Search

Begin New Search Topic Economy Political Geography Asia Journal Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies

1. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Game Changer in the Indo-Pacific: The View from Japan

Author:
Glen S. Fukushima
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic that struck in late 2019 has affected the world profoundly, and Japan is no exception. But the direct impact on Japan has been relatively small considering the number of cases of infections and deaths relative to the size of Japan’s population, particularly considering its elderly population and high density. For instance, among the G7 countries, Japan has had the fewest cases of infections (4,690 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 32,276 in Canada, 40,620 in Germany, 64,804 in the United Kingdom, 66,828 in Italy, 86,283 in France, and 99,652 in the United States. Similarly, among the G7 countries, Japan has had by far the fewest number of deaths (81 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 638 in Canada, 996 in Germany, 1,601 in France, 1,776 in the United States, 1,870 in the United Kingdom, and 2,004 in Italy. This chapter argues that although the direct disruptions to Japan resulting from the pandemic have been less than to the other G7 countries, the effect of the pandemic on other nations with strong geopolitical importance to Japan—in particular, the United States and China—coupled with changes in Japan’s domestic political and economic environment have accelerated changes in geopolitical posture and direction that were already in progress in Japan. The fundamental geopolitical challenge facing Japan is how to ensure its military security, political independence, and economic prosperity in the face of a less reliable and less predictable United States and a more powerful and more assertive China. For Japan, the ideal resolution of this challenge is to maintain positive and constructive relations with both countries, while recognizing the reality that even as economic ties with China—whether in trade, investment, finance, tourism, or the exchange of people—are growing relative to ties with the United States, political and security ties (and the sharing of common values) with the United States remain the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is only natural that Japan would seek to diversify and strengthen its relationships with other countries, regions, economic arrangements, and international organizations and institutions. This diversification, which could be seen since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, has gained momentum in recent years, and the pandemic has served only to accelerate it. The analysis proceeds through the examination of the following: 1) pandemic chronology; 2) Japan’s domestic politics; 3) relations with the United States; 4) relations with China; 5) Japan’s diversification strategy; and 6) conclusions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

2. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

3. Economic Regionalism is Key to Openness and Growth: An ASEAN Perspective

Author:
Sanchita Basu Das
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are involved in several regional economic arrangements, not only their own ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), but also those in a bigger geographic area, such as the ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). A subset of these countries are partaking of Asia-Pacific deals, namely the latest Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Some are pursuing bilateral deals in pursuit of deeper economic cooperation. Finally, all ASEAN countries are members of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which although not labelled a trade agreement, is concerned with trade-related measures including transport infrastructure, policy coordination, economic connectivity through trade and investment, customs modernization, financial cooperation, and people-to-people linkages. A common feature of all these trade agreements is that they are not just focused on removing restrictions on trade, i.e. lowering import tariffs and quotas, but are much more comprehensive and include issues like trade in services, investment, labor, intellectual property rights, regulatory standards, and health and safety rules. All of these agreements deal with cooperation measures beyond national borders and can be called deep economic cooperation. They go beyond the WTO framework and are often labeled “new regionalism,” understood as state-led projects in the context of global developments. The extent of deepness varies, mainly depending on the participating countries’ development stage and the economic competitiveness of domestic sectors. What do the ASEAN countries aim to achieve? Theory has elucidated that governments have motives ranging from politics to economics when entering an economic cooperation arrangement. The political motives could be confidence building, i.e. if an international relationship was blemished by a history of conflict, economic cooperation can introduce a process of confidence building.3 For smaller countries, it could be seen as a means to increase bargaining power with the international community. Countries often see economic cooperation as a means to hasten their domestic economic reforms so as to increase attractiveness to foreign investors.4 Governments could follow a regionalism exercise also to defend domestic interests that are threatened by regionalism elsewhere. As for the economic motives, countries prefer cooperation among a limited number of players as it enables continued protection in a bigger geographical space and shuns producers from non-members. This enables them to exclude “politically sensitive,” noncompetitive domestic sectors completely from trade liberalization. Finally, regional economic arrangements are essential for creating economies of scale for producers and offering a larger market for consumers, which increases attractiveness to potential investors. This chapter elaborates on ASEAN’s perspective on economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. It examines key initiatives that ASEAN countries are currently negotiating or implementing in their national economies, discusses economic and strategic motives, and views the future of regionalism from an ASEAN perspective. It concludes that although the ASEAN countries are facing some uncertainties in their pursuit of economic regionalism, they will continue to support the endeavor as it serves their economic structure of openness. The countries have realized the benefits of economic integration in terms of confidence building of investors, thereby bolstering economic growth.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Economic Growth, Trade, ASEAN, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
Asia

4. A Chinese Perspective on the Impact of Sanctions

Author:
Cheng Xiaohe
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since the Korean War, North Korea (the DPRK) has endured sanctions imposed by the United States and other western countries, but the sanctions began to acquire a dramatic impact only in 2006 when North Korean ballistic missile blasts invited a punitive reaction from the UN Security Council. In addition to sanctions imposed by individual countries, for the first time, international organizations, notably the Security Council, passed punitive resolutions in an effort to rein in North Korea’s missile and nuclear development. In order to supervise implementation of the sanctions, the Security Council set up a committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 in 2006 (the sanctions committee), which now comprises all 15 members and makes its decisions by consensus. To North Korea’s dismay, as it continues to fight against western countries’ economic sanctions and military embargo, it now has to bear the brunt of sanctions from its traditional allies, China and Russia. Even so, it has been defying international pressure and pressing ahead with its missile and nuclear weapons programs. Despite tougher sanctions, North Korea is poised to possess missiles with nuclear warheads that could hit South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper explores the effectiveness of the sanctions, asking whether the North’s steady progress on nuclear and missile weapons demonstrates their failure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

5. A U.S. Perspective on Bilateral Economic Relations

Author:
Mark Manyin and Brock Williams
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The past several years have been an era of relative calm in U.S.-South Korean trade and economic relations. The Trump administration, however, has signaled two potential paradigm shifts that could lead to greater tension in the bilateral economic relationship. The first is the president’s relatively negative view of existing U.S. trade policy and willingness to at least threaten the use of measures that historically have been infrequently deployed to correct what he views as its failures. This may affect the future course of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which the administration presumably will scrutinize as part of its examination of relationships in which the United States runs a trade deficit. Second and intimately related, the president has signaled in his statements a willingness to use U.S. security relationships to influence economic relations and vice versa. On both fronts, uncertainty abounds, due in part to existing institutional structures that limit the president’s ability to take new policy directions without, for example, the consent of Congress. The administration’s own lack of clarity on its policy priorities and the possibility that stating seemingly extreme positions may represent a negotiating tactic rather than a policy shift, also cloud the outlook for how the United States will approach the bilateral economic relationship. The uncertainty also reflects the fact that key trade policy officials, including the United States Trade Representative (USTR), have yet to be confirmed.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

6. The Trump Administration, U.S.-Korean Economic Relations, and Asian Regionalism

Author:
Claude Barfield
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This analysis written “in medias res” (in the midst of things) covers trade policy under President Donald Trump. The basic outline was prefigured during the presidential campaign, but this did not preclude surprising policy twists and turns (even contradictions) during the first months of the administration. In part, these tergiversations can be explained by the shakedown cruise for any new regime, but in this case, this fairly standard phenomenon has been complicated by the highly personal, idiosyncratic “Trump brand” of policymaking. In many areas of domestic and foreign policy, Trump had little or no experience or fixed opinions. Not so with trade: well back in the 1980s, Trump, as a private corporate leader, had railed against the “unfair” trade practices of Japan and other U.S. trade partners, as well as mounting U.S. trade deficits.1 These themes defined his presidential campaign and have been carried through in actions since he took office in January. The trade priorities have included: “America First” and the vigorous assertion of U.S. sovereignty, with the undisguised threat of unilateral action in defiance of the World Trade Organization; trade negotiations and renegotiation of existing trade agreements with the primary goal of reducing U.S. trade deficits; stepped up use of trade remedy (anti-dumping and countervailing duties) actions, as well as the threat to retaliate against U.S.-defined “unfair” trade practices; and tying trade restrictions directly to alleged national security imperatives. Yet, what seems a sure fact one day may be outdated the next, complicating preparation of this chapter.
Topic:
International Relations, Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America