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452. Japan’s Aging Society as a Technological Opportunity
- Author:
- Ken Kushida
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Japan’s extreme demographic aging and shrinking is an economic and societal challenge, but also a technological opportunity for global leadership. Technological trajectories of worker automation and worker skill augmentation within Japan are already being shaped by the country’s demographics. Software, robotics, and other technology deployments are transforming the nature of work in a wide range of sectors in Japan’s economy, and across types of work such as blue-collar, white-collar, agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Specific ways in which Japan’s demographics shape technological trajectories include market opportunities, acute labor shortages, and favorable political and regulatory dynamics. The private sector is driving technology deployments in industrial sectors hit hard by Japan’s aging population, ranging from construction and transportation to medical care and finance, with strong government support in each of the domains. Demographically driven technological trajectories play to Japan’s strengths in implementing, deploying, and improving technologies rather than generating breakthrough innovations. Japan’s demographically driven technological trajectory can be an important platform for international technology cooperation, fitting with the top U.S.-Japanese political leadership agreements on fostering strong innovation and technology collaboration ties. Japan’s start-up ecosystem, often in partnership with large incumbent firms, will be critical in deploying new technologies by defining new markets and providing new offerings. An effective analysis goes beyond broad demographic numbers to delve into specific pain points of particular segments of society to better capture their situations and roles in shaping market opportunities that drive technological adoption. This introductory paper: (1) defines key analytical concepts; (2) surveys some of Japan’s key demographic shifts; and (3) highlights cases from agriculture, construction, transportation, healthcare, eldercare, land, and housing ownership.
- Topic:
- Demographics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Aging
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
453. Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020–2024
- Author:
- Saheb Singh Chadha
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- India and China have been engaged in a standoff at their border in eastern Ladakh since April–May 2020. Over 100,000 troops remain deployed on both sides, and rebuilding political trust will take time.
- Topic:
- Security, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, India, and Asia
454. Non-meritocrats or choice-reluctant meritocrats? A redistribution experiment in China and France
- Author:
- Margot Belguise, Yuchen Huang, and Zhexun Mo
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
- Abstract:
- Recent experimental evidence contends that meritocratic ideals are mainly a Western phenomenon. Intriguingly, the Chinese public does not appear to differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, despite China’s historical emphasis on meritocratic institutions. We propose that this phenomenon could be due to the Chinese public’s greater reluctance to make an active choice in realstake redistribution decisions. We run an incentivized redistribution experiment with elite university students in China and France, by varying the initial split of payoffs between two real-life workers to redistribute from. We show that, compared to French respondents, Chinese respondents consistently and significantly choose more non-redistribution across both highly unequal and relatively equal status quo scenarios. Additionally, we also find that Chinese respondents do differentiate between merit- and luck-based inequalities, and do not redistribute less than the French, excluding the individuals who engage in non-redistribution choices. Chinese respondents are also as reactive as the French towards scenarios with noisy signals of merit, such as inequalities of opportunities. Ultimately, we contend that the reluctance to make an active choice is indicative of diminished political agency to act upon redistribution decisions with real-life stakes, rather than apathy, inattention, having benefited from the status quo in Chinese society or libertarian preferences among the Chinese. Notably, our findings show that Chinese individuals’ reluctance to make a choice is particularly pronounced among those from families of working-class and farming backgrounds, while it is absent among individuals whose families have closer ties to the private sector.
- Topic:
- Labor Issues, Class, Institutions, Redistribution, and Meritocracy
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and France
455. Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle
- Author:
- Philipp Barteska and Jay Euijung Lee
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
- Abstract:
- Does bureaucratic capacity matter for growth miracles? This paper investigates how much the effect of an industrial policy during South Korea’s growth miracle depends on bureaucratic capacity. We find that the bureaucrats implementing the policy greatly change its effect on exports – the variable targeted by the policy and key to South Korea’s economic success. These bureaucrats manage offices that promote exports on appointments to 87 countries between 1965, when South Korea was one of the world’s poorest countries, and 2000. We exploit the three-yearly rotation of managers between countries to show that increasing bureaucrat ability by one standard deviation causes a 37% increase in exports. This effect is comparable to the policy’s average effect – estimated from office openings. Hence, this industrial policy entirely depends on bureaucratic capacity: It has no effect when implemented by a bureaucrat one standard deviation below average. We find evidence for a key mechanism via which better bureaucrats increase exports: transmitting information about market conditions. Under better bureaucrats South Korean exports increase more strongly with a country’s import demand – taking advantage of this demand. Finally, we investigate whether bureaucrat experience increases South Korean exports. We isolate quasi-random variation in experience: a product’s import demand growth during the bureaucrat’s first appointment. Such experience increases exports in subsequent appointments of this bureaucrat. This highlights that organizational capacity grows endogenously, implying a novel channel for path dependence in organizational capacity.
- Topic:
- Exports, Economic Development, and Bureaucracy
- Political Geography:
- Asia and South Korea
456. Russia and China in Central Asia: Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston, and Nathaniel Schochet
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits. Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence. Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues. For Russia and China, Central Asia is also likely to be an important building block in their larger counterorder-building effort. The two countries are likely to sustain—and step up—their efforts to build an alternative order in Central Asia, including by deepening cooperation and broadening the number of countries participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to legitimize and demonstrate the benefits of their collective global leadership. This effort will face resistance from the Central Asian states that object to the concept of a Russia-China condominium of power in their region and have shown an ability to come together to resist attempts to turn the SCO into a forum that would strengthen a collective Russia-China security role in the region. The United States has an opportunity to redouble its engagement in Central Asia. The Central Asian states highly value U.S. political support for their independence and sovereignty, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Washington can encourage greater connectivity and cohesion among the countries, demonstrating its support for their increasing cooperation with one another in ways that could strengthen the region’s economic attractiveness and political agency. This contrasts with the way in which Russia has traditionally dealt with the region, which is to try to capitalize on divisions and disputes among the countries. While it cannot match China dollar for dollar or supplant Russia’s cultural and political influence in the region, the United States can enhance its trade, investment, energy, counterterrorism, and diplomatic ties to these countries. Enhancing U.S. and European investment in Central Asia, especially for development of the Middle Corridor, could help prevent Russia and China from further deepening their grip on the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, Cooperation, Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia
457. Countering Coercion: Managing Chinese Gray Zone Activity in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis and Nilanthi Samaranayake
- Publication Date:
- 03-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has been engaging in gray zone activity—coercive behavior that is aimed at changing the status quo but that is below a threshold that would prompt a military response—particularly against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and these actions are raising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.1 Washington must closely monitor the situation and take steps to help protect the sovereignty of Southeast Asian nations from PRC intimidation and territorial encroachment. China makes ambiguous claims to 90 percent of the 1.3 million square miles of the South China Sea, including waters within the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade—around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually—is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.2 PRC maritime bullying is not new, but it has intensified in the past few years, especially against the Philippines. Beijing aims to convince Manila to give up its claim to Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater reef located in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. The Philippines makes its claim to the shoal by housing a small contingent of marines aboard a World War II–era ship, the BRP Sierra Madre, that was intentionally grounded there in 1999.3 Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea threaten to involve the United States, which has been a treaty ally of the Philippines for over 70 years. Despite the risk that tensions could further escalate, Washington continues to stand firmly behind Manila as it employs asymmetric tactics to push back against Chinese behavior.4 PRC maritime activities and goals in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the time being, are focused on protecting China’s economic interests (80 percent of its energy imports flow through the Indian Ocean), gathering intelligence, and projecting power, not on asserting maritime claims.5 However, China’s unrelenting aggression in the SCS has raised concern that Beijing will soon begin to demonstrate similar behavior in the IOR. Over the past 15 to 20 years, China has expanded from sporadic to regular presence in the Indian Ocean through its naval ships, research vessels, and fishing fleets, as well as a military base. The United States and its allies and partners must not be complacent about PRC actions in the Indian Ocean Region, especially China’s submarine port visits and docking of dual-use ships such as in Sri Lanka and, more recently, Maldives. Due to the high stakes involved, the United States and its allies and partners must balance the need to deter China with the need to avoid military escalation when responding to PRC gray zone acts. When there are violations of international law and norms or when the lives of official personnel or civilians are threatened, Washington and its allies must respond.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea
458. Beyond China's Black Box: Five Trends Shaping Beijing’s Foreign and Security Policy Decision-Making Under Xi Jinping
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- China’s foreign and security policymaking apparatus is often described as a metaphorical black box about which analysts know little. That is true to an extent, but at the same time, it is possible to develop a better understanding of the people, institutions, processes, and pressures that go into making China’s policies toward the world during Xi’s “new era,” that is, his time as the country’s top leader. This report pursues that objective by identifying five major trends mostly internal to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-state system that shape its foreign and security policymaking. In addition, the paper describes the effects that each trend generates, from bureaucratic incentives to behavioral patterns. The first trend is personalization of the system around Xi. It reduces the influence of various interest groups and therefore the need to bargain with and among them, raises the prospect of groupthink among the loyalists Xi has surrounded himself with, and potentially increases the importance of achieving certain goals for China on Xi’s watch. In addition, Xi’s centrality creates a major management bottleneck that could hamper the system during even brief absences. The second trend is empowering the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the state. That trend has made more officials into policy-implementers rather than policymakers, even on issues below the level of strategy. It has also increased central demands for ideological activities, such as Xi Jinping Thought study sessions. At the same time, while the leadership wants to improve coordination and might be making some progress, it stops short of actions that could allow government organs to coordinate horizontally if doing so might plausibly jeopardize the center’s control. The third trend is domestic policy headwinds and the search for alternative forms of political legitimacy for the CCP. This creates two contradictory pressures: China’s reaching out and trying to improve ties with the world, and its turn to an assertive and at times even aggressive form of nationalism to counteract stalling economic growth. It also dents the power and influence China gained through its rapid rise and its role as a massive market driving global economic growth. The fourth trend is further elevation of regime security over other concerns. This trend negatively affects Beijing’s ties with foreign countries by worsening the experience of foreigners visiting and living in China, exporting repressive political ideas and techniques to the world, and complicating how China’s foreign and security bureaucracy interacts with its counterparts. The fifth and final trend is diplomatic and military assertiveness and seeking an active global leadership role, which feeds a self-reinforcing cycle of growing tensions, requires PRC diplomats to shoehorn any activities into Xi’s marquee frameworks, and leads Beijing to build out structures of an alternative international order. Examining these trends helps illuminate the macro pressures shaping China’s foreign and security policy decision-making. Still, aspects of how the party-state makes decisions about its foreign and security policies—“known unknowns” —remain particularly opaque. These include information flows to senior leaders, the dynamic among Xi and his top advisors, and the structure and frequency of important meetings. More knowledge in those areas might shed light on larger questions related to whether there are informal constraints on Xi’s power and how Xi is thinking about eventual transfer of power.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and Decision-Making
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
459. Disorderly Conduct: How U.S.-China Competition Upended the International Economic Order & What the U.S. Can Do to Fix It
- Author:
- Emily Kilcrease and Adam Tong
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- To gauge the health of the U.S.-China economic relationship, one can turn to the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who remarked in March 2024 that U.S. “tactics to suppress China . . . [were] reaching a bewildering level of unfathomable absurdity.”1 Rhetorical flourishes may be the one bright spot in the relationship. As tensions rise over economic restrictions and policies on both sides, economic relations have become a worrisome source of instability in the overall geopolitical relationship. The economic relationship has become increasingly dominated by security concerns, and integration is seen as not an opportunity but a risk to U.S. interests and values. The United States must develop a strong, pragmatic strategy for advancing its economic and security interests within the U.S.-China economic relationship, accounting for the fact that the security competition is now playing out across the economic landscape. To inform the development of an effective U.S. strategy for the economic relationship with China in the context of rising securitization, the United States must learn from its past attempts to advance its economic and security interests in the relationship. The first section of this report, “Where have we been?” examines past U.S. approaches, along with the challenges of pursuing similar policies in today’s geopolitical context. The second section, “Where are we going?” distills lessons from these past approaches and defines a new strategy for the United States, offering recommendations to implement it. Broadly speaking, prior U.S. strategies can be divided into two camps. First, the United States sought to bring the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the rules-based order and incentivize it to be a responsible stakeholder.* When that failed, U.S. strategy pivoted to one of imposing costs on the PRC and taking actions to constrain behaviors that threatened U.S. economic security interests. Within those broad strategies, U.S. policymakers have pursued four main approaches, in differing combinations and intensity, all of which involve associated challenges. They are: Play by the rules: The intention of bringing the PRC into the rules-based international system was to create external pressure that would align PRC actions with U.S. economic and security interests. Key efforts under this approach included the U.S. support for the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the later U.S. attempts to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty. Challenges for the approach include the fact that rules have a weak ability to constrain state behavior in a geopolitically contested environment where national security risks arise from economic integration. We need to talk: In light of increasing complexity in the bilateral relationship, U.S.-PRC dialogues were intended to identify and advance mutual interests while providing a regular forum to attempt to resolve disputes. This is seen in the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in the Bush administration and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in the Obama administration. In other contexts, such as ongoing talks under the Biden administration, dialogues have served primarily to communicate the rationale for U.S. policy actions in an attempt to put a floor under the bilateral relationship.2 Challenges to this approach include that commitments made in a dialogue process may not be enforceable, the meeting can become the deliverable, and the dialogue process cannot alter underlying geopolitical shifts. Defense is the best offense: Defensive approaches relied on domestic U.S. authorities to counter specific harms created by PRC practices and policies. The United States has a wide range of economic tools (e.g., tariffs and trade remedies) as well as national security–based tools (export controls and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States [CFIUS] process for conducting national security reviews of foreign investments), all of which have been used with greater frequency over the past decade. Challenges when using these tools include the disruptive and potentially escalatory nature of defensive approaches, and the lack of clear frameworks to assess the effectiveness of defensive policies. Additionally, relying on unilateral approaches can create friction within potential economic alliances. In the United States, defensive approaches have often suffered from a blending of economic, national security, and values concerns, eroding the legitimacy of the national security argument. Have more friends: These strategies centered on efforts to shape the PRC’s external environment through the negotiation of ambitious trade and investment agreements with major trading partners, with the goal of increasing economic integration with close partners, creating indirect pressure on the PRC to level up to higher standards, and developing common approaches to address concerns with nonmarket economies. Such an approach is challenging because traditional ways of shaping the external environment have not directly addressed securitization of the U.S.-China economic relationship. U.S. domestic political realities impose a considerable constraint on the use of trade policy as a strategic tool.
- Topic:
- Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Strategic Competition, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
460. The China-Russia Entente in East Asia: Contending with Authoritarian Partnership in a Critical Region
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Evan Wright, and Nathaniel Schochet
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Closer cooperation between China and Russia is a major force driving global geopolitics. But how relations between the two authoritarian powers are shaping specific regional and functional areas remains understudied. This report helps to fill that gap for the critical region of East Asia. The China-Russia relationship has improved despite—and, in some ways, because of—Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing helps to fuel Russia’s war machine and defends the principles Moscow uses to justify the invasion. Both powers are also deepening and expanding their relationship beyond Ukraine. The pair cooperate across a range of fields, from military affairs to economics and global norms. Undoubtedly, current and potential fissures remain in the bilateral relationship. However, the leadership in both countries carefully manages these tensions to ensure they do not derail the overall relationship. Beijing-Moscow coordination extends to East Asian hot spots, including the areas around Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Around Japan, China and Russia work together to advance their respective territorial claims and pressure a rival Northeast Asian power and close U.S. ally. China and Russia use multiple military tools in pursuit of those goals, including joint aerial and naval patrols, joint exercises, and incursions into Japan’s air defense identification zone. Together, these activities put significant operational strain on the Self-Defense Forces, Japan’s military, as they respond. On the Korean Peninsula, China and Russia have turned away from multilateral cooperation to manage the North Korea threat and toward blaming democracies and reaching out to Pyongyang instead. Russia has moved closer to North Korea to help offset Moscow’s diplomatic isolation and barter for weapons. But that cooperation has not yet undermined China’s preferences or interests. Beijing maintains its own working relationship with Pyongyang while coordinating with Moscow to blunt international pressure on North Korea. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. To the south, Russia increasingly backs Beijing’s actions to pressure Taiwan as Taipei reaches out to democracies worldwide. Moscow’s support for Beijing has been particularly pronounced during major cross-Strait events in recent years. In the South China Sea, Russia tries to balance historical relationships with Southeast Asian states even as its power wanes and subservience to China deepens. For example, Russia’s cooperation on energy projects with Vietnam shows that Beijing’s and Moscow’s regional interests sometimes diverge. How China and Russia manage their relations in East Asia will be a major factor shaping the regional diplomatic and security environment. Moscow’s presence and power in East Asia have already suffered because of its disastrous war in Ukraine. Over time, Russia likely will become even more subservient to China. The China-Russia entente might therefore prove most useful for Beijing in its home region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, Partnerships, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
461. The Great Reset and the Near-Term Implications for the Chinese Economy
- Author:
- R. Reghunanadhan and J. T. Karackattu
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
- Institution:
- Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
- Abstract:
- The Great Reset has had a severe impact on the Chinese economy, with implications domestically, and on the global supply chain. One consequence has been the decline in the overall market demand in China, with a significant negative impact on infrastructure development and the labour industry. A unique aspect is a survey is to analyze the impact of COVID-19 on innovation and integration of digital technologies in China. The authors explicate the impact of the Great Reset on the Chinese economy, the implications on the supply chains that China is a crucial part of, and the global implications thereof.
- Topic:
- Labor Issues, Economy, Innovation, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Great Reset
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
462. China Tests the Water in Palestinian Diplomacy
- Author:
- Ramzy Baroud
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- While the ramifications of the recent unity agreement signed in Beijing by multiple Palestinian factions remain to be seen, it is evident that China has stepped up as a leader in the region
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Asia, and Palestine
463. Migration or stagnation: Aging and economic growth in Korea today, the world tomorrow
- Author:
- Michael A. Clemens
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- South Korea faces an unprecedented economic crisis driven by rapid population aging, as it approaches a future of negative economic growth. This paper examines the full range of possible policy responses with the potential to restore dynamism to the Korean economy. Contrary to many prior analyses, I find that enhanced labor migration to Korea is necessary, sufficient, and feasible. Migration is necessary because in the best forecasts we have, no other class of policy has the quantitative potential to meaningfully offset aging. Migration is sufficient because enhanced temporary labor migration by itself would offset most of Korea’s demographic drag on growth over the next 50 years. And migration is feasible because the levels of migration and timescale of the transition would resemble that already carried out by Malaysia and Australia. Many advanced economies will follow in Korea’s demographic footsteps in decades to come, and have much to learn from the decisions that the Korean government makes now.
- Topic:
- Demographics, Migration, Labor Issues, Economic Growth, and Aging
- Political Geography:
- Asia and South Korea
464. Korea’s Trade Policy Agenda in an Uncertain US Trade Environment
- Author:
- Alan Wm. Wolff and Han-Koo Yeo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- This paper addresses how South Korea, a mid-sized ally of the United States, can best navigate clearly identifiable risks, crafting a positive and pragmatic international trade policy. Korea is heavily dependent on the United States for its defense. It is clear that US trade policy has recently shifted toward being more self-centered, a policy unlikely to be reversed any time soon. The United States is on the threshold of a presidential election that makes it unpredictable in its trade policy, which may become directly harmful to Korean economic prospects if there is a change in leadership. US trade policies under President Joseph Biden have been primarily aimed at onshoring rather than friendshoring, but they have not been actively hostile or threatening. If there is a second Donald Trump term, Korea might not be excluded from substantially increased tariffs—whether for protection, revenue, or leverage—despite the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). At the same time that Korea is watchful of developments in the United States, it needs to pay attention to its neighbor, China, the world’s largest trading economy, a country that has practiced trade coercion against it. South Korea is the world’s 13th-largest economy. It is a strong proponent and practitioner of free trade. It is one of a group of midsize free market democracies aligned with the United States that, ranked by GDP, includes Japan, Germany, and France (and therefore with others, the European Union), the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and Australia. The future of the global trading system that the market-oriented countries wish to enjoy is increasingly dependent on this group of midsize economies and the European Union. Korea has thrived in large part through its open trade policy that has made it the country with the world’s greatest number of free trade agreements (including with both the United States and China, as well as with the European Union). It shares strong economic security interests with the United States: It has its own K-CHIPS Act, which provides substantial subsidies to its semiconductor industry. It invests very substantially in critical minerals and batteries, as does the United States. Korea also collaborates with the United States in the production of vaccines to meet future pandemics.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Investment, Trade, Economic Security, Semiconductors, Steel, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Asia and South Korea
465. The International Economic Implications of a Second Trump Presidency
- Author:
- Warwick McKibbin, Megan Hogan, and Marcus Noland
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- The paper explores policies promoted by former president and now candidate Donald Trump that would potentially affect the global economy. We focus on immigration policy, trade, and erosion of the Federal Reserve Board’s political independence. Each policy has differing macroeconomic and sectoral impacts on the United States and other countries. We find, however, that all the policies examined cause a decline in US production and employment, especially in trade-exposed sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, as well as higher US inflation. The trade policies do little to improve the US trade balance; however, the erosion of Fed independence does so by causing capital outflows, a significant depreciation of the dollar, and higher unemployment toward the end of 2028, which worsen American living standards. Scenarios combining individual policies show that the changes cause a large inflationary impulse and a significant loss of employment (particularly in manufacturing and agriculture) in the US economy. The negative impact of a contraction in global trade is significant for countries that trade with the United States the most. The adverse effect is offset for some economies by the positive effects of an inflow of foreign capital that would otherwise have gone into the US economy. An online dashboard contains a full set of macroeconomic and sectoral results for all countries.
- Topic:
- Migration, Central Bank, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, and Deportation
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
466. Economic implications of revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status
- Author:
- Megan Hogan, Warwick McKibben, and Marcus Noland
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- The United States’ granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status, formerly known as most favored nation status, to China in 2000 resulted in a large expansion of bilateral trade. Concerns over Chinese trade practices and the impact of Chinese exports on US import-competing sectors have contributed to US political discontent and calls for the revocation of PNTR, including by former president Donald Trump in his reelection campaign and in the 2024 Republican Party Platform. The authors find that revoking China’s PNTR status would cause higher inflation and a short-term decline in US gross domestic product relative to baseline from which the economy never fully recovers. The loss of output and employment would be felt unevenly across the economy, with agriculture, durable manufacturing, and mining taking the biggest hits. Stock market prices would fall, with agricultural, durable manufacturing, and mining firms absorbing the biggest declines. All of these impacts would be magnified if China retaliates. Ironically, the revocation would damage the US industrial sector and contribute to a wider US trade deficit.
