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51. Côte d'Ivoire : faire baisser la pression

Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
En Côte d'Ivoire, la sortie de crise est menacée par une situation sécuritaire volatile et des blocages politiques. Le dernier trimestre a été marqué par une série d'attaques meurtrières qui ont visé un commissariat de police, l'un des principaux camps militaires du pays, plusieurs posi- tions de l'armée et une centrale électrique. Ces incidents ont été précédés par d'autres violences à l'Ouest. Même si ces évènements ne constituent pas une menace immé- diate pour la stabilité, ils indiquent que, pour certains, la guerre n'est pas terminée. Lenteur de la réforme du sec- teur de la sécurité, gel du dialogue politique, fragilité de la coalition au pouvoir, ret our de la violence verbale, révélation de projets de coup d'Etat, doutes sur la réalité d'une volonté de réconciliation nationale, sont autant de signes préoccupants. Le présid ent Alassane Ouattara et son nouveau gouvernement formé le 22 novembre ne doivent pas compter exclusivement sur la relance économique et le verrouillage sécuritaire pour consolider la paix. La com- munauté internationale ne do it pas détourner son regard d'un pays dont la stabilisation est d'autant plus cruciale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest que le Mali voisin a basculé dans une crise profonde et durable.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Poverty, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa

52. Sudan: Major Reform or More War

Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The “Sudan Problem” has not gone away with the South's secession. Chronic conflict, driven by concentration of power and resources in the centre, continues to plague the country. The solution is a more inclusive government that addresses at least some of the peripheries' grievances, but pledges to transform governance remain unfulfilled. A key hurdle – though not the only one – is President Bashir, who has further concentrated authority in a small circle of trusted officials and is unwilling to step aside. Many hope for regime change via coup but have not considered the dangers. The goal should be managed transition to a government that includes, but is not dominated by his National Congress Party (NCP). He might be willing to go along if he concludes greater disorder or even a coup is growing more likely, but only if the right incentives are in place. The international community should contribute to these provided a credible and inclusive transitional government, a meaningful national dialogue on a new constitution and a roadmap for permanent change in how Sudan is governed are first put firmly in train.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Regime Change, Insurgency, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

53. Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis

Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Since 2001, violence has erupted in Jos city, capital of Plateau state, in Nigeria's Middle Belt region. The ostensible dispute is over the “rights” of the indigene Berom/ Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers to land, power and resources. Indigene- settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing widespread intercommunal strife, which particularly affects the Middle Belt. The Jos crisis is the result of failure to amend the constitution to privilege broad-based citizenship over exclusive indigene status and ensure that residency rather than indigeneity determines citizens' rights. Constitutional change is an important step to defuse indigene-settler rivalries that continue to undermine security. It must be accompanied by immediate steps to identify and prosecute perpetrators of violence, in Jos and other parts of the country. Elites at local, state and federal level must also consistently implement policies aimed at reducing the dangerous link between ethnic belonging and access to resources, power and security if intercommunal violence is to end.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Democratization, Ethnic Conflict, Natural Resources, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

54. Le golfe de Guinée : la nouvelle zone à haut risque

Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
En l'espace d'une décennie, le golfe de Guinée est devenu l'une des zones mar itimes les plus dangereuses du monde. L'insécurité maritime est un véritable problème régional qui menace, à court terme, le commerce et, à long terme, la stabilité des pays riverains en compromettant le déve- loppement de cette zone éc onomique stratégique. Initia- lement pris au dépourvu, les Etats de la région ont pris conscience du problème et un sommet international sur ce sujet doit être prochainement organisé. Afin d'éviter que, comme sur les côtes est-africaines, cette criminalité trans- nationale ne prenne une ampleur déstabilisatrice, les gou- vernements concernés doivent mettre fin au vide sécuritaire et apporter une réponse collective à ce danger. Grâce à une coopération dynamique en tre la Communauté écono- mique des Etats d'Afrique centrale (CEEAC) et la Commu- nauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Ce- deao), les pays du golfe de Guinée doivent devenir les premiers acteurs de leur sécurité et mettre en œuvre une nouvelle approche fondée sur l'amélioration de leur sécuri- té maritime mais aussi de leur gouvernance économique.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Crime, Development, International Trade and Finance, Maritime Commerce, Fragile/Failed State, and Piracy
Political Geography:
Africa

55. L'Est du Congo : la rébellion perdue des ADF-Nalu

Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Les Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l'Ouganda (ADF-N alu) sont un des groupes armés les plus anciens et les moins connus de l'Est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) et le seul de cette région à être considér é comme une organisation terroriste appartenant à la nébuleuse islamiste d'Afrique de l'Est. S'ils ne constituent pas une menace déstabilisatrice comme le Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), ils tiennent cependant tête à l'armée congolaise depuis 2010. Créé en RDC en 1995 et situé aux confins montagneux de la RDC et de l'Ouganda, ce groupe armé congolo-ougandais fait preuve d'une extraordinaire résilience qui tient à sa position géostratégique, son inse rtion dans l'économie transfrontalière et la corruption de s forces de sécurité. Par con- séquent, avant d'envisager toute nouvelle intervention militaire contre les ADF-Nalu, il convient de faire la part du mythe et de la réalité et de réduire sa base socioéconomique tout en proposant une offre de démobilisation et de réinsertion à ses combattants.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Ethnic Conflict, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Africa

56. Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation

Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Somalia's growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya. The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalise and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalising on long-standing grievances against the central state. This problem could grow more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia. Radicalisation is a grave threat to Kenya's security and stability. Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies before it is too late must be a priority. It would be a profound mistake, however, to view the challenge solely through a counter-terrorism lens.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Islam, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

57. Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings

Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Although the mayhem following the disputed December 2007 elections seemed an exception, violence has been a com­mon feature of Kenya's politics since the introduction of a multiparty system in 1991. Yet, the number of people killed and displaced following that disputed vote was unprecedented. To provide justice to the victims, combat pervasive political impunity and deter future violence, the International Criminal Court (ICC) brought two cases against six suspects who allegedly bore the greatest responsibility for the post-election violence. These cases have enormous political consequences for both the 2012 elections and the country's stability. During the course of the year, rulings and procedures will inevitably either lower or increase com­munal tensions. If the ICC process is to contribute to the deterrence of future political violence in Kenya, the court and its friends must explain its work and limitations better to the public. Furthermore, Kenya's government must complement that ICC process with a national process aimed at countering impunity and punishing ethnic hate speech and violence.
Topic:
Political Violence, Democratization, Government, and International Law
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

58. The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia

Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The decision in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia's Juba Valley to wage war on Al-Shabaab is the biggest security gamble Kenya has taken since independence, a radical departure for a country that has never sent its soldiers abroad to fight. Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was given the go-ahead with what has shown itself to be inadequate political, diplomatic and military preparation; the potential for getting bogged down is high; the risks of an Al-Shabaab retaliatory terror campaign are real; and the prospects for a viable, extremist- free and stable polity emerging in the Juba Valley are slim. The government is unlikely to heed any calls for a troop pullout: it has invested too much, and pride is at stake. Financial and logistical pressures will ease once its force becomes part of the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM). But it should avoid prolonged “occupation” of southern Somalia, lest it turn local Somali opinion against the intervention and galvanise an armed resistance that could be co-opted by Al-Shabaab, much as happened to Ethiopia during its 2006-2009 intervention.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, and Somalia

59. Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed

Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The next six months will be crucial for Somalia. The international community is taking a renewed interest in the country; the mandate of the feeble and dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expires in a half-year; and emboldened troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to deal the weakened (though still potent) extremist Islamist movement Al-Shabaab further defeats. This confluence of factors presents the best chance in years for peace and stability in the south and centre of the country. To achieve that, however, requires regional and wider international unity of purpose and an agreement on basic principles; otherwise spoilers could undermine all peacebuilding efforts.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

60. Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis

Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Despite the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, Burundi is facing a deepening corruption crisis that threatens to jeopardise a peace that is based on development and economic growth bolstered by the state and driven by foreign investment. The “neopatrimonialist” practices of the party in office since 2005 has relegated Burundi to the lowest governance rankings, reduced its appeal to foreign investors, damaged relations with donors; and contributed to social discontent. More worrying still, neopatrimonialism is undermining the credibility of post-conflict institutions, relations between former Tutsi and new Hutu elites and cohesion within the ruling party, whose leaders are regularly involved in corruption scandals. In order to improve public governance, the Burundian authorities should “walk the talk” and take bold steps to curtail corruption. Civil society should actively pursue its watchdog role and organise mass mobilisation against corruption and donors should prioritise good governance.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Foreign Aid, Foreign Direct Investment, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa