Search

Begin New Search Topic Conflict Resolution Publishing Institution International Peace Institute

41. State-building and Constitutional Design after Conflict

Author:
Kristi Samuels and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth
Publication Date:
08-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of constitutional choices made after conflict, drawing upon comparative studies of six constitutions and peace agreements. The paper attempts to synthesize the practical lessons drawn from the cases, with a focus on (i) the constitution-making process; (ii) the extent of reliance on executive and geographical power-sharing; (iii) the viability of checks and balances; (iv) the electoral model; (v) the role of political parties in the transition; and (vi) issues of implementation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Development, and Government

42. Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisi

Author:
James Cockayne (ed.)
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Commercial security is increasingly present in humanitarian and post-conflict settings. The UN has even considered using commercial security to solve peacekeeping shortfalls. Yet using commercial security in these settings raises difficult ethical, operational and strategic questions. This exploratory study begins to describe the decentralized, ad hoc use of commercial security in these settings, in an attempt to provoke the further research and discussion needed before these questions can be adequately answered.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Humanitarian Aid, and Peace Studies

43. Remittances in Conflict and Crises: How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises and Transitions to Peace

Author:
Patricia Weiss Fagen and Micah N. Bump
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Although migrant workers, refugees and immigrants have been sending money, goods and ideas home for millennia, until about a decade ago donors and international finance agencies paid little attention to the phenomenon. Interest has grown exponentially as statistics show what we now call migrant remittances to be among the most important contributing factors to national economies in several countries. Nearly all the countries in the conflict, war-to-peace transition, and crisis categories are highly dependent on remittances. The slow recovery of livelihoods and persistent violence or repression ensure high levels of migration and the need for remittances in such countries for several years after conflict and crises have ended. By all accounts, migrant remittances reduce poverty in important ways in developing countries. Research shows that migrants transfer funds and invest in their countries of origin at times when international investment has all but disappeared. By serving these purposes in countries emerging from or still experiencing conflicts (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and others), remittances can be seen as a sine qua non for peace and rebuilding.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Peace Studies, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Liberia, and Somalia

44. International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict. A Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding

Author:
Alberto Cutillo
Publication Date:
02-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The end of the Cold War and the spirit of cooperation which prevailed in the early 1990s within the Security Council provided the international community with a historic opportunity to address the number of violent conflicts—and particularly internal conflicts—which had been steadily increasing since the end of World War II.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Development, and Peace Studies

45. Securing the Rule of Law: Assessing International Strategies for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice

Author:
Reyko Huang
Publication Date:
11-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The past dozen years have seen a proliferation of international efforts to strengthen national criminal justice systems in post-conflict countries. Part of the burgeoning of discourses, policies and programs on the primacy of the rule of law in peacebuilding, these efforts are based on the principle that the restoration of law and order in the immediate aftermath of conflict is critical for building a durable peace. The UN Secretary-General encapsulated this growing importance of the rule of law in a 2004 report, in which he also stressed the need to develop strong national criminal justice systems for the administration of justice in accordance with international standards.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and International Law

46. Kashmir: From Persistence to Progress?

Author:
Cyrus Samii
Publication Date:
08-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Jammu and Kashmir (J) has been a continual bone of contention, the object of three wars and a theater of engagement in a fourth war, between the two countries. Since 1989, insurgency has consumed Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (IJK), claiming at least 45,000 lives. All major attempts at resolution by the international community have failed, including those through the United Nations. With overt "nuclearization" by India and Pakistan in 1998, and with "jihadist" militants playing an increasingly prominent role in the insurgency since the mid-1990s, the Kashmir conflict also bears the marks of a distinctly twenty-first century security predicament.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Human Welfare, and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Middle East, India, and Jammu and Kashmir

47. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict

Author:
Heiko Nitzschke and Karen Ballentine
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
This policy report provides a synopsis of the key findings from case studies on the political economy of armed intra-state conflicts, commissioned by the International Peace Academy's program on Economic Agendas in Civil wars (EAC W ). These findings offer lessons for improved policies for conflict prevention and resolution. Combatants' incentives for self-enrichment and/ or opportunities for insurgent mobilization created by access to natural and financial resources were neither the primary nor sole cause of the separatist and non-separatist conflicts analyzed. Nevertheless, extensive combatant self-financing complicated and prolonged hostilities, in some cases creating serious impediments to their resolu-tion. In all cases, however, these factors interacted to varying degrees with long-standing socio-economic and political grievances, inter-ethnic disputes, and security dilemmas brought about by weak and unaccountable systems of governance. Conflict analysis should avoid "resource reductionist" models in favor of comprehensive approaches that not only account for the complex interrelationship between economic and political dynamics, but also incorporate the political economy of both rebellion and state failure. Improved understanding is required of the role that combatant access to resources can play in shaping a permissive opportunity structure for separatist and non-separatist conflicts relative to other socio-political factors. Different resource endowments affect different sorts of conflicts and benefit combatant parties in distinct ways, depending, inter alia, on the mode of exploitation and how proceeds are managed by the state. "Lootable" resources, such as alluvial diamonds and illegal narcotics are more likely to be implicated in non-separatist insurgencies. They prolong conflict by benefiting rebels and conflict-dependent civilians, compromising battle disci-pline, and by multiplying the number of peace spoilers. "Unlootable" resources, such as oil, gas, and deep-shaft mineral deposits tend to be associ-ated with separatist conflicts, which are often caused by ethno-political grievances over inequitable resource revenue-sharing and exclusionary government policies. Given the importance of lootable natural resources and easily captured diaspora remittances in sustaining many of today's armed conflicts, improved international regulatory efforts to curtail these resource flows are both warranted and necessary. Commodity control regimes need to be strengthened and also complemented by more comprehensive efforts that address the financial flows connected with those resources. However, even the most robust resource control regimes are unlikely to have a decisive or even fully positive impact. Where conflicts are motivated by a mix of political, security, ethnic, and economic factors, curtailing resource flows to combatants may weaken their military capacity but not their resolve to continue fighting. In addition, regulatory regimes may have adverse humanitarian effects by increasing civilian predation by rebels or by stifling civilian incomes. When designing and implementing regulatory regimes, policy-makers need to distinguish between those who exploit armed conflict for profit and power and those who participate in war economies to sustain their civilian livelihoods. The offer of "economic peace dividends" may co-opt belligerents into ceasefires or more formal peace processes. Critically, however, economic inducements are unlikely to achieve these results in the absence of a credible military threat and may risk the creation of "negative peace," where justice and sustainability are deeply compromised and the threat of renewed conflict remains high. Policy-makers need to identify and adequately integrate economic incentives of combatants into a wider set of political and strategic inducements for conflict resolution and peace-building. Today's insurgents increasingly engage in illegal economic activities either directly or through links with international criminal networks. However, insurgency groups have not equivocally transformed into mere criminal organizations as they retain- albeit to varying degrees- military and political goals. While improved interdiction and law enforcement are important policy tools, casting rebellion as a criminal rather than a political phenomenon may risk mischaracterizing legitimate grievances, thereby foreclosing opportu-nities for negotiated resolution, and may lend de facto legitimacy to state actors, regardless of their behavior and role in the conflict. Poor economic governance and state weakness are the critical mediating factors between resource abundance and vulnerability to armed conflict; the first engenders popular grievances, the second makes separatist and non-separatist insurgencies politically and militarily feasible. Policy responses need to focus on structural conflict prevention efforts by, inter alia, designing and supporting tools and strategies for more effective, equitable, and accountable systems of resource management, complemented by longer-term strategies of economic diversifica-tion and poverty reduction. Contemporary intra-state conflicts have strong regional and even global linkages. By increasing the number of potential war profiteers and peace-spoilers and multiplying the points of conflict, these broader dimensions not only affect the character and duration of hostilities, but also complicate the prospects for conflict resolution and post-conflict stability. Both conflict analysis and policymaking need to address these regional dimensions by strengthening the economic management capacities of formal regional organi-zations and ad hoc alliances, complementing- and thus strengthening- national and global conflict management strategies.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, and Political Economy

48. Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation

Author:
Susan L. Woodward
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
There has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of how economic factors contribute to the success or failure of peace agreements. What is clear however, is that economic factors play a more significant role in the failure of peace agreements than they do in the success of such initiatives; Peace agreements are often very weak on economic aspects. This is problematic because the success of the first phase of peace implementation is largely dependent on three economic factors: sufficiently rapid economic revival to generate confidence in the peace process; adequate funding to implement key aspects of the peace agreement; and, for a sustainable peace, there must be sufficient funding to enable the establishment of government institutions and the transition to a peace-time economy; Five important lessons have emerged from experience in the area of peace implementation over the last decade: The need for broad-based impact assessments At present, assessments tend to measure whether an aid project was implemented as planned, not whether it contributed to a sustainable peace. As a consequence, important opportunities to make informed mid-course adjustments in long-term programs and to develop more effective programs are lost; An early emphasis on employment is critical Active employment is critical to redirecting behavior and encouraging support for the peace process. The success of crucial programs such as those for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons are also linked to the availability of employment; Invest in Building Institutional and Social Capital Conventional approaches to post-conflict economic recovery tend to emphasize macroeconomic stability at the expense of economic infrastructure. However, in post-conflict settings, the financial and legal institutions so necessary to implement economic policy and ensure good governance are either weak or nonexistent. More attention must be paid to financing the development of basic public sector capacities and social capital. Donor decisions about whom to assist and what to fund have lasting political impacts Donor monies influence government policy, whether directly through the imposition of explicit conditions or in more indirect ways. Lending decisions also influence the political landscape within the recipient county and the behavior of third-party implementers; An international presence introduces economic distortions It is seldom acknowledged that the economic impact of international peace missions runs contrary to the aims of self-government and economic and political sustainability. As a consequence, decisions about implementation and exit are extremely important; There is an urgent need for a new economic strategy that addresses the challenges of post-civil war environments.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Economics, Peace Studies, and Treaties and Agreements

49. Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan

Author:
Simon Chesterman
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
In the rare circumstances in which the United Nations administers a post-conflict territory, what law should be enforced? By whom? And, crucially, how should one resolve the potential dilemma between building capacity for sustainable local institutions and maintaining respect for international standards of justice? This report examines these questions through the experiences of United Nations administrations in Kosovo (1999— ) and East Timor (1999-2002) and the assistance mission in Afghanistan (2002— ). Practice in this area has, necessarily, been improvizational rather than principled. But it is possible to draw some broad lessons from these three experiments in judicial reconstruction First, the administration of justice should rank among the higher priorities of a post-conflict peace operation – certainly far higher than it is currently ranked in Afghanistan. There is a tendency on the part of international actors to conflate armed conflict and criminal activity more generally. Drawing a clearer distinction and being firm on violations of the law increases both the credibility of the international presence and the chances of a peace agreement holding. Failure to do this undermined the credibility of the international presence in Kosovo, and led to missed opportunities in East Timor. Secondly, in an immediate post-conflict environment lacking a functioning law enforcement and judicial system, rule of law functions may have to be entrusted to military personnel on a temporary basis. Recourse to the military for such functions is a last resort, but may be the only alternative to a legal vacuum. The law imposed in such circumstances should be simple and consistent. If it is not feasible to enforce the law of the land, martial law should be declared as a temporary measure, with military lawyers – especially if they come from different national contingents – agreeing upon a basic legal framework. Persons detained under such an ad hoc system should be transferred to civilian authorities as quickly as possible. Thirdly, once the security environment allows the process of civil reconstruction to begin, sustainability should generally take precedence over temporary standards in the administration of basic law and order. Whether internationalized processes are appropriate for the most serious crimes should be determined, where possible, through broad consultation with local actors.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, South Asia, Kosovo, and Southeast Asia

50. Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building

Author:
Simon Chesterman
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Afghanistan represents a radically different model in the panoply of UN peace operations. On paper it resembles earlier assistance missions that provided governance and development support to post-conflict societies. In practice, however, the UN mission remains intimately involved with the Afghan Transitional Administration and therefore with the peace process that put it in place. This disjunction between formal authority and practical influence poses a challenge not only for the specific operation in Afghanistan but also to accepted models of UN peace operations more generally. Most analyses of UN peace operations suggest that the more complex the political environment, the larger the amount of resources required to complete the mandate. On any such measure, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) faces an uphill battle. UNAMA is instead pursuing a high-risk strategy that requires two conceptual leaps from the normal mould of peace operations. The first is that it is possible to blur the normal distinction between negotiating a peace agreement and implementing it. The second is that the UN can make up for its small mandate and limited resources through exercising greater than normal political influence. There is widespread agreement among UNAMA and most of its Afghan partners that expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul would be an important stabilizing factor in this process. If it is to be done, it should be done urgently, while all parties are still buying into the Loya Jirga process. Given the reaction of the United States and potential troop-contributing nations, however, expansion now appears highly unlikely. Every UN mission and development programme now stresses the importance of local 'ownership'. This may be the first mission where some of the local population themselves are truly taking charge. Development, however, is notoriously supply- rather than demand-driven; donor countries are infamous for pledging one thing and delivering another. Agencies must therefore take this into account when constructing fictional budgetary targets that they know will not be met, making responsible financial planning still more difficult. Compounding these problems is confusion in Afghanistan as to what projects are actually going to be funded and when. This is partly caused by the refusal of some of the largest donors to have their money pooled into a trust fund for the whole of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga was intended to encourage Afghans from all parts of the country to 'buy into the peace process'. This phrase was used metaphorically, but should also be understood literally. Encouraging Afghans to see the solutions to their problems as lying in the embryonic institutions of the state is good politics internationally. It is also Afghanistan's best chance for stability and relative prosperity.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Peace Studies, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia