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  • Author: Maria-Louise Clausen
  • Publication Date: 04-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: Denmark assumed leadership of NATO Mission Iraq in late 2020. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of their personal security and of those who provide it can impact the success of this mission. A recent survey provides new insights. At a time of political turmoil and insecurity in Iraq, NATO has vowed to step up its commitment in the region. This happens at a time of increased resistance to the US presence in Iraq, and a deteriorating security situation due to the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran taking place on Iraqi soil, as well as signs of an Islamic State resurgence. Security is a major concern in Iraq. When respondents were asked to select their most important concern for the Iraqi government to address, the most common choice was ‘maintaining security and stability’ (30.5%), closely followed by the job situation (27.5%), and corruption (26.2%). This should be read in conjunction with the fact that 71.7% of respondents stated that they experience their personal security as currently either only partially or not at all ensured. This was most pronounced among the surveyed Shias, with only 18.8% indicating that they feel fully or partly secure in contrast to 46.7% of Sunni respondents.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, Justice
  • Political Geography: Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Denmark
  • Author: Asbjørn Thranov, Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
  • Publication Date: 05-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: Russia has proposed an international regime governing the use of cyber and information operations. However, ‘digital sovereignty’ means something very different in Moscow than it does in Washington. In September 2020, the Russian authorities launched a new initiative to regulate the use of cyber and information operations by states. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, introduced the debate by suggesting that Russia and the USA lead the way by signing a bilateral agreement restricting their activities in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The two states, so Putin suggested, should establish regular dialogue and set up a ‘hot line’. Putin also proposed a new agreement on cyber and information operations that should ‘exchange guarantees against interference in the internal affairs of the other side, including into electoral processes, inter alia, by means of the ICTs and high-tech methods’. Shortly afterwards, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, added more details. In a statement, he drew a dark picture of the world ‘facing a real cyber pandemic’, pointing to the risk of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the interference by some states in the internal affairs of other states. ‘It is high time’, so he claimed, that the international community agreed on a regime to regulate the use of ICTs. Russia has proceeded to promote the new initiative at the current 75th session of the UN General Assembly, which has responded with a decision to renew the mandate of the open-ended working group on the security and use of ICTs in 2021-2025.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Cyberspace
  • Political Geography: Russia, Eurasia, North America, United States of America
  • Author: Trine Villumsen Berling
  • Publication Date: 05-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: Denmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ended up standing exposed and alone. A better politics of energy alliances and better strategic preparation are key lessons for small states like Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy. RECOMMENDATIONS: Small states should include energy in strategic documents pertaining to foreign and security policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox of the great powers. Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Small states should strive to build enduring political alliances focused on energy. Small states should prioritise sending experts to the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in order to stay on top of the international security situation concerning energy.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, Minerals
  • Political Geography: Europe, Denmark, Baltic States
  • Author: Maria-Louise Clausen, Ekatherina Zhukova
  • Publication Date: 05-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: A priority for NATO Mission Iraq is to further the Women, Peace and Security agenda as one of the mission’s activities. This effort should focus on raising awareness of the operational benefits of equal opportunities and diversity and not just counting the number of women involved. RECOMMENDATIONS: Formulate a clear mandate for WPS functions in the mission that positions the WPS agenda as an integral element of NMI’s other activities. Support awareness-raising programmes and initiatives to transform social norms, including patriarchal gender norms and institutional socio-political constraints on female participation. Support the transparent qualifications-based recruitment and employment of women and prioritize the focus on inclusive work environments, both mentally and physically. Incorporate intersectional and masculinity perspectives in the work on WPS to avoid creating an image of WPS as a foreign-backed agenda that is only of, by and for elite women.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Women, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, Justice
  • Political Geography: Iraq, Middle East
  • Author: Mikkel Runge Olesen
  • Publication Date: 01-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The Biden administration is likely to adopt a less chaotic US approach to the NATO alliance concerning China. European members should utilize this calmer time to develop viable strategies on how to tackle non-conventional threats from China within the Alliance in concert with the US. RECOMMENDATIONS: NATO members should: Continue to develop their own strategies and procedures against non-conventional Chinese threats in the domains of cyber, influence activities, and trade and investments. Resist the temptation to fall into inertia in determining how NATO should deal with China after the fear of a US withdrawal from NATO has subsided. Work with the Biden administration to develop NATO’s role in relation to China further on grounds that are acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Organization
  • Political Geography: China, Asia, Denmark, United States of America
  • Author: Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
  • Publication Date: 02-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: A survey of current Russian strategies and military thinking about the Arctic points to clear separate military and development goals. Leading Russian military commentators usually include both in their analyses, often highlighting the softer development aspect of security. Moreover, much of the military writing identifies broad possibilities for international co-operation in the Arctic. Key findings Russian military commentators usually insist that all relevant actors need to act with care to avoid a deterioration of the situation in the Arctic. Russian military writing contains a strong focus on the development of the Russian Arctic. Russian military writing identifies broad possibilities for co-operation in both the military and civilian fields.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, International Organization, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, Minerals
  • Political Geography: Russia, Arctic
  • Author: Christine Nissen, Jessica Larsen
  • Publication Date: 02-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The concept of ‘European strategic autonomy’ is girdled by myths and resistance. These common misconceptions can be overcome by member states to strengthen the EU in the face of today’s challenging security environment. RECOMMENDATIONS: Ways forward for the concept of strategic autonomy: Level of ambition: strategic autonomy should not be seen as an end in itself but as a means to protect and promote common values and interests across strategically important EU policy areas. Geography: strategic autonomy should enable the EU to undertake activities, in particular in the immediate European neighbourhood. Policy scope: strategic autonomy should encompass the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy, and not just defence.
