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1. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:
John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

2. Korea's Official Development Assistance to the Philippine Education Sector: Observations and Inputs

Author:
Inero Ancho
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Advocating inclusive and equitable quality education (SGD 4: Quality Education) is central to sustainable development efforts anchored on collaboration and partnership that enable the policy-to-impact synergy. Agencies and institutions in various levels need to align motivations as they work towards realizing education for sustainable development (ESD). As education fuels sustainable development, school access and completion need to be prioritized, as wealth inequality and gender gap are eliminated. Human capital investment involves the provision of relevant and responsive education systems and training. These mechanisms enable an individual to be productive and contribute to positive outcomes, improved standard of living, and potential gains. As a core element to growth and poverty reduction, human capital suggests implementing significant and concrete progress in core education indices. Further, sustained economic growth, increased productivity value, and favorable social returns are manifested outcomes at the macro level. This paper looks at the ODA from Korea to the Philippines in the context of education. The discussion will be anchored on the Philippine Development Plan and AmBisyon Natin 2040 as roadmaps reflecting the aspirations of every Filipino of having a strongly rooted, comfortable, and secured life.1 Observations and inputs will be offered to ensure effective ODA and provide focus and ways forward towards access to and quality of education, along with programs and projects that contribute into any meaningful development of the Philippine economy.
Topic:
Development, Education, Economy, Human Capital, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Philippines

3. Crossing Rivers by Yakhide-Boat and Horsehead-Ferry: Waterways in Pre-1959 Tibet with Diana Lange

Author:
Diane Lange
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Professor Diana. Lange will speak on the significance of waterways for infrastructure, economy and socio-cultural life in pre-1959 Tibet. She focuses on ferry and transport services in the Tibetan corvée tax system, including the nature of taxation on a specific Tibetan village – the fishing village of Jun in Chushur County in Central Tibet. Her research is based on extensive fieldwork in this fishing village conducted during several trips to the area between 2003 and 2012. She also analyzes how fishermen in Southern and Central Tibet adapted to the geographical, ecological and cultural conditions of their environment.
Topic:
History, Infrastructure, Economy, and Rivers
Political Geography:
Asia and Tibet

4. South Korea and IPEF: Rationale, Objectives and the Implications for Partners and Neighbors

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As a key manufacturer of high-end technology components critical to the sustainability of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South Korea is essential in any effort to rebuild a resilient global supply chain but also to the promotion of a clean economy. South Korea can thus contribute to two of the pillars of IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), specially to pillars II and III (supply-chain resilience and a clean economy). However, as the US executive and legislative branches intensify their hawkish approaches to China, they have not given much consideration to the possible damage they will inflict on the strategic interests of some of their allies. In particular, they have not fully considered Korean factors when legislating on bills such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This paper argues that allies such as South Korea and France must make the White House and US legislature aware of the external consequences of their decisions and behavior, and that they must cooperate within the confines of US-led strategic initiatives.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

5. The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Leadership

Author:
Aidan Campbell
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Investigations seeking to explain the rise of China rarely investigate the many new institutions founded to increase China’s economic success and influence over global affairs. In the economic sector, some better-known projects include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank. One of the newest and least understood institutions founded to promote international use of the RMB is the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). The purpose of this research is to examine the development, policies, and goals of CIPS in order to better understand the phenomenon of Chinese-lead international economic institutions. Novel evidence for CIPS’s intention to adopt blockchain technology and provide services for currencies other than the RMB is presented. The conclusion to this research is that CIPS is presently too small to pose a threat to the existing SWIFT network or predominance of US dollar transactions in international trade. At the same time, CIPS evidences a patient and rational strategy designed to reform international norms and patterns of trade to China’s advantage in the long term.
Topic:
Political Economy, Leadership, Economy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. Asia: Country fact sheet

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Summary, Economy, Background, and Fact sheet
Political Geography:
Asia

7. China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources

Author:
Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Naomi Aladekoba
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent. In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively. The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, Business, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

8. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. China and the new globalization

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

10. Building a Coalition - the U.S. Faces Down Competition with China in the Chip Sector

Author:
Damian Wnukowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent months, the U.S. has intensified its international efforts to limit China’s ability to produce the most advanced chips. The result includes the introduction by Japan and the Netherlands of restrictions on the export of modern machines for chip production. In response, China is trying to attract foreign investment and develop its own potential in this sector. The U.S. actions may significantly slow the pace of China’s technological development and economic growth and limit its potential to further strengthen its military capabilities. This may make it difficult for China to support Russia with dual-use products and render possible offensive actions against Taiwan harder.
Topic:
Economy, Production, Semiconductors, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

12. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade

Author:
Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐​long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐​handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
Topic:
National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Southeast Asia Aid Map - Key Findings Report

Author:
Alexandre Dayant, Grace Stanhope, and Roland Rajah
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Official development finance plays an important role in financing Southeast Asia’s development, equivalent to around 10% of total government development spending in the region. China is Southeast Asia’s single largest development partner and leads infrastructure financing. Yet, implementation problems have seen the scale of China’s financing decline in recent years. Traditional development partners collectively still dominate development financing in Southeast Asia at 80% of the total. The multilateral development banks lead the way, followed by Japan, Europe, and South Korea. The United States and Australia are mid-sized players. India and the Middle East have become notable sources of non-traditional development finance, with the Islamic Development Bank playing an important role. Climate development finance is increasing, but Southeast Asia will need more support if it is to transition towards resilient, low-carbon development. Intraregional development cooperation is growing, but only makes up a small part of development finance in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Humanitarian Aid, Finance, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

14. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

15. Asia: Forecast summary

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Background, Charts and tables, and Annual indicators
Political Geography:
Asia

16. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

17. Asia: Forecast summary

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Background, Charts and tables, and Annual indicators
Political Geography:
Asia

18. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

19. Asia: Forecast summary

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Background, Charts and tables, and Annual indicators
Political Geography:
Asia

20. General Equilibrium Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts of China’s Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System

Author:
Xianling Long, Da Zhang, Lawrence Goulder, and Chenfei Qu
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China introduced the world's largest emissions trading system in 2021 which is intended to help cost-effectively achieve its pledges of reaching a peak in CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060. The system is a tradable performance standard (TPS) with a bottom-up intensity-based emissions cap, unlike a top-down absolute cap approach commonly used globally. General Equilibrium Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts of China’s Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System developed and applied a multi-sector, multi-period general equilibrium model to assess the emissions, energy mix, and economic impacts of a series of options for the future development of this policy. These included cap-setting, benchmark design, auction design, and sectoral expansion, with valuable insights provided on the potential future evolution of this policy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

21. Countering Economic Coercion: Tools and Strategies for Collective Action

Author:
Wendy Cutler and Haeyoon Kim
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
conomic coercion has become one of the most pressing and growing challenges on the international scene today, which has raised concerns about the potential damage to global economic growth, the rules-based trading system, and international security and stability. Compounding this issue is the difficulty faced by governments worldwide, particularly small and mid-sized nations, in effectively responding to such measures. In light of this challenge, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) hosted an online discussion “Countering Economic Coercion: Tools and Strategies for Collective Action,” on February 28th moderated by Wendy Cutler, ASPI Vice President; and featuring Victor Cha, Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Melanie Hart, Senior Advisor for China and the Indo-Pacific in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment; Ryuichi Funatsu, Director for Economic Security Policy Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; and Mariko Togashi, Research Fellow for Japanese Security and Defense Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Asia

22. The Transition From an Intensity to an Absolute Emissions Cap in China’s National Emissions Trading System

Author:
Duan Maosheng
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The unique characteristics of China's economic development and electricity marketization have resulted in the implementation of a bottom-up intensity-based emissions cap in China’s national emissions trading system (ETS) in its early stages. However, the efficacy of the bottom-up cap-setting approach remains controversial, particularly with regard to achieving emission reduction goals and cost-effectiveness. In response to China's "dual carbon" targets and updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), China’s national ETS shall gradually shift towards a real cap-and-trade system, with a transition period when a hybrid system, which has an absolute control cap beside the intensity cap, is implemented. The Transition from an Intensity to an Absolute Emissions Cap in China’s National Emissions Trading System examines the cap-setting approaches used in ETSs in China, the underlying reasons for choosing intensity caps in China, and major issues related to the transition from an intensity cap to an absolute cap in China’s national ETS.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

23. Economic and Environmental Impacts of China’s New Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System

Author:
Lawrence Goulder, Xianling Long, Chenfei Qu, and Da Zhang
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s National Emissions Trading System (ETS) has already become the world’s largest ETS and is expected to contribute substantially toward meeting China’s pledge to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. The new system is based on a tradable performance standard (TPS), a rate-based system under which each covered facility receives from the government in each compliance period a certain number of emissions allowances based on its output and the government’s assigned “benchmark” ratio of emissions per unit of output. Economic and Environmental Impacts of China’s New Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System describes the results from a multi-sector multi-period general equilibrium model designed to assess the potential economic, energy mix, and emissions impacts of different future policy options under China’s National ETS over the period 2020–2035, by sector and province and in the aggregate
Topic:
Environment, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

24. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

25. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

26. Asia: Forecast summary

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Background, Charts and tables, and Annual indicators
Political Geography:
Asia

27. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

28. Asia: Forecast summary

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Background, Charts and tables, and Annual indicators
Political Geography:
Asia

29. The role of natural resources in the territorial conflicts of Xinjiang and Tibet in the People´s Republic of China

Author:
José Antonio Peña-Ramos, Adrián García Peña, and Chiara Olivieri
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
More than 1,437 million people inhabit China. More than 91% are ethnic Han, leaving the rest divided into more than fifty groups officially recognized as minority nationalities. The history of China has seen clashes between some minority groups and the State, even of a secessionist nature. Some of them reach the present day, as in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet. This article examines the weight that natural resources and other geopolitical benefits for the Chinese State can have in both territories. The working hypothesis is that these resources and benefits are essential for China's economic and geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, Uyghurs, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Tibet, and Xinjiang

30. Structural Transformation and the Global Production Value Chain: Potential Impact of the Cambodia-Republic of Korea FTA on Cambodia

Author:
Shandre Mugan Thangavelu and Vutha Hing
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the structural transformation of the Cambodian economy based on the impact of the CKFTA in terms of trade, output growth, and employment. It summarises the key results of the CKFTA study that examined the impact of the CKFTA on the Cambodian economy – specifically quantitative (structural gravity model estimation and simulation) and qualitative trade policy evaluation in terms of exports, output, and structural transformation of the economy in the global and regional value chains. The policy brief also highlights the key benefits of the CKFTA to the Cambodian economy.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, Trade, and Value Chains
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Cambodia

31. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

32. Asia: Forecast summary

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, Background, Charts and tables, and Annual indicators
Political Geography:
Asia

33. China and Nicaragua’s Deepening Embrace

Author:
Scott B. MacDonald
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In October 2023, Nicaragua signed an agreement with China’s CAMC Engineering Company (中工国际工程) for the reconstruction, expansion, and upgrading of the Punta Huete International Airport (Yicai, October 18). The company is a subsidiary of the conglomerate China National Machinery Industry Corporation (国际集团), also known as Sinomach (Sinomach, accessed November 15). Local and Chinese officials are touting the $492 million project as part of China’s Bridge and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting a deepening of Daniel Ortega’s regime’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Global Times, October 18). Closer links between Beijing and Managua demonstrate that China’s economic statecraft remains central to its strategy to further penetrate Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of significant geopolitical importance to the United States. The sustainability of China’s economic statecraft, and BRI in particular, have come into question in recent months due to the country’s domestic economic problems. However, the Nicaraguan airport announcement signals that the PRC remains economically active in the region, and its ambitions have not wavered. This is something of which the remaining handful of countries that officially recognize Taiwan are well aware: Beijing’s attention to regional infrastructure continues, if more selectively than before, but only to those countries who have decided to forgo relations with Taiwan. Beijing is further extending its reach into the strategic underbelly of the United States. For Nicaragua, the restoration of diplomatic ties with China serves the geopolitical needs of President Daniel Ortega in distancing his regime from the United States and softening the blow of sanctions (imposed due to fraudulent elections and gross human rights violations), while providing a source of non-Western funds to finance infrastructure projects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Central America, and Nicaragua

34. Hong Kong: The Keystone in China’s Economic Statecraft

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The recent decision by Hong Kong to join China in banning Japanese seafood took many observers by surprise (Reuters, August 23). At first glance, the ban seemed an overblown reaction to Japan’s handling of nuclear wastewater, which many international bodies have deemed safe and compliant with established procedures. And while it is commonly understood that Hong Kong’s government is politically influenced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), many still believe in its economic autonomy. Considering the significant economic reliance of Japan on Hong Kong for its seafood trade, among other sectors, the ban startled numerous stakeholders (Nikkei Asia, August 25). However, the move is less shocking when Hong Kong is viewed as an integral cog in China’s economic statecraft machine. Traditionally, Western governments lack strategic foresight regarding Hong Kong’s long-term position. Often, this oversight stems from an inadequate comprehension of Hong Kong’s pivotal financial role relative to China, as well as an underestimation of its potential as a node for strategic leverage, both for and against China. China’s rise as a global superpower is inextricably linked to its adept use of economic statecraft, a fusion of economic might and strategic prowess. Its pressure on South Korea to stop the production of Taiwanese military submarines provides a recent example (Reuters, October 16). Hong Kong is a pulsating metropolis at the heart of this strategy. It not only exemplifies China’s ambitions but also acts as a crucial conduit for realizing them. There are two key strands of Hong Kong’s centrality to Beijing: its function as an economic lifeline to the global financial system and its role in the clandestine acquisition of technology and intellectual assets for China from overseas. The US and its allies must focus more on Beijing’s overt and covert leveraging of Hong Kong and think harder about what the city’s function should be in an era of de-risking, geoeconomic competition, and weaponized interdependence.
Topic:
Economy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Superpower
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Hong Kong

35. Ten Years On, How is the Belt and Road Initiative Faring in Indonesia?

Author:
William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
“It is not merely talk, but it is about actually building something. From airports to railways, these are industries we can see and touch. This is exactly the sort of courage and real action the world needs right now.” So said Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in 2017 (BRF, May 14, 2017; Jakarta Globe, May 16, 2017). This year marks the tenth anniversary of this ambitious, globe-spanning infrastructure development project. Today, 151 countries and 32 international organizations have joined the initiative, which Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently described as a “global enterprise to build a belt of prosperity and a road to happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], January 20). A decade ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI with a series of speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia calling for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road,” respectively (Consulate General of the PRC in Toronto, September 7, 2013; China Daily, October 4, 2013). The following year, China announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road fund at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing and a $20 billion Maritime Silk Road fund in Indonesia (China Daily, November 9, 2014). From the BRI’s inception, it has been clear that Southeast Asia and its largest economy— Indonesia—are intended to serve as a centerpiece of the megaproject (Global Times, November 16, 2022). Roughly two-thirds of all people of ethnic Chinese ancestry outside of China are in Southeast Asia. [1] The 142-kilometer (88 mile) Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) is one of the BRI’s flagship projects (China Brief, December 22, 2022). Indonesia also hosts nearly half of the eight overseas industrial parks that China has established across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the China-Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, and the China-Indonesia JuLong Agricultural Industry Cooperation Zone (China Development Institute, June 26, 2019). While Beijing has pulled back its overseas BRI lending—and Xi has exhibited some notable reticence toward hosting a third Belt and Road Forum—Indonesia challenges the broader narrative that the BRI is somehow fading away (Green Finance & Development Center, July 24, 2022). In the world’s fourth-most populous country, Chinese investment has continued apace, and both governments continue to champion the BRI’s ability to deliver “mutual benefit” and “win-win results.” Still, understanding Indonesia’s experience with the BRI requires closer examination of the history behind China-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation, major projects beyond the oft-discussed Jakarta-Bandung HSR and their impacts on the Indonesian public, and the extent of economic engagement between Jakarta and Beijing.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

36. Italy’s Pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Towards a Value-driven Foreign Policy?

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy is stepping up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, both in the economic and security realms. The cabinet led by Giorgia Meloni – a centre-right coalition often portrayed by commentators as right-wing and nationalist – is rebalancing Rome’s policy in the Far East by scaling down ties with Beijing and by effectively lending support to the United States and its Asian allies vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive and self-confident China. Moving away from previous centre-left governments that tended to prioritise commercial relations with Beijing, the conservative coalition in power since September 2022 has been fostering defence-related cooperation with Japan and India and chip-related cooperation and investments with Taiwan. Moreover – and remarkably for a country that has long been absent from Asian security – the Italian government has sent a patrol vessel to the South China Sea and plans to forward the country’s flagship aircraft carrier to the area to conduct joint exercises with the navies of Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The quantity and quality of initiatives being undertaken warrant the label of an Italian ‘pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. By upgrading its presence in the region, Italy joins the other G7 nations in their efforts to uphold the rules-based order and dissuade Beijing from invading Taiwan. However, to consolidate the western anchorage of this pivot, the Meloni government needs to fully align its policy towards Beijing with that of the Euro-Atlantic allies – which includes deciding whether to continue to lend Italy’s official support to China’s Belt and Road Initiative or not.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Italy, and Indo-Pacific

37. Where is China heading?

Author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
China is ambitious, it is making this known and everyone is beginning to realise it. So much so that today a growing number of observers fear that it will take greater risks to achieve its objectives and fall into the famous "Thucydides' trap"; in short, that it will launch into a war, notably around Taiwan, which would inevitably involve the United States. Isn't its goal to supplant America and become the world's leading power? If, by 2028 or 2030, the Chinese economy were to exceed the US economy in terms of GDP, it is doubtful that it will succeed in removing the US from its pedestal. This is likely to be lower and more contested. But rather than a power transition, the world is witnessing the emergence of new, permanently asymmetrical bipolarity and, no doubt, a new Cold War[1].
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

38. COVID-19 and the Health of Banking Sector in Japan and South Korea: A Comparative Study

Author:
Munim Kumar Barai
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The economies of Japan and South Korea are dominated by banks. Both countries have created a complex financial structure, including a well-established banking industry at their heart that supports economic operations. However, both countries’ banking sectors have previously faced crises such as the Asian Financial Crisis (mostly in South Korea), the Japanese economic slowdown, and the financial crisis of 2007-08 (both). While the Bank of Japan (BOJ) approved the quantitative easing (QE) monetary policy and lowered interest rates to manage the crises, the Bank of Korea (BOK) pursued interest and financial restructuring as well as banking system digitization to overcome the crises. Covid-19 has disrupted the normal operation of banks, and the central banks and governments of both countries have implemented a variety of monetary and other measures to mitigate its economic and financial consequences. This study aims to identify and assess the health of domestic banks in Japan and South Korea for the Covid-19 ex-ante and interim periods. Several important variables, i.e., portfolios of assets and liabilities, asset productivity, stockholders' equity, profitability, and operating efficiency, have been included to evaluate the health of their banks. This compari-son of health metrics for 2010 to 2020 could help identify changes or shifts in the banking sector of Japan and Korea. The study has used ex-ploratory and descriptive methodologies to undertake qualitative and quantitative evaluations of important bank health indicators in the ex-ante and interim periods of Covid-19. It also used a hybrid method to produce research goals and arguments, including a framework based on what was already known in the field.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Economy, COVID-19, and Banking
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

39. Accelerating Transitions towards a Circular Economy and Policy Implications for Korea

Author:
Jinyoung Moon, Youngseok Park, Seung Kwon Na, Sunghee Lee, and Eunmi Kim
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study analyzes global efforts to transition to a circular economy, and analyzes each country's responses and major issues to the stages of waste generation and management, which decisively distinguish the existing economic system from the circular economy. In addition, this study examines cases of private-sector-led cooperation for sup-porting developing countries in terms of international cooperation and linking with international trade, and also analyzes the implications of information-based environmental policies in response to the circular economy. Finally, based on the results of these analyses, this study proposes policy measures to prepare for the circular economy.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Economy, Trade, Private Sector, and Management
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

40. A Review of the First Decade of the Korea-EU FTA

Author:
Dong-Hee Joe
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union (EU) and Korea, which entered into force in 2011. The EU is the world's largest economy and Korea's third largest trade partner, only after China and the United States. Back when the FTA nego-tiations began in 2007, the EU was Korea's second largest export destination, from which Korea enjoyed the largest surplus. Al-so, more than 35 per cent of Korea's foreign direct investment came from the member states of the EU. Korea is also a major econ-omy and a major trade partner of the EU, especially in Asia. The FTA with Korea was the first case of the EU's “next generation” FTAs, and is considered to have served as a benchmark for the EU's bilateral trade agreements thereafter (Kang 2016). As for Korea, it was the first FTA with a major economy, even before the US, its traditional ally, and China, its closest neighbor. Because of its importance, the Korea-EU FTA has received attention from economics and trade policy. KIEP also took a look at the first decade of its implementation last year (Joe et al. 2021). This Brief introduces some of the findings in Joe et al. (2021), fo-cusing on the impact of the FTA on the bi-lateral economic relationship between the two sides.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Korea

41. Internationalization of the Korean Won in the Light of RMB Internationalization

Author:
Hyo Sang Kim, Young Sik Jeong, Ji Young Moon, and Da Young Yang
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
While China has risen to become a global superpower with a growing impact on the world economy, its currency, the Renminbi (RMB), has a limited role in the existing international financial system. China has made significant progress and will continue to push for the internationalization of the RMB, which can disrupt the global financial system, dominated by the US dollar. Under such circumstances, Korea must find a new direction for the internationalization of the Korean Won. The internationalization of the Korean won will provide new opportunities for the economy to take a further step through financial advancement.
Topic:
Economy, Currency, Internationalization, and Financial Development
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

42. Why Brazil Sought Chinese Investments to Diversify Its Manufacturing Economy

Author:
Celo Hiratuka
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, economic relations between Brazil and China have grown significantly. The main driver of this process has been China’s enormous demand for agricultural, energy, and mineral commodities. On the one hand, Brazil’s strong competitiveness in these products has helped the country consolidate its role as an important supplier to China, increasing exports and turning China into the main destination for Brazilian exports since 2009.1 On the other hand, China, by virtue of its status as the “factory of the world,” has established itself as the main supplier of manufactured products to Brazil.2 Nonetheless, Brazilian scholars, think tanks, and private manufacturing firms have raised concerns. They have done so despite the great boost in bilateral trade flows; the favorable trade balance for Brazil; and the leveraging of businesses in several Brazilian sectors such as soybeans, iron ore, and oil. These concerns are related to the excessive concentration of Brazilian exports in a few products, the environmental impacts of these exporting activities, and the effects of strong Chinese manufacturing competition on Brazil’s domestic market. These worries have become more significant when one considers the growing importance of manufacturing changes with the diffusion of Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and the search for new renewable energy sources and environmental sustainability. For Brazil, this matter reflects a need to advance bilateral relations beyond existing export trade volumes and toward new drivers of more diversified economic growth that will help the country escape a specialization in commodities. The fortunes of the Chinese company BYD in Brazil are highly relevant to these trends. BYD is a company that has diversified from the production of batteries into different innovative industrial sectors, such as renewable energy and electric vehicles. BYD has also been expanding rapidly in international markets, and in that process it chose Brazil as an important market, where it has built factories to produce electric bus chassis, photovoltaic panels, and batteries for electric buses. BYD’s trajectory in Brazil certainly has not been smooth. On the contrary, the firm has had to adapt to market fluctuations and, above all, to changes in the Brazilian government’s economic policies, which have made the company’s experience in the country quite turbulent. Despite this, BYD survived its first years in Brazil and more recently has been showing signs of continuing to invest in the Brazilian market. Analysis of BYD’s experience in Brazil shows, on the one hand, that there are important possibilities for new economic relations with China that go beyond trade in commodities, with productive investments that can potentially help Brazil simultaneously incorporate more knowledge-intensive activities and drive positive environmental impacts by generating renewable energy and reducing carbon emissions. On the other hand, the story of BYD also shows that the transformation of these possibilities into effective benefits requires coordinated actions on the part of Brazilian policymakers to offer a long-term horizon for Chinese investments. In that spirit, Brazil must craft a long-term strategy for its economic relationship with China to increase the odds that bilateral engagement can advance in a new and more sustainable, mutually beneficial direction.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Economy, Investment, Manufacturing, and Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

43. Hard Cash and Soft Power: When Chinese Firms Win EU Contracts

Author:
Allison Carragher
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The European Union is a committed defender of open markets. This extends to its public procurement mechanisms, which remain open to all bidders. EU policymakers have developed tools intended to defend the bloc’s interests in the face of increased economic and strategic competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but few policymakers understand how the European public views the debate. As the first major EU-funded, China-built infrastructure project, the Pelješac Bridge in Croatia provides a unique opportunity to conduct a thorough analysis of European public opinion toward EU tendering policy and Chinese companies. Brussels has labelled the PRC a partner for cooperation and negotiation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival,1 but the nuances of this policy remain difficult to ascertain. Projects and policies presented by China as “cooperation” often contain elements of economic competition or are leveraged by the PRC for strategic gain. However, this dichotomy has not filtered down to citizens. Extensive polling reveals that Croatians share very few of the concerns of EU policymakers. Furthermore, the PRC state-owned construction firm enjoys more visibility than the EU, which provided hundreds of millions of euros for the project. In terms of soft power, which is here defined as the ability of a country to shape the narrative, the Pelješac Bridge has been a resounding success for the PRC. The Croatian public has largely embraced the PRC’s preferred image of itself as a reliable and trustworthy economic partner and a benign power that does not interfere in domestic affairs. This opinion diverges from official EU policy and glosses over evidence of the PRC’s unfair economic practices, environmental and labor shortcomings, and interference in European democracies. Notably, the PRC’s soft-power gains were achieved on the EU’s own dime. It is not in the EU’s interest to bankroll the economic and soft-power ambitions of its systemic rival. As a democratic institution, the EU has a responsibility to both respond to public opinion and educate its citizenry when EU interests are at stake. In this case, the EU should recalibrate its tendering policy to be fairer and better aligned with its own economic and strategic interests. This process is currently underway, but it should also be extended to co-financing arrangements like the Team Europe approach, which combines traditional EU assistance with support from individual EU member states and international financial institutions. These policies must also be paired with renewed efforts at visibility and branding. Lastly, there is a need to collect and publish better data on the end users of EU funds in order to evaluate successes and identify future issues.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Economy, Business, Soft Power, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

44. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

45. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

46. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) through economic diplomacy strategy. Study of Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

Author:
Shanti Darmastuti, Arry Bainus, Widya Setiabudi, and Dudy Heryadi
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Free trade is considered to make a positive contribution to both domestic and international economy because of the removal of trade barriers. The importance of free trade can be seen from the increasing free trade agreements between developed and developing countries. The involvement of developing countries in free trade agreements enables them to make efficiency and maximize the benefits of implementing free trade agreements. Developing countries however often do not get results that are as expected in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). For example, Indonesia has not yet obtained the outcomes that were expected in the implementation of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA). The results highlight that one fundamental factor for obtaining optimal benefits from a trade agreement is internal coordination prior to the negotiation process.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Economy, Policy Implementation, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Indonesia, and Asia

47. Governing the Global Commons: Challenges and Opportunities for US-Japan Cooperation

Author:
Kristi Govella, John Bradford, Kyoko Hatakeyama, Saadia M. Pekkanen, Setsuko Aoki, James Lewis, and Motohiro Tsuchiya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The global commons—domains beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of any single state but to which all states have access—are essential to the stability and prosperity of the international order. In addition to the high seas, outer space, the atmosphere, and Antarctica, which are defined as global commons by international law, analysts have also suggested that other domains such as cyberspace may also qualify as potential commons. These domains provide essential public goods such as trade routes, transportation and communication networks, fish stocks, satellite imagery, global positioning, and e-commerce infrastructure that benefit countries around the world. To successfully manage the resources of the global commons and ensure open access to their spaces, effective governance structures must exist to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of state and non-state actors. Consequently, states have tried to come to agreements in each domain about how to enable broad access, avoid conflict, and enable cooperation. Over time, these discussions have resulted in the creation for each domain of a “regime,” a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge (see Box 1). These regimes can take shape in the form of international law, national law, local regulations, private standards, and institutional bodies. They differ dramatically in maturity and complexity: the governance regime of the oceans has developed over the course of centuries, while the rules and norms of cyberspace have only had a few decades to coalesce. However, all these regimes attempt to solve similar dilemmas surrounding shared access and resources.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Democracy, Economy, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

48. China’s Digital Silk Road in Indonesia: Progress and implications

Author:
Zulfikar Rakhmat
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update discusses the progress of China’s Digital Silk Road in Indonesia, a major destination, in both its hard and soft aspects, as well as the potential impact of its implementation. Chinese companies are offering a response to Indonesia’s needs, but concerns exist, especially surrounding security and surveillance, that Indonesia’s increasing reliance on China could also further erode its democracy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Surveillance, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

49. What Putin’s War in Ukraine Means for the Future of China-Russia Relations

Author:
Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Björn Alexander Düben analyses China’s reaction to, and motivation in implicitly supporting, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, even as Putin’s strategic blunder becomes increasingly difficult to deal with. The author finds that, as long as Putin remains in power, long-term alignment since 2014 and a shared authoritarian world-view will cement closer ties between the PRC and Russian Federation; this at the cost of the latter devolving to a client-state dependent on China to keep its economy afloat, whilst the PRC’s cautious state banks further diminish Russian hopes of financial cooperation in order to avoid secondary sanctions from the West.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Economy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Asia

50. The private sector advances in China: The evolving ownership structures of the largest companies in the Xi Jinping era

Author:
Tianlei Huang and Nicolas Véron
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This paper documents recent structural changes in China’s corporate landscape, based on company-level data, providing a complementary perspective to that of official Chinese statistics. We classify China’s largest companies by revenue since 2004 (based on Fortune Global 500 rankings), and largest listed companies by market capitalization since 2010, into state and private-sector categories, using a conservative definition of the private sector. Among the largest companies by revenue, the private sector was nonexistent in the mid-2000s but has grown steadily in the past decade, even though the state sector still dominates. The aggregate revenue of private-sector companies has grown from zero in Fortune’s ranking in 2005 (based on 2004 revenue) to $104 billion in the 2011 ranking, or merely 3.8 percent of the $2.78 trillion in aggregate revenue for all Chinese companies in the ranking, and to $1.7 trillion in the latest 2021 ranking (based on 2020 revenue), or 19 percent of the Chinese companies’ aggregate revenue. As for market value of the largest listed firms, the private sector’s share in the top 100 listed Chinese companies was only 8 percent at end-2010 but crossed the 50 percent threshold in 2020 and retreated slightly in 2021 to 48 percent, following that year’s regulatory crackdown on several private-sector-dominated industries. These findings do not support a narrative of broad-based rollback in recent years of previous private-sector expansion.
Topic:
Economy, Private Sector, Corporations, and Business Management
Political Geography:
China and Asia