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51. Rights-Based Alternatives to Incarceration for Women Lessons from Colombia’s Public Utility Law and the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy

Author:
Claudia Cardona, Julie Hannah, Isabel Pereira-Arana, and Rebecca Schleifer
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Dejusticia
Abstract:
Women’s incarceration in Colombia is deeply linked to the disproportionate application of drug laws and to the gendered inequalities women face in poor and care demanding contexts. A novel law introduced in 2023 addresses these issues and allows certain women heads of household living in conditions of marginality to exchange prison for public service in freedom. Law 2292 - the Public Utility Law, is an expression of the International Guidelines on Human Rights and Drug Policy, and of normative shifts in Colombia around criminal policy and drug control. This paper documents how Mujeres Libres, the Center for Law, Justice and Society (Dejusticia), and the International Centre for Human Rights and Drug Policy, based at the University of Essex, came together to use the Guidelines as a shared advocacy and technical framework to strengthen the implementation of Law 2292. Aimed at policymakers, judges, public defenders, and civil society in Latin America and beyond, this paper offers a practical account of our implementation efforts: how our partnership formed, how we engaged strategic actors and identified key pathways of change, what tools we produced, what results we are beginning to see, and what should happen next.
Topic:
Human Rights, Women, Inequality, Participation, Drug Policy, and Incarceration Alternatives
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

52. La inteligencia artificial en la Unión Europea

Author:
Cristina Puente, Celia Fernández Aller, Antoni Farriols Solá, Katherin Corredor, and Elisa Gutiérrez García
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La inteligencia artificial se ha consolidado como una tecnología de impacto sistémico, acelerada en los últimos años por la irrupción de la IA generativa y los grandes modelos de lenguaje, con efectos transversales en la economía, los servicios públicos y la vida social, y con profundas implicaciones éticas, laborales y geopolíticas. En este contexto de competencia estratégica entre Estados Unidos, China y la Unión Europea, el informe analiza la evolución tecnológica, los modelos fundacionales, las aplicaciones sectoriales y los riesgos asociados, subrayando la dependencia europea de infraestructuras y hardware externos, así como su posición de liderazgo normativo frente a un rezago en inversión, escalabilidad y talento. A partir de este diagnóstico, se examinan las iniciativas europeas emergentes, los desafíos de gobernanza global y las oportunidades para que la UE impulse un modelo de IA confiable, sostenible y centrado en las personas, que combine innovación, soberanía tecnológica, protección de derechos fundamentales y cooperación internacional en un entorno global cada vez más inestable.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Youth, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

53. Criterios para una fiscalidad saludable: Especial consideración a los productos con alto contenido en azúcar

Author:
Julio César Muñiz Pérez
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
Especial consideración a los productos con alto contenido en azúcar La forma en que compramos y consumimos alimentos está cambiando, y la fiscalidad se ha convertido en una importante herramienta para promover la salud pública. Sin embargo, ¿Está funcionando adecuadamente la tributación actual sobre la alimentación? Recientemente hemos publicado un informe que analiza cómo debe diseñarse una «fiscalidad saludable» que sea verdaderamente efectiva, coherente con la normativa europea y justa para el consumidor. Lo que descubrirás en este informe: Ingredientes, no productos: Por qué habría que poner el acento en el “ingrediente objetivo” y no en penalizar categorías completas de alimentos. El IVA como mejor alternativa: Las ventajas de usar tramos de IVA diferenciados según el etiquetado, frente al empleo impuestos especiales. Evidencia vs. Recaudación: La necesidad de evaluar si estas medidas son eficaces para mejorar la salud o si solo generan un rechazo social. El papel de la industria: Cómo la colaboración y la innovación (I+D+i) pueden ser tanto o más eficaces que la simple aplicación de impuestos
Topic:
Political Science, Legislation, Public Policy, Public Health, Sugar, and Value-Added Tax (VAT)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

54. África ante la crisis de financiación para el desarrollo

Author:
Andrea Chamorro, Jaume Portell, Olga Namasembe, Luis García Blanch, and Romeo Gbaguidi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas les invita a debatir en Casa África en torno al Informe África 2026. En esta edición nos centramos en los retos y oportunidades que plantea un nuevo modelo de financiación al desarrollo a resultas de factores como la retirada de EEUU del sistema de la ayuda, con el desmantelamiento de la USAID y de las agencias de Naciones Unidas; la presencia creciente de China a través de su proyecto de la Franja y la Ruta; o nuevas prioridades en Europa como el aumento del gasto en defensa. Nuestro Informe ofrece un estudio en profundidad que reflexiona y elabora propuestas en torno a un nuevo modelo de financiación del desarrollo sostenible. Estamos en un momento crítico donde la UE y España deberían contribuir a la articulación de un nuevo modelo, más horizontal, participativo y eficaz. Abordaremos cuestiones como el estado actual de la deuda y el desarrollo en África: el nexo entre seguridad y desarrollo; las tensiones entre las agendas externas y los intereses africanos en el Sahel y África Occidental; el nuevo escenario de la cooperación española y europea; el papel del sector privado, o las perspectivas para el desarrollo africano tras la IV Cumbre de Financiación de Sevilla.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Financing
Political Geography:
Africa

55. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica

Author:
Xavier Villar
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
Topic:
Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

56. Universidad dual: Formación innovativa para el futuro profesional

Author:
Vicent Climent-Ferrando
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
El dinámico mercado laboral actual exige una formación universitaria más ágil y relevante. A menudo, la evolución curricular de las universidades no sigue el ritmo de la innovación empresarial, generando una brecha entre la academia y las necesidades del sector productivo. La Universidad Dual surge como una solución clave, integrando la formación académica con la experiencia práctica en empresas. Este modelo no solo impulsa la actualización de los currículos, sino que también eleva la empleabilidad de los estudiantes al ofrecerles un entorno de aprendizaje real y aplicado. Sin embargo, su implementación presenta desafíos importantes: asegurar la calidad educativa, invertir en la capacitación del personal docente en las empresas y garantizar el equilibrio entre el estudio y el trabajo para los estudiantes. Desde Fundación Alternativas, abordamos estos retos. Presentamos un Policy Paper y una jornada de debate dedicados a analizar en profundidad el modelo de formación dual universitaria. Nuestro objetivo es evaluar su estado actual y proponer recomendaciones de política pública que faciliten su adopción progresiva, minimizando los riesgos asociados a esta transformación.
Topic:
Education, Markets, Labor Issues, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

57. Hacia la Ley de Chips 2.0

Author:
Emilio García García
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
En este documento elaborado por Emilio García García se aborda la revisión de la Ley de Chips de la UE, que tuvo su origen en la crisis de la cadena de suministros posterior a los confinamientos para contener la pandemia de la COVID-19. La Comisión Europea ha acelerado su proceso de revisión junto con la globalidad de la estrategia de semiconductores comunitaria. En un escenario de inestabilidad geopolítica, el ejecutivo de la UE ha señalado la industria de semiconductores como una de las claves de la soberanía tecnológica del Viejo Continente, motivando así la urgencia del proceso. La ya denominada Ley de Chips 2.0 debe tener en cuenta los éxitos y fracasos de la estrategia actual, así como los cambios geopolíticos y del entorno tecnológico y de mercado. Se presenta en el documento un resumen de estas circunstancias y recomendaciones para la próxima revisión de la norma. Si bien destacamos la importancia de la nueva Ley, la nueva política industrial y comercial europea para semiconductores debe trascender el marco de una directiva o reglamento, y la implementación de las recomendaciones de la sección final requiere cambios en otros instrumentos de la UE y nuevas herramientas.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Law, European Union, Geopolitics, Political Science, Public Policy, and CHIPS
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

58. Ciencia, Industria y Competitividad

Author:
Gonzalo León, Francisco Marín, Carlos Marti Sempere, Raquel Jorge, and María Peñate
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas analiza la evolución del sistema de I+D en España en el contexto internacional y geopolítico, destacando los grandes cambios recientes en ciencia, tecnología e innovación. El informe subraya que España dispone de capacidades competitivas en áreas clave como biotecnología, comunicaciones, software o IA, y puede contribuir al fortalecimiento tecnológico de la UE. Ante el ascenso de China, la inestabilidad global y la creciente importancia de la seguridad y la soberanía tecnológica, el texto defiende la necesidad de reformar el sistema español de I+D, mejorar su gestión y alinearlo con una política industrial europea más ambiciosa. El objetivo final es reforzar la competitividad, la autonomía tecnológica y el papel estratégico de España en Europa.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Youth, Digital Culture, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Spain

59. Political Violence in America: Public Perceptions, Polarization, and Accountability

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe political leaders’ failure to condemn violent rhetoric contributes a lot to violent actions in society. Majorities of Americans also believe that false or misleading information generated by AI (64%) and public displays of hate symbols (61%) contribute a lot to violent actions in society, while smaller majorities believe easy access to guns and harsh and violent political language are also drivers (both 53%). While 51% of Republicans believe public displays of hate symbols contribute a lot to violence, 76% of Democrats do. Fewer than half of Republicans (46%) believe that harsh and violent political language contributes a lot to violence in society; white evangelical Protestants are the only group of religious Americans in which a minority (45%) share that view. Very few Americans support hostile and violent actions by their political allies to advance important political goals. Very few Americans justify imprisoning a political opponent without a trial if that person poses a clear danger to the country (12%); damaging or destroying property as a form of protest (7%); pushing, shoving, or punching a political opponent (6%); posting the home address or private phone number of a political opponent online so their family will be harassed (5%); or killing a political opponent if that person poses a clear danger to the country (5%). While very strong majorities of Americans over the age of 50 completely disagree that violent and harsh actions may justify political outcomes, such sentiments are less widely shared among younger Americans, especially those who are under 30. More than three in four Americans disagree that violence may be needed to save the country; views are similar across partisan groups, though they have shifted some throughout the year. Most Americans (77%) disagree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” compared with 20% of those who agree. Agreement about the potential need for political violence has decreased significantly among Republicans since President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024; agreement among Democrats has remained low over time but increased slightly in the past year. Since early 2021, support for political violence has varied across religious groups. Support among white Christians has declined since the 2024 election, though white evangelical Protestants continue to show higher support than white Christians overall. Support for political violence remains highest among Christian nationalism Adherents and lowest among Rejecters. Americans’ views on who is most responsible for political violence are deeply polarized, split largely along partisan and religious lines. Democrats overwhelmingly attribute most responsibility for political violence to right-wing groups (73%), while Republicans attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups (72%). While more Christians of color and non-Christians attribute most responsibility to right-wing groups for most political violence today, white Christian groups attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (64%) attribute responsibility to left-wing groups, while most Rejecters (72%) attribute responsibility to right-wing groups. Christian nationalism Skeptics are divided. Americans’ views are strongly divided by party and religion on whether National Guard deployments in American cities cause more violence than they prevent. A slim majority of Americans (52%) agree that deploying the National Guard to patrol American cities may cause more violence than it prevents. Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) are far more likely than Republicans (23%) to agree. Most Christians of color and non-Christians agree that these deployments cause more violence, while white Christian groups are far less likely to do so. Agreement is particularly lower among white evangelical Protestants (29%). Christian nationalism Rejecters (80%) are the most likely to agree, followed by Skeptics (54%), Sympathizers (37%), and Adherents (26%). Opposition to Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white Christian groups, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Most Americans (68%) oppose “President Trump’s pardoning of over 1,500 people convicted for their role in the attacks on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,” compared with 29% who favor it. Republicans (63%) are far more likely to favor these pardons than independents (22%) and Democrats (4%). White Christian groups, particularly white evangelical Protestants (58%), are more likely than non-Christians (24%), Christians of color (19%), and unaffiliated Americans (18%) to favor Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons, as are Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (49%), compared with Skeptics (25%) and Rejecters (8%). Opposition to stripping citizenship and deporting U.S. citizens deemed a threat is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white evangelical Protestants, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Four in ten Americans (41%) favor “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country.” Republicans (60%) are roughly twice as likely as independents (38%) and Democrats (27%) to agree. White evangelical Protestants (56%) are the only religious group with majority support for stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them, compared with fewer Hispanic Protestants (49%), white Catholics (48%), and white mainline Protestants (46%). Support among other religious groups is notably lower. Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (57%) are notably more likely than Skeptics (40%) and Rejecters (23%) to favor stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship.
Topic:
Political Violence, Accountability, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

60. Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Around three in ten Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. One-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (11%) or Sympathizers (21%), compared with two-thirds who qualify as Skeptics (37%) or Rejecters (27%). These percentages have remained stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022, with a slight decline among Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters, who peaked at 32% in June 2023 and declined to 26% by the end of 2025. White evangelical Protestants and Hispanic Protestants are most likely to hold Christian nationalist beliefs; Americans who frequently attend religious services, especially those who are white, are more likely to be Christian nationalists. White Christians (46%) are more likely than Christians of color (39%), non-Christians (13%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (10%) to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. White evangelical Protestants (67%) and Hispanic Protestants (54%) are the only major religious groups among whom a majority hold Christian nationalist beliefs. The majority of those who attend religious services weekly or more qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (54%), compared with 39% of those who attend at least a few times a year and 20% of those who seldom or never attend services. This correlation holds among those who pray outside of religious services and those who read religious texts. White Americans who attend religious services, pray, or read the Bible or other religious texts frequently are more likely than their Black and Hispanic counterparts to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Christian nationalism support is also strongly linked to party, media habits, age, education, and race. A majority of Republicans qualify as either Christian nationalism Adherents (21%) or Sympathizers (35%), compared with one-quarter of independents (7% Adherents and 18% Sympathizers) and less than one in five Democrats (5% Adherents and 12% Sympathizers). Two-thirds of Americans who most trust far-right news sources qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (34%) or Sympathizers (31%), as do a majority of those who most trust Fox News (18% Adherents and 37% Sympathizers). Support for Christian nationalism is positively associated with lower education levels and older age; AAPI Americans are far less likely to be Christian nationalists than other Americans. Christian nationalist views predominate in the South and Midwest; support for Christian nationalism is strongly correlated in all 50 states with favorable views of President Donald Trump and the proportion of Republican representation in state legislatures. The states with the highest levels of support for Christian nationalism — which includes about half of their residents — are Arkansas (54%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (51%), Oklahoma (49%), and Wyoming (46%). Three states emerge with more than half of their white, non-Hispanic residents supporting Christian nationalism: Arkansas (59%), Mississippi (54%), and West Virginia (53%). The higher state residents scored on the Christian nationalism scale, the more likely they are to hold favorable views of Trump and the larger the proportion of Republican elected officials in their state legislatures. Christian nationalists are more likely than other Americans to support political violence and score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Three in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (30%) and one-quarter of Sympathizers (23%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” compared with only 14% of Skeptics and 11% of Rejecters. Support for political violence among Christian nationalism Adherents was higher under President Joe Biden and declined after Trump’s reelection. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; scores for Skeptics are mixed, while Rejecters score low. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers overwhelmingly view Trump as a strong leader, while Skeptics and Rejecters overwhelmingly view him as a dangerous dictator. Christian nationalists also hold more extreme views about immigrants and are more likely to say mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal. Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (53%) believe that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (54%) agree with “the U.S. government deporting undocumented immigrants to foreign prisons without due process.” While at least half of Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers support birthright citizenship, majorities agree with “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country” (66% and 56%). Over four in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (44%) and one-third of Sympathizers (34%) say that mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal in all or most cases, compared with one-quarter of Skeptics and one in ten Rejecters.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Ideology, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America