  • Topic: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, European Union, Strategic Autonomy
  • Political Geography: Europe, Denmark
  • Author: Per Kalvig, Hans Lucht
  • Publication Date: 02-2021
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: Rare earth elements (REEs) are vital for communications, the green energy transition and defense, but are produced almost exclusively in China. As the projected REE mines in southern Greenland inch closer to realization, Denmark and its EU partners remain sidelined from future supply chains for raw materials. Key findings: Rare earth elements (REEs) are vital to daily life, communications, green energy and defense. Yet, REEs and products containing REEs are almost exclusively controlled and produced by China. Significant long-term strategic state or supra-state support is required to challenge Chinese dominance of the REE sector and reduce the vulnerability of European and American energy supplies. In the absence of REE industries in Europe or America, the two REE projects in South Greenland, with their potential to become significant suppliers of REE, will most likely supply Chinese-controlled raw materials industries.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Environment, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, Minerals, Rare earth elements (REEs)
  • Political Geography: China, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, United States of America
  • Author: Peer Schouten
  • Publication Date: 03-2021
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The Horn of Africa and the Sahel are among the most fragile regions in the world: poor, lacking basic infrastructure and state presence across much of their respective territories, and both form hotbeds of conflict and political instability compounded by climate change. This DIIS Working Paper focuses on identifying evolving notions of fragility that could strengthen Danish stabilisation efforts in the Horn and Sahel. It foregrounds notions of fragility that move away from a focus on strong state institutions towards the adaptive capacities of populations in the hinterlands of the Horn and the Sahel to deal with conflict and climate variability. The paper gives an overview of this rapidly evolving field and distils key insights, challenges and future options by exploring the question, how can we support people in the Sahel and Horn to re-establish their responsibility for their respective territories and the management of their natural resources? The paper addresses this question by exploring the implications of recent climate change and livelihoods research on how we approach fragility and, by extension, stabilisation. On the basis of such research, the Working Paper advocates a move away from a sector-based understanding of fragility towards a way of working that is more in line with contextual realities, alongside the ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilisation that Denmark promotes. The key message is that, programmatically, Danish stabilisation efforts across both regions could benefit from a more explicit focus on supporting the variability that dominant livelihood strategies require and that need to be considered if sustainable security and development outcomes are to be achieved. Failing to do this will only serve to marginalise key communities and may drive them further into the arms of radical groups.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Democratization, Development, Environment, Radicalization, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Justice
  • Political Geography: Africa, Europe, Denmark, Horn of Africa
  • Author: Christine Nissen, Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, Jakob Linnet Schmidt, Mikkel Runge Olesen, Hans Mouritzen, Jon Rahbek-Cemmensen, Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Graham Butler, Louise Riis Andersen
  • Publication Date: 04-2020
  • Content Type: Special Report
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: The Danish defence opt-out will hamper the protection of Danish interests if, in the future, there is dynamic integration, working towards increased European strategic autonomy. Conversely, the defence opt-out will be less important if the EU’s defence cooperation stagnates or is rolled back, for example due to internal disagreement among the member states. These were the main findings in the external DIIS report from 2019 that has now been translated to English. The report was commissioned by the Danish government in November 2018 and focuses on the development in the EU in the field of security and defence policy cooperation and its significance for Denmark. Picking up from the last DIIS report (2008), the new report focuses in particular on the period following the launch of the EU’s global strategy in the summer of2016. The analysis is based on interviews with experts, officials and representatives from the EU, NATO, Denmark and other Member States, as well as case files in the archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official documents, and existing research.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union
  • Political Geography: Europe, Denmark