- Topic:
- Economics, Bilateral Relations, Manufacturing, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
467. The Rise of US Economic Sanctions on China: Analysis of a New PIIE Dataset
- Author:
- Martin Chorzempa, Mary Lovely, and Christine Wan
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- Concerns over China’s national security and human rights activities have led the United States to rely increasingly on financial sanctions and export controls to curb Beijing’s behavior. But the tools are so complex it is difficult to assess their effectiveness. A new PIIE dataset sheds light on this economic statecraft. The first Trump administration added three times as many Chinese entities to export control and other sanctions lists than the previous four administrations; the Biden administration added even more to these lists. Most sanctions and controls target high-tech sectors, especially electronics, military and defense entities, aviation, space, and aerospace; targets are chosen under a veil of secrecy, raising questions over accountability and transparency. The benefits of isolating Chinese firms come with potential costs, hobbling innovation for US and allied business, encouraging circumvention of sanctions, and accelerating Chinese innovation.
- Topic:
- Economics, Human Rights, National Security, Sanctions, and Exports
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
468. Camp David and US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation: Consolidating the Northeast Asia Anchor in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Yasuyo Sakata
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- Yasuyo Sakata provides a historical overview of US-Japan-ROK defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, from the Korean War to the Camp David Summit, explaining how the trilateral partnership was redefined as an Indo-Pacific partnership and incorporated the “Northeast Asia Anchor.” Sakata argues that Japan and the United States have taken the lead in reconstructing the Indo-Pacific security architecture through their Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategies, and that the US-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship has been incorporated into this framework alongside other alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS. Sakata explores how Korea’s shift back towards the Indo-Pacific under President Yoon’s leadership has allowed for expansion of the scope of US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, as affirmed during the Camp David Summit. However, Sakata contends that a comprehensive defense approach is needed in the Indo-Pacific involving allies and partners to build upon this foundation and strengthen defense and security cooperation amidst the challenges posed by North Korea, the Taiwan Strait, maritime security, cybersecurity, and space. Action is essential, as time is running out to solidify gains from the Camp David Summit and build a stable relationship. Therefore, Sakata argues that Japan and South Korea should strengthen relations deliberately yet cautiously before domestic politics potentially spoil recent progress.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
469. US-South Korea Cyber Cooperation: Towards the Higher-Hanging Fruits
- Author:
- Jenny Jun and So Jeong Kim
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- In the past decade, the US and South Korea faced a relatively narrow set of challenges in cyberspace, notably North Korea’s cyber crime facilitating sanctions evasion. In the next decade, however, the two countries will face a more diversified set of challenges with growing North Korean ties with Russia, its involvement in the war in Ukraine, and intensifying US-China competition. The US and South Korea must develop a joint playbook for responding to scenarios of disruptive cyber operations targeting South Korean public and private sectors and prepare for an even more difficult environment for curbing North Korea’s cyber crime as Russia provides a way out. Over the past two years, the US and South Korea have significantly deepened and broadened cooperation on cyber issues and have expanded cooperation further to trilateral and multilateral settings. The two countries established several regular high-level and working-level dialogues, have issued joint sanctions and threat advisories, and deepened mil-to-mil cooperation. However, 2024 has been a watershed in terms of shifting geopolitical dynamics on and around the Korean peninsula. Cyber threats will become more diversified, and the bilateral relationship will be tested at the seams without a clear joint strategic concept and operational plan.
- Topic:
- Sanctions, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
470. Clean Energy Pragmatism as a Spark for US-South Korea Relations
- Author:
- Elan Sykes
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The United States and South Korea are close allies, committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and home to advanced industrial economies. Pragmatic cooperation on clean energy technologies would aid their shared goals in climate mitigation, energy security, and supply chain resilience. US-South Korea cooperation should include pooling shared technological expertise, aligning market and carbon accounting rules, investing in constrained supply chains, and adopting well-targeted policies to encourage research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects for early-stage technologies like clean hydrogen and advanced nuclear power plants. Clean energy pragmatism requires acknowledgment of the constraints facing each country to ensure policies are properly scoped, politically durable, and revised iteratively in light of observed outcomes. Neither country can succeed in this multidecadal transition alone. With their shared industrial capacity, world-class innovators engaged in joint research and development, and properly aligned market standards, however, both countries can solidify their position to achieve 21st-century energy security and economic growth. Yet, policy design and implementation are never complete unless a problem is entirely solved, and climate change is not a problem that can be solved over a single presidential term. Political shifts hold the potential to either undo progress or help spur new action.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Science and Technology, Renewable Energy, Supply Chains, and Research and Development
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
471. Canvasing Variations in US-South Korea Cooperation on AI and Quantum Technology
- Author:
- Sanghyun Han
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This paper elucidates how Washington and Seoul cooperate on AI and quantum technologies, both recognized as critical emerging technologies essential to their national interests. Technology cooperation is denoted as government-to-government efforts aimed at cultivating and developing technology, focusing on national strategies and interests. In AI, the United States holds a dominant leadership position, while South Korea demonstrates strengths in certain areas, though not across the board. Cooperation in AI primarily focuses on standardization efforts, with significant involvement of the South Korean government in partnerships with the US private sector, as well as private-sector-led bilateral research initiatives. In contrast, South Korea’s capabilities in quantum technologies are far more limited. Nevertheless, cooperation in this domain is largely centered on research collaboration, with both governments actively participating alongside international research consortia led by the United States. The differing focuses—standardization in AI and research collaboration in quantum technologies—reflect the respective strengths and needs of the two countries in these critical fields. The progression of the US-ROK alliance in this direction is both natural and beneficial, as the development of advanced and sophisticated technology is incrsaneasingly beyond the capacity of any single state alone.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, Standardization, and Quantum Computing
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
472. Cooperation on Semiconductor Supply Chains and Technology
- Author:
- Soyoung Kwon
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The security alliance between the United States and South Korea, once focused primarily on military defense, is evolving to include economic security and technological cooperation. The evolving partnership between the two countries, particularly in the areas of semiconductor supply chains and advanced technologies, features the deepening and broadening of the alliance in the form of a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance. This change is driven by intensifying competition between the United States and China, which has led to the securitization of key technologies like semiconductors. This paper examines the opportunities and challenges in deepening and broadening US-South Korea cooperation on semiconductor supply chains. While such developments support the shared objectives of advancing technological innovation, bolstering supply chain resilience, and addressing potential threats from China, challenges remain in diverging threat perceptions and concerns about collective deterrence. The study concludes that aligning strategic objectives in economic security and technological cooperation is essential to ensure the sustainability of the alliance and its ability to navigate the complex global techno-geopolitical landscape.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
473. From Security Alliance to Comprehensive Technology Centered Partnership
- Author:
- Scott Snyder
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations have embraced the expansion of economic cooperation within the US-ROK alliance, leading to the emergence of South Korea as a valued technology partner of the United States and an era of institutionalization for the bilateral relationship. This issue of Korea Policy examines the commitments of the two governments to cooperate on the development of critical and emerging technologies and is intended to capture major changes in the depth of cooperation reflected in the intensification and expansion of policy dialogues between the two countries in both technology development and the defense industrial base. Major themes highlighted across the papers include challenges to maintaining a technology-centered coalition among like-minded partners, the impact of political transition on the sustainability of technology-driven cooperation, the role of the private sector, and the implications of expanding the concept of an alliance beyond its core security-centered logic. As the alliance management baton passes from the Biden to the Donald Trump administration, an important question will be whether the Biden administration’s efforts to “lock in” institutionalized cooperation are sustainable through the political transition and whether such efforts will only be successful with “buy-in” from President Trump and his new administration.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
474. Effective US government strategies to address China’s information influence
- Author:
- Kenton Thibaut
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- China’s global influence operations have received increasing attention in the national security community. Numerous congressional hearings, media reports, and academic and industry findings have underscored China’s increased use and resourcing of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics in its covert operations both in the United States and abroad. In response, US government offices the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), among others, have made strides in raising awareness of the issue and charting pathways to increase the resilience of the US information ecosystem to foreign influence. To date, however, the efforts to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been fragmented. That fragmentation is indicative of a lack of cohesion around the concept of influence operations itself. Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms. This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence. As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order. The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded. To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit. This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale. The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity. In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world. That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos. This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such. The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces. The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.
- Topic:
- Media, Disinformation, and Digital Policy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
475. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power
- Author:
- David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
476. Friends in space: NATO and Japan cooperation beyond the skies
- Author:
- Nanae Baldauff
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- NATO and Japan share compelling reasons for space security cooperation: worldwide ownership of space assets; Japan as among six most capable space powers; and the application of Article 5 to space. Japan is attractive to NATO in terms of space technology, space capabilities, operation, and funding. NATO is attractive to Japan because NATO is becoming a backbone of space-based data hub contributing to the Alliance’ Multi-Domain Operations. NATO-Japan space security cooperation should be pursued through political, operational, educational, and industrial/commercial partnership, and joint training and exercises.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, International Cooperation, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
477. A Proposed Paradigm Shift: Future Regional Security Concerns and Human Rights
- Author:
- Greg Scarlatoiu
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward North Korea has been almost exclusively focused on eliminating the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The past three decades have been defined by bipartisan failure on North Korea policy. To overcome this grim predicament, a “paradigm shift” is needed—one that elevates North Korean human rights to a level on par with the other critical issues, including political, security, and military concerns. Advancing human rights through multilateral and international diplomacy will be key to a human rights upfront approach that leads to safeguarding peace and security on the Korean peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and beyond.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Human Rights, Ideology, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
478. North Korean Support to Iran’s Proxy Partners
- Author:
- Bruce E. Bechtol
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- This essay details the role of North Korea weapons, delivery systems, and technical expertise to Iran’s regional allies (Syria, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas) – starting during the Cold War and transitioning into the PostCold War period. Pyongyang has proliferated chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, conventional arms, and sent advisers, trainers, engineers, and technicians for a variety of projects to Syria. The 2012-2020 Syrian civil war moreover expanded the Assad regime’s need for all kinds of North Korean arms. Hezbollah’s military intervention on behalf of the Syrian regime has also forced the Lebanese guerilla movement and its Iranian patron to become increasingly dependent on North Korean weapons and expertise. The Israeli war with Hamas that began on October 7, 2023, has seen a terrorist force supplied with weapons by both North Korea and Iran – often in collaboration when it comes to getting the weapons and training to Hamas operatives.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, and Proxy Groups
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Asia, North Korea, and Syria
479. The Future of Cyberwarfare in Northeast Asia
- Author:
- Minwoo Yun
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- A new phase of global geostrategic hegemonic conflict is intensifying. The theater of this emerging hegemonic struggle encompasses not only conventional physical realms-land, sea, air, and space-but also virtual realms of cyber and human cognition. Northeast Asia has emerged as the epicenter of this new round of global conflict. The victor in the geostrategic struggle within Northeast Asia is poised to exert a greater influence over the entire Eurasian theater of the New Cold War. In the Northeast Asian theater, the US, Japan, and South Korea stand against China, North Korea, and Russia. Cyberwarfare holds a pivotal role in this confrontation, as all parties possess advanced information technology, scientific capabilities, and cyberwarfare prowess. Consequently, in the context of Northeast Asia, cyberwarfare could be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the geostrategic conflict, possibly more so than in any other region. This article explores the future of cyberwarfare in Northeast Asia. To accomplish this, it will delve into the geostrategic significance of Northeast Asia in the broader global hegemonic conflict, underscore the importance of cyberwarfare in future warfare, and ultimately examine the current state and prospective evolution of cyberwarfare in the Northeast Asian context.
- Topic:
- Security, Cybersecurity, Espionage, Influence, and Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
480. The U.S. Decision Making Process and Lessons Learned from the Korean Armistice
- Author:
- Kyengho Son
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper examines U.S. efforts during the Korean Armistice negotiations focusing on decision-making processes and the interplay between military operations and negotiations. The U.S. government transitioned to a different phase of the Korean War following the Communist Chinese Forces’ second offensive at the end of 1950. The Truman Administration decided to end the war with negotiations. The members of the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting (SJM), which was created to discuss politico-military affairs after the Chinese intervention in 1950, had worked hard to prepare for negotiations. They devised terms and conditions and handled the Commander of the UN Forces to facilitate reaching agreement on each agenda item. Besides the negotiation efforts, the UN Forces’ Command employed its military power to apply pressure to the armistice talks. Yet the use of military power revealed limits to the promotion of the armistice talks. Before agreeing on a definition for the demarcation line, UN forces secured victories that forced the Communists back to the negotiating table after a long adjournment. However, military pressure by UN forces could not prevent prolonged discussions over the Prisoners of War (POW) issue. It was Stalin’s death that ultimately brought the Communists back to finalize the Armistice.
- Topic:
- Cold War, History, Korean War, Decision-Making, and Armistice
- Political Geography:
- Asia and Korea
481. The United Nations and Human Rights in North Korea
- Author:
- Raymond Ha
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- Despite the emergence of geopolitical trends that threaten global stability, the United Nations is—and will remain—indispensable for the promotion of human rights in North Korea. Domestic political changes in South Korea and the United States have set the stage for robust multilateral coordination on North Korean human rights, including at the United Nations. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea remains the focal point of relevant activity within the United Nations, as the Seoul office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights continues its work in the field. Moreover, the Security Council held a public discussion on North Korean human rights in August 2023 after a six-year hiatus, as South Korea, the United States, and other like-minded countries emphasized the connection between human rights and security issues. It will be vital to keep human rights at the forefront as North Korea reengages with the world following its COVID-19 lockdown. Finally, North Korea’s fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in November 2024 will not only enable states and civil society organizations to spotlight Pyongyang’s human rights record, but also reveal opportunities for engagement going forward.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, United Nations, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
482. Sin Ch’ae-ho’s Toksa Sinron and Anti-Flunkeyism as the Heart of Korean Nationalist Historiography
- Author:
- Kyu-hyun Jo
- Publication Date:
- 04-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Journal of Korean Studies
- Institution:
- International Council on Korean Studies
- Abstract:
- This article will analyze three main features of Sin Ch’ae-ho’s Toksa Sinron (A New Interpretation of History), first focusing on his interpretation of Pu-yo and Tan-kun’s lineage in the formation of Korean identity. Next, it will explore how Sin Ch’ae-ho highlighted ancient figures like General Ŭlchi Muntok and Yŏn Kaesomun, challenging the Sino-centric view of Korea’s past. The discussion will then turn to the Silla Outpost Theory, delineating Sin Ch’ae-ho’s criticisms and presenting his arguments for its rejection. The article will conclude that these three essential features of Toksa Sinron form the core of emphasizing the Korean essence of ancient Korean history and that the displacement of China and Japanese colonial historiography in this process was the principal mission of Sin Ch’ae-ho, which Toksa Sinron successfully accomplished. These qualities explain why Sin Ch’ae-ho occupies the exclusive position in Korean historiography as the father of modern Korean nationalist historiography
- Topic:
- History, Identity, and Historiography
- Political Geography:
- Asia and Korea
483. Competing for the Global South: Asia and the Quest for Leadership in a Multipolar World
- Author:
- Filippo Fasulo and Nicola Missaglia
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
- Abstract:
- As the world transitions into a multipolar era, an increasing number of nations are challenging Western dominance and reshaping the global order. Central to this shift is the rise of the Global South, led by Asia’s powerhouses - India and China. These two nations, each offering distinct governance, development, and security models, are in a growing competition for influence. Countries across the Global South are advocating for a more equitable international system, demanding debt restructuring, climate action, and solutions to emerging security challenges. What strategies will India and China propose to address these demands? And how will their rivalry shape the future of the Global South as a unified force on the world stage?
- Topic:
- Leadership, Global South, Multipolarity, International System, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, India, and Asia
484. China’s influence at the United Nations: words and deeds
- Author:
- Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Théo Storella, and Pauline Weil
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- We investigate China’s influence at the United Nations by focusing on the promotion of its narratives (words) and its voting behaviour (deeds). For the former, we assess the extent to which China’s global initiatives have become embedded in UN discourse compared to Western initiatives. For the latter, we assess the degree to which countries, regions and voting coalitions align their UN General Assembly votes with China compared to the US. When it comes to words, China’s global initiatives are sometimes louder than the West’s. More specifically, the Belt and Road Initiative has had a much greater impact on UN discourse than any Western initiative. Other Chinese global initiatives do not clearly stand out from those of the West, with the Global Compact for Migration mentioned more frequently at the UN than any Chinese initiative other than the BRI. We also find that Chinese initiatives are more self-referential. Thematically, both Chinese and Western initiatives are very focused on security as well as aid and human rights. Moving to voting patterns, countries’ income levels are a key determinant of alignment in voting. Poorer countries are much more aligned with China than with the US. North America and the European Union, in that order, are generally more aligned with the US than with China and these trends are much more stable than one could expect given China’s growing economic influence.
- Topic:
- United Nations, Bilateral Relations, Governance, European Union, Economy, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
485. Updating the EU strategy on China: co-existence while derisking through partnerships
- Author:
- Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Abigaël Vasselier
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The European Union-China relationship has deteriorated markedly since the EU introduced a three-part strategy in 2019 based on partnership, competition and systemic rivalry. Th e relationship has been undermined by China’s support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its increasingly anti-Western foreign policy that aims to alter the international rules-based system. Meanwhile, the economic relationship is changing because of China’s structural deceleration and increasing self-reliance, coupled with the EU’s growing critical dependence on China, especially for digitalisation and decarbonisation. Europe must accept that relations with China will not return to their pre-pandemic state. While there is no need to change the overall strategy, the EU should seek co-existence with China while preserving EU values and interests. Cooperation is still needed to address global problems, including climate change, in which China plays an important role in finding solutions, but on which the EU cannot accept Chinese cooperation at any price. In terms of co-existence, the EU must continue to pursue de-risking – or reducing its exposure to China – especially for its energy and digital transitions. De-risking has started but more needs to be done to understand how it can be continued while not creating conflict. The EU should pursue a three-part approach: increase coherence and coordination with all European stakeholders, refi ne the EU economic-security strategy while accepting trade-offs, and seek partnerships as the best offensive tool. The 2024-2029 European Commission should foster discussion of China and coordination of strategic issues within a larger constituency. EU countries, with Commission coordination, need to be more involved in building a comprehensive approach, including by conducting national risk assessments and by shaping and implementing de-risking measures. On economic security, full implementation of current defensive instruments is needed, along with new protections, such as better coordination of export controls and a new outbound-investment screening mechanism. The trade-offs stemming from pursuing more security will need to be made explicit in order to mitigate them. On partnerships, the EU must look beyond the United States, working within the G7 and with other like-minded countries, such as Australia and South Korea, which have valuable experience of de-risking. Mutually beneficial and strategic cooperation agreements need to be brokered with relevant emerging and developing economies.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Economy, Risk, Trade, and Coexistence
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
486. Xi Transforms the Party: Senior Cadre Selection in a New Era
- Author:
- Mark Stokes, Eric Lee, Cathy Fang, and Marek Haar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project 2049 Institute
- Abstract:
- Due to the challenges associated with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise, anticipating who will lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a major concern. General Secretary Xi Jinping has reshuffled the deck around norms for succession. With old patterns woven out of the CCP’s banner, studying the new framework for promoting new senior leaders and the sub-factional politics lying underneath will aid in identifying who will lead the CCP and govern the PRC in the future. To that end, this report offers a summary of the leader promotion process within the CCP, a guide to identifying rising CCP leadership in the future, and a map of the current six sub-factions competing for Xi’s favor.
- Topic:
- Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
487. Partnership of convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China convergence
- Author:
- Rahman Yaacob
- Publication Date:
- 12-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- It is unlikely that Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be a Chinese military base or outpost such as the facility in Djibouti fully operated by the People’s Liberation Army. However, China could gain preferential access to the base or use its facilities there to collect intelligence against other states. The Cambodia–China defence convergence is driven by differing motives. Cambodia seeks a partner to modernise its military so it can meet perceived security threats from Thailand and Vietnam, while China wants to expand its political influence and military reach in Southeast Asia. New political and military leadership in Cambodia offers Australia and other like-minded partners an opportunity to deepen defence relations with the kingdom to counter China’s influence.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Navy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Cambodia
488. The East China Sea Dispute: China’s and Japan’s Assertiveness from Mao to Xi
- Author:
- Andrew Chubb
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 amid a serious foreign policy crisis following the Japanese government’s nationalization of three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The move was aimed at blocking Shintaro Ishihara’s Tokyo municipal government from purchasing the uninhabited islands from their private owner and constructing a harbor and other infrastructure that would further inflame tensions. Although Beijing understood Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s goal was to prevent an even worse crisis, it nonetheless responded by sending maritime law enforcement ships into the Japanese-controlled territorial seas around the islands, backed by a furious propaganda wave that unleashed violent anti-Japanese protests in dozens of cities across China. The result was a fundamental change in the sovereign territorial seas around the islands from Japanese control to overlapping control — a situation that continues to bring ships and aircraft from both sides into close contact on the water, increasing the risk of an accident that could bring about armed conflict. How much of China’s behavior in the East China Sea is attributable to Xi Jinping? To what extent have Sino-Japanese action-reaction dynamics been at play versus longer-term processes of the shifting distribution of power in the region or changes in domestic politics? How important have the hydrocarbon deposits that originally touched off the dispute been, and to what extent have the area’s fisheries — or fisherfolk — been protagonists? This paper assesses these questions using a systematic time-series dataset of both sides’ patterns of behavior over the long term, from its origins in the early 1970s to the Xi era. It visualizes the historical trajectory of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea, charting each side’s key moves across domestic, diplomatic, and physical domains and the balance between military, administrative, political, and resource motivations behind them. Quantifying the changes in China’s and Japan’s behaviors in the disputed area from 1970 to 2015 reveals six key dynamics: The East China Sea dispute began over oil and gas resources but switched toward a contest for military and administrative control as China rapidly expanded its naval and coast guard presence in the mid-2000s. China’s policy was already trending in an increasingly assertive direction well before Xi took power. China’s gray-zone assertiveness dates back to the mid-1990s, while coercive methods started in the mid-2000s. The key change Xi has overseen is China’s increasingly militarized — but also regularized — presence in the disputed area. Japanese actors have triggered several acute periods of tension with provocative moves, but China has driven the long-term arc, with its shifts from “shelving” the dispute in the 1970s to greater assertiveness from the mid-1990s to regular coercion from the mid-2000s. The two significant periods of non–Liberal Democratic Party rule in Japan have both preceded surges of Chinese assertiveness followed by Japanese pushback, raising questions about China’s calculations regarding domestic politics in Japan. Despite several high-profile propaganda campaigns and diplomatic blitzes, most of China’s moves have been in the physical domain on the water, while Japan has focused on diplomacy and domestic administrative moves. Xi’s precise role in the escalation around the disputed islands in September 2012 remains unclear, but his centralization of power since the 18th Party Congress has coincided with a regularization of China’s assertive behaviors. A less powerful leader might, like Xi’s predecessors, find it more difficult to prevent substate actors from taking destabilizing actions in the area, as occurred several times in the 2000s.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, History, Maritime, and Xi Jinping
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, and East China
489. Who Briefs Xi Jinping? How Politburo Study Sessions Help to Decode Chinese Politics
- Author:
- Neil Thomas and Feifei Hung
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- China’s politicians are lifelong learners. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls itself a “learning party” (xuexi dang) because its members participate in regular study sessions. These are designed to enhance organizational discipline and to instill practical knowledge. Even the Party’s top leaders, the 24 members of the Politburo, dedicate a half-day almost every month to the “collective study” (jiti xuexi) of a topic chosen by General Secretary Xi Jinping. This practice is unusual compared to most Western governments. It is rare that a U.S. president would convene their cabinet for lectures on employment policy, political theory, or World Trade Organization reform — all recent topics of Politburo study sessions. So why do Party leaders spend so much of their limited time doing collective study? What do they study? Who briefs from? How can we use this information to better understand Beijing? This paper first explains the nature and importance of Politburo study sessions. It then uses a unique dataset to analyze changes in topics and briefers over time before presenting case studies of how sessions focused on technology and foreign affairs relate to policymaking. The conclusion summarizes our findings about the value and limits of using these sessions to decode Chinese politics.
- Topic:
- Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
490. The United Front, Comprehensive Integration, and China’s Nonmilitary Strategy Toward Taiwan
- Author:
- Guoguang Wu
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Global opinions have increasingly considered the potential danger of war in the Taiwan Strait should China take military action to invade the island in pursuit of its plan for “full unification of the motherland.” These are legitimate concerns, as such danger increases with the growth of both China’s national power and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s global ambitions. Military action should not, however, devalue Beijing’s military-backed, nonmilitary strategy to reclaim Taiwan. What, in practice, is the specific purpose of Beijing’s nonmilitary strategy? How do nonmilitary and military means mutually support each other in China’s overall reunification strategy? As the Taiwan populace seemingly drifts further away in terms of a shared Chinese identity and rejects future unification, why does China still deem nonmilitary means optimal for dealing with Taiwan? This paper addresses these questions by first discussing how China’s Taiwan strategy consists of both military and nonmilitary elements, highlighting how Xi has upgraded the latter by “putting the people at the center” of “peaceful reunification” while simultaneously preparing military action and how the nonmilitary strategy follows the spirit of the united front political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It then investigates one of China’s latest nonmilitary initiatives to deal with Taiwan, namely, the “cross-strait integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian, and analyzes the strategic implications of those various measures for promoting “comprehensive integration.”1 The third section explores how the CCP defines the situation in the Taiwan Strait as a continuation of civil war and, accordingly, employs both military and nonmilitary strategies for winning said war. By considering how the two strategies complement one another, it also explains why CCP leadership has strengthened nonmilitary means, such as integration, despite prior ineffectiveness. The paper concludes that nonmilitary measures will not ultimately lead to “peaceful reunification” but are instead intended to mask Beijing’s overall capabilities to deal with Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Regional Integration, Economic Development, and Identity
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
491. Ishiba Takes the Helm: A New Kind of Leader for Japan
- Author:
- Asia Sociey
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) leadership elections are normally staid and predictable affairs. But scandals in the LDP and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s radical decision to dissolve powerful party factions disrupted business as usual. In an unusually dramatic election on September 27, Shigeru Ishiba emerged as the new party president — and automatically became prime minister of Japan. Ishiba, a long-standing fixture in the ruling LDP who had run for the position four times before, surprised many observers by defeating eight other contenders including powerful party veterans, popular “young Turks,” and a prominent female lawmaker. He immediately called for a general election on October 27 as an opportunity to secure a mandate for his policies during the often short-lived “honeymoon” for a new prime minister. For the United States, Ishiba brings a strong commitment to the security relationship, albeit from an approach and perspective that have the potential to disrupt the current progress in modernizing the alliance. He has advocated for a more equal partnership and for revisiting the foundational documents that govern the status of the U.S. troops stationed throughout the archipelago. It is an open question whether that element of his campaign rhetoric will translate into governing policies; indeed, he has already appeared to walk back some of his positions, including calling for an “Asian NATO” ahead of the general election. With the U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of many regional security arrangements, any significant change to the bilateral relationship could alter the stability and order of the broader Indo-Pacific.
- Topic:
- Elections, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Prime Minister, and Fumio Kishida
- Political Geography:
- Japan and Asia
492. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate
- Author:
- Kate Logan and Li Shuo
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
493. On Science & Tech Diplomacy
- Author:
- Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
494. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy
- Author:
- Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
495. On Alliances in Northeast Asia
- Author:
- Emma Chanlett-Avery, Duyeon Kim, and Yuka Koshino
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Over the past two years, delegations to Washington from Japan and South Korea have one predominant question for their interlocutors: What would a Trump 2.0 administration mean for their countries and for U.S. global leadership more broadly? Both Asian capitals appreciate the upgrades to their bilateral pacts with the United States under the Biden administration’s alliance-centric foreign policy, and express anxiety about the possible return of Trump as commander-in-chief. Even before his election in 2016, Trump had expressed open disdain for U.S. alliances and that skepticism could be amplified in a second term by his “America First” approach. With Kamala Harris now at the top of the Democratic ticket, Washington analysts assume broad continuity in her foreign policy approach, although nuances may yet emerge. But while a Harris election and a second Trump presidency contrast sharply on policy and style, the views from Seoul and Tokyo point to enduring elements of American foreign policy that are likely in either outcome. In many ways, Trump and Harris share an approach to U.S. economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Upon taking office in 2017, Trump fractured the Obama administration’s core economic pillar of the so-called rebalance to Asia by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This divorce drew dismay particularly from Japan; Tokyo had seen the 12-nation free trade pact as its primary tool to blunt China’s rising economic sway over the region and to reinforce its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP). The Biden-Harris administration has similarly expressed little enthusiasm for re-joining the reformed version that Japan salvaged after the U.S. withdrawal, and its signature regional economic policy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IFEP) lacks the market access that the region’s economies crave. Japan and South Korea also had misgivings about the passage of domestic economic legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act that would have penalized South Korean and Japanese investment in the United States. “Friend-shoring” rhetoric aside, both Seoul and Tokyo see either leader forging an industrial policy that defaults to protectionist trade practices. Both Japan and South Korea are also concerned about diminishing American leadership of the world and the ascendance of illiberal, authoritarian blocs. Biden and the Democratic Party have generally promoted U.S. alliances as underpinning a world order that promotes stability and the rule of law. Yet during Biden’s presidency, wars in Europe and the Middle East have flared, threatening to distract Washington from its Indo-Pacific priorities and driving deep divisions in public opinion both domestically and internationally. Trump and his Republican colleagues, on the other hand, mostly disapprove of U.S. military involvement in international conflict and fidelity to international alliances, particularly NATO. A Trump administration could undermine the rules-based system by brokering deals with authoritarian leaders, neglecting multilateral institutions that seek to quell conflict, and reinforcing the rising ideological isolationism in U.S. politics. Trump and Biden policy convergences aside, Seoul’s and Tokyo’s experiences with each president are starkly different. A Trump presidency would almost certainly present deeper challenges to each country and disrupt the web of security partnerships that both countries view as broadly stabilizing. How Trump would approach the China challenge is likely to be the central question: Will he be relatively supportive of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific if he sees them as amplifying U.S. power and deterrence? Or will he seek to cut his own deals with Beijing that excludes allies’ interests? Would he demand multifold increases in the burden-sharing agreements supporting the U.S. military presence in the region that allies would resist? A separate set of questions arises considering a Democratic victory. Would Harris opt to continue Biden’s approach to alliances? Would her administration see the Indo-Pacific as equally important to the trans-Atlantic partnership? Would Harris’s foreign policy team have a different view of how to handle strategic competition with China? All of these yet-unanswered questions loom large for Japan and South Korea over the coming months.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Alliance, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Presidential Elections, and Kamala Harris
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia
496. On U.S.-China Relations & Security
- Author:
- Lyle Morris and Wu Xinbo
- Publication Date:
- 10-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- In the run-up to the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, national security issues are playing a key role in the campaigns of the two candidates — Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump. In particular, since China has been identified as the United States biggest “strategic competitor” during both the Trump and Biden administrations, a key question is how will the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will be affected under a Harris or a Trump presidency? This article explores how both candidates will approach China if elected president. In particular, both authors will present U.S. and Chinese perspectives of how both candidates will influence bilateral relations, with a particular focus on national security. The central question to be considered is this: Will there be any discernible changes to U.S. policy towards China under a Harris or a Trump presidency? If so, what changes might be expected? Both authors agree that there will be few differences at the macro level in the China strategies of Harris and Trump: “strategic competition” has become deeply ingrained as the guiding principle within the U.S. national strategy towards China. Furthermore, national security has seeped into U.S. trade and investment policy toward China in recent years, to include greater U.S. export controls on high-technology commodities. Thus, it is likely that both candidates will continue policies that nest national security considerations within an overall economic approach toward China. However, we may expect tactical differences in both candidates’ policies regarding trade and U.S. approaches to alliances. Harris will likely continue policies under a Biden administration that prioritize the central role that U.S. alliances in Asia and Europe play in the world. While Trump will likely inject uncertainty into the role of alliances within strategic competition with China. He will also likely adopt a much more aggressive stance on trade, to possibly include heavy tariffs on China, that may destabilize an already unstable bilateral relationship.
- Topic:
- Security, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Presidential Elections
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
497. On the Road of Excess: How Startups Are Driving China’s Electric Vehicle Boom
- Author:
- G. A. Donovan
- Publication Date:
- 09-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- A complex mix of ingredients came together to create China's electric vehicle boom, but government subsidies alone cannot explain the emergence of the industry's sophisticated ecosystem and vast manufacturing capacity. An alternate explanation is that Chinese carmakers could scale up and rapidly expand production of electric vehicles because they have access to the deep pools of flexible financing provided by capital markets, sovereign wealth funds, and private equity and venture capital investors, both in China and from overseas. China’s electric vehicle startups have raised billions from investors eager to finance potential unicorns in innovative, environmentally friendly industries. Taking inspiration from Tesla, Google, and other Silicon Valley pioneers, the founders of these startups have relied on rising valuations to attract new investment to sustain their operations despite years of losses. However, many of China's electric vehicle startups now find it hard to raise funds as their valuations have plummeted, and the market forces that drove the industry's breakneck growth may now be slowing it down.
- Topic:
- Investment, Manufacturing, Subsidies, and Electric Vehicles
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
498. Lai Ching-te’s Inauguration Speech: Reactions from China, Civil Unrest in Taiwan
- Author:
- Simona Grano
- Publication Date:
- 06-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- After winning Taiwan’s presidential election with 40% of the vote in January,1 Lai Ching-te faced his first major test on May 20, 2024: his inaugural address. The speech incited a strong military reaction from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, the largest civil protests since the Sunflower Student Movement2 have gripped the island in reaction to a bill passed by opposition parties — a bill that some fear could expand the legislature’s power and undermine the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidency. For a number of reasons, Lai’s address, the protests, and his cross-Strait policies are crucial to understanding the continuing evolution of cross-Strait relations as well as the PRC-U.S.-Taiwan triangle. First and foremost, cross-Strait relations are at an all-time low; second, the U.S. presidential election in November could shift U.S. policy toward Taiwan; and third, Lai will govern with a divided Legislative Yuan, presenting challenges to his domestic agenda. This paper will first deal with President Lai’s address and how it framed cross-strait issues, Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC, and other important topics. It will then cover China’s response and likely posture in the upcoming months. The paper then analyzes the current civil protests in Taiwan and how a divided legislature will impact politics over the next four years. The penultimate section looks at the expected differences between a Biden presidency and a Trump presidency for Beijing, Taipei, and the world. A conclusion sums up the paper’s key points.
- Topic:
- Protests, Presidential Elections, Regional Politics, and Cross-Strait Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
499. Politics First: The Key to Understanding China’s Third Plenum
- Author:
- Neil Thomas and Jing Qian
- Publication Date:
- 07-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Anticipation is growing for one of the most important events in Chinese politics this year. On June 27, General Secretary Xi Jinping chaired a meeting of the 24-man Politburo that announced the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its Third Plenum in Beijing on July 15–18. A plenum is a plenary meeting of the committee’s 205 members and 171 non-voting alternate members. The meeting is important because the Central Committee will issue an authoritative “decision” (jueding) that will guide policymaking for years to come. The document will center on “further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese-style modernization” amid concerns both at home and abroad about the Party’s ability to steward China’s economic, geopolitical, and social development. However, expectations should be modest. Historically, third plenums are often overrated as catalysts for transformational change and instead introduce plans that expand on existing policy themes. Xi’s first third plenum in 2013 appeared unusually ambitious, raising hopes for economic and political liberalization, but its true significance was in enabling Xi’s centralization of power. The policy signals for this month’s plenum suggest a strong emphasis on Xi’s goals of achieving technological self-reliance, addressing financial risks, streamlining central-local relations, and improving social welfare. There are also hints that Beijing may try to ease conditions for private firms and foreign investors in high-tech sectors, as well as efforts to enhance internal Party governance. Additionally, several previously sacked officials are expected to lose their seats on the Central Committee. This article analyzes the historical context, policy signals, personnel movements, and key documents related to the upcoming Third Plenum.
- Topic:
- Government, Politics, Domestic Politics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
500. Persuasive technologies in China: Implications for the future of national security
- Author:
- Daria Impiombato, Nathan Attrill, Albert Zhang, Fergus Ryan, and Bethany Allen
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The rapid adoption of persuasive technologies—any digital system that shapes users’ attitudes and behaviours by exploiting physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities—will challenge national security in ways that are difficult to predict. Emerging persuasive technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (AI), ambient technologies and neurotechnology interact with the human mind and body in far more intimate and subconscious ways, and at far greater speed and efficiency, than previous technologies. This presents malign actors with the ability to sway opinions and actions without the conscious autonomy of users. Regulation is struggling to keep pace. Over the past decade, the swift development and adoption of these technologies have outpaced responses by liberal democracies, highlighting the urgent need for more proactive approaches that prioritise privacy and user autonomy. That means protecting and enhancing the ability of users to make conscious and informed decisions about how they’re interacting with technology and for what purpose. China’s commercial sector is already a global leader in developing and using persuasive technologies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls China’s private sector and mandates that Chinese companies—especially technology companies—work towards China’s national-security interests. This presents a risk that the CCP could use persuasive technologies commercially developed in China to pursue illiberal and authoritarian ends, both domestically and abroad, through such means as online influence campaigns, targeted psychological operations, transnational repression, cyber operations and enhanced military capabilities. ASPI has identified several prominent Chinese companies that already have their persuasive technologies at work for China’s propaganda, military and public-security agencies. They include: Midu—a language intelligence technology company that provides generative AI tools used by Chinese Government and CCP bureaus to enhance the party-state’s control of public opinion. Those capabilities could also be used for foreign interference (see page 4). Suishi—a pioneer in neurotechnology that’s developing an online emotion detection and evaluation system to interpret and respond to human emotions in real time. The company is an important partner of Tianjin University’s Haihe Lab (see page 16), which has been highly acclaimed for its research with national-security applications (see page 17). Goertek—an electronics manufacturer that has achieved global prominence for smart wearables and virtual-reality (VR) devices. This company collaborates on military–civil integration projects with the CCP’s military and security organs and has developed a range of products with dual-use applications, such as drone-piloting t
- Topic:
- National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Persuasion
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Asia-Pacific