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its Third Plenum from 15 July to 18 July. The Third Plenum is usually a meeting focused on economic reforms and sometimes proposes significant directions related to reforms. After the meeting concludes, a communiqué is typically issued, followed after a few days by the full text of a fuller Resolution. The Communique of this plenum was published on 18 July and the Resolution on 21 July. The full text of the Resolution appears as Appendix 1 On 26 July, the China Studies Centre hosted an online roundtable to discuss the main conclusions and resolutions of the plenum and their implications.
Topic:: Economics, Government, Reform, Domestic Politics, Macroeconomics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS