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Begin New Search Political Geography China Publishing Institution The Jamestown Foundation

81. Another Potemkin Visit? Rethinking the UN Human Rights Chief’s Upcoming Trip to Xinjiang

Author:
Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In March, United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet announced an agreement with China for a May visit, which includes access to Xinjiang. The exact date for the visit has yet to be determined, but recent reports indicate it is due to take place before the end of this month, which will make Bachelet the first UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit China in 17 years (China Daily, May 11). Negotiations were stalled for years with Bachelet first indicating intent to report on Xinjiang in a 2018 request for unhindered access to “all regions of China” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), September 10, 2018). At the end of April, a UN advance team arrived in Guangzhou to quarantine before traveling to Xinjiang to lay the groundwork for Bachelet’s visit (South China Morning Post (SCMP), April 25.
Topic:
Human Rights, United Nations, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

82. Future Global Policeman? The Growing Extraterritorial Reach of PRC Law Enforcement

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The recently signed security agreement between the Solomon Islands and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the support of Chinese police to the Solomon Islands government to suppress social unrest in November 2021, highlight the increasing international deployment of PRC law enforcement (China Daily, April 2). This deployment follows several decades of expanding PRC international law enforcement activity, which is intended for extraterritorial enforcement action, seeking the return of fugitives, and as part of China’s engagement with other countries. The 2021 violence in the capital, Honiara, led to destruction in the local Chinatown and the subsequent deployment of Chinese police officers, who have previously provided equipment and training to the Solomon Islands. The China Police Liaison Team is led by Zhang Guangbo, an officer of the rank of Commissioner third class, who stated that the deployment is intended to protect the safety of Chinese communities in the Solomon Islands as well as to contribute to the overall stability in the islands (Embassy of the PRC in the Solomon Islands, March 4). There has been considerable unease in wider region over the expanded deployment of Chinese police officers to the Solomon Islands. The governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States have all criticized the security pact, and have raised concerns that the deployment of Chinese police officers could lead to a future military presence. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne stated on March 25 that “Australia is aware of the proposed draft Security Cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands…We would be particularly concerned by any actions that undermine the stability and security of our region, including the establishment of a permanent presence such as a military base” (Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 2022). In response to these concerns, the Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia has said that if Chinese police officers were called on for assistance they would be under the command of the Royal Solomon Islands Police and stated that “We will try and do our best in terms of dealing with them to make sure that what is happening in other countries where, like Hong Kong, doesn’t happen in our country” (Solomon Times, 6 May 2022).
Topic:
Security, Politics, Law Enforcement, and Economy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

83. The Storms to Come: China and Natural Disasters

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Chinese government is currently focused on sustaining its “dynamic clearance” zero-COVID strategy, while also mitigating the negative externalities of this approach, including shortfalls in food supply and access to medical services in Shanghai and other major urban centers (China Brief, April 8). Last Friday, netizens temporarily overwhelmed censors on WeChat to widely share the video- “Voices of April” (四月之声, si yue zhi sheng), which highlights the nightmarish lockdown experiences of many Shanghai residents (China Digital Times, April 23, 2022). Mounting popular frustration with the government’s pandemic response underscores how environmental factors, which include not only diseases but also natural disasters, threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political standing. Water-related disasters such as the severe flooding that devastated Henan province last summer, and the extended drought that hit southeast China beginning in late 2020 are a rising risk due to climate change and extensive environmental degradation in China (Xinhuanet, July 31, 2021; Sina, December 9, 2021).
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Governance, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China and Asia

84. China’s 2022 Defense Budget: Behind the Numbers

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
At the fifth session of the 13th National People’s Congress in early March, the Chinese government announced a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (about $229 billion) for fiscal year 2022, which is a 7.1 percent year-on-year increase from 2021 (Xinhua, March 5). After years of double digit increases in the 2000s and early 2010s, this is the seventh consecutive year that China’s defense spending has grown by single digits. Nevertheless, China has moved up in the global defense spending rankings, and is now second only to the United States in expenditures. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2021). For instance, at $229 billion, China’s military spending is three times that of India’s $70 billion figure for 2022 (The Economic Times, March 5). An increase in Beijing’s defense budget raises red flags for China’s neighbors and the U.S. given the growing tensions over Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayas. However, in Chinese eyes, as Beijing-based military expert Wei Dongxu argues, the budget is “proper and reasonable” (Global Times, March 5).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, and Transparency
Political Geography:
China and Asia

85. China and the Ongoing Political Crisis in Pakistan

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is closely monitoring the rapidly developing political crisis in Pakistan. The current upheaval stems from the introduction in Parliament of a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Imran Khan, and his subsequent allegation that the motion is due to a foreign conspiracy to topple his government. On Sunday, the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly (the lower house of parliament), who is a member of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party (PTI) party, dismissed the no-confidence vote as a violation of Article 5 of the Constitution, which establishes loyalty to the state as the basic duty of every citizen (Dawn, April 3). Following the dismissal, President Arif Alvi dissolved the National Assembly on the Prime Minister’s advice (The News , April 3). These developments are unfolding in the context of “letter gate,” which refers to Khan’s recent allegations that the no-confidence motion introduced by the opposition is driven by the efforts of a foreign power, which he later claimed was the US, to induce regime change in Pakistan. Yesterday, Pakistan’s Supreme Court declared both the Deputy Speaker’s dismissal of the motion again Khan, and the president’s decision to dissolve parliament unconstitutional. The Supreme Court restored the National Assembly and ordered it to reconvene on Saturday to hold a vote on the no-confidence motion (Dawn, April 7). China’s state-run media has reported extensively on the whole drama from the deputy speaker’s ruling to the Supreme Court’s verdict (Xinhua, April 8; NDTV, April 3).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Stability, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and Asia

86. The Beijing Olympics in Retrospect: An Anti-Human Rights Politics Machine

Author:
Christelle Genoud
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
As the U.S. and other Western nations announced diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frequently exhorted the international community to keep politics out of the games (People’s Daily, December 8, 2021). Spokespersons of the Beijing Organizing Committee also objected to the “politicization” of the Olympic Games, and claimed that the closed loop Olympic bubble was solely a COVID-19 containment measure necessitated by growing concerns over the spread of the Omicron variant in China (Global Times, January 5). Although, the creation of a closed loop bubble was ostensibly undertaken for epidemic prevention purposes, it also had the impact of isolating athletes and journalists, and forestalling unwanted international focus on poor human rights conditions in China.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Sports, and Olympics
Political Geography:
China and Asia

87. Organized Crime on the Belt and Road

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The continued rapid economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the past decade has brought greater commerce and investment to Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, as China’s overseas economic footprint has grown, Chinese organized crime groups have also expanded their activities to become a regional problem. President Xi Jinping first introduced the BRI in 2013 when he proposed to Asian leaders jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, both of which PRC officials later commonly came to call the BRI. The expansion of Chinese organized crime across Asia encompasses multiple areas of activity: online fraud (including pyramid schemes), online gambling, human trafficking (for slavery and prostitution), animal or animal parts trafficking (for use in traditional Chinese medicine), and money laundering (of the proceeds of crime from the PRC).
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economic Growth, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, Asia, Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar

88. Why Beijing Wants the Dalai Lama to Reincarnate

Author:
Tenzin Dorjee
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
A strange battle is waiting to unfold at the center of the Sino-Tibetan conflict: the fight over the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. As the 86-year-old Tibetan leader, who has spent most of his life in exile, advances further in age, there is growing uncertainty about where, or whether, his reincarnation might appear. In a 2011 statement, he laid out several different succession scenarios, one of which was the possibility that he might bring the lineage to an end (Office of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, September 24, 2011). The Chinese government was incensed; it vowed to install its own 15th Dalai Lama after the demise of the incumbent—with or without his consent (Tibetan Review, December 3, 2015).
Topic:
Religion, Domestic Politics, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Tibet

89. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia

90. City of Vice: Macau, Gambling, and Organized Crime in China

Author:
Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In November 2021 and January 2022, the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) Judiciary Police arrested 13 individuals involved in operating two separate casino VIP customer “junkets” for engaging in illegal gambling activities, running a criminal syndicate, and money laundering (Macau Judiciary Police, November 29, 2021; January 31). The criminal groups used their VIP junket business in Macau casinos to recruit mainland Chinese residents to engage in illegal online gambling on overseas platforms, and illicit side-betting. The proceeds of the syndicate were then laundered and transferred through the junket accounts of the casinos using underground banks. These developments underscore how gambling in Macau has grown from small beginnings, as tolerant Portuguese administrators did not want to unduly antagonize local Chinese, to a multi-billion dollar business that has been infiltrated by organized crime groups for much of its modern history. During Portuguese rule (1557–1999) Macau was described as the “city of the name God,” hosting the religious orders of St. Augustine, St. Dominic, and St. Francis, as well as convents and Catholic churches (Cultural Affairs Bureau, Macau Government). In the 20th century, Macau became a city of vice as casino gambling emerged as the dominant business, supported by related prostitution, money lending, and money laundering from mainland China. After the return of sovereignty and administration from Portugal to China in 1999, Macau has had extraordinary economic success and relative political stability compared to the neighboring Hong Kong SAR. Macau’s gross domestic product (GDP) rose from $6.458 billion in 1999 to $45,103 billion in 2016 at average annual growth rate of 12 percent. This economic growth, however, has been increasingly dominated by the gambling sector, which in 2013 accounted for over 60 percent of GDP. Casino “gross gambling revenue” in Macau has surpassed Las Vegas and the city is effectively the world’s largest gambling center. [1] However, as the gambling sector has grown, so has the organized crime long associated with that business that has become a domestic problem for China and has impacted other countries in Asia. A particular concern for Beijing is the Macau gambling industry’s role in facilitating capital flight.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Borders, Gambling, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Macau

91. Gay in the PLA: Chinese Military Views on Homosexuals Serving in the Armed Forces

Author:
Brian Waidelich
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified the recruitment and retention of top-notch human capital as key to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) transformation into a “world-class military” by mid-century. In late January 2022, under Xi’s guidance as chairman, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) issued its “Decision on Strengthening Military Talent Work in the New Era” (关于加强新时代军队人才工作的决定, Guanyu jiaqiang xin shidai jundui rencai gongzuo jueding), which calls human talent “a key element driving the Chinese military’s high-quality development and for winning the initiative in military competition and future warfare.” The decision calls on the PLA to develop high quality, professional talent in key areas—joint operations command, new-type combat forces, science and technology innovation, and strategic management—and for these individuals to provide “firm support” for achieving the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military-strengthening goal and building the PLA into a world-class military (Xinhua, January 26). The CMC’s decision echoes similar past statements by Chinese leaders who have emphasized the need for the “right” kind of people to lead and support China’s armed forces (US Army War College, July 23, 2021). A common thread is the requirement for PLA personnel to fill increasingly specialized billets as the force receives and operates new, high-tech information systems, weapons, and equipment (China Brief, January 14). Apart from pronouncements of desired education and experience levels for incoming servicemembers, the PLA also publicizes certain exclusion criteria. The PLA’s official conscription and recruitment website, for example, specifies several physical requirements including minimum height and passable body mass index (Zhongguo Zhengbing Wang, January 14, 2021). However, evidence indicates other potential exclusion criteria for Chinese service members that are less clearly stated. This article offers a preliminary analysis of PLA views on homosexuals—in most cases, gay men specifically—serving in China’s armed forces. [1] The analysis draws upon 12 academic papers published by PLA-affiliated authors between 2009 and 2019 whose research focused on issues related to homosexuality and/or homosexuals serving in China’s armed forces. Ten of the 12 studies involved test subjects. This topic was difficult to explore due to the paucity of primary source material (PLA authorities may deem content on sexual minorities sensitive and unfit for public consumption). Yet it remains an important issue, as it has implications for the talent pool the PLA can draw from and for homosexual servicemembers’ ability to survive, thrive, and contribute to China’s objective of developing a world-class military force.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, LGBT+, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

92. China and Pakistan: Strains in the All-Weather Partnership?

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China and Pakistan have formally launched Phase II of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship venture in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing on February 3-6 for the Winter Olympics, the two sides signed a Framework Agreement on Industrial Cooperation to kick off the second phase of CPEC, which will focus on the development and industrialization of special economic zones (SEZs) (Pakistan Today, February 4). The joint statement issued at the end of Khan’s visit noted that “the two sides signed or concluded a number of agreements / MoUs, covering bilateral cooperation in areas of economic and technical, industry, investment, infrastructure, space, vaccine, digitalization, standardization, disaster management, culture, sports, and vocational education” (for the full text of the China-Pakistan joint statement see People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6). According to Pakistan’s Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) on CPEC Affairs Khalid Mansoor, CPEC’s second phase will attract multi-billion dollar investments to Pakistan. Representatives of around 500 Chinese companies met with Khan in Beijing, and per the Prime Minister’s remarks to Pakistani media following the visit, expressed interest in investing in industry, agriculture, information technology, infrastructure, housing and construction, mining and oil refining (Business Recorder, February 8). The big question, however, is whether this ostensible interest from Chinese businesses will translate into hard cash commitments. China is concerned over the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan. In the run-up to Khan’s visit, Pakistani militants carried out several major attacks in the country. On January 17, the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, opened fire on a security checkpoint in Islamabad (Dawn, January 19). A few days later, the newly formed Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) carried out a bomb attack in a busy market in Lahore (Express Tribune, January 20). Hours before Khan left for China, Baluch militants struck again, this time attacking security forces’ camps in Panjgur and Naushki in Baluchistan province in southwestern Pakistan (Dawn, February 2). Then on February 5, the TTP killed five Frontier Corps personnel at a security checkpoint in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Dawn, February 7). Last year, Pakistan suffered 207 terrorist attacks, a 42% increase over 2020, according to a study by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an independent think-tank based in Islamabad. Fatalities from terror attacks increased by 51% over the previous year. [1] Worryingly for Beijing, Pakistani militant groups have increasingly threatened Chinese nationals. Four of the attacks in 2021 targeted Chinese nationals and at least 17 Chinese workers were killed in these attacks. As China and Pakistan move into Phase II of CPEC, the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Pakistan will be a key concern.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

93. What is at Stake in China-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations?

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Satellite imagery reveals that China has recently accelerated construction along its border with Bhutan. Underway since 2020, the project includes over 200 structures, with several two-story buildings in six locations (Times of India, January 13). Bhutan has not commented on the situation in keeping with its policy to refrain from public discussion of border issues, whereas Beijing has framed the development as “normal construction activities on its own territory” (The Hindu, January 13). India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has acknowledged that it is monitoring China’s bridge-building activities over the Pangong Tso lake (India MEA, January 6). In late December, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the “standardization” of the names of 15 places (eight residential areas, four mountains, two rivers, and one mountain pass) in the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China also claims and calls “Southern Tibet” (藏南, Zangnan). This is the second instance of China renaming localities in Arunachal Pradesh; the first occurred in 2017 (Global Times, December 30, 2021). India called it a “ridiculous exercise to support untenable territorial claims” (Indian MEA, January 6). Though 2022 has only begun, China’s various intimidation tactics against India are already in full swing: from renaming places and circulating videos of People’s Liberation Army soldiers raising the five-starred red flags of China, supposedly, in the Galwan Valley as part of their New Year celebrations, to expanding its dual use infrastructure along the Himalayan border (Global Times, January 1; The Print, January 13). According to state media, China has been strengthening infrastructure-related projects in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Beijing claims its infrastructure push in Tibet is intended to support economic development, but the Indian side interprets the projects as serving dual use, or, military purposes (China Brief, November 19, 2021). While Chinese sources claim that India was making a “fuss,” they did not, however, entirely deny these reports (Global Times, January 19).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Bhutan

94. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Hits Bottom in Balochistan

Author:
Kiyya Baloch and Akbar Notezai
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In early January, several hours of heavy rain exposed poor infrastructure and exaggerated claims of massive development in Gwadar. The largely deserted port city sits on the Iranian border in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province, which is wracked by poverty, militancy, and violence. Despite its challenging location, Gwadar has long been touted as the crown jewel of the much heralded China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the $62 billion megaproject connecting western China with the Arabian sea (China Brief, January 17, 2020). On January 4, heavy rains disrupted routine activities, forcing schools, restaurants, and shops to shut down. The town’s main streets and roads, as well as its tiny airport, were flooded (Twitter/KiyyaBaloch, January 4). Cars floated down roads and people used small wooden dhows to navigate flooded streets. Local reports claimed that in the remote southern parts of Gwadar, thousands of people fled their homes (Dawn, January 5). In the city center, which is about three miles from the seaport where the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) is building a $250 million coastal port, officials from the Pakistan Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) said floodwaters had reached heights of four to six feet (ARY News, January 4; Balochistan Times, January 4). As Gwadar has fallen on hard times, residents have blamed Beijing and Islamabad for ignoring them in their CPEC megaproject plans. The governments of both China and Pakistan claim that they are modernizing Gwadar by building a well-equipped hospital, parks, technical colleges, modern roads, an industrial park, and a seaport. For years, Chinese and Pakistani officials have claimed that this coastal backwater would soon compete with Dubai, Singapore, and Shenzhen to attract huge foreign investment. However, the currently poor state of Gwadar’s infrastructure underscores that this narrative remains illusory. The rain and flooding have wreaked havoc in Gwadar as it grapples with huge protests demanding better civic facilities and an end to economic injustices. Some have called the recent protests a struggle for civil rights, while others have labeled the movement — the “Baloch Spring” (Dawn, January 2). In December, the protests, which lasted for more than a month, became a heated topic of discussion on Pakistani social media. However, the protests attracted only modest international media attention, and were officially called off on December 16. While it is too early to determine the full impact of the protests, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Chief Minister of Balochistan province have formed a committee to address protesters’ concerns.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

95. China-Lithuania Tensions Boil Over Taiwan

Author:
William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
After Lithuania decided to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in July 2021, China responded with an all-out diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against the Baltic nation of 2.8 million people. The Chinese government expelled the Lithuanian ambassador, recalled its own ambassador from Vilnius in August, and downgraded Lithuania’s overall diplomatic status in China (Xinhua, August 10, 2021). In response, Lithuania announced a diplomatic boycott of the upcoming Beijing Winter Olympics in protest of China’s human rights abuses, even before the United States, Australia, Canada, and Britain announced their own Olympic boycotts (LRT, December 2, 2021). “Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America,” former U.S. President George W. Bush told a crowd of thousands gathered in the capital city of Vilnius in 2002 (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, November 25, 2002). Back then, Bush lauded Lithuania’s entry into NATO and pledged that its people would no longer stand alone against external aggression. Two decades later, rapidly intensifying tensions between Lithuania and China are putting Bush’s famous words to the test. As Lithuania looks to its democratic partners in the EU and U.S. for support amid a firestorm of Chinese sanctions, the response has been mixed and somewhat uncertain.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and Lithuania

96. The U.S.-China Perception Gap: A Recipe for Disaster?

Author:
Harry He
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In December, a war of words raged across the Pacific over the very meaning of the word “democracy” (China Brief, December 14, 2021). The United States held its Summit for Democracy, inviting other democracies of various stripes, while China convened its own competing “Dialogue on Democracy,” calling out the U.S. for fomenting a cold war-style global geopolitical split (CGTN, December 2, 2021; U.S. Department of State). This discourse battle exemplifies a trend in Chinese views of the U.S. that has been gradually forming over the past 15 years. The 2008 global financial crisis, ill-fated American military campaigns, and mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic have led Chinese leaders to doubt U.S. power and capabilities. Yet, Washington has held on to the belief that it is capable of shaping China’s behaviors, either through inducement or deterrence. Even as the U.S. recognizes the limits of its influence and the recent relative decline in prestige, it still sees tremendous strengths in its military and economic prowess, alliance networks, democratic values, and soft power. The perception gap between China and the U.S. concerning American power is a potential recipe for disaster. While this does not imply that conflict is imminent or unavoidable, it does make miscalculations and miscommunications in the U.S.-China relationship both more likely and more dangerous.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Discourse, and Perception
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

97. A Bitter Winter: Omicron Tests the Limits of China’s Zero-COVID Approach

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has sought to achieve a “zero-infection” (零感染,ling ganran) rate among its population. The Chinese government has pursued this objective through the “dynamic clearance” (动态清零, dongtai qing ling) policy, which is predicated on keeping China’s international borders largely closed, and rapidly detecting, isolating, and eliminating domestic outbreaks (People’s Daily, January 7). Dynamic clearance relies on digital monitoring, mass testing, and controlling population movement to achieve early detection and reduce of COVID-19 transmission. Responses to even single-digit case clusters include mandatory lockdowns, and centralized quarantines in government health centers for potentially infected or exposed groups (Xinhua, August 19, 2021).
Topic:
Crisis Management, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:
China and Asia

98. Xi Jinping Boosts the Party’s Control and His Own Authority

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Under Xi Jinping, the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has initiated multi-pronged measures to ensure the success of celebrations marking the centenary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July this year and planning for the 20th CCP Congress, scheduled for the second half of 2022. The accent is on preserving political stability and further consolidating the apparently unassailable authority of President Xi, who is also CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Topic:
Media, Political Parties, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

99. Winter Coal Shortages Reveal Chinese Energy Vulnerabilities

Author:
Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Amid the coldest winter recorded since 1966, provinces across the People’s Republic of China (PRC) struggled with the worst electrical blackouts seen in nearly a decade (OilPrice, January 8). More than a dozen cities across Zhejiang, Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Guangdong provinces imposed limits on off-peak electricity usage in early December, affecting city infrastructure and factory production. Analysts expect power shortages to persist through at least mid-February (SCMP, December 23, 2020). Officials have repeatedly assured the public that residential heating would not be affected and that China’s electrical supply remained “stable” and “sufficient,” even as energy spot prices continued to rise into the new year.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Services, Electricity, and Coal
Political Geography:
China and Asia

100. Early Warning Brief: Introducing the “New, New” China Coast Guard

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the past decade, the China Coast Guard (CCG, 中国海警, zhongguo haijing) has experienced two major reforms. The first, which began in 2013, uprooted the service from the Ministry of Public Security—where it was organized as an element of the People’s Armed Police (PAP)—and placed it under the control of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), a civilian agency. In the process, the CCG was combined with three other maritime law enforcement forces: China Marine Surveillance (CMS), China Fisheries Law Enforcement (CFLE), and the maritime anti-smuggling units of the General Administration of Customs. The resulting conglomerate was colloquially called the “new” CCG, differentiating it from the “old” CCG of the Ministry of Public Security years. The second reform began in 2018, when the “new” CCG, now swollen with the ranks of four different forces, was stripped from the SOA and transferred to the PAP, which itself had just been reorganized and placed under the Central Military Commission (CMC) (China Brief, April 24, 2018). While much research has been done on the first reform, little is known about the second, at least in the English-speaking world. This article seeks to answer basic questions about the “new, new” CCG. What are its roles/missions, organization, and force structure? How does it differ from the CCG of the SOA years? How is it similar? What progress has been made two years after the second reform began?
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Armed Forces, Reform, and Borders
Political Geography:
China and Asia