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21. The Case of United States Views of Its Ties with China

Author:
Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
U.S. views of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been hardening for at least two decades, from George W. Bush characterizing China in the 2000 presidential campaign and the first months of his presidency as a “strategic competitor,” to the Obama administration’s pursuit of a “pivot” to the Asia–Pacific in response to China’s growing assertiveness, to the Trump administration describing China’s rise as signaling the “return of an era of great power competition.” Does this trend reflect changes in U.S. self-conception and national identity? Evolving assessments of threat in light of Chinese behavior and what these imply about the regime’s intentions? A reaction to shifts in the overall balance of power between the two countries, perhaps a reflection of a declining superpower facing a rising challenge, “tragically” destined to participate in a “contest for supremacy in Asia” that will ineluctably result in a “Thucydides trap” or war of hegemonic transition? Or is it instead an inevitable clash between a liberal, democratic, rule of law capitalist hegemon and a resilient authoritarian challenger that is a communist dictatorship increasingly reliant on aggressive nationalism since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and evolving rapidly towards national socialism or fascism? While each of these perspectives provides some purchase on the recent developments in U.S. – China relations as seen from Washington, this chapter focuses on the role of national identity, arguing that identity is by no means the sole or best explanation, but that it is an important factor that should not be overlooked or underestimated.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. China’s Role in India’s Hindu Nationalist Discourse

Author:
Rush Doshi
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
"Hindu nationalism risks pushing India into war with China,” blared the headline from China’s nationalist tabloid, Global Times. Meanwhile, in Washington, a wide-ranging network of analysts optimistic on U.S.-India ties similarly argue that India’s nationalist political forces will push the country further away from Beijing and likely closer to Washington. These are bold claims about the ways in which national identity will intersect with great power politics. But are they correct? That question is now more urgent than ever. The Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP) sweeping victory in the May 2019 elections shows that Hindu nationalism is the potent political force reshaping the country. But what role does China play in Hindu nationalist narratives, and how might those narratives affect China policy? This paper explores the various threads of Hindu nationalism and chronicles the relatively limited role that China plays within them. First, it explores the history of Hindu nationalism as a political force in India, demonstrating its tendency to view Islam – rather than the West or China – as the salient other. The key nationalist policy priorities for Hindu nationalists–including the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code that reduces sharia’s role in civil law, the repeal of Article 370 of India’s Constitution that protects Kashmir’s special status, and the construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya on the grounds of what was once a mosque – are all issues that implicate Hindu relations with Islam. Second, after making the argument that Hindu nationalism is primarily focused on Islam, the paper then turns to analyzing China’s role in nationalist ideology. It argues that China plays a relatively limited and often contradictory role in nationalist discourse despite the increasingly contentious Sino-Indian relationship. Hindu nationalists view China through a variety of lenses – sovereignty, trade, and values – each of which produces a different perspective and precludes a singular, unified Hindu nationalist view of China. And in some areas, Hindu nationalists even admire Chinese approaches.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nationalism, Religion, Political Parties, Domestic Policy, and Hinduism
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

23. Putin’s Strategic Framework for Northeast Asia

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper discusses the strategic framework for Russia’s policies toward Northeast Asia, placing it in the context of Moscow’s geopolitical repositioning after the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing confrontation with the United States, and the alienation from Europe. After 2014, the Ukraine crisis put an end to Russia’s quarter-century-long attempt to integrate with the West and become part of a Greater Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time and in the same place (Ukraine), Russia’s attempt to build a power center in the former Soviet space came to an end. Ukraine was not the cause of either failure, but it was the trigger of both. The conclusion was clear. Russia was not fit for integration into something that was bigger than Russia, and Russia was no longer capable of integrating former borderlands. Two-plus decades after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Russia stood alone—but also free. Such was the end of a grand illusion linked to the West, and also the end of three centuries of empire-building.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

24. Monetizing The Linchpin: Trump's Foreign Policy versus the U.S.-Korea Alliance's Value to Washington

Author:
Kyle Ferrier
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s increased emphasis on the cost of the U.S.-South Korea alliance has called into question its appreciation of Seoul’s contributions and raised concerns about the future of the relationship. Amid this uncertainty, this paper highlights key, yet underappreciated benefits that Washington receives from a strong alliance with Seoul. The cost-centric approach being applied to the U.S.-South Korea relationship follows an overarching trend in U.S. foreign policy under Trump, which the paper terms as “trading intangibles for tangibles.” In effect, the White House greatly underestimates the intangible value of longstanding U.S. foreign policy norms, often leveraging them—and in doing so, undermining them—in favor of short-term economic gains. Though intrinsically more difficult to quantify in dollars, intangible aspects of U.S. foreign policy have much greater financial and economic value to the United States. Consequently, and counterproductively, the Trump administration’s approach may actually prove to challenge the U.S. financially, even in areas where the economy isn’t directly involved, such as the U.S. alliance system. In the case of South Korea, Washington is putting its alliance credibility—consisting of deterrence against Pyongyang and assurance with Seoul—on the line by attempting to extract major financial concessions from Seoul, chiefly through military burden-sharing negotiations. The annual $5 billion contribution the U.S. is reportedly asking South Korea to agree to by the end of the year is a steep jump from the just under $1 billion Seoul agreed to earlier in the year. However, this annual $5 billion is dwarfed by what strong alliance credibility with Seoul provides Washington, which is at risk from the Trump administration’s intensified focus on cost. Still, the challenge remains that the nature of these benefits makes them difficult to quantify in dollars. To bridge this gap, the paper recontextualizes existing monetary figures across an array of areas to illustrate a baseline value of the key security benefits Washington enjoys through a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance—essentially, “tangibilizing” the intangibles. Though the actual list of benefits is far more expansive, the three explored in the paper are: preventing the return of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, fostering foreign policy convergence on the Korean Peninsula, and supporting common values in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

25. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for U.S.-ASEAN Economic Governance Architecture

Author:
Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During his visit to Asia in November 2017, President Donald Trump announced his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the U.S. approach to the region. The Department of State unveiled in detail the economic elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy in April 2018. These economic policies were reiterated by Vice President Mike Pence at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Papua New Guinea in November 2018. For instance, Pence maintained that Washington plans to “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade,” promote private sector investment, and assist regional states on sustainable infrastructure development. On December 31, Trump signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) passed by the U.S. Congress earlier that month. ARIA further advances the strategy by mandating the executive branch to “develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, the text authorizes $1.5 billion to “the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense . . . for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used” to achieve several objectives including ensuring “the regulatory environments for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are transparent, open, and free of corruption.” Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the effects of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on the future of U.S.-ASEAN economic governance architecture. “Strategy” refers to “the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” Such a study is warranted for a few reasons. First, the jury is still out on the degree to which this strategy would align or clash with different approaches and policies supported by Southeast Asian governments. Clashes of ideas and policies can result in not only failed implementation of the U.S. strategy but also competing economic initiatives which could undermine the future of U.S.-ASEAN trade and investment ties. Therefore, this research is aimed at: 1) assessing how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy would interact with Southeast Asian nations’ policies to shape the future development of regional economic architectures, and 2) forging policy recommendations for the U.S. and ASEAN governments on how they could jointly pursue regional economic institution-building. The questions I explore include: 1) What are the economic components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy? 2) How will this strategy and Southeast Asian countries’ economic agendas/policies interact to shape the future advancement of regional economic architecture? and 3) What should American and ASEAN governments do to foster cooperation and lessen conflict among their different policies regarding economic regionalism? The chapter is organized as follows. The next part discusses the economic components of the Indo-Pacific strategy under the Trump administration. The second section examines the interactions between this strategy and the economic agendas of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to highlight the areas of complementarities and clashes. The last section provides policy recommendations for American and Southeast Asian governments to augment synergies and ameliorate clashes among their policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Governance, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

26. The Trump Economic Impact on East Asia after Two Years: The Case of South Korea

Author:
Yoon Yeo-joon
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The U.S.-South Korea relationship has traditionally been characterized as a security alliance, meeting the interests of both countries for a stable Korean Peninsula. Economically, Korea was a major recipient of U.S. development assistance after the Korean War. The U.S. also provided non-reciprocal preferential trade treatment, which played an important role in Korea’s economic development. After Korea’s unprecedented economic development, the economic relationship between the two countries progressed from mere donor-recipient relations. The U.S.-Korea economic partnership culminated in the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), which came into effect in 2012. During the past 70 years, the U.S. has become the second most important export destination and the third most important importer for Korea. Korea has also risen to be the sixth largest trading partner for the U.S. During these years, Korea has also benefited from common values shared with the U.S., such as democracy, rule of law, and an open and free market economy. Two years into the Trump administration, the U.S.-Korea economic relationship is facing another turning point. Trump is a game changer, trying to alter the global trading system and its relation to China. Korea has been only partially affected by his grand scheme so far. However, Trump specifically blamed the KORUS FTA as a major contributing factor to the U.S.’ huge trade deficit and domestic job losses in manufacturing. As a result, the KORUS FTA was amended. Various protectionist measures, such as Section 201 tariffs on washing machines and solar panels as well as Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, could have a substantial impact on Korea. Rising protectionism in the U.S. is a grave concern for Korea considering the significance of the U.S. to the Korean economy. This chapter explores U.S.-Korea economic relations two years into the Trump administration—too short a time to make definitive statements such as whether the relationship has deteriorated or not. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic relations between Korea and the U.S., focusing on trade and investment. Section 3 covers the KORUS FTA renegotiations, which were recently settled. It includes what was decided and the implications for the Korean economy. Section 4 summarizes the protectionist measures that the Trump administration has imposed and how these measures would impact Korea, adding a simple empirical analysis that investigates whether the U.S. trade balance with Korea improved over the two years. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

27. North Korea’s Sharp Power and the Divide Over Korean Identities

Author:
Aram Hur
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter examines the nature and motivations of North Korea’s sharp power toward South Korea. Unlike China or Russia, to secure long-term survival, North Korea ultimately needs cooperation from the rival democracy it seeks to undermine. I argue that this produces a particular North Korean brand of “Trojan horse” sharp power: the hijacking of South Korea’s value diplomacy apparatus to disseminate a dual narrative. Externally, North Korea aims to project soft power hand in hand with South Korea to the international community, while internally, it exploits South Korea’s nationalist divisions to its desired ends. I illustrate this strategy through in-depth case studies of North Korea’s most significant sharp efforts in 2018. The analysis contests a simplistic understanding of sharp power and shines a different light on the regime’s recent diplomatic efforts.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

28. Just a Dash? China’s Sharp Power and Australia’s Value Diplomacy

Author:
John Fitzgerald
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
When supporters of China’s President Xi Jinping point to his many accomplishments they highlight his impressive anti-corruption drive, the end of the one-child family policy, the intensive monitoring of social organizations and citizens, his reorganization of the party and its armed forces, the unilateral occupation and militarization of contested territories in the South China Sea, and the massive Belt and Road Initiative advanced under his administration. Among these larger accomplishments, one that is easily overlooked is his role in compelling the people and government of Australia to recalibrate their relationship with China. In particular, the actions of his government have triggered a major rethink on the place of values in Australian foreign policy and diplomacy.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

29. China's Sharp Power and South Korea's Peace Initiative

Author:
Kim Tae-Hwan
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
If we understand geopolitics as “representations of space” as well as “spatial practices,” then the Indo-Pacific region can be understood as a newly emerging geopolitical hotspot in which major powers are not only vying for the control of spaces, but also waging a war of discourse on values and worldviews, reconstructing geographical spaces in their own interest. Discourse on a nation’s visions and strategies are increasingly employed as a soft power instrument of foreign policy to persuade the international audience, both state and non-state actors. Sharp power is gaining ground in this peculiar context of geopolitical competition combined with the battle for values and ideas. China is at center stage in this geopolitics-cum-discourse game in the Indo-Pacific region. “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s messages to the world,” Xi Jinping exhorted his comrades in 2014, underscoring the importance of international discourse as a type of communicative soft power. But it is hard to distinguish sharp power from soft power solely in terms of the assets employed, as both utilize similar assets. The differences between the two are revealed only by looking into how those assets are mobilized in the real world. When actually put to use, sharp power is often mingled with soft and hard power, easily stretching into the realm of conventional security. This chapter delves into how Beijing has been creatively capitalizing on a hybrid approach, using both hard and sharp power in disseminating its message in narrative form. By putting a special focus on Beijing’s strategic moves made against the backdrop of the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, I examine the ways China combines its sharp and hard power in tackling security issues that its leadership considers as serving “core national interests.” I also address South Korea’s response to China’s sharp power offensive through the lens of inclusionary identity politics, which underscores the need for constructing a shared identity based upon a common vision, even on such critical issues as security. China’s sharp power certainly poses grave challenges to the liberal international order, but what makes Beijing’s value-based offensive sharpedged is essentially not the discourse per se, but the methods it employs in propagating its narrative. Amidst the contending blocs of values between liberalism and counter-liberalism, South Korea, resorting to peace diplomacy as a non-great middle power, should play the role of a reconciler to avoid the clash of values and ideas, if not civilizations. Below, I argue that South Korea’s peace diplomacy should be ultimately aimed at designing its diplomatic trajectory of advancing counter-geopolitics in order to mitigate geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

30. Chinese Sharp Power and U.S. Values Diplomacy: How Do They Intersect?

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
An intensifying backlash against Xi Jinping’s makeover of China and Donald Trump’s makeover of the United States has muddied thinking about the national identity struggle recently building between the world’s top two powers. What was heralded as the “China Dream,” benefitting from earlier touting of “harmonious” themes, became tarnished as the “China nightmare” of stooping to any means to steal secrets and undermine other states. The long-admired “beacon on the hill” had become sullied as the valueless and selfish “America First” unable to champion democracy or even truth, which was dismissed as “fake news.” The clash in national identities between the two dominant powers on opposite sides of the Pacific is now taking an idiosyncratic form, which challenges us to separate the essence of the struggle likely to be unavoidable for decades ahead from its specific manifestations under the exceptional circumstances of today. Whereas Trump is seen as sui generis, an anomaly that is unlikely to put U.S. values diplomacy at long-run risk, Xi Jinping’s shift from soft power to sharp power appears more sustainable even if there is reason to assume that another effort will be made to raise the profile of Chinese soft power at some point. If 2017 was the year of mounting obsession with Russian sharp power, 2018 proved to be the year of increasing attention to Chinese sharp power. As the focus expanded from Russia to China, a similar set of questions was being asked: 1) how was sharp power manifested? 2) what are the comparisons between Chinese and Russian sharp power? and 3) what was the United States, cognizant of the experiences of other targets of sharp power, doing in response? The suggested answers have pointed not only to developments in Sino-U.S. relations, but also to some wider implications for the Indo-Pacific region of an ever-deepening values confrontation. As many anticipate a prolonged struggle ahead between the United States and China, steeped in different and clashing national identities, the prospects for Chinese usage of sharp power and of U.S. effectiveness in the advance of values diplomacy should be on people’s minds, but there has been a shift of attention as Trump refused to acknowledge the blatant use of Russian sharp power on the minds of many Americans, let alone to make Chinese sharp power his concern. In the absence of such concern, others have raised alarm about China’s sharp power and warned that Trump’s indifference to advancing U.S. values diplomacy is resulting in a dangerous vacuum.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

31. The North Korean Factor in the Sino-Russian Alliance

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Kim-Putin summit in April 2019 and the abortive Trump-Kim summit in February 2019 compel us to review Korean issues from the regional security standpoint, rather than primarily as a proliferation question. Despite apparent failure of the Trump-Kim summit, the search for denuclearization and peace in Korea will continue. North Korea is obviously resuming discussions with Russia and China to decide their future course of action, inasmuch as Kim went to Vladivostok. The summit with Putin in April only reinforced those considerations, as it is clear from the subsequent press conference that Kim asked Putin to transmit his views to Washington and that Putin agreed to do so. Likewise, Washington must rethink its approach. Instead of emphasizing denuclearization, Washington would likely benefit from viewing Korean issues primarily as regional security questions. Certainly, Russia and China do so. Therefore, rethinking Russo-Chinese ties to North Korea offers valuable insights in the quest for a lasting Korean peace, especially as Russia and China have become allies.5 The argument of a Sino-Russian alliance is admittedly a minority view among scholars, but the mounting evidence of their alliance is apparent not only in regard to Korea—as the other chapters in this collection show—but in larger military-political affairs as well.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

32. Sino-Russian Relations, South Korea, and North Korea

Author:
Robert Sutter
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This examination of the relations among these four governments assesses the ever-closer China-Russia relationship featuring stronger strategic alignment against the United States and its interests in many parts of the world, including the Korean Peninsula. It also considers how the Sino-Russian relationship reacted to the major changes in the Korean Peninsula brought on by the string of remarkable developments on the peninsula since 2017. Those developments include: the Donald Trump administration’s heavy pressure against North Korean nuclear weapons development in 2017; North Korea’s abrupt shift away from confrontation and toward negotiations with the U.S. and South Korea in early 2018; the subsequent dramatic shift toward top-level U.S.-North Korea negotiations to ease tensions and improve relations seen in Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018 and February 2019; and active, related North Korean summitry with South Korea and China. In this period, China and Russia in relations with South Korea and North Korea repeatedly worked together to offset U.S. pressures and undermine U.S. influence. Developments over the past two years have seen China emerge as a critically important player with a major role in all aspects of negotiations involving the crisis caused by North Korea’s rapid development and repeated testing of nuclear weapons and related development and testing of ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as the continental U.S. By contrast, Russia’s role and influence have declined in importance. The failed revival of the Six-Party Talks, in which Russia and Japan played a direct role along with North and South Korea, China, and the U.S. in dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, and the current regional dynamic focused on only the four latter powers means that Moscow and Tokyo have been marginalized by recent developments. Such an outcome challenges the Russian government of President Vladimir Putin and its drive to play a prominent role as a leading world power on issues important to Russian interests. Demonstrating new prominence, Putin hosted visiting Kim during a brief summit long sought by Russia in Vladivostok on April 25. The Russian leader said North Korea’s security concerns would be better met with international guarantees involving Russia and China rather than bilateral North Korean agreements with the U.S. Up until this point, Russia had been playing second fiddle to Beijing, repeatedly siding with China in matters regarding the Korean Peninsula. China, for its part, seemed comfortable with close cooperative relations with Russia as it deals with Korean matters. Whatever differences the two may have over Korean issues have been difficult to discern amid their collaboration and cooperation, which focus on weakening the American position in Korea and Northeast Asia.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

33. The China-Russia-North Korea Triangle After Kim Jong-un's Turn to Diplomacy

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The triangle of Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang has great significance for the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the globe. It played a critical role in the 1950 launching of the Korean War, when the Cold War took shape. It became the subject of much speculation in the 2000s, when the Six-Party Talks offered hope that the post-Cold War framework could become one of trust based on shared interests in peace and stability and joint prosperity focused on Northeast Asia. Today, it is again worthy of close attention, as diplomacy has intensified in an atmosphere of increasing polarization. Various alternatives for the future of this triangle have recently been suggested. The options offered for the emerging China-Russia-North Korea triangle include the following. One, a North Korean defection centered on a deal with the United States and an understanding with South Korea allowing for gradual inter-Korean integration with economics in the forefront. Two, a Chinese sphere of influence, which Russia is too weak to resist and North Korea prefers to the danger of regime change through Korean integration and U.S. demands for openness and human rights. Three, a balanced triangular alliance, where North Korea resumes playing off its allies in Beijing and Moscow without having to take the side of either, but this time without a serious split between the two great powers. Four, maximum autonomy of Pyongyang carving space among the five states most concerned with its destiny, leaving this triangle with no more significance than the triangle with the U.S. and South Korea. Fast-moving, diplomatic developments in 2018-2019 provide some evidence for assessing these alternative outcomes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

34. Is Pyongyang Different in Washington and Seoul? English and Korean Language Policy Discourse on North Korea

Author:
Jeffrey Robertson
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During 2017-18, international attention turned to the Korean Peninsula as the threat of conflict reached new heights. This led to an explosion in the growth of “North Korea watchers”— the community of scholars, analysts, government officers, NGO advocates, and journalists who commit a portion of their lives to following events in North Korea. Divides emerged in overlapping regional, professional, institutional (political), and linguistic differences that saw individuals take conflicting positions on key issues. This paper investigates just one of these divides—how language and culture impact policy discourse on North Korea. The study explores language as a source of division in the North Korea watching community. It uses Einar Wigen’s argument that international relations should be conceptualized as inter-lingual relations, which suggests that despite the narrowing of political vocabularies, residues of politico-cultural differences remain in how concepts are contextualized into discourse, even between close partners. The study assesses compatibility between English and Korean language conceptualizations of North Korea, through an assessment of core inputs into policy discourse. The study then discusses the implications for U.S.-South Korea relations, and ongoing efforts to strengthen Korean Peninsula security.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, Korea, and United States of America

35. The Candlelight Mandate & Moon Jae-in’s Inter-Korean Dilemma

Author:
John Delury
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The question of the proper relationship between domestic sentiment and foreign policy is a vexed one. Historically, statesmen and strategists have tended to distrust or disparage the role of the demos in the elite enterprise of foreign affairs. In the immortal words of the then vice president Richard Nixon: “If we indulge in the kind of thinking which assumes that foreign policy decisions should be made on the basis of public opinion polls we might as well decide now to surrender our position of world leadership to the communists.” Yet from even the most condescending foreign policy establishment perch, it is hard to dispute the significance of securing public support for key foreign policy moves. Nixon as president was fully aware of this, carefully stage-managing his most dramatic maneuver, the visit to China in February 1972, in a way that would maximize support back home. And of course, Nixon’s loss of public trust over the Watergate scandal brought about the abrupt end of his influence on everything, including foreign affairs. Nixon’s impeachment, after years of public opposition to the war in Vietnam, strengthened the view in the United States that unsupervised elites were in fact the worst possible stewards of the instruments of national power, and that popular, democratic checks were critical ingredients in wise and prudent foreign policy. Once the public is accorded a decisive role in foreign affairs deliberation, we have to grapple with the problem of determining what “the public” thinks in the first place. Who represents “the public”? How can we assert “it” thinks one way or another? What do we mean by expressions such as “the public seems to have changed its mind”? French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, for example, challenged the validity of statistical representations of “public opinion” based on polling data. Bourdieu argues that public opinion so constructed is an “artefact” of the pollsters, rather than a reflection of an actual thing in the world. Polling data creates a false sense of certainty about public preferences—the illusion of a static and knowable thing, “the public,” where one does not exist. Despite the epistemological limitations and political biases embedded in the art of polling, public sentiment must be brought into the equation of foreign policy analysis. Particularly in a South Korean context, given the highly participatory nature of political culture, it would be foolish to adopt an elitist premise that the public factor can be ignored. South Korean president Moon Jae-in, for one, emphasizes the critical importance of democratic legitimacy and public input in all aspects of governance, including foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Governance, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

36. Science Diplomacy: An Underestimated Toolkit of South Korea’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Olga Krasnyak
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Science diplomacy is becoming increasingly popular in foreign policy. Branching out of public diplomacy, science diplomacy is a sophisticated and knowledge-based toolkit to secure and promote foreign policy objectives. Unlike the U.S., the best example of how effective science diplomacy can be, South Korea does not recognize science diplomacy as a source of soft power. This paper looks at ways to incorporate science diplomacy into Seoul’s foreign policy agenda, the benefits from which will further its goals in advancing South Korea’s image as an attractive, cooperative, and influential country. Building South Korea’s reputation as among the core of scientifically developed countries will not only enhance commercial benefits, but also help address the current security dilemma, shape future geopolitical outcomes in a multi-polar world, and accelerate Korea’s participation in emerging scientific endeavors such as space exploration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

37. A Way Out of the North Korean Labyrinth

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The sudden announcement of a North Korea-U.S. summit in March 2018 upended all previous diplomacy concerning North Korea’s nuclear program. In return for a bilateral presidential summit, Pyongyang has agreed to suspend testing of its nuclear and missile programs and accepted the continuation of scheduled U.S.-South Korea exercises as planned. While this unexpected development reduces tensions and opens up a political path to a solution on the Korean Peninsula, it also imparts increased urgency for a well-conceived U.S. diplomatic strategy so that the summit and any ensuing negotiations lead to positive outcomes for Washington and Seoul and the other interested parties, thus ensuring its sustainability. In this context, the author advances an assessment of the current situation and a proposal for a U.S. program that could reduce military tensions in and around Korea, lead to the stabilization of a new and legitimate equilibrium in Northeast Asia, and advance shared American, South Korean, and Japanese objectives.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

38. Chinese Views of Korean History in the Cold War Era

Author:
Jin Linbo
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter draws a rough sketch of the evolution of Chinese views on Korean history in the Cold War era in three parts. The first focuses on the formulation of Chinese views of the Korean War in 1950 and the mainstream assessment of the war after Sino-South Korean diplomatic normalization in 1992. The second focuses on China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the Cold War years. The third deals with the changes and limits of perceptions on Korean history after diplomatic normalization and their impact on bilateral relations between Beijing and Seoul. For centuries many Chinese have firmly believed that the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula is like that between lips and teeth, they are not only close to but also dependent upon each other. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. From the middle of nineteenth century, the geopolitical proximity and interdependence between the two have become the determining factors in formulating Chinese perceptions towards Korea. Since then the national security concerns symbolized by the sense of lips and teeth had been frequently stressed by some Chinese intellectuals and officials when both China and Korea were exposed to the growing imperialist expansion and geopolitical competition in East Asia. In order to maintain the traditional tributary relationship between China and Korea, China fought the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Although it was miserably defeated, and Korea was consequently annexed to the Japanese empire in 1910, the Chinese sense of lips and teeth remained undiminished. Rather, it was further strengthened among ordinary Chinese when the Cold War began and especially when the Korean War broke out in 1950. After the end of World War II, China faced a new situation on the peninsula. Korea was liberated from Japanese rule but soon divided into the Soviet backed socialist North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the U.S. backed capitalist South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a newly established socialist country, China naturally allied itself with the Soviet Union and viewed the DPRK as a close friend while regarding the United States and ROK as hated foes. The intensified Cold War confrontation between the two camps and two Koreas triggered the outbreak of the Korean War. In order to safeguard its own political, ideological, and security interests, China quickly got involved in the war by sending the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) to fight together with its DPRK friend against their common enemies. The war ended with a cease-fire armistice and created a friend and foe Cold War framework, which the new China was compelled to face even beyond the Cold War era. Under these circumstances, the majority of Chinese held the view that it was the capitalist enemy rather than the socialist friend who started the Korean War with a view to overthrowing not only the socialist government in Pyongyang but also the similar one in Beijing. Therefore, it was against this background that China’s attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas in the post-Korean War era were doomed to be ideologydriven and DPRK sympathetic.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

39. Chinese Views of Korean History to the Late 19th Century

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In the tradition of imperial China and communism, Chinese publications see history as a morality tale. In the case of Korean history to the late decades of the nineteenth century there are essentially three actors: virtuous China, evil Japan, and variable Korea. There are three critical periods which receive the bulk of attention: the 7th century, the late 16th century trailing into the 17th century change of dynasty in China, and the last decades of the 19th century. The narrative advances the notion of competing visions of regional order, contrasting Chinese and Japanese frameworks and examining Korean policies in light of the choices made between these options. Official Chinese narratives couch today’s opportunities in historical context. A battle rages between socialism and capitalism, offering China a unique prospect to tip the balance. This is not only a present-day challenge; it is a struggle over consciousness of history—a campaign against “historical nihilism” that disagrees with orthodoxy in support of communist party legitimacy and the rectitude of Chinese civilization. A speech given by Xi Jinping in July 2010 at the Central Party School and only recently made available leaves no doubt about the tight censorship imposed on publications about history. South Korea’s history is especially sensitive as the poster-child for the benevolence of the imperial Chinese regional order, the battleground for the key war fought by China to maintain its surroundings against capitalist encroachment, and a chief testing grounds for the rejuvenation of China against U.S. hegemonism and Western civilization. Premodern history is an inseparable part of this agenda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, History, and Narrative
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Korea

40. Chinese Views of Korean History

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The way Chinese officials and writers view the history of Korea—from ancient times to the post- Cold War developments in South Korea—matters for at least three reasons. It is a commentary on Chinese national identity since Korea bears importantly on multiple dimensions of how that identity has recently been constructed. It is likewise a window on how Chinese view the order they seek to forge in East Asia, linking it to the earlier Sinocentric order. Finally, Chinese views of Korea’s history offer valuable insight into China’s vision of the future of the Korean Peninsula and its relationship to China. It is commonplace to regard historical narrative as a lens on views of the present and plans for future policies, but this is even more the case for a country with the tradition of Confucian historiography with its extraordinary stress on correct thinking about the past, and communist historiography redolent with socialist realism insistent on a zero-sum understanding of the past. We read in Chinese historical writings on Korea a morality tale with undoubted relevance to how China constructs both its identity and its international relations. The Korean Peninsula has significance for Chinese national identity beyond that of any foreign country except Russia and the United States with the possible exception of Japan. It is where ideology was honed as China sent the PLA to prevent the fall of North Korea after Mao had given his blessing along with Stalin to the North’s attack on the South. As ideology has grown again in importance, the significance of North Korea’s socialist pedigree and shared origins in the crucible of revolution against imperialism has risen. In the historical dimension of national identity, China’s leaders in the 1990s weighed allowing candor about the origins of the Korean War at a time when de-ideologization was fitfully taking place and there was no established narrative on history. Some saw sensitivity to North Korean reactions as the key to why China did not go further, but the resistance inside China proved more tenacious than they assumed. Historical purity toward Japan intensified apart from a short-lived interval with “new thinking” in 2003. With South Korea on the frontlines in China’s quest for demonization of Japan over history, its own history became a test case for the national identity gap between it and China. The history of Korea is so interwoven with that of China and it can reveal much about recent views.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, and Identity
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Korea